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DOI: 10.1177/0268580907076571 2007; 22; 289 International Sociology

Katherine Meyer, Helen Rizzo and Yousef Ali Changed Political Attitudes in the Middle East: The Case of Kuwait

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289

Changed Political Attitudes in theMiddle East

The Case of Kuwait

Katherine MeyerThe Ohio State University

Helen RizzoThe American University in Cairo

Yousef AliKuwait University

abstract: The groundswell of interest in Middle Eastern public opinion that arosefrom debates over the ‘third wave’ of democracy and the ‘clash of civilizations’ aswell as from September 11 spawned numerous surveys from 2000 on. However,surveys from the Middle East, particularly longitudinal ones, are largely absentfrom earlier decades and limit ability to contextualize current findings. Drawingon three surveys from the 1990s, this article examines changes in Kuwaiti citizens’attitudes toward democracy and related issues in the years following the Gulf Warof 1991. This serves as a baseline for current research not only in Kuwait but alsoin other nations, taking account of differences. Findings show that from 1994 to1998, Kuwaitis increased their preference for democracy, but not for women’srights or western media. They developed more affinity for the Arab world, par-ticularly the Gulf Coast countries. Regarding religious beliefs and practices, therewas an increasing desire to separate religion from the public sphere while remain-ing religious privately. These trends were directional rather than cyclical or fluc-tuating, and they held across population subgroups.

keywords: democratization ✦ Islam ✦ Middle East ✦ political change

The 1990s was a decade of dramatic social change in Kuwait, a small butstrategically important nation in the Middle East. It began with the 1990–1invasion, occupation and then liberation from Iraqi military forces; itended in 1999 with an Amiri decree granting women full political rights.

International Sociology ✦ May 2007 ✦ Vol. 22(3): 289–324©International Sociological Association

SAGE (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, and Singapore)DOI: 10.1177/0268580907076571

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The decree was then subsequently defeated in parliament in November1999. In the years following the 1990–1 Gulf War, several salient issuesand debates were at the forefront in Kuwaiti society. Questions aroseabout the process of democratization, including whether or not toincrease women’s political rights and about relationships with adjacentGulf neighbors, the larger Arab world and western nations (Momayezi,1997). During this same period, the third wave of democratization sweptover much of Latin America, Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa aswell as parts of Southeast Asia (Diamond and Plattner, 1993; Huntington,1993a). In debates about this third wave, an issue was whether or not theMiddle East could become part of the global spread of democracy. Somescholars argued that Islamic beliefs and practices were a key barrier todemocratization in the Middle East (Huntington, 1993b; Kedourie, 1994;Lewis, 1994; Lipset, 1994). Issues of religiosity, especially whether or notIslam and democracy were compatible, also became particularly pertinentin Kuwait and the Middle East. The research presented here focuses onchanges in Kuwaiti citizens’ attitudes toward democracy, internationalrelationships and religion in the years following the Gulf War of 1990–1.

During the 1990s, little systematic research tracked changes in nationalself-consciousness and/or political and social attitudes of Middle Easterners,particularly Gulf citizens. September 11 2001 marked a turning point, andsince then numerous scholars have commented on the groundswell ofenthusiasm for understanding Middle Eastern public sentiment (al-Braizat,2002; Center for Strategic Studies, 2005; Esmer, 2002; Tessler et al., 2006;Zogby, 2002, 2005). Global surveys, such as the fourth wave of the WorldValue Survey (WVS 2000)1 collected in 1999–2003, began to include MiddleEastern countries. However, recent scholarship often struggles with thelack of baseline information, particularly longitudinal data.

In this article, we provide an important foundation for the current spateof survey research on public opinion in the Middle East as we integrateour survey data based on random household interviews of 1500 Kuwaiticitizens that were conducted in 1994, 1996 and 1988 (Ali et al., 2003; Meyer,Rizzo and Ali 1998, 2001, 2005; Rizzo et al., 2002). We address over timequestions that were central to Kuwaiti public opinion in the decade fol-lowing the 1990–1 Gulf War and provide a context for understanding cur-rent trends. (1) Did citizens grow more enthusiastic about democraticgovernance including incorporating women politically? (2) Did they wantstronger or increased alliances with the West? (3) Did they favor develop-ing regional economic and military partnerships? (4) Did they embracemore traditional religious beliefs and customs? In other words, didKuwaitis develop stronger cultural and practical affinity with the West orbecome more distant? Also, we examine longitudinally questions that areimportant to theories of social change and the body of empirical research

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bout the consequences of war and occupation; namely, questions aboutthe direction, distribution and pace of change. Did public opinion fluctu-ate rapidly in the years following the 1991 Gulf War or was it directional,i.e. moving increasingly toward or away from specific views towarddemocracy and a nation’s place in a globalizing world? Did a pervasivepolitical culture develop, or did support for a more democratic culturevary by social group? Did those enjoying social advantage have differentviews from others?

Public Opinion on Prevalent Issues

Attitudes toward Democratization and IncorporatingWomen PoliticallyScholars studying democratization often highlight the importance of citi-zens’ attitudes and values to creating the kind of political culture that isnecessary for a transition to democracy and, especially, democratic con-solidation (Huntington, 1993a; Inglehart, 2000; Tessler, 2002a). Eventhough some contend that individual-level support for democratic senti-ments can follow (rather than precede) elite-led transitions to more dem-ocratic systems (Rose, 1997; Schmitter and Karl, 1993), empirical evidencefrom Taiwan, Korea, Latin America and even the Arab world (Chu et al.,2001; Harik, 1994; Kubba, 2000; Mainwaring, 1999) revealed that the tran-sition and consolidation of democratic forms of government requires that‘all significant political actors, at both elite and mass levels, believe thatthe democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for their society,better than any other realistic alternative they can imagine’ (Chu et al.,2001: 123). As Harik (1994: 56) argued in terms of the Arab world, ‘a dem-ocratic government needs a democratic political culture, and vice versa’.

Most research that tackled the development of a democratic cultureduring the 1990s and beyond addressed, directly or indirectly, Huntington’s(1993b) controversial ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis. It examined if reli-gious citizens of Middle Eastern Muslim nations favored democratic gov-ernance, particularly whether or not democracy was operational wherethey lived. Substantial proportions did favor democracy. For example, inthe early to mid-1990s, Tessler (2002b)2 discovered that the majority ofPalestinians and Egyptians (60 percent and 78 percent respectively)thought that democratic forms of governance were important and sub-stantial proportions of Moroccans and Algerians (45 percent and 40 per-cent) felt similarly. Using WVS 2000 data, Tessler (2002a) demonstratedthat close to or greater than 90 percent of the Egyptian, Jordanian, Algerianand Moroccan populations were positive toward democracy. Using Pales-tinian data collected in 2003, Tessler et al. (2006) noted that a larger per-centage (84 percent) supported democratic systems of governance than in

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1995. Tessler and Altinoglu (2004) found that vast majority of Turks (86.5percent) had positive attitudes. Other cross-national studies used theWVS 2000 and found that the Muslim world did not differ from the Westin terms of its support for democracy (al-Braizat, 2002; Esmer, 2002; Norrisand Inglehart, 2002). Even citizens in religiously conservative Saudi Arabiain 2003 and war-torn Iraq in 2004 had highly favorable sentiments towarddemocratic governance with 60–70 percent of Saudis supporting democ-racy depending on the measure (Moaddel, 2006) and 80–90 percent of Iraqissupporting democracy depending on the wording of the question (Tessleret al., 2006). Thus, when individuals were surveyed in various nations,their religious adherence did not bar enthusiasm for the democratizationprocess, and support for democracy seemed to be spreading in the MuslimMiddle East. Examining here whether or not a similar democratic polit-ical culture was developing in Kuwait during the 1990s, we expectedKuwaitis to become more supportive of democracy, partly because ofthese larger trends and particularly because of experiences around thetime of the Iraqi invasion and occupation in 1990–1.

Prior to the onset of the Gulf War, the ruling government was pressuredto restore parliament, which it had dissolved in 1986. Since then, bothIslamic and nationalist opposition groups had become more cooperativeand mutually tolerant (Ghabra, 1991; Hicks and al-Najjar, 1995) and theyspurred public debate and demanded the restoration of the constitutionand parliament. Gathering 30,000 signatures in the autumn of 1988, topetition support of democracy and a return to the 1962 constitution in thefall of 1988, they pressed forward in organizing a series of public meetings(diwaniyya) that were held every Monday in December 1989, with severalthousand citizens demanding that the parliament be restored. The rulinggovernment made several arrests in order to halt the meetings, but theassemblies continued to draw thousands of people and some becamesilent sit-ins. The government conceded somewhat by proposing that aninterim national assembly (Majlis al-Watani) with limited powers reviewthe previous parliamentary experience. In June 1990, a divided Kuwaiticitizenry elected the Majlis al-Watani. On the eve of the Iraqi invasion on2 August 1990, the nationalist and religious opposition were coordinatingforums for open and popular political dissent and debate.

During the invasion and occupation, the opposition groups rallied andbecame leaders of the resistance. These members of the Islamic and nation-alist movements, their voluntary associations and other groups that hadbeen the most politically marginalized since the dissolution of parliamentin 1986 – the Shias and the commercial class – manifested the most loyalsupport of Kuwait’s sovereignty and the emir as its legitimate ruler, will-ing to fight and die for their nation. While in exile, the ruling family andthe political elite articulated the need for a freely elected National Assembly

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(parliament) and a well-developed civil society during the Jidda confer-ence that was held in Saudi Arabia on 13–15 October 1990. Numerous sec-tors of Kuwaiti society, including the opposition, former parliamentariansand government leaders, were present. The ruling government concededthat constitutional government might have prevented the Iraqi invasionand was necessary for the continued legitimacy of its regime. Both EmirJabir al-Ahmad and Crown Prince Saad al-Abdallah committed to hold-ing elections once the occupation ended and to restoring the democraticprocess, the Kuwaiti constitution and the National Assembly. The Iraqicrisis enabled the political opposition and its associations to gain morepolitical rights in Kuwait once the Iraqis withdrew. In postwar Kuwait,the parliament was restored and elections were held regularly. Wehypothesize that Kuwaitis’ desire for democracy and its attendantprocesses would increase over time, since the constitution and the parlia-ment were restored, parliamentary elections were held in 1992 and 1996before and during our survey period, civil society was growing morevibrant, vocal and active (Crystal, 1996) and support in the region for theglobal trend toward democracy was developing.

