Born in the USA: How Immigrant Generation Shapes Meritocracy and ItsRelation to Ethnic Identity and Collective Action

Shaun WileyThe College of New Jersey

Kay DeauxCUNY Graduate Center and New York University

Carolin HagelskampYale University

Endorsing meritocracy can make low-status group members more accepting of inequality. This studyexamined whether rejecting meritocracy is related to increased ethnic identification among Latinoimmigrants, and whether identity in turn is related to increased support for collective action. Wehypothesize that these relationships depend upon immigrant generation. A survey was conducted with184 first- and second-generation Latino immigrants in New York City. Second-generation Latinosendorsed meritocracy less than those in the first generation, at least in part because they perceived thatother Americans viewed their group in a less positive light (i.e., lower public regard). Further, meritoc-racy was negatively linked to ethnic identity and, through it, support for collective action among thesecond generation. Among the first generation, meritocracy was not related to ethnic identity and waspositively related to support for collective action. We discuss the implications of growing up near thebottom of the U.S. social hierarchy for ethnic identity and collective action.

Keywords: meritocracy, collective action, ethnic identity, immigration, generation

The United States continues to be an immigrant nation. Morethan one in five residents is foreign born (12%) or has at least oneforeign-born parent (11%; U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). The na-tional story of immigration is tied to meritocracy, or the Americandream: the idea that immigrants and their children can improvetheir lot through hard work (Hochschild, 1995). At the same time,many immigrants encounter a group-based hierarchy in the UnitedStates based on race (Vickerman, 1999) or documented status(Massey, 2007). In this research we examine relationships betweenmeritocracy beliefs, ethnic identity, and support for collectiveaction among two groups that differ in their experience in the U.S.social hierarchy—first- and second-generation Latino immigrants.Our main contention is that the more extensive experience ofsecond-generation immigrants with the consequences of theirlower group status makes them dubious about the existence ofmeritocracy and, in turn, increases their identification with theirethnic group and their endorsement of actions to improve itsposition in society.

Meritocracy

Meritocracy is one of the dominant belief systems in the UnitedStates (Katz & Hass, 1988; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Weber, 1958);it is a core component of the “American Dream” (Hochschild,1995) and also plays an important role in the national story ofimmigration. It is characterized by the beliefs that any individualcan improve their position in society (i.e., individual mobility)through hard work (i.e., the Protestant work ethic). People whobelieve that society is meritocratic perceive that there are fewsystematic barriers to success aside from their own efforts andabilities. In contrast, people who reject meritocracy perceive thatextraneous factors, such as group memberships, can limit one’schances in life (Major, Kaiser, O’Brien, & McCoy, 2007).

As a belief about the way society ought to be organized, meri-tocracy supports a message of fairness and equal opportunity (SonHing et al., 2011). As a belief about the way things are, that is, asa descriptive statement, meritocracy can have the consequence ofjustifying inequality because it implies that people’s low status canbe attributed to their own lack of effort or ability (Jost & Hunyady,2002; Major et al., 2002; Levin, Sidanius, Rabinowitz, & Federico,1998; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). In this article, we use meritocracyto refer to people’s descriptive beliefs about whether people cansucceed in society on the basis of their own efforts and abilities.Belief in the operation of meritocracy can be an incentive for thosewho choose to leave a country where outcomes are seen as pre-determined by custom or class. At the same time, substantialevidence indicates that believing that meritocracy exists while atthe same time being part of a disadvantaged group can encouragemembers of those groups to accept their position in society. Theyare less likely to perceive their group and themselves as victims of

Shaun Wiley, Psychology Department, The College of New Jersey; KayDeaux, Doctoral Program in Psychology, CUNY Graduate Center andDepartment of Psychology, New York University; Carolin Hagelskamp,Department of Psychology, Yale University.

This research was partially funded by a Presidential Authority Awardfrom the Russell Sage Foundation (#88-08-06) to the second author. Weare grateful to Hector Martinez for his assistance in data collection and toNida Bikmen for her comments on a draft of this article.

Correspondence to this article should be addressed to Shaun Wiley,Assistant Professor, Psychology Department, The College of New Jersey,2000 Pennington Road, Ewing, NJ 08628-0718. E-mail: swiley@tcnj.edu

Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology © 2012 American Psychological Association2012, Vol. 18, No. 2, 171–180 1099-9809/12/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0027661

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discrimination (Major et al., 2002; McCoy & Major, 2007), forexample, and more likely to blame their group for its situation(Major et al., 2007). Few studies, however, have examinedwhether the alternative of rejecting the existence of meritocracycan encourage members of disadvantaged groups to challenge theirposition in society.

People who perceive that their group has low status or isdisrespected are less likely to believe in meritocracy; Black andLatino college students, for example, perceive that society is lessmeritocratic than do higher-status Asians and Whites (Levin et al.,1998; Major et al., 2002). This difference is greater when peopleperceive that the status gap between the groups is large (Levin,2004). What are the consequences of this lowered belief thatmeritocracy exists for intergroup behavior, specifically the en-dorsement of collective action? The first aim of this study is toexamine the possible relationship between belief in meritocracyand collective action, or any action taken as a group member toimprove the group’s position in society (Wright & Tropp, 2002).

