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Assessing the impact of EUgovernmentality in post-conflictcountries: pacification orreconciliation?Sandra Pogoddaa, Oliver Richmonda, Nathalie Toccib, Roger MacGintya & Birte Vogelaa Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute (HCRI), Universityof Manchester, Manchester, UKb Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, ItalyPublished online: 27 Jan 2014.

To cite this article: Sandra Pogodda, Oliver Richmond, Nathalie Tocci, Roger Mac Ginty & BirteVogel (2014) Assessing the impact of EU governmentality in post-conflict countries: pacification orreconciliation?, European Security, 23:3, 227-249, DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2013.875533

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2013.875533

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Assessing the impact of EU governmentality in post-conflict countries:pacification or reconciliation?

Sandra Pogoddaa, Oliver Richmonda*, Nathalie Toccib, Roger Mac Gintya andBirte Vogela

aHumanitarian and Conflict Response Institute (HCRI), University of Manchester, Manchester, UK;bIstituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, Italy

(Received 4 June 2013; final version received 11 December 2013)

European Union (EU) interventions in conflict countries tend to focus on governancereforms of political and economic frameworks instead of the geopolitical context orthe underlying power asymmetries that fuel conflict. They follow a liberal patternoften associated with northern donors and the UN system more generally. The EU’sapproach diverges from prevalent governance paradigms mainly in its engagementwith social, identity and socio-economic exclusion. This article examines the EU’s‘peace-as-governance’ model in Cyprus, Georgia, Palestine and Bosnia and Herzego-vina. These cases indicate that a tense and contradictory strategic situation may arisefrom an insufficient redress of underlying conflict issues.

Keywords: EU governance; peacebuilding; conflict resolution; institution building;development

Introduction

Is European Union (EU) governance an exemplar for contemporary conflict resolutionand peacebuilding or is it an inconsistent, contingent process, driven by contradictoryinterests, norms and actors? Such efforts feature prominently – if implicitly – in the EU’sexternal activities (Council of the EU 2007a, Title 1: Article 3–1). In a philosophicalsense and as a practice, the EU’s institutions and policy-makers assume that theirpromotion of governance reform in post-conflict environments is emancipatory.

EU governance in post-conflict zones delivers ‘peace-as-governance’, meaning anapproach to making peace, based not on addressing its root causes and dynamics directlybut instead reforming governance processes and structures of the state according to theliberal peace model (Richmond 2005). Rather than resolving conflict, this approach leadsto pacification and stabilisation through an improvement of socio-economic conditionsvia rigorous but unempathetic governance, which appeases a conflict-ridden society. YetEU rhetoric and much of the academic work surrounding these issues assumes that itsgovernance leads to the ‘good life’: it produces conflict resolution and transformation andso is the basis for reconciliation and redress of conflict’s underlying causal factors.

This reflects the notional underpinnings of a culture and not just an expedientrationality of governance for security and prosperity for the EU. It sets the pattern for theevolving relationship between EU governance and peacebuilding based on rights and

*Corresponding author. Email: oliver.richmond@manchester.ac.uk

European Security, 2014Vol. 23, No. 3, 227–249, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2013.875533

© 2014 Taylor & Francis

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liberal normative standards. This article will explore the following questions: is there adistinct EU governance approach towards conflict countries? Does this approach and itsoperational rationalities contribute to conflict resolution, transformation or peacebuilding(variously defined) or other (complementary or competing) policy objectives?

EU policy and peacebuilding

There is no explicit peacebuilding strategy on the part of the Commission or the EU as awhole, but there are a number of recurring elements across EU documents, policies andspeeches, ranging from certain goals pursued (good governance, human rights,democracy, transparency, accountability, market economics, rule of law, etc.) to thepolicy means used (contractual arrangements and constructive engagement, trade, aid,rule of law missions, security sector reform missions, etc.). They implicitly pursue aliberal script of governance reform.

The Göteborg Programme of 2001 elevated the engagement in post-conflict states topriority status in the EU’s external relations (Council of the EU 2001). The first EUSecurity Strategy in 2003 called upon the Union to engage in a wide range of peaceactivities, spanning from conflict prevention, to crisis management and post-violencerehabilitation (Council of the EU 2003). In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty stated that the Union’sexternal action would aim at ‘preserving peace, preventing conflicts and strengtheninginternational security’ (Art III-193(2c)) (Article 21(2) of the Treaty on European Union).

Aimed at potential entrants, associates or neighbours, the EU has since developedvarying tools and strategies. Deployed tools range from short- to medium-term effortsaimed at securing ceasefires, demobilisation, disarmament, peacekeeping and reconstruc-tion to long-term efforts aimed at promoting good governance, security sector reform,judicial reform and transitional justice, democracy, civil society development, humanrights protection and socio-economic development (Commission of the EC 2001a;Richmond et al. 2011).

