"Chinese Perspectives on Theater Missile Defense: Policy Implications for Japan," Asian Survey,...

Chinese Perspectives on Theater Missile Defense: Policy Implications for JapanAuthor(s): Kori J. UrayamaSource: Asian Survey, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2000), pp. 599-621Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3021184 .

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CHINESE PERSPECTIVES ON THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE

Policy Implications for Japan

Kori J. Urayama

After several years of discussion, on August 16, 1999, the U.S. and Japan formalized an agreement to conduct joint technology research on theater missile defense (TMD). TMD systems are intended to in- tercept and destroy ballistic missiles; the systems come in upper- and lower- tier configurations and can be based on land or at sea. The U.S.-Japan agreement, which came in the form of a memorandum of understanding (MOU), calls for the U.S. Department of Defense and Japan's Defence Agency to formally begin studies on an upper-tier Navy Theater Wide (NTW) system, a mobile, sea-based configuration capable of being carried on Aegis-equipped ships.1 In response to the signing of the U.S.-Japan agreement, the Chinese government has begun to heighten its anti-TMD campaign. It is evident that China's opposition is changing from mere political rhetoric to a carefully calculated discussion founded on more realistic concerns. Accordingly, Ja-

Kori J. Urayama is Research Assistant for Project Alliance Tomorrow at The Tokyo Foundation, Japan. The author is grateful to Yoichi Funabashi for his insightful comments, guidance, and support, as well as to Akihisa Nagashima, Dingli Shen, Zhu Mingquan, Reinhard Drifte, James Nolt, Seongwhun Cheon, Li Bin, Fumihiko Yoshida, Hitoshi Yoshida, and an anonymous reviewer for Asian Survey for their comments. The author is also indebted to Takahiro Suzuki and other administrative staff at the Tokyo Foundation's Research Division, and wishes to thank Lincoln Bell, Kojiro Yamaura, and Justin Hill for their editorial assistance.

Asian Survey, 40:4, pp. 599-621. ISSN: 0004-4687 ? 2000 by The Regents of the University of California/Society. All rights reserved. Send Requests for Permission to Reprint to: Rights and Permissions, University of California Press, Journals Division, 2000 Center St., Ste. 303, Berkeley, CA 94704-1223.

1. The land-based, upper-tier counterpart to NTW is the Army Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD). Upper-tier systems are said to be effective at up to 3,000 kilometers. Such systems may violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Lower-tier systems effective at up to 1,500 kilometers, however, may be permissible. They comprise the Aegis-equipped Navy Block IV A fleet defense system at sea and the upgraded Army Patriot PAC-3 on land.

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pan will have to address these concerns, for ignoring them could lead to an unmanageable divide with China.

In this article, I examine the Chinese reaction to the TMD issue and attempt to explain why China has reacted to Japan's involvement in the development project in the way it has. The assessment of Chinese views in this article is based largely on interviews with 35 Chinese government officials and security/arms control experts from 20 civilian and military research insti- tutes during my visits to China (Beijing and Shanghai) in September and November 1999 and the U.S. also that November. An additional series of interviews was conducted in Shanghai and Beijing in April 2000.2 The article is structured as follows. First, I consider the reasons for Chinese opposition to Japan's TMD involvement and analyze various factors underlying Chinese concerns. I then explore some possible policy courses China could take in response to Japan's TMD initiative and analyze their implications for Japan. Third, I suggest various policies for Japan to consider in furthering its TMD discourse with China. Based on these analyses, I then conclude with an assessment of Chinese attitudes toward Japan's TMD policy and of the overall policy implications those attitudes will hold for Japan.

Reasons for Chinese Opposition to TMD Even before the August 1999 signing of the MOU, China had already been opposed to the idea of the U.S. and Japan jointly developing a TMD network. Beijing first voiced its concerns in 1996 when a Chinese official raised the issue in a Sino-Japanese security dialogue. Initially, Chinese antipathy to TMD was relatively subdued, as many domestic analysts were uncertain over the feasibility of such a system being implemented. However, with the development of more concrete project plans by the U.S. and Japan and a better assessment of the overall situation by China, Chinese opposition became more vocal and acute. China now employs an array of arguments in support of its position.

Most Chinese officials and analysts reject Japan's official line that its TMD will be a purely defensive measure intended to deter ballistic missile threats from North Korea. Many Chinese see Japan's North Korean threat theory as being grossly exaggerated, with one analyst going so far as to say it is sheer "propaganda" fabricated by the Japanese government in an effort to control and manipulate Japanese media and public opinion.3 Such sentiment is also officially reflected in the position of the Chinese government: Sha Zukang, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Department of the

2. Citations have been limited to direct quotes and other instances where specificity is required; the comments of these individuals have been kept anonymous, unless noted otherwise.

3. Interview with a Chinese missile expert in the U.S., November 1999.



KORI J. URAYAMA 601

Chinese Foreign Ministry, has been quoted by the Xinhua wire service as saying that Japan's "perception" of a North Korea threat "is just a pretext."4 The Chinese have cited five reasons for their opposition to a Japanese TMD network: (1) concern over possible Taiwanese involvement in TMD; (2) the possibility that China's deterrence capability might be undermined; (3) the threat of Japan's remilitarization; (4) the further strengthening of the U.S.- Japan alliance; and (5) the negative impact it would have on the global arms control process.

Possible Taiwanese Involvement in TMD Not surprisingly, all the Chinese analysts interviewed cited the Taiwan factor as the foremost reason for Chinese opposition to regional deployment of TMD. As Premier Zhu Rongji once declared, "We ... are firmly and particularly opposed to including Taiwan in the TMD because [it] not only violates international missile agreements but also interferes in China's internal affairs and encroaches on China's sovereignty and territorial integrity."5 If extended to include Taiwan, TMD could eliminate the only credible option left to China to deter Taiwan from seeking independence.

When discussing a potential Japanese missile defense system, Chinese experts contend that Japan's real intention is to protect Taiwan should a direct military confrontation occur between Beijing and Taipei in the future. These analysts suspect that Japan's intention is to involve itself directly in any Tai- wan Strait crisis-namely, by deploying NTW-equipped Aegis ships to protect Taiwan from Chinese missile attacks-in an effort to boost its position as a military and, more importantly, political power in the Asia-Pacific region. Some analysts have even stated that Japan's TMD system is not of concern to Beijing so long as it is not extended to cover Taiwan. Others have expressed a willingness to accept Japan's land-based, lower-tier TMD deployment (PAC-3) but are opposed to the deployment of upper-tier TMD systems, es- pecially sea-based, mobile versions, which they fear could be deployed to protect Taiwan.