Meritocracy, Ethnic Identity, and Collective Action

One reason to expect a relationship between rejecting meritoc-racy and collective action is that both are tied to ethnic identifi-cation among members of low-status groups in the United States.From a social dominance (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) or systemjustification (Jost & Banaji, 1994) perspective, meritocracy repre-sents a legitimizing (or system-justifying) ideology. For membersof low-status groups, endorsing ideologies that support a hierar-chical system can come at their group’s expense. To the extent thatmembers believe in the fairness of a system that disadvantagestheir group, they should be less committed to the group itself,which is likely to have an interest in changing the social hierarchyor its position in it. Supporting this relationship, Levin et al. (1998)found that perceptions of the United States as a meritocraticsociety were negatively linked to ethnic identification amongBlacks and Latinos. If low-status ethnic groups do have an interestin changing their position in the social hierarchy, then people whoidentify with those groups should also support collective action.Indeed, ethnic identity predicts ethnic activism (Sears, Fu, Henry,& Bui, 2003) and orientation to collective action (Deaux, Reid,Martin, & Bikmen, 2006) among Latino college students in theUnited States.

A similar relationship between meritocracy and collective actionvia ethnic identity can be argued from a social identity perspective(Tajfel & Turner, 1979). According to social identity theory,meritocracy represents an individual mobility belief. When peopleperceive opportunities to improve their status as individuals, theyare less likely to identify with their group and more likely topursue individual strategies to improve their position in society.When people perceive that individual mobility is illegitimatelyblocked, in contrast, they will be more likely to identify with theirgroup and pursue collective strategies to improve their status, suchas collective action (Ellemers, 1993; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink,& Mielke, 1999; Verkuyten & Reijerse, 2008).

These theoretical perspectives converge on a negative relation-ship between meritocracy and ethnic identification and a positiverelationship between ethnic identity and collective action. Conse-quently, we expect that rejecting the existence of meritocracy willhave an indirect effect on collective action via ethnic identity.

Ethnic identity will be stronger for members of a low-status groupwho reject the existence of meritocracy. Higher ethnic identifica-tion, in turn, will be linked to stronger advocacy for collectiveaction.

Several studies offer preliminary support for our idea that iden-tity may link meritocracy to collective action. First, increasedidentification can explain why people are more supportive ofcollective (as opposed to individual) strategies to improve groupstatus when individual mobility is blocked (Mummendey et al.,1999). Second, Deaux et al. (2006) found that ethnic identificationmediated the link between acceptance of social inequality, a vari-able that has been linked to meritocracy (e.g., Son Hing et al.,2011), and collective action orientation among native-born Blacksand Latinos (a category that combined second-generation immi-grants with subsequent generations). In this research, we attempt toextend this effect to one of the dominant ideologies in the UnitedStates, namely meritocracy.

Despite its practical relevance, relatively little work has exam-ined immigrant collective action (but see Deaux et al., 2006;Klandermans, van der Toorn, & van Stekelenburg, 2008; Lalonde& Cameon, 1993; Okamoto & Ebert, 2010; Simon & Ruhs, 2008;Simon & Grabow, 2010). Of that work, only two studies have beenconducted in the United States (Deaux et al., 2006; Klandermanset al., 2008) and only one included Latino participants (Deaux etal., 2006). Further, no research has considered the role of meri-tocracy in collective action, in general, or among immigrants, inparticular.

Immigrant Generation

Beliefs about meritocracy and its link to ethnic identity arepresumed to be forged through experiences near the bottom of agroup-based hierarchy (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Evidence insupport of this claim is usually based on comparisons betweenhigh- and low-status group members (Levin, 2004; Levin et al.,1998). If experience is the key element, then group members withless experience in the U.S. social hierarchy—or substantial expe-rience elsewhere—are likely to show a different pattern of rela-tionships. In this respect, a comparison of first-generation immi-grants (i.e., those who were born in another country but migratedto the United States in late adolescence or adulthood) and second-generation immigrants (i.e., those who arrived at a young age orwere born in the United States to immigrant parents1) offers aparticularly interesting perspective. These two generations of im-migrants represent groups who both occupy relatively low posi-tions in terms of the ethnic group membership in the U.S. socialhierarchy (Fiske & Lee, 2011), but whose ethnic identities andbeliefs about meritocracy were developed in different contexts.

First-generation immigrants spend their early lives in their coun-try of origin, where their group—for example, Mexican—is defi-nitional for the country as a whole and thus, is likely to bepositively valued (i.e., has high public regard). Thus, being Mex-ican is unlikely to be a barrier to their advancement in Mexico,even if other barriers exist (e.g., class, indigenous background,

1 We will use the term 2nd generation to refer to both 1.5 and 2ndgenerations throughout the article, except when referring to immigrants’place of birth.

172 WILEY, DEAUX, AND HAGELSKAMP

etc.). To the extent that immigrants recognize the existence of lessthan positive views of their ethnic group in the United Statesbefore they arrive, those who migrate are likely to be optimisticabout their ability to overcome them (Waters, 1999). Even aftermigration, their experiences related to individual advancement andtheir ethnic group membership are likely to be filtered throughtheir initial optimism (Jasinkaja-Lahti, Mahönen, & Liebkind, inpress).

