Colonel John Graham of Fintryand the Fourth Cape Eastern Frontier War, 1811-1812

Johan de Villiers •

Not much is nowadays remembered of Colonel John Graham in South Africa. His nameis perpetuated in the city of Grahamstown, Eastern Cape, and the name of a primary school atPlumstead, Cape Peninsula. Buried in the old Wynberg cemetery, Somerset Road, his grave istoday unidentified and lost forever.

Johan Graham was the second son of Robert Graham of the Fintry Estate in Forfarshire,Scotland. He was born at Dundee on 24 April 1778 and inter alia taught by the learned ProfessorJohn Playfair and Josiah Walker, tutor at Athol House. At the age of 16 years Graham wasgazetted Ensign in the 85th Regiment of Foot, but he never joined this regiment, because in thesame year (1794), having assisted his cousin, Thomas Graham of Balgowan (afterwards LordLynedoch), to recruit candidates for the 90th Regiment of Foot (Perthshire Volunteers), he waspromoted to a Lieutenancy in that regiment. I

In July 1795, commanding a company of this regiment, he served on the Isle de Dun, offthe coast of France. III health compelled him in December that year to return to England. Afterrecovering, in March 1797, the Duke of York, Commander-in-Chief, granted him permission tojoin the Austrian Army temporarily. His cousin, by that time Colonel Thomas Graham, alsoserved in the Austrian Army. In 1799 John Graham took part in military actions against theFrench republican forces in Northern Italy, viz. at Adiye (26 March),Verona (30 March) andVilla Franca (5 April).2

In June 1799 he presumably returned to England on board a vessel under command ofAdmiral Samuel Hood, whose fleet occupied the French harbour of Toulon and also capturedmany French ships in the Mediterranean.3 Back in England, Graham became aide de camp toLord Chatham whom he accompanied to Holland in September. He served in that country untilthe withdrawal of all British forces in February 1800. Subsequently he recruited volunteers forthe 93'd Regiment of Foot in Scotland. He was appointed Major of this regiment and fromOctober 1800 served with his troops on the Channel Island of Guernsey. In October 1802 hereturned with his regiment to Scotland. After receiving the Reserve in Ireland, he took commandof a battalion of Light Infantry Militia until being appointed Assistant Quartermaster General forthe period February 1804 to July 1805.4

Professor of HislOry, University of Zululand.

Scottish Record Office (hereafter S.R.O.), G.D. 151/3/1 Graham of Fintry Letters, Undated notes, pp. 4-5.

Ibid.

South African Biographical Dictionary, I, p. 329; D.M.G. Sutherland, France 1789-1815, (London, 1985),p.189.

S.R.O., G.D. 151/3/1 Graham of Fintry Letters, Undated notes, pp.5-6.

At the resumption of the Napoleonic wars in Europe, the strategic importance of theBatavian colony at the Cape of Good Hope was apparent to the British Government.s In July1805 Graham embarked with his regiment on "secret foreign service" under supreme commandof Major-General Sir David Baird. It was only after leaving the Brazilian harbour of SaintSalvador that sealed Instructions were opened, indicating the British Government's immediateobjective to take over the hostile Batavian Government of the Cape Colony.6

During the landing of British troops at Losperd's Bay on 6 January and the subsequentbattle on the Blaauwberg flats on 8 January 1806, Major John Graham commanded the combinedBritish Light Infantry with distinction. The loose sand and heat hampered their progress, butCape Town and its fortifications were occupied without any further resistance of the localcitizens. After the final capitulation of the Colony by General Jan Willem Janssens, Bairdordered Graham to immediately "raise and discipline" a regiment of native Khoi and Colouredpeople, which soon became known as the Cape Regiment. Graham officially becameLieutenant-Colonel and local commanding officer of this regiment on 26 January 1806.7

Graham's regiment fulfilled a key role in the defence of the Cape Colony, especially due to theurgent withdrawal of several other British regiments from the Colony and the specialcharacteristics of the indigenous soldiers who were enlisted and trained by mainly Britishofficers at the regimental headquarters in Wynberg, Cape Peninsula.8

Graham soon proved to be an energetic and versatile regimental commander. Accordingto his own testimony, in addition to his mother tongue English-Gaelic, he was "tolerableproficient" in Dutch, Italian, German and French. He communicated well with the soldiers andlocal citizens at the Cape, being a practical organiser and inspiring leader.9 It seems thatGraham's main challenge was twofold, viz.

• to recruit and enlarge the Cape Regiment with the best available local Khoi andColoured talent, and

• to overcome any assumed prejudices of local citizens against this new regiment, bymaintaining a clear and pro-active conciliatory approach.