Interestingly, many of these experts consider TMD to be technologically flawed, with one researcher even describing the TMD project as "a waste of money."6 What these analysts worry about is not so much the strategic implication of the transfer of TMD technology to Taiwan, but rather the political impact of such a transfer: it could act to integrate Taiwan into a U.S.-led

4. "China Condemns U.S. Missile Plans," Associated Press, November 25, 1999. 5. "Chinese Premier's Press Conference, full text," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, March 16,

1999. 6. Interviews in Beijing, September 1999.




joint command system, which, in these analysts' view, would be tantamount to the creation of a de facto military alliance.

Undermining China's Deterrence Capability Many Chinese experts argue that the deployment of an upper-tier, space- based TMD system in Northeast Asia could nullify China's strategic leverage. In particular, there is a growing concern among them that TMD could undermine the impact of China's short- and mid-range ballistic missile forces. Most of these analysts, however, do not regard TMD to have short- term strategic implications; rather, they perceive those implications to be long-term in nature. They worry that China's missile forces, currently under- going modernization, will be rendered useless as a result of the deployment of Japan's TMD system, which is likely to happen just as the missile modernization effort is completed.7

The expressed Chinese notion that Japan's ballistic missile defense system undermines China' s nuclear deterrent can, on the flip side of the coin, be seen as an indication that Japan is being targeted by China-a possibility that a few Chinese analysts admit cannot be entirely ruled out. One senior-level researcher for a government think-tank openly warned Japan not to forget that, because it hosts U.S. forces on its soil, it will be the first target of Chi- nese missile attacks should a Sino-American military confrontation occur in the future.

Threat of Japan's Remilitarization China is concerned that Japan's participation in TMD development could re- vive latent Japanese militarism and suspects that Japan is trying to become both a political and military power by dint of TMD deployment. It believes that "the TMD project can trigger a surge in the overall development of Ja- pan's military forces and military industry, which will be used to prop up Japan's political position in the Asia-Pacific region."8 Adding to this concern is the belief that a stronger, more assertive Japan could precipitate a weakening of China's political power in the region.

Most Chinese analysts also seem to believe that Japan is seeking to acquire an offensive missile capability through its involvement in TMD research and development (R&D),9 namely, that it is planning to retain the technology

7. Abe Junichi, "China's Missile Modernization and Situations Revolving around TMD in East Asia" (in Japanese), Issues and Studies 28:10 (July 1999), p. 16.

8. Xia Liping, "TMD: One of the Unstable Factors in Northeast Asian Security" (paper presented at the Fifth Meeting of Expanded Senior Panel of Limited Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia, Hakone, Japan, October 1999).

9. One missile expert pointed to Japan's rocket launching capability as evidence of Japan's gradual move toward the completion of the modernization of its already high-tech military force:



KORI J. URAYAMA 603

developed until the day comes when it feels a need to build its own nuclear warheads. Japan is said to be developing a "shield" (or a "bullet-proof vest," as one analyst put it) first, and, once having acquired the shield, will move to create a "sword" (i.e., nuclear weapons). The analysts interviewed do acknowledge that Japan's compliance and transparency is currently in accord with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguard standards and its nuclear nonproliferation commitment, including its ratification of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). However, they refuse to trust the veracity of Japan's arms control agenda, commenting that the only thing stopping Japan from going nuclear right now is a political constraint-which, in their view, could be lifted over- night. They also reject recent Japanese assertions that the U.S. is not enthusi- astic about strengthening or maintaining its extended nuclear deterrent over Japan; said one, "Why are some Japanese thinkers doubting the credibility of U.S. security assurances all of a sudden? This is all just a pretense."10

China's suspicions of a military resurgence in and the possible nuclear arming of Japan are likely to remain Beijing's primary reasons for being opposed to TMD. It should be pointed out, however, that the Chinese do not necessarily view Japan's latent nuclear capability as an urgent concern, nor do they anticipate that Japan will pose a substantial military threat any time soon provided that the U.S.-Japan alliance remains intact.

Further Strengthening of the U.S.-Japan Alliance Another serious Chinese concern is that Japan's TMD is really aimed at China as part of a U.S.-Japan containment strategy. One researcher ques- tioned the logic behind TMD as a political tool to strengthen the alliance, asking, "If the alliance was already strengthened in 1996, what is the point in strengthening it again and why now?""1 Similarly, another analyst contended that it is not so much the system or its technological viability about which

When launching its satellites, Japan utilizes solid fuel (as opposed to liquid fuel), which, in his view, is used only for military purposes. The researcher noted that Japan is attempting to acquire missile technologies for dual use so that it can translate the capabilities into military purposes (for long-range, surface-to-surface missiles) in the long-run. Interview in the U.S., November 1999. Also see Yan Xuetong, "TMD Shaking East Asian Stability" (paper presented at "Missile Defense and the Future of ABM Treaty," a joint seminar organized by Oxford Research Group and Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament, Beijing, March 2000).

10. Interview with a Chinese research fellow in the U.S., November 1999. The fellow was commenting partly about a general trend and partly in response to the information from the author that some younger Japanese politicians, dissatisfied with U.S. reaction vis-a-vis North Korea's missile threat, have expressed doubts about U.S. commitment to Japan and its extended deterrence. The politicians' comments came in a closed meeting that they had with U.S. think- tank researchers and former government officials in June of that year.

11. Interview with a Chinese missile expert in the U.S., November 1999.




China is concerned but rather Japan's intention, questioning "What is Japan's real intention behind its participation in TMD? We cannot help but conclude that it is being targeted at China."'12

Even though several analysts acknowledge that the U.S.-Japan alliance acts as a regional stabilizer, they fear that TMD will make Japan too dependent on the U.S., which could lead to uncontrolled U.S. unilateralism. Such worries can be traced to military analysts' concerns regarding Japan's Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), specifically Japan's acquisition of Command, Con- trol, Communication, Computer, Intelligence (C41) capabilities, through integration into the U.S. military system. These concerns reflect China's fear about the RMAization of U.S. allies (in an integrated command structure). This fear is rooted in China's concern that Japan's Self-Defence Forces will, accompanying a redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance, expand the scope of their operations and widen the sphere of their military assistance activities. In this respect, NATO's justifications for intervention in Kosovo and the rele- vance of the U.S.-Japan security guidelines to contingencies in the Taiwan Strait were mentioned as a cause of concern by some of the analysts interviewed. Some said that they see recent developments surrounding TMD and the U.S.-Japan security guidelines as a move toward a "mini-NATO" in Asia created to contain China.13

Nevertheless, not all of the Chinese experts interviewed see Japan as being a willing participant in a new cold war-like trend. Some urge that Japan should adopt a more independent foreign and security policy to restrain future U.S. unilateralist tendencies and interventionist policies in the Asia-Pacific region. They were quick to add, however, that such an independent stance should not be carried to a point where it threatens Chinese security interests.

