Clashing Over Conversion:Who is a Jew and Media Representations of an Israeli Supreme Court Decision

Clashing Over Conversion: ‘‘Who is a Jew’’ and MediaRepresentations of an Israeli Supreme Court Decision

Bryna Bogoch • Yifat Holzman-Gazit

Published online: 30 May 2010

� Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Abstract Religion-state issues are particularly contentious in the Israeli context

and they are often resolved by litigation before the Supreme Court in its capacity as

the High Court of Justice. A recent controversy that reached Israel’s High Court of

Justice in 2005 involved a petition to recognize the validity of non-Orthodox

conversions to Judaism. This paper examines the role of the press in constructing

the controversy and the image of the High Court of Justice by analyzing all the

reports and editorials in both an elite and in a popular newspaper, published from a

week before the decision was issued until to 1 month afterwards. It looks at the

visual, inter-textual and linguistic features of the articles and analyzes the frames

used in representing the Court, the petitioners, and the controversy. We found that

two distinct frames were used by the papers to convey the essence of the contro-

versy in the Tushbeim case. While the organizing idea in Haaretz, the elite news-

paper, was one of Israel as a civic state, Yediot, the popular newspaper, emphasized

the religious dimension of Israeli nationhood. Moreover, contrary to widespread

perceptions of the popular press, it presented a wider range of views than did the

elite newspaper, which tended to praise the Court and to support the decision.

However, both papers avoided challenges to the basic issue of whether religious

authorities should control the definition of the character of Israel as a Jewish State.

B. Bogoch (&)

Department of Political Studies, Bar Ilan University, 52900 Ramat Gan, Israel

e-mail: [email protected]

B. Bogoch

Department of Interdisciplinary Social Science Studies, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel

Y. Holzman-Gazit

School of Law, College of Management, 75190 Rishon Lezion, Israel

e-mail: [email protected]

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Int J Semiot Law (2011) 24:423–445

DOI 10.1007/s11196-010-9172-y

Thus, the media in effect defined the terms of the struggle over the Jewish identity

of the state within consensual boundaries.

Keywords Religion and state � Supreme Court � Law and media �Popular press � High Court of Justice � Israel � Law and religion �Law and popular culture � Textual analysis

1 Introduction

Legal scholars have recently come to appreciate the fact that an understanding of the

ways in which law operates must include notions of popular conceptions and

awareness of the law [17, 19]. As a result, growing attention has turned to the

cultural study of law, and the representations of the law and legal actors in popular

culture [49, 50, 52]. These media images are often the main source of public

knowledge of the law, and as such form the basis of notions of legality that

determine our underlying assumptions about how the law works, and when it can be

mobilized [11, 17, 24, 42, 53]. Cultural studies have emphasized the permeable

boundaries of the law and the intermingling of popular culture and legal practice,

such that films, journalism and television shows are now regarded as essential texts

for understanding how law rules [6, 30, 44, 46, 52].

Newspapers play a special role in the cultural construction of law, because unlike

other media, the press is assumed to describe real events and to select, highlight and

explicate the phenomena that are crucial to the public in fulfilling its watchdog role

in democracy [14, 24, 26]. While the press coverage of law and order is

considerable, sometimes comprising more than half the content of the newspaper

[16], media studies of legal issues in the past have focused mainly on crime and

criminal law [3, 6, 57]. Today the range has expanded, including studies of the

media portrayal of human rights [37], civil litigation [27, 39], members of the legal

professions [21], and lately, a growing interest in the media coverage of Supreme

Courts [2, 5, 7, 8, 26, 51, 55].

This article contributes to the developing body of research on the media coverage

of Supreme Courts by analyzing the press coverage of a decision by Israel’s High

Court of Justice (HCJ) that revolved around one of the most contentious issues in

Israeli society: the religion-state dispute [32, 56]. The case at issue (known as

Tushbeim/05) dealt with the validity of non-Orthodox conversions to Judaism

conducted outside of Israel. The Court ruled that such conversions should be

regarded as qualifying the converts for citizenship rights that are granted Jewish

immigrants despite the objection of the Orthodox establishment in Israel to

recognizing these converts as Jews. This article uses insights from the study of

media frames [10, 15, 45, 58] and the textual analysis of media content [9, 25] to

analyze articles that referred to the decision in a popular (tabloid) and an elite

(quality) newspaper. Our purpose is to compare the way the stories are framed in

each newspaper, and to suggest what these press narratives mean for the image and

social role of the court, and for the definition of Israel as a Jewish and democratic

state.

424 B. Bogoch, Y. Holzman-Gazit

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1.1 News Narratives and News Framing

The analysis of how news texts construct our understanding of issues and public

controversies has been the focus of research in various branches of communications

studies [36, 45, 54, 60, 61]. One important concept to emerge from these studies is the

concept of frames. While a number of definitions of frames have been suggested

(reviewed in Johnson-Cartee [29], de Vrees [10], Reese [45] and Matthes and Kohring

[36]), frames, like themes, basically refer to the ‘‘central organizing idea for news

content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the use of

selection, emphasis, exclusion and elaboration’’ [29, p. 24]. In doing so, frames define

problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments and often suggest remedies [10, 14,

15]. Some scholars of framing have emphasized the ways in which institutional

interests and power relationships are invoked in the framing of news stories, so that

hegemonic values and beliefs are supported and reinforced [9, 15, 36, 45].

Both qualitative and quantitative methods have been used in the identification of

frames in the news media, in order to analyze the visual, semantic and syntactic

elements of the text and the structure or organization of the news narrative [10, 36,

45]. Tankard [58] compiled a list of eleven focal points for identifying and

measuring frames in studies of the press, including headlines, subheadings, photos

and captions, source selection, quote selection, statistics and charts, and the

concluding paragraph. Deacon et al. [9] took account of the formal staging of

the news text, including its position, composition and intertextual relations, i.e., the

relation the news story has to other stories and other discourse types within the

newspaper. They also emphasized the sequencing of sources, protagonists, and

representations of events. Gamson and Modigliani’s [22] analysis of news frames

focused on metaphors, exemplars, catch phrases and depictions.

One of the factors that have been related to the use of different frames in studies

of the press is whether the newspaper is a quality (elite) or a tabloid (popular) paper

[20]. Elite newspapers, geared to an educated, high status audience, are regarded as

professional papers and enjoy the reputation of credibility, accuracy, objectivity and

fairness. Popular newspapers aim for the widest possible audience, and are often

viewed as providing low-quality, unprofessional infotainment [16, 40]. The two

types of newspapers, it is said, provide distinct accounts of events and highlight

different topics and actors [16, 59]. Some researchers have suggested that the elite

press gives more coverage to marginal groups and unpopular causes. Others have

claimed that the elite press gives voice to official, establishment voices, whereas the

popular press frames issues from the point of view of the general public [40]. The

framing of Israel’s High Court of Justice in a decision recognizing non-Orthodox

overseas conversions for immigration purposes will be examined in a popular and in

an elite newspaper.

