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Assessing the Responses of The Economic Community of West African States to the Recurring and Emerging Security Threats in West Africa

Benjamin MaiangwaUniversity of Manitoba, Canada

AbstractSince its formation in 1975, The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has attained a mixed-bag of accomplishments in the area of peace and security. Despite its modest gains in this area, the capacity of the organization has been constantly challenged by emerging and recurring security threats in the West African region. These include jihadist terrorism, drug trafficking and the unconstitutional changes of government. Informed by a brief analysis on the theory of security regionalization, this paper assesses the progress of ECOWAS in resolving the aforementioned security challenges, and then determines how the organization could become more meaningful to regional and global security. The data acquired for the paper was gleaned through scholarly deductions and a vigorous review of ECOWAS’ security mechanisms.

KeywordsECOWAS, West Africa, security regionalization, terrorism, drug trafficking, unconstitutional changes of government

Introduction

At the end of the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, there was a great optimism that the West African region would continue on the path towards accelerated growth and economic transforma-tion (Adebajo 2004: 1). These hopes were sustained by both the return to democratic rule in some West African countries in the 1990s and the modest achievement of The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the area of peace and security. However, the recurrence and emergence of certain security challenges – such as military coups, drug trafficking and terrorism – in some West African states have continued to pose existential threats to both the stability of the West African region and the regional security integration project of ECOWAS.

Corresponding author:Benjamin Maiangwa, Arthur V Mauro Centre for Peace and Justice, University of Manitoba, St Paul’s College, 70 Dysart Road, Winnipeg, MB R3T 2N2, Canada. Email: bennymaiangwa@gmail.com

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The 2012–2013 armed violence in Mali – where the mix of ethnic violence, jihadist terrorism, military coup and drug trafficking coalesced to destabilize the north of the country – demonstrated the façade of Mali’s stable democracy, and highlighted some of the shortcomings of ECOWAS in the area of conflict management and counterterrorism. But despite its obvious limitations, Thonke and Sliid (2012: 48) contend that the performance of ECOWAS vis-à-vis other major regional organizations in Africa (the Intergovernmental Authority on Development – IGAD; the Southern Africa Development Community – SADC; the Economic Community of Central African States – ECCA; the Arab Maghreb Union – AMU) has been a remarkable achievement. This owes partly to the developed security mechanisms and the relative advances of ECOWAS in the area of economic and security integration.

Some of the notable security mechanisms of ECOWAS include the 1999 Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Resolution, Management, Peacekeeping and Security (hereaf-ter, the Mechanism), the 2001 Protocol on Good Governance and Democracy (hereafter, the 2001 Protocol), and the 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (hereafter, ECPF). In 2013, ECOWAS adopted a Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan in reaction to the esca-lating nature of jihadist terrorism in Mali and in Nigeria, as well as a response to the historical lack of a regional counterterrorism strategy in West Africa.

Although ECOWAS has utilized its security mechanisms, with varying degrees of success, to manage the outbreak of conflicts in West Africa, certain deficiencies have been noted with regards to the manner in which some of the provisions of its security protocols have been articulated and administered. As regards terrorism, ECOWAS made provisions in Article 3 of the 1999 Mechanism and Article 24 of the 2001 protocol to combat the threat. However, ECOWAS’ efforts towards translating the provisions of these protocols to concrete plans and actions have been criticized. For instance, Lacher and Tull (2013: 1) argue that despite having adopted a Counterterrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan, ECOWAS’ member states have not shown the cooperation and determi-nation required to combat terrorism in the region.

Furthermore, despite ECOWAS’ zero tolerance towards unconstitutional changes of govern-ment and military coup as stipulated in Article 45 (1) of the 2001 protocol, some West African leaders have shown utter disregard to the provision of the protocol. The attempts made by former President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria (1999–2009), Mamadou Tandja of Niger (1999–2010) and Blaise Compaoré (1987–2014) of Burkina Faso to tamper with the constitutions of their coun-tries in order to prolong their stay in power are prime examples. This is compounded by military interference in the democratic affairs of member states as demonstrated by the 2012 coup in Mali and Guinea Bissau.

Additionally, ECOWAS’ efforts in security operations have mainly been demonstrated in the areas of peacekeeping and conflict management. The important works of conflict prevention, secu-rity sector reform and post conflict reconstruction are often shunted to the margins or left to the whims of donor agencies and external actors. Considering these weaknesses confronting ECOWAS as an organization, it is therefore not surprising that the West African region is still beset by the aforementioned recurring and emerging security threats. Thus, in assessing the capacity and responses of ECOWAS to the regional dynamics of West Africa’s security threats, this paper will review the 1999 Mechanism, the 2001 Protocol, the ECPF and the ECOWAS Counterterrorism Strategy in order to:

1. Examine and assess how the articulation and application of certain provisions of ECOWAS protocols are informing the manner in which the organization is responding to the changing nature of West Africa’s emerging and recurring security challenges, especially in this

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instance, how ECOWAS is responding to the threat of terrorism, drug trafficking and unconstitutional changes of government;

2. Assess how ECOWAS member states are responding and complying to regional security protocols;

3. Examine how ECOWAS is utilizing the ECPF to prevent the outbreak of violent conflicts in West Africa, and highlight the challenges confronting the organization in discharging this duty;

4. Examine the relationship of ECOWAS with its foreign supporters in the area of peace and security.

The overall purpose of the paper is to determine how the security mechanisms and capacity of ECOWAS could be enhanced to enable the organization to usefully impact on the security environ-ment of West Africa.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the first section introduces the theoretical frame-work of the paper, which hinges on the theory of security regionalization. The second section examines West Africa’s recurring and emerging security challenges. These challenges include the threat of terrorism, drug trafficking and unconstitutional changes of government. The third section reviews the important security mechanisms of ECOWAS and assesses how they have impacted on the security challenges outlined above. The final section reflects on several ways in which ECOWAS could become more meaningful to regional and global security.