If the Chinese are indeed sincere about Japan playing a restrainer role vis- a-vis the U.S., then Japan's participation in the joint TMD R&D project can be seen as serving China's interests, as such involvement would strengthen Japan's political independence in decision-making in a crisis or military conflict. As the Henry L. Stimson Center Working Group on TMD noted in its June 2000 report, "Within the alliance framework, any increase in interde- pendence would potentially provide Tokyo with useful leverage. If . .. the United States were to need Japan's help (and not just money), Tokyo could have more say on policy matters in Washington."'14 Thus, Tokyo would, by virtue of its participation in TMD, be in a stronger position to prevent Wash- ington's unilateralist urges should a military crisis emerge in the region.

12. Interview in Beijing, April 2000. 13. Interview with a Chinese arms control expert in the U.S., November 1999. 14. Henry L. Stimson Center Working Group, Theater Missile Defenses in the Asia-Pacific

Region, Henry L. Stimson Center Report, no. 34 (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, June 2000), p. 66.



KORI J. URAYAMA 605

Negative Influence on Global Arms Control Process In early 1999, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Daily declared that TMD runs counter to the trend toward peace and development, retards global arms control and disarmament efforts, and detrimentally influences global and regional strategic balance and stability.15 Such sentiment was reiterated and repetitively emphasized by many of those interviewed for this article. They contended that TMD deployment would harm disarmament efforts by retard- ing further nuclear arms control initiatives, reversing the process of reducing the number of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV) in missile stockpiles, and undermining China's support for a no-first-use policy. They argued that China may reduce its overall effort in the arms control sphere if TMD were deployed, and warned that an uncooperative China could impede the global arms control movement, which they stated would be detri- mental to Japanese interests.

Specifically, TMD could cause a weakening of China's support for CTBT, of its role in the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) negotiations, and of the likelihood for joining the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).16 Some Chinese arms control experts are attempting to establish that any U.S. sale of missile-defense technology to Japan would constitute an act of missile proliferation and therefore violate the MTCR. For example, one expert esti- mated that if an NTW interceptor carries a 500-kilogram payload, its burnout altitude would be 54 kilometers and its range 261 kilometers. With a possible upgrade of the propulsion system, such an NTW system has the potential of violating the MTCR, which prohibits the transfer of technology of missiles with a range of over 300 kilometers carrying a payload of 500 kilograms.17

There also are those Chinese experts who oppose upper-tier TMD systems on the basis that such systems violate the ABM treaty, "the positive value of which China has recognized and accepted" over the years.18 Three concerns

15. Gao Junmin and Lu Dehong, "A Dangerous Act," People's Liberation Army Daily, Janu- ary 24, 1999.

16. The FMCT, more commonly known as the "fiss-ban" treaty, is a multilateral agreement that would prohibit the production of fissile material, such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium, for weapons of mass-destruction. The MTCR was established by the G7 in 1987. It is a suppliers' regime whose members (currently 29) agree to restrict sale of ballistic/cruise missiles and their components to other countries.

17. Li Bin, "Ballistic Missile Defense [BMD] and the Missile Technology Control Regime" (paper presented at the Eighth International Castiglioncello Conference, "New Challenges in the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction," Italy, September 1999).

18. Zhu Mingquan, "U.S. Plans on National Missile Defense (NMD) and Theater Missile Defense (TMD): A Chinese Perspective," Monitor 5:1-2 (Winter-Spring 1999), p. 22. The 1972 ABM Treaty and its 1974 protocol prohibit the U.S. and Russia from developing and deploying more than a single, limited strategic defense system. In 1997, the U.S. and Russia agreed that TMD systems may be deployed as long as they do not pose a realistic threat to either's strategic




in particular have been brought up by the Chinese regarding TMD in view of the ABM Treaty. First, there is the fear that the U.S. will develop NMD technology in the name of TMD; a Japanese TMD system would therefore be regarded as being at the "forefront" of the U.S. NMD. Second, any transfer of ABM technology to other countries (e.g., from the U.S. to Japan) would violate the treaty. Finally, the Chinese fear that abrogating the treaty could spur Russia to develop countermeasures, which in turn could offset regional stability by causing a regional arms race in which China would be compelled to participate.19 These concerns notwithstanding, the question remains whether China actually considers the ABM Treaty to be a cornerstone of strategic stability. If China invokes the ABM logic in opposing TMD, one must ask how China justifies its own missile modernization program. The Chinese have, from time to time, warned that the development of a highly capable U.S. missile defense system could cause an acceleration of China's effort to modernize its offensive forces. Nevertheless, despite the assertion of Chinese experts that this missile modernization drive has come in response to the TMD initiative in East Asia, it must be pointed out that the PLA has been working on its new DF-31 missiles since 1970 and on MIRV since the early 1980s, developments under way long before TMD became the subject of wide public debate.20 In this light, Chinese insistence on linking TMD with the ABM Treaty appears to be based on a free-riding spirit rather than being borne out of a sincere desire to preserve the spirit of the treaty for the sake of maintaining regional or global strategic stability.

The interviews conducted demonstrate that the Chinese position regarding TMD has become increasingly diverse in orientation. It is interesting to note that a few analysts are beginning to argue that excessive opposition to TMD is not in China's national interest, as a vehement stance against such a technologically questionable system may, in the long-run, call China's own intentions into question. According to one analyst, some in the Chinese government have recently begun to assume a posture of not being overly concerned regarding TMD. Another expert remarked that it would be more prudent for the government to take a wait-and-see approach on TMD than voice outright its opposition to a technologically questionable system. Holding its cards

nuclear force and will not be tested to give such systems that capability. Lower-tier systems such as PAC-3 or Navy Area Defense are permissible under the treaty.

19. Regarding NMD fears, see Sha Zukang, "Can BMD Really Enhance Security?" (speech delivered at the 2nd China-U.S. Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonprolifera- tion, Monterey, California, April 1999). For ABM technology transfer, see Sha Zukang, "China's Policy on International Nuclear Proliferation" (speech delivered to the Carnegie En- dowment for International Peace Conference on Non-Proliferation, Washington, D.C., January 1999). Finally, for concerns about Russia, see Zhu, p. 22.

20. Gregory May, "China's Opposition to TMD Is More about Politics than Missiles" (in Japanese), Foresight (February 2000).