A necessary ingredient in creating a democratic political culture andconsolidating democratic institutions is incorporating those who areexcluded into the political process (Wolbrecht and Hero, 2005). Throughoutthe world, but in the Middle East in particular, women are often system-atically excluded from various aspects of society but especially from pol-itics. Moghadam (2004) has argued that the quality of democracy in theMiddle East depends not only on institutions and processes of gover-nance but also on the incorporation of women. Inglehart and Norris(2003) pointed out that the cultural clash between the Islamic world andthe West is not over whether or not democracy is the best political system,but rather over gender equality and sexual liberalization. Using WVS2000 data, they found that citizens of Muslim societies were significantlyless supportive of equal rights and opportunities for women and had sig-nificantly less permissive attitudes toward homosexuality, abortion anddivorce than those living in western, democratic countries (see alsoEsmer, 2002; Moaddel, 2006). Inglehart and Norris noted that attitudestoward such issues involve tolerance, trust, political activism and supportfor individual autonomy, characteristics that are closely associated withstable democratic regimes. Their research and others (Esfandiari, 2004;Fish, 2002) implied that cultural and religious as well as structural barri-ers, e.g. women’s limited role and second-class status in Middle Easternsociety, block democratic implementation in Muslim countries.

In Kuwait, the road to women’s achieving full political rights (whichwere granted in May 2005) was particularly contentious throughout the1990s. The 1991 Gulf War brought the issue of women’s political rights

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once again to the forefront because of the heroic role many Kuwaitiwomen played in the resistance to occupation. The emir was one of thefirst to publicly recognize and praise Kuwaiti women for their heroism.Women organized to capitalize on their contributions to wartime resist-ance by insisting on full citizenship rights. For example, Kuwaiti womenmarried to non-Kuwaitis organized to improve the status of husbandsand children denied basic citizenship rights. In 1993, two years after thewar ended, the oldest women’s organization in Kuwait, the Women’sCultural and Social Society, organized the first post-liberation women’sconference, focusing on gender discrimination and bringing the debate onwomen’s rights into national consciousness. Throughout the 1990s andinto the new century, women’s groups, independent feminists andIslamist activists held protest rallies, issued public statements, sponsoredseminars and lectures, and signed petitions addressed to the NationalAssembly.

Even as some groups of Kuwaiti women and their allies worked to getpolitical rights, an opposition started to voice its reservations as early as1991. Most of the opponents to women’s enfranchisement were Islamistsand/or tribalists, including some women, whose increasing politicalpower since the 1980s was a result of the regime’s desire to divide theopposition by weakening the secular Arab nationalists through strength-ening the Islamists (al-Mughni, 2001). After the Gulf War ended, theIslamist and tribalist opposition joined a larger movement to rewriteKuwaiti history in order to make it more favorable to those who had leftKuwait during the invasion. This included denying the important roleswomen played during the occupation. Even those among the oppositionwho did not deny women’s activism during occupation still attempted toundermine a justification for women’s rights based on earned entitlement(Tétreault, 2006). Regardless of what women did during the occupation,the Islamists continued to argue that a woman’s primary and divinelyordained role was to be a wife and mother and was forbidden by religiousteachings to become involved in politics. By 1993, senior members of par-liament said that proposals to grant Kuwaiti women all or part of theirpolitical rights had no chance of being approved by parliament.

The backlash against women’s rights peaked in the parliament in 1996,making it far less welcoming to the issue than it had been in 1992.Women’s organizations were still active but even as they demonstratedoutside parliament to demand the vote in early March, a newspaper pollshowed that among 200 male university students surveyed, only 30.8 per-cent thought that women should vote and only 20.6 percent thoughtwomen should compete in parliamentary elections (Associated Press, 12March 1996). As Tétreault (2000) argued, young men, such as those polledin Kuwait, may have been threatened by competition from their female

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counterparts at the university, viewing them as potential rivals in the labormarket that had been constricted since the economic crisis and restructur-ing of the 1980s. During the 1990s, women were entering the labor force inlarger numbers (National Bank of Kuwait, 1997).3 Moreover, 1996 saw thehighly controversial law to sex-segregate Kuwait University debated andpassed, and there was an assassination attempt against a member of par-liament, Abdullah Nibari, a strong ally of women’s political rights. In 1998,a parliamentary committee once again rejected a draft law grantingwomen’s political rights (Associated Press, 2 March 1998), but the effortsby women’s groups finally seemed to pay off when the emir issued anedict in May 1999, granting women the right to vote and run for parlia-ment in 2003 after legally dismissing the 1996 parliament. But the directivewas twice rejected by close votes in parliament in November 1999.

In examining the 1990s, we would expect Kuwaitis’ support forwomen’s political rights to fluctuate due to the conflicts surrounding thisissue. We expect Kuwaitis to be more receptive to women’s rights in 1994due to women’s participation in the Iraqi resistance. However, we predictthat by 1996 public opinion backing women’s rights would decrease dueto the backlash coming from the increasing powerful Islamist/tribalistblocs in parliament who used religion and tradition as justifications fortheir resistance, as well as opposition from upwardly mobile Kuwaiti menwho saw women’s increasing labor force participation as a threat to theiropportunities in an increasingly competitive job market. By 1998, wehypothesize that there will be a rebound in Kuwaitis’ support forwomen’s political rights in reaction to the unpopular law to sex-segregateKuwait University, as well as increased mobilization by women’s groupsand their allies working for political rights during this period that led upto the amiri decree of 1999 that aimed to give women full rights to politi-cal participation (Rizzo, 2005).

Attitudes toward the West and its MediaScant survey research examined the effect of the 1991 Gulf War on atti-tudes toward the West, particularly in the Gulf Cooperation Council(GCC), during the years immediately following the western interventionthat ended the Iraqi occupation. However after 11 September 2001, therewas a tremendous interest in discovering how Arabs felt about the West tosee if there were truly a ‘civilizational clash’ between the Middle East andthe West. Zogby (2002, 2005) and the Center for Strategic Studies (2005)conducted multiple country polls in the Arab world in 2002, 2004 and 2005,which included Egyptians, Arab Israelis, Jordanians, Lebanese, Kuwaitis,Moroccans, Emiratis, Saudis, Syrians and Palestinians. All surveys foundthat Arabs’ anti-West attitudes were related to the foreign policies of theWest, particularly the US and Britain, not to cultural or religious concerns.

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Most people did not view western nations as homogeneous; Arabs’ viewstoward the West were more complicated than surface analyses of theregion might suggest.

Many survey respondents were favorable to aspects of US society, suchas accomplishments in science and technology, freedom and democracy,education, movies and television and the American people. However,they felt that the positive elements of western society were not reflectedin actual policies, particularly those directed toward the Middle East. Thedisjuncture between professed values and actual policy implementationdrove anti-western sentiment, particularly directed toward the US andBritain. Respondents felt negative towards the US and Britain regardingtheir policies toward the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, their handling of Iraqsince the 2003 invasion and the US treatment of Arab and Muslim minori-ties since 9/11. They perceived the US and UK as promoting their owninterests in the region, imposing their will on the Arab world and violat-ing human rights with their policies. The US, in particular, was viewed asbeing influenced by the ‘Zionist’ lobby. On the other hand, the majority ofrespondents viewed France, and to a lesser extent, Germany and Japanfavorably. France, especially, was perceived as treating countries in theArab world with respect and dignity, promoting democracy and humanrights and not imposing its will and interests upon other nations. TheFrench and German opposition to the war in Iraq led Arabs to have muchmore positive views toward them than toward the US or U.K.

Our surveys preceded those conducted by Zogby (2002, 2005) and theCenter for Strategic Studies (2005) and measured attitudes over the 1990s.We expect Kuwaiti respondents’ attitudes toward the West to be informedby western, particularly US, regional policies. We predict that in 1994Kuwaitis would manifest positive attitudes toward the West because of theUS-led alliance that liberated Kuwait from Iraq. However, we think thatpositive feelings would decrease over time, as Kuwaiti citizens sought tolessen their dependence on the West for economic and military security,especially to end US pressure to buy unnecessary weaponry. We alsoexpect Kuwaitis’ favorable impressions of the West and their desire for tiesto the West to decrease as hopes for resolving the Palestinian–Israeli con-flict in 1993 decreased by the end of the 1990s. The peace process was frus-trated and stalled by 1998 and the growing perception of Arabs was thatthe US was not a fair arbitrator of the conflict.

Kuwaitis’ views of the West include whether or not they follow westernmedia, as this has implications for their views towards democratizationand relationships with the West. After being somewhat isolated during theIraqi invasion, Kuwait made it a priority to insure access for its entire pop-ulation (both Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis) to the latest communicationstechnologies including US, Asian, Middle Eastern and European media

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outlets (Wheeler, 2000). Ghareeb (2000), Sakr (2001) and Seib (2005) presentauthoritative information on the development of media during the 1990sin the Middle East, which we summarize here. Prior to the 1990–1 GulfWar and the emergence of satellite television, many in Arab nations reliedon western media outlets such as the BBC, Radio Monte Carlo, the Voice ofAmerica, etc. because they viewed Arab media as controlled and censoredby their respective governments. The 1990–1 war increased the popularityof CNN’s all-news format. Saudi and Egyptian television stations pickedup several of CNN’s programs aired live during the war. Arab consumerswatched instant live coverage and news of the war, viewing westernmedia reporting as more reliable and accurate than Iraqi or other Arabreports. However, CNN’s and other western media’s coverage of the waralso highlighted to the Arab world that western media had their ownbiased and particular slant. Many in the region were disappointed by the‘unquestioning or cheerleading attitude of many Western journalists dur-ing the war’ (Ghareeb, 2000: 401). Many were disturbed by the lack ofattention to Iraqi civilian deaths. Instead, the focus was on the accuracyand superiority of western technology and weapons. For Arab reporters, itwas an eye opener to realize that western journalists also had biases andwere influenced by their own governments in their war reporting.Consequently, Arab reporters grew more self-confident and called for localand pan-Arab media; the rise of Arabic language satellite news channels,such as Al Jazeera, became both possible and successful.