Security regionalization

The theory and practice of security regionalization evolved as an idea within the broader processes of regional integration and cooperation. It describes the situation in which regional entities are variously affected by common security challenges, which enable them to organize a common response against such threats (Ogwu, 2008: 792). Buzan and Waever (2003: 44) use the term ‘regional security complex’ (RSC) to describe the processes involved in the transmutation of national security threats into regional issues. According to them, RSC entails ‘a set of units whose processes of securitization, de-securitization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another’.

Although Buzan and Waever (2003) theorize regional securitization as contingent on geographic contiguity on the basis that ‘threats travel easier over short distances than over longer ones’, it is important to note that regional clustering of security is not necessarily dependent on geographic proximity (Tavares, 2010a: 166). The activities of terrorist groups, which could be domestic or transnational, may compel states to transcend their rivalries and organize common responses to tackle terrorism (Tavares, 2010a: 162–166).

The legal basis for the involvement of regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security is outlined in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Article 52(1) of the Charter asserts that ‘nothing in the Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security’. Article 53(1) states that the UN Security Council ‘shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrange-ments for enforcement action under its authority’; but no enforcement action shall be undertaken by regional organizations without the authorization of the Security Council (Article 53(1), UN Charter Chapter VIII). Despite these clear stipulations, Abass (2004) argues that Chapter VIII con-tains certain deficiencies regarding the security roles of regional organizations. For example, ‘nothing in the Chapter foretold the peace enforcement role regional organizations currently play in their respective regions, nor did the chapter envisage the kind of relationship that developed

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between regional organizations and the UN after the Cold War’ (Abass, 2004: xx). It is such defi-ciencies that have continued to pose serious legal and operational challenges for the functioning of regional organizations and their relationship with the UN in the area of peace and security. Against the foregoing context therefore, this paper will assess the operational capacity of ECOWAS in the area of peace and security, while highlighting its strengths, shortcomings and prospect of being a solid institution that can determine the stability of West Africa for the foreseeable future.

Examining West Africa’s security challenges

In 1994, Robert Kaplan, a prominent American journalist, published a thought-provoking article in the Atlantic entitled ‘The coming anarchy’. In the said article, Kaplan argues that the West African region was bound to face an impending Armageddon. He comments on the widespread nature of crime in the region and the tyrannical regimes therein, and then refers to the unemployed and less educated youth on the streets of Sierra Leone as ‘loose molecules in a very unstable social fluid’; a fluid which, according to him, ‘was clearly on the verge of igniting’ (Kaplan, 1994). Continuing, Kaplan (1994) argues that ‘the increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms, and international drug cartels’ will pose a seri-ous threat to West Africa’s stability in the future. Kaplan also argues that Nigeria’s prospects for democratic transition are slim, and that it is likely that Nigeria will remain ungovernable due to its pervasive ethno-religious and regional cleavages (Kaplan, 1994).

Kaplan’s ‘coming anarchy’ has been widely criticized. For instance, Besteman (2007) contends that by arguing that ‘Africa’s state borders are increasingly irrelevant Kaplan slips into writing about a generic “Africa” and provides his readers no information about the diversity of cultural practices, languages, environments, political histories, democratic successes, economic systems, life experiences, etc., on this vast continent’ (Besteman, 2000: 27).

Although, to some extent, West Africa seemed to have demonstratively lived up to some of Kaplan’s gory prognosis, in recent times, widespread political violence such as civil wars and inter-state conflicts are becoming less common in the region, and on the entire continent. As noted by Straus (2012: 180), incidents of civil wars on Africa have ‘declined steeply, so that today there are half as many wars as in the 1990s’. To be sure, the UN has closed its peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone. Although this may increase the pressure on the Sierra Leonean government to deliver public safety and national security (Security Council Report 2013: 14), the end of the UN mission in Sierra Leone, taken together with the decline of interstate violence and civil wars in West Africa and the greater prominence of ECOWAS in conflict management are, perhaps, indications that the security situation of West Africa did not turn out to be as gloomy as Kaplan had forecast two decades ago.

Besides civil wars, the spates of military coups have also declined in West Africa, even though Mali and Guinea Bissau were ravaged by coups d’état in 2012. In addition, the West African people are becoming responsive and are beginning to question the nature of governance and style of lead-ership in their countries. The setting ablaze of the house of parliament in Burkina Faso in October 2014, which brought to an end the 27-year rule of President Blaise Compaoré is a cautionary tale of the non-tolerance of West African people towards despotic and undemocratic regimes. In essence, then, Kaplan’s anarchic assessment of how West Africa would turn out in the 21st century was shortsighted (Diplomatic Discourse, 2012): ‘He miscalculated general global impacts based on a few personal experiences in Sierra Leone’ (Diplomatic Discourse, 2012). Nonetheless, while there are reasons to be optimistic, recent conflict trends in the region have reignited a great deal of concern regarding the stability of the region and the progress of the regional integration project of ECOWAS. Next is a brief discussion on these emerging and recurring security threats, and their impacts on the stability of West Africa and on the security regionalization project of ECOWAS.

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The threat of terrorism

The US Country Report on Terrorism disclosed that in 2011, ‘Africa experienced 978 terrorist attacks. This was attributable in large part to the more frequent attacks of Boko Haram in Nigeria’ (Financial Action Task Force, 2013: 5). The group’s horrendous attacks have claimed more than 6000 lives since its first violent uprising in July 2009. Boko Haram’s escalating violent activities, with the attendant causalities, regional spill-over into Cameroon, Niger, Chad, and alleged abuses by the Nigerian security forces, pose an immediate threat to human security and the stability of Nigeria and the West African region as a whole (ISS Dakar et al., 2013: 2).