KORI J. URAYAMA 607

close to its chest would enable China to make a better technological assessment of the system first. The experts' varied arguments reflect a diversifica- tion in the Chinese reaction to TMD. For an added example, Sha Zukang recently stated that China does not reject the whole concept of TMD, thus exhibiting a level of understanding with regard to the role of TMD in protect- ing U.S. overseas military presence.21

Additionally, some Chinese analysts show a certain level of understanding with regard to Japan's rationalization for developing TMD, given that Japan's security environment is one in which missile proliferation is a growing concern. One researcher affiliated with a PLA-related think-tank commented that Japan's desire to develop advanced defense technology for national security purposes is, to a limited extent, understandable even as seen from a Chinese perspective. Another prominent security expert remarked that China is not really in a position to oppose Japan's TMD because it (as well as North Ko- rea) is in fact a contributing factor to Japan's missile threat perceptions.

On the other hand, comments made by the Chinese interviewees revealed Beijing's position on regional security to be politically self-serving in charac- ter. Again, many contended that Japan should become more independent but not to the extent of becoming a threat to China. The bottom line appears to be that China wants to deny Japan the opportunity to acquire a legitimate defense capability against potential ballistic missile threats. What some Chi- nese experts are demanding is nothing less than China's total security, irre- spective of how obtaining this might conflict with Japan's security needs.

China's Possible Policy Courses in Response to TMD

As noted above, the Chinese dialogue on Japan's missile defense system is acquiring various nuances. Whereas some analysts are advocating a "careful wait-and-see" stance rather than voicing outright opposition to a system that will take some time to actually deploy, others are pushing for an aggressive response. Described below are some of the policy courses that they argue Beijing could take in response to the U.S.-Japan TMD initiative.

Reconsideration of China's Nuclear Posture Some Chinese experts argued that should the U.S. and Japan decide to deploy a TMD system, China would have no choice but to reconsider its nuclear policy. Viewing such a system as a threat to its own nuclear deterrent, China might feel forced to increase the number of its nuclear warheads and to re-

21. Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that the degree of Chinese understanding does not extend as far as to Japan's participation in TMD, as Sha argued that it is not necessary for Japan to join the U.S.-led missile defense system. See Xinhua, November 25, 1999.




consider its No First Use (NFU) pledges. However, a problematic aspect of this argument is raised by China's assertion that deploying TMD would undermine its own deterrent capability; this inversely suggests that Chinese warheads are aimed at Japan. As noted earlier, a researcher from Shanghai warned that Japan should not forget that the role it plays in hosting U.S. military bases subjects it to priority targeting if a U.S.-China military confrontation should break out. Similar statements have also been reported in the past by Bonnie Glaser and Banning Garrett, whose interviewees at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations are quoted as saying, "We don't need to attack Japan with nuclear weapons, but we need to be able to attack U.S. forces in Japan . . . if we need to retaliate with nuclear weapons."22 Some of the Chinese analysts I interviewed repeatedly emphasized this point that it is the U.S. forces there that would be China's target. In saying so, however, they fail to recognize that the implications are the same. They also fail to see that such problematic logic, far be it from deterring Japan away from involvement in missile defense projects, in fact increases Japanese apprehension about Chinese intentions, which in turn reinforces Ja- pan's sense that it needs to support such R&D initiatives.23

Acceleration of the Missile Modernization Program and Drive to Develop TMD Countermeasures

Many of the experts interviewed argue that the presence of TMD could prompt China to speed up its missile modernization program. They contend that TMD's interception capability could easily be overcome if China chose to amass overwhelming ballistic missile forces. As Chu Shulong of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations commented in a Los Angeles Times interview, "There's no problem for China to increase its arse- nal by 100 missiles a year, even with today's budget constraints. These missiles are cheap to produce."24

Another possible response would be for China to accelerate its cruise missile program. It is widely believed that China does not yet possess strategic cruise missiles but that they are definitely under development. If China has

22. Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance," Asian Survey 37:4 (April 1997), p. 394.

23. From Michael Green's presentation at "Countering the Missile Threat: International Mili- tary Strategies," a conference organized by the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Washington, D.C., February 1999. Also see James Przystup, "China, Japan, and the United States," in The U.S. -Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future, eds. Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin (Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), p. 36.

24. Jim Mann, "China Snarls against a 'Paper Tiger'," Los Angeles Times, January 19, 2000. One Chinese expert interviewed said it would cost China only around US$2 billion to deploy 200 ICBMs. Interview in Shanghai, November 1999.



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indeed accelerated its development of cruise missiles as reported, the move may be in partial response to TMD. Furthermore, some security analysts even argue that the deployment of TMD may prompt Beijing to equip its missiles with multiple warheads (i.e., MIRVs). China's logic behind outfit- ting with MIRVs in response to Japan's TMD project suggests again that Japan is being targeted by Chinese nuclear warheads. Such a development would undoubtedly call China's intentions into questions and fuel the China threat theory in Japan.

The experts interviewed also elaborated some examples of countermeasures that Beijing could employ in response to TMD. For instance, they said China could move to develop an anti-satellite system.25 As stated in a recent U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) report, China may already be building or even possess an anti-satellite (ASAT) capability, using laser radar technology to track and image low-orbiting satellites. Additionally, the DoD report notes that the Chinese may be developing jammers that could be used against Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers.26 Another countermeasure mentioned by the analysts was for China to equip its warheads with multiple decoys so as to exhaust TMD capabilities.

The November 1999 test of a manned spacecraft by China also might have significant military implications, including the possible deployment of ma- neuverable reentry vehicles (MARVs). A Chinese military expert, Song Yichang, boasted in an interview with the state-run China Business Times, "We can use this technology to change trajectories in flight, making missiles do a little dance and evade opponents' attacks." The interview was a rare official confirmation that China is stepping up its technology to counter BMD, in tandem with its diplomatic pressure tactics.27

However, some Chinese analysts warn that such reports should not be taken at face value, as cut-throat battles are being waged within the defense industry over who will grab the biggest pieces of the pie. The information in the aforementioned report might thus be interpreted as yet another appeal by the defense industry for budget augmentations. One analyst noted, "MARY is a questionable and costly technology; decoys are a much more sensible countermeasure option. But some parties, eager to win the government's support, are pushing for this technology anyhow." Similarly, another arms control expert contended that the missile defense debate is being used as a

25. Interview in Beijing, September 20, 1999. See also Dingli Shen, "Chapter Three: Ballistic Missile Defense and China's National Security," Jane's Special Report, April 10, 2000.

26. U.S. Department of Defense, "Future Military Capabilities and Strategy of the People's Republic of China," available on the World Wide Web at <http://www.jya.com/dodl226- 98.htm> [accessed on October 18, 1999].