2 Procedure and Sample

Our sample comprised all articles relating to the Tushbeim/05 decision that appeared

in Yediot Aharonot (the most popular newspaper in Israel) and in Haaretz, the only

Clashing Over Conversion 425

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daily quality paper of general interest in Israel,1 for a period extending from 1 week

prior to the date on which the decision was issued to 1 month after the decision (i.e.,

from March 26 to May 5, 2005). The sample included reports, editorials, signed

opinion pieces and feature articles explaining the decision and its impact. We also

examined articles relating to conversion in general and to other religion-state issues

that appeared during the research period. Altogether, there were 40 articles in the

sample.

This study is based on a qualitative analysis of the way the press framed the

Court and the decision, and the position taken by the papers toward the decision.

The analysis took into account visual aspects of the structure, size and placement of

the articles, lexical choices and syntactic elements of the headlines, sub-headings

and lead sentences, and the depiction of the protagonists, as well as the sequential

arrangement of the narrative and the hierarchy and nature of the sources quoted.

These features reveal the values, assumptions and ideological positions of the paper,

and the meanings that are promoted as well as those that are ignored by the mass

media on contentious religion-state issues in Israel.

Before presenting the findings of our research on the press coverage of the

decision, we will discuss the nature of the religion-state relationship in Israel and the

role of the Supreme Court in deciding religion-state issues in general and the

specific instance of conversions in particular.

3 Religion-State Relationships in Israel

The definition of Jewish identity has been a controversial issue in Israel since its

founding in 1948. Israel’s Proclamation of Independence of May 14th, 1948

declared the ‘‘establishment of a Jewish State in Eretz-Israel, to be known as the

State of Israel’’. As a democratic, non-theocratic state, Israel would, the

Proclamation pledges ‘‘uphold the full social and political equality of all citizens,

without distinction of religion, race or sex; [and would] guarantee the freedom of

religion, conscience, education and culture.’’ This self-definition as both a Jewish

and a democratic state has resulted in chronic tensions arising from the encounter

between traditional Judaism and a Western liberal state, and between Jewish law

and state law. The lack of a written constitution that stipulates the model of the

relationship between the state and religion,2 has led to ongoing debates that have

been played out in the Israeli parliament (the Knesset) and in the courts, particularly

in the Supreme Court in its capacity as the High Court of Justice.

1 At the time of the decision there were two popular daily newspapers in Israel, Maariv and YediotAharonot commonly referred to as Yediot. Yediot is chosen to represent the popular press in most studies

because of its wider circulation (60% of daily newspaper readers read Yediot in 2005, compared to 30%

who read Maariv).2 According to the Proclamation of Independence, a constituent assembly should have prepared a

constitution by October 1, 1948. However, because of disputes largely due to a potential clash between a

secular constitution and Jewish religious law, the plan to enact a constitution did not materialize [23].


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Israel’s Supreme Court stands at the head of the court system.3 As the highest

Court of Appeals in civil and criminal matters, the Supreme Court adjudicates

appeals by right from lower courts.4 As the High Court of Justice (HCJ), the Supreme

Court rules as a court of first instance, primarily in matters regarding the legality of

decisions by state authorities and in direct challenges to the constitutionality of laws

enacted by the Knesset. The HCJ has broad discretionary authority to rule on matters

on which it considers necessary to grant relief in the interests of justice, and which

are not within the jurisdiction of other courts or tribunals.5 Because state-religion

controversies involve challenges to the incorporation and interpretation of religious

norms by state authorities and public institutions, adjudication in this field has been

handled primarily by the Supreme Court in its capacity as the HCJ.

For the first 25 years of Israel’s existence, the debates regarding religion and

state relationships focused on how to formalize the Jewish dimension of the state.

Tensions arose among those who advocated a strict separation between religion and

state, those who believed that Orthodox Jewish law should be the guiding principle

of the new state, and those who sought a middle ground [12, 13, 34, 47]. As the

Reform and Conservative movements did not gain a foothold in Israeli society in

those early state-building years, the content of state-sanctioned Jewish laws was

shaped exclusively by the Orthodox movement.6

The debate on the religion-state relationship took a new direction in the 1970s

with the development of a more heterogenic society in Israel. Growing numbers of

non-Orthodox Jews from North America who were affiliated with the Conservative

and Reform denominations in the US immigrated to Israel after the 1967 war.

Furthermore, as Israeli society emerged from its nation- building stage, calls to

define Judaism in terms of cultural and historical affiliation, not necessarily

dependent on Jewish religious definitions, gained public exposure.7 While the

3 The Supreme Court sits in Jerusalem and its area of jurisdiction is the entire country. Currently, there

are twelve justices out of a possible fifteen serving on the Supreme Court. Unlike the American Supreme

Court where the entire bench presides over all cases, the Israeli Supreme Court usually sits in panels of

three. However, there is also a possibility of expanding the panel. The difference between the Israeli and

American courts with respect to the initial (default) size of the bench is an outcome of the fact that the US

Supreme Court’s exercise of jurisdiction is primarily discretionary, whereas in Israel the Supreme Court

hears appeals by right in civil and criminal matters and serves as a court of first instance in most matters

relating to petitions against state actions.4 A ruling of the Supreme Court is binding upon every court, other than the Supreme Court itself. This is

the principle of binding precedent (stare decisis) in Israel.5 The High Court of Justice grants relief through orders such as injunction, mandamus, and habeascorpus as well as through declaratory judgments.6 An early example is the area of family law. As a carryover from the Ottoman rule (1517–1917) and the

British Mandate in Palestine (1917–1948), matters of personal status, such as marriage, divorce, burial,

and inheritance are under the sole jurisdiction of religious authorities. From the British Mandate’s

recognition of the Orthodox authorities as the sole authorities on issues of Jewish law, Orthodox Jewish

law has become binding on the Jews of Israel with the exception of those who hold foreign nationality and

could contract civil marriages before consular officers. Political maneuvers by the religious parties in the

1950s and 1960s led to further imposition of religious norms.7 For the variety of opinions see Ben- Rafael [4]. This book comprises the replies sent by 50 scholars to

Ben-Gurion, the first Prime Minister of Israel, in answer to a question he sent asking them to define ‘‘who

is a Jew’’. The question was sent in response to the problem of registering the children of a non-Jewish

parent [35].


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secular community continued to oppose the imposition of [Orthodox] religious

norms in Israel, the legislature and the courts also had to face new challenges

concerning the definition of state-recognized Judaism. Non-Orthodox movements

sought to interpret, legislate and implement state-definitions of Judaism that

diverged from Orthodox Jewish law. The central field in which these attempts took

place was the definition of ‘‘who is a Jew’’.

