Demographic Changes

Just like other European countries, Belgium has wilnessed quite dra­matic demographic changes since World War n. The family has changed

DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE AND LABOUR MARKETTRENDS

79Belgiwn: economie hardship

Before looking at divorce legislation and family policy in Belgium, we firsLsketch a general demographic profile and give an ewnornic outline of thecountry. In lhe demographic section, we pay special attention to lhe evo­lution of marriage fonnation and dissolution, to new living arrangementssueh as cohabiLation and to fertiJity trends. The sketch of the economieprofile wiIl mainly offer an overview of poverty rates and the composilionof the Belgian labour market, and highlight trends in (un)elllploymentfigures and male and female part-time employment.

Belgian state structure evolved from a unitary state to a federal state, inwhich the central federal au lhority weakened and the regional authoritieswere granted legislative and executive powers in the fields of employment,education, and welfare. Unlike the Gennan Federal State, in which theLänder operate independently from the federal authorily, Belgium has twotypes of l'egional authorities. First, the Communities (three in total: theFlemish Community, the French Community and the Gennan-speakingCommunity) have jurisdicLion over person-related matters. At this level,policy-making is carried out in lhe fields of culLural issues (theaLre, librar­ies, and so on), education, the use of languages and maLters relating to theindividual - which concern health policy (curative and preventive medi­cine) on the one hand and assistance to individuals (protection of youth,social welfare, aid to families, immigrant assistance services, and so on)on lhe other. Next, the Regions (also Lhree, but geographically somewhatdifferent from the Communities: the Flemish Region, the Brussels-CapitalRegion and the WaIloon Region) execute powers on territorial issues.Their powers exLend to economie matters, employmenl, agricull.ure,energy, transport, loca! authorities and other domains.

Divorce legislalion, which is rooted in lhe French Code Napoléoll of1804 (Senaeve, 2004a), has remained under the jurisdiction of the federalauthority. This is also true for tax policy, national defence, foreign affairsand social security legis!ation. Flemish as weil as Walloon individualsseeking a divorce have to go through identical divorce procedures and wil!be confronted with the same lax policy and social security consequences.

INTRODUCTION

From a European stand point, Belgium is a country of averages in manyrespeets. The country lags behind in terms of the demographic evolutionthat has taken place in the Northern European countries, but it is aheadof developmenls in Soulhern Europe. Neither Belgium's cmploymentrates nor its poverLy figures have ever been exceptional from a Europeanperspeclive. One of the domains in which I3elgium takes a leading posi­tion, however, is the field of marriage dissolulion. Longitudinal divorcecalculations show thal60 per cent of the marriages contracted in 1995 willeventually end in divorce (Vanhove and Matthijs, 2002). Divorce rales havequadrupled over the past 30 years and are still increasing steadily. In theEuropean and NOtth American context, many explanations have been putforward for these lrends. From a demographie perspective, this evolution isintegrated in detail into the theory of the Seeond Demographic Transitionas formulated by Leslhaeghe (l995a, 1995b; Lesthaeghe and Neeis, 2002;Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa, 1986) and Van De Kaa (1994). Accordinglo lhis theory, the dramatic changes in demographic behaviour are due tothe cultural shift during the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, a causallink betweenmicro changes in belief systems and changes in demographic behaviour (forexample, birlhs out ofwedloek, cohabitation and divorces) has resulted inshifLing macro trends. As indicated above, Belgium is undergoing a delayedevolntion compared with Northern Europe, but it is catching up, and cur­renLly shows one of the highest divoree rales in Europe.

ExplanaLions for the Belgian demographic evolulion are always com­plicated by the country's idiosyncratic slale structure. Even thoughI3elgiulll is one of lhe smallest countries in Europe, its political system isvery complex and incomprehensible to outsiders. After World War IJ, the

3. Belgium: economie hardship despiteelaborate childcare and leave timeprogrammesDimitri Mortelmans, Laurent Snoeckx andPeter Raeymaeckers

tremcndously, and new trends in partnership formation have arisen. Thisso-called 'Second Demographic Transition' (Lesthaeghe and Neels, 2002)- in which individual autonomy and fema1e emancipation play a major ro1e- is characterized by an accelerating upward trend in divorces, advance-ment in the age of marriage, and a rise in new family forms such as pre­marital and non-marita1 cohabitation (which lead to a rise in extra-maritalbirths), single-parent families (most of them headed by women), remar­riages and post-marital cohabitations (Lesthaeghe, 1995b). When we lookat Belgian nuptiality figures and compare them with European figures, itbecomes clear that, on the one hand, the Belgian demographic evolutionstarted later than that in N orthem European countries. On the other hand,the latest figures (2000) show that the divorce rate, al 2.6 per thollsandpopulation (see Data Appendix), is among the highest in Europe, whilc themarriage rate is among the lowest, namely 4.4 (see Data Appendix).

Data on family structure in Be1gium (see Data Appendix) show thatthe share of one-person households has been rising since ]985. ]n 2000, itbecame the most common household type (31.2 per cent). The number ofsingle female households is higher than that of single males because of thelanger life expeclancy of women (FPS Economy - Directorate-GcneralStatistics Belgillm, 2004b; not shown in Data Appendix). Another largeshare of Belgian households consists of couples with and without childrcn(30.2 per cent and 22.2 per cent, respectively). As the percentages show(see Data Appendix), the proportion of cOllples in the population ofhouseholds has been declining since 1985. However, the relative numberof single parents had risen to ]].1 per cent in 2000. Within this group,single-mother households are in the majority - a situation partly due tocustody arrangements, which almost automatically assigned children tothe mother until 1995 (when Belgian divorce legislation was amendedsubstantially). ]nformation on the number and distribution offamily units(FPS Economy - Directorate-General Statistics Belgium, 2004b) indi­cates lhat sing1e-father hOllseholds account for 161 000 units, whereas thenllmber of sing1e-mother households adds up to 431 000 (out of a total ofabout 2 760 000 hOllseho1ds).