The EU’s engagement in the wider liberal peacebuilding project links its internalarchitecture to its external projection as a pacific or normative agent. In fulfilling itsforeign policy aims, in fact, the treaty argues that the EU is ‘guided by, and designed toadvance in the wider world, the principles which have inspired its own creation,development and enlargement’ (Article III-193(1)). Like the UN, these principles includedemocracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law (Article I−2 and I−3), alongside inter-state cooperation and integration (Commission of the EC 2001a,2001b, Kronenberger and Wouters 2005). Hence, the EU’s governance approach inconflict areas ranges from conflict resolution to society-appeasing strategies, whilelargely abstaining from the pursuit of a mediated, high-level settlement between politicalleaders or supporting a ceasefire through peacekeeping activities. By interacting withconflict parties at multiple levels – state, sub-state, private sector and civil society – andacross a variety of policy areas – economic, social, political, cultural, environmental,infrastructural, etc. – the EU’s role in conflicts has been more pervasive and oftenindirect. This places high expectations on the Union to contribute to reconciliation.

As the first step for formulating a peacebuilding strategy, the European Commissionhas compiled and updated a checklist of root causes of conflict (Commission of the EC2008) since 2002, which delineates its assumptions on how the conflicts emerge and howthey can be prevented. Factors deemed crucial in provoking and sustaining conflict arebrought to the attention of the European Council and Council of Ministers as the

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institutions responsible for deciding where, when and how to intervene in crisis situationsoutside of the Union’s boundaries (Duke and Courtier 2009). The Commission’s list ofroot causes, however, has yet to be translated into an explicit policy strategy in the areasof conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

Concepts such as ‘normative power’, underlying assumptions of integration, goodneighbourliness or association imply a reconciliation of difference within a commonframework (Diez 2001, Diez et al. 2006, Manners 2008). This could be deemed conflicttransformation or resolution if the common framework is negotiated freely between allpartners in the absence of significant power, social, economic or cultural hierarchies. Inpractice, though, this equality is not achievable, and policy tools based on such conceptsmay have contradictory effects on conflict dynamics.

The EU’s contribution to peacebuilding is an amalgam of practices, which havedeveloped in different cases often in association with other international actors. Given theproliferation of EU missions, as well as delegations, around the world, there is anargument to be made that it follows, often with massive financial resources, standardliberal and neoliberal rationalities.

Governance: concept and methodology

Governance can be interpreted as a system that seeks to rationalise and organise thedistribution of public goods (both physical and symbolic) within and between states,institutions and communities. Navigating the plethora of definitions for governance usedacross the social sciences (Chhotray and Stoker 2009) requires one fundamentaldistinction: governance is more than a synonym for contemporary government in so faras the concept of government is limited to the ‘structure and function of public institutions,their authority to make binding decisions and allocations of values through politics, policy,and administration’ (Jensen 2008). The concept of governance, by contrast, investigatesthe blurred line between formal and informal decision-making structures in processes that‘steer, control and manage society’ (Kooiman 1993, p. 2). Governance occurs when stateand non-state actors are mutually dependent (Jachtenfuchs 1995, p. 115, Jachtenfuchs1997, 40) and shape each other’s governmental rationalities (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002,Sending and Neumann 2006, Chandler 2010, p. 71/72). This produces a broad legitimacy.

Culture, identity, custom and social-historical legacies significantly shape society’sexpectations towards and politicians’ justifications of governance. Governance representsa concurrence over common values and interests. It is underpinned by cultural norms andhistory. Governance might be seen as an obstacle to regional order and domestic socialjustice or as their provider and guarantor through the legal regimes created by states andregional or international organisations. Hence, the governance discourse is based on thelong-standing premise (World Bank 1997, p. 2) that globalisation, intergovernmentalismand grassroots agency have increased the capacity of non-state actors to affect statebehaviour and also redress the structural dynamics of conflict to some degree. It alsoimplies that states and global governance find ways of making political subjects complywith, rather than enabling political resistance, their claims to legitimate authority(Richmond 2011). This may occur through consent, consensus or conditionality, butfrom the EU perspective, it presupposes universality, common standards and a sharedhabitus arising through external action rather than emerging from local political processes.

Measuring the capacity of governmental institutions as used in ‘good governance’studies bestows a facade of scientific validity on policies, which are shaped and driven by

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elite preferences. From this rational-legal perspective, institutional strength depends onhow effective government is in maintaining order through state institutions that promotesecurity, national unity and free markets. The EU has always prided itself on adding tothis a concern with civil society, welfare and pluralism. Regional or internationalgovernance is supposed to promote and support these core functions of states, utilising acommon cosmopolitan and legal framework (World Bank 1997, p. 2).

These normative underpinnings of governance are assumed to automatically give riseto conflict resolution and transformation, via peacebuilding, statebuilding and develop-ment strategies [United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 2012, p. 20]. However,this approach fails to reflect the tension between universal norms and state, local,traditional or informal legitimate authority, which are all central to a more contextualconcept of governance. Moreover, it has not resolved the obvious tension between liberaland neoliberal rationalities of governance, and the very different types of subjects theyproduce or favour often at the expense of localised systems of legitimate authority.

One major strand of EU governance literature focuses on compliance with theUnion’s legislative output,1 another one on multi-level decision-making (Marks et al.1996, Hix 1998, Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999, Scharpf 1999, Hooghe and Marks 2001,Kohler-Koch 2003, Eberlein and Kerwer 2004, Bache and Flinders 2004, Wallace et al.2005, Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2006). Scholarship on compliance tends to reduce EUgovernance to an apolitical process in which outcomes are largely determined byadministrative capacity and compatibility of regulatory traditions (Treib 2008, pp. 7–9).Both strands of literature are inward-looking in their focus on institutional mechanismsand member states’ behavior.