The early 1990s brought Arabic satellite channels into the media arena.The Saudi-owned Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC) began in Londonin 1991 and was the leader in news programming until Al Jazeera enteredthe field in 1996. Using western-style reporting, MBC had a reputation forpresenting accurate and reliable news and current events programs. In 1993and 1994, two more Saudi satellite channels entered the market, Arab Radioand Television (ART) and Orbit. Even Arab governments set up satellitechannels throughout the 1990s, including Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria,Yemen and Libya. In 1996, the Arab satellite television nexus entered a newphase with the entrance of two Lebanese channels and another from Qatar.The Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC) and FutureTV immediatelychallenged the previously dominant Egyptian and Saudi satellite channels.However it was Al Jazeera, which began broadcasting from Doha, Qatar,that changed the face of Arabic satellite news channels. After experiencinginitial technical difficulties, Al Jazeera was able to compete with Arabicchannels. Since 1998, it has been the most watched Arab news networkbecause of its reputation for independence and willingness to discuss topicsoften prohibited by Arab governments.

In this research, we examine if the western media continued to have largelistening and viewing audiences and play an important role in influencing

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the political decision-making process (Alnajjar, 2000) and public opinion asthey had before the 1990–1 Gulf War, in the face of new competition fromalternative and independent Arab news satellite sources.

Attitudes toward the Arab World and the RegionWe conjecture that during the 1990s Kuwaitis would gradually want looserties to the West and become more interested in strengthening ties withcountries in the region, particularly the GCC, because of some commonideas and practical interests. On the ideological side, the 1991 Gulf Warunderscored pan-Arabism, an ideological current present in the Arab worldsince the Second World War that sprang in part from hostility to the spreadof western culture and influence. Pan-Arabism sought a single unified Arabstate and was embraced by Arab regimes and substantial segments of theirpublics before 1978. After Egypt and Israel signed the Camp David Accordsin 1979, pan-Arabist ideology lost popularity among Arab nation-states(Dawisha, 2003; Susser, 2003) as regime leaders focused on national identi-ties instead (Gelvin, 1999; Ibrahim, 1998; Munson, 2003). During the GulfWar, the trend toward the decline of pan-Arabism was amplified as Arabnations aligned against each other. However, individual citizens continuedto support it, and its ability to mobilize populations became evidentthroughout the Arab world during the 1990s, as demonstrated by the seriesof confrontations between the US and Iraq since the 1991 Gulf War.

Although the 1991 Gulf War severely divided the Middle Eastern Arabworld into Gulf and non-Gulf states, there had been previously a practi-cal cohesiveness of the Middle East that existed alongside socioeconomicand political diversity. The GCC countries emerged from the war con-vinced that bilateral security pacts with western nations were moreimportant to their well-being than alliances with other Arab states (Faour,1993). Over time, it would be reasonable to expect that practical com-monalities would emerge with Kuwaitis interested in increasing their eco-nomic and security ties with the Arab region, particularly the other GCCcountries. But how would Kuwaitis view nations that supported Iraq dur-ing the 1991 crisis, such as Jordan and Yemen as well as the PalestinianLiberation Organization (PLO), over time? It would seem that once theKuwaiti government normalized relations with former enemies, such asJordan in 1997, citizens’ animosity might decrease because of more press-ing domestic and regional concerns during the mid-1990s.

Attitudes toward Religious Beliefs and PracticesWe examine Kuwaitis’ religious beliefs and practices during the 1990sbecause they were nationally salient issues and materials for scholarlydebate over democracy and women’s rights prompted by the ‘Clash ofCivilizations’ thesis. Throughout the region, observers noted the loss of

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popularity of Arab secular nationalist and socialist movements since the1970s; Kuwait was no exception. With their demise, the power of Islamistmovements (with the help of some Arab governments including Kuwait)increased as they moved in to assume the role of the opposition duringthe Gulf War of 1990–1. They were extremely well organized, had grass-roots support in many countries due to the quality social services theyprovided and through promoting simple yet attractive religious ideolo-gies. In countries with undemocratic regimes, they were the only realisticoption for opposition (Brown et al., 2006). In Kuwait, a more democraticsituation, they were extremely successful gaining parliamentary repre-sentation (as with Islamists in Jordan and Morocco) in the 1992, 1996 and1999 elections.

Also, a general Islamic revival has occurred in the region since the1970s, with increased expressions of personal piety, such as veiling, mengrowing beards, Islamic dress among both sexes, mosque attendance anda growing interest in studying religious texts and teachings, particularlysince the Iranian revolution. Thus, we examine variables related to thesetrends as indicators of the contention that there have been rising levels ofpersonal piety and religiosity that accompany the rising political popu-larity of Islamist groups in Kuwait as evidenced by their success in par-liamentary elections, particularly during the 1990s.

Process of Change and its Structural Aspects

Patterns of ChangeTheoretical questions about the pervasiveness of change influenced ouranalysis. Although it seems probable that pervasive change follows ashort, intense war, we were mindful of differential status groups in theMiddle East and examined whether changes in political attitudes weremore evident in some than in others. Was change sweeping and perva-sive, or diverse and dependent on individuals’ positions in the socialstructure? Within the Middle East, classes of citizenship are often differ-entiated, and distinctions of gender and socioeconomic status involve dif-ferent life experiences and advantages. Our research design attended tosocial status distinctions in order to see if subpopulations drew closer ormore distant from legitimizing a democratic model of government, and ifattitudinal change proceeded in an uneven or piecemeal pattern.

Empirical and theoretical work on uneven patterns of change presentscompeting explanations. Some researchers demonstrate that the advan-taged maintain the attitudes and views that benefited them in the past;thus, they remain conservative or become reactionary (Lo, 1982). Otherspoint out that the advantaged are structurally positioned to be in closecontact with sources of change and develop a revised or modified outlook

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prior to other groups (Lenski et al., 1995). Some note that the relativelydisadvantaged accommodate quickly to change, partly because they havea history of grievances and partly because they have less to lose than theadvantaged (Piven and Cloward, 1977). Others explain that the disad-vantaged remain isolated from contact with infrastructures that promoteexpansion of ideas. Given these competing hypotheses about the effects ofsocial status on attitudes toward change, we assessed whether or not theadvantaged sought to protect the status quo.

Status AdvantageA number of structural characteristics denote status inequalities in ArabMuslim countries like Kuwait. In particular, religious sect, residentiallocation, class of citizenship, gender and level of education give evidenceof structural advantage or disadvantage. Complexities related to statusmake it clear that differences in power, privilege and prestige are relative,not absolute.

Religious Sect. In Arab nations, membership in either the Shia orSunni sect corresponds to majority/minority status in a nation and to con-nections with national political elites (Ayubi, 1992). In Kuwait, membersof the Sunni sect are the numerical majority, about 70 percent of the citi-zen population; also, the ruling family and leaders of the nation are Sunni.Sunni citizens are advantaged both by being in the majority and by beingmembers of the sect that is dominant; Shias are not.

Further, Shias have some historical disadvantage because of a persist-ent and widespread assumption in the Gulf States that they retain alle-giance to Iran and that they are ethnic Persians, even though many areArabs. Consequently, Shias’ loyalty in the GCC countries is often ques-tioned; for example, Kuwaiti Shias were suspect during the Iran–Iraq War(1980–8) when Kuwait supported Iraq. In Kuwait, Shias handled theirsocial marginalization by developing their own formal and informal asso-ciations. That infrastructure enabled them to start a resistance movementagainst the Iraqis in the early stages of the 1991 Gulf War while the Sunnipopulation was relatively unorganized. The resistance clearly demon-strated Shia loyalty to Kuwait; as a result, the state removed official dis-criminatory measures against them in the public sector. In sum, KuwaitiSunnis remain advantaged by their numbers and by their ethnic associa-tion with the ruling elite, but they do not have legal privileges authorizedsolely for them to the exclusion of Shia citizens.

Residential Location. Before the discovery of oil, most societies in theArabian Peninsula, including Kuwait, consisted of two distinctive com-munities, the urban town dwellers (hadhar), engaged mostly in sea trade,

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and the tribal nomads (badu), who herded sheep and camels and lived inthe desert. After Kuwait’s independence in 1961, when both groupsbecame citizens, populations grew, especially the badu, and urbanizationbecame more pervasive so that Kuwaiti citizens now mostly inhabiturbanized space. Kuwait’s population is about 60 percent badu.

Community of origin manifests itself among Kuwaiti citizens in differ-ential social capital, opposing views toward the meaning of citizenshipand residential separation that is best described as metropolitan and non-metropolitan. Prior to nationhood, Kuwaitis who resided in Kuwait City(hadhar) enjoyed more resources than those from the desert community(badu). Although the badu are rapidly catching up, hadhar retain a historyof advantage in education, greater access to the outside world and a morecosmopolitan lifestyle. Therefore, residents of metropolitan Kuwait Cityhave more current and inherited social capital than those residing outsidethe metropolitan area in urbanized spaces (the majority).

The metropolitan hadhar have different perspectives from the non-metropolitan badu concerning what it means to be a citizen. For the hadhar,citizenship connotes allegiance to the nation; the term jinsiyya derivesfrom the verb meaning ‘to assimilate, to naturalize’. As Longva (2000: 194)states, ‘the jinsiyya model is heavily biased toward . . . “entitlement citi-zenship”’; it is close to western ideas of citizenship, such as membershipin a similar, horizontal, more equal and less hierarchical community, andnational development is a common achievement of citizens.