High divorce rates, declining marriage rates, and the rise in new livingarrangements such as pre-marital, non-marital and post-marital cohabita­tion have led to a higher proportion of children bom out of wedlock, ascan be clearly seen in the Data Appendix. The crude divorce rates showan accelerating trend from 1985 unti! 2004 (with a temporary peak in 1995due to the shortened and simplified divorce procedure thereafter), togetherwith a declining crude marriage rate (5.8 per cent in 1985 to 4.1 per centin 2003) and a rise in births outside of wedlock (7.07 per cent in 1985 to31.0 per cent in 2003). The Total Fertility Rate (TFR), which had been

81Belgium: economie hards/tlj)

The slructure of the labour market is a crucial factor in the post-divorcecoping process (Raeymaeckers et al., 2008b; Uunk et al., 2005). Acccssto the labour market, and possibilities for increasing one's labour marketparticipation -, or, inversely, of easily reducing one's working hours -. areimportant to former spouses who are re-adapting their Jives to a newsituation.

As in many European countries, the Belgian labour rnarket is char­acterized by extensivc regulation. Although laws on working times andemployment protection became more flexible during the 1980s and J990s, astrict regulation of labour contracts stil! prevails (Dewilde, 2006). Whereasunemployment rates for men have fluctuated around 6 per cent since1985, the rates for women have decreased, from 16.7 per cent in 1985 to9.5 per cent in 2005 (see Data Appendix). These general figures, however,conceal the structural heterogcneity of labour market risks - for example,

The Be]gian Labour Market

declining since 1960, shows a rather modest rise from 1985 onward (seeData Appendix) d ue to a recuperation of first chi1d postponements. Still,part of the TFR increase is due to the Belgian population with migrantroots. Within this migrant population, the fertility rate is higher than thenational average. ]f fertilily rates among these groups decreasc, Belgiumwill have a negative population growth. Since 1970, a growing share ofnon-marital cohabitations and remarriages has been observed. ]n 1970, 11per cent of all marriages were remarriages. In 2000, this proportion hadalready risen to 31 per cent (FPS Economy - Directorate-General SlatisticsBelgium,2004b).

Unfortunately, Belgium does not publish official statistics on cohabita­tion. Recently, Corijn (2004) published cstimates ofthe share ofcohabitinghouseholds based on the National Register. In 1970, about 4.3 per centof all households were cohabiting partners. The number of cohabitinghouscholds increased to 4.7 per cent in 199 land 7.6 per cent in 2004.About half of these couples have never been married, one-fifth consist oftwo divorced partners and 18 per cent are households containing at leastone divorcee (Corijn, 2005). Parallel to a rise in sccond marriages, we canobserve that the increase in cohabitation is partly due ta a rise in divorces.A large number of divorcees start new relationships and either remarry orcohabitate. Be1gium has rccognized same-sex marriages (see below). Atthe time of the policy's official instalrnent in 2003, a total of 1631 same­sex marriages were concluded (58.8 per cent were male coup]es). In 2004,this number rose to J904 (54.8 per cent male couples; FPS Economy ­Directorate-General Statistics Be1gium, 2004a, 2005).

Single couJltry studies80

migrants and people who leave school earJy are quile vulnerable on thelabour market. In addition, there are significant inequalities between theregions in lerms of unemployment: 3.8 per cent in Flanders, 6.8 per cent inWallonia and 9.9 per cent in Brussels (Steunpunt WAV, 2005). Long-termunemployment is ralher high in Belgium, as repeatedly indicated by severalEuropean and international studies (see De Lathouwer et aL, 1999, forfigures). One cause of this is the country's rather high unemployment ben­cfltS, which are (almost) unlirnited in duration (De Lathouwer et al., 1999).Employees under the age of 50 who ale cohabiting are lhe only people whocan lose their unemployment benefits. Singles and heads of households cannever be sllspended.

Belgian men have an employment rate of 68.3 per cent, which is ratherlow compared with other European eountries. While employment flguresfor women have increased since 1990, and reached 53.8 per cent in 2002 (seeData Appendix), the women's employmen t rate has nevertheJess remainedrather low from a comparative perspective. Especially in comparison withNorthern European coun lries Jike Denmark, Finland and Sweden (but alsoGreat Brilain), women are not employed as often as one would expect whentaking Belgium's e1aborate childcare facilities into account (see below). Thepercentage ofworking mothers with children under the age of six (see DataAppendix), however, amounted to 68.8 per cent in 2005. Only Denmarkand Sweden do better and have higher parlicipation rates. The influence ofgenerous family benefits and extensive childcare services that facilitate thework--caregiving combination clearly comes into play. In addition - andllnlike policies in countrics such as Germany, Great Britain and Spain - thissocial policy, which is situated on the boundary between a traditional malebreadwinner and a dual-earner model (AndreB et aL, in this volume), pro­teets single mothers from poverty (see Data Appendix).lt should be noted,however, that single-parent families in llelgium (single mothers making up80 per cent of tbe cases) have a high poverty rate (36 per cent) comparedwith couple households (13 per cent on average; see Data Appendix) ..

