Biases in the Perception of Barack Obama's Skin Tone

Running head: Biases in the Perception of Barack Obama’s Skin

Tone 1

Biases in the Perception of Barack Obama’s Skin Tone

Markus Kemmelmeier H. Lyssette Chavez

University of Nevada, Reno

in press, Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy

Authors’ note:

We are indebted to Kevin Lanning for his editorial guidance as well as three anonymous reviewers whose insights and criticism helped to improve this article. We gratefully acknowledge the counsel of Michael Webster who inspired the Study 2 paradigm.

Corresponding author:

Markus KemmelmeierInterdisciplinary Ph.D. Program in Social PsychologyMail Stop 300University of Nevada,


Reno, Nevada [email protected](775) 784-1287

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mailto:[email protected]


Abstract

White Americans higher in prejudice were less likely to vote for

Barack Obama than other Americans. Recent research also

demonstrated that supporters and opponents of Mr. Obama engaged

in skin tone biases, i.e. they perceive Mr. Obama’s skin tone as

lighter or darker in line with more positive or negative views of

him. Across two studies we hypothesized that skin tone biases

occur as a function of two independent sources: racial prejudice,

which is always related to skin tone bias, and political

partisanship, which is related to skin tone bias primarily during

elections. Study 1 assessed perceptions of Mr. Obama’s skin tone

shortly before and after the 2008 Presidential election, and

shortly after the first inauguration. Study 2 assessed

perceptions in the middle of his first term, immediately prior to

the 2012 Presidential election, and one year into his second term

in office. Consistent with our hypothesis, we found that partisan

skin tone bias was limited to the election period, whereas

prejudice-based skin tone biases occurred independent from any

election. (170 words)

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KEY WORDS: skin tone; racial bias; social perception; Barack

Obama; partisanship

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With the election of Barack Obama as 44th President of the

United States a racial barrier fell: For the first time, an

African American and a biracial individual had been elected to

the highest office in the land.1 However, as recent research

demonstrates, Mr. Obama’s election did not signify an end of

racial bias with implicit and explicit racism being a major

predictor as to whether voters supported Mr. Obama or not

(Greenwald et al., 2009; Knowles, Lowery, Schaumberg, 2010; Payne

et al., 2010; Piston, 2010). The focus of this paper is on a

specific aspect of race-related bias, namely, the recently

established tendency of voters to perceive Obama’s skin tone in a

biased fashion (Caruso, Mead & Balcetis, 2009). We argue that

voters negatively disposed toward the election of Obama perceived

him as darker-skinned than those who supported him. However, we

hypothesize that skin tone biases have two separate sources: a

prejudice-based bias and a partisanship-based bias, which vary in

1 Barack Obama is the son of a White American mother and an African father, and this mixed-race parentage is likely responsible for his middling skin tone, which is the focus of the present research. However, Mr. Obama tends to identify himself as African American, and his race tends to be categorized by the majority of the U.S. population in the same way. Therefore, this article will refer to him as African American.

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how context-dependent they are.

Skin Tone and Skin Tone Bias

In the U.S. and many other places, darker skin tone is

linked to lower social status even when background

characteristics are kept constant (e.g., Hunter, 2007; Smith-

McLallen, Johnson, Dovidio & Pearson, 2006; Uhlmann et al.,

2002). Among African Americans, darker skin tone is related to

lower educational attainment, occupational prestige, and family

and personal income compared to lighter skin tone (e.g., Keith &

Herring, 1991; Wade, Romano & Blue, 2004). Research shows that

both Whites and African Americans still associate different

stereotypes with African Americans based on skin tone (Dixon &

Maddox, 2005; Maddox & Gray, 2002). Specifically, light-skinned

African Americans are more likely to be described as educated,

intelligent, and wealthy, whereas dark-skinned African Americans

are associated with more negative characteristics and traits such

as poor, unattractive, uneducated, and aggressive (Maddox & Gray,

2002; see also Hagiwara, Kashy & Cesario, 2012; Pauker et al.,

2009 for related findings). And in the legal system, even when

controlling for seriousness of crimes committed and prior

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criminal history, dark-skinned defendants are more likely to be

given harsher sentences than light-skinned defendants (e.g.,

Blair, Judd, & Chapleau, 2004; Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-Vaughns

& Johnson, 2006). At the same time, skin tone seems to be in the

eye of the beholder especially when individuals rely on prior

knowledge and stereotypes when judging the color of a target. For

example, Maclin and Malpass (2001) found that ambiguous-race

faces with prototypical African American hairstyles were

perceived as having a darker complexion than identical faces with

prototypical Hispanic hairstyles. That is, the perception of skin

tone may be another case where top-down processing influences

color perception, a phenomenon also demonstrated for non-social

stimuli (e.g., Mitterer & de Ruiter, 2008; Voss, Rothermund &

Brandtstädter, 2008).

Prejudice-based Skin Tone Biases

In light of the extant social-psychological literature on

racial biases, we argue that the perception of skin tone is in

part a reflection of individual levels of racial attitudes. It

has been established that individuals are often perceived based

on group membership, with the impact of a perceiver’s

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expectations increasing with greater ambiguity (e.g., Darley &

Gross, 1983; Eberhardt, Dasgupta & Banaszynski, 2003). Thus,

perceptions of skin tone may reflect prejudice. Specifically,

individuals who are more suspicious of or hostile toward African

Americans should perceive the same skin color to be darker, thus

assimilating their perception to their dark-skinned prototype,

even when skin tone is not the only determinant of racial

prototypicality (e.g., Strom et al., 2012). Conversely,

individuals with more favorable attitudes should perceive the

same skin color to be lighter. Such a racial bias in color

perception should be particularly strong in instances when a

person has a “middling” skin tone, i.e. can neither be

characterized as light or dark, and does not lend itself to easy

classification as Black or White.

Consistent with this reasoning, Caruso et al. (2009) treated

biases in skin tone perception as a type of implicit prejudice.

The authors found a correlation between skin tone perception and

the Black-White IAT for conservative, but not for liberal

participants. Moreover, they did not find any evidence that their

measure of explicit prejudice was associated with skin tone

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biases. This finding is potentially surprising, because explicit

and implicit racism tend to be correlated, even when their

relationship varies in strength (e.g., Nosek, 2007). It is not

unusual for explicit and implicit prejudice to have different

correlates (e.g., Dovidio, Kawakami & Gaertner, 2002). However,

Caruso et al. (2009) did not obtain any evidence for a

relationship between voting preference for Mr. Obama and any type

of racial prejudice, even though these types of effects are well

documented (e.g., Greenwald et al., 2009; Knowles et al., 2010;

Payne et al., 2010; Piston, 2010). This raises the question

whether especially Caruso et al.’s measure of explicit prejudice,

Brigham’s (1993) Attitudes toward Blacks scale, was well-suited,

because its questions about blatantly racist interpersonal

behaviors might have aroused self-presentational concerns.