Furthermore, the rising tide of terrorism in the Sahel compounds the jihadist threat in West Africa. The major manifestation of this threat was in Mali where, in 2012, some groups of Islamist militants and Tuareg ethnic militias seized control of the north of the country. This came after President Amadou Toumani Touré was toppled in a coup led by one Captain Amadou Sanogo in March 2012. Some of the armed Tuareg group were, until October 2011, part of Ghaddafi’s com-batants in Libya. The Islamists (AQIM, MUJAO, Ansar al-Dine)1 and the Tuaregs (the MNLA)2 both want – though with different objectives – the independence of northern Mali (Maiangwa, 2013: 2). Although the French-led intervention and a democratic political transition have brought a semblance of peace to Mali, the Sahelian region still remains vulnerable to infiltration by terrorist elements from Mali, Algeria, Libya and Nigeria.

Drug trafficking

The emergence of the Latin American drug cartels in West Africa has been cited as one of the fac-tors that triggered the 2012 crisis in Mali (Kühne, 2013: 3). West Africa’s coastal states of Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Cape Verde, Nigeria, Ghana, The Gambia and Senegal have become major transit routes for drug traffickers from Latin America such that these states are now regarded as the ‘coke coast’ or ‘narco-states’; so-called because ‘there state institutions have been greatly compromised by drug trafficking’ (Aning, 2011: 150; WACD, 2014: 20). According to the West African Commission on Drugs (WACD), ‘the UN Secretary-General estimated the yearly value of cocaine transiting through West Africa at US$1.25 billion, which is more than the annual budgets of several countries in the region’ (WACD, 2014: 12). Although considered a relatively nonviolent security challenge, drug trafficking has significantly contributed to state fragility in some of West Africa’s coastal states, particularly in those states recovering from violent conflicts or decades of political instability (Aning 2011: 168; WACD 2014: 13).

The drug crime is propelled by the high level of corruption and impunity of security officers, as well as the weak and corrupt judicial systems obtaining in several West African states. Politicians in the region have been reportedly complacent in the drug trade. According to Aning (2011: 152), one investigator notes the common tendency of politicians to adopt a laisser-faire attitude towards the drug crime, ‘believing that it is preferable to the type of violent conflicts that have destroyed other states in the region’. This raises the suspicion that drug cartels may be forging ‘alliances of convenience’ with certain politicians in the region. For instance, in 2005 ‘Colombian drug cartels reportedly financed the re-election campaign of President João Bernardo “Nino” Vieira, effectively placing him and his country at the whims and service of drug traffickers’ (WACD, 2014: 20). More so, terrorist elements in West Africa and the Sahel–Saharan belt reportedly have also forged alli-ance with drug traffickers for financial gains. This is made easier by the fact that most of the ter-rorist groups are operating in a fragile region characterized by porous borders, political instability, unemployment, climate change and corruption (WACD, 2014: 12). It is alleged that Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has been supporting the drug trade in the trans-Sahel region by

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placing levies on drugs passing through its controlled territory and, in some cases, by actively engaging in the drug trafficking trade in order to generate revenue for its operations (WACD, 2013a: 19; Haysom, 2014: 1).

It is not yet clear whether the alliance of terrorists and drug traffickers in West Africa is ‘a united threat or simply a function of the political-economic dynamics of the region’ (Financial Action Task Force, 2013: 13). But according to WACD (2014: 54), ‘the link between drug traffickers and terrorists is more opportunistic than ideological’. And in the context of judicial corruption, ineffec-tive laws and institutions, and weak border control, terrorist organizations in the region may con-tinue to thrive on the proceeds derived from their involvement in the drug trade (Financial Action Task Force, 2013: 15).

Unconstitutional changes of government

The staging of military coups d’état and the tendency by incumbents to tamper with their national constitutions in order to extend their term in office constitute a major security threat to the West African region (Omotola, 2011: 1–8). In the last two decades alone, unconstitutional changes of government accounted for more than 80% of conflicts in the region; ‘from Liberia (1989–2005), Sierra Leone (1991–2002), Cote d’Ivoire (1992–2002; 2010–2011), Guinea Conakry (2007–2010), Guinea Bissau (2005–2009), and Mauritania (2008)3‘ (Sampson, 2011: 538). Countries like Nigeria and Benin Republic have experienced tumultuous political transitions, interspersed with bloody military coups and counter coups. Benin Republic, for example, ‘had no fewer than 12 Heads of State in the first decade of its independence; every one of which was overthrown in a coup d’état’ (Omotola, 2011: 12). Only Cape Verde and Senegal had never had a military coup (Diallo, 2005: 6), although in 2012 the former President of Senegal Abdoulaye Wade did interfere with the con-stitution of his country in a bid to run for a third term. Similarly, in Burkina Faso, the attempt by President Blaise Compaoré and his supporters to persuade parliament to scrap the constitutional limit on president terms so as to elongate his term in office led to violent outbursts of demonstra-tions by the restive citizens (New York Times, 30 October 2014), which brought an end to the 27-year rule of President Compaoré.

Because ECOWAS has been uncompromising towards all forms of unconstitutional changes of government through its 2001 protocol, Omotola (2011: 13) observes that elections are beginning to feature prominently in the transitional processes of many West African states. Yet, the 2012 Malian crisis, the ongoing Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria, and the violent anti-government riot in Burkina Faso are testaments to the changing dynamics and unpredictable nature of West Africa’s security challenges. Next is a discussion on how ECOWAS has been applying its security mechanisms to address the aforementioned security challenges.

Assessing the application of ECOWAS’ security mechanisms

The first major attempts by ECOWAS at maintaining peace and security in West Africa came with the adoption in 1978 of the Accord on Non-Aggression and Defence (ANAD) and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance of Defence (PMAD) in 1981. Article 18 of the PMAD (ECOWAS, 1978: 7–8) states that in the case where an internal conflict in a member state is actively maintained and sus-tained from outside, the Authority shall decide to intervene; whereas it shall not do so if the conflict were driven by internal forces. Article 2-4 of ANAD discourages member states from committing acts of aggression against each other or allowing foreigners to commit an act of aggression against a member state (cited in Anning et al., 2010). By externalizing internal conflicts and ignoring the possibility of internal instability resulting from issues of state fragility or sectarian and communal

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clashes, PMAD and ANAD have been criticized as being too limited in scope (Elowson and Macdermott, 2010: 23).4 For his part, Francis (2009: 92, 93) argues that both protocols were mainly regime protection strategies that served only the interests of ECOWAS’ leaders and safeguarded them against external (and internal/oppositional) security threats.

