Coin Evidence: a Mercian – Wessex Alliance 874-878?

Like Prof Dumville this author is somewhat reluctant to place too much reliance on coins; one is in

agreement with his statement that the coin evidence “... does not make overt historical statements ...

I ... suggest ... that recent interpretations ... for the period 873-886 be reconsidered ... otherwise

[the] clash with the other historical evidence is unavoidable” (Dumville Wessex and England from

Alfred to Edgar 1992 p17 fn79 commenting on the proposals of Loyn and Blackburn). Echoing this

position the writer would focus on the crucial and critical events between 871 and 878 to assist in

the proposed ‘reconsideration’ of those ‘recent interpretations’. In as much as Anglo-Saxon studies

could ever be described as a subject of journalistic sensationalism, the discovery in late 2014 of a

coin hoard in Oxfordshire was presented in a full page article and referred to in a leader in The

Times, among other newspapers, as proof of a Stalinist like ‘falsification’ of history by Alfred,

quoting the curatorial assessors of the find. This hoard has led the author to write a new section to

this paper (see The Watlington Hoard of 2014 below).

The author wishes to emphasise the distinction between ‘numismatic information’ and ‘numismatist

theory’; it is the latter set of opinions that are promoted as ‘Coin Evidence’ rather than the

inscriptions on the coins giving us neutral or positive information; that is they are “recent

interpretations”. Essentially the numismatists theories contradict the geopolitical and temporal

Statements of the documentation. Their theory would if adopted fundamentally distort our

understanding of the period under review. More pointedly, the numismatists provide a theory for a

non-existant problem as there are no issues with the record to which they are providing a solution.

Indeed, the theories as adumbrated create confusions as to an understanding of the period under

review. The author presents his opinions as being informed by the military and geopolitical textual

reports that are readily available and can be interrogated for their veracity and tested against other

reports which in turn can be scrutinised in regard to these.

Coins would be issued for two different purposes which would govern their quality:

i) for internal trade; ii) for use with external parties (either trade or tribute). Clearly some may have

been produced for vanity/status purposes and there is the essential fiscal – taxation process of ‘re-

coining’, calling-in and reissuance which was also related to tributary payments.

The numismatists theories discussed here are based on positions related to their understanding of

the ‘temporal issuance’ of coins and ‘locative control’ of such issues. With these opinions they

include that of the role of moneyers in the period. These matters are analysed in detail below.

Blackburn in this collection and elsewhere (Hill & Rumble 1996 and Blackburn, Mark. 1998 and

‘The London Mint in the Reign of Alfred’ in Kings, Currency and Alliance ... in the Ninth Century,)

proposes that there was an Alfredian ‘monetary reform’ dated closely to 875-6, during Guthrum’s

first invasion and before Ethandun. This theory he explains occurred in relation to monetary or

economic ‘alliances’. The present writer argues that this proposal can have little basis in the

prevailing military and political circumstances of that period. Blackburn goes further and offers

narrow precise dating of ‘880’ for another Alfredian coinage reform (Blackburn: Hill and Rumble

1996; §8 pp160-163). It is unclear what text or opinion Blackburn’s assertions are based on.

Such dates can only be arrived at by accepting some historians arguments about the date of the

Treaty or Alfred’s occupation of London and then arguing from that unproven assumption and

concluding on a false premise for the dating for the coins. From there we find that some historians

pick up that numismatic theory and use it as proof of their own proposal; the referents and their

arguments become circular (see literature developing this cited by Naismith London and its Mint ca

880 - 1066: A Preliminary Survey in British Numismatic Journal 83, p51 2013). Haslam et al rely

on Blackburn’s interpretation for their arguments, the latter are then adopted by other numismatists

as the historical ‘proof’ of the Blackburnian theory. The coins are then provided as proof of the

‘historiographic’ theory. Therefore, the coin ‘evidence’ for these theories are not valid. This author

argues that the period of 875-879 was one when the Anglo-Saxon polities were at their nadir with

the collapse of any previous alliances against the Great Army, were just precariously holding on to

temporary advantages and not an appropriate time for fiscal experimentation. Similarities of motifs

on coinage across Europe and further afield do not prove anything about political arrangements.

Inferences from Inscriptions

Two examples of making historical inferences from coins:

1) ‘ALVVOLDVS’ inscribed on a coin from Northumbria is said to have been produced for

Æthelwold after his alleged acceptance as ‘king’ by the Northumbrians after 900 following his

flight from Wessex; the coins being proposed as commissioned to represent that. Leaving aside that

Stenton believes that both the dating and the inscription (‘Æthelwold’ would not be transcribed as

‘ALVVOLDVS’) are unsafe (ASE p322 fn2) so that the ascription and dating are circular; it surely

is as likely that if they are indeed coins of Æthelwold then he issued them himself from his own

bullion as it is unlikely he had arrived in the north penniless, ie he simply paid a group of Vikings to

act as his army and in that sense he was their ‘king’. Another of these was found in the Silverdale

Hoard of 2011 (Lancashire ie also Northumbria) along with the sole example of one inscribed

‘AIRDECONVT : – : DNS : REX’ (Harthcnut : - : Lord : King) with those of Alfred (Ian

Richardson, Two hoards and one unknown Viking ruler. British Museum 2011). All that these can

indicate, along with the names of other ‘kings’ we find references to eg Eohric, killed at The Holme

902-904, or Eowils, Halfdan and Ohtar killed at Tettenhall 910, or ‘Sigtryggr’ of Lindsey ca 930s,

and any number of Sitrics and Olafs is that kingship (and minting) were rather more diffuse among

the Viking armies of Northumbria than the notion of some ‘regality’ centred on York with a related

treasury function. Indeed, it was probably just as decentralised as ‘kingship’ in the eastern midlands

was when Edward defeated the Viking-armies of those areas piecemeal during his reign. Mint

‘signatures’ of York of various minor, obscure or otherwise unrecorded kings’ coinage may indicate

nothing more than a quality control mark of a standard that was readily recognised. Whether such

multiple issues had also represented or indicated a tributary relationship to an ‘over king’ among

subordinates or some primus inter pares is impossible to ascertain from our lack of knowledge of

the dynamic of the alliances or internal political arrangements obtaining among them. Perhaps as

we had seen with Halfdan with the Great Army and Hæstan in the 890s there was a coalition under

a military leadership of a well regarded ‘heroic’ figure.