Lastly, the relatively small sample size (n = 44) of Caruso et

al.’s (2009) Study 3 leaves it open as to how reproducible the

authors’ null finding is.

We are aware of only one other study that examined the link

between racial attitudes and perception of skin tone. Levin and

Banaji (2006, Study 1) examined the correlation between a

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thermometer rating of feelings toward African Americans and the

possible biases in recognition memory for racially mixed faces.

These authors did not find any relationship between racial

attitudes and participants’ lightness judgments of White or

African American faces. Because prejudice was not a primary

concern in this study, and because the reliability of their

racial attitudes measure was unknown, the present research re-

examines this issue. We hypothesized that, on average,

individuals high in explicit prejudice would perceive African

Americans to be more dark-skinned than individuals with more

favorable racial attitudes. And because Mr. Obama is African

American and of middling skin tone, we predicted that negative

racial attitudes are associated with perceiving his skin tone as

darker than positive racial attitudes.

Partisan Skin Tone Biases

Whereas skin tone biases may indeed reflect racial

prejudice, they might also be fueled by other, analytically

distinct biases. Specifically, we argue that political partisans

may engage in motivated skin tone biases. That is, in the heat of

competition, such as the U.S. Presidential election, partisans’

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perceptions of each other or of each other’s preferred candidates

might become biased, with negative aspects of the political

opponent being accentuated (e.g., Jackson, 2002; Kemmelmeier &

Winter, 2000; Robinson, Keltner, Ward & Ross, 1995). In the

context of the U.S., one side (e.g., Republicans) may rely on a

range of dimensions to denigrate the opposing side (e.g.,

Democrats). As demonstrated by Caruso et al. (2009), partisan

biases did become evident in the perception of Obama’s skin tone.

In two studies conducted prior to the 2008 Presidential election,

these authors demonstrated that political conservatives judged an

image of Obama showing him with a darker skin tone to be more

representative of the candidate compared to an image showing him

with a lighter skin tone. They further demonstrated that these

judgments correlated with participants’ intent (Study 2) or

actual vote (Study 3) for Obama.

We argue, however, that there are marked differences between

prejudice-based and partisan skin tone biases. Though both are

based on the same cultural racism, they differ in the

applicability of one’s underlying attitudes or dispositions to

the issue of race. With Barack Obama being African American,

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perceivers’ attitudes toward African Americans are always

applicable to the perception of Mr. Obama. That is, unless

perceivers are able to ignore Mr. Obama’s racial heritage, racial

prejudices should always shape perceptions of his skin tone. In

contrast, partisan biases may or may not result in biased racial

perceptions. With one’s race and political views being

conceptually unrelated, whether racial biases occur or not may be

a function of political intergroup conflict. We hold that, in

times of comparatively low political conflict, i.e. during

periods of comparatively low voter involvement (e.g., between

Presidential elections), and with racial attitudes kept constant,

there is no reason for White Republicans to consider an African

American or a biracial candidate to be more or less dark-skinned

than White Democrats. This, however, might be very different in

the heat of political battle, when any means might be acceptable

to denigrate one’s opponent. In other words, partisan conflict,

such as elections, might activate motivated biases. Partisans

might capitalize on the latent association between darker skin

tone and lower status to see their opponents in an unfavorable

light. Building on research on the motivated nature of social

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perception (e.g., Kunda, 1990), recent research has documented

motivated biases specifically with regard to visual perception

(e.g., Balcetis & Dunning, 2006; Cole & Balcetis, 2011; Voss et

al., 2008). To the extent that skin color is a dimension on which

status is conveyed, White perceivers who oppose Mr. Obama but

support his rival for the presidency should be particularly

inclined to perceive his skin tone to be darker. However, this

motivation to denigrate Mr. Obama should be mitigated when there

is no acute political conflict, e.g. when the election has been

decided and when there is not doubt that Mr. Obama is firmly

established in office, or when many voters may not be engaged

enough to choose a side. The resulting prediction is that the

kind of skin tone biases observed by Caruso et al. (2009) should

be unique to election periods, when partisans are highly

motivated to support their own candidate and denigrate the

opponent, but should diminish outside or after an election.

The Present Studies

In two studies comprising a total of five samples we

examined skin tone biases associated with Mr. Obama and their

association with racial attitudes and partisanship. In Study 1 we

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assessed White college students’ perceptions of Mr. Obama’s skin

tone along with their political and racial views shortly before

the 2008 Presidential elections, shortly after the elections, and

shortly after Obama’s first inauguration in 2009. Using a

different paradigm, Study 2 examined perceptions of Mr. Obama’s

skin tone in fall of 2010, shortly before the 2012 Presidential

elections, and in 2013, one year after the elections. In both

studies participants saw different images of Mr. Obama which had

been digitally altered to show him with lighter or darker skin

tones. Participants’ selection of lighter or darker skin tones

was then predicted based on measures of racial attitudes and

partisan leanings.

Study 1

Method

Participants. This study included three White-only samples,

all of voting age. The decision to exclusively focus on Whites

was made because in 2008 there were sufficiently large numbers of

White students who supported either Mr. Obama or Mr. McCain for

President. Non-white overwhelmingly supported Barack Obama for

President; thus, their inclusion would have introduced a

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confound. The pre-election sample of 123 undergraduates (55% female;

mean age = 21.21 years), recruited from five college classes,

completed materials approximately one week before the 2008

Presidential election. The post-election sample of 74 undergraduates

(65% females; mean age = 21.41 years), obtained from the same

classes, participated between two to four weeks after the

election with many students having also participated in the pre-

election study.2 The post-inauguration sample of 104 undergraduates

(53% female; mean age = 21.99 years), recruited from similar

classes, participated during the following semester four to five

weeks following the presidential inauguration. Samples did not

differ with regard to demographic characteristics or means of

assessed variables. The pre-election sample included 101 students

who said that they were registered to vote with 55 intending to

vote for Mr. Obama and 46 intending to vote for Mr. McCain. The

post-election samples included 47 students who reported having voted

for Mr. Obama and 20 who said they voted for Mr. McCain, and in

2 Forty post-election participants (52.7%) indicated having previously participated in the pre-election sample, but 34 (45.9%) had not (one person did not recall, 1.4%). A comparison of participants who had or who had not participated already prior to the election revealed no reliable differences, nor were experimental effects qualified by this variable. Because this suggested that any carryover effects were minimal, the post-election sample was treated as independent for the purpose of the present analysis.

