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Bringing Stakeholder Values into ClimateRisk Management Programs: DecisionAiding for REDD in VietnamLisa Kenney a , Joseph Arvai a b , Mamta Vardhan c & Delia Catacutand

a Department of Geography and Institute for Sustainable Energy,Environment, and Economy , University of Calgary , Calgary ,Alberta , Canadab Decision Research , Eugene , Oregon , USAc Department of Resource Economics and Department ofEnvironmental Sociology , University of Alberta , Edmonton ,Alberta , Canadad World Agroforestry Centre , Ha Noi , VietnamPublished online: 14 Jul 2014.

To cite this article: Lisa Kenney , Joseph Arvai , Mamta Vardhan & Delia Catacutan (2014): BringingStakeholder Values into Climate Risk Management Programs: Decision Aiding for REDD in Vietnam,Society & Natural Resources: An International Journal, DOI: 10.1080/08941920.2014.918233

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Bringing Stakeholder Values into ClimateRisk Management Programs: Decision Aiding

for REDD in Vietnam

LISA KENNEY

Department of Geography and Institute for Sustainable Energy,Environment, and Economy, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta,Canada

JOSEPH ARVAI

Department of Geography and Institute for Sustainable Energy,Environment, and Economy, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta,Canada, and Decision Research, Eugene, Oregon, USA

MAMTA VARDHAN

Department of Resource Economics and Department of EnvironmentalSociology, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada

DELIA CATACUTAN

World Agroforestry Centre, Ha Noi, Vietnam

The United Nations (UN) Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and ForestDegradation (REDD) program offers incentives for developing countries to reduceCO2 emissions and to invest in low-carbon paths to sustainable development. Indesigning and deploying REDD programs, the UN is asking that participatingnations go beyond focusing just on technical issues associated with carbon manage-ment and also include a range of social considerations; for example, program man-agers are being asked to undertake stakeholder-based processes aimed atincorporating community concerns in program design, implementation, and manage-ment. The research reported here discussed the application of structured decisionmaking to the design of REDD programs in Vietnam. The goal of structureddecision making is to place the values, objectives, and concerns of stakeholderssquarely in front of managers so that they may lend maximum insight to decisionsthat require trade-offs across environmental management options.

Keywords decision aiding, PES, REDD, stakeholder engagement, trade-offs,Vietnam

Received 21 June 2013; accepted 25 December 2013.Address correspondence to Lisa Kenney, Department of Geography, University of

Calgary, 2500 University Drive NW, Calgary, Alberta, Canada T2N 1N4. E-mail: lmkenney@ucalgary.ca

Society and Natural Resources, 0:1–19Copyright # 2014 Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN: 0894-1920 print=1521-0723 onlineDOI: 10.1080/08941920.2014.918233

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Finding ways to maintain and protect ecosystems against threats from humans isincreasingly becoming a priority for policymakers. To this end, payment for environ-mental services (PES) programs are one of the latest in a long history of approachesto promote natural resource conservation. PES programs are designed to providefinancial incentives to motivate the protection or enhancement of ecosystem ser-vices,1 with payments that are conditional upon the achievement of predeterminedmanagement goals (Engel et al. 2008; Pagiola 2008).

The implementation of PES programs is expanding rapidly worldwide,especially in developing countries. In these settings, many in-country resource man-agers as well as nongovernmental organizations (such as the World AgroforestryCentre and the World Wildlife Fund) see PES as achieving important dual goalsof environmental protection and community development, of which the latteraddresses social and economic needs. Specifically, under certain conditions, pay-ments to people under PES contracts can be used for both environmental manage-ment and poverty reduction, while the collaborative and institutionalarrangements required to implement these contracts may strengthen democraticgovernance (Wunder 2005).

The largest and one of the most well-known examples of PES set in a developingcountry context is Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation(REDD). Proposed REDD and REDDþ initiatives are being promoted by a consor-tium of United Nations (UN) agencies, as well as the World Bank. REDD is aneffort to create financial value for the carbon stored in forests, offering incentivesfor developing countries to reduce emissions from forested lands and invest inlow-carbon paths to sustainable development. Its successor, REDDþ, goes beyonda focus on deforestation and degradation to also include forest conservation andmanagement, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (UNDP 2008). Severalcountries, including the United States, together have already pledged more than$4.5 billion in support of REDD because they see it as a means of mitigating theworld’s CO2 emissions.

In terms of designing and deploying REDD programs, the UN is asking thatparticipating nations and organizations go beyond the established practice of focus-ing just on technical issues (e.g., establishing environmental baselines against whichto measure change, addressing concerns about program leakage, and assessingadditionally). REDD managers are also being compelled to address a range of socialconsiderations—through what the REDD program refers to as ‘‘safeguards’’—during the program’s design, implementation, and management processes. Forexample, REDD program officials in developing countries are being asked to under-take stakeholder engagement processes aimed at listening to—and incorporating—local and community concerns during program design, the evaluation of alternativemechanisms for achieving environmental protection goals, and assessing alternativepayment structures and distribution options (UNDP 2008).