2) The Cuerdale Hoard; found near Preston on the Ribble, in 1840, were some 3,000 uncirculated

silver pennies inscribed ‘CNVT’ with a cross of some sort on them, as part of one of the largest

hoards discovered in the UK. It was proposed that the hoard was deposited by Hiberno-Vikings

coming from or going to Dublin as hidden booty, ie circa 905-10, although as they were successful

in both directions in that period it is difficult to understand the circumstances of deposition. The

proposed dating preferences are themselves vague. This Knut has been suggested as a short term

Dano-Viking King of Yorvik ca 900. He may only have been a sub-king and have ruled in the west

Pennine area somewhere between the Lune and the Mersey. He might as easily have been the

depositor and having just had the coins produced was on the defensive from the Hiberno-Vikings

much later ca after 917. However, within the same hoard were coins of one ‘SIEFREDVS’ of

Alfred, Edward, ‘St Edmund’ and also of ‘Æthelstan’ (probably of Guthrum, otherwise the date of

deposition would be skewed by a quarter of a century and more). Any theory trying to relate these

to a specific set of circumstances in local politics with a narrow date can only create further

confusion. Neither Alfred, nor Edward in the first decade of the Tenth Century, ever had any status

in Northumbria and so their coins could only have arrived there as part of trade, or more likely

tributary, payments. There are many contrary theories about this hoard and this author’s is as valid

as any of them (see summary of papers and references Anglo-Saxon Discovery: Meet the Vikings.

Ashmolean Museum 2005 G Williams et al).

In both cases the suggestion is that we have to find a succession of ‘kings’ with full control over the

whole of Northumbria and in trying do so we would find some either remarkably short reigns or

‘overlapping’ ones to the confusion of some commentators. Clearly, these problems evaporate if we

regard these kings reigns as being in parallel, ‘co-kings’ and/ or being either subordinate to each

other and/ or with discreet territorial interests. Internecine conflict both between them and Hiberno-

Vikings makes matters more obscure. Once again the ‘Coin Evidence’ is made to fit a theory (See

also Alex Woolf, ‘Review of Northumbria, 500–1100: Creation and Destruction of a Kingdom’,

ScotHR 86 (2007), 132–34 and his Scandinavian Dynasties in English Kingdoms at academia.edu).

There could be an assumption that the Great Army was a monolith which concentrated control over

the areas it invaded, but it was in effect a series of alliances and coalitions between various war

groups which attacked together and then divided up piecemeal the Anglo-Saxon polities. These

coalitions can be discerned more easily when we analyse how they were allied in both the ‘Last

War of Alfred’ in the mid 890s and in his son’s, Edward’s, conquest of these territories in the

second decade of the Tenth Century. What then of Anglo-Saxon alliances against the Great Army?

A Monetary and Military ‘alliance’?

Abels in reviewing some of Blackburn’s arguments is taken with the idea of some formal ‘monetary

union’ following from Wessex’s alliance with Burgred and flowing through to Ceolwulf II’s ‘reign’

and this was due to Alfred’s holding off the Halfdan attacks in 871 (Abels ‘Alfred the Great’ 1998

pp 142-146). That was hardly an overwhelming success for Alfred, as Abels admits it involved in

‘buying peace’ ie selling short his alliance with Mercia if effective after 867 (this author’s proposed

Treaty of Wilton of 871 see §Alfred and Guthrum’s Treaty). Neither kingdom was in any position to

make such an alliance, indeed the military one had largely failed and continued to do so. In 870 the

invaders crossed southern Mercia from East Anglia and settled at Reading which was in the Wessex

Thames borders of Berk-shire. Burgred had previously allowed transit across Mercia to the Great

Army to attack East Anglia. This proves that any effective alliance by Wessex with the Mercians

had ceased and the Viking army had now arrived to directly threaten Æthelred I’s kingdom. From

870 both Wessex and Burgred’s Mercia appear to be on their own, they had no combined operations

thereafter until Guthrum’s retreat to the east in 879. Halfdan went from Reading in 871 to occupy

Lundenbyrig, perhaps this term indicates the Roman intramural area; this can hardly be construed as

a success for either the kingdoms of Wessex or Mercia on which some unified monetary

arrangement could be made. At this date there was no alliance at all on which to base this proposed

monetary reform.

Neither was Ceolwulf II, replacing Burgred in 874, in a position to forge any alliance with Alfred

because he too was compromised by the circumstances of his own accession, the ceding of major

parts of Mercia to Halfdan; probably the areas of the later Leicester-, Northampton-, and Bedford-

shires (this author’s proposed Halfdan–Ceolwulf Treaty see §Alfred and Guthrum’s Treaty below).

The Statement at ASC sa 873 r 874 following Burgred’s departure to Rome is more detailed than

just the hostile epithet description of his successor and says:-

7 þy ilcan geare hi sealdon Ceolwulfe anum unwisum cynges þegne Myrcena rice to healdenne, 7

he him aðas swor 7 gislas sealde þet hit him georo wære swa hwilce dæge swa hi hit habban

woldon 7 he geare wære mid him sylfum 7 mid eallum þam þe him gelæstan wolden to þæs heres

þærfe. “& the same year [r874] they [ie the Great Army] granted to Ceolwulf, a foolish king’s thegn, the

kingdom of Mercia to be held & he to them swore & granted hostages, that it [ie Mercia] should be

ready for them whichever day they might want it, & he himself & with all of them of his, to do so for

the Viking-army’s need”. (my translation and glosses).

It is difficult to describe this arrangement as in any way less than a submission to and alliance with

the Great Army; it can hardly be a mere gloss or a side swipe to besmirch Ceolwulf as suggested by

the theories discussed here. Alfred was not in a position to demand any status within Mercia or

‘London’ in 874 from either Ceolwulf or Halfdan. The suggestion of Alfred instituting a monetary

reform from 880 is to smuggle in the argument that by this date he had already acquired ‘London’

following a Treaty with Guthrum in the west-country in 879, itself a contentious position. Such

fiscal arrangements after 886 are less problematic, but by then Guthrum and the other Viking

armies had reached some sort of stable peace arrangement with the Anglo-Saxon alliance put

together between Alfred and Æthelred following the institution of the military programme of the

Burghal Hidage and would not be challenged until after Guthrum’s demise.

Most of the ‘monetary alliance’ argument rested (at that time of publication in 1992) on an

interpretation of coins struck for Alfred by the Mercian moneyer bearing the inscription ‘rex sm’

(proposed as “possibly ... Rex Saxonum et Merciorum”: Blackburn ibid p146 fn54) suggesting he

had some control over part of Mercia in the period with the agreement of Ceolwulf II (op cit pp145-

146). There is no evidence of any alliance or association between them at all, given the hostility of

the ASC’s references to Ceolwulf in the context of his submission to Halfdan in 874 and to

Guthrum’s army in 877 (this author’s proposed Halfdan–Ceolwulf Treaty and Guthrum–Ceolwulf

Treaty see §Alfred and Guthrum’s Treaty below). Alfred’s reign lasted for twenty years after that of

Ceolwulf, we need not regard that any Alfredian-‘Mercian’ coins were produced

contemporaneously to Ceolwulf at all. The window for an alliance with Ceolwulf is very narrow.