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the post-inauguration sample the corresponding numbers were 47 and

29, respectively.

Materials. We obtained a photograph of Barack Obama in the

public domain (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Obama.jpg). The

image was cropped such that Mr. Obama’s face occupied roughly 85%

of the entire image. Via Adobe Photoshop™ we generated different

versions of the image by lightening or darkening Mr. Obama’s skin

tone by adjusting input levels from 1 downward and upwards in

steps of 0.1. We produced five darker versions of the picture

(level 0.5 to 0.9) and five lighter versions (level 1.1 to 1.5)

resulting in a total of 11 versions including the original

(lightness levels numbered 1 through 11, with 6 being the

original image).

Each participant saw nine prints of the 11 image versions

(each 2.25” x 3.125”), arranged in a 3 x 3 matrix. Participants

received either the “dark spectrum” (lightness levels 1 to 9) or

the “light spectrum” (lightness levels 3 to 11). Half of

participants saw the darkest image of the spectrum in the upper

left corner of the matrix and the lightest one in the lower right

corner. For the remaining half, this order was reversed such that

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the lightest image within the spectrum was shown in the upper

left corner of the matrix (see Figure 1). Note that this approach

sought to avoid any order effects through counterbalancing. Also,

any potential problems resulting from participants exhibiting a

tendency toward selecting the center image were avoided because

the original image (lightness level 6) was never shown in the

center of the matrix.

Procedure. At all three points in time, participants

learned that researchers were interested in their perceptions of

Barack Obama. Participants received a survey which included the 3

x 3 picture matrix of images, and selected which image they

believed to portray the “real Obama.” Subsequently, participants

indicated for which candidate they planned to vote (pre-election) or

did vote for (post-election, post-inauguration) in the 2008 Presidential

election.

Next, participants responded to the following statements: “I

consider myself a Barack Obama supporter,” “Barack Obama is the

right choice for America,” “is linked to terrorism and is a

danger to this country” (reversed), and “is too liberal for me”

(reversed). They also rated how likeable they considered Obama to

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be. These items were combined into an Obama-support index (pre-

election = .85, post-election = .90, post-inauguration = .89). All

items used seven-point Likert response scales. A question

inquiring if participants had seen Mr. Obama at a live rally did

not yield any results and is not reported further.

Participants also completed the eight-item symbolic racism

scale (Henry & Sears, 2002), a modern and subtle type of racism,

which encompasses four general themes: (a) the notion that Blacks

receive more than they deserve; (b) Blacks are unwilling to work

hard; (c) resentment about Blacks pushing for greater equality,

and (d) the notion that racial discrimination is no longer an

obstacle (McConahay & Hough, 1976). Symbolic racism has been

shown to predict Whites’ political attitudes and candidate

preference generally (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears, Van Laar,

Carrillo, & Kosterman, 1997) and preference for Mr. Obama

specifically (Lyberger & Monteith, 2011, Experiment 1).

In addition, participants used seven-point Likert-type

scales to rate Mr. Obama concerning his likability, competence,

physical attractiveness, how typically African American and how

typically European American he looked, whether he was Muslim, and

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his agreement or disagreement with his policies concerning health

care, Iraq, and taxes. Finally, basic demographic questions were

included such as age, gender, and race/ethnicity.

Results

Participants’ choice of letters from the photo matrix was

recoded such that the image with the darkest skin tone received a

1 and the image with the lightest skin tone received an 11. Given

our two different spectrum conditions, for the dark spectrum

condition the codes ranged from 1 to 9, and in the light spectrum

condition from 3 to 11. The original image always received a code

of 6. The resulting score was submitted to a 2 (spectrum) x 2

(order) general linear model.

To test our contention that skin tone biases related to

partisanship and skin tone biases related to racial attitudes are

independent, we included both candidate preference (voting for

Barack Obama vs. John McCain) and symbolic racism as additional

predictors in the model. We did so in part because, at least

shortly before and after the election, there was a substantial

correlation between symbolic racism and candidate preference, pre-

election r(99) = .47, p < .001, post-election r(66) = .50, p < .001, but

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post-inauguration r(72) = .14, p = .25 (see also Lyberger & Monteith,

2011). (Correlations between racism and conservatism were, pre-

election r(118) = .48, p < .001, post-election r(73) = .49, p < .001,

but post-inauguration r(99) = .05, p = .60.) Thus, our model included

spectrum, order and candidate preference as categorical

predictors, and symbolic racism as continuous predictor. We

included all main effects and all interactions that did not

involve both candidate preference and symbolic racism, allowing

us to examine if the latter two variables independently predicted

perception of skin tone. This analysis included only participants

who planned to vote or had voted for either Barack Obama or John

McCain. Each Study 1 samples was analyzed separately.3

Selection of images. In all three samples we found a main effect

of spectrum, pre-election F(1, 87) = 19.00, p < .001, p2 = .18, post-

3 The goal of our analyses was to separate the statistical effect of racial attitudes and political partisanship, which necessitated both types of variables to be included in the present analyses. Our original plan was to analyze differences between the three samples as part of one general linear model. Such models make the implicit assumption that correlations between predictors are constant across all cells of the design. Because we observed considerable variation in the correlation between candidate preference and symbolic racism across our three Study 1 samples, each sample was analyzed separately. Variation in the correlations between predictors was also part of the reason why interactions involving both candidate preference and symbolic racism were not included in the models reported here. However, if the data were analyzed using a general linear model that included all possible interaction terms, none of the terms involving both candidate preference and symbolic racism were significant, and all results were confirmed.

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election F(1, 54) = 11.38, p < .001, p2 = .17, post-inauguration F(1,

60) = 6.44, p = .014, p2 = .10. On average, participants in the

darker spectrum condition picked an image showing a darker skin

tone than those in the lighter spectrum condition (pre-election M =

3.88, SD = 1.19 vs. M = 5.16, SD = 1.58; post-election M = 3.86, SD

= 1.40 vs. M = 5.62, SD = 1.74; post-inauguration M = 4.03, SD =

1.08 vs. M = 5.44, SD = 1.76). While not significant in the

other samples, post-election participants selected a darker skin tone

when the darkest image was shown in the upper left corner of the

matrix compared to the lower right corner (M = 4.14, SD = 1.36

vs. M = 5.24, SD = 1.92), F(1, 54) = 4.40, p = .041, p2 = .08.

Overall, the fact that participants’ image selections varied with

presentation context suggests that participants did not possess a

very firm memory of Mr. Obama’s skin tone. At the same time it is

difficult to ascertain to what extent participants’ selections of

images should be interpreted as a reflection of their accuracy in

recalling the correct skin tone. This difficulty stems from the

fact that the overwhelming majority of participants must be

assumed to have only second-hand knowledge of Mr. Obama’s skin

tone. When selecting an image, they had to rely on their memories

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of various media representations, which may have portrayed Mr.