Critiquing EU governance

Foucault’s concept of governmentality may be understood as institutions’ techniques andprocedures for directing human behaviour towards a subject status, with which they maycomply, willingly or not. Governance becomes normalised despite its contested practices,rationalities, hierarchies and unintended consequences (Rose et al. 2006). The concept ofgovernmentality serves as a useful analytical tool since it comprises a set of questionsrather than assumptions (Rose et al. 2006, p. 84). It investigates which practicesgovernance techniques consist of, which premises and principles inform those techniques,which conditions have shaped them, whether a governing technology is contested by or inalliance with other arts of governing and specifically what its relationship with itssubjects is. This prompts a series of questions on how governance may contribute toconflict resolution or transformation:

. Is governance aimed at entrenching or mitigating power, mobilisation for eliteinterests or disciplining the subject?

. It is aimed at producing conflict resolution and transformation in various forms,meaning reconciliation and reform or does it aim at stabilisation and pacification?

. Do peacebuilding, statebuilding or development represent a disciplinary form ofpeace led by states and international or regional actors?

. And if so, might this retain legitimacy, or do these mechanisms induce merely anegative form of peace (Fukuyama 2004, Richmond 2005, Chandler 2010, p. 15)?

. Under which circumstances do the subjects of peacebuilding approaches consentto them, and how might they resist?

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In the extreme, governmentality produces a neoliberal biopolitics, which pacifies anddepoliticises its subjects, or in other words, brings them into line with liberal notions ofmodernity as secure, voting, rights-based and market-oriented citizen-subjects. However,it also points to the capacity of governance’s subjects to exploit the ‘circulation of power’and resist it in subtle or public ways (Foucault 1983, Pickett 1996). As much globalgovernance research remains dominated by the debate over the hollowing out of the state(Rosenau and Czempiel 1992, Strange 1996a, 1996b, Mann 1997) through the lens ofgovernmentality though, the state ‘consists of a plethora of contingent, possiblyconflicting, resistant, and often transnational practices’ (Foucault 2009, Bevir 2010).This renders the issue of power shifts between the state and non-state actors difficult toinvestigate because power circulates from disciplinary to resistance agencies.

The concept of governmentality can be deployed to see how far EU governanceframeworks are based on standardised economic and institutional rationalities. Sincethese rationales are grounded in historical conceptions of European governance, theymight fail to reflect the politics, needs, interests or identities of subjects in our conflictcases. Does the EU prioritise its own governance rationality over those of its post-conflictsubjects? If so, this questions the legitimacy of EU peacebuilding and implies that EUpeacebuilding may constitute a form of neo-trusteeship. This equates to peace-as-governance, where governance is externally driven rather than a product of a politicaland social contract.

Links between governance and conflict resolution

Contemporary governmentality is operationalised through statebuilding and security,development and political institution building. Figure 1 depicts these mechanisms asinstruments of top-down governance. While governance generally implies the involve-ment of a multiplicity of actors in circulating power-relations (including domination,

Top-downGovernance(Internat., state, local)

Bottom-up

Conflict resolution Development

Statebuilding / security

Society formation

Local development

Political institutions

Polity formation

Peace formation/state formation

STATE

Violence / conflict

Pacebuilding / statebuilding

Legitim

acy

Low

High

State capture

Conflict manage-ment

Figure 1. Governance tracks and mechanisms.

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resistance or compliance), the top-down track is shaped predominantly by externalgovernance actors. Grass-roots actors engage in governance through a different set ofmechanisms, summarised in the bottom-up governance track. If external and localgovernance approaches complement one another, they form a social contract which couldbe defined as some form of conflict resolution, even if this is a hybrid outcome thatcarries forward existing power relations. If external and local approaches clash, peace willat best occur in its negative form and result in either conflict management, dominationand resistance, conflict or coalescence. These distinct strategies create contingentpressures on state and EU governance (Bevir 2010, p. 435).

Statebuilding/security

Crucial to the EU governance approach in conflict countries are security issues, includinghuman security, internal security and the management of migration (Council of the EU2006). The security dimension of governance is prioritised particularly when the EUconsiders states to be fragile or failing (Hout 2010) and thus unable to perform basicgovernment functions (Commission of the EC 2006a, pp. 12–14). Durable statebuildingrequires a functioning security sector, calling for capacity building within defence, police,intelligence and judicial structures.

The international blueprint for statebuilding operations can be seen as ‘liberal peacelite’: focused on creating institutional capacity, infrastructure and security,2 but strippedoff its rights components.3 After 9/11, statebuilding efforts were expanded as globalgovernance’s response to the prevalent Western threat analysis. ‘Bad governance’4 and itsextreme form of failed states were regarded as breeding grounds for terrorism andorganised crime (Council of the EU 2003, p. 5). Ever since the statebuilding agendabecame inextricably linked with the concept of ‘good governance’, there has been anunderlying assumption that there is a set of core features of the state (World Bank 1997)which can be evaluated in terms of their stability and effectiveness. This link makesinstitution-building activities palatable to donors who try to abstain from overt politicalinterference either because of their own colonial experiences or to avoid foreign policydisasters like the occupation of Iraq. By enhancing the capacity of state institutions,improving physical as well as service infrastructure and assisting governments’ efforts toregain the monopoly of coercive power (through SSR and DDR), statebuilding supportsgovernments’ capacity to project state power throughout the country.