These safeguards are important—indeed, critical—for promoting more demo-cratic and transparent development practices. But at the same time, many research-ers and practitioners are growing concerned about a lack of guidance when it comesto their implementation in what, on many levels, amounts to collaborativedecision-making processes (e.g., see Fischhoff 2012; Kellon and Arvai 2011). Theseconcerns are buttressed by the frequent lack of balance in environmental manage-ment processes between the limited efforts—on the one hand—to incorporatebroad-based stakeholder values into policy decisions and—on the other hand—the

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large-scale efforts to conduct technical assessments of anticipated biophysical,economic, and ecological impacts. Within REDD, for example, a great deal ofemphasis has been placed on analytic techniques ranging from remote sensing andgeographic information systems (GIS), to advanced ecological and economic model-ing (Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007; Pagiola et al. 2007; Kalacska et al. 2008). By con-trast, relatively little in the way of analytic effort has been devoted to establishingscience-based standards for stakeholder engagement, systems analysis, and decisionsupport.

Multiparty decision-making processes often utilize education and informationsessions, community meetings, and workshops aimed at facilitating consensus build-ing and conflict resolution. Initiatives like these are important steps forward in termsof stakeholder engagement by improving transparency and providing opportunitiesto exchange information; however, good listening, education, and negotiations ontheir own are insufficient for informing the kinds of complex decisions that are com-mon in natural resources management efforts like REDD. Decision researchers havelong demonstrated that in loosely structured situations, both individuals and groupsstruggle with a predictable set of difficulties when making complex decisions. Thesedifficulties are often related to how information is presented and framed, and howintuitive or routinized judgmental processes interact with, and often preempt,in-depth analysis (Wilson and Arvai 2006; Wilson and Arvai 2010). One of the fun-damental conclusions from this area of research is that people often end up makingdecisions that, at best, only partially address the full range of their concerns and sub-sequently fail to confront required trade-offs when evaluating competing alternatives(Arvai et al. 2012; Kellon and Arvai 2011).

With this as backdrop, the research reported here sought to apply principles andtools from structured decision making (Gregory et al. 2012; Arvai and Post 2012;Kellon and Arvai 2011; Bessette et al. 2014; Kenney et al. 2014) to stakeholder delib-erations about the design of potential REDD programs in Vietnam. The general goalof structured decision-making (SDM) approaches is to place the values, objectives,and concerns of stakeholders squarely in front of managers so that they may lendmaximum insight to decisions that will be made about environmental managementoptions. In this sense, SDM processes correspond well with contemporary viewsof REDD as a framework for participatory environmental governance, insofar asit can help facilitate the alignment of stakeholders’ interests toward the achievementof desired environmental outcomes (Thompson et al. 2011).

SDM relies on the normative benchmarks for high-quality decision making thatcome from multiattribute utility theory (Keeney and Raiffa 1993) and decisionanalysis (Clemen 2004) as one of the pillars of the stakeholder engagement process.In addition, an SDM approach draws on insights from behavioral decision researchto identify common biases in decision making that must be addressed in order max-imize decision quality (National Research Council 2005; Kahneman et al. 1982).SDM also draws on guidance related to good practice in risk communication (Arvaiand Campbell-Arvai 2013; Arvai and Rivers 2013), and stakeholder engagement anddeliberation (National Research Council 1996) so as to reach community membersin credible and defensible ways.

SDM is comprised of five interactive elements aimed at (1) defining the decisionproblem that is to be the focus of analysis; (2) identifying stakeholders’ andpolicy-specific objectives that will guide the decision-making process, including theperformance measures that will be used to gauge success or failure; (3) creating a

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broad array of logical, creative alternatives that directly address objectives; (4) usinga variety of expert and local knowledge sources to forecast the consequences associa-ted with alternative courses of action, including key sources of uncertainty; and (5)helping decision makers to confront value trade-offs that arise when selecting amongalternatives.

A range of analytic tools is available for use during a SDM process. These includedecision trees and influence diagrams for characterizing decision points and alterna-tives, objectives hierarchies for displaying the values concerns of stakeholders, port-folio builders for creating alternatives, consequence matrixes for depicting theobjective-by-objective performance of alternatives, and software tools for trade-offanalysis. Methodologically, SDM often relies upon interviews, workshops, surveys,and experiments (e.g., choice and factorial experiments) to collect necessary infor-mation about participants’ objectives and preferences. SDM provides both a comp-lementary structure, and a suite of methods that can be used in conjunction withother approaches—such as participatory rural appraisal (Chambers 1994) and partici-patory environmental governance (Bulkeley andMol 2003; Newig and Fritsch 2009)—that also focus on deliberative processes, and the knowledge and analytical capacity ofboth technical experts local people. In terms of added value, SDM helps to decomposecomplex decisions, thereby addressing some of the judgmental challenges common toindividual and group deliberations (Kellon and Arvai 2011; Arvai et al. 2014).

Methods

Study Context and Location

Vietnam is one of a handful of pilot countries under the UN REDD program; as isthe case with other countries taking part in the REDD program, REDD in Vietnamis in the early stages of development. The government of Vietnam finalized its com-mitments for a national REDD program in 2012, and is planning to begin piloting alimited number of individual REDD initiatives in late 2013. While the national pro-gram provides the general framework for REDD in Vietnam, there remains ambi-guity about what specific REDD initiatives will actually look like once in place.These ambiguities include uncertainty around program design (e.g., contract design;payment type, amount, and timing; etc.), implementation (e.g., management struc-ture), and monitoring and verification processes, while also addressing the UN’sconcerns about transparency, stakeholder participation, and safeguards.