Obama as more or less dark-skinned (Kemmelmeier, Welch, Erhart &

Chavez, 2013). Moreover, although made publicly available by then

Senator Obama, we cannot verify how accurately the original image

used in the present research, let alone our prints of it, portray

Mr. Obama’s skin tone. From this perspective it is not surprising

that only a minority of participants in each sample selected the

original image (pre-election 8.9%, post-election 10.8%, post-inauguration

12.7%), with participants in every sample choosing on average

images that were lighter than the original (M = 4.69, 4.70, and

4.64, respectively). But although the objective accuracy of a

particular selection cannot be assessed, variability in the

selection of images of different lightness is still diagnostic of

motivated perceptual biases.

Is perception of Mr. Obama’s skin tone moderated by symbolic racism? Our

pre-election data revealed a main effect for symbolic racism, F(1,

87) = 4.05, p = .047, p2 = .04, showing that higher levels of

racism were associated with the selection of an image of Mr.

Obama with a darker skin tone, b = -.51. No such effect was

present in the post-election data, F < 1. (There was some indication

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for the predicted effect for racism when candidate preference was

not included in the model, F(1, 65) = 3.46, p = .067, p2 = .05.)

However, at post-inauguration there was again a main effect for

symbolic racism, F(1, 60) = 5.06, p = .028, p2 = .08, which was

qualified by a marginally significant symbolic racism x order

interaction, F(1, 60) = 3.80, p = .056, p2 = .06. When

respondents encountered the image with the darkest skin tone

first, higher scores in symbolic racism predicted selecting a

darker skin tone, b = -.38, se = .13, p = .003; such an effect was

absent when respondents first encountered the image with the

lightest skin tone, b = -.05, se = .08, p = .56. These results

show that, with the exception of right after the election,

symbolic racism did have at least some impact on perception of

Mr. Obama’s skin tone.

Is perception of skin tone moderated by voting for Barack Obama? Our

pre-election data revealed that students who intended to vote for

Barack Obama viewed him as more light-skinned than prospective

John McCain voters (M = 4.96, SD = 1.69, n = 55 vs. M = 4.18, SD

= 1.26, n = 44), F(1, 87) = 4.98, p = .028, p2 = .05. By

contrast, similar analyses at post-election and post-inauguration did

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not show any effect involving candidate, all Fs < 1.55, ps > .21,

p2 < .03. Thus, our data provided a partial conceptual

replication of Caruso et al. (2009) showing that McCain voters

considered Barack Obama more dark-skinned than Obama voters.

Importantly, this effect occurred only prior the 2008

Presidential election, but was absent once the election was

decided.

Is perception of skin tone moderated by conservatism? Next, we

replaced the categorical candidate preference variable of the

last model with a continuous predictor of self-described

conservatism. Though candidate preference and conservatism were

always substantially correlated (all three samples r > .72), this

analysis allowed us to include participants who did not intend to

vote or had not voted, that is, participants who were less

motivated to denigrate any political candidate who was not to

their liking. In the pre-election sample (n = 118), we did not find

any effect involving conservatism, all F(1, 106) < 1.93, p > .16,

p2 < .02, nor was there an effect in the post-election data, F(1,

62) < 1.56, p > .21, p2 < .025, nor in the post-inauguration data,

F(1, 87) < 1.71, p > .19, p2 < .02. Thus, the inclusion of

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participants who were less engaged in the election as well as the

use of a predictor variable that, unlike candidate preference,

was only indirectly related to partisan support or opposition to

Mr. Obama did not generate any evidence of partisan skin tone

biases, neither before or after the 2008 Presidential election.

Changes over time

Our argument is that, in contrast to prejudice-based skin

tone bias, partisan skin tone bias is only temporarily activated

in the “heat of the battle” when it serves the observers’

motivation to denigrate the political opponent. However, as soon

as the conflict is mitigated or the election is decided, the

partisan skin tone bias should wane. This implies that, over

time, opponents of Barack Obama (McCain supporters) should have

changed their perception of Barack Obama’s skin tone. If they

were motivated to view Mr. Obama as particularly dark-skinned

prior to the election, they should perceive his skin tone as

lighter after the election. A similar trend is not necessarily

expected for supporters of Mr. Obama. It is certainly conceivable

that some of Mr. Obama’s White supporters perceived lighter skin

to be linked to higher status and thus may have perceived him to

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be lighter-skinned during the turmoil of the election than

afterwards. However, for many Whites Mr. Obama’s candidacy and

subsequent election win served as a symbol of the progress made

in U.S. race relations. We reasoned that, if Whites were proud

that even a Black man would be able to get elected to the highest

office in the land, a biased perception of Mr. Obama’s skin tone,

which would minimize his Blackness, is unlikely.

To examine changes over time we used a general linear model

in which we included candidate preference, time (pre-election, post-

election, post-inauguration), as well as spectrum and order as

factors, while controlling for participant gender and age. This

analysis showed a candidate preference by time interaction, F(1,

214) = 3.34, p = .039, p2 = .03. Symbolic racism was not

included in this model to avoid problems associated with the

starkly varying correlation between candidate preference and

symbolic racism over time (see 3). As summarized in Figure 2

there was no reliable change in the overall skin tone perceptions

of Obama supporters at the three points in time. However, there

was a change for McCain supporters: Whereas they perceived Barack

Obama’s skin tone as significantly darker prior to the election,

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following the 2008 election their skin tone ratings were

indistinguishable from those of Obama supporters. A planned

comparison contrasting McCain supporters’ pre-election means with

their post-election and post-inauguration data means was

significant, p = .019, whereas the corresponding contrast for

Obama supporters was not reliable, p = .19.

Additional ratings of Mr. Obama and his policies

A series of 2 (candidate preference) x 3 (sample) analyses

of variance showed, as expected, that even when levels of

symbolic racism were controlled supporters of Mr. Obama

considered him to be more likeable, attractive, competent, were

less likely to agree that he was Muslim, and were also more

favorable toward his policies concerning health care, Iraq, and

taxes than supporters of Mr. McCain, all F(1, 226) > 31.31, p

< .001, p2 > .12. Interaction effects suggested that opponents

of Mr. Obama were slightly more supportive and considered him

slightly more competent once he was inaugurated, all F(2, 226) >

2.48, p < .09, p2 > .022; though perceptions of how likeable,

attractive and whether he was Muslim did not vary over time, F(2,

226) < 1.48, p > .22, p2 < .014 . Notable, none of these

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evaluations of Mr. Obama and his policies followed the pattern

obtained for the lighter or darker selection of images of Mr.