Reflecting the unwavering faith in the Westphalian state as the guardian of peace,international statebuilding efforts aim at reinforcing central state authorities (OECD-DAC2007, Chhibber 1997, pp. 17–20). Peacebuilding provides a normative sheen to thisprocess in liberal-internationalist guise, supporting rights, representation and a socialcontract.

In recent years, the reinforcement of local authorities implicit in cosmopolitanunderstandings of rights and representation (whether religious, tribal or ethnic) has addedcomplexity to governance mechanisms in response to the failure of high-profilestatebuilding projects like Afghanistan and Iraq or stalemate in Cyprus, Bosnia andHerzegovina (BiH) or Israel/Palestine.5 It implies that legitimacy rests also on localconsensus for law, institutions, provision of public services and development practiceseven if these have been internationally agreed a priori.

As analysis of the EU’s policy frameworks (Commission of the EC 2000, 2006b,Council of the EU 2005) and funding priorities6 shows, the EU has made a concerted

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effort to promote statebuilding activities since the turn of the century, while it has alsobecome more involved in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. EU policies envisage anadvanced form of social contract through which government is answerable to the needsand rights of its populations, mirroring the relatively high expectations and standards ofexisting EU members. On paper, this social contract foresees a more significant state rolethan that used by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the US in Afghanistanand Iraq, and is more focused on civil society and identity matters. It is more socialdemocratic than neoliberal though the latter is becoming increasingly embedded in EUapproaches to peacebuilding.

Critique of state-centric peacebuilding has been mounting for years. AnthropologistPierre Clastres warned in 1977 that the rise of the state inevitably meets with violentresistance of indigenous communities, whose survival as homogenous groups depends ontheir autonomy (Clastres 2010 [1977], pp. 273–277). In essence, statebuilding operationshave lacked sufficient sensitivity towards local needs and identity and are thus failing toestablish a viable social contract between conflict-torn societies and their states (Hout2010, Richmond and Franks 2011). Chandler argues that they are depoliticised andrepresent a retreat from a liberal rights system (Chandler 2010, p. 15).

Consequently, recent reports by the World Bank and by United Nations DevelopmentProgram (UNDP) address state fragility, statebuilding and peace in terms of localownership, ‘people’s security’ and a social compact or a social contract (UNDP 2012).Likewise, the EU has engaged in a revision of its neighbourhood policy, putting at theforefront notions such as ‘deep democracy’ and ‘sustainable stability’ (Tocci andCassarino 2011). However, the EU’s focus on national elites has tended to limit itssupport for local agency, such as civil society leaders, traditional leaders and forcustomary processes of conflict resolution. Exploring this avenue more fully may help toanchor the relationship between the governed and the government in a new, more locallylegitimate social contract (Boege et al. 2008, Department for International Development(DfID) 2009, p. 24, UNDP 2012).

Development

Economic factors have always featured prominently among the motivations for conflicts:land, loot, natural resources and arms trade turn conflicts into profitable business forsome and thus provide incentives for continued hostilities.7 Arguably, more important forthe understanding of contemporary conflicts, however, is a sound analysis of structuraland horizontal inequality and economic marginalisation as an aggravating factor (if notroot cause) in the outbreak of hostilities (Stewart 2008). Inequality and economicgrievances often related to identity issues are, for instance, a trademark of conflicts overself-determination. Fragile states are another focus of international interventionism, whichrenders development, governance and security inseparable (Commission of the EC 2011,p. 8).

Picking up on this link between conflict and development, the EU’s White Paper onGovernance states: ‘The objectives of peace, growth, employment and social justicepursued within the Union must also be promoted outside for them to be effectivelyattained at both European and global level’ (Commission of the EC 2001c, p. 26). Drivenby its commitment to holistic approaches, the EU has been trying to address this trinityand ‘claims to have a particularly development-sensitive approach to security challenges’(Faria and Youngs 2010, p. 1). Development policies can also be deployed to avoid overt

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political engagement. EU policies towards Northern Ireland, for instance, have avoidedany involvement in institution building or political processes. Instead, the focus of itswell-funded and long-term EU Funds there have been on economic development as a wayto bring divided communities together.

Despite long-standing attempts to integrate security and governance issues into long-term development approaches (Commission of the EC 2003b, Council of the EU 2007b,2010), the EU admits that crisis responses continue to be prioritised over developmentpolicies, that security measures remain disconnected from broader development effortsand that EU policies tend to have little impact on conflict countries (EU-Africa Troika2008, Commission of the EC 2009a). Partly, these failures can be explained because ofthe security (rather than development) bias of EU institutions involved in the formulationof conflict policies (International Crisis Group (ICG) 2002, pp. 12–13, Centre forEuropean Policy Studies (CEPS) 2006, p. 62) or donor interests in using development aidto promote their commercial relations with middle-income states (Faria and Youngs 2010,p. 3).