In an effort to address some of these ambiguities concerning REDD in Vietnamvia the use of an SDM process, our research focused on community and expert sta-keholders and decisions at both the national and local level. In undertaking ourresearch, we worked closely with the Vietnam office of the World AgroforestryCentre (ICRAF).

While our national level work took place in the capital city of Ha Noi, ourresearch at the local level focused on a series of villages in the northern Vietnamprovince of Bac Kan. These villages were selected with guidance from ICRAF, basedon their likely selection as future REDD sites. The villages in our study ranged in sizebetween approximately 30 and 70 households, the vast majority of which rely pri-marily on subsistence agriculture to meet their needs.

In studying SDM for REDD design in these areas, our research unfolded inthree related phases: a series of workshops, a survey, and a pilot experiment focused

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on trade-offs. Research at the national level was conducted in English by two of thearticle’s authors (Kenney and Vardhan). At the village level, the project team wasaccompanied by translators, who also helped translate all study instruments fromEnglish to Vietnamese (which were back-translated with the help of ICRAF staff).

SDM Workshops

Based on an initial list provided by ICRAF and a chain sampling method, we con-ducted a series of SDM workshops with 10 national-level stakeholders, all of whichwere based in Ha Noi. These workshops included representatives from governmentagencies, international donor organizations, local nongovernmental organizations,research institutions, and Vietnam’s UN REDD office. At the local level, workwas conducted in four villages in Bac Kan province.

Workshops at the national level focused primarily on eliciting managementobjectives that might guide the design and implementation of REDD initiatives.Time was also devoted to discussions about related performance measures.

In an effort to account for cultural considerations at the village level, with thehelp of ICRAF, we worked with local representatives in each village to organizethe SDM workshops. We asked that a wide range of villagers—including the poorestcommunity members—be invited to participate in the workshops, and we organizedseparate workshops for men and women. In order to facilitate open discussion,people with leadership positions participated in separate sessions, which alsotook place as part of our overall research effort. Participants were compensatedfor their time.

The SDM workshops in each village were conducted over two days, and thesame participants took part in both sets of workshops. All of the workshops fol-lowed a similar protocol, based on methods used in other developing-countrySDM processes (see Arvai and Post 2012; Kellon and Arvai 2011; Kenney et al.2014; Arvai et al. 2014). However, while the elicitation of objectives and the devel-opment of performance measures took place at the village and national levels, part-icipants in the village-level workshops also devoted time to the design of alternatives.The rationale behind this difference was twofold. Alternatives were already beingdesigned by managers at the national level, so we felt that devoting additional energytoward this step in the SDM process would be viewed as perfunctory by participants.We found the reverse to be true at the village level: Local stakeholders had yet to beconsulted about REDD in Vietnam. So, we felt that it would be most informativefrom the standpoint of REDD design if we worked with stakeholders at the villagelevel to design alternatives that best reflected their values, concerns, and objectives.Relatedly, devoting time to the design of alternatives at the village level allowed usto further study and document the effectiveness of SDM in a REDD context interms of both designing REDD programs and providing a method to ensure REDDsafeguards.

The first day in each village began with an introductory session describing theSDM process, as well as a participatory scoping discussion to gain a better under-standing of local forest use patterns and behavior, land tenure arrangements, liveli-hood activities, and previous experience with PES initiatives. The workshop thenmoved on to elicit participants’ objectives and performance measures related toREDD initiatives that might one day be implemented in the area. In order to helpfacilitate the discussion about objectives related to REDD, we structured this part

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of the workshops around key programmatic elements, including program design andmanagement (e.g., a top-down, agency-driven process vs. a bottom-up stakeholder-based approach), performance-based conditionalities (e.g., penalties) and forest userestrictions, payment type, contract arrangement, and monitoring and verification.This facilitated discussion followed the format used in other SDM studies (e.g.,McDaniels et al. 1999; Arvai and Post 2012), and focused on differentiating meansfrom ends objectives.

This step in an SDM process is important for two reasons. First, identifying endsobjectives helps decision makers and analysts to understand the areas of concerns thatmost—if not all—stakeholders in an area care about: for example, issues like humanwell-being, environmental health, and so on. Second, a focus on means objectivesreveals important insights about how stakeholders envision that the ends objectivesmay be achieved (e.g., enhancing biodiversity as a means to improving environmentalhealth). In making this distinction, ends objectives may be viewed as initial proxies forthe kinds of alternatives (e.g., the individual elements of REDD initiatives) that maybe considered during later stages of decision-making (Gregory et al. 2012). For eachworkshop—in Ha Noi and in Bac Kan—we constructed means–ends networks tovisually display the objectives of stakeholders (Figures 1 and 2).

Figure 1. Means–ends network outlining the objectives regarding REDD program design andimplementation elicited from national-level managers and stakeholders.