Second-generation immigrants, in contrast, spend their earlylives in the United States, where they cannot assume that otherpeople see their ethnic (or their parents’ national) identity in apositive light (i.e., low public regard). For example, second-generation West Indian immigrants believe that others view theirethnic group less positively than do their first-generation counter-parts (Deaux et al., 2007; Wiley, Perkins & Deaux, 2008). Ac-cordingly, second-generation immigrants may be less inclined toperceive that meritocracy exists than do the first generation. So-ciological research with West Indian immigrants supports thisview. Although both first- and second generation immigrants rec-ognize barriers to their advancement, members of the first gener-ation believe that they can overcome those barriers with hardwork—that is, they endorse meritocracy. The second-generationimmigrants, in contrast, see such barriers as systemic, that is, theyreject meritocracy (Waters, 1999). A second aim of the presentstudy is to extend this ethnographic research with West Indians toa quantitative analysis with Latino immigrants. We expect thatsecond-generation Latinos will endorse meritocracy less than dothose in the first generation (H1). Furthermore, we expect that thisdifference will be at least partially explained by the less favorableviews (i.e., lower public regard) that they believe other Americanshave about their group (H1a).

Furthermore, the strength of a first-generation immigrant’s eth-nic identity is less likely to be tied to beliefs about the UnitedStates, having been established long before their emigration(Giguere, Lalonde, & Lou, 2010). In contrast, the strength of asecond-generation immigrants’ ethnic identity is established in thecontext of the U.S. racial hierarchy. Although it may be influencedby intragroup factors, such as parental socialization and trips to thecountry of origin, it is also likely to be influenced by beliefs aboutmeritocracy, as it is for native-born Blacks and Latinos (Levin etal., 1998). As a result, generation is expected to moderate therelationship between meritocracy and ethnic identity, such thatthere will be a negative relationship between the two variables inthe second generation, but no relationship in the first generation(H2).

Suggestive evidence for our view can be found in the work ofDeaux et al. (2006), who assessed acceptance of social inequalityamong ethnic groups, a form of hierarchy-enhancing ideology, byimmigrants and native-born Blacks and Latinos in the UnitedStates. They found no association between acceptance of group-based inequality and group identity among first-generation Blackand Latino immigrants, but a negative association for the native-born (in this case, both second and third generation immigrants).Considering only the first generation sample, time in the UnitedStates was a factor, as a negative correlation between acceptanceof inequality and ethnic identification emerged among immigrantswho had spent more than eight years in the country compared tothose who were more recently arrived.

Hypothesis 2 allows us to make one additional prediction re-garding the relationship between meritocracy and collective ac-tion: We expect that ethnic identity will forge an indirect linkbetween meritocracy and collective action, but only for second-generation immigrants (H3). Specifically, we expect that lowerbeliefs in meritocracy will be related to stronger ethnic identifica-tion in the second generation, which, in turn, will predict greatersupport for collective action. In the first generation, we expect norelationship between meritocracy and ethnic identity and thus, noindirect link to collective action.

Finally, there is some reason to believe that meritocracy itselfmay hold different implications for first- and second-generationimmigrants. Recent work has acknowledged that meritocracy—and more specifically, the Protestant work ethic—has at least twoassociations (Levy, West, & Ramirez, 2005; Levy, West, Ramirez,& Karafantis, 2006). On one hand, believing that meritocracyexists implies that any individual can get ahead through hard work,regardless of extraneous factors such as one’s group memberships.Based on this definition one might expect that meritocracy wouldincrease both attempts at individual mobility and collective actionamong members of low-status groups. Both working hard to get abetter job and working to place qualified members of one’s groupin high positions in government and business would seem moreeffective in a meritocratic system. But, as we have argued, meri-tocracy can also have an additional implication: that members oflow-status groups deserve their position. It is this implication thatmakes ethnic identification and collective action unnecessary.

Having been born and/or raised in the context of the U.S. racialhierarchy, second-generation immigrants are likely to be wellacquainted with this additional implication of meritocracy. Withless experience in the United States and a strong desire to improvetheir own position and that of their families, first-generation im-migrants may be less aware or less accepting of this possibility(which, if accepted, would nullify much of their rationale forcoming to the United States). In addition, the Protestant work ethichas been positively linked to egalitarianism (not acceptance ofinequality) in at least one Latin American country, Colombia(Ramirez, Levy, Velilla, & Hughes, 2010), offering some reason tobelieve that the meaning of meritocracy may be seen only in itsmore positive form in other countries and cultures where first-generation immigrants formed their beliefs. Accordingly, we ten-tatively expect meritocracy to be positively related to support forcollective action in the first generation (H4). We speculate that thefirst generation may not see meritocracy as an ideology thatimplies that low-status groups deserve their position in societygiven their experiences in the country of origin and their lack ofexperience in the U.S. social hierarchy. Rather, they may viewit—like collective action—simply as a way to improve their ownposition in a fair and open society.