By 1911 serious problems in the eastern frontier districts of the Colony required the completeinvolvement of John Graham and his regiment.

On both sides of the official Fish River boundary of the Colony successive phases ofconflict erupted between the different cattle herding communities, ignoring the frontierarrangements of Governor Joachim van Plettenberg in 1778. Nine eastern frontier wars followedwhich only terminated a century later and which may be holistically interpreted as one longperiod of conflict of fluctuating intensity.1O

10

Cape Archives (hereafter C.A.), B.R. 73 Bijlagen: Extract Secreete Notulen, II June 1805,547-551.

S.R.O., G.D. 151/5 Graham of Fintry Letters: John Graham to "a particular friend in Dublin", 16 March1806, no. 34.

S.R.O., G.D. 151/3/2 Graham of Fintry Letters: Statement of Service of Lieutenant-Colonal John Graham,29 Dec. 1809, p. 556.

The African Court Calendar: List of the Army at the Cape of Good Hope, 1806-1810, no pages.

S.R.O., G.D. 151/3/2 Graham of Fintry Letters: Statement of service of John Graham, 29 December1809, p. 556.

Vide e.g. AJ. Smithers, The Kajjir Wars (London, 1973).

2

The eastern frontier zone of the Cape Colony may be defined as a region or territory ofinter-penetration between various distinct societies. During most of the nineteenth centurydifferent societies competed and interacted on the gradually closing frontier, each attempting toachieve hegemony. 11

In cases of large scale cross-border raids and thefts, isolated white and Khoi farmersclaimed protection from the distant Colonial authorities, whose main concern seemed to cut backfinancial expenses. The Colonial farmers were favoured by their mobility (horses) and fire-arms,but lacked cohesion and numerical strength. By 18 I I the estimated official population figures ofthe two eastern frontier districts were as follows:12

POPULATION WHITE MEN & KHOIMEN & SLAVE MEN &WOMEN WOMEN WOMEN

Uitenhage 1III 1224 580Graaff-Reinet 2619 3544 1499Total 3730 4768 2079

By 1811 at least 20 000 Xhosa intruders had already crossed the Fish River boundary intothe grassy Zuurveld and beyond. Their numerical strength must be added to their intimateknowledge of and adaptability to the physical environment of indigenous vegetation, steepravines and treacherous river crossings. Xhosa fighters used to conceal themselves in densethickets by wrapping their skin cloaks around their bodies to protect themselves against thorns.13

The vanguard of white stock-farmers moving eastwards, and Xhosa cattle-herdersmigrating westwards, caused rivalry on the eastern frontier, especially in the contested Zuurveld,between the Sundays and Fish Rivers. Each group resisted the advance of the other, particularlywhen population increased in a limited area. Within Xhosa ranks further stress was generated bya dynastic feud between Ngqika, paramount Chief of the western Xhosa, and Ndlambe, his uncleand former regent.

While John Graham accumulated and trained an efficient Cape Regiment at itsheadquarters in Wynberg, Major Jacob Glen Cuyler, his immediate deputy officer stationed atFort Frederick, Algoa Bay, recommended in 1808 that the Colonial authorities set an ultimatumto all Xhosa intruders west of the Fish River to withdraw from their abodes before a given date.Graham supported this suggestion, but the Cape Governor, the Earl of Caledon, maintained thatonly the official policy of "preserving what we possess" should be applied on the easternfrontier, avoiding any form of offensive action.14

Serious concerns arose when Chief Ndlambe's followers settled close to the SundaysRiver. By the end of 1809 it seemed that a combined Xhosa invasion of the Zuurveld wasimmanent. Echoing official policy, Graham warned Cuyler to refrain from any aggressive

11

"13

"

H.Lamar and L.Thompson (eds), The Frontier in History, (New Haven, 1981). pp. 7-9.

Public Record Office (hereafter P.R.O.), W.O. 1/635 Commander-In-Chief: Graham - Hope, 18 Nov. 1806.pp.51-58.

J. Campbell, Travels in South Africa (London, 1822), pp. 118-119,374.

C.A., G.H. 34/4 Letter Book: Caledon - Collins, 14 Nov. 1808, p. 80.

3

From the above statistics it is clear that Graham could only rely on the Light Dragoonsfor swift operational tasks; the last three regiments being infantry that could merely be used todefend strategic posts. Numerically Graham's Cape Regiment was by far the biggest in number(30 officers and 522 men) and also best adapted to perform fatigue duties in the unique frontierenvironment.