Therefore, it is difficult to place just when such an agreement with Alfredian Wessex could have

been made between 871 and 877, nor need we posit this. The defeats at Nottingham in 867, Reading

in 870, Wilton and occupation of Lundenbyrig in 871, either jointly or severally for the two English

kingdoms gave their attempted alliance the quietus. Torksey and Lindsey were lost by Burgred’s

peace with Halfdan in 872. Even before his ‘abdication’ Burgred can hardly be regarded as an

independent king having ceded territory and diplomatic support to the Great Army by continuously

striking bad bargains of ‘buying peace’ in both territory and specie. Repton was occupied in 873

and Derby probably shortly after when Burgred abdicated in 874. The southern Midlands

Northampton-‘shire’, Leicester-‘shire’, were probably taken at Ceolwulf’s accession. When

Guthrum occupied Cambridge shortly after this the final slice of eastern Mercia was taken.

Despite Alfred’s vigilance he had to fend off an invasion by Guthrum at Wareham in 875 which

moved to a siege at Exeter in 876. Coelwulf’s accession in 874 as an ally of the Great Army and

submission to Guthrum in 877 hardly indicates an appropriate period for the purpose of a common

economic policy. The most that could be achieved by Alfred in these circumstances would be a re-

coinage, ie a tax levy, as a requirement of raising sufficient funds for paying Danegeld and/ or

raising capital for military re-organisation of the kingdom. The author suggests that such fiscal

measures may well have been the cause of his debacle at Chippenham see §Wessex Resurgant).

Common Coin Motifs

The ‘monetary alliance’ proposal is an exceptional argument in that it actually cannot be supported

by any other evidence. Was this proposed meaning of the ‘rex sm’ style and title adopted by or ever

applied to Alfred? Is there even an indication he was ever referred to as ‘King of Mercia/ns’,

Edward the Elder was not, even after 918, as we first see the title given to a West Saxon perhaps

Æthelstan, in 924, but not again conclusively until Edgar in 957 when Eadwig was rejected north of

the Thames. Alfred was later described as ‘king of the Angles and Saxons’ and by a stretch of the

language used in the Treaty as ‘king of all the English nation’ (‘Anglecynn rice’).

Fig 3: ‘Cross and Lozenge’ Fig 4: ‘Monogram London’

To try to explain away this lack of evidence it cannot be said that this was a matter of ASC re-

writing history excluding the role of Ceolwulf II or an alliance with him, or that he was playing

some clever game with Halfdan and Alfred (cf Haslam 2006 op cit.). If this proposed earlier

territorial acquisition by Alfred of Mercian territory (perhaps just London) had actually happened

867-874-877 then the ASC could easily have included a Statement as a legitimation of Alfred’s later

position and still degraded the last Mercian ‘king’s’ role as well. If this ‘rex sm’ inscription did

imply Alfred’s status in both kingdoms, very dubiously, then it was simply a later issue than

assumed, ie after the events of Ethandun, BH Programme, Retreat of Guthrum etc ie from 879.

There was a ‘monetary and political union’ of sorts as a result of the alliance with Ealdorman

Æthelred then. Any coins which describe Alfred as ‘Rex Angl ...’ likewise could only have been

struck after 879 or probably only after 886 ie after the ‘disappearance’ of Ceolwulf II.

Alfred also issued coins of ‘+LoN:DI’ ie ‘monogram London’ types, Blackburn claims between 879

and 886 (see Fig 4) which is the period between the Statements in the annals between Guthrum’s

leaving of Cirencester for ‘East Anglia’ (with an assumption that he abandoned London and east of

the Colne-Ouzel to move east of the Lee) and the ‘settlement’ of London by Alfred. The

numismatic evidence cannot give us an exact date, only a range and this preferred range is itself

based on the arguments between historians of the period. The contrast with Alfred’s so called

‘Cross and Lozenge’ issue is pertinent.

In the ‘Cross and Lozenge’ type (Fig 3) Alfred is describedon the obverse as ‘ÆLFRE : DREXS’;

the ‘S’ is suggested as indicating ‘Saxonum’. The ‘Monogram London’ type (see Fig 4) states

simply ‘ÆLFR EDREX’. Although this does not limit his authority to just the Saxons it need not

imply anything else, ie as king of all the English/ Mercians-Saxons. Alfred described himself, as did

contemporaries, as ‘King of the West Saxons’. Earlier coin issues of other English kings designate

them merely as ‘Rex’, indeed Ceolwulf II issued similar coins with this inscription and he can

hardly be described as a unifying and leading figure, he never having been more than king of the

Mercians and in reality only of the ‘English’ Mercians, the remnant after Burgred’s and his own

cessions to the Halfdan and Guthrum’s armies. As to precedence of issuance, Blackburn’s

assumption is that the ‘Lozenge/ Rex/S’ pre-dates the ‘London/ Rex’ type because of his

interpretation of these abbreviations (Blackburn op cit).

Burgred, Halfdan and Ceolwulf II also issued coins with the ‘+LoN:DI’ reverse but with portrait

obverses representing themselves. Haslam (after Blackburn etc) argues that these were issued in

parallel to demonstrate a series of alliances and takeovers in and around ‘London’ in the period

872-879 to explain this (Haslam op cit). No alliances need be proposed nor sharing of status in

regard to ‘London’. One wonders why Halfdan should take control of this and then give rights in it

to Alfred. Surely, the following proposal is more straightforward an explanation of the London

monogram issues. A leading minter was active in London and he and his clients retained the same

reverse to show his quality mark and changed only the portrait obverse to reflect the origin of

bullion.

This could be done in two ways to produce the series of similar coins by the moneyers, who often

moved around mints and royal employers with their specialist skills, the same moneyer would

produce coins for different clients:-

1) ‘consecutive issues’: Burgred’s coins were struck before 871, Halfdan’s coins between 871-4,

Ceolwulf II’s 874-877/79 and Alfred’s from 886. Why need we make the evidence show anything

more complicated than that?