Badu understand citizenship as ‘following of’ or ‘allegiance to’ a leaderand membership in a hierarchy where citizens are loyal to rulers(taba’iyya), such as the ruling family of Kuwait. This view focuses on enti-tlement to material well-being and security, rather than on participationin public affairs and political accountability. It fits with the Kuwaiti wel-fare state, where citizens have extensive social rights without obligationsof taxation or military service (Longva, 2000).

In brief, while the metropolitan hadhar are more privileged by intergen-erational social capital, the more populous, non-metropolitan badu areimportant to the continuation of a taba’iyya welfare state. As potentialallies for the ruling family in circumstances when the urban merchantpopulation opposes it, the non-metropolitan badu enjoy potential power,though less privilege and routine power, than the hadhar.

Class of Citizenship. In Kuwait and other Middle Eastern nations,two classes of citizenship predominate. The main differences betweenthe first and second class is that the former has more social prestige.Differences in privileges between the two classes vary by country. InKuwait, second-class citizens recently gained the right to vote fornational parliamentary office, but not to run for it. Class of citizenship

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does not correspond to religious sect, and there are first-class citizenswho are either Sunnis or Shias.

In Kuwait, the legal definition of class of citizenship is based partiallyon the date of family origin. Generally, those who immigrated to the townof Kuwait before 1920 are first class, because they banded together in 1920against Ibn Saud and defeated the Ikhwan troops in the Battle of Jahra.When Kuwait became a nation in 1961, they and their descendantsbecame ‘first-class’ citizens, and their loyalty has never been questioned.In general, immigrants who settled between 1920 and 1948 were grantedsecond-class citizenship. They enjoy many rights and privileges of citi-zenship, but they cannot be candidates for national political office andlack the legitimacy of the descendants of the original settlers.

At the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, a third wave ofimmigrants having Bedouin ancestry settled in Kuwait City. Between themid-1960s and 1980, some of them were granted first-class status as wellas housing and other social benefits in order to build up a popular base ofpolitical support for the ruling Sabah family against the increasinglyvocal, liberal opposition led by the urban merchant class (Longva, 2000).Regardless of date of origin, first-class citizens are more privileged thansecond-class citizens and, of course, stateless people without citizenship.

Gender and Education. The women and development literature con-sistently points out that the structural positions of Muslim women, suchas social class differences, render their life worlds distinct from each otheras well as from men and that development and social change providemixed outcomes for women (Moghadam, 1992; UNDP, 1995, 2002). Also,researchers agree that Arab society has traditionally assigned and contin-ues to assign a subordinate economic and social status to women,although there is disagreement on the origins of this situation (Kazemi,2000; Moghadam, 1993). In Kuwait, women were excluded from voting inparliamentary and municipal elections and from running for parliamen-tary office in the 1990s. This rendered them politically worse off than malesecond-class citizens. Kuwaiti rulers seemed to be ambivalent aboutwomen’s rights, wanting Kuwait to be a modern society where womenwork alongside men in public life, while seeming to reinforce local tradi-tions that encourage women to be segregated and submissive to men’sauthority.

Education is a good indicator of socioeconomic status in Kuwait, morerepresentative than a SES measure that includes income and occupationtogether and more accurate than employing income and/or occupationseparately. In Kuwait’s welfare state, every citizen has access to jobs andsocial services. Thus, income and occupational prestige are less relevant.Being highly educated reflects status advantages.

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In sum, the advantaged groups of Kuwaiti citizens are men, Sunnis,first-class citizens, metropolitan residents and the highly educated. In thisarticle, we examine whether change is ubiquitous or developing in anuneven pattern, depending on the structural advantage of subpopulations.

Expectations about the Pattern of Change and the Roleof Status AdvantageIn terms of changes in attitudes toward democratization, based on pastresearch using this data set (Rizzo et al., 2002; Meyer, Ali and Locklear,1998) and the numerous books and articles by Brady, Schlozman, Nie andVerba during the 1970s through 1990s,4 we expect that since advantagedgroups in society are more likely to participate politically, these samegroups, particularly the better educated, Sunnis, first-class citizens, urbanresidents and male respondents, will have higher levels of support fordemocratization than the disadvantaged groups and these positive senti-ments for democracy in the abstract will increase more among the advan-taged statuses over time.

However, in terms of support for women’s rights, we expect, based onour previous research comparing groups that supported women in1994–8 (Meyer et al., 2005), that those favoring increased women’s rightsin 1998 were different from the supporters in 1994. In 1994, advantagedgroups, such as men, Sunnis and the religiously orthodox, supportedwomen’s rights. The 1998 advocates were mixed in terms of social status.Advantaged groups, such as urban residents and those with higher levelsof education, supported women’s rights along with disadvantagedKuwaitis, such as women and Shia citizens. Thus, we expect the 1994advocates to decrease their support for women’s rights over time whilethe 1998 supporters will increase their support over this same period.

While we do not have strong hypotheses about subgroups’ attitudestoward the Arab world and the GCC due to a lack of research in this par-ticular area, we do predict, based on the 2004 findings of the Center forStrategic Studies (2005) survey of five Arab countries, that those from dis-advantaged statuses will have the most negative attitudes toward the Westduring the 1990s. Even though the advantaged are also very critical ofwestern, especially American, foreign policy in the Middle East now, theytended to be much less critical of western society and culture and wantedcloser economic and cultural ties to the West than the disadvantagedbecause they were in a better position to benefit from these types of ties.Thus, we expect that advantaged groups in Kuwaiti society have morefavorable attitudes toward the West over time, while the disadvantagedgroups will become increasingly more hostile over this same period.

Finally, we expect the more marginalized in Kuwaiti society to becomemore religious over time as a way to express their disaffection with and

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exclusion from the benefits of modernization processes, while seeing littlechange among the more advantaged groups in Kuwait.

Data and Methods

SampleFifteen hundred households from the Kuwaiti population were randomlyselected within census tracts in Kuwait and respondents within house-holds were selected to be interviewed by a team of 10 interviewers over athree-month period in winter 1994, and again in winter 1996 and 1998. Inthis repeated cross-section design, respondents within households wereselected by the Selection Table Method for selecting adults within house-holds developed by Kish (1965).5

MeasurementVariables were grouped into four categories to examine changes in atti-tudes toward democracy, toward the West, regional and Arab solidarityand religious beliefs and practices. All variables measured by multipleindicators were developed through multivariate scaling techniques utiliz-ing both confirmatory and exploratory factor analyses. Here, we presentthe reliability of these scales by using the alpha reliability coefficientbecause it makes variability at different time periods easy to observe.

Attitudes toward Democracy. Attitudes toward democracy wereassessed by examining views toward democracy as a form of government,leadership styles, mutual consent and political candidacy. Respondentsreplied to a general question about preferring democracy (presidential orparliamentary) above other forms of government, such as the shura ortribal systems. This was measured as a dummy variable, with those whodid not prefer democracy as the reference group.

Regarding leadership styles, respondents reported their agreement ordisagreement with the necessity of strong authority for stability; responsecategories ranged from 1 to 5. Respondents stated their preferences forgoverning control placed with the regime, society at large or mutual con-sent between state authority and society. Responses were dichotomizedwith control by state authority and by society combined and treated as thereference group. Next, respondents were asked about voting practices byexpressing agreement or disagreement with the statement that peopleshould choose political candidates for their religious sect, not their politi-cal experience (range = 1–5).

Finally, respondents were asked how they felt about expanding politi-cal rights for women. Three items assessed these attitudes: women’s abil-ity to participate in parliamentary elections, the desirability of women’s

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holding local political office and the belief that women should have theparliamentary vote. Scale responses ranged from strongly disagree tostrongly agree; the alpha reliability coefficient was .519 for 1994, .661 for1996 and .719 for 1998.

Attitudes toward the West. Attitudes toward the West included a three-item scale of friendly affect toward France, the UK and the US, countriesthat supported Kuwait during the 1991 Gulf War (range = 1–4; α = .815 in1994, α = .868 in 1996 and α = .804 in 1998). Attitudes were also measuredusing a two-item scale indicating approval of increased trade and allianceswith the West (range = 1–5; α = .565 in 1994, α = .458 in 1996 and α = .635in 1998), and a two-item scale reporting frequency of following westernradio and television stations, such as the BBC, CNN and the Voice ofAmerica (range = 1–4; α = .635 in 1994, .704 in 1996 and .650 in 1998).

Regional and Arab Solidarity. A set of scales and indicators withresponse categories ranging from 1 to 5 measured Kuwaitis’ regional cohe-siveness. First, Kuwaitis were asked how much they approved of a militaryalliance with the GCC. Next, a scale was created to determine how muchKuwaitis would like to be united as a commonwealth with the Gulf Coastcountries of Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.Reliability of the scale was .686 in 1994, .814 in 1996 and .785 in 1998.

Arab solidarity was assessed by a four-item scale (range = 1–5) indicat-ing respondents’ approval or disapproval of: (1) one flag and anthem rep-resenting all Arab nations, (2) all Arab nations united as one country, (3) astrong Arab identity in the world system and (4) Arab solidarity in tradeand business with Egypt, Syria and Morocco. The reliability of the scalewas .657 in 1994, .669 in 1996 and .737 in 1998. Finally, Kuwaitis’ friendli-ness toward the non-Gulf Arab countries who supported Iraq during the1991 Gulf War was tapped by a scale indicating how friendly Kuwaitis felttoward Yemen, Jordan and the PLO (range = 1–4). The scale had a relia-bility of .779 in 1994, .765 in 1996 and .762 in 1998.

Religious Beliefs and Practices. In order to capture the complexity ofthe Islamic faith beyond Sunni and Shia sect distinctions, several indica-tors measured respondents’ identification with Islamic beliefs. Identifica-tion with Islam, i.e. Islamic orthodoxy, was tapped by a scale askingrespondents how strongly they agreed or disagreed (range = 1–4) with thefollowing: (1) it is a duty to help those confused about religion, (2) it isimportant to help people become enlightened about religion, (3) theworld would be a better place if more people held my religious views, (4)the world’s problems are aggravated by the fact that so many people aremisguided about religion, (5) all Muslims must work together to face the

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western challenge against Islam and (6) Islam does not separate politicsand religion. This scale had a reliability of α = .741 in 1994, α = .683 in 1996and α = .684 in 1998.