Graham personally attended to the transportation of the military reinforcements,equipment and ammunition on board the UPTON CASTLE to Algoa Bay. On arriving at theDrostdy of Uitenhage, 27 October 1811, he spent some weeks personally observing the extent ofXhosa occupation of the frontier districts.27

On 21 November he ordered the troops to move their military posts in an eastwarddirection, closer to the Fish River boundary. This would enhance the protection of more farms,extend the military communication lines and provide strategic support to any contemplatedCommando operation.28 In the district of Graaff-Reinet, Graham concentrated the bulk ofLyster's troops at Bruintjes Hoogte. The left flank of Lyster's posts stretched from BruintjesHoogte to the Baviaans River, a northern tributary of the Great Fish River. The right flank ofLyster's posts stretched from Bruintjes Hoogte to the Riet (or Vogel) River, where the cavalry(21" Light Dragoons) were stationed.29

Graham's grand strategy to clear the eastern frontier of Xhosa invaders was carefullyplanned. He warned Major Lyster that in case of forceful operations against the Xhosa, somemay succeed to move unobserved in a westward direction, rather than crossing the Fish River.The reserve troops at the various outstretched posts must be on the qui vive for such Xhosa thatmay attack them from the back, especially during the night. An~ roaming Xhosa found duringday time, must be disarmed and forced over the eastern boundary. 0 Graham instructed Lyster to:

• keep the exact number of reserve troops at the various posts secret,

• use only a part of the reserve troops at a post for patrol work,

• avoid entering dense forests where the enemy could wait in ambush,

• notify Graham immediately when any Xhosa chief is found and held at a post,

• strategically withdraw the reserve troops from the posts in case of being completelyoutnumbered and over-powered by a major enemy onslaught, and

• defend at all costs the drostdy and administrative centre of Graaff-Reinet.

Graham evidently took into account the particular needs and circumstances at the different posts,by allowing discretionary powers to commanding officers of the reserve troops31

27

"29

30

31

C.A., G.H. 23/4 Despatch Book: Cradock - Liverpool, 18 October \811, nO.3; S.R.O., Ex G.D. 151/2/1Graham of Fintry Muniments : Graham - Reynell, 29 October \8\\, pp. \-2.

C.A., C.O. 33 Leners Received: Graham - Reynell, 2\ November \8\ \, nO.29.

S.R.O., Ex G.D. 151/2/2 Graham of Fintry Muniments : Graham. Reynell, 2\ November 181 \, pp. 13.15.

S.R.O. Ex G.D. 151/2/1 Graham of Fintry Muniments: Graham - Lyster, \5 November 181 I, pp. 6-8.

Ibid.

6

In addition to the defensive function of the advanced frontier posts, Graham's strategywas meticulously presented in his General Instructions of November 1811, whereby a well-planned and bold trifid offensive had to be launched against the Xhosa intruders of the frontierdistricts. For this purpose he called upon all available armed citizens of Graaff-Reinet andUitenhage, under their respective Landdrosts, as well as a proportion of regular troops, includingthe Cape Regiment. The three divisions of the contemplated force comprised of

• a right division, close to the coast, commanded by Cuyler, Landdrost ofUitenhage,

• a central division, commanded by Captain George Sackville Fraser of the CapeRegiment, and

• a left division, from the district of Graaff-Reinet, commanded by Landdrost AndersStockenstrom.32

Graham allowed ample time for the farmers to finish the wheat harvest, before they were to jointhe Commando under their civil leaders, e.g. Field-Commandant Gabriel Stoltz, and FieldcometsWillem Grobler and Willem Nel.33

In the mean time Graham had to resolve a storm in a teacup, when LanddrostStockenstrom complained to him that Lyster had ignored the civil authority by instructing armedcivilians of the reserve force to serve under officers of the Army. Graham responded that Lysterwas a most experienced officer and appointed in command of all the reserve forces. It wasimpossible for Stockenstrom simultaneously to command the left wing of the Colonial task force,as well as the reserve forces in the district. 34

At the Drostdy of Uitenhage some Khoi scouts reported to Graham on 22 November thatthey had visited the main settlement ("kraal") of Habana in the Rietberg. They found this pettyChief, a cousin of Ndlambe, in a desperate condition. He was old and sickly. He seemedunprepared for war and afraid of the British. Graham expected that Habana would remove hisfollowers and cattle peacefully over the eastern boundaries.35 At the beginning of December1811 he sent Landdrost Stockenstrom as emissary to the headquarters of Chief Ngqika outsidethe Colony, in the Tyumie Valley, east of Kat River. This paramount Chief agreed toStockenstrom that he would allow his traditional rival Ndlambe and followers to cross and settleeast of the Fish River. Graham welcomed the status quo with Ngqika, but did not trust him.36