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The first day of the workshops included a discussion of performance measuresfor as many of the means objectives with which participants felt knowledgeable orcomfortable. Here, the focus was on how participants might track the performanceof REDD programs. Understanding these performance measures is critical duringdecision making because they help to make more concrete what maybe fairlyabstract objectives or alternatives; this is important both during the initial phasesof REDD program design and, later, monitoring and verification.

On the second day, the workshop focused on identifying and evaluating alterna-tive REDD program designs. At the outset, participants were reminded of theirobjectives from the previous day (by highlighting the relationship between elicited

Figure 2. Means–ends network outlining the objectives regarding REDD program design andimplementation elicited from local, village-level stakeholders.

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means and ends objectives) and were asked to brainstorm about possible REDDdesigns that would meet them. In order to facilitate this process, we asked parti-cipants to start with a status quo REDD design based on a well-known PES programin Vietnam (known as the 661 Program) and then make changes to it to better reflectobjectives elicited during the previous day.

Survey

A survey was conducted to validate the key findings obtained during the workshopsjust described. Working again with representatives in each village to recruit a rangeof village residents (via chain sampling), the survey was administered to a total of 92respondents across three villages in our study area. Questions were based upon boththe objectives, as well as the alternatives that were discussed during the workshopsin Phase 1 (see Tables 2, 3, and 4, presented later, for items and scales). In order toaccommodate a range of literacy levels, the survey questions were read aloud to respon-dents. As with the workshops, survey respondents were compensated for their time.

Trade-Offs Experiment

Trade-off analysis in SDM typically takes place using either a decision-analytic(Hammond et al. 1998; Clemen 2004) or an econometric (Bennett and Birol 2010;Adamowicz et al. 1998) approach. However, we were confronted with limited timein each village; therefore, in order to gauge community members’ willingness tomake certain tradeoffs, we conducted an exploratory field experiment. Once again,representatives from each village assisted with the recruitment—via chain sam-pling—of a wide range of residents to participate. Respondents (n¼ 144) were drawnfrom nine villages located in the areas adjacent to our study areas, and receivedremuneration for their participation. The experiment focused on three attributesidentified in the SDM workshops and the follow-up survey (program design,management structure, and incentive type) and followed a 2 (top-down involvingonly national REDD mangers vs. bottom-up involving REDD managers andvillagers)� 2 (REDD program management led by village leaders vs. led by govern-ment agencies)� 3 (cash incentives vs. hybrid cash and in-kind incentives vs. in-kindincentives alone) factorial design. The experiment utilized a mixed between–withindesign, with participants being randomly assigned four REDD program scenarios.

After considering each scenario, participants were asked to answer seven ques-tions aimed at gauging willingness to participate in a REDD program, as well astheir satisfaction with specific REDD program attributes. As with the survey alreadydescribed, the assigned treatment scenarios along with the accompanying surveyquestions were read aloud to each participant. Responses were collected on 4-pointLikert scales (see Table 5, presented later).

Results

Workshop Findings

Stakeholders at the national level identified four different ends objectives relatedto the design and implementation of REDD programs: protecting ecosystemsservices, climate change mitigation, improving local well-being and livelihoods,

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and—related—poverty reduction (Figure 1). Several additional subobjectives servedas means to these ends. For example, several stakeholders discussed the importanceof developing REDD safeguards, participatory monitoring, and local participationin REDD programs as means of improving livelihoods and well-being in localvillages.

At the village level, there was agreement with the national-level managers aboutthree ends objectives: improving livelihoods and well-being in local villages, povertyreduction, and protecting ecosystem services. However, the means to these ends werequite different at the village level when compared to the national level (Figure 2).Village-level stakeholders tended to focus on means objectives that were local inscope. For example, they focused in much greater detail on promoting more demo-cratic governance systems, and on protecting specific ecosystem services (e.g., pro-tecting forests that, in turn, would serve as a means of providing clean water andair, erosion control, etc.). At the national level, stakeholders tended to focus onmeans objectives that could be implemented on a wider scale (e.g., regarding themitigation of climate change).

Performance measures (Table 1) discussed at the national-level workshopstended to be more technically oriented (e.g., percent tree cover, tons of carbon seques-tered). At the village level, performance measures tended toward social considerationsand ecosystem services (e.g., the quality of the relationship between village-levelstakeholders and managers, water quality, presence of useful tree species).

Alternatives developed by participants typically included the following ele-ments: (1) a bottom-up and collaborative design process conducted jointly betweenREDD program officials and local participants; (2) a benefit structure thatincluded a mix of cash and in-kind benefits (e.g., the provision of goods such asfertilizer, seeds, and building materials such as bricks) paid to individuals, andin-kind benefits paid to communities (e.g., improved roads, improved irrigationdrainage channels, new schoolrooms, medical facilities, etc.); (3) local (vs. provin-cial or national government) management and monitoring of REDD programs—including the distribution of benefits—that is handled jointly between village lea-ders, village forest boards, and individual participants; (4) allowance for limitedhousehold use of forest resources and land (e.g., for fuel wood, timber, food, live-stock); and (5) imposing only limited conditionality of payments so that parti-cipants and communities are not penalized for naturally occurring perturbations(e.g., fire, flood, etc.).