The Current Study

We conducted our research among Dominicans and Mexicans inNew York City. Dominican migration to New York has beensteady since 1965. Dominicans are the largest single immigrantgroup in New York City, with 602,093 residents (Limonic, 2007).Despite their large numbers and historical presence, they occupy arelatively low-status position (Itzigsohn, Giorguli, & Vasquez,2005) and face frequent discrimination in the United States (Gras-

173IMMIGRANT GENERATION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION

muck & Pessar, 1991). Mexicans make up more than half of thetotal immigrant population in the United States, but constitute amuch smaller proportion in New York City, with a reported289,755 residents (Limonic, 2007). Mexican migration to NewYork City is recent, dating primarily from the early 1990s. Thegroup holds a relatively low-status position in the United Statesand reports frequent discrimination (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001).

Method

Participants

A total of 184 first- or second-generation immigrants wererecruited from seven community organizations in New York City.First generation (N � 125) was defined as those who were born inanother country but migrated to the United States in late adoles-cence or early adulthood); second generation (N � 59) were thosewho were born in the United States to immigrant parents or whoarrived at the age of 10 or younger. The participants completedpaper-and-pencil questionnaires in either English or Spanish be-fore or after classes, events, or general meetings in the organiza-tions’ offices. Participants self-identified as either Dominican (n �93) or Mexican. They chose to complete the survey in eitherSpanish (n � 138) or English and were compensated $10 for theirtime. Sixty-four percent of participants were female and the meanage was 32.96 (SD � 10.71). Twenty-five percent of participantshad less than a high school diploma, 23.9% had completed highschool, 14.7% had a 2-year college degree, 27.7% had a 4-yearcollege degree, and 8.7% had completed some postgraduate work.Of first-generation immigrants born outside of the United States,the average age of arrival was 19.1 (SD � 9.31).

First-generation participants (M � 35.05, SD � 9.97) weresomewhat older than second-generation participants (M � 28.53,SD � 10.94), t(182) � 4.01, p � .001. A greater proportion offirst- (80.8%) than second-generation immigrants (62.7%) com-pleted the survey in Spanish, �2(1, N � 184) � 6.99, p � .01. Thesecond-generation respondents had a higher level of educationthan the first, �2(1, N � 184) � 15.79, p � .003. Approximatelya third of the first generation (31.2%) had not completed highschool, compared to only a tenth of the second generation (11.2%).Second-generation immigrants were twice as likely to have grad-uated from a four year college (44.1%) compared to the first(20.0%). The generations did not differ significantly by gender orethnicity. Age, education, ethnicity, gender, and language of sur-vey were included as covariates in subsequent analyses.

Measures

Unless otherwise noted, all items were assessed on 7-pointLikert scales (1 � strongly disagree to 7 � strongly agree).

Public regard. Public regard was measured with four itemsfrom the public subscale of the Collective Self-Esteem Scale(Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). Two items were reverse-coded. Theoriginal scale identifies a generalized “others” as a referencegroup, but in this study we specified the reference group tobe “other Americans.” A sample item is “In general, other Amer-icans respect Dominicans.” Reliability for the scales was adequate,� � .60.

Meritocracy. Meritocracy was measured with an 8-item scaleused in Major et al. (2007), who adapted it from Levin et al.(1998). The measure is defined by two subscales, half of which arereverse scored. The first assesses the Protestant work ethic andincludes four items (e.g., “If people work hard in the United Statesthey almost always get what they want”). The second subscaleassesses individual mobility beliefs and also includes four items(e.g., “Advancement in U.S. society is possible for all individuals,”“Individual members of certain groups are often unable to advancein American society,” the latter reverse-scored). Because previousresearch has found the subscales to be correlated (r � .41 in Majoret al., 2007), as they also were in our analysis (r � .49), andbecause we had no a priori reason to separate them, the twosubscales were combined in a single measure, � � .74.

Ethnic identity. A measure of ethnic identity adapted fromLuhtanen and Crocker (1992) was used to assess the importance ofone’s ethnic group (i.e., Dominican or Mexican) to the self-concept. The original scale included four items, two of which werereverse scored (e.g., “Overall, being Dominican [Mexican] haslittle to do with how I feel about myself”). One of the four items,however, was not strongly correlated with any of the others, (i.e.,“Being Dominican [Mexican] is an important reflection of who Iam,” rs � .07–.16). Dropping this item improved the overallreliability of the scale from � � .60 to � � .66. We report resultsusing the 3-item scale.

Collective action support. Three items adapted from La-londe and Cameron (1993) assessed “How important is it for yourethnic group to act collectively to improve its position in theUnited States?,” with each item then making reference to a specificaction: “Getting more Dominicans [Mexicans] elected in U.S.government,” “Increasing the power of Dominicans [Mexicans] inthe United States,” and, “Getting more Dominicans [Mexicans] inhigh positions of U.S. companies.” The scale ranged from 1 � notat all important to 7 � very important. The three items yielded areliable scale, � � .79.

Results

Mean Generational Differences

We conducted an analysis of covariance to see whether thegenerations differed in their endorsement of meritocracy, publicregard, the importance of ethnic identity, and support for collectiveaction goals.2 As predicted in H1 and in initial support of H1a,second-generation immigrants endorsed meritocracy less and per-ceived lower public regard than did first-generation immigrants,even after including age, education, ethnic group, gender, andquestionnaire language as covariates (see Table 1). There were no

2 We conducted measurement invariance analyses to be confident thatour measures had comparable psychometric properties and had the samemeaning across first and second generations. Following procedures recom-mended by Gregorich (2006), we conducted a series of confirmatory factoranalyses within a structural equation framework. All three measures in themodel showed a strong factorial (scalar) invariance across the two samples.Thus, a model that constrained all factor loadings and item intercepts to bethe same across groups fit the data equally well as a model that allowedfactor loadings and item intercepts to vary across groups, as indicated bya nonsignificant chi-square difference test.