2) The alternative, is ‘concurrent issues’: if we accept there was an overlap in production or ‘joint

issue’ in Blackburn’s proposal, then this would occur when the Vikings demanded gold and silver

‘for Peace’, which had to be of a particular fineness. Minters were specialist craftsmen and

professionally required to produce coins of a certain standard and quality. So the uniform and

improved coinage is actually a condition of the ‘peace’ bought by the English kingdoms from the

Vikings. This is surely the principal reason as to why there was a convergance in quality and style

of issuance by the two remaining independent Anglo-Saxon kingdoms and why the Viking-army

issue is similar to them. It wasn’t anything to do with any alliance between any parties at all but

required of them by their mutual enemy. ‘London’ was not an “open city” with free trading English

and Vikings using the same currency. The London monogram is simply a reflection of that common

quality mark of the moneyer and the bust that of the king whose bullion it was struck from and who

made the payment to the Vikings (Halfdan’s were for status and trade). These therefore are not

‘joint issues’ but rather ‘concurrent issues’ and the theories are really about ‘temporal issueance’.

There is an ancillary point to be made related to these ‘temporal issueance’ arguments which is that

of ‘locative control’ of them and the role of moneyers. This argument of the author is supported by

incidental evidence of Blackburn who demonstrates that Guthrum (as Christian named ‘Æthelstan’)

used the same moneyer as Alfred in his kingdom 880-890 (or whatever date is given for the

movement to east of the Lee and thence to his death). Blackburn also points out (relying on Loyn)

that mint output volume and quality declined towards the close of Alfred’s reign and the beginning

of his son’s: the suggestion is because a plague caused an economic downturn (Blackburn: Hill &

Rumble 1996 op cit). Surely the reduction in specie was because Alfred was now in his winning

period and did not have to offer tributary payments anymore. Also, Blackburn claims that ‘Alfred’

coins were extensively circulated in the Danish areas before the re-conquest (Blackburn cited in

Abels ibid p166-7). This supports this writer’s view, not that there was a monetary union but that

the coins were principally meant as payment for the Viking host and ‘supervised’ by their agent.

Again, Blackburn quotes his own authority when he claims evidence that Alfred’s coins where

struck at ‘London’ for a few years after Burgred’s abdication, ie in a period when the success of the

‘Great Army’ and its fractions were causing problems for Wessex as well (Blackburn in Hill &

Rumble 1996 op cit §8 p169). There is no independent proof that Wessex had any say north of the

Thames in this period. Surely, if any ‘Alfredian’ coins were minted in ‘London’ at that date this was

nothing to do with any purported ‘alliance’ or political status involving that place and Wessex, but

more to do with paying tribute of sufficiently quality to satisfy the Vikings who were in control of

‘London’, its Mint and trade. Alfred’s military reverses and truces from 871-875 put him in no

negotiating position with the enemy to demand anything in ‘London’; he was just about holding on

to the core of Wessex. Here the theory is proposed without much in terms of background references

and then the ‘Coin Evidence’ is announced as providing the supportive proof of the theory.

The learned numismatist position is driven by the concept that there must be ‘exclusivity’ of

production in a minting place and this is by exerting territorial control of it. Yet, oddly the ‘joint

issue’ argument at base contradicts that concept anyway, for how could conjoint sovereignty be

exercised exclusively? The logic of the numismatist position is based on a ‘false syllogism’ which

takes the form:

“i: Kings produce coins in their kingdoms exclusively eg ‘X king in X country and Y king in Y

country’;

ii: Coins of X king have been produced in Y country;

iii: Therefore - X king controls Y country”.

Stated in this way we can see that the term that is missed in the logic is that nothing need exclude

the condition

“X king had Y king’s coins produced in X country”;

which is what is proposed by this author in that Halfdan required the production of Ceolwulf’s and

Alfred’s coins in London as part of his quality control of tribute through the moneyer based there.

On the whole, Blackburn can add nothing germane to the Burghal Hidage List dating because his

whole essay shifts across a history of mints in various burhs between the reigns of Alfred, Edward

and Æthelstan (Blackburn op cit passim §8); all that he can show is that various burhs had mints for

those kings at some part of their reigns. This is not really that informative.

The Watlington Hoard of 2014

However, the Blackburnian theory has been somewhat revitalised by other numismatists due to the

discovery of the Watlington Hoard in October 2014 and extensively reported in the press and other

media. These reports stemmed from the display of the find by the British Museum marking its new

exhibition of December 2015. As Dumville noted in 1992 of the proposal on the numismatist

theories that their “...recent interpretations ... for the period 873-886 be reconsidered” (Dumville

loc cit). The current writer repeats that warning and suggestion on this most recent find. The

interpretation is predicated on finding ‘Two Emperors’ types for Ceolwulf and Alfred together in

the Hoard. The previous proposal of the same theory was based on the ‘monogram London’ types

of both kings being found, albeit separately. The role of historiography is to analyse and simplify

events so that they can be explained rationally to the uninformed. The alternatives, offered by this

writer, to date of issuance or precedence of coins with the same Reverses to different monarchs’

Obverses has been explored and explained above as either:-

1) ‘consecutive issues’ and

2) ‘concurrent issues’.

If they are ‘consecutive issues’ then there is no reason to postulate joint sovereignty or alliances. In

the ‘concurrent issues’ case there need not be any assumption that minting in a place proves in any

way the authoritative control by King X of that mint place’s territory, eg the London mint. The

Watlington Hoard seems to provide evidence that the different issues deposited together is

indicative of the ‘concurrent issue’ but not for the Blackburnian ‘joint issue’ which is predicated on

exclusive territorial control of a mint’s location or some kind of ‘joint / co-kingship’. The author

simply regards the location of the mint/ moneyer as the place of the quality control of bullion for

purposes of tribute. One is tempted to leave the argument there but for the significant general

publication coverage in the national press and broadcasting media of this archaeological discovery

and the formal authoritative statements by leading numismatists. Alfred, Ceolwulf and Halfdan

cannot all have controlled London together, the other evidence indicates that a Viking-army

remnant did so (see §Guthrum’s Retreat of 879 and § Alfred and Guthrum’s Treaty below).