27. "Launch Gives China Boost-U.S. Defense Easier to Avoid, Says Paper," Seattle Times, November 22, 1999.




pretext by the Chinese military establishment to obtain greater defense budget allocations. As these comments reveal, the recent missile defense debate has sparked fierce industrial competition for defense budget allocations in China.28

Threat of Uncooperative Stance in Multilateral Arms Control Negotiations

Some analysts predict that China may threaten to boycott the MTCR (in which it has yet to participate formally) in an attempt to prevent U.S.-Japan joint R&D on TMD from progressing any further. One security expert noted that such a move is plausible because compliance with MTCR has itself been a big compromise for China to begin with.29 It is also highly probable that China will link TMD with FMCT, which could have a significant effect on the global arms control process. One scholar argued that the lack of Chinese cooperation in FMCT could prompt India to pull out of the negotiations, which could in turn induce Pakistan to drop out as well. However, it may not be in China's long-term interests to take an uncooperative stance on arms control issues, as doing so would hardly enhance China's security. Even some of the Chinese arms control experts indicated that an uncooperative policy would only hurt China's image in the global arms control arena, which it cannot afford to let happen.

To some degree, the scenario outlined above is already being played out. At the February 2000 meeting of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), China explicitly linked FMCT to TMD by refusing to permit any negotiations on the former unless parallel talks took place on outer space. Specifically, China proposed a new agreement that would prohibit the testing, deployment, and use of any weapon system or its components in outer space and put limi- tations of the use of satellites for military purposes. And, as the experts feared would happen, China earned criticism for its stance, specifically from the U.N. Disarmament Research Program's head, Patricia Lewis, who contended that China's insistence on linking FMCT and TMD had greatly re- tarded CD negotiations altogether.30

Buttressing a Sino-Russian United Front Opposing TMD

When U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen declared on January 20, 1999, that the DoD planned to allocate additional funds for NMD and TMD pro-

28. Interviews in Beijing, April 2000. 29. Interview with a senior-level analyst for a government think-tank in Shanghai, September

1999. China has declared that it will fully comply with the MTCR regulations but has yet to announce its formal membership.

30. "China Proposes a Treaty to Prevent Arms Race in Space for 'TMD Containment' at Geneva CD" (in Japanese), Yomiuri shinbun, February 18, 2000, p. 7.



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grams, one of the first Chinese responses was to step up talks with Russia on a united approach to dealing with those ballistic missile defense systems. On April 16, China and Russia issued a communique that reiterated their anxiety over the issue and stated that the two would continue to consult with each other concerning the issue.31 China could implement such a united approach in opposing further TMD development. In fact, it has already begun to take its case to the international arena in an attempt to apply increased pressure. That October, for example, China, together with Russia and Belarus, intro- duced a resolution related to U.S. missile defense, one that demanded strict compliance with the 1972 ABM Treaty at the U.N. First Committee (Dis- armament and International Security) discussion on arms control.32

That said, however, Sino-Russian cooperation has not constituted anything more than a diplomatic offensive thus far. Although some Chinese security experts contend that China and Russia may together develop countermeasures against TMD or even codevelop their own system,33 such technological cooperation is unlikely to occur over the immediate horizon. As Zhu Rongji recently stated, while both Russia and China are opposed to the U.S. missile defense system, this should not be taken to mean that they have "already discussed joint measures to counter this program. The time has not yet come for that."34

One must also wonder about the nature of Sino-Russian collusion given the fact that China's military modernization effort is partially driven by its per- ceived need to hedge against possible Russian expansionism in the next cen- tury, which must give Russia reason to be uneasy about Chinese military intentions. Furthermore, doubting Russia's commitment to a united front against missile defense, some Chinese analysts are beginning to suspect that Russia may withdraw from tactical collaboration sometime soon. "I doubt whether Russia is at all concerned about TMD, or even NMD for that matter, as calculations would indicate the target of these systems to be China, not Russia," reasoned one analyst.35 Recent talks on U.S.-Russian cooperation in

31. "Sino-Russian Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Communique Issued," Xinhua, April 16, 1999.

32. As this issue was going to press, in July 2000 China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan issued a joint statement saying that stability in the Asia-Pacific region would be destroyed by any deployment of a TMD system, which they argue would lead to an escalation of an arms race. See "'Shanghai Five' Nations Stress Unconditional Respect for ABM Treaty," Xinhua, July 6, 2000.

33. Interview with a senior-level researcher for a government think-tank in Shanghai, Septem- ber, 1999. See also Yan, "TMD Shaking East Asian Stability."

34. "No Russian-Chinese Actions over Asian Missile Defense Plan," Jamestown Monitor, March 16, 1999. See also "Chinese Premier on TMD," Xinhua, March 15, 2000.

35. Interview with an analyst for a civilian research institute in Beijing, April 2000.




ballistic missile defenses have also stirred up a sense of uneasiness in China, as it can be easily concluded that such cooperation is directly targeted at China.

Some Policy Implications for Japan Several policy implications can be drawn from this analysis of the Chinese response to Japan's involvement in the TMD co-research project.

An Immediate Halt to TMD Joint Research Would Undermine Japan's Security Interests

Japanese willingness to participate in a co-research project on TMD has come largely in response to North Korean missile launches and nuclear threats. Intimidated by North Korea's latent capability to build advanced ballistic missiles, Japan had no choice but to review its defense posture and consider new defense options needed to heighten its security. The Japanese government began taking concrete steps to normalize its bilateral relations with North Korea, but as Defence Agency Director-General Kawara Tsutomu recently stated, North Korean ballistic missiles remain a major security threat to Japan despite a moratorium on test launches of Taepo Dong 11.36 Accord- ingly, Japan should by no means bargain away its security option solely because of opposition put up by another state.

Moreover, there is little doubt that Japan's TMD initiative also largely has been a response to ballistic missile proliferation in the region for which China is partially responsible. A senior U.S. national security official stated that China has been cooperating with North Korea in the development of both satellite and launch technologies, which suggests that China is technologically linked to the firing of North Korea's Taepo Dong I missile in 1998.37 Furthermore, the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996, when China test-fired its short- range Dong Feng-15 ballistic missile, elevated the possibility that China could use such offensive weapons. Additionally, some now speculate that the total number of the coastally deployed M-9s and shorter-range M- us has grown to 150-200 missiles, and would eventually rise to more than 600 by 2005 should the current trend continue.38

It would be ideal if Japan's vulnerability to ballistic missile threats could be overcome solely by diplomatic means such as MTCR and other missile nonproliferation export control regimes. But as crucial as export control poli-

36. "North Korea's Missiles Still a Threat: Japan's Defence Chief," Agence France Presse, December 9, 1999.