Survey Results

Overall, the survey (n¼ 93; 47% female) results suggest strong agreement withrespect to particular program design and management attributes, objectives, andincentives between those people who completed the survey and participants in theSDM workshops. For example, survey participants felt that program design andmonitoring should be undertaken jointly by villagers and REDD management agen-cies, and that groups of local villagers should be primarily responsible for forestprotection activities (Table 2).

Similarly, there was strong alignment with respect to the importance of keyobjectives—for example, protecting ecosystem services, promoting democraticgovernance, poverty reduction, improving local well-being, and climate change miti-gation—identified during the SDM workshops (Table 3).

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Table 1. Preliminary list of performance measures for objectives elicited fromnational-level (N) and village-level (V) stakeholders, where arrows indicate desireddirection of performance, that is, increasing (%) or decreasing (&)

Ends objectives National-level measures Village-level measures

Protect ecosystemservices (N&V)

Per cent tree cover (%) Number of landslides (&)Carbon stocks (%) Availability of desired tree

species (%)Number of new land usepolicies implemented (%)

Improved air quality; e.g., clear,no haze (%)

Number of land usecertificates allocated (%)

Improved water quality; e.g.,clarity, odor, etc. (%)

Number of communities=individuals who receiveforested landallocations (%)

Amount of land for growingcrops, livestock (%)

Improve livelihoods=well-being (N&V)

Number of individualsinvolved in REDDprograms (%)

Amount of timber and fuelwood available to households(%)

Number of communitiesinvolved in REDDprograms (%)

Number of households thatreceive benefits regardless ofprogram participation (%)

Number of individualsattending REDDinformation=planningmeetings (%)

Socioeconomic indicators;e.g., GDP (%), literacy(%), health indicators (%)

Poverty reduction(N&V)

Socioeconomic indicators;e.g., employment (%),average per-capitaincome (%)

Ability to meet financialobligations (food, school fees)each month (%)

Level of awareness aboutREDD programs amongpolicymakers, governmentofficials (%)

Performance on tests to followREDD training (%)

Promote democraticgovernance (V)

Not discussed Number of productive meetingbetween managers andstakeholders focused onREDD program design (%)

Number of village leaders hiredto serve as REDD programfield managers (%)

Number of occasions wherevillage forestry boards are inREDD co-management (%)

(Continued )

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The same was true of respondents’ feelings toward incentives—cash and in-kind,administered to both individuals and communities—which were identified during thediscussion of REDD program alternatives (Table 4).

Regarding gender differences in terms of program design (Table 2), objectives(Table 3), or incentives (Table 4), independent-sample t tests revealed only one: namely,that women felt more strongly than did men about the importance of protecting foreststo provide an adequate supply of fuelwood and firewood (Table 3, item 6). However,even though this difference was significant, both means were at the higher end of theimportance scale (�xxwomen¼ 3.95 vs. �xxmen¼ 3.71).

We also computed new variables to compare survey respondents’ ratings ofdesirability for cash (Table 4, questions 1, 5, and 7) and non-cash (Table 4, questions2–4, 6, and 8–10) incentives; a t test revealed no significant differences (p¼ .42).However, when we compared constructed variables based on the distribution ofbenefits—either to individuals, to groups of villagers who would divide paymentsinternally, or to the village leader who would divide the payments—a significantdifference was detected by a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) (p< .001). AGames–Howell posttest revealed that survey respondents preferred a distributionof payments either to individuals (p< .001) or to groups (p¼ .05) over paymentsto the village leader. Respondents were, however, indifferent between a distributionof payments to individuals or groups (p¼ .46).

Table 1. Continued

Ends objectives National-level measures Village-level measures

Climate changemitigation (N)

Reference emissionlevels (&)

Not discussed

Amount of CO2 sequestered(%)

Table 2. Participants’ (n¼ 92) opinions about REDD program design andmanagement

Survey question �xxAll SD �xxMen SD �xxWomen SD p

1. Who should be involved in the planningand design of forest managementprograms in your area?

1.98 0.15 1.98 0.14 1.98 0.15 .93

2. Who should be involved in the forestprotection activities in your area?

1.10 0.30 1.14 0.35 1.05 0.21 .11

3. Who should be involved in monitoringforest protection performance?

2.01 0.18 2.00 0.20 2.02 0.15 .54

Note. For questions 1 and 3, responses were provided on 3-point Likert scales where 1¼ justgovernment and REDD management agencies; 2¼ a mix of villagers, government, and REDDmanagement agencies; and 3¼ just villagers. For question 2, responses were binary where1¼ small groups of villagers and 2¼ individual villagers. Significance testing (independent-sample t tests) focused on differences between men (n¼ 49) and women (n¼ 43).