The Speculative Deposition Circumstances

Whenever a find of a hoard is made there is much speculation as to how it was lost, with

suggestions as to how and crucially when it was deposited. Unfortunately, too much is made of

these sort of proposals which one often sees repeated as a hard fact. The Watlington Hoard it is

proposed was abandoned “... sometime after the Battle of Edington ...” in 878 (Williams op cit) by a

recently deceased member of Guthrum’s or of the Great Army, who did not live to recover it. It is

taken that the depositor was a Viking because of the presence in the Hoard of items of hack silver,

that is if we accept a Viking had deposited it at all. Now Watlington is some way from the area of

that battle, indeed in Mercia not Wessex. We know that Guthrum’s Army was kettled in a fort after

Edington, usually suggested as Chippenham, for a period covering the negotiations in Somerset

between himself and Alfred which culminated in that force’s leaving of Wessex, decamping

Chippenham to settle at Cirencester. In 879 Guthrum moves eastwards to ‘East Anglia’ usually

defined as east of the Lea, although at least east of the Colne-Ouzel. Certainly the Oxford-shire and

Berks-shire areas were vacated by the Viking army in 879 as they moved to the east but there are no

military operations mentioned. Whether Guthrum had agreed to go by a treaty (the consensus) or it

was entirely voluntary and induced by the military situation for Guthrum (this writer) he seems to

have done so unmolested. So the loss of the hoard may be due to the death of a Viking who never

returned from the previous battles. But these battles stretch back to Wareham in 875. So much for

speculation, but the date of ‘878’ as a terminus post quem has just been demonstrated as unsafe and

could be in the period of battles and sieges earlier than this. However, we have no real proof against

the counter-argument that the Hoard was lost after 886, in the 890s, when there were other Viking

incursions into Æthelred’s Mercia. The other assumption of two or more coin types being found as

deposited together is extended to the proposal that they are issued concurrently. Yet we often find in

hoards coins of different periods or even of different areas, such as European coins mixed with

those of Alfred and Edward. It is selective to the argument to be proved that because Alfred and

Ceolwulf’s coins are found together that they are contemporary and this somehow proves the theory

that they issued them conjointly.

The Numismatists Theory

The present writer’s position is situated against the overall political and military background

presented in the documents and the proposed ‘Coin Evidence’ is not be seen as contradicting that.

The following numismatists argument is a theory not based on anything other than assumptions and

misreadings of this and therefore the ‘Coin Evidence’ in effect does not support their theory.

The arguments, as reported, of Gareth Williams (British Museum Curator of Medieval Coinage)

referring to the discovery of this Hoard was that the coins both had a ‘Two Emperors’ image on the

Reverse accompanied by the inscription of either Ceolwulf’s or Alfred’s name and/or busts on their

Obverse which he claimed “.... signified that they were minted in an area ruled by the two kings in

an equal coalition”. Furthermore Dr John Naylor, a Curator of the Ashmolean Museum of Oxford

University, is also quoted as opining that the coins indicated a “... more sustained alliance [between

Wessex and Mercia] against the Vikings that lasted for some years” (The Times 11 December 2015

p3 ‘Alfred airbrushed ally from history’ by David Sanderson and untitled leader p41 anon; as well

as an interview with Michael Wood on the BBC R4 Today programme largely stating the same

view. This press conference and release was for the exhibition Hoards: the hidden history of

ancient Britain of December 2015 and see http://www.britishmuseum.org/whats_on/exhibitions/hoards.aspx).

The article’s contributors continue “Historical documents suggest that Ceolwulf had been a weak

king ... The coinage tells us a slightly different story ... There was more an alliance of equals. The

evidence is quite strong.” (op cit Naylor) With full respect, to the learned Curators, the Watlington

Hoard proves no such thing and the ‘evidence’ is purely a supposition of the scholars involved.

Most obviously as Prof Dumville has said about this theory, which has been promoted previously

by Prof Blackburn in particular, the coin evidence “... does not make overt historical statements ...”

(Dumville loc cit). Yet the curatorial interpretation is that the coins do make such an ‘overt

statement’ and one could be forgiven for assuming that these coins bear the names of both Alfred

and Ceolwulf together (Williams confirmed to author that the Obverses are differently inscribed

“Ceolwulf/Ciowulf Rex (M) and Alfred (various spellings) Rex, sometimes with indications of who

he was king of.” the Reverses have the names of the moneyer: pers comm 22/12/2015 and final

report forthcoming). In fact they only share the Reverse pattern of the ‘Two Emperors’ (‘proving’

equal status) and the ‘Cross and Lozenge'.

Yet the ‘Two Emperors’ pattern is a common feature of coins produced in the Anglo-Saxon era,

across the Heptarchy, being an imitative design of a style originating from the Roman Empire

copied by insular rulers’ mints, notably Offa of Mercia. That these common themes appeared

among the coins struck for various rulers of the different states, ‘Cross and Lozenge’, ‘Monogram

London’ or ‘Two Emperors’ does not prove any such assertions as to ‘co-kingship’, economic

union or alliances.

What would the numismatists view be if coins were discovered on which there appeared a bust of

Guthrum with the ‘Two Emperors’ Reverse? Presumably, some convoluted theory would be

proposed that indicated a ‘triple alliance’ or that a Alfred-Guthrum conjoint monarchy had also

obtained in this period.

This gives rise to another query: an alliance between Alfred and Ceolwulf perhaps, but against

whom? Surely it would be against Halfdan’s led Great Army. Yet what were the joint operations by

them against it from 874? Was it a joint coalition between them and with Halfdan or another Viking

Army? Why then does Guthrum invade Wessex at Wareham without being attacked by the

Mercians or their putative Viking allies in 875? Haslam suggested that Ceolwulf was playing off the

Vikings against Alfred; why would he therefore create an alliance ad novo with Wessex at all in

874? He clearly has one with Halfdan anyway at his accession. Why would Alfred form an alliance

with an ally of the Great Army? Of course this argument itself already assumes that Alfred had a

presence in ‘London’ in joint sovereignty, presumably granted by Ceolwulf and his Viking ally in

order to take it back off Alfred again; so what was the point of that?

Timing of an ‘alliance’ - when?

Offering a Ceolwulf-Alfred ‘equal coalition’ has been seen as problematic by this writer because on

the numismatists proposal, as Dumville has pointed out, there is a “... clash with the other historical

evidence ...” (Dumville op cit). The issues as to how this proposed ‘equal coalition’ could have

arisen have to be fitted into the available chronology from that evidence, essentially the ASC

accounts. If the coins indicated a “... more sustained alliance ... that lasted for some years” (Naylor

op cit 2015) then that proposal has to be defined quite specifically: which years exactly, rather than

as a nebulous period of “... some years”. To illustrate the possible time range a grid is provided by

the author of the dates and events in Mercia and Wessex in relation to the Great Army’s activities

and that of Burgred’s-Ceolwulf’s and Æthelred I-Alfred’s reigns as have come down to us from the

ASC account. All these proposed numismatist events, of monetary and military alliances, have to be

compressed into 874-877 as a remote maximum possibility and effectively the ‘singularity’ of 874-

875. (see figure 5).