The ‘euphemistically labeled ECOWAS Monitoring Group’ (ECOMOG) (Møller, 2009: 6) peacekeeping mission (Operation Liberty) in Liberia was the very first attempt by the organization to intervene militarily in a member state. ECOMOG was subsequently deployed to intervene in the civil wars that struck Sierra Leone (1997–1999), Guinea Bissau (1998–1999, 2012) and Côte d’Ivoire (2003–2004). The intervention by ECOMOG prompted a ‘spurt of institutional develop-ment within ECOWAS, which helped to transform the organization into Africa’s most advanced conflict management body’ (Coleman, 2007: 73). Consequently, ECOWAS revised its Treaty in 1993 and underscored the need to maintain ‘regional peace, stability and security through the pro-motion and strengthening of good neighbourliness’ (Article 4(1), 1993 Revised Treaty).

The revised ECOWAS treaty paved the way for the creation of other important security mecha-nisms and institutions. The first important security mechanism to be created was the 1999 Mechanism. The Mechanism established various instruments for the strengthening of regional cooperation in the areas of ‘conflict prevention, early-warning, peace-keeping operations, the con-trol of cross-border crime, international terrorism and the proliferation of small arms and anti-personnel mines’ (Article 3, Mechanism for Conflict Prevention 1999). These instruments include the Mediation and Security Council (MSC), the Executive Secretariat, ECOWAS Rapid Response Force, an Early Warning System (ECOWARN) and the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF). The sec-ond important security mechanism that ECOWAS created was the 2001 Protocol. The protocol expresses zero tolerance towards any form of unconstitutional changes of government in West Africa and enumerated certain principles of good governance within ECOWAS member-states (Diallo, 2005: 3). Article 45 (1) of the 2001 Protocol asserts that ‘in the event that democracy is abruptly brought to an end by any means or where there is massive violation of Human Rights in a member state, ECOWAS may impose sanctions on the state concerned’ (ECOWAS, 2001). In 2008, the ECPF was created in order to enable ECOWAS to prevent the outbreak of conflicts in West Africa.

The ECOWAS institutions established by the 1993 treaty are the de facto implementing agen-cies of the aforementioned mechanisms. These institutions include the Authority of Heads of State and Government; the Council of Ministers; the Community Parliament; the Economic and Social Council; the Community Court of Justice; the Commission, and the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID) (Francis, 2009: 93). The paper will highlight some of the functions of only the following three institutions: the Authority, the Community Court of Justice, and the ECOWAS Commission. At this point, the paper will examine how ECOWAS has used the provi-sions of its security mechanisms (especially the 1999 Mechanism and the 2001 Protocol) to address unconstitutional changes of government, drug trafficking and terrorism in West Africa.

ECOWAS’ response to unconstitutional changes of government

Some West African leaders have flaunted the provisions of the 2001 Protocol either by tampering with their constitutions to maintain a hold on power or by staging a coup (WANEP, 2003: 17). The cases of Togo (2005), Guinea (2008), Guinea Bissau (2009 and 2012), Niger (2009 and 2010) Cote d’Ivoire (2010; Omotola, 2011: 7) and Mali (2012) are salutary examples.

In 2005, ECOWAS imposed a travel ban on Togolese leaders ‘because the military had, upon the death of the dictator, Gnassingbe Eyadema, manipulated his son (Faure Gnassingbe) into power’ (Møller, 2009: 5). ECOWAS swiftly acted to stop the unconstitutional ascendancy of Faure

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as President of Togo by invoking the Togolese constitution and Article 45 of the 2001 Protocol (Bah, 2012: 277). The AU was also supportive of ECOWAS’ intervention in Togo. The combined efforts of ECOWAS and the AU led to the organization of elections in Togo, in which Faure emerged as President. It bears mentioning that the ECOWAS Chairman who announced the sanc-tion on Togo in 2005 was the then President of Niger, Mamadou Tandja, who himself attempted to tamper with his country’s constitution in 2009 at the completion of his second term in office. By way of response, ECOWAS suspended Niger Republic from all its decision making bodies in 2009 (Souaré, 2010: 16).

While ECOWAS is adept at sanctioning member states who flaunt the provision of Article 45 of the 2001 Protocol, the organization has not shown the clout needed to properly ensure the compli-ance of member states with the provisions of the Protocol, and to determine when, if necessary, to properly prosecute defaulters. Moreover, the fact that ECOWCAS allows some West African lead-ers with questionable credentials – such as Blaise Compaoré – to lead mediation processes in the region is regarded by WANEP (2003: 23) as ‘one of the ironies of the 2001 Protocol’. Another issue apropos the mediation efforts of ECOWAS has been the tendency of those mediating ‘to pursue national interest’ (Elowson and Macdermott, 2010: 10). Nevertheless, the involvement of leaders with the merits and qualifications – such as Thabo Mbeki and Kofi Annan – to spearhead mediation processes in Africa could, according to Straus (2012: 198), be seen as part of the resolve by African leaders to take a greater interest in the prevention and resolution of conflicts on the continent.

ECOWAS’ response to drug trafficking

ECOWAS has made some appreciable efforts in dealing with drug trafficking in West Africa. The 2009 Abuja Political Declaration and accompanying Action Plan on the Prevention of Drug Abuse, Illicit Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in West Africa and the 2010 Dakar Initiative are some of the major initiatives that have been implemented by ECOWAS to tackle the drug trade (Aning and Pokoo, 2013: 10). In support of the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan, the UN created and implemented the West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI) in four West African countries including Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone (UNOWA, 2014).