A set of items measured religiosity by assessing respondents’ prefer-ences (range = 1–5) for Islamic appearance and practices. Respondentsreported how strongly they agreed or disagreed with: (1) families shouldinsist that women wear veils, (2) men should have beards, (3) parentsshould oppose marriage between Shias and Sunnis and (4) Shias andSunnis should only pray in their own mosques. (Other indicators wereincluded in the surveys but respondents’ replies lacked variability.)Associations among these variables were low, and the variables wereexamined separately, because of the low intercorrelations and differentialsalience of religious practices to individuals (Miller, 1995).

AnalysisAnalysis proceeded in several stages. First, a profile of attitudes related tonational political culture in 1994 was developed. Then, cross-time analysiswas conducted by calculating the differences of means between 1994 and1996, 1996 and 1998 and 1994 and 1998 using ANOVA. The key indicatorsreflecting attitudes toward democratic beliefs and practices, the West, theGCC and Arab nations, and religious beliefs and practices were examinedfor all respondents and within categories of structural variables: namely,sect, citizenship class, residential locale, gender and educational level.Change in attitudes was examined first for all respondents and then withinthese status categories. For all scales, such as friendliness toward the West,change in each indicator was inspected to confirm that all indicators in ascale changed in the same positive or negative direction over time.

Only significant differences in means at the p = .05 level or less wereretained in the findings. We examined the patterns of variations in signifi-cant changes from 1994 to 1996 and 1996 to 1998, such as gradual increasesor decreases in support, circular changes, a significant increase or decreasefrom 1994 to 1996 followed by stabilization in 1998, or no significant changefrom 1994 to 1996 but then a significant increase or decrease from 1996 to1998. We found that most of the changes between 1994 and 1996 and 1996and 1998 were so small that just describing the overall change from 1994 to1998 captured the main findings. Thus, we only present the analysis ofoverall change from 1994 to 1998 and examine it for all subgroups.

Findings

Table 1 summarizes the views of Kuwaitis in 1994, 1996 and 1998. Inanalyses not presented here (but available in the Appendix), we examinedcitizens’ views within status categories but did not find in particular years

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Table 1 Means of Attitudes 1994, 1996 and 1998 (standard deviations)

Direction1994 1996 1998 of change

Attitudes toward democracyPrefer democracy (0–1) 0.390 0.540 0.610 +

(0.488) (0.498) (0.488)Mutual consent (0–1) 0.790 0.710 0.840 +

(0.411) (0.455) (0.370)Strong authority (1–5) 4.570 4.180 4.440 −

(0.893) (1.123) (0.990)Politicians by sect (1–5) 1.550 1.670 1.490 *

(1.004) (0.990) (0.835)Support women’s political 3.019 2.623 2.877 *rights (1–5) (0.754) (1.119) (1.175)

Attitudes toward the WestFriendly to West (1–4) 3.050 3.070 3.130 +

(0.697) (0.753) (0.665)Trade and ally w/west (1–5) 3.920 3.570 3.660 −

(1.064) (0.945) (1.028)Follow western media (1–4) 2.030 2.260 1.750 −

(0.790) (0.797) (0.812)

Regional and Arab solidarityGCC military alliance (1–5) 4.530 4.430 4.620 +

(1.014) (1.032) (0.823)GCC commonwealth (1–5) 4.360 4.490 4.440 +

(0.685) (0.704) (0.707)Arabism (1–5) 3.210 3.540 3.540 +

(1.028) (0.955) (1.008)Support Iraq’s allies (1–4) 1.340 1.580 1.570 +

(0.507) (0.597) (0.592)

Religious beliefs and practicesIslamic orthodoxy (1–4) 3.314 3.139 3.344 *

(0.459) (0.560) (0.434)Women should veil (1–5) 4.480 4.070 N/A −

(1.006) (1.215)Men should wear beards (1–5) 3.050 3.020 2.910 −

(1.358) (1.296) (1.229)Sunnis and Shias separate 2.710 2.550 2.750 *mosques (1–5) (1.505) (1.335) (1.357)Oppose Sunni/Shia 2.980 2.920 3.170 +intermarriage (1–5) (1.593) (1.383) (1.401)

Change between 1994 and 1998 significant at .05 level, two-tailed test. Plus sign (+) = posi-tive change. Negative sign (−) = negative change. Asterisk (*) = fluctuation between 1994and 1996, and/or 1996 and 1998.

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that there were significant differences within subgroups, i.e. Sunnis vsShias, men vs women, etc., in any year. Thus, Table 1 describes the sam-ple overall. Table 2 shows the direction, either positive or negative, of sig-nificant changes in attitudes at the p = .05 level or less, between 1994 and1998 within status groups.

Attitudes toward Democratic Practices andIncorporating Women PoliticallyIn 1994, Kuwaitis’ attitudes toward democracy were ambivalent (seeTable 1, column 1). The majority of Kuwaitis (about 60 percent) did notthink that democracy was the best form of government, and they emphat-ically agreed that a strong authority was necessary for a stable govern-ment (mean of 4.57 on a five-point scale). Also, Kuwaitis felt neutral toexpanding political rights to women. It seems they manifested scant evi-dence of supporting a democratic political culture. Nonetheless, a major-ity of Kuwaitis (almost 80 percent) favored mutual consent betweengovernment authority and society in leading the country. A majority alsostrongly believed that people should make decisions about political lead-ers based on experience, not on religious sect affiliation. These opinionsshowed a preference for ideas and practices articulated by democracies.In brief, there was mixed popular support for democratic beliefs and prac-tices three years after the conclusion of the 1991 Gulf War.

The last column of Table 1 shows the direction of significant changes inattitudes between 1994 and 1998. On the whole, citizens’ views towarddemocratic beliefs and practices changed significantly. Kuwaitis’ attitudesclearly shifted in favor of democratic principles and practices. Preferencesfor democracy relative to other forms of government grew. About 60 per-cent of Kuwaiti citizens supported democracy in 1998. Kuwaiti citizens alsobecame significantly more favorable toward mutual consent in governing.By 1998, over 80 percent of Kuwaitis thought that society and the regimeshould check each other’s power. Kuwaitis were less willing to think thatstability required a strong authority, even though they still keenly favoredit (mean = 4.44, five-point scale). Compared with 1994, Kuwaitis were sig-nificantly more interested in considering the religious sect of political can-didates in 1996. However, by 1998, they had become significantly morefavorable than they had been in 1994 or 1996 to selecting political candi-dates on their experience rather than their religious sect. The only exceptionto this clear pattern of support for democratic ideals was Kuwaitis’ decreas-ing support for women’s political rights in 1998 as compared to 1994.

Thus, as predicted, Kuwaitis preferred democracy principles and prac-tices but had a harder time viewing democracy as incorporating womenmore fully into the political system, a finding that reflects Kuwaiti’sambivalence about women’s issues during the 1990s.

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Attitudes toward the West, its Media, the Gulf CoastCountries and the Arab WorldIn 1994, Kuwaitis’ attitudes toward the West, the Gulf Coast countries andthe Arab world were of two minds. Kuwaitis favored affiliation with theWest and especially the Gulf Coast countries, but not with the larger Arabworld. They felt positively toward the US, France and Britain (mean = 3.05on a four-point scale) and moderately favored continuing trade and mili-tary alliances with the West (mean = 3.92, five-point scale). Even thoughtheir political attitudes had a western component, they followed westernmedia only occasionally (mean = 2.03, four-point scale).

Kuwaitis strongly supported forming military and economic allianceswith the GCC. On both measures, Kuwaitis’ responses had means greaterthan 4 on five-point scales. They manifested strong support for allianceswith immediate neighbors, underscoring the importance of regionalismin their worldviews. Sentiments toward the larger Arab world weremixed. Regarding Arabism, Kuwaitis moderately supported the ideas ofhaving one flag and anthem representing all Arab nations, uniting allArab nations as one country, maintaining a strong Arab identity in theworld system and increasing Arab solidarity in trade and business withEgypt, Syria and Morocco (mean = 3.2, five-point scale). They were decid-edly unfriendly toward Arab countries that sided with Iraq during the1991 Gulf War, i.e. Jordan, Yemen and the PLO (mean = 1.34, four-pointscale).

By 1998, Kuwaitis manifested a mix of attitudes toward the West.Although they felt increasingly friendlier toward western allies such asBritain, France and the US as predicted, they were significantly less sup-portive of trading and forming economic or military alliances. They fol-lowed western media significantly less in 1998 than they had in 1994probably due to the Arabic-language news options that became availableduring this time, particularly Al Jazeera, through satellite television.

Regarding their GCC neighbors, Kuwaitis were even more interested instrengthening ties than they had been in 1994, when support was veryhigh. Specifically, they grew significantly more supportive of militaryalliances and an economic commonwealth with the other members of theGCC (Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates).

Kuwaitis’ desire for stronger relationships with the larger Arab worldgrew significantly between 1994 and 1998, although it remained moderateto low. Citizens moderately supported Arab unity, the need for a strongArab identity in the world system and increasing trade with Egypt, Syriaand Morocco. Kuwaitis also were more positive toward the Arab territo-ries that had been aligned with Iraq during the Gulf War, i.e. Yemen,Jordan and the PLO. Although Kuwaitis still felt unfriendly toward thesecountries in 1998, there was significant movement away from hostility.

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Attitudes towards Religious Beliefs and PracticesIn 1994, Kuwaitis’ attitudes toward religious beliefs and practices wereambivalent. Kuwaitis were highly orthodox in their religious beliefs(mean = 3.3, four-point scale) and strongly supported women veiling butwere only moderate in their support of men having beards, Sunnis andShias praying in separate mosques and in their opposition to intermar-riage between the two sects (mean around 3 out of a five-point scale).