3.1 ‘‘Who is a Jew’’? Normative Implications

The answer to the question of ‘‘who is a Jew’’ carries profound implications under

Israeli law. In addition to the subordination of all Jews to Orthodox Rabbinical

courts for personal status issues, the recognition of an individual as a Jew is crucial

for immigration and identification purposes. Israeli law accords every Jew the right

to immigrate to Israel and to be automatically granted citizenship (the status of an

oleh).8 Jews who immigrate to Israel are entitled to financial assistance and various

state subsidies designed to help them with initial acclimatization.9 State identity

cards also included a ‘‘nationality’’ rubrique in which citizens were defined as

Jewish or other.

The issue of immigration and automatic citizenship is governed by the Law of

Return enacted in 1950. In presenting the Law of Return before the Knesset, Prime

Minister Ben-Gurion stated that it embodied the central purpose of the new state.10

However, the Law of Return does not include a definition of the term ‘‘Jew’’ for the

purpose of immigration and citizenship, despite the legislature’s awareness of the

controversy surrounding its meaning and the varying definitions that are given to

Judaism. The same tactic of not defining who a Jew is was employed by the

legislature in the original version of the Population and Registry Law of 1965 which

governs the procedure of issuing state identity cards in Israel.

Following a controversial decision in which the HCJ implicitly recognized an

alternative to the Orthodox definition of Judaism, a new section was added to the

Law of Return and the Registry Law in 1970.11 The amendment defined a Jew as ‘‘a

8 Oleh not only means an immigrant but is a value-laden word in Hebrew. It means going up. The term is

used only with respect to Jews who immigrate to Israel, as opposed to non-Jewish immigrants. Israelis

who leave Israel to other countries are called yordim which means going down from a high place to a

lower one.9 The acronym for the financial assistance provided to Jewish immigrants is Absorption Basket.

http://www.moia.gov.il/Moia_en/FinancialAssistance/AbsorptionBasket.htm?SearchText=.10 PM Ben-Gurion stated the following during the introduction of the Law of Return to the Knesset:

‘‘This is not a Jewish state merely because Jews are the majority of its population. It is a state for Jews

everywhere. The Law of Return embodies the central purpose of our state’’ [28].11 H.C. Shalit v. Minister of Interior, 23(1) P.D. 447, translated at Selected Judgments of the Supreme

Court of Israel, Special Volume, 35 (1971). The Shalit case involved Benjamin Shalit, a reserve officer in

the Israeli Navy, who married a non-Jewish woman while studying in Edinburgh. His wife joined him in

Israel and received a resident certificate. In her ID card registration documents, Shalit’s wife declared

herself a British national with no religion. The Shalits attempted to register their Israeli-born children as

having no religion in the rubric of religion and as Jews in the rubric of nationality. The registration clerk

in the Ministry of Interior refused to make the distinction between religion and nationality and suggested

that Shalit leave both the ‘‘nationality’’ and religion‘‘ rubrics in the ID card blank. Shalit appealed to the

Supreme Court and won by a 5–4 majority decision. The decision was based on technical grounds,


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http://www.moia.gov.il/Moia_en/FinancialAssistance/AbsorptionBasket.htm?SearchText=

person born to a Jewish mother or who has converted and does not belong to another

religion’’. From then on, the question ceased to be ‘‘Who is a Jew?’’ and became

‘‘Who is a convert?’’. The legislature once again failed to specify the type of

‘‘conversion’’ necessary in order to become a citizen of the State of Israel and to be

registered as a Jew on one’s ID card. This imprecision led to contentious court

challenges and legislative actions over the next two decades.

3.2 The Conversion Controversy: The Interplay Between the Legislature

and the Supreme Court

Since the 1970 Amendment to the Law of Return, Orthodox political parties have

repeatedly and unsuccessfully sought to amend the law so that it would specify that

immigrant rights would be granted to converts to Judaism only if their conversion

was conducted under Orthodox auspices. The controversy over the definition of who

a convert re-emerged in 1995 when the HCJ ordered the Ministry of Interior to

register as Jewish a woman who had converted under Reform auspices in Israel.12

The legal rationale for the decision was technical. The court found that the Interior

Ministry’s request for a conversion certificate from the Rabbinate—which of course

the convert could not provide as her conversion was not recognized by the Orthodox

establishment—had no basis in the authorizing legislation and that therefore there

were no grounds for refusing the granting of Jewish status to the petitioner. Despite

the technical reasoning, this decision—known as the Goldstein case—was hailed by

Reform and Conservative leaders as de-facto official state recognition of non-

Orthodox conversions performed in Israel. This was, however, a broad interpre-

tation of the ruling. Recognizing the political controversy over the definition of

‘‘who is a Jew’’, the justices in Goldstein avoided ruling on the validity of non-

Orthodox conversions in Israel. Chief Justice Barak explicitly stated that: ‘‘We are

not ruling on what the substantive content of conversions in Israel is’’. Furthermore,

since Goldstein was already a citizen of Israel by virtue of her marriage to an Israeli,

the court’s ruling did not interpret the concept of ‘‘conversion’’ for the purposes of

the Law of Return (which provides for automatic Israeli citizenship), nor did it

address conversions performed outside Israel.

Leaving those issues undecided, the Supreme Court directed the legislature to

clarify the guidelines for conversions performed in Israel. The court added that

should the legislature fail to establish such guidelines regarding state recognition of

non-Orthodox conversions performed in Israel, the responsibility would fall to the

court in future cases. Almost immediately, political forces mobilized to initiate

legislation to further clarify the status of conversions performed in Israel, including

Footnote 11 continued

specifically questioning the scope of the independent discretion of the registration clerk. However, the

Court ruling also implicitly recognized an alternative interpretation to the Orthodox definition of Judaism.

The court ordered the Ministry of Interior to register Shalit’s children as belonging to the Jewish nation

and to leave their religious affiliation blank. The Shalit ruling triggered a public storm and political

pressures that culminated in an amendment to the Law of Return and the Registry Law [1, 33, 38].12 H.C. 1031/93 Eliana Pessaro v. Minister of Interior, 49(4) P.D. 49, abridged in Jewish law Association

Studies (2000).


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a committee that recommended the establishment of a conversion institute operated

jointly by the three denominations.13 These initiatives failed, and the Reform and

Conservative movements resumed their efforts to attain their goals through

adjudication.

The Na’amat case (2002) was a partial continuation of the Goldstein case. Several

petitioners who converted in Israel under the auspices of the Reform movement and

others who converted abroad sought to be recognized as Jews.14 The court decided by

a majority of 10 to 1 that those converted in Israel should be registered as Jews on

their identity cards and with the Ministry of Interior.15 The Court left to a future

occasion the decision about whether non-Orthodox conversions performed abroad

entitled the converts to be regarded as Jews under the Law of Return, with the rights

to automatic citizenship and to state financial assistance in absorption [48]. That

occasion came 3 years later in the Tushbeim case.