In addition to the above interventions, Article 46 of the 1999 Mechanism made provision for the establishment of a special fund for preventive and criminal justice response to, among other things, drug trafficking. The Article also made recommendation for the establishment of a Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Centre (ECPCJS). While an ECODRUG Fund has been created with an ‘allo-cated US$150,000 for start-up costs’ (IRIN West Africa Update, 1998), the ECPCJS has yet to be established as at the time of writing.

In 2013, the erstwhile UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, complemented the anti-drug efforts of ECOWAS by establishing the West African Drugs Commission (WACD) (Kühne, 2013: 10). The Commission, which is headed by the former president Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, set out three major objectives on tackling the drug trade: (1) to mobilize public awareness and political commitment; (2) develop evidence-based policy recommendations; and (3) develop local and regional capacities and ownerships (WACD, 2013b).

Thus far, WACD has conducted an assessment of the measures that the West African states have taken to address the drug crime. The assessment revealed that ‘no West African state has imple-mented systematic reintegration scheme for drug users’ (Aning and Pokoo, 2013: 4). It is argued that one of the reasons why the issue of establishing reintegration schemes for drug users has not been properly dealt with is that the normative framework against drug trafficking in several West African states is quite rigid and draconian (Aning and Pokoo, 2013: 9). Nigeria’s National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), Ghana’s Narcotics Control Board (NACOB) and other drug

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agencies in Liberia and Sierra Leone all lead the fight against drug trafficking, but in a manner that Aning and Pokoo (2013: 9, 10) had adjudged as merely ‘enforcement-driven’, and even so, with many challenges ranging from under-funding to corruption among the security agencies.

Other ECOWAS initiatives geared at combating drug trafficking include the formation of the West African Police Chiefs Committee (WAPCCO), West African Joint Operations Initiatives (WAJO), ECOWAS Drug Control Unit and Drug Fund (EDCUDF), Airport Communication Project (AIRCOP), the Global Container Control Programme (GCCP), the 2013 ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan, and the ECOWAS integrated Maritime Security Strategy (Cockayne and Williams 2009: 20; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2013: 7, 8; WACD, 2014: 16). UNODC has also been supporting the ‘interdiction of containerized shipments’ (UNODC, 2013: 53) under the GCCP (a joint programme of UNODC and the World Customs Organization). UNODC has also ‘developed National Integrated Programmes (NIPs) for all the ECOWAS countries’ (Aning and Pokoo, 2013: 11). However, the problem of under-funding has continued to derail the progress and effectiveness of these regional and international initiatives against the drug crime. For example, one of the reasons adduced for the dormancy of the ‘Drug Control Unit’ has been the lack of financial resources (Cockayne and Williams, 2009: 20). There is also the perennial issue of the lack of political will by ECOWAS member states.5

Another shortcoming in the interventions against the drug crime in West Africa is that most of the efforts made have mainly focused on restricting the flow of the drugs and strengthening border and law enforcement mechanisms with little attention invested in improving public health and prosecuting corrupt politicians and public officials involved in sustaining the crime (WACD, 2014: 17). The foregoing shortcomings press the need for a comprehensive and rigorous approach that encompasses the focus on the health of drug users, as well as the overhauling of the legal-constitu-tional mechanisms of ECOWAS member states so that they could be more proactive in prosecuting politicians and influential people who are complicit in the drug trade.

ECOWAS’ response to terrorism

In Article 3 of the 1999 Mechanism, ECOWAS made provision to combat international terrorism. Article 24 of the 2001 protocol also enjoined member states to strengthen their national agencies responsible for preventing and combating terrorism. The Article asserts that ‘the Department of Political Affairs, Defence and Security of the Executive Secretariat shall initiate joint activities for the national agencies of Member States in charge of preventing and combating terrorism’ (Article 24 of the 2001 Protocol). Despite these provisions, several ECOWAS states, and, indeed, many African countries, have been slow in prioritizing the issue of counterterrorism. This is partly because according to a report by the UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA) (2010: 24), African leaders were initially of the view that ‘they should not be expected to apply the scarce human, technical and financial resources available to them to combat terrorism, which they regarded as mainly a global threat manifesting itself in Africa’. But given the escalating nature of terrorist activities in Mali and Nigeria, and the ripples in other countries within West Africa and beyond, ECOWAS adopted a counterterrorism strategy and implementation plan in 2013.

The ECOWAS Strategy is articulated along three main pillars: prevent, pursue, reconstruct (Ewi, 2013). The implementation of the ECOWAS Strategy lies with the West African states. However, to ensure regular follow-ups, accountability and effective monitoring of the process, ECOWAS includes a role for international organizations and partners and civil society organiza-tions in the implementation process. Equally important are the roles of the National Taskforce on counter-terrorism, ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Coordination (Unit/Centre), periodic evaluation

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and reporting on implementation of the ECOWAS Strategy, the ECOWAS Court of Justice, as well as the Inter-Governmental Group against Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing in West Africa (GIABA) (ECOWAS Press Release, 6 May 2011). These efforts notwithstanding, very little by way of countering terrorism has been achieved by ECOWAS. The Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria still rages as at the time of writing, with little or no intervention from ECOWAS. Similar is the situation in Mali where foreign troops, mainly from France, as well as the UN forces have been at the helm of counterterrorism and peacekeeping operations in the country.

In essence, then, while it could be argued that ECOWAS has made considerable progress in the area of peace and security in West Africa, the organization, nevertheless, does confront some critical challenges ranging from the non-compliance of member states, lack of resources and lack of will to follow through on the implementation of protocols. Another challenge, which will be discussed in the next section of the paper, is the inability of ECOWAS to adequately utilize the provisions of its conflict prevention framework (ECPF). Some suggestions on how the organization could restructure itself to become more meaningful to global and regional security will be made.