Looking at part-time employment, the proportion of Belgian menworking part-time is low and hardly changes over time (from 6.3 per centin 1985 to 7.6 per cent in 2005). The share of women in part-time jobs,on the other hand, has risen from 16.4 per cent in 1985 to 40.5 per cent in2005. Moreover, male part-time employment is found almost exc1usivelyin the groups of men under 19 years or above 65 years of age. Part-timejobs are relatively common; small part-time jobs are virtually non-existent(Steunpunt WAV, 2005). The average number of homs worked weckly inpart-time jobs is 21.5, placing Belgium between France (22.6) on the onehand and Germany (19.5) and the Netherlands (18.4) on the other (DeLathouwer et al., 1999).

Belgian Divorce in Historical Perspective

83Belgium: economie hard~hip

Belgium's demographic as weIl as its labour market characteristi(;sprovide some indication of what divorce entails for BeIgian men andwomen. Although divorce is a prevalent life-course risk in Belgiull1, thereare 110 specific measures to assist individuals who divorce and/or becomesingle parents. However, Belgium's well-regulated labour market and lowpoverty rates lead us to expect that the negative eITects of divorce win beless severe in comparison with other European countries.

Belgian divorce law originates from the French legal system. In lhe Ancienrégime de la France, most family law matters feil within the jurisdic­tion of the Roman CathoJic Chureh (Senaeve, 2004a). Delgium became

FAMILY LAW AND DIVORCE IN BELdYUM--/'//

In this section, we present an overvie~o(the different options Belgian lawprovides as far as marriage and s~áration are concerned. We discuss thehistory of Belgian divorce legis11t'lon and ils recent evolutions, and presentthe different divorce options Cj.6d their consequences concerning property,children and alimony. Beca~e cohabitation is rapidly gaining importanceas a household type, we alsf:'pay attention to the protective measures avail­able in case a cohabiting re\ationShiP breaks up.

lntroduction: Getting Marrièd

Before turnillg lo Belgian Iegislation on divorce and separation, lt IS

important to describe the ways in which couples ean legally unite. Thetraditional union is, of course, marriage. As an altemative to marriage,people can cohabit. This factual union has neither legal consequences, nordoes it offer any form of protection when lhings turn out badly. In 2000,Belgium introduced a 'Declaration of Cohabitation', I according to whichtwo cohabiting people can have their cohabitation registered and enter astate of 'Iegal cohabitation'. The dec1aration introduces several protec­live measures for cohabiting couples, which resem bie those for marriedones. The statement can be given by any coupIe, regardless of the genderof both partners. Therefore, tbe Declaralion of Cohabitation was seen asthe first official registration for homosexual couples. A next step in thedevelopment offamily rights for same-sex couples was taken in 2003, whenBelgium allowed people of the same sex lo marry. There is one restriction:adoption is still reserved for heterosexual couples.

Single country studies82

Belgian Divorce LegisJatioD

independent in 1830 and ratified the French Code Napoléon in 1884. Oneof the regulations which were left out at that time was divorce by mutualconsent. The 1884 law remained in force until 1974, when a major break­through was realized in terms of no-fautt divorce. Spouses of mentally illpersons were allowed lo apply for divorce, and married couples could geta divorce aftel' they bad lived separately for ten years.

In 1994, Belgian divorce legislation again went through some majorchanges wbich made the dissolution ofmarriage much easier. The so-called'double introduction', which consisted of a divorce claim and an applica­tion, was replaced by a mere application preceding the trial (Senaeve andPintens, 1997; Senaeve et al., 1994). The divorce procedure was therebysimplified and shortened by six months. Another new element in the altereddivorce procedure was a modifkation of the obligation that both partnerstry to save their marriage. This obligation was dropped and it is the part­ners' free decision whether to do so or not. The announcement of the newlaw in 1993 kept many couples from applying for a divorce, which is c1earlyvisible in the divorce rates halfway through the 1990s.

Current divorce legislation includes three standard procedures: first, thereis divorce by mutual consent, which is by far the most frequently usedprocedure; secondly, couples can terminate their marriage based on factualseparation. The third procedure is marriage dissolution based on 'facts':one of the spouses is confronted with misconduct on the part of his or herpartner. In addition to these three standard procedures, there is 'separationfrom bed and board', which is often mentioned as a fourth way of divorc­ing (Heyvaert, 2002). Technically, this is not a divorce in legal terms, butonly a temporary measure for married people who decide to live separately.Therefore, we limit our discussion to the three standard procedures.

In the case of divorce by mutual consent, both spouses agree to dissolvetheir marriage. In contrast to the other two procedures, the question ofguilt is not raised (Senaeve and Pintens, 1997). Two conditions are requiredin order to qualify for a divorce by mutual consent: first, both spousesneed to be oIder than 20; secondly, the marriage must have lasted for atleast two years (Heyvaert, 2002; Senaeve, 2004a). In case of a divorce bymutual consent, the court does nol need lo intervene in matters relating toproperty, family and personal rights. It is up to the partners to agree onthe partition of joint property (Senaeve, 2004a), their new addresses, theparen tal authority and lhe financial arrangement concerning children - ifnecessary, an alimony agreement. The mutual consent procedure takesabout five months.

85Belgium: economie hardship

The legal state of factual separation is determined by two conditions.First, it requires a factual separation of a certain period of time. In 2002,the duration of the separation was two years (Heyvaert, 2002). Before that,the time span had already been gradually reduced, from ten years in 1979to five years in 1982. Secondly, the separation must reveal an irretriev­able breakdown of the marriage. This means that the marriage is beyondsaving. The married couple does not live together, and they have cut ofTall contact with each other. Until the moment of the actual divorce, thecourt takes temporary measures based on a consensus. Whereas before1994, the authority of the civil court was timited to temporary measuresconcerning children, the Act of 1994 expanded its jurisdiction to includetemporary measures concerning the persons involved, their goods and themaintenance of the spouses (Senaeve and Pin lens, 1997).