An incident took place near the town of Uitenhage, on 2 December 1811, which triggeredthe outbreak of the Fourth Frontier War. Graham was informed that the Xhosa fighters attackeda small mounted military patrol, killing one member (Swartz) and taking eight horses. Animmediate follow-up operation proved fruitless and Graham concluded:

32

33

34

35

36

C.T. Atkinson (ed.), Supplementary Report on the Manuscripts of Robert Graham ofFintry (HistoricalManuscripts Commission publication no. 81, London, 1942), p.88

P.L. Zietman, Die Verdediging van en Verdedigingsbeleid op die Oosgrens (M.A. dissertation, UNISA,1941), p. 69.

S.R.O., Ex G.D. 151/2/1 Graham of Fintry Muniments: Graham - Stockenstrom, 7 December 1811, pp. 28-30.

CA., CO. 33 Letters Received: Particulars of a conversation between Habana and three Hottentots,undated, enclosure in no. 29.

Ibid., Graham - Reynell, 12 December 1811, nO.32 ..

7

'I gave them orders, if they could get the murderers, to shoot them immediately, for sorryI am to say, that reasoning with these savages is of no avail. .. ,)7

The three organised military divisions to clear the frontier districts of Xhosa intruders,commenced with their task on 20 December, utilising the visibility of full moon in nighttime.On 26 December the right wing of Ndlambe's forces that were well hidden in the bush,confronted the division of Cuyler. The Chief stepped forward and loudly challenged Cuyler,stating that he had conquered the Zuurveld in a previous war and that he would not voluntarilyyield it. He then raised his assegai as a signal to his followers to attack. The warriors, however,did not approach the troops close enough to experience the effectiveness of the Colonialfirearms.3 It was evident that Ndlambe had rallied all the Zuurveld Xhosa in a war of resistanceagainst Graham's clearing up operation. Graham decided to concentrate all his available forces(three divisions) at Zokamma (also known a Coerney), about 16 kilometres northeast of themouth of the Sundays River, in order to prepare for a combined military attack on Ndlambe'sstronghold in the Addo Bush.

Graham instructed Landdrost Stockenstrom to move the left division over the passes ofthe Zuurberg and Rietberg to join Fraser's central division in the vicinity of Korhaan Drift on theSundays River.39 On the evening of 29 December Graham received the alarming news thatStockenstrom, who first wished to consult him personally, had fallen with eight of his mountedparty, including the Fieldcornets Potgieter and Greyling, and a Coloured interpreter, in a surpriseattack that morning at Doorn Nek in the Zuurberg. This tragic incident was executed by theimiDange warriors of petty Chief Xasa, who refused to negotiate the removal of his peopleacross the Fish River boundary .40

Graham insisted that the left division must link up with Fraser's central column for thecontemplated combined operations. This took place at Zokamma on New Year's day 1812,4\where Graham assembled a combined force of about

Royal Artillery

2 I 51 Light Dragoons

Cape Regiment

Armed citizens

Total

30 men

20 men

400 men

350 men

800 men

.17

.18

.19

'"41

Ibid.

S.R.O., Ex G.D. 15112/1 Graham of Fintry Muniments: Cuyler-Graham, 26 December 1811, pp. 38-39 .

e.A., e.O. 2582 Letters Received: Extract of a private communication of Lieutenant-Colonel Graham, 2January 1812, enclosure in no. 50.

Sir Andries Stockenstrom: The Autobiography of .. (Edited by e.W.Hultol1, Struik, Cape Town, 1964),pp.57-61

e.A., e.O. 2582 Letters Received: Extract of a private communication of Lieutenant-Colonel Graham, 2January 1812, enclosure in 110.50.

8

On 2 January he organised them in six companies, each comprising of 60 armed citizensand 20 Cape Regiment soldiers, to sweep the Addo forest on foot from the north, shooting allmale Xhosa and seizing all cattle. This was the first time that Colonial troops were used tosystematically scour thickets on foot in this frontier war. It proved to be less successful, becauseagile Xhosa warriors could easily evade the heavily armed soldiers under cover of the naturalvegetation and physical terrain. After five days of fatiguing service, the parties returnedreporting that they could only eliminate 12 or 14 Xhosa, including the old Chief Chungwa, whowas hiding in the bush, but that Field comet Nortje was also killed by an assegai of the enemy.The various Colonial companies confiscated 2 500 cattle during the operation.42