Other explanations, however, point to a more general shortcoming of internationaldevelopment strategies: externally sponsored development initiatives tend to operate viaineffective growth paradigms (Fine 2004, pp. 216–219). Accordingly, donors tend todefine development solely based on income levels and devise free-market approaches asthe main solution to tackle this problem. This development-as-growth model hasaggravated, rather than alleviated, spatial disparity between growing and lagging regionsthough (Moulaert and Sekia 2003, Dunford 2005, Fothergill 2005, Andy et al. 2007).

EU development policies diverge from the neoliberal script of the prevalentWashington Consensus at different stages in the integration process, however. As amulti-layered integration project, the EU’s reform requirements – and the associatedeconomic and social costs and benefits – depend on which aspects of the Union a partnercountry joins. Trade integration as the lowest integration stage comes closest to theneoliberal model of the Washington Consensus. Trade partners have to open theirindustrial markets to European goods according to the neoclassical growth assumptionthat economic integration leads to mutually beneficial trade creation, but the EU does notreciprocate by liberalising agriculture markets. New economic geography shows,however, that low-income countries have to suffer through industrial relocation, risingunemployment and depressed wages in the short- and medium-term before being able toreap the benefits of trade integration with highly competitive markets such as the EU(Krugman and Venables 1995, Krugman 1999). Since EU aid focuses on industrialadjustment measures rather than sponsoring effective social safety valves in thirdcountries, trade integration implies massive social costs in exchange for vague long-term benefits.8

Taking the next integration step and becoming an EU member state change theapplied development paradigm fundamentally, however. Member states have to over-rather than de-regulate their markets.9 Moreover, members have access to regional andcohesion funding as the main tools of redistribution within the EU region. One integrationstep further and the EU’s economic approach shifts from Keynesianism to neoliberalism.Participating in the monetary union imposes strict fiscal discipline on its members andthus might result in the slimming down of social services and cause economic hardshipfor the most vulnerable segments of society. Yet, often, the dissolution of welfare stateprovisions, public services, civil service jobs, health and education is particularlyproblematic in a post-conflict state and potential EU member or associates. EU

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representatives have been directly involved in the various OECD meetings which havedeveloped such policies on peacebuilding and statebuilding recently (OECD 2007).

Despite their social costs, free trade agreements remain central in EU externalrelations with potential post-conflict members, such as Cyprus prior to its accession, andCroatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Georgia. In deeply divided societies, free tradeagreements may exacerbate perceived intergroup economic disparities. In part, the EU’spersistence on trade integration is based on its own experience of reconciliation througheconomic integration. Making development policy work for conflict resolution ininequality-induced conflicts would require a focus on the context-specific root causesof inequality (and therefore power relations) and engage with the question of whatdevelopment and socio-economic justice means to the marginalised (Pike et al. 2007,p. 1255).

Political institutions

The EU’s third governance toolbox encompasses assistance for political institutions, suchas initiatives to support democratisation, constitutional power-sharing arrangements, therule of law and rights safeguards. These policies are expected to alleviate local grievancesbetween different ethnic and social groups. Democratisation can be regarded as anumbrella term encompassing a series of reforms (Wetzel and Orbie 2011) regardingelections and electoral systems, an independent judiciary, the fight against corruption, anactive civil society (Commission of the EC 2001c), decentralisation and the effectivepower to govern.

Rights-related conditionalities have been inserted in trade and preaccession agree-ments, although much of the EU’s work in this sphere has been indirect, encouraging stateson its borderlands to ratify legislation in respect of minorities or to introduce judicialreforms. It has also often acted in concert with other organisations such as the Council ofEurope or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (Tocci 2007).

In the aftermath of interstate conflicts, the EU tends to push for the establishment ofintergovernmental regional forums as pre-emptive conflict resolution tools. The under-lying narrative is often based on Europe’s own history in which the creation ofintergovernmental institutions led from functional cooperation over the creation of vestedinterests to close intergovernmental ties. Through this ‘domestic analogy’ (Schimmel-fennig 2010), the Union seeks to reconstruct an international environment similar to itsown self-perception. This includes not only democratic constitutionalism, marketeconomies and the regulatory state but also the principle of regional cooperation andintegration.

In practice, these governance strategies have met with various obstacles and sufferedfrom inconsistent implementation efforts (Merlingen 2007). External donor attempts toreform or develop institutions tend to follow the liberal peace blueprint and thus imply aspecific understanding of procedural democracy and law. The greatest dilemma in tryingto resolve conflict through political institutions lies in the fact that positive peace couldonly be achieved through simultaneous progress on all fronts, while urgent short-termsteps or political constraints have often led to a divorce of those inseparables. Diplomaticefforts to end hostilities, for instance, may require concessions on human rightssafeguards or on the scope of transitional or post-conflict justice and accountability(Lekha Sriram 2008, p. 181/182). Power-sharing clauses in constitutions or peaceagreements have furthermore proven too rigid to adjust to rapid demographic changes.10

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Hence, they are bound to clash with democracy’s principle of fair and equalrepresentation as well as individuals’ political rights, as the cases of Israel/Palestine,Lebanon and Bosnia-Herzegovina have shown.11