From this it can be seen that if there was any independence of action by Ceolwulf II to form an

alliance with Alfred-Wessex, with his remnant of independent Mercia, it could only have occured

between 874 when he succeeded Burgred (and after he had already allied with Halfdan) and the

next year 875 when he is not seen as helping Alfred at Wareham. Indeed in 874 he already seems to

have accepted the loss of Cambridge to Guthrum. By a stretch of the timing he may have remained

a ‘sleeping’ ally of Alfred until Guthrum arrives in 877 in ‘Independent’ Mercia from Exeter, but

what sort of alliance is that? Furthermore, it is indeed strange that the clear existence of an alliance

between the two kingdoms by the marriage of Æthelwulf’s daughter Æthelswith of Wessex to

Burgred of Mercia shortly after 853 is not mentioned by the numismatists in this same context, yet

it led to the joint operations between them against the Welsh and later the Vikings at Nottingham.

Fig 5 Time line of events in Mercia and Wessex between 865 and 886

MERCIA WESSEX

865 Great Army arrives in Kent, then goes to East Anglia

and then 866 to York/ Northumbria

867 Great Army takes Nottingham

Burgred ‘makes peace’ with them.

867 Æthelred I supports Burgred at Nottingham

869 Great Army crosses to East Anglia

870 Halfdan crosses from East Anglia to Wessex via Mercia

arrives at Reading

871 Halfdan occupies London: Mercians ‘make peace’

again (‘Treaty at London’ Burgred and Halfdan)

871 Nine major battles: Alfred succeeds to throne and

‘makes peace’ with Halfdan after defeat at Wilton

(‘Treaty of Wilton’)

872 Halfdan returns through Mercia to York. Later

occupies Torksey-Lindsey from York/ Northumbria; Burgred ‘makes peace’ again.

873 Viking-army takes Repton – (and ‘Derby-shire’)

874 Burgred abdicates –

replaced by Ceolwulf II who forms an ‘alliance’ with

Halfdan who returns to Northumbria (‘Halfdan – Ceolwulf Treaty’)

874 Guthrum arrives in Cambridge from Repton

875 Guthrum arrives at Wareham from Cambridge is

besieged by Alfred and a peace made - Treaty of Wareham then

876 Guthrum marches to and occupies Exeter

877 Guthrum arrives in Hwicce in the harvest and

‘divides up’ Ceolwulf II’s independent Mercia. No

more references to Ceolwulf. (‘Guthrum – Ceolwulf Treaty’)

877 Guthrum departs Exeter for Mercia. (‘Treaty of Exeter’ Alfred – Guthrum)

878 Guthrum attacks Alfred at Chippenham who flees.

Alfred returns, defeats Guthrum’s army at Ethandun, then

makes a peace with him (‘Treaty of Wedmore’)

879 Guthrum leaves Chippenham goes to Cirencester.

879 Guthrum retreats to the east ‘East Anglia’.

883 Alfred ‘at London’ siege

886 Alfred ‘settles’ London and gives it to Æthelred

‘Alfred and Guthrum Treaty’ defines spheres of influence.

Indeed it is hard to discern any grounds for an anti-Viking alliance between Wessex and Mercia that

survived into the reign of Alfred (from 871) and also that of Ceolwulf (from 874). The only

‘alliance’ discernible was that from 867 between the deceased Æthelred I (d 871) and the deposed

Burgred (to 874) which seems to have ended at the point Halfdan arrived in Reading in 870 if not

before. Furthermore, the British Museum Curator was widely quoted as saying that “A picture is

emerging here of a more complex political history in the 870s which is deliberately misinterpreted

in the 890s to give a different picture ... It is more like Stalin and Trotsky where Ceolwulf is

airbrushed out of history.” (op cit quoting Gareth Williams). It is purely on this ‘Two Emperors’

image that the weight of the ‘equal coalition’ and joint ‘rule’ in ‘London’ arguments are placed and

fully embroidered into a theory of this political relationship and a proposed ‘Stalinist’ falsification

to hide that it ever happened between 874-877. The point here is that the ASC, considered as first

produced by 892, is being said to have misrepresented the earlier events showing Ceolwulf in a

poor light. If this proposal is correct a lot more than the annal for 874 would have to be falsified,

virtually every Statement and factual representation in the ASC account would likewise have to be

invented between 870 and 879. There would be no Halfdan arrival at Reading or occupation of

Lundenbyrig, or invasions requiring nine major battles, or Guthrum invasions and sieges at

Wareham, Exeter and Chippenham, because according to Blackburn et al in this period 874-876

there was sufficient peace for Alfred to be developing a new coinage system with his alleged ally

Ceolwulf who was presumably hosting Guthrum in some part of Mercia at the same time.

Instead of concrete proofs of this numimatist theory, we have what is really just speculation and not

coherent explanation. Nor is this thesis necessary, as if it was required to explain some supposed

anomaly of the Statements in the ASC. It is derived purely from a numismatic theory itself lodged

within an unnecessary elaboration of the ‘evidence’. The theory has no ‘object’; there is no problem

that it has to account for and it actually causes more confusion by being promulgated.

This theory would lead to a proposed major revision of how we should perceive the ASC’s

treatment of the events in Mercia from 874 to 879, that is between the abdication of Burgred and

Ceolwulf’s own disappearance from the record. In the same period Wessex is under repeated attack

yet we have no evidence of ‘allied support’ from Mercia during this. The arguments which suggest

that the ASC account calumniates Ceolwulf do not proffer a reason as to quite why this should be

so, or why his role had to be degraded if he was an active ally of Alfred against the Viking-armies.

There does not seem to be a really satisfactory explanation, offered by the theorists of this position,

as to why his name is damnified as a ‘foolish king’s thegn’, or as to why he is said by the

Statements in the ASC to have given putatively active allegiance to Halfdan’s forces at his accession

in 874 and presumably tacit support to Guthrum’s first and then second invasions of Wessex in 875

and 878. These revisionist arguments appear especially contrary and illogical as such if we review

the treatment in the same texts regarding his predecessor, Burgred, who can be seen as in alliance

through marriage and in the joint siege at Nottingham. Or even more so especially the Statements

about his successor, Ealdorman Æthelred, who is lauded for his supporting role of Wessex; yet

according to this numismatists theory he was presumably continuing the same arrangements, of

Ceolwulf, as a military partner of Wessex. He also takes over London on its ‘settlement’ by Alfred

in 886. Æthelred is given full credit for successfully leading against Hæstan’s armies in the 890s

and was presumably the ‘co-victor’ with Edward at the incursions into Mercia before the battle at

‘the Holm’. It was his force that was largely responsible for the defeat of the Northumbrian invasion

at Tettenhall in the first decade of the tenth century.