To expedite the expulsion of all intruding Xhosa from the frontier districts, Grahamrequested Governor Cradock on 8 January to transfer at least 200 additional regular soldiers ofthe Cape Garrison to reinforce the frontier troops and to enable him to fully deploy the CapeRegiment for operational duties in the guerrilla warfare against the Xhosa.43 To this request theGovernor responded swiftly by ordering the embarkation of200 rank and file and officers of the60th Regiment of Foot to Algoa Bay.44

By the end of January Graham ascertained that Ndlambe and his immediate subjects, withall their cattle, had evacuated the coastal war zone between the Sundays and Fish Rivers. Theyretreated eastwards across the Colonial boundary on 14 or 15 January, followed also by remnantsof the community of the fallen Chungwa.45

This enabled Graham to attend to deteriorating conditions in the Bamboesberg, where thewife of a farmer (van der Merwe) and several Khoi cattle herders had been killed by Xhosamarauders, seizing several droves of cattle. Graham ordered that armed citizens and soldiers ofthe Cape Regiment be henceforth mounted for quick retaliatory expeditions. They were to trackstolen cattle to the hiding places of the Xhosa and to kill male inhabitants indiscriminately.46

The Xhosa Chief Habana, who seemed unprepared for war in November 1811,subsequently provided sanctuary to numerous hostile Xhosa leaders and fugitives at hisstronghold in the Rietberg. Graham decided to launch a simultaneous twofold attack onHabana's sanctuary. On 24 January 1812 some 150 men from Graaff-Reinet were to attackHabana's place from the north, while Fraser with an equal number of soldiers had to assail itfrom the south. Habana's warriors skillfully avoided any direct confrontation with the troops,withdrawing time and again into the vast overgrown ravines of the Rietberg. Graham, however,responded by sending an additional 200 fresh soldiers of the Cape Regiment to continue theoffensive with orders to kill or drive all Xhosa invaders over the eastern boundary.47 Atdaybreak, on 13 February, a twelve day sweeping operation of the northern and southern slopesof the Rietberg started. The troops covered a distance of about 65 kilometres of deep valleys andnearly inaccessible ravines. They applied a scorched earth policy by destroying all Xhosagardens and crops and seizing some 600 cattle. About 30 male Xhosa were killed in action, but

42

43

44

45

46

47

C.A .• G.H. 28/4 Enclosures to Despatches: Graham - Reynell, 8 January 1812, no. 12.

C.A., C.O. 2582 Letters Received, Graham - Reynell, 8 January 1812, nO.50.

C.A., G.H. 23/4 Despatch Book: Cradock - Liverpool, 23 January 1812, p.28.

C.A., C.O. 2582 Letters Received: Graham -Alexander, 30 January 1812, nO.5.

Ibid.

C.A., C.O. 2582 Letters Received: Graham - Reynell, 31 January 1812, enclosure 4 in no. 50.

9

more than 100 Xhosa women and children were also taken captive by the troops and sent overthe Colonial boundary via Bruintjes Hoogte. Graham was convinced that this military operationhad unequivocally demonstrated to the Xhosa intruders that no hiding place in the frontierdistricts was inaccessible to the Colonial forces.48

By the end of February Graham reported to Governor Cradock that all resistance ofXhosa intruders in the frontier districts had been broken and that "hardly a trace" of them hadremained.49 For all practical purposes the Fourth Frontier War had ended. On 7 March theGovernor announced in a general Communique that Graham's troops had successfully sweptsome 20 000 Xhosa intruders out of the Zuurveld in just two short months. A minimum of bloodhad been shed, but the Xhosa leaders practically experienced the effectiveness, extent andhegemony of Colonial military power.50 The Governor reported to the Commander-in-Chief atthe Horse Guards that

'Lieutenant-Colonel Graham of the Cape Regiment, in whose hands all the civil andmilitary power was lodged, has conducted the whole course of the proceedings with thegreatest ability and good management, and has expressed himself in the most favourableterms of every part of the military force under his command. The success that hasattended the measures pursued, has gone beyond expectation and the expulsion of the(Xhosa intruders) from His Majesty's territory into their own country, effected in themanner it has been done, with so little violence, seems to receive universal satisfactionand will give a peace and security to the frontiers of this settlement hithertounknown ... ,51

But the termination of the war did not end Graham's commitment to arrange thenecessary measures for a lasting peace and stability in the frontier districts. He firstly improvedlines of communication by opening strategically important roads in the Zuurveld. Soldiers andcivilians were utilised to repair the old route from Korhaan Drift (Sundays River) toRautenbach's Drift (Bushman's River) and a new road over the Addo Pass.52