Obama.

Nevertheless, it is conceivable that the above reported skin

tone effects might be due to varying evaluations of Mr. Obama,

for instance, his perceived attractiveness. Attractiveness was

correlated with preference for Mr. Obama, pre-election r(99) = -.43,

post-election r(67) = -.41, and post-inauguration r(72) = -.46, all p

< .001, though not with selecting a lighter image of Mr. Obama,

pre-election r(99) = -.08, post-election r(67) = -.05, post-inauguration

r(72) = .08, all p > .38. And when main and interaction effects

of attractiveness were controlled, the findings reported above

concerning the effect of partisanship on skin tone base were

confirmed.

Similarly, changing perceptions of Mr. Obama’s skin tone

might reflect changes in his perceived typicality as an African

American. Additional ANOVAs showed that supporters of Mr. Obama

thought that he looked more typically African American than did

McCain supporters (M = 4.56, SD = 1.00 vs. M = 4.09, SD = 1.29),

all F(1, 226) = 10.20, p = .002, p2 = .043, but Obama supporters

28


also considered him to be more typical of European Americans (M

= 3.26, SD = 1.17 vs. M = 2.83, SD = 1.31), all F(1, 226) =

5.22, p = .023, p2 = .023. Differences in typicality did not

vary across the three samples, both interactions F < 1. Thus,

changes in typicality cannot account for the changing effects of

partisanship on skin tone bias.

Discussion

Overall, Study 1 replicated the partisan biases in the

perception of skin tone previously demonstrated by Caruso et al.

(2009). However, this study statistically separated partisan skin

tone biases and prejudice-based skin tone biases, documenting

independent effects. Whereas we found at least some evidence

across all three points in time that high-prejudice individuals

were more likely to view Barack Obama as dark skinned, similar

biases associated with political preferences were confined to the

period prior to the election, when also Caruso et al.’s (2009)

studies were conducted. This pattern is consistent with the

notion that partisan biases in the perception of skin tone are

activated as a function of political intergroup conflict. When,

as in the case of the U.S. presidential elections, supporters of

29


the Democratic Party and the Republican Party are arguing over

and campaigning for the next president, partisans are motivated

to perceive the other party’s candidate in less favorable ways.

For this purpose, we argue, they distorted the perception of

Barack Obama’s skin tone, a conceptually unrelated status

dimension. This type of skin tone bias might be characterized as

opportunistic bias in the service of one’s partisan goals, which

is distinct from a skin tone bias based on latent racial

prejudice.

Study 2

The goal of the second study was to examine partisan and

prejudice-based skin tone biases using a different experimental

paradigm. Whereas Study 1 relied on the simultaneous presentation

of different images of Barack Obama, research examining facial

characteristics tends to prefer the sequential presentation of

stimuli (e.g., Rhodes, Jeffery, Watson, Clifford, & Nakayama,

2003; Webster & Maclin, 1999). This makes direct comparisons

between different “versions” of Barack Obama impossible, but

forces participants to make a Yes/No decision for every

individual image.

30


Similar to Study 1, Study 2 was conducted at three different

points in time: in fall of 2010 during Barack Obama’s second year

in office; in late October 2012, exactly one week prior to the

Presidential election; and in early November 2013, one year

following the election. Our hypothesis concerning partisan skin

tone biases leads us to expect primarily latent prejudice-based

bias rather than partisan bias in fall of 2010 and 2013. However,

following Study 1, another Presidential election should arouse

very strong partisan feelings to have Mr. Obama’s political

opponents engage in a skin tone bias that are independent from

their racial attitudes.

Method

Participants. The present research included three White-only

samples. The 2010 mid-term sample consisted of 89 undergraduates

(85% female; mean age = 23.6 years), recruited from six different

college classes in October and November of 2010. The 2012 pre-

election sample consisted of 44 undergraduates (66% females; mean

age = 19.1 years), obtained from one large college class, in

which the present research was conducted as an in-class exercise,

whose results were subsequently discussed in class. The 2013

31


post-election sample also consisted of 44 undergraduates (61%

females; mean age = 19.2 years) and was conducted as an in-class

exercise in the very same room using the same equipment as the

2012 pre-election sample. As in Study 1, the samples did not vary

systematically in terms of gender, symbolic racism and

conservatism, though the 2010 sample was significantly older than

the two subsequent samples. Note that in the 2010 sample 56

undergraduates reported having participated in the 2008 election

with 38 having voted for Mr. Obama and 18 having voted for Mr.

McCain. In the 2012 sample 23 undergraduates said that they were

registered to vote with 8 intending to vote for Mr. Obama and 15

for Mr. Romney. And in the 2013 sample 17 undergraduates reported

having participated in the 2012 election with 7 having voting for

Mr. Obama and 10 having voted for Mr. Romney.

Procedure. Using the images of Barack Obama generated in

Study 1, we generated a timed PowerPoint presentation in which

all 11 versions of the image of Mr. Obama were presented to

participants a total of four times increase the reliability of

our findings. In the 2010 sample, roughly half of our

participants saw the images in the order from lightest to darkest

32


for four times (lightness levels 1 through 11), whereas the other

half saw them in the order from darkest to lightest (levels 11

through 1) a total of four times. The study was conducted in a

classroom setting such that each member of the class saw the same

version of the PowerPoint presentation.4 Because presentation

order did not have any influence on focal results (see also

below), the 2012 and the 2013 samples only used the lighter-to-

darker presentation order.

The presentation began with general instructions informing

participants that they would see a series of images of Mr. Obama

on screen, and that they would be asked for each individual image

whether the image represented Mr. Obama as they remembered him.

Participants received a response sheet on which they were asked

to mark their response. It was explained that the task would be

relatively fast-paced, but that participants should be as

4 For the 2010 mid-term sample we attempted to manipulate participants’ sense of partisan conflict prior to the skin tone perception task. Half of the participants (participants in three of the six classrooms) were asked to writeabout Mr. Obama’s health care policy, a high-conflict topic during the first half of Mr. Obama’s first term, and half (participants in the other three classrooms) were asked to write about Mr. Obama’s educational policies, a low conflict policy. However, only slightly more than 53% of participants in the health care condition, and only 26% in the education policy condition said that they knew enough to provide an informed opinion. Because conflict priminghad no influence on the kinds of images that participants selected of Mr. Obama it is not reported further.