37. Bruce Dorminey, "Chinese Missiles Basic to New Strategy," Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 8, 1999.

38. "U.S. Missile Defence: Strategy, Technology and Politics," IISS Strategic Comments 5:3 (April 1999).



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cies are to securing missile nonproliferation, MTCR is by no means a pan- acea for solving the problems of missile proliferation. Diplomatic means alone cannot ensure Japan's (or anyone else's) security. As such, TMD R&D should not be halted immediately but pursued, with some circumspection, as an insurance policy against the possibility of ballistic missile threats height- ening again in the future.

Use of TMD as a Diplomatic Card in Discussing Regional Missile Initiatives

Continuation of the TMD co-research does not imply disregarding China's concerns over TMD altogether. Japan and the U.S. should certainly work to decrease China's threat perception where possible. Recently, some observers have urged that TMD should be used as a card to entice Chinese participation in a formal trilateral security dialogue.39 In fact, some Chinese analysts have indicated that China might consider making missile-related pledges in exchange for a partial TMD deployment commitment and Chinese official statements have appeared to bespeak the possibility of such bargaining. For instance, Zhu Rongji has been quoted as saying, "Whether or not you [the U.S.] build a TMD, that's your business. But if you were to get Taiwan involved in this TMD, then China's position is that it would be adamantly opposed to such an action."40 As another example, some Chinese experts have indicated that China would soften its position on U.S.-Japan TMD initiative to a "de facto acquiescence" if the U.S. and Japan would explicitly reject Taiwanese involvement in the joint project.41 Such statements would appear to indicate that a degree of bargaining is possible if heed is paid to China's bottom line on TMD.

There are a number of missile initiatives worth discussing with China. For example, possible TMD limits could be set in return for China's pledge not to deploy MIRVs and strategic cruise missiles. A TMD system also could be only partially deployed in return for China's pledge to decrease its coastal missile deployments. However, Japan should not pursue initiatives such as these on an exclusively Chinese basis, as North Korean missiles are of serious concern as well. It is desirable to pursue any missile initiatives with a long-term goal of including North Korea. Christensen argues that by agree- ing to limit TMD, Japan and the U.S. may be able to gain more active partici-

39. Thomas Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," International Security 23:4 (Spring 1999), p. 77. See also Abe, "China's Missile Modern- ization," p. 17.

40. "Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji Reflects on U.S.-Chinese Relations," Cable News Network (transcript), April 13, 1999.

41. Komori Yoshihisa, "U.S. Analyses on Chinese Views: Tacit Understanding Toward TMD if Taiwan Excluded" (in Japanese), Sankei shinbun, July 8, 1999.




pation from Beijing in discouraging further North Korean missile development.42 The U.S. and Japan could, for example, agree to limit TMD in exchange for North Korea's full compliance with the Perry process.43 The critical element in promoting such initiatives will be how to positively and constructively engage both China and North Korea in discussions on the region's missile milieu for which they are largely responsible.

As some critics argue, to expect the TMD card alone to elicit a major arms control agreement may be unrealistic. Nevertheless, the idea of missile-related, arms control pledge exchanges is not entirely inconceivable, as some Chinese experts are actually sending positive signals regarding such an initiative, while official Chinese statements are becoming increasingly nuanced in that direction. Japan and the U.S. could work to decrease China's threat perception where possible and, in turn, ask Beijing to reciprocate, where appro- priate. Described below are two examples of bargaining chips that might be used in promoting such exchanges.

Be explicit that Taiwan will not be included in any future TMD deployment. Beijing will not tolerate the covering of the Taiwan Strait by any future deployment of a Japanese missile defense system. Doing so could complicate cross-strait relations and Japan should therefore refrain from including Taiwan in U.S.-Japan TMD research and Japan's TMD network should not be deployed to defend Taiwan against Chinese missiles.44 After all, Japan does not have a Taiwan Relations Act as the U.S. does nor is it bound by any legal obligation to protect Taiwan. However, if the Japanese TMD system is not deployed to protect Taiwan, then the Chinese will have significantly less reason to be concerned about Japan's R&D on a NTW system, as such opposition is largely based on the logic that the system could be mobilized in defense of Taiwan. Though it is highly likely that Beijing would still oppose Japan's TMD on the basis that an upper-tier missile defense system (whether the sea-based NTW or land-based THAAD) could di- minish China's offensive nuclear capability, at least its concern over Taiwan could be greatly mitigated.

One may argue that such a measure would be impossible given the political geography of the Taiwan issue and the complexity of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Many Chinese observers in fact doubt whether Tokyo is capable of

42. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," p. 77.

43. Private communication with Fumihiko Yoshida, deputy director, Foreign News Desk, Asahi shinbun, Tokyo, December 25, 1999.

44. This measure is to be limited to Japan's ballistic missile defense system, which would be deployed on Japanese Aegis ships. It should not be confused with the U.S. NTW system deployed to protect U.S. forces in Japan as it is unrealistic for the U.S. to explicitly declare that its TMD will not be used to protect Taiwan.



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convincing Washington to make such a statement. As a prominent foreign policy analyst at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences observed, "Unfor- tunately, Japan doesn't control the military aspect of the alliance, the U.S. does."45 That said, enshrined within the joint TMD R&D project is a possibility for Japan to exert some political leverage over the U.S. Thus, Tokyo may be able to exert stronger influence on the U.S., particularly in further strengthening the U.S.-Japan-China security dialogue. Some Chinese analysts note that for Tokyo to play a restrainer role would be welcomed by Beijing and state that, if such could be achieved, Beijing would likely soften its stance on Japan's TMD. They also stated that Tokyo's clarification of the Taiwan factor within its TMD framework would be a key to gaining an arms control agreement from China. It must be stipulated, however, that exclusion of Taiwan from co-development and co-deployment in Japan's TMD system is not to be confused with how Japan's security guidelines are applied to Taiwan. That is another matter to be dealt with on a separate basis.

Be as open and transparent as possible about TMD R&D. There is an obvious need to ensure transparency of the TMD R&D process. The Japanese government's position is to keep the program as transparent as possible. Hence, it is fair to say that such measures as partial data releases to the Chi- nese could be taken so as to reduce China's threat perception level. One suggestion is for the U.S. and Japan to publish a joint TMD white paper. Sensitive information, of course, would not be disclosed, but partial release of information could be a constructive confidence-building measure (CBM).46 Such an overture could be made in exchange for China increasing its military transparency; specifically, Beijing could offer a partial data release of its missile modernization program and clarify its nuclear doctrine, which remains highly opaque and ambiguous.