Between 1994 and 1998, there was significant fluctuation in Kuwaitis’level of orthodoxy and belief that Sunnis and Shias should pray in sepa-rate mosques. Their level of support dropped in 1996 but then returned to1994 levels by 1998. On the other hand, there were decreasing levels of sup-port for women’s veiling between 1994 and 1996, and for men’s havingbeards in 1998. Also, opposition to Sunni and Shia intermarriage increasedfrom 1994 to 1998. Thus, by 1998, Kuwaitis were still highly orthodox, andsupported Sunnis and Shias praying in separate mosques and werestronger in their opposition to intermarriage. Yet they were less supportiveof other Islamic practices, such as those related to physical appearance.

In brief, between 1994 and 1998, Kuwaiti citizens articulated more dem-ocratic sentiments over time, except for women’s rights. They demon-strated more affinity with the Arab world, especially the Gulf Coastregion. However, there was a mixed picture of change regarding religiousbeliefs and practices.

Patterns of Change and Pervasiveness acrossSubpopulationsTable 2 shows overall directional change, i.e. either increasing (+) ordecreasing (–) support for various beliefs and practices between 1994 and1998 for the entire sample and subgroups within it. It also shows instancesof no change (blank) and of significant fluctuation (∗) between 1994 and1996, and 1996 and 1998. In general, the trend was significant and direc-tional rather than fluctuating or circular. Table 2, column 1, demonstratesthat changes for the entire sample increased or decreased over time, fluc-tuating only regarding attitudes toward the religious sect of politicians,including women politically, Islamic orthodoxy and sect segregation ofmosques. Table 2, columns 2–11, demonstrates that change was fairly uni-form across status categories.

Regarding democracy and women’s rights, a general preference fordemocracy, its principles of mutual consent and its qualifications for polit-ical candidacy reflected a democratic worldview by 1998. That view wastempered somewhat by a persistent, though declining, preference forauthoritative leadership and decreasing support for women’s rights.These findings were mostly consistent across subpopulations. Where theywere not or where opinion fluctuated, there was scant evidence that

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Tabl

e 2

Dir

ecti

on o

f Sig

nific

ant

Cha

nges

in M

ean

Att

itud

es 1

994–

8

Firs

t-Se

cond

-N

on-

Hig

h A

llSu

nni

Shia

clas

scl

ass

Met

rom

etro

Mal

eFe

mal

eIn

term

edia

tesc

hool

Uni

vers

ity

Att

itud

es to

war

d d

emoc

racy

Pref

er d

emoc

racy

(0–

1)+

++

++

++

++

++

+M

utua

l con

sent

(0–

1)+

++

*+

*+

**

Stro

ng a

utho

rity

(1–

5)−

−*

−*

−*

*–

–*

*Po

litic

ians

by

sect

(1–

5)*

**

**

*Su

ppor

t for

wom

en’s

*

*+

**

**

**

−*

*po

litic

al r

ight

s (1

–5)

Att

itud

es to

war

d th

e W

est

Frie

ndly

to W

est (

1–4)

++

++

Trad

e an

d a

lly w

/W

est (

1–5)

−−

*−

*−

−−

−−

−Fo

llow

wes

tern

med

ia (

1–4)

−−

–−

−–

−−

−−

−−

Reg

iona

l and

Ara

b so

lidar

ity

GC

C m

ilita

ry a

llian

ce (

1–5)

+*

+*

*+

**

GC

C c

omm

onw

ealt

h (1

–5)

++

*+

Ara

bism

(1–

5)+

++

++

++

++

+Su

ppor

t Ira

q’s

allie

s (1

–4)

++

++

++

++

++

+

Rel

igio

us b

elie

fs a

nd p

ract

ices

Isla

mic

ort

hod

oxy

(1–4

)*

**

**

**

**

**

*W

omen

sho

uld

vei

l (1–

5)−

−−

−−

−−

−−

−−

−M

en s

houl

d w

ear

bear

ds

(1–5

)−

−−

+−

−−

−Su

nnis

and

Shi

as s

epar

ate

**

**

**

**

mos

ques

(1–

5)O

ppos

e Su

nni/

Shia

+

++

++

+*

*+

+in

term

arri

age

(1–5

)

Cha

nge

betw

een

1994

and

199

8 si

gnif

ican

t at .

05 le

vel,

two-

taile

d te

st. P

lus

sign

(+)

= p

osit

ive

chan

ge. N

egat

ive

sign

(−)

= n

egat

ive

chan

ge. A

ster

isk

(*)

= f

luct

uati

onbe

twee

n 19

94 a

nd 1

996,

and

/or

199

6 an

d 1

998.

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International Sociology Vol. 22 No. 3

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Kuwaitis in multiply advantaged positions (Sunnis, men, first-class andeducated citizens) were partial to some opinions while those with multi-ply disadvantaged statuses favored others.

In terms of the West, Kuwaiti citizens’ opinions reflected stable, high,positive affect; in some subgroups, it actually increased. However, anyinterest in practical ties, such as trade, economic and military alliances, orfollowing the media, markedly decreased. Shias and metropolitan resi-dents distinguished themselves because they grew more positive towardKuwait’s allies from the 1991 Gulf War, despite some fluctuating senti-ment about trade in 1996. Perhaps these groups were benefiting mostfrom networking with the West.

Regarding the GCC countries and the Arab world, Kuwaitis generallywanted strong linkages with the other GCC countries in 1994 and grewmore favorable toward such networks by 1998. Also, they became morepositive toward Arab solidarity and former enemies as the distance fromwestern intervention during the 1991 Gulf War increased.

Examining Islamic orthodoxy and attitudes toward veiling, there were nosignificant deviations in overall patterns. However, less advantaged groups(Shias, second-class citizens, women and those with intermediate levels ofeducation) departed from the overall pattern of beliefs about men havingbeards, Sunnis and Shias praying in separate mosques and sect intermar-riage. Shias remained moderate in their support for all of the religious prac-tices. Second-class citizens grew more supportive of beards while all othersbecame less so. Women and the less educated held steady in their moderatelevels of support for men having beards and separation by sect for prayer.Yet they fluctuated in their beliefs about sect intermarriage, thereby depart-ing from all other groups who grew more opposed to the practice over time.

In short, Table 2 does not show sustained differences of opinion amonggroups of citizens that are based on multiple advantaged or disadvan-taged statuses. Attitudinal change was dispersed in the same directionacross all citizen groups, regardless of religious sect, class of citizenship,metropolitan residency, gender or education. Advantaged citizensseemed neither more nor less protective of their statuses.

The findings in Table 2 argue for the development of a pervasive polit-ical culture, one that favors democratic practices and principles mostlybut does not extend to including women politically. There is also a strongaffiliation with the other GCC countries. Kuwaiti citizens were not inter-ested in becoming either increasingly connected to the West or alienatedfrom their Arab neighbors in the years following the 1991 Gulf War.Finally, Kuwaitis were still highly orthodox in 1998 and had moderatesupport for Sunnis and Shias praying in separate mosques and opposingsect intermarriage, although their support for other practices, such aswomen’s veiling and men’s wearing beards, was decreasing.

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Meyer et al. Changed Political Attitudes in Kuwait

313

The existence of a pervasive political culture across status groups doesnot mean, however, that its development between 1994 and 1998 was insen-sitive to the relative advantages of status groups. The attitudes of severalless advantaged groups, i.e. Shias, second-class citizens, non-metropolitanresidents and high school graduates, either manifested greater intensity orfluctuated more. Shias exemplify this most clearly. Their increased partial-ity for the West and GCC military alliances between 1994 and 1998 stoodout. Also, Shias’ opinions rose and fell markedly. A sharp increase in sup-port for Yemen, Jordan and the PLO occurred between 1994 and 1996, butit declined significantly by 1998 when Iraq again threatened to enterKuwait’s borders. Shias’ preference for strong authority and moderatesupport for western alliances dropped sharply between 1994 and 1996,then returned closer to its former level in 1998. Again, the external threatfrom Iraq probably played a part in this pattern of fluctuation.

In general, while Kuwait citizens developed a common political culturebetween 1994 and 1998, less advantaged subpopulations manifested moredeviations from the general pattern of change, though not from the gen-eral direction of change.

Discussion

The research presented here demonstrates several things about changes inpolitical attitudes following western intervention in 1990–1 and providesa basis for current work on the political culture in Kuwait and othernations in the Middle East.

First, although allegiance to the principles and practices of democracygrew, a preference for increasing women’s rights and western alliances ornews sources did not automatically accompany it. We found that citizenssupported a model of democracy that incorporated their own history andgeography. This finding echoes research on the spread of democracy in partsof Asia. It suggests that Kuwaiti citizens prefer carving out their own nichewithin international politics. Even when they receive western military inter-vention willingly, there is no assurance that citizens will preserve an interestin sustaining extensive ties or developing a model of governance that favorsthe West more than their own regional and historical roots. We conjecturethat a common experience, such as resisting Iraqi occupation and calling forthe reinstallation of the Kuwaiti constitution and parliament, only fortifieshistorically and geographically specific democratic political cultures.

Second, governing regimes in the Middle East cannot easily ignore cit-izens’ opinions regarding their nation’s niche in international politicswithout facing problems of legitimacy, when they are uniform as in theKuwait sample. Although Kuwaiti subpopulations probably differ onissues other than those we examined, citizens’ views on issues made

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International Sociology Vol. 22 No. 3

314

salient by the 1991 Gulf War (i.e. views toward democracy, the West, theregion and the Arab world) were very similar. Competition among statusgroups in favor of advancing one or another position was not evident. So,governing regimes cannot appease one subgroup while relying on thedemands of another to be relatively less important. Difficult challenges ingovernance are inherent in satisfying public opinion that favors demo-cratic principles and practices and feels positive toward the West, andsimultaneously favors Arab solidarity, its own media, and trade and mil-itary alliances with the Gulf Coast countries.