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Trade-Offs Experiment

We used multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) to evaluate the importanceof the different program attributes (program design, management structure, and

Table 3. Participants’ (n¼ 92) ratings of key REDD program-related objectives andconcerns

Survey question �xxAll SD �xxMen SD �xxWomen SD p

1. Importance of protecting forestsnear your village

3.97 0.18 3.94 0.24 4.00 0.00 .08

2. Importance of protecting foreststo address climate change risks

3.97 0.23 3.96 0.29 3.98 0.15 .71

3. Importance of protecting foreststo improve water quality

3.96 0.20 3.92 0.28 4.00 0.00 .06

4. Importance of protecting foreststo improve air quality

3.99 0.10 3.98 0.14 4.00 0.00 .35

5. Importance of protecting foreststo provide timber forconstruction

3.87 0.45 3.86 0.41 3.88 0.50 .78

6. Importance of protecting foreststo ensure an adequate supply offuelwood and firewood

3.83 0.50 3.71 0.65 3.95 0.21 .02

7. Importance of protecting foreststo provide land for livestock tograze

3.36 0.95 3.27 0.95 3.47 0.96 .32

8. Importance of having youropinions included during forestmanagement

3.92 0.45 3.98 0.14 3.86 0.64 .24

9. Importance that villagers shareequally in the benefits fromdevelopment programs

3.98 0.15 3.98 0.14 3.98 0.15 .93

10. Importance of having adequateirrigation and drainage systemsin your village

3.93 0.29 3.96 0.20 3.91 0.37 .39

11. Importance of having adequateroads in your village

3.98 0.15 3.96 0.20 4.00 0.00 .16

12. Concern about poverty in yourvillage

3.97 0.18 3.96 0.20 3.98 0.15 .64

13. Concern about being able toafford school fees

3.90 0.42 3.94 0.24 3.86 0.56 .38

14. Concern about being able to sellproducts and=or crops in orderto earn an income

3.96 0.20 3.92 0.28 4.00 0.00 .06

15. Concern about corruption in thegovernment

3.27 1.12 3.47 1.00 3.05 1.23 .07

Note. All responses were provided on 4-point Likert scales where 1¼ not at all important=concerned and 4¼ very important=concerned. Significance testing (independent-sample t tests)focused on differences between men (n¼ 49) and women (n¼ 43).

12 L. Kenney et al.

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incentive type) on respondents’ willingness to participate in a REDD program(Table 5).

Only one of the three possible main effects—incentive type (p< .001)—played asignificant role in participants’ willingness to participate in a REDD program;neither program design nor management structure was significant. None of the poss-ible interactions between attribute terms played a significant role in a respondents’willingness to participate.

Focusing just on incentive types, the difference between cash and hybrid incen-tives in terms of affecting willingness to participate was not significant, as revealedby a Tukey’s posttest. However, both cash and hybrid incentives outperformedin-kind incentives on their own (p< .001 for both incentive types) in terms of affect-ing respondents’ willingness to participate in a REDD program.

A MANOVA was also employed to evaluate the importance of the threeprogram attributes on respondents’ satisfaction with five different REDD programelements: design, management, payment type, payment amount, and paymentallocation (Table 5). In this case, the main effects associated with each attribute wereall significant drivers of satisfaction with different REDD programs (p< .001 for allattributes). However, none of the possible interactions between attribute termsplayed a significant role in respondents’ satisfaction ratings.

Table 4. Participants’ (n¼ 92) ratings of REDD incentive structures

Survey question �xxAll SD �xxMen SD �xxWomen SD p

1. Cash payments to individualparticipants

3.80 0.54 3.78 0.59 3.84 0.49 .59

2. Seeds and fertilizer to individualparticipants

3.83 0.52 3.78 0.59 3.88 0.45 .33

3. Bricks and cement for construction toindividual participants

3.95 0.27 3.98 0.14 3.91 0.37 .23

4. More efficient cook stoves toindividual participants

3.93 0.32 3.90 0.42 3.98 0.15 .23

5. Cash payments to groups ofparticipants

3.79 0.60 3.84 0.59 3.74 0.62 .47

6. Seeds and fertilizer to groups ofparticipants

3.85 0.49 3.82 0.57 3.88 0.39 .51

7. Cash payments to the village leader 3.80 0.49 3.82 0.44 3.79 0.56 .818. Seeds and fertilizer to the village

leader3.65 0.67 3.55 0.77 3.77 0.53 .12

9. Bricks and cement for construction tothe village leader

3.61 0.74 3.53 0.79 3.70 0.67 .28

10. Community-wide benefits providedby REDD sponsors (e.g., roadimprovements, construction ofirrigation channels)

4.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 1.00

Note. All responses were provided on 4-point Likert scales where 1¼ not at all desirable and4¼ very desirable. Significance testing (independent-sample t tests) focused on differencesbetween men (n¼ 49) and women (n¼ 43).