174 WILEY, DEAUX, AND HAGELSKAMP

significant differences between the generations for ethnic identityor collective action goals. With one exception, there were nodifferences between Dominican and Mexican participants. Domin-icans were more likely to endorse meritocracy (M � 4.03, SD �1.05) than Mexicans (M � 3.80, SD � 1.25), F(1, 177) � 9.83,p � .002.

Also in support of H1a, public regard partially mediated therelationship between generation and belief in meritocracy, as ex-pected. Following the guidelines of Preacher and Hayes (2008), wetested for an indirect effect of immigrant generation on meritoc-racy via public regard using bootstrapped confidence intervals (seeFigure 1). There was a significant indirect effect of generation onmeritocracy via public regard. After accounting for this effect, thedirect effect of meritocracy on generation was reduced, signifyingpartial mediation.

Associations Between Ethnic Identity, Meritocracy,and Collective Action by Generation

As expected, simple correlations reveal divergent patterns forfirst- and second-generation immigrants in the relationship be-tween ethnic identity, meritocracy and collective action support(see Table 2). We conducted hierarchical multiple regression anal-yses following Aiken and West (1991) to examine whether immi-grant generation moderated the relationship between meritocracyand ethnic identity (H2). The results supported our predictions.Even after accounting for covariates and main effects, there was asignificant interaction between meritocracy and generation on eth-

nic identity (see Table 3). Meritocracy was negatively related toethnic identity for second-generation immigrants, � � �.45,t(51) � �2.31, p � .05 after accounting for covariates, but not forthose in the first generation, � � .16, t(118) � .98, p � .33.

To further Test H3, concerning the role of ethnic identity inforging an indirect link between meritocracy and collective actionsupport in the second generation, and H4, concerning the potentialpositive direct relationship between the variables in the first gen-eration, we conducted a two-group comparison analysis of a me-diation model using structural equation modeling (SEM) in Mplus6 (Muthen & Muthen, 2010). This approach utilizes model fitstatistics to test the moderating role of generational status on eachpath in the mediation model and compare the size of the indirecteffect of meritocracy beliefs on collective action goals across first-and second-generation immigrants. We first fitted a model thatconstrained all pathways to be the same across first- and second-generation immigrants. The fit of this model was evaluated withconventional goodness-of-fit indices. Following recommendationsby Kline (2005) and Hu and Bentler (1999), a satisfactory modelfit with a relatively small sample size includes the comparative fitindex (CFI) and the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) of equal or greaterthan .9, and the root mean square error of approximation(RMSEA) of less than .08. We then tested a model in which thethree pathways were allowed to vary across the two immigrantgroups. Such a model is saturated and, therefore, yields a perfectfit. A significant (.05 level) chi-square difference on three degreesof freedom (one for each path) was used as evidence that theunconstrained model fit the data better than the constrained model;hence, generational status operated as a moderator.

To evaluate the direction of the moderation and provide furtherevidence in support of H3 and H4, we first compared the coeffi-cients for each path across first and second generations. We testedfor mediation by estimating and comparing the indirect effects of

Table 1Means (Standard Deviations) for Study Variables and Tests of Differences Between Groups

First generation(n � 125)

Second generation(n � 59) F �2

Public regard 4.66 (1.24) 3.95 (1.04) 8.70�� .05Meritocracy 4.17 (1.04) 3.38 (1.20) 14.51��� .08Ethnic identity 4.25 (1.83) 4.54 (1.56) .87 .01Collective action support 6.16 (1.08) 5.86 (1.22) .24 .00

Note. Age, gender, ethnicity, education, and language of survey were included as covariates in all analyses.�� p � .01. ��� p � .001.

Figure 1. Parameter coefficients and standard errors predicting meritoc-racy. � p � .05. �� p � .01. ��� p � .001. 95 % CI (bootstrapped) Lower ��.38, Upper � �.09. IG � Immigrant generation (0 � 1st generation, 1 �2nd generation), PR � Public regard, M � Meritocracy. Age, education,ethnic group, gender, and language of survey are included as covariates. Amoderated mediation analysis following Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes(2007) was also conducted to test whether ethnic group moderated either ofthe indirect paths. There was no significant interaction of generation andethnic group on public regard or public regard and ethnic group onmeritocracy. Further, the indirect effect of generation on meritocracythrough public regard was significant for both groups (ps � .05).

Table 2Correlations for Study Variables by Immigrant Generation

1 2 3

1. Meritocracy — .03 .18�

2. Ethnic identity �.40�� — �.093. Collective action support �.22† .38�� —

Note. Correlations for the first generation (n � 125) appear above thediagonal. Correlations for the 2nd generation (n � 59) appear below thediagonal.† p � .10. � p � .05. �� p � .01.