Assessing the provisions of the ECPF and the way ahead for ECOWAS

As stated, ECOWAS has made some modest progress in the area of peace and security, and has also had its fair share of criticism and problems. To begin with, ECOWAS has been criticized by secu-rity analysts and scholars for its excessive reliance on the reactive approaches to conflict resolution and management. As Tavares (2010b: 41) pointedly argues, ECOWAS’ ‘defense and security staff still regards peace and security as a mainly military responsibility involving the ESF and other techniques involving military forces supported by formal structures’. In this context, the important tasks of conflict prevention and peace-building are often neglected or, in some cases, left at the mercy of donors and multilateral organizations.

The ECPF provides a sound normative basis for a comprehensive conflict prevention and peace-building agenda for West Africa (ECOWAS, 2008). A careful examination of some of the compo-nents of the ECPF reveals both the lack of proper implementation of this framework by member states and, to some extent, its poor articulation. For instance, Article 49(g) (on Preventive Diplomacy) provides that ECOWAS and member states ‘shall take account of gender equity when facilitating the active involvement of former Heads of State, Eminent and high-profile personali-ties in mediation, conciliation and facilitation as ECOWAS Special Envoys and Ambassadors’. However, in practice, women have rarely been given the opportunity to play any significant role in the high profile mediation missions of ECOWAS. Moreover, the language of certain provisions of the security protocols of ECOWAS seems to suggest that they were formulated without due con-sideration to the leadership role of women. For instance, while outlining the duties of the Deputy Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Article 16(2) of the 1999 Mechanism begins with the non-inclusive language of ‘“He” shall have under “his” supervision appropriate departments, divisions and sections, as may be necessary…’.

On the issue of fostering democracy and good governance, Article 53(m) of the ECPF asserts that ‘ECOWAS will develop after-office roles for out-going incumbents and former Heads of State’. Such a provision opens the organization to various criticisms. One of which is that the ECPF opens room for leaders that have abused power while in office to still maintain key leadership positions within the structure of ECOWAS. This may explain why some former Heads of State in West Africa – including those who have led brutal and corrupt regimes – are often given mediating roles to play

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by the Mediation and Security Organ of ECOWAS. Such oversight should be corrected in practice if ECOWAS is to be respected by the people and warring parties in conflicts, who may prefer to listen to leaders with credible credentials and track record of good governance.

Another important point to highlight is the legality of the after-office roles for out-going incum-bents and former Heads of State. Does ECOWAS need an after-office role for former Heads of State as an obligation? What financial implications does this have for the organization? And to what extent is the ‘after-office’ role meaningful in building the institutional capacity of ECOWAS (considering that there is already the institution of the Authority that is responsible for operational-izing the security mechanisms of ECOWAS)? These questions are important to consider given the problem that ECOWAS already has with duplication of mandates, as well as its numerous logistical and financial constraints.

Equally important to consider is the involvement of certain despotic regimes in West Africa in the mediation of conflicts in the region. In authorizing Heads of States in the region to mediate in conflicts, especially those arising from military coups and insurgency, ECOWAS should always ensure that these leaders are not themselves guilty of the same crime in their home countries. Before his resignation, Blaise Compaoré, under the auspices of ECOWAS, headed many mediating missions in West Africa, including the 2012 crisis in Mali. This is despite his track record of stag-ing a military coup in Burkina Faso in 1987, which led to the dead of the former Burkinabe President, Thomas Sankara. To have such ex-leaders occupying after-office roles could irk many West African citizens and impede the progress of ECOWAS from truly becoming an organization of the people.

Furthermore, the ECPF pointed out the importance of adopting Peace Education as a conflict prevention and counter-radicalization strategy in Article 90(a). However, such education is still non-existent in many West African states. Although there are religious, civic and life orientation modules in many secondary schools in West Africa, the pervasiveness of sectarian violence and radical extremists’ activities necessitates the implementation of a module that deals specifically with peace education, especially in secondary schools where there are many young people who can be easily lured and recruited into extremist and insurgent organizations.

Moving forward, ECOWAS has also been criticized for not being able to revive the ESF to face security emergencies of an emerging nature like terrorism. In Article 21 of the 1999 Mechanism, ECOMOG, which was later transformed into the ESF, is mandated to undertake the following tasks:

Observation and Monitoring; Peace-keeping and restoration of peace; Humanitarian intervention in support of humanitarian disaster; Enforcement of sanctions, including embargo; Preventive deployment; Peace-building, disarmament and demobilize; Policing activities, including the control of fraud and organized crime; Any other operations as may be mandated by the Mediation and Security Council. (Chapter III, Article 21, ECOWAS 1999 Mechanism)

The last sentence, which reads Any other operations as may be mandated by the Mediation and Security Council, could be interpreted to also include counterterrorism operations. However, it is important to note that ECOWAS had not previously problematized the issue of terrorism in any significant way until the adoption in 2013 of the regional Counterterrorism Strategy. Besides, the civilian component of the ESF has not been effectively developed due both to the lack of resources and technical expertise as well as the overdependence of ECOWAS on the military approach to conflict management. This leaves ECOWAS with little option other than to seek the support of the international community in the area of intelligence gathering, equipment supply and the counter-terrorism training for its civilian and military components of the ESF.

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The US Special Operations Forces have been providing ‘training and assistance to regional countries around Mali including Niger, Libya, Mauritania and Burkina Faso’ (Sheehan and Porter, 2014: 2). On 17 January 2013, the European Union established the EU training mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) in order to improve the military capacity of the Malian Armed Forces (Council of the European Union, 2013: 1). And although Nigeria has not benefited from such ‘on the ground’ training or military assistance like the French intervention or the ECOWAS-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), the USA, UK, France, China and Israel have sent technical support to Nigeria after the kidnapping of the 200+ Chibok girls in April 2014.

Still, the socio-political make-up of Nigeria makes external intervention in the country prob-lematic. As Hutchful (2010) rightly argues, counterterrorism is often perceived in ‘ethnically and religiously diverse societies (such as Nigeria) as a form of racial, ethnic and religious profiling’ (cited in Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2010: 4). Moreover, Nigeria is often perceived as a regional leader with the capacity to take care of its problems and those of its neigh-bours. But such perception was always going to present a problem to ECOWAS, especially in a situation where Nigeria’s internal crises were to necessitate a regional response (Thonke and Spliid, 2012: 55). According to Møller (2009: 7), the hegemonic position of Nigeria in West Africa means that ECOWAS will be unable to do much about Nigeria’s internal security crises. It is no surprise therefore, that besides its condemnation of the terrorist acts in Nigeria, ECOWAS has not been able to render any tangible counterterrorism assistance to Nigeria.