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Table

5.Participants’(n

¼144)ratingsof12alternativeREDD

programs

Interest

inparticipating

SatisfactionwithREDD

program

elem

ents

REDD

program

Self

Others

Design

Managem

ent

Paymenttype

Paymentamount

Paymentallocation

� xxSE

� xxSE

� xxSE

� xxSE

� xxSE

� xxSE

� xxSE

T.G

.C

3.98

0.12

3.91

0.11

3.41

0.09

3.22

0.09

3.29

0.13

3.20

0.15

3.89

0.05

T.G

.H

3.87

0.11

3.80

0.10

3.37

0.09

3.30

0.08

3.90

0.13

2.82

0.14

3.91

0.05

T.G

.I

3.07

0.12

3.16

0.10

3.35

0.09

3.24

0.08

2.35

0.13

2.94

0.14

3.86

0.05

B.G

.C

3.96

0.12

3.90

0.10

4.00

0.09

3.48

0.08

3.22

0.13

3.08

0.14

3.88

0.05

B.G

.H

3.91

0.11

3.86

0.10

4.00

0.09

3.36

0.08

3.54

0.13

2.83

0.14

3.93

0.05

B.G

.I

3.25

0.11

3.23

0.10

3.98

0.09

3.26

0.08

2.24

0.13

3.23

0.14

3.96

0.05

T.V

.C

3.92

0.11

3.87

0.10

3.57

0.09

3.85

0.08

3.24

0.13

3.24

0.14

3.85

0.05

T.V

.H

3.82

0.12

3.69

0.10

3.30

0.09

3.94

0.08

3.66

0.13

2.71

0.14

3.96

0.05

T.V

.I

3.05

0.12

3.08

0.11

3.52

0.09

3.97

0.09

2.30

0.13

3.17

0.15

3.79

0.05

B.V

.C

3.94

0.11

3.92

0.10

4.00

0.09

3.92

0.08

3.37

0.13

2.96

0.14

3.85

0.05

B.V

.H

3.86

0.12

3.78

0.10

4.00

0.09

4.00

0.08

3.72

0.13

2.88

0.15

3.96

0.05

B.V

.I

2.88

0.11

2.96

0.10

4.00

0.09

3.87

0.08

2.35

0.13

3.04

0.14

3.96

0.05

Note.REDD

programsweredifferentiatedbasedonthreeattributes:

program

design,managem

entstructure,andincentivetype.

Responsesto

questions1and2wereprovided

on4-pointLikertscaleswhere1¼definitelynot,2¼probably

not,3¼probably

yes,and4¼definitelyyes.Responses

toquestions3–7werealsoprovided

on4-pointLikertscaleswhere1¼very

unsatisfied,2¼somew

hatunsatisfied,3¼somew

hatsatisfied,and4¼very

satisfied.Program

design:B¼bottom-up;T¼top-down.Program

managem

ent:V¼managed

byvillageleader;G¼managed

bygovernmentagencies.

Incentive:

C¼cash;H¼hybridcash

þin-kind;I¼in-kind.

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As might be expected, the design attribute only had a significant influence onparticipants’ satisfaction with program design such that bottom-up designs were pre-ferred to those implemented in a top-down fashion (p< .001). Likewise, the manage-ment attribute had only a significant influence on participants’ satisfaction withprogram management; here, REDD programs managed by village leaders werepreferred to those managed by government agencies (p< .001).

Following this pattern, the payment attribute only had a significant influence onrespondents’ satisfaction with the payment type. Here, a Tukey’s posttest shows thatcash payments had a greater influence on satisfaction than did hybrid payments(p< .001); in turn, hybrid payments had a greater influence on satisfaction thandid in-kind payments (p< .001). Looking more closely at payment type, we alsoobserved that it played a significant role in terms of respondents’ satisfaction withthe payment amount. Specifically, respondents were more satisfied with the paymentamount when the incentive was cash as compared to when it was presented as eithera hybrid payment (as shown by a Tukey’s posttest, p< .01) or an in-kind payment(p< .01).

Discussion

These results carry with them a series of important implications for the future devel-opment of REDD programs in Vietnam (and elsewhere). Specifically, our researchidentifies a series of interrelated objectives, performance measures, and alternativesthat help inform future REDD programs in the study area. At the same time, ourresults point to the benefits of a decision-focused and systems-analytic approach—SDM—for the design, implementation, and management of a REDD initiative.

First, our study indicates that potential REDD program participants preferplanning processes that enable them not only to voice their concerns and objectives,but to actually have these included (in a direct and meaningful way) in REDD pro-gram design and implementation processes. As such, REDD program officials needto move beyond assumptions of what potential participants want or need (e.g., cashincentives, which have become a common refrain in PES programs) or simply engag-ing in dialogue about villagers’ concerns. Instead, program managers must find waysto provide much-needed structure for impending multistakeholder decisions, andmust seek out REDD program alternatives that clearly incorporate stakeholders’varied concerns and objectives.

Our results also point to the importance of implementing decision-aiding pro-cesses that account for both stakeholders’ needs and environmental outcomes atthe local level. For example, some of the villages in which we worked were comprisedof essentially community-managed forests, whereas others were located entirelywithin a national park. The rate and extent of deforestation in these areas, and else-where across Vietnam, vary substantially. Both of these variables have implicationsfor the type of REDD activities that can and should take place in an area (e.g., refor-estation vs. afforestation, patrolling, etc.).

Relatedly, since there is a strong preference for local monitoring of progress,outcomes that will be the focus of REDD programs should also address locally rel-evant objectives. For example, REDD initiatives should go beyond a focus on mea-sures such as forest cover and carbon sequestration potential to also address closelylinked local concerns such as drainage, erosion control, and water quality. Such anapproach conforms with recent research and practice related to the inclusion of

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traditional and local knowledge in cooperative resource management (Turner et al.2008; Berkes 1999). At the same time, monitoring programs that rely on both localparticipation and knowledge may be combined with technical approaches mentionedby national-level stakeholders (e.g., remote sensing). Combining monitoring activi-ties in this way would also help to achieve objectives regarding capacity and trustbuilding, especially between villagers and program officials.