Multilateral forums as part of external governance strategies have proven ineffectiveas conflict resolution tools, especially in cases where the impulse for institution buildingcame from third parties rather than from the actors involved in the conflict. The Union forthe Mediterranean and its predecessor policy the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (orBarcelona Process), for instance, have established a whole plethora of platforms formultilateral dialogue. In the run-up to or during the al-Aqsa Intifada and the July Warbetween Israel and Lebanon in 2006 though, these forums failed to promote diplomaticconflict settlement between the adversaries.12

Case studies: Cyprus, Palestine, Georgia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

The precise effect of the EU’s governance agenda depends on the actual mix ofmechanisms and the mode of their implementation in different geographical contexts.Indeed, while the EU’s governance agenda follows the same notional script across thespectrum of its external action (Börzel and Risse 2005, p. 48), the specific focus andintensity of the EU’s governance agenda may vary according to factors such as itsproximity to the third country, the power relations between them, the country’s politicalstructures, member states’ particularistic interests, pressure exerted by other externalactors and the EU’s specific diagnosis of the governance problematique in the thirdcountry (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009).

Effective conflict resolution requires the adjustment of technical and institutionalformulas for governance reforms to local needs, politics and conflict dynamics. Byengaging with local needs and rights, however, the EU is caught in the crossfire betweenpartiality and being seen as uncaring. The former case occurred with respect to the GreekCypriots in 2003–2004, the latter once the EU aimed at leaving a lighter footprint inBosnia-Herzegovina.

In order to implement its governance agenda, the EU has tended to pursue one ofthree strategies. First, the EU can follow a top-down approach encapsulated in the policyof conditionality. Here the EU sets the conditions to be fulfilled in order for a thirdcountry to receive predetermined material or symbolic benefits from the EU (Smith 1999,Grabbe 2001). Rather than governance, suggesting a horizontal and systemic mode ofaction, the EU’s mode of action here is more in line with the notion of government,meaning a hierarchical process of rule selection, adoption and implementation betweenthe EU and the third country. Examples of conditionality are the requirements of theCopenhagen criteria in the accession process with EU membership as their ultimatereward, or the assistance channelled through the SPRING Programme, which links aidallocations to reform commitments of recipient countries.

Second, the EU can engage in a bottom-up approach to governance by interactingwith civil society (Marchetti and Tocci 2011, Tocci 2011). EU civil society engagementtakes a variety of forms, including dialogue, training and ‘capacity building’. It aims atenhancing the capability of civil society actors to influence the political, social andeconomic development of their respective countries through advocacy. Hence, bottom-upapproaches reinforce accountability for political and social reconciliation where issueslike class, identity and religion are stratifying factors. However, the EU’s engagement

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with local civil society beyond relatively large urban-based NGOs and INGOs based inconflict countries is limited.

Third, the EU can pursue its governance agenda through its transgovernmentalfunctional cooperation with third countries (Freyburg et al. 2009, Lavenex andSchimmelfennig 2011,). Functional cooperation can be situated at the meso-level inbetween the macro-level changes induced by conditionality and the micro-level changespursued through civil society. At the meso-level, the EU governance agenda is promotedthrough technical and financial assistance as well as regular interaction between publicadministration officials, private sector representatives and civil society actors and experts(Lavenex 2009). This technocratic cooperation ranges from the mainly technical andeconomic sectors – e.g. competition policy, transport, environment, information societyand trade – to the more overtly political ones – e.g. immigration and border management.Functional cooperation often results in the transposition of elements of the EU acquiscommunautaire (Lavenex 2004, p. 683), which is facilitated by power asymmetriesbetween the Union and the third country. In contrast to conditionality, however, ruletransfer in functional cooperation takes place in a selective, negotiated and flexiblemanner through overlapping informal policy networks between the EU and the thirdcountry, rather than through imposition. Where top-down and bottom-up strategies reachtheir limits, functional cooperation facilitates governance reforms through the backdoor(Wetzel 2011).

With two out of three mechanisms based on power asymmetries rather than locallegitimacy, the rationality of EU governance appears as one of governmentality:conditionality and governance reforms through the backdoor over consent amongst itssubjects, indicating pacification and coexistence rather than conflict resolution andreconciliation emerging from consensual institutional development in a specific context,reflecting evolving local agency and evolving international standards.

Statebuilding

In terms of statebuilding, EU conflict resolution strategies in Georgia, Palestine, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cyprus vary in almost every aspect: strategies range from full autonomyto federation; the EU deploys different incentive regimes in the statebuilding process andlacks a common policy on how to deal with internationally non-recognised local elites.Hence, there is no identifiable EU blueprint for statebuilding.