The third procedure, divorce based on facts, can be initiated when justone mem bel' of the couple is confronted with misconduct on the part of hiswife or her husband for example, the guilty spouse seriously neglects hisor her marital duties, or some factual grounds are present, such as adul.tery, acts of violence, ill treatmen tor gross insults (De Corte, 200 I). If theoffended spouse wins the case, he or she will retain all the advantages ofthe marriage (De Corte, 2001).

Consequences of Divorce in BeIgian Family Law

During several of the above mentioned procedures, temporary and com­plementary meaSUl'es are taken by the couple or the court. Family lawregulations govern the process of the divorce and sLipulate rules concern­ing the living situa tion of the ex-spouses and their children. Dy the end ofthe procedure, measures need ta be taken with respect to the division ofproperty and the custody of the children, if there are any. If the divorceprocedure is based on facts, the question of alimony for the ex-spouse wil!also arise.

The division of property aftel' marriage dissolution depends upon thecouple's marriage settiement. Belgian family law mentions three differentcontracts (Gerio, 2001): joint property, division of goods and participationof property. Most Belgian couples prefel' joint ownership of property (thisis aJso the sLandard contract when a couple does not opt for any system),which means that in case of a divorce, all property wiU be divided equallybetween the husband and the wife. When opting for the division of goods,spouses keep all property rights at the beginning of their marriage andmaintain them in case of a divorce. Marriage or divorce actually has noeffect on the spouses' properties. The third system concerns a participa­tion of property. During the marriage, partners divide the ownership of

Single country s/udies84

their goods. In case of a divorce, all wages, illterests alld propcrty acquiredduring the marriage are divided according to the division that was madeduring the marriage.

Children are the most importanL subject of debate in almost everydivorce trial. In general, separated couples fight more often over childrenthan they do over property. In 1995, one year after the adaptation of thedivorce procedure, a major amendment to custodiallaw was implementedwhich stated that both parents have an equal right to raise their children(Uyttenhove et al., 2004). Before 1995, one of the spouscs was grantedcllstody rights and the other had visiting rights. Joint parenting has nowbecome thc standard. Nevertheless, when partners do not agree on thecustody arrangements, or if one of the partners refuses to raise the children,the court takes compulsory measures. Belgian family law clearly stipulatesthat the j udge has to take one criterion into consideration, and that is tllcinterest ofthe child (Senaeve, 2004b). Children can be placed under guardi­anship or parental authority can be granted to only one parent, while Lheother is granted visiting rights.

Although property regulation is a decisive element of the economieconsequences of divorce, the financial situation of the ex-partners oftendepends on the amount of alimony received (or paid) by the ex-partner orchildren. Maintenance obligations can only be adjudicated in tI1e case ofa divorce based on facts, with the result being tllat the guilty spouse paysalimony to the innocent party. Belgium has no fixed alimony rates. Thebasic idea is that the alimony has to guarantee that Lhe innocent spousecan maintain the standard of living that he or she had before the divorce.The court also considers the financial capacity of the claimant in tenns ofincome and job opportunities. The financial situation of the debtor is alsotaken into account: the amount of alimony may never exceed one-third ofhis or her income (GerIo, 2003; Senaeve, 2004b). However, as Cantillon(1999) states, 50 per cent of divorced women report that they do notreceive any maintenance paymenLs. Many partners are reluctant to payor, in many cases, are not capable of financially supporting two families.Moreover, the mean amount of these payments only comes to about €125(1999 figures), which implies that they reprcsent only 8 per cent of thefamily income (CantilIon, 1999). The obligation to pay alimony terminatesas soon as the spouse receiving it starts cohabiting with someone, or whenhe or she remarries.

In the case of children's alimony, other factors are taken into considera­tion. Bath parents pay equally for the upbringing of the children. Whenone parent is given full custody, the other parent pays alimony for the chil­dren. The determination of the alimony rate is based on the same principleas the spouse's alimony: the children's standard of living has to be identical

Cohabitation in Helgian FamiIy Law

WELFARE STATE ARRANGEMENTS AND DIVORCEIN BELGIUM

87Belgiwn: economie hardship

to the pre-divorce situation. Alimony is obligatory when the children areunder age, or as long as their education is not finished. In the case of non­payment, there is no official child maintenance regulation that providesadditional beneflts for single mothers. 2

Having discussed the consequences of divorce as they are described inBelgian family law, we will now take a look at welfare state regulations. InBelgium, divorce is not directly related to Lhe social security system, becausesocial security rights are primarily based on labour market relations andnot on household composition. In that respect, the Belgian social welfaresystem is based on the logic of the classic male breadwinner. Divorce isnot officially recognized as a social risk (i t only plays a minor part in the

Two people are officially cohabiting when they hand in a written appli­cation Lo the municipal registry (GerIo, 2003). In terms of the couple's!egal protection, the state of cohabitation resembles the marital state.Even though protection is not as extensive as it is for married couplcs, thelaw provides a minimum of protection La officially cohabiLing partners.Because of the importance of the couples' material situation, cohabitationlegislation provides insurance against any unacceptable behaviour on thepart of one of the partners (Senaeve, 2004b). Three main types of pro tec­tion can be discerned.

First, the couple's joint property is protected. This aspect refers prima­rily to a joint rent law, which implies that both partners become holdersof the tenancy agreement. Thereby, both partners have to approve anycancellation, notification and judicial demands (under penalty of nullity).Secondly, a joint debt liability has been installed. When one of the cohabit­ing partners contracts a debt, the creditor can recover the outs tanding debtfrom both partners. Third - and comparable to the marital system - legalcohabitation comes with particular mutual obligations. The cohabitingcoupte is obliged to Jive in the same residence; they have to be faithful andgive moral support and material assistance to each other (Senaeve, 2004b).A registered partnership ends when one of the partners dies, gets married,or when a concerted or unilateral declaration is presented at the municipal­ity. When a cohabiting relationship ends, none of the partners or childrenhas a right to alimony.