3.3 ‘‘Stop-Over Conversions’’: The Case of Tushbeim/05

The Tushbeim case involved the status of Conservative and Reform conversions

conducted abroad for purposes of recognition under the Law of Return.16 Unlike the

circumstances in Naamat that dealt with petitioners converting in Israel, in

Tushbeim the candidates for conversion had undergone conversion proceedings

abroad after having resided in Israel as non-Jews. They had travelled abroad for the

explicit purpose of converting, which is why these conversions were termed ‘‘stop-

over conversions’’.17 In accordance with general procedure in petitions to the HCJ,

the Tushbeim case was adjudicated in two stages. First the court asked the state to

respond to the petition by explaining why it would not recognize the conversion of

the petitioners for the purpose of the Law of Return. The state replied that the prior

residence of the petitioners in Israel precluded their entitlement to the status of olehunder the Law of Return, irrespective of the question of the validity of their

conversion. The argument was that the Law of Return applies only to Jews living

abroad who desire to immigrate to Israel and not to a person who undergoes a

conversion ceremony (either inside or outside Israel) while living in Israel. In a

majority of 7 against 4, the court refused to accept the state’s position. The majority

opinion was written by Chief Justice Barak who explained that:

Aliya (i.e., immigration) means the settling of a Jew in Israel… It would be

illegal discrimination if one person were to be recognized as an ‘‘oleh’’ [new

13 The Committee (known as the Neeman Committee after the name of its chairperson) reached a

compromise proposal to create an institution for the preparation of converts and to oversee the conversion

process. According to the proposal, the conversion institute would be operated jointly by the three

denominations, but only Orthodox Rabbis would conduct the conversion ceremony itself. This proposal

would have granted recognition by the State of Israel and by the Rabbinate to the Reform and

Conservative movements in Israel in matters of personal status. See Keinon [31, p. 1].14 HC 5070/95 Naamat v. Minister of Interior, 56(2) PD 721. abridged in 31 Justice pp. 37–42 (2202).15 The Court expanded the panel in Naamat case to 11 out of the 15 justices serving at the time. This is a

clear indication of the perceived importance of the dispute.16 HC 2597/99 Tushbeim v. Minister of Interior (ruling given on 31.5.2004).17 In Hebrew, the term is literally’’ hop-over‘‘ conversions.


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immigrant] because he converted and subsequently settled in Israel while the

same recognition is denied to another person desiring to settle in Israel, purely

because he converted after having come to settle in Israel. Both of the converts

joined the Jewish people and came to settle in Israel: both of them are sons

[sic] returning to their homeland.18

Having rejected the state’s argument for negating the petitioners’ entitlements to

an oleh certificate under the Law of Return, the court ordered the state to grant the

petitioners Israeli citizenship, including the financial assistance of the absorption

basket. However, the court gave the state another opportunity to formulate its

position regarding the nature of conversions required for recognition as a Jew under

the Law of Return. The state’s reply to the court was that it would confer equal

recognition to all conversions conducted abroad provided that the convert was a

member of a recognized Jewish community (Orthodox, Conservative, or Reform)

and the conversion was conducted by community institutions.

On March 31 2005, the Court issued its final decision. It rejected the state’s

qualifications by a majority of 7 to 4. While acknowledging the importance of

ensuring that the conversion was genuine, the majority of the justices held that it

was not necessary to compel the convert to join the converting community in order

to ensure the seriousness of the conversion. They held that it was sufficient ‘‘that the

conversion took place in a recognized Jewish community abroad, was followed by

immigration to Israel and was conducted according to the guidelines accepted in

that community for someone desiring to join the community’’. The petitioners, who

resided in Israel prior to their conversion and pursued the process in Israel but went

abroad for the actual ceremony, were recognized by the Supreme Court as Jews, and

entitled to Israeli citizenship including the benefits provided Jews under the Law of

Return. We now turn to the analysis of how the Tushbeim conversion case was

reported by the popular and quality press in Israel.

4 The Press and the Tushbeim Case

There is no doubt that the court’s decision was deemed newsworthy by both papers.

On the day before the decision (March 30, 2005), four articles in Haaretz, including a

photograph, charts and commentary, discussed the possible implications of the

forthcoming decision, presented conversion statistics and described conversion

procedures in Israel. The day after the decision was delivered (April 1, 2005), not

only did it make front page headlines in Haaretz but two articles that appeared on the

front page continued onto the second page of the newspaper, and additional stories

covered most of the second and third pages. On the same day, the third page of Yediotwas dedicated in its entirety to decision-related articles (without any advertisements).

Moreover, throughout the month, in addition to news and editorial items about the

conversion decision itself, there were spin-offs into other religion-state controversies

which sometimes referred to the decision in passing, as well as to other stories of

18 HC 2597/99 Tushbeim v. Minister of Interior (ruling given on 31.5.2004) Id. Par. 19.


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converts and conversions that did not mention the decision at all. The fact that 17

articles in Yediot and 23 articles in Haaretz dealt with religion-state matters during

the 1 month period (Table 1) stands in stark contrast to the relatively few stories that

featured HCJ decisions about religion-state issues found at other times (5). The large

number of opinion pieces (almost twice as many opinions as news stories in Yediot,and the same number of opinions as news stories in Haaretz) is another sign of the

controversial nature of the topic, and its salience in the Israeli context.

4.1 Frames and Narratives

Two distinct frames were used by the papers to convey the essence of the

controversy in the Tushbeim case. While the organizing idea in Haaretz was one of

Israel as a civic state, Yediot emphasized the religious dimension of Israeli

nationhood.

Haaretz’ coverage centered around the right of overseas converts to Israeli

citizenship under the Law of Return and the centrality of the Supreme Court in

enabling the petitioners to overcome the hurdles created by the religious

establishment and the political arena. From the very first headline announcing the

forthcoming decision (published a day prior to delivery) the centrality of the theme

of citizenship and the powerful status of the High Court of Justice are obvious:

‘‘HCJ will rule tomorrow if conversion outside Israel is recognized for purposes of

the Law of Return’’.19 Subsequent headlines also use the same form: ‘‘HCJ ruled’’,

‘‘HCJ decided’’. In fact, explicit references to the HCJ and to the ruling appear in

nine of 17 headlines about the case and its implications. Two photographs of Chief

Justice Barak were appended to the articles. By contrast, in Yediot, there were no

photos at all of any of the Justices or of the Court, and the HCJ is mentioned in only

four of the 13 decision-specific headlines.