In Georgia and Palestine, the EU is facing and partly aggravating a conundrum:statebuilding – as in creating new autonomous state entities – would satisfy the demandsof those conflict parties which seek self-determination as a conflict resolution strategy[the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the separatist governments of South Ossetia andAbkhazia]. Strong opposition to this strategy from other conflict parties, however, impliesthat a decisive pursuit of self-determination might reignite hostilities. Here the EUfacilitates governance reforms but refrains from using its leverage to forge a politicaldecision on the issue of independence versus domination or federation. This does notmean that the EU remains on the sidelines of the political conflict though; by refusing torecognise the breakaway regions, while envisaging an EU-Association Agreement withan undivided Georgia, the EU backs Tbilisi’s claim on territorial integrity. In the MiddleEast, the EU supports a two-state solution by reinforcing emerging state structures withinthe institutional framework of the PA. In the case of Cyprus, the EU facilitates the

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modernisation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) state institutions,aiming at North–South reunification.13

The failure of Salam Fayyad’s two-year plan for Palestinian statehood illustrates thatgovernance reforms in themselves contribute little to conflict resolution. Reforms of thePalestinian Authority may facilitate state–society relations but have no effect on the all-pervasiveness of the military occupation and its curtailment of Palestinian political andeconomic freedoms as the main Palestinian grievances in the Middle East conflict (Halper2000, Gordon 2008). Hence, institution-building falls short of statebuilding as long as thoseinstitutions remain without actual authority (Butenschoen 2007). Mainly, EU-sponsoredsecurity sector reforms have mitigated Israeli security grievances over attacks of Palestinianinsurgent groups in theWest Bank. EU investment in the CoordinatingOffice for PalestinianPolice Support has reinforced the rule of law in the West Bank and outsourced theoppression of militant Palestinian groups to the security apparatus of the PA. This has notresulted in an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories though as the EU had hoped.Hence, Israel’s military occupation still serves as a guarantor for territorial expansion,demanded by Israel’s growing and increasingly powerful religious right (International CrisisGroup 2009). The EU’s reluctance to use any sanctions – such as conditionality, tradeboycotts or pressing Israel for damages for Israel Defense Forces (IDF) destroyed aidinvestments in Palestine – against Israel in support of Palestinian sovereignty has degradedEU aid from statebuilding assistance to sponsoring the occupation (Cronin 2011).

EU-sponsored governance reforms to prepare the TRNC for reunification might fallshort of facilitating a federal conflict resolution strategy in Cyprus due to strongopposition from local and regional14 political elites. In Georgia, the EU was effective inbolstering the administrative and legal capacity of the state in the early post-2003period.15 Those governance reforms failed to create institutions that could resist elitecapture and thus did not prevent the Georgian government from provoking a conflict withRussia in 2008. The more entrenched the Saakashvili government became, the more itwas dragging its heels on governance reforms.16

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, statebuilding has impacted in various contradictory ways onconflict resolution: the attempt to manage conflict through a new multi-ethnic entity inwhich no ethnic group dominates the other has not only mitigated societal tensions butinadvertently reinforced ethnic identities (Armakolas 2007). Borders (such as the Inter-Entity Boundary Line), redistribution policies, education and decentralisation have beendesigned along ethnic lines. This has reduced hostilities in the short run but aggravatesinterethnic reconciliation in the long run. Initiatives to promote cooperation between theethnic groups in the public and civil society sector have fallen short of interethnicconfidence building (Stavrevska 2013, p. 21/22).

In BiH, the EU has conditioned accession on the implementation of required reformsand on significant steps towards reconciliation (Commission of the EC 2009b). Here, theEU has used its Stabilisation and Association Agreement as leverage in pushing for a lessdiscriminatory constitution. While ethnic quotas have soothed intergroup fears overdomination immediately after the civil war, they have over time bred patronage networks,corruption and ethnic partition. Given its bowing to obstructionist politicians the EU hasbeen criticised for failing to address ethnic categorisation effectively (MacMohan andWestern 2009, pp. 78–81).

In Georgia, the EU was effective in bolstering the administrative and legal capacity ofthe state in the early post-2003 period.17 The more entrenched and less compliant theSaakashvili government became though, the more Georgia started dragging its heels on

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governance reforms. Due to external sponsorship from the International Monetary Fund(IMF) and other donors,18 a conditional Association Agreement with the EU might havelost some of its appeal.

The treatment of internationally not recognised local elites constitutes anotherinconsistency of EU statebuilding interventions across our case studies: in order toincorporate the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in peace negotiations, EUinstitutions started treating the Palestinian leadership under Yasser Arafat like agovernment in trade negotiation, the Euro-Arab Dialogue and Euro-Mediterraneanpolicies. This inclusionary approach was neither extended to the democratically electedHamas-led government after the 2006 elections, nor to the government of the TRNC. Theblacklisting of Hamas as a terrorist organisation stops the EU from officially engagingwith the government in Gaza. The EU’s resulting ‘West Bank only’-statebuilding strategyhence further deepens the divide between the Palestinian territories. In the case of Cyprusthe European Commission established a Programme Support Office (EUPSO) in NorthNicosia to act as a bridge between the EU and the not recognised government of theTRNC. Given that the Republic of Cyprus uses its veto power within the EU to obstructdirect negotiations with the TRNC, this backdoor channel remains the Union’s onlyaccess to the Turkish Cypriot leadership. In contrast to political will of engaging with theTRNC and the diplomatic backing of the PLO, the EU entertains no official relations withAbkhazia and South Ossetia.

Development

EU development policies vary significantly across the cases. Analysis of the EU’seconomic governance initiatives in Georgia show that the Union’s development model isanything but a neoliberal growth project. Faced with unregulated markets such as theprivate sector in Georgia, the EU requires the harmonisation with EU standards beforeentering closer economic relations. To expedite the association process, the Georgiangovernment would have to establish anti-trust regulations, food safety standards andlabour regulations.