Single country studies86

regulation of pensions). In practice, however, it is clear that the loss of aspouse can have huge implications on the social and economie situation ofboth ex-partners. In this brief overview, we touch upon family allowances,childcare services, leave systems and unemployment insurance.

With respect to Esping-Andersen's welfare state typology, Belgium isusually assigned to the group of Continental European welfare regimes(Andries, 1997; Esping-Anderscn, 1991). It has a [ow score in the clusterof liberal regimes and an average score in the cl uster of social democraticregimes. Together with a high degree of decommodification, Bclgiumscores considerably high on 'corporatism' and 'etatism' indices. Thesystem makes a strict division between regulat.ions for employees, civilservants and self-employed persons. A second trait is the degree to whichhealth and unemployment benefits and (partially) pensions are related toearnings. This is a carry-over from the classic male breadwinner modelwhich is deeply rooted in the system. This principle is also represented ingenerous family benefits and social transfers which support a traditionaldivision of labour. Nevertheless, an elaborate childcare infrastructure,enabling women to combine work and family, provides evidencc thatBclgium also has characteristics of the d ual-eamer model (Andre!) et aL,in this volume).

Belgium scores high in the area of public expenditures for family serv­ices. Only Denmark, Finland and Sweden do better (see Data Appendix).Concerning the share of its gross domestic product (GDP) spent on familycash benefits, Belgium is the absolute front-runner, with 1.8 per cent. Theallowance system for families with children is one of the most universaIisticin the world (CantiUon, 1999). However, there are same farms of selectiv­ity which are very efficient - for example, for unemployed persons withchildren, more than 60 per cent of the enlarged benefits arc granted to low­income families, which leads to large poverty reductions. Child benefits arepaid un ti I a child reaches the age of 18 (or even 25 if the child is a student oris disabled). Child benefits arc socially and age adjusted. The basic amounl(from €77 per month for the first child to E2I3 per month from the thirdchild onwards) can be raised for long-term unemployed persons (from anadditional amount of €39 per montb for the nrst child to an additionalamount of €4 per month from the third child onwards) and as the child getsolder (for the first child from an additional €13 per month [6-12 years oId]to an additional €26 per month [> 18 years old] and from an additional €26per month to an additional €51 per month for other children). The Belgianchildcarc system is quite comprehensive, providing care for 30 per cent ofall children up to the age of 3 and for 97 per cent ofchildren between 3 and6 years old (see Data Appendix). Moreover, there are tax deductions forthe costs of childcare for children up to the age of 3 (CantilIon, 1999).

DIVORCE RISKS AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCESOF DIVORCE IN BELGIUM

In addition, Belgium provides maternity, paternity and parentalleave.Working women are entitled to 15 weeks of maternity leave, while workingmen are given 10 days olf. A three-month parentalleave is also available.The partners can either split the period between the two of them or decidethat one of them wil! take tbe full leave. In practice, it is most aften themother who takes the three-month leave.

The Belgian unemployment insurance system is a rather elaborate andcomplex legislative structure. The calculation of unemploymenl benefitsdepends on the earnings of the unemployed person before he or she lost hisor her job, the period ofunemployment and the family siluation. However,there is a tendency to loosen the link between employment earnings andsodal rights (Dewilde, 2006). Coverage rates are very high and the dUra­tion of benefits is next to unIimited, resulting in low poverty rates.

89Be/gium: economie hardrhip

Research on the consequences of partnership dissolution consistentlyshows a larger breakup penalty for women in comparison wÏlh men.OveraIl, women experience a net income loss of 30 to 40 per cent duringthe first few years aCter the dissolution (Bianchi et aL, 1999; KaJmUn andBroese van Groenou, 2005; Poortman, 2000; Smock, 1994). The extent ofthe financial consequences, however, is highly dependent on the nationalsetting. In their review of the economie consequences of divoree, AndreBet al. (in this volume) find differences ranging from an income 10ss of 80per cent (a Gennan study from 1984) to an income gain of 7 per cent(a Belgian study from 2003). In the fiterature, these vast differences areusually explained by the income-related and employment-related welfarearrangements typical for each country. As Uunk (2004) and Dewilde(2002) show, welfare regime typologies explain, to a great extent, tbe wayin which economie consequences are reduced after a divorce. Either welfaretransfers are available to compensate for the income loss, or institutionalarrangements enable the individual's (re-)entry into the labourmarket. Fo!'those who are already working, these arrangements facilitate the combina­tion ofwork and caregiving. FamiJy-friendly policies (Raeymaeckers et aL,2008a, 2008b) and the accessibility of large-scale childcare provisions seemto facilitate women's working opportunities (Uunk et aL, 2005).

In comparative analyses, Belgian women often manage to reduce thenegative economie consequences of divorce better as compared to womenin other countries. In most analyses, Belgium is c1assified within the groupof conservative welfare regimes - even though it is acknowledged that on

Single country studies88

family policy indicators, Be1gium scores close to the social-dcmocratic groupin the Esping-Andersen typoJogy (Andre13 et al., in this volume; Uunk,2004). Uunk finds the lowest income changes (minus 20 pcr cent) among theconservative regimes, while Andre13 et al. find better outcomes in comparisonLo Germany. A combination ofhigh social transfers and an elaborate child­care infrastructure accounts for this result. Even though childcare facilitiesdo not moderate the negative effects as such, they are responsible for highlabour participation rates among mothers. Available childcare facilities helpdivorced mothers to combine their labour activities with an increased careresponsibility in case they are given eustody of the children.