One point overlooked in this theory is if it is true, that Ceolwulf was an ally of Wessex, in the way

his predecessor and successor are clearly presented as being so, then why did Burgred abdicate to

be replaced by a member of an earlier rival dynasty, the alliterating C-Ws, that Burgred’s had

displaced? If Ceolwulf is not just carrying on a policy of solidarity with Alfred but actually

strengthening it in an ‘equal coalition’ with him then why should Burgred be regarded as a failure

and in turn Ceolwulf himself is regarded as so by the ASC when he disappears to be substituted by

the seemingly ‘non-dynastic’ Æthelred continuing the same policy? So why should Ceolwulf

allegedy be singled out for derision?

Place of ‘alliance’ – where?

However, there is a more important question that arises out of this speculative theory; just what was

it that was being ‘united’ between these kings under this proposal? If such a practical suggestion of

‘unification’ could be made then it would allow us to uncover the reason for the alleged

whitewashing of Ceolwulf, but all that we are offered in this theory is the vague suggestion of

conjoint rule and monetary union based on an interpretation of an image on a coin, the purpose and

timing of its issuance. Just what was the “... area ruled by the two kings in an equal coalition” as

suggested by the Curators? (Williams et al op cit). Let us try and provide some practical examples.

There are at least three possibilities: -

a) Was it their kingdoms? That was clearly not so. There was no ‘united kingdom’ in this period,

indeed Mercia was being sliced up by various elements of the Great Army. Why should either

Alfred or Ceolwulf cede authority in their ancient domains to each other at all?

b) Therefore, was it their armies? Again this can be dismissed as there were no joint operations after

870, on a generous view of the military activities at Reading, if indeed after 867. Surely if there

were combined manoeuvres we would have read something in the ASC regarding the brilliant

expeditions in Mercia of the Wessex army if this had been so, in say attacking the Great Army at

Torksey, or Repton, or Cambridge or at least stymieing its further advances to the south of the

Thames. Or perhaps if the Mercian fyrd participated in the ‘nine national fights’, of 871, in Wessex

they could have been castigated for letting Alfred’s side down. Yet the ‘successes’ of either the

Mercians or the West Saxon armies are exactly what we read of in the ASC during the 890s and in

Edwards’ reign. These accounts do give dues to the Mercians as well. Indeed in 870 Ealdorman

Æthelwulf of Berk-shire, who was originally a Mercian, is given high regard for his efforts at

Reading-Englefield which ended in his death. The ASC does not paint Alfred as ‘sole saviour [of]

England’ (Naylor-Williams op cit), a concept Alfred is unlikely to have grasped, his interest was to

maintain the precarious status of the remaining parts of Wessex-Mercia in an alliance forged after

Ceolwulf’s disappearance.

c) The obvious ‘combined territory’ which has been proposed on the ‘mint signatures’ and Reverses

is that ‘London’ was shared. Yet just why could this be so? It raises some insuperable problems as

to the political and diplomatic background. Why would Burgred or Ceolwulf have shared such

authority with Wessex over the largest insular trading town and why was this not mentioned in the

record? What would the quid pro quo be for the Mercians? What is Wessex supposed to have done

for this? The Mercians made a peace with Halfdan after he occupied London in 871 and in the same

year he was invading Wessex and Alfred seemed to have lost all of the nine military encounters and

made a peace which seems related to the defeat at Wilton. So that ‘london’ was not available for

‘joint sovereignty’ then. Why would Halfdan have shared London with a defeated third party even

if he had done so with the Mercians? Why does the ASC not mention any West Saxon interest in the

town in the period? The questions pile up, are insuperable and furthermore unnecessary to answer if

we reject the numismatists theory.

Any such status for the King of Wessex north of the Thames would be of extraordinary geopolitical

importance. Yet, this is not mentioned even in the annal for recte 886 where Alfred is lauded for its

‘settlement’ and we could have expected, from the theory, how this was a just reward and liberation

of what had been part of his domain. Instead of that, what we are told is that he immediately

donates it to his son-in-law. This ‘donation’ in all probability was extending Alfred’s role of a joint

operation but nevertheless it seems an odd gesture if Wessex/ Alfred had previously had some

control of it and had now expended blood and treasure to regain it.

More Complications in the Numismatists Theory for London’s status in the period 871 – 879

There is also the problem of the ‘interregnum’: how did the suggested ‘equal coalition’ or joint

sovereignty of Alfred-Ceolwulf in London come to its end - how was ‘London’ lost? This gives

rise to further problems and questions:-

i) just when was it lost? ii) who was it lost to?

On the proposed numismatist theory there can only be yet further confusion and embroidery of

explanations if one attempts to answer these points. If we accept the theory then ‘London’ was

clearly ‘lost’ to a Viking-army in 871 before the time of Guthrum’s invasion of 878 because the

usual view is that it was only ‘settled’ by Alfred sometime after Guthrum’s retreat to ‘East Anglia’

east of the Lee (whatever year that is supposed to be). We see Halfdan occupied it in 871 and we

have his ‘monogram London’ coins to show something of his status there; ie at least striking coins.

Yet did he lose it? Did he leave and allow the Mercians to reassert control under Burgred in 872

after the Mercians ‘made peace’? Or did he then share it with Alfred (and for why?) until his

abdication when Ceolwulf joined him there? Why did Guthrum by-pass London in his ‘march to

Wareham’ in 875? If London was a conjoint domain of the Anglo-Saxons then one could have

expected opposition in Middlesex to Guthrum’s advance by the London burhware or they could

attack him in the rear. Why did Guthrum ignore London as a prize? Or did he get it from Ceolwulf

and/ or an affinity of Halfdan or of his own army then or later in 877, when he arrives in western

Mercia? Halfdan/ whomever occupied ‘London’ before Alfred’s accession in Wessex. The simplest

scenario is that in 875 a Viking-army allied to Ceolwulf controlled it since 871.