Utilize TMD Debate as a Starting Point for a Serious Sino-Japanese Security Dialogue and Other Bilateral CBMs

China's vehement opposition to TMD signals the possibility that the current debate could have a strong potential to become the starting point for a serious Sino-Japanese security dialogue. My interviews in China poignantly revealed that much of China's opposition to Japan's involvement in the TMD project is rooted in China's historical distrust of Japan. The Japanese government should utilize CBMs with China to alleviate unnecessary tensions.

45. Interview in Beijing, September 1999. 46. Comments by Li Bin, senior fellow, China Youth College for Political Science, Beijing,

China, September 1999. See also Li, "Ballistic Missile Defense."




Japan must be willing to listen more attentively to Chinese concerns over TMD and be more sensitive to the roots of such Chinese concerns. While most of these may stem from a persisting Chinese distrust of Japan for historical reasons, there are also other factors that should not be ignored, such as the rise of a new nationalism in China and an ideological rigidity resulting from recent anti-U.S. hegemony sentiments. At the same time, Japan must pay close attention to Beijing's internationalist element, which has grown in recent years, and endeavor to further encourage it when there are signs of China wanting to cooperate with Japan and the U.S.

Similarly, China must be just as responsible for addressing concerns on the Japanese side and reassuring Japan of its intentions. Some Chinese question why Japan would feel threatened by China's missiles in the first place. One missile expert asked, "The Chinese [short- and mid-range] missiles [deployed in coastal areas] have always been there, why make such a fuss about them now?"47 What they fail to understand is that China's missile diplomacy in 1995 and 1996 left a big scar on Japan's security psyche and led many Japa- nese to doubt the credibility of China's no-first-use pledge.48 Such Japanese concerns over Chinese missile diplomacy cannot be discredited as being blown out of proportion but need to be discussed in depth.

It must also be noted, however, that China's reluctance to acknowledge Japan as an equal partner will be very difficult to overcome. As some Chi- nese scholars point out, for various reasons Beijing still finds it difficult psy- chologically to treat Tokyo as a full-fledged nation state and is, thus, not yet ready when it comes to devising CBMs to define Japan as an equal security and military counterpart.49 As such, the path to Sino-Japanese bilateral CBMs will remain rocky for the foreseeable future, regardless of which diplomatic card is used to initiate the process. This process, therefore, needs to be pursued carefully and cautiously so as not to evoke inflated or unrealistic expectations on either side.

In addition to the series of military exchanges already in place between Tokyo and Beijing, there are three other ideas for future bilateral CBMs worth noting in passing. One might be to conduct joint military exercises for

47. Interview in the U.S., November 12, 1999. 48. Author's interviews with Japanese politicians, security experts, and government officials,

February-March 2000. Also see Frank Umbach, "World Gets Wise to Pyongyang's Nuclear Blackmail-Part 2," Jane's Intelligence Review 11:10 (October 1999). Some of the material on Japan's positions and policies that follows are derived from the author's February-March 2000 interviews in Tokyo; as with the Chinese experts, citations are limited only to direct quotes and other instances where specificity is required.

49. Jiangwei Wang, "Confidence-Building Measures and China-Japan Relations," in Confi- dence-Building Measures and Security Issues in Northeast Asia, eds. Benjamin Self and Yuki Tatsumi, Henry L. Stimson Center Report, no. 33 (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, February 2000), p. 81.



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nuclear disaster relief operations.50 A second would be to establish a joint Japan-China working group to discuss various security issues, possibly starting with missile defense and its implication on Sino-Japanese relations. Fi- nally, the two could boost cooperation-and confidence-in non-contro- versial areas such as transnational crime (e.g., through joint police investiga- tions to combat drug trafficking or terrorism), the environment, and energy.

Discuss TMD More Openly in the Context of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and Make the R&D Process as Transparent as Possible

Another factor contributing to China's vehement opposition to TMD appears to be rooted in the fact that the U.S.-Japan discussions over TMD are exclu- sionary and lack transparency. In Japan, discussions on TMD are far from exhaustive and only a few have been bold enough to address the issue of TMD's impact on the U.S.-Japan alliance. If Japan refuses to deal adequately with this concern, its China policy relative to TMD will be in danger of fail- ing altogether. There are four fundamental questions Japan should address, as outlined below.

How will TMD deployment affect U.S. forward presence in the Asia-Pa- cific? A consensus on the impact TMD will have on the future U.S. forward deployment in Asia has yet to be formed. Some argue that TMD for Japan will strengthen U.S. forward deployment, while others contend that a robust air defense in Asia, particularly after the Korean reunification, will facilitate U.S. troop withdrawal from the region.51 This is a topic that warrants serious discussion in Japan, though it has not been actively pursued to date.

China obviously bears the U.S.-Japan alliance factor well in mind when discussing TMD in East Asia. While Beijing does openly acknowledge the need for a U.S. presence in the region to function as a regional stabilizer, it is alarmed at the prospects of such a presence being strengthened unnecessarily via TMD. Two Chinese experts have said that "the introduction of advanced TMD systems into certain regions will further reinforce the U.S. regional

50. Private communication with Hitoshi Yoshida, visiting researcher, Economic Research In- stitute for Northeast Asia, Tokyo, March 2000.

51. The former view was offered in Green's presentation at the "Countering the Missile Threat" conference, while the latter came out in a meeting between the Heritage Foundation researchers and a Japanese delegation on March 22, 1999. See Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) and Tokyo-American Center (TAC), Theater Missile Defense, Tokyo, RIPS/ TAC, April 1999.




military presence and enhance its capabilities for intervention in regional affairs."52

How will TMD be positioned relative to U.S. extended deterrence? Security experts such as Green and Cambone maintain that TMD will help strengthen the U.S.'s extended deterrence umbrella over Japan by dealing with such newly arising concerns as rogue states, limited ballistic missile threats, and chemical/biological weapons that cannot be restrained by the nuclear shield alone. They argue that a "modest" TMD deployment would assure a reduc- tion of Japan's vulnerability to "ambiguous coercive threats."53 Some Japa- nese have expressed similar views, arguing that a regional TMD system would be the most effective measure as a practical force to reduce hegemonic countries' incentives in this region. It must be noted, however, that while they acknowledge that TMD may play a partial deterrent role as an effective denial force, they also contend that U.S. allies will continue to rely on the U.S. deterrent and that for such allies as Japan, a TMD deployment would be purely defensive, not for nuclear deterrence. On the other hand, some Japa- nese security professionals contend that Japan's rationalization to opt for its own missile defense system in the first place actually stems from a certain level of distrust vis-a-vis the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella-these analysts are far from being convinced that the U.S. would seriously consider the nuclear retaliation option even if Japan were under a serious nuclear threat by a regional rogue state.