To conclude this chapter, we focus on the income effects of relationshipdissolution for Belgian men and women, based on data from the BelgianHousehold Panel (PSBH). Before doing sa, we illustrate the rangc of differ­ent divorce risks in Belgium. Since divorce - together with inactivity linkedto unemployment or disability - is the major life event leading to povertyin Belgium (Dewilde, 2006), it is important to gain an insight into therisk factors for divorce. Controlling for socio-demographic backgroundvaria bles, reJationship characteristics are the best predictors of divorce inBelgium. Premarital cohabitation is the most important negative predic­tor of divorce, while marriage duration appears to be the most protcctiveelement (Snoeckx eta!., 2005). In addition, significant differences are foundbetween the regions (Flanders and Wallonia). A close look at these regionaldifferences shows that the elfects of premarital birth and the presence ofchildrell (as a protective faetor) are stronger in Ftanders. This goes handin hand with the effect of the number of religious persons in the regions.Tt appears that cultural deterrninants - especially the historical RomanCatholic characLer of Flemish society - still exert an important protectiveforce on the risk of getting a divorce (SnoeckX et al., 2007).

Bearing these risk factors in mind, we now look at the financial conse­quences of divorce in Belgium. For this purpose, we have used the BelgianHousehold PaneL This panel ran for 11 years between 1992 and 2002. From1994 onwards, it served as the basis for the Belgian section of the EuropeanCommunity Hausehold Panel (ECHP). The motivation for using thePSBH instead of the ECHP is its more detailed data (especially concern­ing income) and the higher number of waves available for analysis (foradditonal infomlation on the PSHB see the Data Appendix). As we lookat all divorces occurring during the panel, the PSI3H enables us to increasethe statistical power of the analysis. The sample we analyse consists ofpeople who dissolved their marriage3 during the panel. We adopted alliegaldivorces, but als0 all married couples no longer living together in a subse­quent wave. There may be a delay in the official dissolution ofthe marriage.Therefore, the marital status of the partners aJone does not capture all

divorcees. Since we focus on the economie consequences of a divorce, theyear of the split marks the timing of the targeted event more closely.

The deseriptive statistics in Table 3.1 show equivalized disposablehousehold incomes4 for men and women one year before and one year aftera relaLionship dissolution. Before rclationship dissolution, the incomes ofmen and women do not differ significantly.5 After a divorce, income differ­enees become highly significant (p < 0.001). For men, we find an increase inequivalized income of nearly 5 per cent. For wamen, the difference is nega­tive, as expeeted. The difference in median equiva1ized income amounls to18.8 per cent, whieh is close to the result (20 per cenl change) of Uunk's(2004) analysis with the ECHP.

In Table 3.2, we present the results of an ordinary least squares (OLS)regression on the proportional change in income ane year after a maritalbreakup. The aim is to look at pre-divorce and post-divorce indicatorsexplaining the size ofthe economie change. Lower values on the dependentvariabie indicate a small or even negative change in income after divorce.Two modeIs were estimated. In model 1, the dependent variabie is the 'raw'proportional change variabie (the change score, for short). Model 2 usesa mu1tiplicative inverse transformation of this variabie to correct for thenon-norrnal distribu tion of the change scores. 6

The parameters of model 2 do not allow for a straightforward interpre­tation. The signs of the parameters are the inverse of thase in model I. Apositive parameter in model 2 indicates an inerease in the inverse changein equivalized household income or - stated in reverse - a decrease in theproportional change in income (as analysed in model 1). For this reason,we wiU interpret the parameters in model 1, even though the significancelevels and relative size of the standardized regression coefficients (13) inmodel 2 are more exaet.

90 Single country sLUdies Belgium: economie hardship

Table 3.1 Equivalized household income (in euros) before and af/errelationship dissolution

N Before(t- I) After (t + 1) Change

Men 88 Mean 1/48.5 1418.4Std. Deviation 387.2 751.8Median 1165.8 1223.0 +4.9%

Women 108 Mean 1036.8 871.1Std. Deviation 396.2 409.3Median 970.4 787.7 -18.8%

Souree: PSI3H (IJ waves).

91

Suurce: PSBH (tl waves).

NO/es: * p < 0.05; ** P < 0.0\; *** P < 0.001.

Table 3.2 Proporlional change ofequivalized household incame (in euros)after relationship dissolution (aLS regression coejficients)

93Belgium: economie hardship

CONCLUSION

From a European perspective, Belgium shows divorce rates which arecomparable to those in the Scandinavian counlries and the UK. Since2005, the continuously rising trend has been stabilizing at a high level.Since cohabitation is q uickly gaining popularity among younger cohorts,and dissolutions of cohabiting relationships are not officially registered innational statistics, a spurious decline in the divorce rate may even occurin the coming years. The Belgian welfare slate can be classified as a con­servative welfare regime (Esping-Andersen, 1991) with a st rong accent onthe family as a provider of welfare. In social security regulations, divorceis not reeognized as a social risk. Poverty measures and labour marketpolieies are generic and work related. Therefore, the male breadwinnermodel can be seen as having a major influence on the effects of ending amarriage. Sinee many pillars of the social security system are based onincome, the non-working partner (usuaJ1y lhe woman) comes up againstthe most severe consequences of divorce. Starting to work or increasingone's working hours are effective slrategies for fighting the income decEneafter a divorce, but the regression analysis in this study does nol show asignificant effect of these strategies. This indicales that Belgian minimumincome protection succeeds both in keeping poverty l'ates low and in mod­erating the income dechne after a divorce.