It is also interesting to note how the sides to the dispute are presented by Haaretz.

Even in the pre-decision phase, the conflict is between the court which has the

power to resolve thorny issues, and the deadlocked, and ultimately weak, political

sphere. The headlines in Haaretz do not explicitly mention the conflict of interests

between the court and the Rabbinate. The Rabbinate is mentioned only once in a

headline, and that is in a pre-decision article that presents the Rabbinate as

responsible for the inability of the political system to achieve its goal: ‘‘Sharon [the

Table 1 Number of stories by

newspaper, topic and type of

story

Haaretz Yediyot

Conversion decision news and features 9 5

Conversion decision editorials and opinions 8 8

Other religion state news 3 1

Other religion state editorials 2 2

Other conversion stories 1 1

Total 23 17

19 Haaretz, 30-3-05, p. 6a.


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then Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon] wanted to remove hurdles, the Rabbinate raised

obstacles and that is why there is no increase in the number of converts’’.20 Thus,

even before the decision is delivered, the dispute is framed in Haaretz as a clash of

interests between the state and the religious establishment on the one hand, and

between the HCJ and the political arena on the other. Haaretz downplays the direct

challenge of the Tushbeim ruling to Orthodox law and the decision’s defiance of the

Orthodox institutions and courts in Israel that have had a monopoly in matters of

personal status and conversions.

In the same pre-decision report which covers about half the page of the newspaper,

we are told that ‘‘The prime minister regards increasing the number of converts as very

important and sees it as one of the central means of guaranteeing the Jewish majority in

Israel.’’21 The Jewish identity of the state and the importance of increasing the Jewish

presence in Israel are almost unanimously accepted values among all sectors of the

Jewish population. Thus, the obstacles raised by the religious establishment are

paradoxically presented as a threat to the very identity of Israel as a Jewish State. In

Haaretz’ version, it is the HCJ, rather than the political establishment, that is portrayed

as the guardian of these hegemonic values. The narrative is one of the strength of court

compared to the weakness of the political system.

In contrast to the way the decision was framed in Haaretz, in Yediot, the story

was primarily one of religion and nationhood, rather than of citizenship. If the

central question in Haaretz was who can be an Israeli and who determines who is

eligible for citizenship, in Yediot it was ‘‘who is a Jew’’, and what are the criteria for

becoming a member of the Jewish people. As a popular newspaper, Yediotdramatizes the conflictual elements of the decision, rather than its legal rationale.

The language, the sources quoted and the visual elements of the first reports of the

decision in Yediot convey these distinct features.

The placement of the report of the decision at the very beginning of the news

section, the large size of the headline and the use of color attest to its importance and

its dramatic nature. The story was headlined in a large white font against a red

background: ‘‘It’s less hard to be a Jew’’.22 This is a play on a familiar saying ‘‘It’s

hard to be a Jew’’ that is both an acknowledgement of the Jewish existential condition

as well as an expression of self-identity and national pride. The court’s decision,

then, was framed as affecting the notion of Jewish people-hood, by blurring the

boundaries between Jews and non-Jews. The story is accompanied by a large color

photo of a teary-eyed convert held by her partner, in which her right hand is folded

diagonally across her chest, in a gesture reminiscent of the motions used in Jewish

penitential prayers (see Fig. 1). Moreover, a yellow circle with the inscription ‘‘We

are all Jews’’ appears like a badge on the partner’s sleeve—a clear reference to the

‘‘Jude’’ badge which Jews were forced to wear in Nazi occupied Europe. The picture

thus invokes the historical connection to the Jewish people outside of the Israeli

context. It also reinforces the criticism by some that the decision recognizing ‘‘stop-

over’’ conversions challenges the uniqueness of the Jewish people.

20 Haaretz, 30-3-05, p. 6a.21 Haaretz, 30-3-05, p. 6a.22 Yediot, 1-4-05, p. 3.


123

A different photo of the same couple was used in Haaretz (see Fig. 2). In

Haaretz, the picture was much smaller and located at the bottom of a review of a

concert, which was the only non-decision related item on the page. There was no

yellow circle superimposed on the convert’s partner’s sleeve. The caption read:

‘‘From a foreign resident to the status of citizen’’.23 Thus, the decision as presented

in Haaretz affects residents in Israel, granting them citizenship, whereas in Yediot, it

affects the Jewish people at large, extending the definition of who can claim

membership.

Yediot’s main headline ‘‘It is less hard to be a Jew’’ together with a secondary

headline and lead paragraph provided the gist of the story as well as the side taken in

Fig. 1 Initial report of HCJ decision, Yediyot

23 Haaretz, 1-4-05, p. 3a.


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the dispute [9, p. 170]. Thus, the sub-headline in the lead story about the decision

read:

By a majority of seven against four, a special panel of the HCJ determined: A

person who started his life as a goy [non-Jew], studied in a Reform or

Conservative framework and ‘‘hopped’’ abroad to obtain the official conver-

sion certificate, is eligible to be recognized as a Jew. Chief Justice Barak: It is

necessary to adopt equal treatment toward non-Orthodox groups in Judaism.

Ultra-Orthodox members of parliament are furious and are organizing

legislation that circumvents the HCJ. And the petitioners celebrate: ‘‘Thank

God’’.

The first sentence of the sub-headline translates the legal decision into colloquial

and even vulgar language. The use of the word ‘‘goy’’, a word meaning nation and

used pejoratively to designate non-Jews, is certainly never used in the decision, and

would be regarded as not politically correct in spoken discourse in most Israeli

circles. The ‘‘goy’’ is culturally and religiously the antithesis of the Jew, and

describing a convert as a goy who has been recognized as Jewish by the court in

effect mocks the court’s decision. Yediot’s use of the word in this context stresses

the newspaper’s view of the decision as eliminating or at least moderating the

difference between Jew and non-Jew. Another similar lexical choice by the

newspaper in the sub-headline is use of a colloquial term ‘‘hopped over’’. Although

in the text of the decision itself the justices acknowledge the colloquial description

of the process as ‘‘stop-over conversion’’, the use of the verb form ‘‘hopped over’’ in

the sub-headline enhances the derisive tone adopted by the newspaper. The

translation into colloquial language both belittles the process and by implication, the

Fig. 2 Photo of convert andpartner, Haaretz


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court’s decision. Moreover, as Fairclough [18, pp. 68–74] has shown, the use of

colloquial language by the newspaper also implicitly claims a relationship of

solidarity with the readers.