33


accurate as possible. Following two practice trials (which showed

the darkest and lightest image of Mr. Obama), each image was

preceded by the number 1 through 44, corresponding to the number

of the trial, which remained on screen for two seconds. This was

followed by the presentation of an image of Mr. Obama for three

seconds, which immediately was followed by the question “Does

this image represent the REAL Barack Obama?” During the three

seconds that this question remained on-screen, participants

checked a YES or a NO on the response sheet. Note that

participants were given the task to correctly identify Mr. Obama,

but never explicitly told to focus on skin tone. Thus, the

repeated presentation of different versions of Mr. Obama’s image

allowed participants to discover differences in skin tone as this

was the only dimension on which the images varied (see also Study

1).

Once they had seen all 44 trials, participants were provided

with a questionnaire similar to the one in Study 1, in which

participants indicate their political and racial views. As in

Study 1, all three samples (the 2010 mid-term sample, the 2012

pre-election sample, the 2013 post-election sample) used the

34


symbolic racism scale (Henry & Sears, 2002; reliabilities

= .75, .67 and .76, respectively). The 2010 sample answered

questions pertaining to which candidate they had voted for during

the 2008 election; the 2012 sample answered questions about for

whom they intended to vote in the 2012 election; and the 2013

sample answered questions about for whom they had voted in the

2012 election.

Results

Each participant provided a total of 44 binary responses

(Yes=1/No=0), one for 11 images to which participants responded

four times each. For analysis we averaged across the four

iterations, which resulted in scores reflecting the likelihood

that a participants had answered Yes to any given image. If

participants consistently confirmed that a particular image was a

realistic depiction of Mr. Obama, their likelihood of an

affirmative response across four iterations of the same image was

1.00 (i.e. four Yes responses). If they consistently rejected the

notion that a particular image was a realistic display of Mr.

Obama, their likelihood of an affirmative response across four

iterations of the same image was .00 (four No responses). We

35


analyzed the data using a linear mixed model with robust

estimation of standard errors. This allowed us to treat the 11

responses provided by each participant as nested within the same

person (level-1) while also examining systematic differences

between persons (level-2), as well as interactions across levels.

Alternative analyses that treated the four iterations as a

separate factor are available in the supplementary material

online.

In the initial model for the 2010 sample, differences

between participants (level-2) were modeled with regard to

presentation order (whether participants saw the 11 images from

lightest to darkest, or from darkest to lightest). But because

presentation order never qualified the influence of symbolic

racism, candidate preference and political orientation, this

factor was dropped from the model for the 2010 data. Presentation

order was not varied in the 2012 sample and the 2013 sample.

Inspection revealed that some participants produced no or

hardly any variance in their responses to the 44 images. In the

2010 sample, 17 participants provided only Yes responses across

all 44 images, and three participants responded the same way (Yes

36


or No) across at least three entire iterations (three times 11

images). In the 2012 sample, the corresponding numbers of

participants were six and two, and in the 2013 sample two and

one, respectively. These participants were excluded from all

subsequent analyses, thus reducing the 2010 sample size to 72,

the 2012 sample size to 36, and the 2013 sample size to 41.

Our model thus included, first, lightness of Mr. Obama’s

skin tone as continuous, centered fixed-effect predictor. In

addition to the linear term we also added quadratic and cubic

terms for this predictor. This was justified based on the

assumption, confirmed in Study 1, that participants would find

images showing Mr. Obama with a middling skin tone to be most

realistic, and images showing Mr. Obama with extremely light or

extremely dark skin tone to be somewhat unrealistic (see Figure 1

for images that were used also in Study 2). In other words, we

expected that the likelihood of an affirmative response would be

low at the lower end (1) and upper end (11) of the original

lightness scale, but be greatest close to the middle range (6),

the original image. To model this preference structure the

addition of a quadratic trend was necessary. But because we could

37


not be sure that participants’ preference structure was indeed

unimodal, we followed the example of earlier research (e.g.,

Rhodes et al., 2003) and included a cubic term for the

relationship between lightness and the likelihood of an

affirmative response.5

Participant was modeled as a random factor. Initially, we

included random coefficients for the linear, quadratic and cubic

terms of lightness, because we sought to answer the question to

what extent individual differences (level-2) influenced response

to darker versus lighter images of Mr. Obama (at level-1).

However, model comparisons with regard to robustness and model

fit revealed the model that only included a random coefficient

for the linear term of lightness as preferable.

The initial model used to analyze the present data included

lightness (three terms: linear, quadratic, cubic), and symbolic

racism as continuous, centered predictors, including their

interactions. Subsequent analyses adding candidate preference as

categorical predictor only included those participants who were

5 Study 1 assumed, rather than demonstrated, that participants’ preference structure was unimodal by asking participants to only select a single image ofhim.

38


registered to vote and either had voted for Mr. Obama or his main

opponent (2010 sample n = 56, 2013 sample n = 17) or intended to

vote for Mr. Obama or Mr. Romney (2012 sample n = 23). This

subsequent model included all interactions with the exception of

terms that included both candidate preference and symbolic

racism. An equivalent approach was used when examining the

effects of conservatism instead of candidate preference.6

Choice of images. None of the samples showed a linear effect

for lightness, all p > .16, but a quadratic trend emerged in the

2012 sample F(1, 388) = 274.31, p < .001 and the 2013 sample F(1,

443) = 223.13, p < .001, though not in the 2010 sample F(1, 783) =

1.71, p = .19. This finding is consistent with the notion that

participants were more likely to choose images of middling skin

tone as being realistic depictions of Mr. Obama. A cubic trend

only emerged for the 2013 sample, F(1, 443) = 5.17, p = .023, but

not the 2010 sample and the 2012 sample, both F < 1.

Are responses moderated by symbolic racism? As expected there was

a racism by lightness interaction, 2010 sample, F(1, 783) = 10.78,

p < .001, 2012 sample, F(1, 388) = 6.46, p = .011, though it only

6 Because the 2010 data were obtained from different classrooms with differentprojection equipment, we controlled for ‘classroom’ in all 2010 analyses.

39


approached significance in the 2013 sample, F(1, 443) = 3.42, p

= .065. In all three years high-prejudice participants were more

likely to select images as reflecting the “real” Mr. Obama when

he was shown as relatively dark-skinned (low lightness), b =

-.021, se = .006, b = -.067, se = .026, and b = -.033, se = .018,

respectively. In the 2012 sample, F(1, 388) = 5.01, p = .026, and

to a much lesser extent in the 2010 sample, F(1, 783) = 2.70, p

= .10, and the 2013 sample, F(1, 443) = 2.45, p = .12, there was

also an interaction involving racism and the cubic term for

lightness, suggesting that at least sometimes nonlinear trends

varied by racism even when the racism by lightness (linear)

interaction emerged consistently across all samples.

Are responses moderated by candidate preference? As in Study 1,

symbolic racism and candidate preference were correlated, but

only in the 2010 sample, r(69) = .23, p = .062 and the 2013

sample, r(17) = .66, p = .002, not in the 2012 sample, r(23) = .00.