While external assistance is important to bolster the counterterrorism capacity of ECOWAS, it does highlight two potentially distressing realities for the West African region: first, that despite the progress recorded so far, regional cooperation on security matters in the region remains very weak. Ewi (2013) identifies the lack of police cooperation and the sharing of information and mutual legal assistance among the West African states as a serious impediment to ECOWAS’ efforts at combating transnational crime. Second, such external assistance does reveal that the rhetoric of ‘African solutions to African problems’ as advanced by past and contemporary African leaders and pundits still remains more a case of rhetoric than reality. Without active cooperation from the West African states, the overdependence of ECOWAS on external assistance may continue to place the organization on the agenda of the West and of the Security Council, where, according to Mwanasali (2009: 247), ‘it would be told, like a child, how to behave by hectoring headmasters’.

The foregoing does not, however, rule out the need for external security assistance to West Africa. It is inconceivable for ECOWAS, as currently constituted, to make progress without some form of external assistance. Institutions like the International Police Organization (INTERPOL), could work with WAPCCO and the ESF to ensure the coordination of the regional police force in the improvement of cooperation in the area of border security in accordance with Article 69(c) and 71(b) of the ECPF. Already, INTERPOL has established a programme called OASIS Africa, which is being funded by Germany ‘to enhance local policing capacity in West Africa’ (Cockayne and Williams, 2009: 20). Coupled with the EU’s support in rebuilding the Malian army, this could serve as a renewed international effort towards strengthening the capacity of the West African security forces. But for optimal results, such external support should be coordinated by ECOWAS. External actors should, in accordance with Article 90(a) of the ECPF, support ECOWAS in reinforcing the capacities of the departments of peacekeeping and Regional Security and Humanitarian Affairs with the requisite funding, training and equipment. This may help to ensure the coherence of the foreign and regional security programmes in the region, and may also guard against the duplication of mandates.

Finally, the lack of capacity and even the slow response of ECOWAS to conflicts may not always be indicative of the organization’s lack of financial resources. This is because when the scale of corruption going on in many African states is taken into account, the argument could be

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sustained that Africa’s regional organizations do not necessarily lack resources because their mem-ber states are financially handicapped; but rather, because of the incompetence, profligacy and corruption of their political elites6 and other public officials who facilitate the chain of the organ-ized crime by sacrificing national and regional security on the altar of greed.7 A study by the International Crisis Group (2014: 46) reveals that some West African countries like Nigeria do have the financial resources to develop projects that can improve the wellbeing of their citizens and the security of their countries. Unfortunately, in West Africa, and elsewhere on the continent, ‘cor-ruption provides the incentive for even a government that has lost the trust of the people to remain in power’ (Atuobi, 2007: 14). It is also through corruption that some Heads of State have had the effrontery to tamper with their national constitutions. This is despite the adoption and ratification – by most ECOWAS member states – of the 2003 UN Convention on Corruption (UNCC), the 2003 AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC), and the 2001 ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight Against Corruption, and the 2011 declaration on Impunity, Justice and Human Right.

To be effective, ECOWAS will need to properly ensure the enforcement of its protocols by member states and be proactive in sanctioning member states and individuals who flaunt the legal provisions of any of its security mechanisms. ECOWAS should also begin to consider moving beyond waging diplomatic sanctions on member states. While diplomatic sanctions such as the suspension of member states and the refusal to organize ECOWAS meetings in defaulting states are welcome initiatives, they are, nevertheless, not as severe as imposing embargoes, which Article 22 of the 1999 Mechanism allows. The ECOWAS Authority should also fulfil its obligation as set out in Article 7(g) of the Revised Treaty to refer ‘where it deems necessary any matter to the Community Court of Justice when it confirms that a member state or institution of the Community has failed to honour any of its obligations or an institution of the Community has acted beyond the limits of its authority or has abused the powers conferred on it by the provisions of this Treaty, by a decision of the Authority or a regulation of the Council’ (ECOWAS Revised Treaty, Article 7(g)). It should also be noted that the right to refer cases to the Community Court of Justice is also conferred on the West African people in Article 4 of the 2005 revised protocol of the Community Court, which also gives the Community Court the expansive authority to adjudicate on human rights issues (Alter et al., 2013: 753; Elowson and Macdermott, 2010: 21).

Thus, the West African people can utilize their rights as guaranteed in these protocols to ensure accountability and compliance to ECOWAS security mechanisms and checkmate human rights abuses by their governments, public and security officials. With failure to restructure itself in the ways suggested above, the alternative for ECOWAS and its member states would be continued overreliance on external actors, with all its implications.

Concluding remarks

The findings of this paper revealed that ECOWAS has invested and contributed immensely in sta-bilizing West Africa against diverse security threats through its robust peace and security mecha-nisms. Through its 2001 protocol, the 1999 Mechanism, and the Mediating and Security Council, ECOWAS has intervened variously to restore constitutional order and democratic governance in countries like Togo, Niger, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso. On the issue of drug trafficking, the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan has paved the way for the institutionalization of various anti-drug trafficking laws and mechanisms in the West African region, including the estab-lishment, by Kofi Annan, of the WACD in 2013. The adoption of the ECPF in 2008 has equipped ECOWAS with the tools for early warning analysis and the prevention and management of con-flicts in West Africa. ECOWAS has also made renewed efforts towards countering terrorism by

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adopting a Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan in 2013. Though the strategy has yet to be implemented, its adoption is a demonstration of intent by ECOWAS to halt the spiralling rise of terrorism in the region (Maiangwa, 2014: 29).