Third, theories about the global spread of democracy often suggest thatIslam impedes the democratization process in the Middle East. Wetracked changes in citizens’ Islamic beliefs or orthodoxy and foundinsignificant differences between 1994 and 1998. Since increasing supportfor democratic principles and practices did not correspond to decreasingadherence to some Islamic beliefs, Islam and democratization are notincompatible for the respondents to these surveys. Instead, we found anincreasing desire to separate religion from the public realms whileremaining religious privately, a stance that is in line with theories of sec-ularization and modernization. In the public realm, Kuwaitis wantedfewer outward displays of religiosity, i.e. veiling and beards, and thoughtthat political experience was much more important than sect affiliationwhen voting. In the private realm, orthodoxy and sect affiliation still mat-tered. Kuwaitis were moderate in their support for separate mosques forSunnis and Shias and were stronger in opposing sect intermarriage.

Finally, regarding the relationship between Islamic orthodoxy andwomen’s rights, we found a more complicated picture. Kuwaitis fluctu-ated in their beliefs between 1994 and 1998, but not in the ways that schol-ars would expect. They became both less orthodox and less supportive ofincluding women in 1996. By 1998, they returned to 1994 support fororthodoxy. Even though they became more supportive of women’s rightsbetween 1996 and 1998, they still did not return to the higher level of sup-port found in 1994. Also, support for veiling and beards decreased along-side decreased support for women’s rights, a finding opposite to mostscholarly expectations. This suggests that other factors besides religiosityare driving attitudes toward women’s political rights.

With the politicization of the women’s rights’ issue since the 1992 parlia-ment, there has been a backlash by groups who feel threatened by womengaining more power in society, groups such as upwardly mobile men whocompete with women for jobs, women who value their roles as wives andmothers above all else and thus see feminism and political rights as devalu-ing those roles, and Islamist and tribalist groups in Kuwaiti society and par-liament who also see the rights of women as a political threat but usereligious and cultural arguments to justify their opposition.

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Ap

pen

dix

: M

ean

Ch

ang

es in

Att

itud

es t

ow

ard

Dem

ocr

acy,

th

e W

est,

and

Reg

iona

lan

d A

rab

So

lidar

ityTa

ble

A1

Mea

n C

hang

es in

Att

itud

es 1

994–

8 by

Gen

der A

llM

ale

Fem

ale

1994

1996

1998

1994

1996

1998

1994

1996

1998

Att

itud

es to

war

d d

emoc

racy

Pref

er d

emoc

racy

(0–

1)0.

390.

540.

610.

450.

620.

670.

320.

430.

56M

utua

l con

sent

(0–

1)0.

790.

710.

840.

760.

670.

840.

810.

760.

83St

rong

aut

hori

ty (

1–5)

4.57

4.18

4.44

4.54

4.18

4.48

4.61

4.18

4.41

Polit

icia

ns b

y se

ct (

1–5)

1.55

1.67

1.49

1.57

1.64

1.51

1.53

1.73

1.48

Supp

ort w

omen

’s

3.02

2.62

2.88

3.08

2.51

2.72

2.94

2.79

3.02

polit

ical

rig

hts

(1–5

)

Att

itud

es to

war

d th

e W

est

Frie

ndly

to w

est (

1–4)

3.05

3.07

3.13

3.03

3.09

3.16

3.08

3.03

3.11

Trad

e an

d a

lly w

/W

est (

1–5)

3.92

3.57

3.66

4.02

3.64

3.82

3.81

3.48

3.51

Follo

w w

este

rn m

edia

(1–

4)2.

032.

261.

752.

202.

421.

951.

852.

041.

56

Reg

iona

l and

Ara

b so

lidar

ity

GC

C m

ilita

ry a

llian

ce (

1–5)

4.53

4.43

4.62

4.53

4.46

4.70

4.53

4.38

4.55

GC

C c

omm

onw

ealt

h (1

–5)

4.36

4.49

4.44

4.41

4.57

4.50

4.29

4.36

4.38

Ara

bism

(1–

5)3.

213.

543.

543.

143.

593.

543.

293.

473.

54Su

ppor

t Ira

q’s

allie

s (1

–4)

1.34

1.58

1.57

1.39

1.64

1.65

1.29

1.50

1.50

Rel

igio

us b

elie

fs a

nd p

ract

ices

Ort

hod

oxy

(1–4

)3.

313.

133.

343.

33.

183.

373.

323.

083.

31W

omen

sho

uld

wea

r ve

ils (

1–5)

a4.

484.

07–

4.52

4.2

–4.

443.

87–

Men

sho

uld

wea

r be

ard

s (1

–5)

3.05

3.02

2.91

3.15

3.13

2.98

2.95

2.87

2.84

Pray

in o

wn

mos

que

(1–5

)2.

712.

552.

752.

662.

462.

712.

762.

672.

79O

ppos

e in

term

arri

age

of s

ects

(1–

5)2.

982.

923.

172.

952.

973.

23.

022.

863.

13a Q

uest

ion

not a

sked

in 1

997

wav

e of

the

surv

ey.

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at King Abdulaziz City for on April 10, 2008 http://iss.sagepub.comDownloaded from

Tabl

e A

2M

ean

Cha

nges

in A

ttit

udes

199

4–8

by S

ect A

llSu

nni

Shia

1994

1996

1998

1994

1996

1998

1994

1996

1998

Att

itud

es to

war

d d

emoc

racy

Pref

er d

emoc

racy

(0–

1)0.

390.

540.

610.

400.

590.

610.

380.

460.

59M

utua

l con

sent

(0–

1)0.

790.

710.

840.

780.

690.

830.

790.

780.

84St

rong

aut

hori

ty (

1–5)

4.57

4.18

4.44

4.60

4.22

1.49

4.52

4.11

4.49

Polit

icia

ns b

y se

ct (

1–5)

1.55

1.67

1.49

1.53

1.66

1.55

1.59

1.69

1.51

Supp

ort w

omen

’s p

olit

ical

3.02

2.62

2.88

3.1

2.54

2.74

2.87

2.9

3.3

righ

ts (

1–5)

Att

itud

es to

war

d th

e W

est

Frie

ndly

to W

est (

1–4)

3.05

3.07

3.13

3.17

3.14

3.65

2.79

2.86

3.08

Trad

e an

d a

lly w

/W

est (

1–5)

3.92

3.57

3.66

4.04

3.67

1.72

3.66

3.39

3.67

Follo

w w

este

rn m

edia

(1–

4)2.

032.

261.

752.

012.

234.

662.

072.

271.

82

Reg

iona

l and

Ara

b so

lidar

ity

GC

C m

ilita

ry a

llian

ce (

1–5)

4.53

4.43

4.62

4.69

4.48

2.37

4.21

4.21

4.50

GC

C c

omm

onw

ealt

h (1

–5)

4.36

4.49

4.44

4.43

4.53

4.49

4.21

4.34

4.27

Ara

bism

(1–

5)3.

213.

543.

543.

243.

573.

573.

143.

423.

45Su

ppor

t Ira

q’s

allie

s (1

–4)

1.34

1.58

1.57

1.31

1.56

1.59

1.41

1.57

1.51

Rel

igio

us b

elie

fs a

nd p

ract

ices

Ort

hod

oxy

(1–4

)3.

313.

133.

343.

323.

113.

353.

33.

223.

3W

omen

sho

uld

wea

r ve

ils (

1–5)

4.48

4.07

–4.

444.

02–

4.59

4.18

–M

en s

houl

d w

ear

bear

ds

(1–5

)3.

053.

022.

913.

173.

072.

972.

812.

842.

7Pr

ay in

ow

n m

osqu

e (1

–5)

2.71

2.55

2.75

2.82

2.55

2.8

2.49

2.54

2.61

Opp

ose

inte

rmar

riag

e 2.

982.

923.

173.

133.

013.

292.

732.

752.

79of

sec

ts (

1–5)

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at King Abdulaziz City for on April 10, 2008 http://iss.sagepub.comDownloaded from

Tabl

e A

3M

ean

Cha

nges

in K

uwai

tis’

Att

itud

es 1

994–

8 by

Cit

izen

ship

Sta

tus

All

Firs

t cla

ssSe

cond

cla

ss

1994

1996

1998

1994

1996

1998

1994

1996

1998

Att

itud

es to

war

d d

emoc

racy

Pref

er d

emoc

racy

(0–

1)0.

390.

540.

610.

400.

560.

620.

380.

520.

54M

utua

l con

sent

(0–

1)0.

790.

710.

840.

780.

710.

840.

830.

670.

8St

rong

aut

hori

ty (

1–5)

4.57

4.18

4.44

4.57

4.23

4.44

4.60

4.04

4.52

Polit

icia

ns b

y se

ct (

1–5)

1.55

1.67

1.49

1.54

1.66

1.49

1.62

1.64

1.56

Att

itud

es to

war

d th

e W

est

Frie

ndly

to W

est (

1–4)

3.05

3.07

3.13

3.08

3.11

3.14

2.92

3.02

3.08

Trad

e an

d a

lly w

/W

est (

1–5)

3.92

3.57

3.66

3.95

3.62

3.67

3.83

3.60

3.56

Follo

w w

este

rn m

edia

(1–

4)2.

032.

261.

752.

042.

291.

762.

012.

211.

66

Reg

iona

l and

Ara

b so

lidar

ity

GC

C m

ilita

ry a

llian

ce (

1–5)

4.53

4.43

4.62

4.56

4.44

4.62

4.38

4.40

4.61

GC

C c

omm

onw

ealt

h (1

–5)

4.36

4.49

4.44

4.37

4.49

4.44

4.30

4.47

4.44

Ara

bism

(1–

5)3.

213.

543.

543.

183.

513.

533.

373.

603.

63Su

ppor

t Ira

q’s

allie

s (1

–4)

1.34

1.58

1.57

1.33

1.55

1.56

1.41

1.65

1.65

Rel

igio

us b

elie

fs a

nd p

ract

ices

Ort

hod

oxy

(1–4

)3.

313.

133.

343.

323.

133.

343.

293.

23.

4W

omen

sho

uld

wea

r ve

ils (

1–5)

4.48

4.07

–4.

494.

03–

4.45

4.12

–M

en s

houl

d w

ear

bear

ds

(1–5

)3.