(Correlations between symbolic racism and conservatism were, 2010

sample r(69) = .44, p < .001, 2012 sample r(34) = .00, 2013 sample

r(50) = .50, p = .001).

When using candidate preference as additional predictor in

40


the above mixed model, neither in the 2010 sample nor in the 2013

sample was there any effect for candidate preference, all F <

2.47, p > .12 and all F < 1.13, p > .29. In stark contrast, in

the 2012 sample there was a pronounced interaction involving

candidate preference and lightness (linear trend), F(1, 241) =

18.33, p < .001. (See supplementary information online for

figures illustrating these effects.) Participants who preferred

Mr. Romney, Mr. Obama’s opponent in 2012, were less likely to

select a lighter-skinned image of Mr. Obama as realistic, b =

-.149, se = .035. This effect was further qualified by an

unexpected candidate preference by lightness (cubic trend)

interaction, F(1, 241) = 11.58, p = .001, b = .005, se = .002,

indicating that a nonlinear component varied as a function of

partisanship. Overall, this pattern is consistent with the

prediction that candidate preference would be only a predictor of

skin tone bias during the election of 2012, but not outside of a

Presidential election.7

Are responses moderated by conservatism? As in Study 1, we 7 Note that less than 45% of both Obama supporters and McCain supporters felt that the original image (lightness level 6) was a realistic portrayal of Mr. Obama, whereas a majority within both groups (> 50%) felt that this was the case for the image of lightness level 7—a reminder that these data should not be interpreted as evidence of accuracy of recall.

41


replaced candidate preference with the continuous predictor of

conservatism to be able to include participants who had not voted

in 2008 or 2012 (2010 sample, 2013 sample) or did not intend to vote

in 2012 (2012 sample). Similar to Study 1, there were no

significant effects involving conservatism in the 2010 sample, all

F < 1, nor in the 2012 sample, all F < 1. In the 2013 sample, there

was a general tendency for conservatives to consider any image

Mr. Obama as less likely to be a realistic depiction of him, F(1,

439) = 4.47, p = .035, b = -.062, se = .029; yet, this was not

qualified by any interaction involving lightness, all F(1, 439) <

2.18, p > .14.

Discussion

Using a different paradigm, Study 2 confirmed the findings

of Study 1 that partisanship, here assessed as candidate

preference, did predict variation in the perception of Mr.

Obama’s skin tone. Supporters of Mr. Romney, Mr. Obama’s opponent

in the 2012 Presidential race, considered images of Mr. Obama

with a darker skin tone to be more realistic than supporters of

Mr. Obama. However, this effect did not occur for former McCain

supporters in 2010, about halfway between the 2008 and 2012

42


Presidential elections, when college student participation and

engagement was very low (e.g. “Exit Poll: Lower Turnout Among

Youth and Black Voters,” November 2, 2010). Similarly, this

effect did not materialize for Romney supporters one year after

the 2012 election, when the fervor of the election had cooled. At

the same time, individual differences in racial attitudes always

predicted skin tone biases, regardless whether the study was

conducted between Presidential elections (2010), during the “hot

phase” of an election (2012) or when the Presidential election

was history (2013).

General Discussion

The present research followed up research by Caruso et al.

(2009), which demonstrated that before and during the 2008 U.S.

Presidential election conservatives perceived Mr. Obama to be

more dark-skinned than liberals. Broadly speaking, our research

is consistent with these findings. Both studies replicated that

candidate preference was related to viewing Mr. Obama’s skin tone

as lighter, if participants intended to vote for him, and as

darker if participants intended to vote for Mr. Obama’s opponent.

This confirms that partisanship is related to skin tone bias. Our

43


findings add to the growing body of research on the importance of

skin tone for racial perceptions in the U.S., and for the

perceptions of Barack Obama in particular (e.g. Caruso et al.,

2009; Hunter, 2007; Keith & Herring, 1991; Maddox, 2004).

Our research, however, differs from Caruso et al. (2009) in

some critical respects. First, the link between skin tone bias

and partisanship was limited to the period right before the

election, when partisan conflict was at its peak and uncertainty

about the participants’ preferred candidate was greatest. It did

not occur after the electoral contest was settled, as was the

case in the post-election and post-inauguration samples of Study 1, or

when only congressional elections, as was the case in the 2010

sample of Study 2, or when no Presidential election was looming,

as for the 2013 sample of Study 2. Given that Caruso et al.

conducted their research in the “hot phase” of the 2008

Presidential elections, the present research points to an

important limitation of these authors’ insights. We hold that

this variation over time most likely reflects the fluctuation of

partisan motivation. Only when partisan motivation is high, as

can be expected during an election, will White partisans resort

44


to the conceptually unrelated dimension of skin tone to denigrate

their political opponent. In other words, we consider partisan

skin tone biases a special case of motivated visual biases (e.g.

Cole & Balcetis, 2011).

Second, other than Caruso et al. (2009), but similar to most

other studies (e.g. Payne et al., 2010), we demonstrated that a

measure of explicit racism was consistently related to skin tone

biases with regard to Mr. Obama (see also Lyberger & Monteith,

2011 Experiment 1). This result is consistent with the notion

that, even when explicit prejudice is no longer socially

acceptable in most circles, explicit prejudice continues to play

a significant role in shaping voting preferences (e.g., Piston,

2010). Moreover, if one interprets skin tone biases themselves as

evidence of implicit racism, our findings may be understood as

supporting the often-found correlation between implicit and

explicit prejudice (e.g., Nosek, 2007; Payne et al., 2010). If

one accepts this interpretation, though, one has to acknowledge

that the relationship of implicit racism and candidate preference

is rather malleable. Indeed, from this perspective it may be

primarily in the context of political conflict, when, as we

45


argue, partisans are most motivated to denigrate the political

opponent, that skin tone related implicit prejudice becomes

relevant to the perception of an African American candidate of

the opposing side.

Recent research by Bernstein, Young and Claypool (2010) is

broadly consistent with this perspective. The authors

demonstrated that implicit prejudice toward African Americans

decreased immediately following the election of Barack Obama in

2008, whereas explicit prejudice remained unchanged. This pattern

is mirrored in the responses of McCain supporters of Study 1, who

considered Mr. Obama darker prior to the 2008 election than after

it. However, at present there does not seem to be any research

that examined whether racial prejudice, implicit or explicit,

predicted support or opposition for Mr. Obama differentially

before and after an election. Existing research linking

individual prejudice to support for Mr. Obama was either conduc-

ted during an election, made explicit reference to the election,

or examined the effects of an experimental manipulation (e.g.,

Columb & Plant, 2011; Finn & Glaser, 2010; Lyberger & Monteith,

2011; Knowles et al., 2010; Payne et al., 2010; Piston, 2010; cf.