175IMMIGRANT GENERATION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION

meritocracy beliefs on collective action support across the groups.Following recommendations by Shrout and Bolger (2002), weutilized bootstrapping methods to evaluate the certainty of theindirect effects with a nonsymmetric 95% confidence interval.Finally, we tested whether the final results held up after includingthe covariates of age, gender, ethnicity, education, and language ofsurvey.

The fully constrained mediation model did not fit the data well(� (3) � 20.53, p � .001, CFI � 0.08; TLI � �0.84, RMSEA �0.25 [0.16; 0.36]). In contrast, the unconstrained model was satu-rated (i.e., with zero degrees of freedom), and the chi-squaredifference between the two models was highly significant (��(3) � 20.53, p � .001). Pathways between meritocracy, ethnicidentity and collective action support operated differently in first-versus second-generation immigrant groups, supporting H3.

Figure 2 summarizes the results for the unconstrained model.Again, in line with H2, meritocracy predicted the level of ethnicidentity in the second generation but not in the first generation.Somewhat unexpectedly, ethnic identity importance predicted col-lective action support for the second but not the first generation.Finally, in support of H4, the direct path from meritocracy beliefsto collective action support was positive and significant in the firstgeneration but not significantly different from zero in the secondgeneration. As a follow-up test, we examined the moderating roleof generation on the relationship between meritocracy beliefs and

collective action support when ethnic identity was removed fromthe model. As expected, this association varied significantly acrossthe two groups. It was positive for first-generation immigrants(b � .18 [.09], p � .05) and negative for second-generationimmigrants (b � �.22 [.12], p � .10).

Table 4 summarizes the results for the indirect effects estimateswith bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. In further support ofH3, the confidence interval around the indirect effect of meritoc-racy on collective action support excluded zero among second-generation immigrants but included zero for first-generation im-migrants. Meritocracy was thus negatively associated withcollective action goals through their negative association withethnic identity for second-generation immigrants only. Addingcovariates to the model did not change the pattern of these results.

Discussion

The present study investigated the relationship between believ-ing in meritocracy, ethnic identity, and support for collectiveaction among two groups of immigrants—first- versus second-generation Latinos—who differ in what they experience as a resultof their ethnic group’s position in the U.S. social hierarchy. Wefirst established that the generations perceived meritocracy todifferent degrees. Compared to first-generation immigrants,second-generation immigrants were less likely to believe thatadvancement in the United States is possible through hard work.The difference between the generations was partially accounted forby differences in their estimates of public regard. Second-generation immigrants perceived that others in the United Statesviewed their group less positively than did those in the firstgeneration. Our findings among Dominican and Mexican immi-grants are consistent with ethnographic observations among WestIndians in the United States. As Waters (1999) wrote, “The firstgeneration tends to believe that, while racism exists in the UnitedStates, it can be overcome or circumvented through hard work . . .The second generation experiences racism and discrimination con-stantly and develops perceptions of the overwhelming influence ofrace on their lives,” (p. 309).

Second, as predicted, meritocracy had divergent links to ethnicidentity and collective action across immigrant generations. In thesecond generation, meritocracy beliefs and ethnic identity werenegatively related. Paralleling results among other native-bornlow-status groups, the rejection of meritocracy, an ideology thatcan justify inequality, was tied to stronger ethnic identification(Deaux et al., 2006; Levin et al., 1998). Extending these results, we

Figure 2. Parameter coefficients and standard errors in the unconstrainedmodel predicting collective action support. � p � .05. �� p � .01. M �Meritocracy, EI � Ethnic identity, CA� Collective action support, 1 � 1stgeneration, 2 � 2nd generation.

Table 3Unstandardized Coefficients (Betas) From Hierarchical MultipleRegression Analyses Examining Moderating Role of Generationin Relationship Between Meritocracy and Ethnic Identity(N � 184)

Block 1 Block 2 Block 3

Age 0.01 0.01 0.01Ethnic group1 .58� .57� 0.48Gender2 0.17 0.19 0.28Education3 0.07 0.05 0.06Language4 .81� .73� .67�

Meritocracy �0.07 0.11Generation5 0.22 4.22�

Meritocracy Generation �.52�

�F 2.19 0.61 4.51�

R2 0.06 0.06 0.09

Note. 1 0 � Dominican, 1 � Mexican. 2 0 � Woman, 1 �Man. 3 0 � Less than high school, 1 � High school, 2 � 2-year college,3 � 4-year college, 4 � Postgraduate. 4 0 � Spanish, 1 � Eng-lish. 5 0 � 1st generation, 1 � 2nd generation.� p � .05. �� p � .01. ��� p � .001.

Table 4Parameter Estimates and 95% Nonsymmetrical (Bootstrapped)Confidence Bounds for the Indirect Effects of MeritocracyBeliefs on Collective Action Goals Through Ethnic IdentityImportance, Among First- and Second-Generation Immigrants(N � 184)

Lower 2.5% Estimate Upper 2.5%

1st Generation �0.046 �0.003 0.0142nd Generation� �0.283 �0.138 �0.038

� Indicates an indirect effects whose 95% confidence bounds does notinclude 0.