To seal off the Fish River boundary, Graham established 22 military posts between theGreat Winterberg and the sea. The posts formed two lines of defense. The front line stretchedfrom Esterhuyzen's Post (east of Slachter's Nek) to Old Kaffir Drift (near the mouth of the FishRiver). The second line of military posts linked Bruintjes Hoogte and Groenfontein. The bulk ofpatrol work was allocated to the Cape Regiment, whose soldiers were mounted partly on packoxen due to horse-distemper that prevailed in the frontier regions. The rest of the patrolsconsisted of farmers called up from different districts for particular periods of service.53

In collaboration with Governor Cradock Graham envisaged a relatively dense farmingpopulation close to the eastern borders of the Colony, to form a cordon of small semi-military

48

49

'051

"53

S.R.O., G.D. 151/3/2 Graham of Fintry Letters: Graham - Reyne)), 26 February 1812, no. 174; P.R.O.,W.O. 1/343 Despatches: Graham - Cradock, 26 February 1812, p. 156.

Ibid

S.R.O., G.D. 151/7/1 Graham of Fintry Letters: Communique, 7 March 1812, p.13.

P.R.O., W.O. 1/343 Despatches: Cradock - Torrens, 8 March 1812, pp. 143-1 58.

S.R.O., G.D. 151/3/2 Graham of Fintry Letters: Graham - Reyne)), 26 February 1812, no. 174.

S.R.O., G.D. 151/2/1 Graham of Fintry Muniments: Graham - Reyne)), 20 March 1812, pp. 39-40.

10

settlements.54 Graham selected the abandoned loan farm of Lucas Meyer, "De Rietfontein", asnew headquarters of the Cape Regiment. It was strategically situated in the Zuuveld, about 30kilometres from the Fish River boundary. In June 1812 the first temporary barracks of wattleand daub were constructed on high level ground for the new military centre on the KowieRiver.55

To honour the exceptional services rendered by Graham and his associates during theFourth Frontier War, Governor Cradock in August 1812 proclaimed that the new military centreon the banks of the Kowie River must be officially called Graham's Town. It soon alsodeveloped into a major administrative and commercial centre.56

Conclusion

What made the Fourth Frontier War and John Graham's role remarkable? Firstly, a relativelysmall number of heterogeneous colonial forces, comprised of regular soldiers and armedcivilians, in total an offensive force of about I 000 men, effectively cleared the frontier districtsof about 20 000 Xhosa intruders within a short period of about two months. Graham'smotivational skills, organisational talents and military experience blended them into concertedaction against a common foe, notwithstanding previous years of escalating tension, loss of livesand property and even the large scale evacuation of loan farms in the frontier districts.

Secondly, one should note that the War was traumatic to the Xhosa, because theyexperienced the full military power of the Colonial forces. At the very moment of theirperceived control of the vast extents of the Zuurveld and Rietberg, they were confronted withcolonial opponents whose fire-power and mobility they could not match. According to theXhosa prophet Nxele (alias Makana or Links) the Xhosa easily credited the Colonial forces withthe mystical power of the "spirits who lived below the sea".57

Although Xhosa leaders such as Ndlambe, Chungwa and Habana claimed a right tooccupy the frontier districts on account of conquests during previous wars, they failed tomaintain their supremacy. Individual property rights did not exist among the Xhosa, but theyadhered to communal occupation of the best arable and grazing lands and specific spheres ofinfluence. They were not unaccustomed to a mobile life style based on seasonal changes, but notto the same extent as the Khoi or San in the interior of the sub-continent.58

The evasive tactics of the Xhosa in guerilla warfare enabled them to avoid heavycasualties and to equalise the assegai and firearm in hand to hand fighting in the thickets. Butthe Xhosa were hampered in coherence from the very beginning of the war. Ndlambe fled withhis followers and cattle across the Fish River, leaving Chungwa to resist the Colonial forces.

54

"56

""

C.A., C.O. 4831 Letter Book: Alexander - Graham, 2 April 1811, pp. 395-396.

S.R.O.,G.D.15IfBox 11 GrahamofFintryLetters:Graham-Reynell, 15 May 1812,no.1O/87/7.

Cape Town Ga::efle and African Advertiser: Proclamation, 14 May 1812 and Advertisement, 14 August1812, p.l.

Janet Hodgson, 'Plugging in to Sources of Power' (Paper presented at the Sixth Congress of theAssociation for the Study of Religion, V.Z., 27-28 June 1984), p. 2.

John Milton, The Edges o/War (Juta, Cape Town, 1983), p. 25.

II

Habana collected many renegades and Xhosa marauders in the Rietberg, but isolated himselffrom his superiors east of the Fish River boundary.