Our research also suggest that REDD initiatives in Vietnam (and elsewhere) willhave to take into account existing local forest use. For example, in communities thatrely heavily on forest products, REDD programs may need to allow for some limitedforest use or replace forgone income or forest products. This could be achieved viathe implementation of alternative income generation programs (Fisher and Shively2005; McKee 1989), or by providing households with alternative sources of essentialservices (e.g., bricks for construction, gas-fueled cookstoves) as in-kind payments(Engel et al. 2008; Wunder 2005).

Indeed, our results suggest that in-kind incentives coupled with individual orgroup payments—that is, hybrid payments—may play an important role in facilitat-ing successful REDD implementation. Our rationale here is twofold. First, ourresearch suggests that potential participants in REDD initiatives prefer to receiveboth cash payments and in-kind payments. Second, research on incentives (e.g.,Gneezy et al. 2011) suggests that using money in a punitive manner—either as a fineor by withholding it—may create perverse incentives for people to either free-ride oropt out of contractual obligations. As a result, deemphasizing the monetary aspectsof a PES incentive may serve to facilitate greater satisfaction on the program part-icipants, compliance, and better environmental outcomes.

Considering these results more broadly, our research also provides insights intothe effectiveness of SDM approaches in designing and implementing PES programsmore generally. In other developing community contexts (e.g., Arvai and Post2012; McDaniels and Trousdale 1999), SDM has proven itself to be a rigorousapproach for involving many, sometimes competing, stakeholders in contentiousdecision-making processes. Unlike approaches that take as their starting pointthe evaluation of alternative management strategies—for example, negotiation oralternative dispute resolution—SDM begins by focusing on stakeholders’ objectivesas a means of creating responsive management alternatives. Likewise, the addedemphasis on establishing performance measures in stakeholder sessions providesa more natural, direct, and broadly understood means of evaluating alternatives.Finally, explicit attention to trade-offs—by focusing on the individual attributes ofalternatives, and not just the alternatives themselves—helps decision makers to betterunderstand the compromises that may be necessary so that other objectives may beachieved.

Perhaps the most important contribution of SDM in a REDD context lies in itsability to standardize the process of establishing UN-mandated safeguards. Despiteits iterative structure, SDM provides a series of steps for approaching complex, mul-tistakeholder decisions. Moreover, SDM processes are bottom-up and stakeholderdriven. Stakeholders with a wide range of expertise and experiences, and drawn froma diversity of places, work together to identify their own REDD-specific objectives,develop performance measures to assess how well these objectives are met, create arange of alternative REDD programs, and then assess each alternative in terms of itsability to meet objectives. All of this work takes place in an open and transparentenvironment. As a result, SDM provides a framework available to REDD program

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officials at all levels for both identifying local communities’ concerns and—importantly—incorporating these concerns into viable and realistic programs.

In spite of its potential, it is important to note that SDM—like any participatorydecision support or stakeholder engagement strategy—is not without challenges.In our study, for example, many participants at the village level reported that theyhad limited experience voicing their opinions and ideas, which initially made forsomewhat passive workshops. In Vietnam (and elsewhere) there is a long historyof top-down decision making and, as a result, passivity in the face of authority.To overcome these barriers in our own work, participants had to—initially—becarefully guided through the SDM process. Once they became familiar with whatwas being asked of them, however, village-level participants were easily able to developlocally specific objectives, measurable criteria, and thoughtful and locally relevantalternatives. As the SDM process progressed, we received positive feedback fromparticipants, who expressed a sense of ownership over the program design process.

In the end, our research suggests that SDM serves as an effective approach forinvolving multiple stakeholders in complex and often contentious issues facing devel-oping communities. Likewise, SDM brings much-needed methodological precision todecision contexts that increasingly demand science-based rigor. All of this mustunfold against the backdrop of the manifold challenges that typify developing com-munities: poverty, the need to better manage natural resources, limited infrastructure,low literacy levels, a diversity of cultural norms and local traditions, tight budgets,poor coordination among decision makers, and—all too frequently—a lack ofdemocratic and transparent decision-making processes. It is our view that all develop-ment decisions—and decision-making processes—must recognize and respond to thesechallenges. To this end, we believe that SDM provides a promising path forward.

Acknowledgments

We are grateful for the assistance and guidance we received during our research fromBui Tuan Tuan, Dang Thi Thu Thuy, Doan Thi Luyen, Duy Dong Ngo, and RobynWilson.

Funding

This research was funded by Carbon Management Canada, the International Devel-opment Research Centre of Canada, the U.S. National Science Foundation (underaward number SES-0924210), and the World Agroforestry Centre (Vietnam). Wethank the World Agroforestry Centre for field support in Vietnam, especiallyDam Viet Bac and Do Trong Hoan. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions orrecommendations expressed in this publication are those of the authors and donot necessarily reflect the views of the sponsors.

Note

1. Ecosystem services include provisioning services such as food, water, timber, and fiber;regulating services that influence climate, flood control, disease transmission, and waterquality; cultural services that provide recreational, aesthetic, and spiritual benefits; andsupporting services such as soil formation, photosynthesis, and nutrient cycling (MEA 2005).

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