176 WILEY, DEAUX, AND HAGELSKAMP

also found that increased ethnic identification served as an indirectlink between meritocracy and collective action for the secondgeneration, although the initial direct relationship between meri-tocracy and collective action support was only marginally signif-icant. Shrout and Bolger (2002) have argued that such indirecteffects indicate a meaningful relationship between variables, es-pecially in the context of relatively small samples. Among the firstgeneration, in contrast, meritocracy and ethnic identity were un-related and thus, no indirect route to collective action support wasobserved. This finding offers new evidence that the link betweenmeritocracy and ethnic identity is influenced by experience andsocialization in the U.S. social hierarchy.

Existing research has shown that believing in meritocracy canmake members of low-status groups more likely to accept inequal-ity (e.g., Major et al., 2002; Major et al., 2007; McCoy & Major,2007). Our study adds to this research, showing that rejectingmeritocracy can make people more likely to support collectiveaction; specifically, doubts about the existence meritocracy canmake people more likely to identify with their ethnic group and tosupport efforts to change its position in society. Thus, the presentfindings extend our understanding of meritocracy from conditionsof social stability to social change as well. Research and theory insystem justification (e.g., Jost & Hunyady, 2002) and social dom-inance (e.g., Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) have focused primarily onthe former, whereas research and theory in the collective action(e.g., Gamson, 1992) and social identity traditions (e.g., Tajfel &Turner, 1979) have focused primarily on the latter. Our resultsanswer the recent call of some scholars to identify processes thatconnect the two (Reicher, 2004).

Our study also shows that being socialized into a new contextcan change one’s perceptions of ideologies that can support exist-ing inequality, at least in part because the perceived status of one’sgroup (i.e., public regard) is different. This insight is consistentwith research from the social dominance perspective showing thatthe lower the perceived status of minority groups, the less theyendorse ideologies that support the existing status hierarchy(Levin, 2004), as well as other research showing that a lack ofperceived respect for one’s ethnic group is associated with lowersupport for social systems (Huo & Molina, 2006). What our focuson immigrant generation adds is evidence that the change inideology is linked to experience within the social hierarchy. In thisway, our research is broadly consistent with the group socializationmodel of ideology (Guimond, 2000; Guimond, Dambrun, Michi-nov, & Duarte, 2003), which argues that one’s (perceived) socialstatus—in our case public regard—influences endorsement of ide-ologies that either enhance or attenuate existing ideologies.

In our discussion of these findings, we have emphasized theconditions and experiences of the second generation, both becausethey have become the focus of much attention within the immi-gration literature (e.g., Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, & Hold-away, 2008) and because they complicate traditional thinkingabout the immigrant experience. An alternative framing couldstress the situation of the first generation. In general, it is thoughtthat people who emigrate are more likely to be high in achieve-ment and power motivations (Boneva & Frieze, 2001); furtherevidence suggests that immigrants are optimistic about their abilityto improve their own lives and the lives of their children (Escobar,2006; Perreira, Harris, & Lee, 2006). Although this initial opti-mism is not always confirmed by subsequent experience, it may

buffer some of its negative consequences (Jasinkaja-Lahti et al., inpress; Perreira et al., 2006). Thus, in our results, first-generationimmigrants’ initial optimism about their ability to succeed in theUnited States may serve to keep perceptions of meritocracy high,even in the face of disadvantage.

The present study suggests that socialization into a new hierar-chy not only changes the level of support for a given ideology, butalso its function. Doubts about the operation of meritocracy werelinked to increased ethnic identity and collective action only forsecond-generation immigrants who had more experience as part ofa group near the bottom of the U.S. social hierarchy and who,perhaps, had more reason to expect better, given their birthrightstatus as U.S. citizens. Such experience of both group devaluationand failure of expectations can, it would appear, qualitativelychange the associations between ideology and identity. Thesefindings are consistent with recent research suggesting that boththe level and function of ideologies that support inequality canchange across contexts (e.g., Jetten & Iyer, 2010; Liu, Huang, &McFedries, 2008). More generally, documentation of processessuch as these may help to explain what have been termed theparadoxes of assimilation and integration (Deaux & Verkuyten, inpress; Rumbaut, 1999), referring to evidence that second-generation immigrants may become more disillusioned with thesociety even as they achieve some success within it. It is alsopossible that second-generation immigrants who do endorse mer-itocracy may have become aware that meritocracy does not onlymean that people with disadvantaged backgrounds can persist andsucceed or “pull themselves up by their bootstraps” against allobstacles through hard work, but that it can also imply that thosewho have not “pulled themselves up” deserve their position (Levyet al., 2005; 2006). To the extent that they accept this implication,strong ethnic identity and support for collective action would beunlikely.

For first-generation immigrants, the direct relationship betweenmeritocracy and collective action was positive, though not partic-ularly strong. One possible explanation for this association is thatmeritocracy offers these new immigrants an index of opportunity.First-generation immigrants’ strong focus on achievement mayattune them primarily to the core definition of meritocracy as abelief that anyone can get ahead in society through hard work,while being less attentive to the implication that members oflow-status groups deserve their position. Thus, first-generationimmigrants do not eschew ethnic identification and collectiveaction goals when they perceive that society is meritocratic. Infact, they are more likely to support collective action under theseconditions. Thus, though first- and second-generation immigrantsin our study support collective action goals to the similar degrees,they seem to do so for different reasons. Additional research isrequired to directly examine the meanings of meritocracy for first-and second-generation immigrants. Ultimately, our design doesnot allow us to tease apart the importance of each generation’sexperiences, motives, and beliefs as they contribute to overalldifferences between the generations. We suspect that both gener-ations are relevant to the equation and believe that this is anextremely promising avenue for future research.