More extensive discussions on this question have yet to take place, espe- cially in Japan where the government tends to treat the nuclear issue-particularly the viability of the U.S. nuclear deterrence vis-a-vis post Cold War nuclear threats and the implication of such on the U.S.-Japan alliance-as an issue not open for discussion. Nonetheless, it is a critical question for Japan to come to grips with as it considers its future policy options regarding TMD, the alliance, and the China factor.

What is the ultimate purpose of TMD? As stated above, the current official position on the aim of Japan's TMD is that it is a purely defensive system and that it will be deployed specifically to counter North Korean missile threats. However, one can speculate that included in the U.S.-Japan rationalization

52. Chen Jifeng and Wang Zheng, "Impact of Development of BMD on International Arms Control and Disarmament Process" (paper presented at the "Missile Defence and the Future of ABM Treaty" seminar).

53. See Michael Green, "Theater Missile Defense and Strategic Relations with the People's Republic of China," in Restructuring the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Toward a More Equal Partner- ship, ed. Ralph Cossa (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998), p. 112; and Stephen Cambone, "The United States and Theatre Missile Defence in Northeast Asia," Survival 39:3 (Autumn 1997), p. 72.



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for developing TMD is the idea that it will remain useful even after the col- lapse of the North Korean regime. Should that event occur, a new purpose for its deployment would come into being, namely, to guard against acciden- tal or intentional launches of Chinese missiles. However, to date there has been no clear consensus as to what the ultimate purpose of Japanese missile defense system is. The problem with the pro-TMD camp is that it comprises two extremes: one side chooses to focus exclusively on the North Korean missile threat, while the other exaggerates the Chinese missile danger (almost to the extent of ignoring the North Korean missile threat altogether). The obvious challenge for TMD proponents is how to address the China factor when discussing the basic justification for the program.

Another factor that needs to be considered is the connectivity between TMD and NMD. How will Japan's TMD be positioned relative to the U.S. NMD? Japanese journalist Funabashi Yoichi, in addressing this factor in a recent piece on NMD, has asked: "Is it the United States's intention to expand its missile defense system into a global command and control system in which each TMD will function as a regional terminal? If so, what will this mean for Japan's own defense and foreign policy and its alliance with the United States?"54 As some Japan Defence Agency officials have openly ac- knowledged, the exact nature of the TMD-NMD relationship is yet to be clearly defined. This is precisely what worries China: How will Japan's missile defense system be positioned relative to U.S. NMD strategy?55 One Chi- nese analyst commented, "If Tokyo can somehow convince Washington to agree to articulating the position of Japan's missile defense relative to its NMD strategy-namely, that Japan's NTWD will not function as a regional terminal of the U.S. NMD, Beijing's threat perception vis-a-vis Japan's missile defense would be greatly reduced."56 Although some Japanese security professionals contend that Japan's BMD will always be under Japanese control regardless of future TMD-NMD integration, others argue that real-time information sharing (with information coming mostly from the U.S. intelligence satellites) will, in actual terms, mean a considerable constraining of Japanese decision-making mobility. Such perception gaps demonstrate the obvious need for a more active discussion on the issue.

How should Japan pursue its TMD discussion relative to the U.S. domestic discussion? Domestic political factors from time to time tend to drive Washington to take extreme actions with regard to matters that may affect

54. Yoichi Funabashi, "Tokyo's Temperance," Washington Quarterly 23:3 (Summer 2000). Also available on the World Wide Web at <http://www.twq.com/info/archives.html> [accessed June 30, 2000].

55. Author's conversations with Zhu Mingquan, Fudan University, Shanghai, April 2000. 56. Author's interview in Beijing, April 2000.




Beijing's sensitivities. Such an example can be seen in Washington's move to abrogate the ABM Treaty and reach a final decision on NMD deployment by autumn 2000, a deadline that appears to have been set to fend off Republi- can attacks against Democrats before the presidential and congressional elec- tions.

Japan needs to take such factors into consideration when discussing missile defense, as it would be dangerous for it to be drawn into such Congress-led dynamics. Care must be taken so that the joint research is not pursued in a manner that jeopardizes matters related to Japan's long-term security interests, including its relations with China. Japan should not hesitate to raise questions regarding U.S. NMD out of concern that it might destabilize the foundations of the bilateral alliance in doing so. Closer policy consultation on this issue is needed, and Japan must be willing to accept its responsibility in defining the discussion parameters as a partner in the ballistic missile defense research process.57

Conclusion China's opposition to theater missile defense is beginning to shift from mere political rhetoric to a highly diversified discussion. My talks with a range of Chinese experts revealed definite openings for a constructive Sino-Japanese dialogue on security, including TMD. Younger Chinese experts candidly admit to the negative consequences of Beijing's missile modernization program on Japan's defense mentality and express a certain level of understanding regarding Japan's move toward developing a TMD system. Many of these younger experts also view the restoration of trust between China and Japan as essential to maintaining long-term stability in the region, and express their desire for improved bilateral relations. Though they do not necessarily fore- see a dramatically improved relationship in the near future, their comments reveal the existence of room for a very constructive discussion on security between China and Japan.

Maintaining its official position on TMD, Tokyo still fails to recognize that the TMD R&D is a serious enough issue to warrant an open discussion among Japan, China, and the U.S., and most particularly between the former two. The current tactic deployed by the Japanese government, which is to reiterate that TMD is a purely defensive system and does not pose any threat whatsoever to China, simply will not work. Some analysts are downright frustrated with this approach and the Japanese government's intransigence in not giving them sufficient answers to their questions. Thus, there is certainly a pressing need to engage China in a comprehensive TMD dialogue. If, in their rush toward TMD co-development, the U.S. and Japan should allow

57. Funabashi, "Tokyo's Temperance."



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short-term imperatives to blind them to China's concerns, they will risk miss- ing the chance to initiate a constructive security dialogue with it.

This is not to suggest that Japan should immediately give up on the idea of pursuing R&D on TMD. TMD does not have to be an extreme "all or nothing" choice between defense and arms control, nor must it be discussed in zero-sum terms. It is possible for Japan to pursue TMD R&D in tandem with such cooperative efforts as arms control initiatives and CBMs. The biggest challenge in such a combined effort will be how to involve China in that process. As such, Japan, the U.S. and China, but foremostly Japan and Chi- na, will need to enhance their security dialogue and exchange so as to do away with unproductive rhetorical confrontations.



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