The foregoing advances of ECOWAS notwithstanding, the findings of the paper also indicated a worrying conflict trend in West Africa: the recurrence and emergence of certain security challenges, which while not on the scale of the civil wars that have ravaged West Africa in the past, nevertheless, pose considerable security challenges for the stability of the region, and the regional integration project of ECOWAS. The escalation of terrorist activities in Nigeria, the staging of coups by army officers in Mali and Guinea Bissau, the anti-government demonstrations in Burkina Faso, and the infiltration of the Sahel by terrorist elements and drug cartels are indications that West Africa, though relatively stable, is far from being secured. The paper blamed the escalation and emergence of these security threats on the following issues: the lack of the implementation of certain provisions of the security protocols of ECOWAS; the inability of ECOWAS to fully adapt to the changing dynamics of West Africa’s security challenges; the non-compliance of member states to the security protocols of ECOWAS; the widespread elite corruption in the region, the (il)legitimacy of ECOWAS mediators, the lack of financial resources and logistics; and the overdependence of ECOWAS on key regional countries like Nigeria. The excessive reliance of ECOWAS on the ‘benevolence’ of external actors could partly be viewed as the inexorable outcome of the foregoing weaknesses.

The paper argued that it is not always clear as to what extent external intervention has helped to secure West Africa from the said emerging and recurring threats. Despite the long years of US intervention in the Sahel, terrorist organizations such as AQIM and MUJAO have turned the region into their hunting ground. The French-led intervention in Mali has also not brought the much desired stability that the country needs. However, external assistance could be relevant to West Africa’s security environment due to the various logistical, operational, institutional and financial challenges that ECOWAS confronts as an organization; coupled with the internal crisis within ECOWAS’ key member states such as Nigeria. That being said, the paper pointed out that external assistance rendered to West Africa should be coordinated by ECOWAS in order to strengthen the organization ensure coherence between external and regional intervention in the region.

In the final analysis, there is no gainsaying the fact that ECOWAS will continue to play an important and active role in the security environment of West Africa. This reinforces the need for the organization to be on the alert and be ready and willing to evolve in order to adequately respond to the changing dynamics and diversity of West Africa’s security challenges. This will entail an active participation and commitment of ECOWAS member states in the security regionalism pro-ject of the organization by domesticating and respecting the security protocols and paying their annual financial contributions on time. Anything short of these responses may corroborate the suspicion already expressed in some quarters that the regional integration project in West Africa is nothing more than a ‘shadowy-project’, which only enables leaders in the region ‘to raise the pro-file, status, formal sovereignty and image of their often authoritarian regimes, but without ensuring implementation of agreed policies’ (Söderbaum, 2010: 7). To have come this far and sustain this impression is to undermine the achievements of ECOWAS and what it represents.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Ademola Abass and Daniel E. Agbiboa for useful comments and suggestions on early drafts of the paper.

Funding

This work was supported by the Arthur V. Mauro Centre, St Paul’s College, University of Manitoba.

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Notes

1. MUJAO is the French acronym for the Movement for Jihad in West Africa; Ansar al-dine is Arabic for Defenders of the faith.

2. The MNLA stands for the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (the aspirational country for the Tuaregs in northern Mali).

3. Although Mauritania withdrew its membership from ECOWAS in 2000, it still remains a part of the West African region. Thus, regardless of whether it is part of ECOWAS member states, Mauritania’s security issues are intertwined with those of ECOWAS member states.

4. With the adoption of the 1999 Mechanism, ECOWAS declared the provisions of the Protocols on Non-Aggression, Mutual Assistance in Defence, and the Protocol on Non-Aggression redundant as they are both incompatible with the provisions of the 1999 mechanism, particularly due to the issues of ‘responsibility to protect’ and ‘collective security’, which the 1999 Mechanism upholds (Article 53, 1999 Mechanism).

5. A similar challenge in this regard is the issue of what Tavares (2010b: 16) calls ‘regional overlapping and institutional proliferation’. The oft-cited example of where this problem is prevalent is in Africa, where different countries (Anglophone, Francophone, Lusophone) belong to various organizations formed according to their colonial compositions, and ‘often with competing agendas’ (Tavares, 2010b: 16). Söderbaum (2010: 8) argues that it might be interesting to ask, in whose interest do these overlapping institutions exist? While authors like Söderbaum (2010) argue that such institutions exist in order to increase the possibilities for verbal regionalism and regime-boosting, I argue that this may not always be the case. One consequence of the colonial logic on the African continent is that it established various institutions and structures in which the colonizers can continue to influence the affairs of their former colonies even after the independence of these countries. The Françafrique policy of the French in Africa is a case in point. Thus, while some African leaders may be using the regionalist projects to advance their interest and boost their image, it could be argued too that they are encouraged or sometimes even assisted to do so for various purposes by their former colonizers.

6. It is interesting to note that a Nigerian ex military leader, the Late General Sani Abacha (1993–1998), who financed and provided leadership to ECOWAS’ peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone reportedly amassed US$450m through corruption, which he kept in various bank accounts around the world (Aljazeera, 2014). This is only the amount that US officials were able to discover. Atuobi (2007: 17) estimates that Abacha looted about US$11–16bn during his time as Nigeria’s Head of State (1993–1998). Of course, the case of Abacha is not an isolated one. Corruption has been the bane of development in many African countries.

7. In consequence, various illicit networks, including drug and sex traffickers, as well as terrorists, are able to operate across the borders of West Africa with relative ease, moving illicit commodities and weapons ‘whilst being able to evade controls outright or buy the silence or acquiescence of officials’ (Olukoshi, 2013: 9).

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Author biography

Benjamin Maiangwa is a doctoral candidate in the Arthur V. Mauro Centre for Peace and Justice at St Paul’s College, University of Manitoba, Canada. His research and writing have focused on jihadist terrorism, the recovery of terrorism victims, and security regionalism in West Africa.

at University of Manitoba Libraries on March 10, 2015jas.sagepub.comDownloaded from