In recent years, Belgian labour market policies have focused on twodomains: the increase of labour force participation aftel' 55 (not at stakehere) and the improvement of work--life balance. With respect to divorceand its eonsequences, Ieave time schedules are trump cards in fighting thenegative economie outcomes of relationship dissolution. The high labourmarkeI participation of mothers - especially younger women - provesthaI being a solo parent and working full-time is a tough, though feasible,combination. In addition, generous child allowances and an elaboratechildcare infrastructure - which almost labels Belgium as a country witha social-democratic welfare regime - ease the economic consequences forwomen. The crucial question remains as to why these regulations do notsucceed in fighting the dramatic economic deterioration shown in ourempirical analyses. Even though women may catch up in the long run, theshort-term l'elapse is reJatively severe in light ofthe aforementioned safetynet.

Since 2000, families and family law have enjoyed renewed political in ter­est. The most visible results of this shift are the aforementioned measuresto improve the work-life balance of young households and same-sexmarriages. From 2004, the breakup of cohabiting unions also seemed tobe induded in the political agenda. Many legislalive initialives have been

Single mull/ry studies

Firsl, we find that pre-divorce income level is a highly significant predie­tor. The parameter of model I suggesls that persons with higher incomelevels before the breakup of a marriage experience a larger loss in income.Next, women clearly suffer more from divorce than do men, as alreadyshown in the descl'iptive analysis. Pre-divorce income level and genderare the two most important predictors of the change in income. Î Model 2further shows a significant effect ofbeing highly educated and ofthe numberof children in the household. Surprisingly, entering the labour market aftel'adivorce tu ros out not to be significant for the prediction ofincome change.About 8 per cent of divorcees start working aftel' a divorce. The effects inmodel 1 show that entering the labour market does help to reduce the nega­tive effects, but note that the parameter is not statisticaHy significant.

Model 1 ProportionaJ Model 2 Inverse ofchange in incorne proportional change in

income

b B b B

OECD-cquivalized 0.0005*** -0.340 0.00037*** 0.349

ineome (in euros)before dissolulionGender (woman) -0.407*** -0.335 0.248*** 0.290

Number ofchildrcn -0.043 -0078 0.072* 0.\85

Age 0.007 0.097 -0.003 -0.049

Not working at t~ I -0.244 -0.167 0.207 0.201

Starled working at 0.266 0.121 -0.262 -0.170

t+ IEducalion

Higher sccondary 0.12\ 0.094 -0.072 -0.080

Higher education 0.221 0.178 -0.180* -0.206

Has ncw partner at 0.108 0.077 -0.132 -0.132

t+1Region (Flanders) -0.031 -0.025 0.098 0.115

Inlercept 1504 0.668

R' 0.27 0.32

Adj R' 0.21 0.27

N 208 208

92

NüTES

I. The regulation of Ihe 'Dcelaralion of CohabilalioLl' was introduced by a law passedin J998, but the actual deelaralion has only been in use since 2000 (Gerio, 2003). Eventhougb Lhe legislalion holds fol' t.he enLire country, there are minor differenecs in thebeuefils adjuc.lged lo cohabitation depending on lhe region.

2. There is no official regu!alioll reganling benefits available to single parent.s in ease theoUler parenl does not pay mainlenance. However, there is a possibility for soeia! servicesLO pay lhe single parent the aJimony in advance (iu 2003 €125 per month). The socialservice wil1 then try lo regain the alimony from the other parent. This reguJalion only holdsfor single parents whose yearly incOJUe does nol exceed €11 544 (situalion in 2003).

3. Only marital dissolutions are eonsidered. Cohabiting couples are nol included in thesample.

4. Disposable household income has bcen adjusle<l ('equivalized') to household sizeusing equivaknce insights from lhe Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopmenL (OECD). Each firsl adult in a household is assigned a weight of I. Furtherhousehold members agcd 14 years and older are assigned a weighl 01'0.5, while childrenbelow Lhe age of 14 count for 0.3 (Atkinson et al., 1995; Hagenaars el al., 1994).

5. Because of inlra-household aLtrition, lhe equivalized disposable household income ofmen and women is not idenLical. However, no ill1put.aLions have been made.

6. We firsl tlsed a log-lransfonnation of the change score as in Uunk (2004). However, thislransformation was insufficient. to correct for non-normality. The mulliplicalive inverselransformalion (see Mosteller and Tukey, (977) lurned out to be more appropriate.

taken to change divorcc legislation once more. Even though few changeshave already been adopted, it is deal' that the reJatively sta bie I3elgianfarnily law wiJl ulldergo several major changes. The rapidly changingdemographic nature of the society, with its numerOLlS new householdfarms, is putting the classic (male breadwinner-based) system under pres­sure. Although large internationally comparative surveys (for exarnple, theECHP) have reference periods that do not yet capture the consequencesof these changes, it is important to nole that the legal context of Belgianhouseholds is changing fast and will probably evolve even more in the yearsto come. Imporlant in this respect is that legislalive policies are movingtowards lowering thc thresholds for getting divorced without compensal­ing for the short-term economie consequences.

From a ELlropean perspective, Belgian poverty rates are low. However,if we look at divorce as a particular life-course event, income declinesremain sharp, a.nd recovery from income decJines may take a long time.Due to thc breadwinner-based foundations of the system, labour marketpolicies and childcare facilities alone do not suffice. Generous and elabo­rate leave time schcdules are predominanlly favourable to dual-earnerhouseholds. The absence of 'family composition' as a criterion for socialsecurity system benefits is largeJy responsible for the unfavourable positionof single parents. Recently, politicaI attention to single-parenl families hasincreaseci, but as yet without any legislative result.