The real reason for the frontier conflict was clearly identified by Graham and hisassociates as a clash about similar means of subsistence between the eastward moving extensivecattle farmers of the Colony and the westward moving Xhosa cattle herders in the disputedfrontier zone. The pressures of population growth, internal strife and succession problemscomplicated the closing frontier situation for the Xhosa intruders.59

To reinforce his limited number of regular troops, Graham called upon the armed citizensof the frontier districts to defend their families and property in the crisis situation. Grahamutilised the traditional Commando system for practical reasons. The farmers were familiar withtheir own local leaders and the physical environment. They had to victualise themselves and usetheir own horses for brief periods of military service. It implied a financial saving to theauthorities and the promotion of self-interest of civilians.6o Nonetheless, Graham arrangedcommissariat services for the regular troops and armed citizens who were utilised for lengthyperiods in the reserve force and at the new frontier posts. This created a market for localentrepreneurs and contractors such as Piet Retief.61 Supplies were also sent from Cape Town byox wagon or ship through the agent Robert Hil1.62

Another remarkable fact of the Fourth Frontier War is the limited loss of lives, asofficially reported. War is always horrible, traumatic and destructive, but Graham succeeded torestrain the anger and ruthlessness of his troops in relation to the grand objectives of his frontierarrangements. The lives of Xhosa women and children were saved during the campaign againstHabana, but immediate revenge motivated the forces against the imiDange after the tragic deathof Landdrost Stockenstrom and his party at Doorn Nek. It is very unlikely that Graham orGovernor Cradock would have underplayed the real number of Xhosa casualties during thefrontier operations.63

How permanent was the outcome of the Fourth Frontier War? With the wisdom ofhindsight it is possible to conclude that Graham's successful military campaign and frontierarrangements did not last long. After he and Cradock had left the Colony, new administratorslacked the zeal and resources to maintain a strict border control and defensive system. Financialinterests surpassed the 'luxury' of military and security needs, regulated from Cape Town andLondon.64

An assessment of John Graham as leader needs some perspective. Leadership is usuallydetermined by an immediate crisis. During the Fourth Frontier War, Graham became the leaderof the moment. His relatively brief period as civil and military commissioner in the frontier waspreceded by a long record of excellent military service abroad and in the Cape Colony, where he

,.60

6\

62

63

64

Ibid., p.61.

Vide Pieter E. Roux, 'Geskiedenis van die Burgerkommando's in die Kaapkolonie' (D. Phil. thesis, U.S.,1946).

J.L.M. Franken, Piet Retiefse Lewe in die Kolonie (Nasionale Pers, Cape Town, 1949), p. 71.

C.A., G.H. 34/2 Indian Letter Book: Cradock - Farquhar, 13 July 1813, no numbers.

S.R.O., G.D. 151/7/1 Graham of Fintry Letters: Communique, 7 March 1812, p.13.

Vide J de Villiers, 'Die Cape Regiment, 1806-1817' (Archives Year Bookfor South African History, 1989,1).

12

soon became acquainted with all sectors of the local population and circumstances. He hadmany friends, but few enemies in his personal life. In his dealings with Landdrost van der Rietand Landdrost Stockenstriim he promoted equal treatment for all people before the law.65Superiors, such as Governor Cradock, regarded Graham as most reliable and loyal, performingduties to the best of his ability and according to the convictions of his time.66

Was Graham the inventor of segregation on the Cape eastern frontier? Certainly not, buthe applied it diligently as a practical and viable solution to the clash of different interests in aclosing frontier situation. The Fish River boundary was an artificial, but official, man-maderuling since 1778. The cattle farming communities of both trekboers and Xhosa herdersregarded the disputed Zuurveld as an ideal grazing land for their increasing stock. Graham didwhat he was required to execute as functionary of the Colonial government. After the expulsionof the perceived Xhosa intruders he made arrangements for the continued "safety andtranquility" on the frontier, in accordance with the recommendations of his predecessors andcontemporaries, e.g. Major Richard Collins and Governor Cradock.67

In the light of recent demands for the gradual changing of names of places andinstitutions associated with racial segregation,68 the names of John Graham, TheophilusShepstone, John Cradock and Benjamin D'Urban may be included. Graham, as much as otherprominent leaders in our history, contributed substantially to the kaleidoscope of South Africandevelopment. He must be judged within the time and context of his services.69 His recordremained unblemished - sacrificing his best years in this country, promoting negotiations andreconciliation, but also firm in conviction and execution.7o Graham's intention on the easternfrontier was never to slaughter the Xhosa intruders, but to use the strongest military measures tocompel them to accept the/ait accompli of the integrity of the Fish River as official dividing linebetween the Colony and Xhosa territory.