An additional element that contributes to the Jewish, as opposed to citizenship

framing of the decision is the side-by-side positioning of two opinion pieces by

religious leaders of the Orthodox and Reform movements under the main story

(Fig. 1). Both pieces are of the same length, and each is accompanied by a passport

sized photo of the Rabbis. The headlines are also parallel and emphasize the

conflicting views of the implication of the decision for the Jewish religion: ‘‘A

death-blow to Judaism’’, and ‘‘A life-saving drug to Judaism’’.24 Here again, it is not

the dispute over citizenship that is stressed, but rather the conflict among the

religious groups. The positioning of the two contrasting views also supports

journalistic claims to objectivity and balance, and deflects from the narrative stance

adopted by the paper.

The contrast between the citizenship frame adopted in Haaretz and the religious

frame that characterizes the coverage in Yedyot is particularly evident in two articles

both top-lined ‘‘Questions and answers’’ that present information about the meaning

and the effect of the decision in the form of queries and responses by an expert. In

Haaretz, the article is headlined ‘‘The application of the decision will await Ministry

of Interior procedures’’.25 The first question is: ‘‘According to the HCJ decision,

does the Minister of Interior have to immediately recognize the conversion of the 17

petitioners, that is to grant them Israeli citizenship and the status of a new

immigrant?’’. In Yediot, on the other hand, the article is headlined: ‘‘On the way to

confirming Reform conversions’’,26 and the first question is: ‘‘Will the state from

now on recognize all conversions that are conducted outside of Israel?’’. In Haaretz,

the question concerns the citizenship rights and benefits that have been denied the

petitioners and are now available to them, while in Yediot the question deals with

the extension of the right of entry to the Jewish religion and people-hood through

conversion abroad. Again, the frames adopted by the newspapers present different

issues as the problematic consequences of the decision.

4.2 The Petitioners

The way the petitioners are described in the two papers, reflects and constructs the

frame that is used. As noted above, in Yediot, the word ‘‘goy’’ is used to describe the

petitioners in both the sub-headline and the text, a term that not only derides

the HCJ decision but emphasizes the status of the petitioners as non-Jews. Haaretz,

by contrast, refers to ‘‘converts’’ or ‘‘petitioners’’, rather than even politically

correct forms of designating non-Jews (i.e., gentiles).

Another feature that constructs the different frames is the way the newspapers

describe the origins of the petition. Yediot introduces the decision as a result of a

‘‘petition submitted 6 years ago by 15 foreigners who were living in Israel and

24 Yediot, 1-4-05, p. 3.25 Haaretz, 1-4-05, p. 3a.26 Yediot, 1-4-05, p. 3.


123

requested to convert’’.27 By contrast, Haaretz reports that the precedential decision

has been given in response to a petition by ‘‘17 tourists and licensed foreign workers

who have lived in Israel for many years with temporary [resident] status’’.28 The

version in Haaretz gives legality and official recognition to the petitioners, and

focuses on the temporary status that they have sought to rectify in their petition. In

Yediot, they are foreigners, outsiders who seek to convert and thus gain entry to the

Jewish people.

Two petitioners are singled out for attention by both newspapers: John Alfonzo

from Columbia and Jestina Castro (Chapana)29 from Peru. Yediot chooses to quote

Jestina’s reaction to the decision in line with the religious frame it adopted

throughout the story: ‘‘Now everything is all right, thank God’’. Haaretz chooses to

describe Jestina’s reaction in the following manner:

‘‘I didn’t sleep, I am so excited’’. This is what Jestina Chapana said yesterday

in almost completely perfect Hebrew, moments after the HCJ decision that

determined that she will be recognized as a Jew for the purposes of the Law of

Return. In one moment, by the decision of the court, Chapana was transformed

from the status of a foreigner to the status of a citizen, a Jew, and a new

immigrant.

Again, the role of the court’s decision in granting Israeli citizenship is fore-

fronted. The Court has decided that Jestina can be an Israeli, and the fact that she is

described as speaking fluent Hebrew is a subtle endorsement of the court’s

judgment. A similar pattern emerges in the case of John Alfonzo. For Haaretz, the

impact of the decision for John Alfonzo is that ‘‘Soon, 15 years after he arrived in

Israel, he will officially become a new immigrant’’ (i.e., entitled to Israeli

citizenship). In Yediot he is quoted as saying ‘‘It’s hard to be a Jew but it’s worth it’’.

Thus, both Haaretz and Yediot focus on the petitioners to personalize the decision,

and to demonstrate its importance to specific individuals. However, the language

used to describe the petitioners evinces different meanings about the implications of

the decision for the religion-state debate in Israel.

4.3 Evaluating the Decision

The stance taken by the paper is revealed through a variety of semantic choices and

sequencing strategies. In Yediot, the evaluation of the decision is apparent from the

main article published a day after the decision was delivered. The top-line, the short

heading above the main headline, reads: ‘‘HJC in a decision that stirs up discord:

The Law of Return applies to ‘stop-over’ conversions’’.30 Thus, from the beginning,

the decision is marked as causing disagreement, as conflictual, so that whatever we

27 Yediot, 1-4-05, p. 3.28 Haaretz, 1-4-05, p. 1. There were in fact 15 individual petitioners, but the International Organization

for Progressive Judaism was also listed among the petitioners.29 In the official version of the decision, she was listed as Castro, and that was the name she was given in

Yediot. Haaretz referred to her as Chapana. It is not clear where they obtained that name.30 1-4-05, p. 3.


123

are told next will be seen in the context of this negative framing. Moreover, opening

the top-line with the HCJ, highlights its role as the agent of the dissent. It would

have been more natural, for example, to say ‘‘A decision by the HCJ stirs up

discord’’. The inversion, commonly used in headlines as an attention getting device

[41], also serves to focus specifically on the HCJ.

While the decision is termed ‘‘dramatic’’ and ‘‘precedential’’ in the opening

article, by and large, there is more space devoted to criticism of the decision than

support of it in Yediot. Of the 13 stories and editorials dealing directly with the

decision in Yediot (excluding those that deal with other conversions or religion-state

issues) four were strongly negative, three strongly positive, and the rest had

elements of both. Interestingly, even the first story, which reported on both majority

and minority opinions as well as reactions by politicians, contained more opinions

that criticized the decision than those that supported it. In fact, the placement of the

opinions supporting the decision as well as their style of expression, seem to belie

the balance created by presenting both types of claims [9]. Thus, the claims of the

State Attorney (against the decision) are presented first, followed by two quotes by

Chief Justice Aharon Barak justifying the decision, closing with a quote from

Justice Proaccia representing the dissenting judges. After the justices, the politicians

are quoted, again first quoting two critical opinions, followed by a politician who

supported the decision, and ending with a politician who criticized it. The story is

arranged in such a way as to legitimate the critical tone adopted in the top-line.