95Belgium: economie !lordship

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97Belgiwn: economie hardshipSingle country studies96

When Marriage EndsEconomie and Social Consequences ofPartnership Dissolution

Edited by

Hans-Jürgen Andre13

Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences,University of Cologne, Germany

Dina Hummelsheim

Max Plande Institute.for Foreign and International CriminalLaw, Freiburg, Germany

Edward ElgarCheltenham, UK· NorthampLon, MA, USA

© Hans-Jürgen AndreJ3 and Dina Hummelsheim 2009 ContentsAll Tights reserved. No part ofthis publication may be reproduced, stored in aretrieval system or transmitted in any farm or by any means, electronic,mechanicalor phOlocopying, recording, or olherwise wilhoullhe priorpermission of lhe publisher.

List ofcontribulOrsAcknowledgemenls

V1l

XII

Publishcd byEdward Elgar Publishing LimiledThe Lypiatts15 Lansdown RoadCbcltcnbamGlos GL50 2JAUK

Introduction: economie and social consequences of partnershipdissolution - what do we knowand what are we looking for?Hans-Jürgen Andre) and Dina Hummelsheim

PART 1 THEORETICAL, METHODOLOGICALANDMEASUREMENT ISSUES

Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.William Pratt House9 Dewey CourtNorlhamplonMassachusetts 01060USA

Conceptualization and measuremenLs of institutional contexts:a reviewHaya Stier

PART 11 SINGLE COUNTRY STUDIES

29

51

78

l55

178

1325 Divergences in the Nordie model: economie consequences of

partnership dissolution in Sweden and FinlandHeikki Hiilarno

6 Great Britain: 'things can only get better ..Wendy Sigle-Rushton

7 Marita! disruption in Spain: c1ass selectivity and deteriorationof economie conditionsLluis Flaquer and Anna Garriga

2 Germany: will the male breadwinner model survive?Dina IJummelsheim

3 Be!gium: economie hardship despite e1aborale childcare andIeave time programmesDimitri Morlelnums, Laurent Snoeckx and Peter Raeymaeckers

4 New holes in the safety net? Economie and socia! consequencesof divorce in Denmark 98M. Azhar Hussain and Olli Kangas

Library of Congress Control Number: 2009921832

ISBN 978 184844 1934

CATG-PEFC.{)52www.pefc.org

@r»EFC-

PEfCJI6·1!·111

Printed and bound in Greal Brilaiu by MPG Books Group, UK

A catalogue record for this bookis available from the British Library

vi ContenlS

8 Low divorce incidence in Greece: facts and 6guresHaris Symeonidou

PART IfI COMPARATIVE STUDIES

9 Female-supportive policies and women's employment afterdivorceMaike van Damme and Wi/fred Uunk

10 Divorce and housing: a European comparison of the housingconsequences of divoree for men and womenCaro/ine Dewi/de

11 The economie consequences of partnership dissolution: acomparative analysis or panel studies rrom Belgium,Germany, Great Britain, ltaly and SwedenHans-Jürgen AndrejJ, Barbara Borg/oh, Miriam Bröcke/,Marco Giefie/mann alld Dina Humme/sheim

12 Marital disruption and economie well-being: poverty, incomeand lifestyle deprivationArnsteil1 Aassve, Gianni Berti, Stefano Mazzuco and LeliziaMencarini

PART IV CONCLUSION

13 When marriage ends: results and conclusionsHans-Jiirgen AndrejJ and Dina Hummelsheim

PARTV DATA APPENDIX

Data appendix

Index

211

233

263

286

330

361

387

407

Contributors

Arnstein Aassvc obtained his PhD in Economics at Bristol Universityin 2000 and is now an Associale Professor in Demography at BocconiUniversity of Milall. He is the deputy director of the Carlo F. DondenaCentre for Research in Social Dynamics. He is a research associate at thelnstitute ofSocial and Economie Research (Essex), Statistics Norway, andthe Centrefor Analysis ofSocial Exclusion (London School ofEconomics).His research interests are wide and include demography, applied statistics,micro-econometrics, social policy, simulations and Iife-course analysis.

Hans-Jürgen Andrefi studied Social Sciences and Research Methads at theUniversities of Frankfurt/Main and Michigan (Ann Arbor). He gainedhis PhD at the University of FrankfurtiMain in 1983 and is at presentProfessor for Empirical Social and Economie Research at the University ofCologne. He has published in the field oflabour markets, poverty research,social pollcy, and multivariate statistical methods.

Gianlli Betti obtained his PhD in Applied Statistics at the Universityof Flo rence in 1998 and is eurrently Associate Professor in EconomieStatistics and mem ber of the 'Centro Interdipartimentale di Ricerca sullaDistribuzione del Reddito C. Dagum' (CRlDIRE) at the University ofSiena, ltaly. He has worked for several projects for the World Bank and tbeEuropean Commission, and has been closely involved with the develop­ment of the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC).

Barbanl Borgloh studied Sociology at the Universities of Hamburgand Bielefeld and ho1ds a Diploma in Sociology from the University ofBie1efeld. Shehas been a Researcher at the University of Bielefeld and pub­lished on the economie consequences of divorce and maintenance law.

Miriam BröckeJ holds a Diploma in Sociology from the University ofBielefeld. She has been a researcher at the University of Bielefeld andpublished on economie consequences of divorce and subjective well-beingaftel' marital disruption.

CaroIine Dewilde is an Assistant Professor in Sociology at the Universityof Amsterdam. Prior to January 2009 she was a Postdoctora1 ResearchFellow with the Research Foundation - Flanders (FWO-Vlaanderen)