A second point of divergence between first and second gener-ations is the lack of relationship between ethnic identity andcollective action among first-generation immigrants. One possibleexplanation follows from the logic of our theory and results. We

177IMMIGRANT GENERATION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION

have suggested that, among the second generation, identities asDominican and Mexican may refer more to beliefs and experiencesin the U.S. hierarchy than they do for the first generation. Thus, if,as we have shown, ethnic identity is more closely tied to beliefsabout the U.S. social hierarchy (though in a negative direction)among members of the second generation, who grew up in thiscontext, than it is for the first generation, who established theirethnic identity elsewhere, then it stands to reason that ethnicidentity would also be more closely related to support for behav-iors aimed at changing the group’s position in the social hierarchyin the second generation. Although this explanation is admittedlypost hoc, it warrants further research.

One important limitation of our research is that we employed acorrelational design. Although the causal sequence that we haveproposed is consistent with both research on permeability andidentity in social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and theideological asymmetry hypothesis (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), ouraccount would be strengthened by an experimental test. One al-ternative explanation would be that ethnic identity influences theendorsement of both meritocracy and collective action support.

Future research might also consider whether our results gener-alize to other immigrant groups. We expect that our findings wouldgeneralize only to groups that occupy relatively low-status posi-tions in the ethnic hierarchy. Immigrant groups that occupy higherpositions in the social hierarchy and benefit from it are unlikely toperceive low public regard or to reject meritocracy in either thefirst or second generation. Consistent with this supposition, wehave observed a similar pattern of generational differences inethnic identification (Wiley et al., 2008) and ideology and collec-tive action (Deaux et al., 2006) among first- and second-generationBlack and Latino immigrants, both of whom occupy low-statuspositions and face a high degree of race-based discrimination inthe United States; in contrast, generation had little effect amongAsian/Pacific Islander immigrants (Wiley et al., 2008), who oc-cupy higher-status positions and for whom support for inequalitymay not be incompatible with their own position.

With regard to ethnic group differences, we found that Mexicanand Dominican groups differed only in their support for meritoc-racy. Mexican immigrants were slightly less likely to supportmeritocracy than Dominican immigrants. Although any explana-tion for this finding is clearly post hoc, it may be attributable to thelonger history of Dominicans in the New York area. Some mem-bers of the Dominican community may have had more opportunityto accrue some degree of social capital, and thus, would provide alarger number of exemplars suggesting that meritocracy mightwork. For the newly arrived, generally poor Mexican population,such examples are probably quite infrequent. Although level ofmeritocracy beliefs differed, it is important theoretically to notethat the groups did not differ significantly with respect to themediating relationship of immigrant generation on meritocracy viapublic regard. Our sample size did not permit ethnic group com-parisons in analyses of meritocracy, ethnic identity, and collectiveaction, although we note that the effects held when includingethnic group as a covariate.

Implications and Future Directions

This study aimed to demonstrate that immigrant generationinfluences Latinos’ endorsement of meritocracy and its relation-

ship to ethnic identity and collective action. Generation is consid-ered to be an index of experience in and socialization to the U.S.based-status hierarchy. A promising direction for future researchwould be to understand the specific processes by which socializa-tion in the United States influences immigrants’ perceptions ofmeritocracy and public regard. Research with African Americanshas shown that public regard is influenced by personal experienceswith discrimination (Seaton, Yip, & Sellers, 2009) as well asparental socialization (Rivas-Drake, 2011; Rivas-Drake, Hughes,& Way, 2009). African Americans, who face more discriminationand who are prepared to deal with it at a young age by theirparents, are more likely to report low public regard. Some of thiswork has shown that the children of Dominican immigrants arealso socialized to deal with discrimination (Hughes, 2003). Pre-sumably their parents, born in the Dominican Republic, did notreceive similar messages. Given that first- and second-generationLatino immigrants do not tend to report different levels of group-based discrimination (Deaux et al., 2006; Wiley et al., 2008),socialization of coping strategies may be a key factor in differ-ences in public regard. We would add that research on socializa-tion should not focus on parents alone. A long history of researchin social psychology has pointed to the importance of groupsocialization more generally (Newcomb, 1943).

Not only should the important role of public regard be recog-nized as we seek to understand the experiences of immigrants, butit also serves as a possible point of entry for intervention programs.Although good intentions cannot necessarily temper the negativeattitudes that are often expressed toward immigrants, policies canbe developed that will affect the experiences that immigrants haveand the subsequent beliefs that they form about their host com-munities. What are often called “welcoming community” initia-tives, for example, can create situations in which immigrantsexperience positive regard from native-born residents and thus,develop a more optimistic assessment of their own place in thatcommunity. Yet, as our results suggest, the welcoming attitudeneeds to extend to those born in the United States, whose experi-ence seems to be most likely to counter the meritocratic Americandream.

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180 WILEY, DEAUX, AND HAGELSKAMP