Perhaps inevitably, the critical voices are more colorful than those supporting the

decision. Thus, quotations from the judicial decision are phrased in rational

reasoned language whereas emotional language, exaggerated claims and war-like

metaphors are used in quotes by opposing politicians. For example, Eli Ishay, an

Ultra-Orthodox politician, was quoted as saying it was ‘‘an explosive belt that

caused an identity terrorist attack against the Jewish people. All that is left for the

court to do is to allow conversions by SMS (text messages)’’.31 In the same item,

however, the quote by the single supporting politician that ‘‘the decision has

corrected a historic injustice by recognizing Conservative and Reform conversions’’

was preceded by a description of his opinion as representing ‘‘predictable voices’’.

This preface diminished the force of the politician’s support and moderated the

intensity of the claim.

Another article on the same page was headlined with a quote by the Minister of

Interior that read ‘‘The decision will be implemented as soon as possible’’. The first

sentences report that the Minister of the Interior expressed his satisfaction with the

decision that removed ‘‘unnecessary hardships’’ from those who ‘‘sincerely and

honestly want to be part of the Jewish people’’ and described his intention to

implement it immediately. However, the rest of the article was devoted to fears by

unnamed senior officials who were quoted as saying that the most problematic issue

remains in place, and that is the possibility of the abuse of the rights that the state

31 Yediot, 1-4-05, p. 3.


123

grants ‘‘Jews’’ who immigrated to Israel…The decision just exacerbates the

situation for us and increases the number of those kinds of ‘‘Jews’’.32 Here as well,

the unfavorable voices were ‘‘the last word’’ in the article, thus strengthening their

effect.

One theme that recurs in several of the articles in Yediot is the question of the

legitimacy of the court’s intervention in deciding ‘‘Who is a Jew’’ issues. This was

invoked both by those who supported and those who objected to the decision. Thus,

one critical opinion piece in Yediot claimed that: ‘‘It is a little ludicrous and mainly

pretentious, and not because the issue is not within the jurisdiction of the HCJ but

because it is not within the jurisdiction of the state. The HCJ can obligate the state,

but not the Halacha. The state can determine ‘‘who is a Jew’’ just like Egged (the

National Bus Company) can determine who is a doctor’’.33 Another observer who

supported the decision claimed that those who complained about state intervention

in religious issues were the first to mix religion in civil affairs. ‘‘From the moment

that the Rabbis and the religious establishment agreed and even demanded that

Halachic issues become laws, these matters ceased being Halacha and became a

law of the land, a law just like any other law’’.34 Thus in Yediot, not only is the

court’s decision a matter for dispute, but the very legitimacy of the court’s

intervention is debated.

The decision is regarded very differently in Haaretz. Of the 17 news, feature and

editorial articles dealing directly with the decision, nine are positive or very

positive, three are neutral, and only five are negative. Thus the proportion of

negative articles is much lower in Haaretz than in Yediot. Not only is the decision

heralded as ‘‘precedential’’, ‘‘groundbreaking’’, ‘‘courageous’’, but it is also

‘‘categorically Zionist’’. Haaretz’ supportive stance is notable from the start, in

the first front page article reporting the decision. In this article, three elements of the

story are highlighted in a separate frame, with boldface type used on the words: Thedecision, The rationale, The winners. Notably there are no losers in Haaretz’

story. The court’s decision is presented as benefiting ‘‘from hundreds to possibly a

thousand people a year’’, and no one is presented as being negatively affected by it.

The photos accompanying the series of articles on the day of the decision

reinforce this positive evaluation of the decision. In addition to two photos of Chief

Justice Barak and two of the petitioners, five captioned passport-sized photos of

politicians and rabbis accompanied the stories.35 Only one was of a Rabbi who

criticized the decision.

Similarly, both the sources cited and the sequential placement of the sources in

Haaretz’ main article mesh with the general positive view of the decision. Haaretzquoted extensively from the majority opinions of Chief Justice Barak and Justice

32 Yediot, 1-4-05, p. 3. This image of a multitude of foreign workers who are just waiting to abuse the

decision and convert in order to obtain the rights of a citizen was commonly used by those objecting to

the decision.33 Yediot, 8-4-05, Sabbath Supplement, p. 22.34 Yediot, 8-4-05, Sabbath Supplement, p. 13.35 Contrary to commonly held notions, Haaretz, the elite newspaper has more photos than the popular

press, at least on a prominent story such as this one. The difference is in the size of the photos. The main

photo in Yediot takes up more of the page than those in Haaretz.


123

Heshin, stressing that the decision is in line with the Zionist ethos of the state.

Haaretz’ presentation of the dissenting opinion is also revealing. While both papers

mention the names of the dissenting judges, and refer to the dissenting opinion of

Justice Procaccia, Haaretz places it after comments by two majority justices and

two petitioners, and it is followed by a statement by one of the petitioners, which

closes the article. In other words, the dissenting opinion is ‘‘sandwiched’’ in

between views that support the decision, thus minimizing its force. Moreover the

dissenting opinion is summarized, rather than quoted and is presented as basically

upholding the position taken by the chief justice.

Justice Procaccia agrees that in principle it is possible to recognize the status

of someone who converted outside of Israel even if he is a resident of Israel,

but there should be state supervision of the conversion process to ensure its

validity and procedural soundness.36

Yediot, by contrast, quotes directly from Justice Procaccia’s minority opinion,

adding authority and credibility to the dissent. Moreover, the excerpt chosen by

Yediot as the essence of Justice Proccia’s decision is much more critical of the

conversion process approved by the majority than the version presented by Haaretz.

The conversion can become a cover-up and a procedure that does not reflect a

genuine wish to become a member of the Jewish people, but simply for

instrumental ends’’ wrote Justice Procaccia. ‘‘Conversion in the pluralistic

denominations is easy and convenient, and there is a suspicion that there will

be abuse of this procedure.37

In addition to a lower proportion of opinion pieces that criticize the decision in

Haaretz, two of the five that do so basically support the decision to accept the ‘‘stop-

over’’ conversions yet they take the court to task for not extending the recognition to

other converts. For example, one article claims that

…yesterday also, the HCJ did not take the final step that would mean deciding

that Reform and Conservative conversions that are conducted in Israel grant

citizenship according to the Law of Return.38

Here, the claim is not that the decision to recognize ‘‘stop-over’’ conversions is

mistaken, but rather that the court should also have recognized non-Orthodox

conversions in Israel. Even a critical article by an Orthodox Rabbi does not so much

oppose the decision as it expresses fears about the possibility of future religion-state

decisions by the court.

If the HCJ were to stop at this stage in its journey to minimize the role of the

Chief Rabbinate and the Jewish Halacha in the lives of Jews in the Jewish

36 Haaretz, 1-4-05, p. 2a.37 Yediot, 1-4-05, p. 3.38 Haaretz, 1-4-05, p. 3a.


123

State, we, the Jews who still espouse the Halacha and its meanings, could live

with it.39

This writer supports the court’s decision, but worries about the implications of

future rulings of the HCJ that may recognize the validity of non-Orthodox

conversions in Israel and ultimately undermine the status of the Rabbinate as the

religious authority in the Jewish state.