46


Effron, Cameron & Monin, 2009).

Third, another critical difference between the present

research and Caruso et al. (2009) is the fact that we only ever

observed a relationship between candidate preference and

individual differences in the perception of Mr. Obama’s skin

tone, but never with political orientation, i.e. how conservative

or liberal participants described themselves. This discrepancy is

likely due to the fact that Caruso et al.’s measure of

conservatism conflated party preference (Republican, Democrat)

and political orientation (liberal, conservative). Whereas it is

likely that a supporter of a political party will support that

party’s presidential candidate, it is less assured that the

broader political self-description has the same predictive power.

Moreover, our approach distinguished more clearly between

participants who were engaged enough in the election to have a

clear candidate preference, and participants who adopted a broad

political self-descriptions, but who were not sufficiently

involved to articulate a candidate preference. As the reader will

recall, the latter group was included in the (nonsignificant)

analyses predicting skin tone biases from political orientation.

47


Thus, it appears that having a candidate preference is a

precondition for a partisan skin tone bias to emerge. This

pattern highlights that partisanship implies that people are

psychologically invested in their cause or, as in this case, in

their candidate (cf. Westen et al., 2006).

Overall, the present research contributes to our

understanding of the intersection between race and politics in

the U.S. It is well established that African American candidates

pose a major issue for many White voters (Block, 2011). However,

it is unclear what specifically about Mr. Obama’s own racial

background and features aroused the resistance of many Whites

and, for instance, increased their voting participation (Petrow,

2010). Was it Mr. Obama’s darker skin tone that motivated the

majority of White U.S. voters to vote against him (e.g. Pew

Center, 2012)? Research generally finds that skin tone is

critical for racial categorization (e.g., Maddox & Gray, 2002;

Maddox, 2004), though recent research suggests that, at least for

Whites, skin tone may be given less weight in perceived racial

prototypicality than other Afrocentric facial features (Strom et

al., 2012; but see Stepanova & Strube, 2009). In other words, how

48


“Black” an African American individual is perceived by Whites may

not necessarily be a matter of skin tone (cf. Brooks & Gwinn,

2010). If Whites rejected Barack Obama because he is African

American, it may have been because of his non-White facial

features, not his skin tone. Naturally, with only one non-White

U.S. Presidential candidate in U.S. history, these two

possibilities cannot be separated empirically. But to the extent

that this account holds, one wonders to what extent skin tone

played a causal role in Whites not voting for a Black President.

After all, House Speaker John Boehner does not seem to face any

obstacles because of his for a White man unusually dark skin

complexion!

However, Hagiwara et al. (2012) recently demonstrated that

Afrocentric features and darker skin tone have an independent

influence on Whites’ affective reactions to African Americans.

This suggests that many White U.S. voters may have reacted

negatively toward Mr. Obama not only because of some of his non-

White facial features (e.g. broader nose, fuller lips), which

easily identify his racial heritage as African American and

marking him as a member of this racial group. Independently of

49


this, Whites may have also responded to his non-White skin tone.

Caruso et al. (2009) as well as our own research have

demonstrated that perceptions of Mr. Obama’s skin tone are

malleable in the sense that Whites with different racial

attitudes and different candidate preferences arrive at different

conclusions. However, at the present it is unclear whether

similar differences in perceptions also apply to Mr. Obama’s non-

White facial features. Future research will have to investigate

whether artificially induced changes of his facial features

(created through image morphing; e.g. Malahy, Sedlins, Plaks &

Shoda, 2010) are detectable regardless of perceivers’ racial

attitudes or candidate preference or not. If one assumes that Mr.

Obama’s facial features are subject to similar perceptual biases

as his skin tone, one might expect that Mr. Obama’s opponents

should be less sensitive to his facial features being subtly

changed in an Afrocentric direction (e.g., fuller lips, broader

nose) than in a Eurocentric direction. Whereas future research

might wish to tackle the perception of Mr. Obama’s features, note

that investigating such motivated biases in the “heat of the

battle” of Presidential election will no longer be possible,

50


because it is extremely unlikely that President Obama, after

concluding his second term in office, will ever stand in an

election again.

An important limitation of the present research is its

exclusive reliance on correlational data. To be sure, an

experimental test of our hypothesis that partisan skin tone

biases emerge primarily during a time of political intergroup

conflict would have been desirable. However, as our failed

attempt of doing so as part of Study 2 showed (see Footnote 4),

it is extremely difficult to simulate the “Sturm und Drang” of an

election, which encompasses the entire American nation every four

years, including citizens who are not much interested or

knowledgeable in the domain of politics. But without experimental

data, causal conclusions are extremely hazardous. We submit that

explicit racial prejudice and temporarily aroused partisanship is

the cause of the observed skin tone biases in the perception of

Barack Obama, but we acknowledge that it is up to future research

to produce more conclusive causal evidence.

Finally, one wonders whether a partisan skin tone bias might

also materialize in a future when White Democratic voters face a

51


Presidential election in which a Black Republican is running

against a White candidate of their own party. Assuming the

persistence of cultural racism and the association between dark

skin tone and inferior social status, as well as the continuation

of contemporary partisan passions, there is no reason to not to

expect the same partisan bias. Even though this scenario may seem

hypothetical, we challenge social psychologists of the future to

be prepared. As was the case with Mr. Obama, the emergence of

unexpected candidates for high political office offers new and

exciting opportunities for social research—and new insight into

when and how what kind of intergroup bias might be deployed.

52


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Supplementary Information

Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online

version of this article at the publisher’s web site:

Appendix: Study 2 Alternative Analyses and Figures

MARKUS KEMMELMEIER received his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan in 2001 in social psychology. He is currently a Professor in the Interdisciplinary Ph.D. Program in Social Psychology and the Department of Sociology at the University of Nevada, Reno. His research interests focus on cultural psychology, political psychology, intergroup relations and interpersonal behavior.

LYSSETTE CHAVEZ received her Ph.D. in Interdisciplinary Social Psychology from the University of Nevada, Reno in 2012. Her research interests included stereotyping, prejudice and juror decision-making. She is currently Sr. User Experience Researcher for Hotwire in San Francisco, California.

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Figure 1Study 1 materials: 3 x 3 picture matrix (lighter spectrum, darkest image first in upper

left corner)

W hich of these pictures portrays the real Barack Obam a?

Note: The original photograph is shown in the second row, left

image.

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Figure 2

Change in skin tone perceptions over time, 2008-2009 (Study 1)

Note: Higher values indicate the selection of images with a

lighter skin tone.

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Biases in the Perception of Barack Obama's Skin Tone

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