In each of these alternatives we find there is no indication in the record to Alfred’s ‘equal coalition’

with Ceolwulf in London or any references as to who ‘took’ London from Alfred-Ceolwulf and

when. Yet in this same period Alfred’s ‘national fights’, the invasions of his territory, his sieges and

his clear defeats in his homeland territory are catalogued for us. Ceolwulf disappears from 879 so

that gives us the latest date for this theory. Yet they must have ‘lost’ London before the proposed

Treaties at Wedmore, Chippenham or Cirencester in order to regain it as a result of any of those

proposed arrangements? So we can push a proposed ‘joint sovereignty’ back to the ‘singularity’

date of 874-875 but unfortunately this is the period of the accession of Ceolwulf, his alliance with

the Great Army and Guthrum’s first invasion of Wessex. Now although these silences could be

argued as mere ‘absence of evidence’ surely in a series of examples such as this, we can find not

one inference to cast doubt on any shred of information that may just be suspicious to an inquisitor.

But the treatment of these issues and how they are covered in the annals gives us no indication of

evidencial loss. We are driven to conclude that the ASC account is as near to a full representation of

the events as we could expect to be truthful.

What of Ceolwulf’s activities in this period? If we grant he is an ally of Alfred then where is his

army at Wareham and at Exeter? We are given that answer in the annal Statement that tells us of

Guthrum’s ‘peace’ with Alfred after being beseiged at Exeter and leaving for Mercia at 877:-

ASC recte 876

Her com se here to Exancestre fram Werham ... 7 se cing Ælfred æfter þam gehorsodan here mid

fyrde rad oþ Exancester ... 7 hi him gislas sealdon, swa fela swa he habban wolde, 7 micle aþas

sworon, 7 ða godne frið heoldon. 7 þa on hærfeste gefor se here on Myrcna land 7 hit gedældon

sum 7 sum Ceolwulfe sealdon.

Here came the Viking-army to Exeter from Wareham ... & King Alfred rode after the horsed Viking-

army with his army to Exeter ... & there to him the Viking-army gave hostages as many as he

wanted of them & great oaths were sworn & to hold a good peace. & then [877] in the harvest the

Viking-army went to the land of Mercia & they divided some & some to Ceolwulf granted.

(my translation)

Ceolwulf simply accepted Guthrum at his arrival and that action seems to comply with what we

read at the Statement for 874. He would give Mercia and his men to the Vikings when they asked

for it.

If London was under some Alfredian influence, then why do we not see any reference to London’s

status until ASC sa ‘885’ (r 886) and by implication in the undated Alfred and Guthrum Treaty (taq

878 - tpq 890). If 878 was the date of a ‘treaty’ at Wedmore which moved Guthrum’s army to ‘East

Anglia’ or a separate ‘treaty’ of 879, at Chippenham or Cirencester that had the same effect, why is

Alfred in operations in 883 ‘at London’ when he is allegedly ‘at peace’ with Guthrum who is east of

the Lea? If Alfred re-occupied London in 878-879 why are we only told of this as occuring five or

six years later (or presumably not being in occupation since at least 883) when Alfred can be said to

‘donate’ it to the Mercians? At this juncture there is no mention of his ‘equal coalition’ or indeed

any sole status before this, indeed before Æthelred’s appearance? All that the numismatist theory

offers is a series of inferences which do not provide us with any clarity towards when and for why

an ‘equal coalition’ period obtained at all (these points are scrutinised at §Guthrum’s Retreat and

§When did Alfred Occupy London? below).

Further objections are related to the tactical timing of this alleged ‘equal coalition’ or joint

sovereignty of ‘London’. If it occurred during the long reign of Burgred then one would expect a

reference to this and some sort of indication similar to the transfer of Berk-shire related to his

marriage. It would be interesting to see if there are ever discovered ‘London mint’ coins of Alfred’s

elder brothers or father or especially Æthelred I, that was in a period when a strong coalition or

alliance can be demonstrated. In 869 Burgred allowed free passage into East Anglia by the Great

Army to conquer it, depose and kill its king. He then allowed, in 870, the Vikings to pass through at

least part of Mercia to occupy the strategic location of Reading in Wessex, which would hamper

any joint miltiary operation with the West Saxons against them. After that in 871 Halfdan’s army

occupied ‘Lundenbyrig’, which would have ended any lingering arrangement between Burgred and

Wessex, we are told the Mercians made peace with Halfdan’s army on arrival. Notably, no

opposition by either Æthelred I/ Alfred or Burgred to this is mentioned of this occupation. It is

impossible to see from the further disastrous events in Wessex in 871, the nine battles which are

mentioned with special pleading that the brothers Æthelred I and Alfred had done anything more

than hold back the attacks, just how could any status in London have been held or recovered to their

advantage after these Viking incursions? Halfdan was hardly likely, having inflicted defeats on

Alfred, to allow him to extend his authority into ‘London’ which in any event belonged to Mercia.

We know of the ‘making peace’ after Wilton between Alfred and Halfdan and this is the usual

paying off of the enemy, indeed may well be the reason that bullion with Alfred’s image was

minted at London as tribute (see fig 5 Chronological table).

Again when the Viking army returned to Northumbria to put down a rebellion against its client

there including the Archbishop, Burgred not only allowed them to pass through but sheltered their

clients until they restored order. After that, 873-874, the Viking army began to formally occupy the

east midlands and the fen country, resulting in the abdication of Burgred. If the ‘equal coalition’ or

joint sovereignty was a new agreement between Ceolwulf and Alfred then just when would the date

of that have been? Sometime between his accession at 874 and the invasion of Wessex in 875 by

Guthrum seems to be the only window. We know only of Alfred’s siege at ‘Lundene’ in sa 883 and

his ‘settlement’ there at r ‘886’. On balance it is more likely that there was no status north of the

Thames for Wessex until that date, not before, this being at least six years since the disappearance

of Ceolwulf and the introduction of Ealdorman Æthelred (see also §Whither Kent?: A Missing War

and §When did Alfred Occupy London? The Continuation War below).

The simplest explanation for Ceolwulf’s ‘bad press’ in the ASC unlike that for Burgred and

Æthelred, who get either neutral or positive mentions, was precisely because he formed no alliance

with Wessex, indeed the evidence is that he did do so with the Viking-armies of Halfdan and then

Guthrum. If there is a suspicious ‘deafening silence’ in the ASC in regard to Ceolwulf it is surely in

the manner of his departure from the record. Perhaps regicide by Æthelred’s faction could not be

mentioned because ‘indelicate’?

The present writer hopefully does not have to belabour the point; there could be no alliance as

proposed between Alfred and Ceolwulf II because there was little opportunity before the Mercian’s

accession and after that it could hardly have lasted a year as it would have practically collapsed at

the Guthrum invasion of Wessex in 875. So where in this numismic analysis is there room for an

‘economic and monetary’ union based on an ‘equal coalition’ / joint sovereignty? Neither Alfred

from his accession in 871 nor Ceolwulf from his replacement of Burgred in 874 had any

independence of action to do so.