053.

022.

913.

093.

022.

892.

772.

853.

1Pr

ay in

ow

n m

osqu

e (1

–5)

2.71

2.55

2.75

2.73

2.54

2.78

2.55

2.59

2.47

Opp

ose

inte

rmar

riag

e of

sec

ts (

1–5)

2.98

2.92

3.17

2.98

2.97

3.18

3.02

2.74

3.03

distribution.© 2007 International Sociological Association. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized

at King Abdulaziz City for on April 10, 2008 http://iss.sagepub.comDownloaded from

Tabl

e A

4M

ean

Cha

nges

in A

ttit

udes

199

4–8

by R

esid

ence

All

Met

ropo

litan

Non

-met

ropo

litan

1994

1996

1998

1994

1996

1998

1994

1996

1998

Att

itud

es to

war

d d

emoc

racy

Pref

er d

emoc

racy

(0–

1)0.

390.

540.

610.

400.

530.

620.

390.

560.

59M

utua

l con

sent

(0–

1)0.

790.

710.

840.

810.

730.

860.

770.

680.

82St

rong

aut

hori

ty (

1–5)

4.57

4.18

4.44

4.60

4.14

4.45

4.55

4.23

4.44

Polit

icia

ns b

y se

ct (

1–5)

1.55

1.67

1.49

1.57

1.68

1.47

1.53

1.67

1.52

Supp

ort w

omen

’s p

olit

ical

rig

hts

(1–5

)3.

022.

622.

882.

972.

743.

093.

062.

442.

65

Att

itud

es to

war

d th

e W

est

Frie

ndly

to W

est (

1–4)

3.05

3.07

3.13

2.95

3.09

3.16

3.16

3.04

3.10

Trad

e an

d a

lly w

/W

est (

1–5)

3.92

3.57

3.66

3.85

3.60

3.76

3.99

3.53

3.54

Follo

w w

este

rn m

edia

(1–

4)2.

032.

261.

752.

082.

321.

841.

982.

191.

64

Reg

iona

l and

Ara

b so

lidar

ity

GC

C m

ilita

ry a

llian

ce (

1–5)

4.53

4.43

4.62

4.42

4.40

4.54

4.66

4.47

4.71

GC

C c

omm

onw

ealt

h (1

–5)

4.36

4.49

4.44

4.27

4.47

4.36

4.44

4.50

4.52

Ara

bism

(1–

5)3.

213.

543.

543.

133.

463.

473.

293.

663.

62Su

ppor

t Ira

q’s

allie

s (1

–4)

1.34

1.58

1.57

1.36

1.58

1.55

1.32

1.58

1.59

Rel

igio

us b

elie

fs a

nd p

ract

ices

Ort

hod

oxy

(1–4

)3.

313.

133.

343.

313.

133.

313.

323.

153.

37W

omen

sho

uld

wea

r ve

ils (

1–5)

4.48

4.07

–4.

433.

96–

4.54

4.23

–M

en s

houl

d w

ear

bear

ds

(1–5

)3.

053.

022.

912.

912.

882.

793.

23.

233.

03Pr

ay in

ow

n m

osqu

e (1

–5)

2.71

2.55

2.75

2.58

2.49

2.64

2.83

2.63

2.88

Opp

ose

inte

rmar

riag

e of

sec

ts (

1–5)

2.98

2.92

3.17

2.85

2.82

3.02

3.12

3.07

3.32

distribution.© 2007 International Sociological Association. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized

at King Abdulaziz City for on April 10, 2008 http://iss.sagepub.comDownloaded from

Tabl

e A

5M

ean

Cha

nges

in A

ttit

udes

199

4–8

by E

duca

tion

All

Inte

rmed

iate

Hig

h sc

hool

Uni

vers

ity

1994

1996

1998

1994

1996

1998

1994

1996

1998

1994

1996

1998

Att

itud

esto

war

d d

emoc

racy

Pref

er d

emoc

racy

(0–

1)0.

390.

540.

610.

300.

490.

590.

350.

540.

620.

450.

580.

61M

utua

l con

sent

(0–

1)0.

790.

710.

840.

760.

640.

810.

780.

700.

840.

800.

770.

84St

rong

aut

hori

ty (

1–5)

4.57

4.18

4.44

4.57

4.10

4.33

4.53

4.21

4.48

4.58

4.16

4.46

Polit

icia

ns b

y se

ct (

1–5)

1.55

1.67

1.49

1.59

1.68

1.51

1.52

1.68

1.42

1.54

1.66

1.54

Supp

ort w

omen

’s p

olit

ical

rig

hts

(1–5

)3.

022.

622.

883.

112.

62.

653.

052.

622.

882.

962.

652.

95

Att

itud

es to

war

d th

e W

est

Frie

ndly

to W

est (

1–4)

3.05

3.07

3.13

3.07

3.15

3.22

3.05

3.06

3.14

3.04

3.03

3.10

Trad

e an

d A

lly w

/W

est (

1–5)

3.92

3.57

3.66

3.84

3.56

3.58

3.95

3.59

3.59

3.95

3.56

3.73

Follo

w w

este

rn m

edia

(1–

4)2.

032.

261.

751.

852.

081.

572.

052.

261.

712.

112.

381.

83

Reg

iona

l and

Ara

b so

lidar

ity

GC

C m

ilita

ry a

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ce (

1–5)

4.53

4.43

4.62

4.56

4.43

4.73

4.57

4.49

4.66

4.50

4.30

4.56

GC

C c

omm

onw

ealt

h (1

–5)

4.36

4.49

4.44

4.39

4.41

4.50

4.36

4.53

4.50

4.34

4.45

4.38

Ara

bism

(1–

5)3.

213.

543.

543.

393.

663.

573.

213.

583.

563.

123.

393.

52Su

ppor

t Ira

q’s

allie

s (1

–4)

1.34

1.58

1.57

1.37

1.59

1.58

1.36

1.60

1.59

1.32

1.56

1.55

Rel

igio

us b

elie

fs a

nd p

ract

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hod

oxy

(1–4

)3.

313.

133.

343.

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053.

413.

283.

173.

333.

323.

143.

33W

omen

sho

uld

wea

r ve

ils (

1–5)

4.48

4.07

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474.

16–

4.49

4.11

–4.

493.

92–

Men

sho

uld

wea

r be

ard

s (1

–5)

3.05

3.02

2.91

3.18

3.12

3.16

3.02

3.01

2.85

3.01

2.97

2.86

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in o

wn

mos

que

(1–5

)2.

712.

552.

752.

832.

712.

862.

692.

532.

792.

662.

482.

7O

ppos

e in

term

arri

age

of s

ects

(1–

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982.

923.

173.

112.

853.

22.

972.

933.

182.

922.

943.

14

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NotesThis research was supported by grants from the Kuwait Research Center, theCollege of Social and Behavioral Sciences at the Ohio State University, theAmerican University in Cairo and the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion.

1. Jordan, Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were added in this wave. The Jordaniandata were collected in 1999, Egypt in 2000–1, Iran in 2001 and Saudi Arabia in2003. Other Middle Eastern countries that have been part of several waves ofthe World Value Survey include Algeria, Morocco and Turkey.

2. The Palestinian data, collected in 1995, were based on a highly representative sam-ple of adults living in the West Bank and Gaza. The Moroccan and Algerian data,collected in 1995–6, were based on randomly selected samples collected in a singlecity in each country, therefore representative of large and heterogeneous popula-tions. The Egyptian data, collected in 1992, were based on area probability sam-pling in Cairo and Alexandria, again representing large and diverse populations.

3. Sixty percent of women aged 20–40 were working in Kuwait in 1997 up from50 percent in 1989 (National Bank of Kuwait, 1997).

4. For example, see Schlozman et al. (1994, 1995), Verba and Nie (1972) and Verbaet al. (1995).

5. Particular attention was directed to making sure that all younger women werelisted and thus sampled. Within Bedouin households, family units were iden-tified and sampling took place within those units. Follow-up interviews wereconducted for missing respondents; thus, the response rate was 100 percent.Also, some adjustments and additional questions were included in the 1996and 1998 survey. Data were weighted to the population means in each survey.

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Biographical Note: Katherine Meyer, professor in the Department of Sociology atthe Ohio State University (OSU), studies political participation and support fordemocracy in the Middle East. Currently, she is co-principal investigator on athree-year NSF Human and Social Dynamics grant on ‘Repression and Dissentin the Middle East’ that includes sociologists and political scientists from fouruniversities. Meyer’s publications on political participation and democratic atti-tudes and practices have derived from survey data from longitudinal generalsocial surveys of Kuwaiti citizens, the World Values surveys, survey of US farmpopulations and citizen surveys in other nations.

Address: The Ohio State University, 300 Bricker Hall, Columbus, OH 43210, USA.[email: meyer.23@sociology.osu.edu]

Biographical Note: Helen Rizzo is an assistant professor of sociology at theAmerican University in Cairo. Her research interests include political sociology,with a focus on democratization, development and the Middle East, and strati-fication, particularly gender and race/ethnic inequality. She has publishednumerous articles on public opinion, citizenship rights and the democratizationprocess in Kuwait. She recently published the book Islam, Democracy and theStatus of Women: The Case of Kuwait (Routledge, 2005). She is currently workingwith colleagues from political science and sociology on an NSF Human andSocial Dynamics grant project examining the dissent/repression nexus in theMiddle East.

Address: The American University in Cairo, 113 Kasr El Aini St., PO Box 2511,11511 Cairo, Egypt. [email: hrizzo@aucegypt.edu]

Biographical Note: Yousef Ali is an associate professor in the Department ofSociology and Social Work at Kuwait University. His research focuses on therole of informal groups in politics in the Middle East and the sources of politi-cal participation, and he has published numerous articles on these topics in bothEnglish and Arabic journals. Professor Ali is also a political commentator forvarious media outlets in Kuwait.

Address: Kuwait University, PO Box 23558, Safat 13096, Kuwait.[email: yali@kuc01.kuniv.edu.kw]

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