What is unquestioned in both Yediot and Haaretz is the right of religious bodies

to control conversion to Judaism and thus dictate eligibility for Israeli citizenship.

Some claimed that the Orthodox establishment was too strict in their demands for

conversion, and thus praised the decision, while others found fault with the Reform

and Conservative procedures that make conversion too simple. However, the notion

that Judaism and thus citizenship should involve conversion by a religious body was

taken for granted by both newspapers, and by the Supreme Court as well.

5 Discussion and Conclusion

We know that the ordinary activity of the Supreme Court is usually hidden from the

public eye, and that our knowledge of Supreme Court activities is by and large

governed by the press coverage of mainly controversial cases [5, 26, 51]. This study

of the coverage of a particularly contentious religion-state HCJ decision used

various approaches from the linguistic and media analysis of texts to analyze the

messages conveyed by the press about the role and legitimacy of the Supreme

Court, and about the identity of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. Despite the

illusion of journalistic neutrality created by the balance in news reports and the

distribution of opinion pieces, the distinct frames used by each newspaper revealed

different images and evaluations of the court and the law, and projected different

meanings regarding the consequences of the decision.

What then, did the readers of Haaretz learn about the legal issues involved in the

Tushbeim case and the Court’s decision about ‘‘stop-over’’ conversions? Because

the elite newspaper chose to frame the dispute in civic terms, Haaretz readers

learned that first and foremost, the case centered on the question of eligibility to be

recognized as an Israeli citizen. Judaism is treated as a ‘‘front-door key’’ for gaining

the automatic citizenship granted to Jews by the Law of Return, a metaphor that

appears in Justice Barak’s decision and is adopted in the headlines and text by the

newspaper. The civic nature of the controversy is sustained by the limited

representation of the role and legitimacy of the Rabbinate and the focus on basically

two actors in the conflict: the state, which enacted the Law of Return and is unable

to pass an amendment to clarify exactly who is entitled to citizenship, and the Court,

that finally decides on the matter on the basis of equality and the desire of the

petitioners. Haaretz takes for granted the Court’s jurisdiction to decide ‘‘Who is a

Jew’’ and ignores the historical role of the Rabbinate in defining Judaism. Only one

39 Haaretz, 13-4-05, p. 2b.


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opinion piece in Haaretz challenged the legitimacy of the court’s intervention by

arguing that a civil court cannot decide matters of religion regulated by religious

laws. Furthermore, Haaretz supports the HCJ for having taken action on an issue

that the political actors sought to avoid. Thus, the HCJ features in the headlines and

in the pictures; supporters of the decision are given prominence in both the reports

and opinion pieces, and the Rabbinate is essentially presented as responsible for the

government’s powerlessness in dealing with the issue.

The favorable image of the HCJ in Haaretz appears even in the few articles that

criticize the Tushbeim decision for ‘‘not going far enough’’. These articles argue that

the Tushbeim ruling rests on strong rationales, yet the HCJ needs to go a step further

and order the recognition of non-Orthodox conversions performed in Israel. In

effect, Haaretz has ‘‘given up’’ on the political process and regards the resolution of

the ‘‘Who is a Jew’’ issue only in terms of future court rulings. The judicial process

is portrayed as superior to the indecisiveness of the Parliament, and the elite

newspaper both endorses the court’s decision and legitimates its role in resolving

the ‘‘Who is a Jew’’ question.

We might have expected that the coverage by the elite press of legal issues would

be more comprehensive than that of the popular press, and that it would present the

full range of views and political implications of an issue as controversial as this one.

While there were more decision-related stories in Haaretz, there was a greater

diversity of views regarding the court’s role in defining Judaism in Yediot. Thus,

within its frame of the controversy as a religious and national issue, the readers of

Yediot were exposed to the problematics of a secular court deciding on the question

of Jewish identity. While acknowledging the implications of Judaism as a key for

automatic Israeli citizenship, Yediot basically adopted a narrative that emphasized

the religious heritage and shared history of the Jewish people that underscored the

struggle to establish Israel as a Jewish state. Addressing the religious and national

dimensions of Judaism, the popular newspaper reported the Tushbeim decision in

colloquial terms that mocked the ‘‘stop-over’’ conversions approved by the court,

and the subsequent blurring of the boundaries between Jews and non-Jews.

Criticism of the court and its ruling was conveyed both by linguistic means, and by

the structure of the articles. Petitioners were portrayed as non-Jews and not as long-

term legal residents of Israel, and the dissenting judgments and criticism by the

Rabbinate were strategically positioned to undermine the case for the decision in

both reports and opinion pieces. Yediot also drew on the theme of the abuse of the

decision by foreign workers to criticize the court for being an irresponsible and

strife-producing institution. The image of the HCJ that was depicted admirably in

Haaretz as an alternative to the weak political system was tempered in Yediot where

voices suggesting that the court may have overstepped its judicial bounds received

greater exposure.

The mass media have become the arena where various social groups, institutions

and ideologies struggle over the definition and construction of social reality [29,

p. 252]. Although we expect that newspapers will expose us to the various sides to a

dispute, we know that issues are defined and framed in such a way as to reinforce

dominant ideologies and power structures [29]. Thus, although Haaretz and Yediotadopted different frames in their coverage of the Tushbeim decision, neither


123

newspaper substantially questioned the religious identity of Israeli citizenship. In

both newspapers, the notion that Judaism and thus Israeli citizenship should involve

conversion by a religious body was taken for granted. Virtually no place in the

media discourse about the Tushbeim decision was allotted to ideas that contest the

religious definition of Judaism. Only one article in Haaretz challenged the religious

basis for admission to the Jewish people as the criterion for defining eligibility for

automatic Law of Return citizenship. Thus, what appear to be very different

narratives with divergent evaluations and views of the court ruling in Tushbeim, are

in fact presented within a taken-for-granted schema that endorses the religion-state

compromises that have long been an integral feature of Israeli public discourse. In

their coverage of the Tushbeim case, both Haaretz and Yediot avoided addressing

the basic question of whether religious authorities should control the definition of

the character of Israel as a Jewish State. By ‘‘naming the contest’’ [43, p. 529] as it

does, and evading a challenge to this basic question, the media in effect support

hegemonic values of the Jewish majority and define the terms of the struggle over

Israel’s Jewish identity within consensual boundaries.

Acknowledgments We would like to thank the Department of Interdisciplinary Social Science Studies

of Bar Ilan University, and the School of Law of the College of Management for their support of this

project. We would also like to thank Sharon Avital for her efficient assistance in locating and collecting

the articles.

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Clashing Over Conversion:Who is a Jew and Media Representations of an Israeli Supreme Court Decision

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