Graham's subsequent role in the Napoleonic wars in Europe and his return to SouthAfrica as Commandant of Simon's Town represent another chapter in his life story. Hismarriage to Johanna, daughter of Rudolph Cloete of Westervoort, Rondebosch, immediatelyafter the frontier war, also confirms his affection to the Colony and its people. But in the lastinstance Graham never lost sight of his roots - Fintry in Scotland.71

65

66

67

68

69

70

71

Graham's handling of the case of the soldier Viool is a typical example. Vide CA., C.O. 10 Sundry Civiland Military Officers: Graham - Cockell, 20 November 1808, no. 112 and Grey - Alexander, 24December 1808, no. 116.

Vide Cradock's praise in the Proclamation of 14 May 1812 in the Cape Town Ga=ette and AfricanAdvertiser, p.1.

G.M. Theal (ed.), Records of the Cape Colony, VB (Report of Collins, 6 August 1809), pp.98-139.

The Mercury, 20 June 200 I, p.2 ("Asmal firm on re-naming schools").

J6m RUsen, Studies in Metahistory (HSRC, Pretoria, 1993), pp. 180-183.

On one of the interior pillars of the Anglican Cathedral in Grahamstown is simply inscribed: "In memoryof Colonel John Graham, Commandant of Simon's Town, Cape of Good Hope, who died 17 March 1821,aged 42 years".

S.R.O., G.D. 151/3/1 Graham of Fintry Leners: Biographical notes, undated, ppA-6.

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The Dynamics of Early 19th Century Nupe Wars

Femi 1. Kolapo •

1. The Nupe in Nigeria

The Nupe of Nigeria inhabit the "low basin formed by the valleys of the Niger and Kadunarivers, between 90E 30' & SOE 30' north." They occupy an estimated total land area of about7,000 square miles.' With reference to a modern map of Nigeria, Nadel delineates Nupe'ssouthern boundary to be a line

drawn from Leaba, on the Niger, eastward to Kataeregi marks the northern boundary ofNupe land, another line drawn eastward from Shari (or Tsaragi) to Abugi and on to theNiger south of Baro .... The Niger, flowing almost straight north-south between Leabaand Jebba, divides Nupe country from Yoruba in the west; the slowly rising country, eastof Lapai and Gidi, sloping upward towards the hills of Gbari country, forms the easternboundary ofNupe.2

The Nupe are composed of several groups of people of distinct dialects, two of which derivedfrom outside of Nupeland. They speak different but mutually intelligible dialects of Nupe andlive within contiguous geo-political boundaries. These subgroups include the Kusapa, theChekpan, the Batachi, the Bini, the Kyedye, the Benu and the Gbedegi. The last two groups weresaid to have derived from Borno and Yorubaland respectively. 3 To their immediate south andsoutheast are the Owe, Bunu, Yagba, Kakanda and a few clusters of the Bassa. The latter twogroups are settled on the west-bank of the Niger river as far down as the point just above itsconfluence with the Benue in Igala territory.

Following the nineteenth century outbreak of the the Nupe war and its subsumption intothe Sokoto jihad after which the Nupes were incorporated into the Sokoto caliphate, Nupelandwas divided among the five emirates. These included Rabah/Bida, Lapai and Agaie, all to thenorth of the Niger, and Shonga and Lafiagi, to the south. The non-Nupe polities of Kakanda,Owe, Yagba, Bunu and Bassa, all became entangled in the Nupe war and ended up in differentlevels of political dependency vis-a-vis the Nupe

The Owe, Bunu and Yagba live further away from the flood plains. They are an inlandagricultural people living in habiting the upland area on the southern border of the Nupe andwest and southwest of the Kakanda and Bassa. Throughout the 19th century, the entire study areawas convulsed in wars. other Nigerian societies were undergoing similar experiences around thesame time. The Hausa states to the north were in the throes of the jihad wars of Uthman Dan

YorklUNESCO Nigerian Hinterland Project and History Department, York University, Canada.

Forde, D., 'The Nupe", Peoples of the Niger-Benue Confluence, London, 1955, p. 17.

Nadel, S. F., A Black Byzantium, London, 1942, p. I; see also R. K. Udo, Geographical Regions ofNigeria, Berkerly, 1970, pp. 116-117.

For a fuller discussion, see Nadel, Black Byzantium, pp. 26-33; Mason, M., "Nupe Kingdom in the 19thcentury: A political History", Ph.D dissertation, University of Birmingham, 1970, pp. 8-14, 26-31.

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