In general, development policies can be both a strategy of pacification and conflictresolution, depending on the role of underdevelopment in the conflict dynamics. Ifgrievances over economic marginalisation are only part of a wider problem of dominationand oppression, economic growth might temporarily mitigate tensions but not resolve theunderlying root causes of conflict. Similar to statebuilding, development is intractablylinked to power structures. Acting on the belief that economics can be depoliticised andeven serve as a game changer in conflicted inter- or intra-state relations, the EU tries toboost growth and foster trade integration in isolation from politics. The cases of Cyprus,Palestine, BiH and Georgia illustrate, however, that the movement of goods and peopleacross internal borders – as a prerequisite for economic development – are inherentlypolitical issues, which cannot be divorced from wider diplomatic solutions to the conflict.

Due to the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU, the Union has inheritedCyprus’ internal border conflict.19 In pursuit of reunification as its conflict resolutionstrategy, the EU has been trying to foster North–South trade and boost socio-economicdevelopment in the Turkish Cypriot community (Council of the EU 2006).20 Attempts topromote trade across the disputed border, the so-called Green Line, have been boycottedby both sides of the conflict though. In the south, the government has halted EU efforts tolegalise the movement of goods, persons and services across the internal border via the

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‘Green Line Regulation’ of 2004,21 while consumers boycott products that originated inthe TRNC.22 Turkey, as the geopolitical power behind the TRNC, undermines North–South trade by subsidising TRNC farmers only as long as they do not trade their productsover the internal border.

In Palestine, even the World Bank and the IMF have denounced the notion of anapolitical economic strategy towards peace as out of touch with reality (Kanaan 2010,World Bank 2010). The Netanyahu government’s strategy of focusing on an ‘economicpeace’ is a re-launch of failed Israeli policies to extract a pacification dividend withoutrestoring economic or political freedoms to the Palestinians (Khalidi and Samour 2011,p. 7/8). By constraining trade and labour migration between and beyond the Palestinianterritories, Israel’s military occupation intervenes in almost every aspect of the Palestinianeconomy. While the EU recognises that development policies in Palestine can only bepursued in parallel with the diplomatic track of conflict resolution,23 the Union sponsorsinitiatives which bank on Israel’s permission and might thus come to naught.24 At firstglance, the EU’s recent development strategy may raise hopes for a stronger politicalstance towards Israel though many Palestinians remain sceptical about the seriousness ofits initiatives.25

In BiH, the EU offers various funding schemes, which require the cooperationbetween the previously conflicting sides. Two neighbouring municipalities on differentsides of interentity line, for instance, are very successful in ensuring EU funds togetherfor infrastructural projects that benefit both sides.26 Such infrastructural projects may blurthe interethnic boundaries in the long run and thereby promote reconciliation.

In Georgia, initiatives to revive a railway link between Georgia and Abkhazia have sofar failed due to fears on both sides: Georgia fears that bilateral negotiations withAbkhazia’s de facto government would upgrade its political status, while the Abkhazianside fears being sidelined and saddled with hidden conditions in the negotiations(Mikhelidze 2013, pp. 55–57). EU-sponsored initiatives such as the Confidence BuildingEarly Response Mechanism tackle such situations of interethnic distrust, raise mutualcultural awareness and try to fight negative stereotypes at the grass-roots level(Mikhelidze 2013, 62–65). The small scale of these projects, however, severely limitstheir effectiveness.

Democratisation and regional integration

In terms of political institutions, the EU’s governance-as-conflict resolution approachsuffers from two major flaws: normative inconsistency and ineffectiveness. Despite itsrhetorical and normative stance that democratisation promotes conflict resolution, the EUoften refrains from throwing its weight behind the democratisation process in conflictcountries. Sponsoring isolated programmes of governance reform does not add up toeffective democracy promotion if EU budget support simultaneously helps to keepunelected elites in power like the PA under Mahmoud Abbas. In post-revolutionaryGeorgia,27 and more recently in the West Bank, the EU supported reforms of the judiciarywith the aim of promoting accountability. Conceptually, such reform steps are importantelements in the democratisation process but have not stopped the Saakashvili governmentfrom further centralisation of power.28 More crucial steps such as backing the outcome ofthe 2006 election in Palestine, which EU monitoring teams had declared free and fair,have not been taken.

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Moreover, the strategy of creating political platforms for dialogue or institutionalisingminority rights has been ineffective with regard to conflict resolution. The platforms forpolitical dialogue established through the Barcelona Process and the NeighbourhoodPolicy fell short of moderating tensions between Israel and Palestine in the run-up to theal Aqsa Intifada and Operation Cast Lead. Equally, good governance and minoritypolicies as part of the association process with Georgia have failed to mitigate intergroupconflicts within Georgian society. In the case of Cyprus, regional integration was evencounter-productive in terms of conflict dynamics. By forgoing the use of conditionality inthe Republic of Cyprus’ accession process, the EU relinquished its leverage to promotethe rapprochement between the southern and the northern part of the island. Granting oneof the conflict parties membership status despite Cyprus’ division and its unsettledconflict gave the Republic of Cyprus the power to veto any EU-led efforts to mitigate theconflict, which may run counter to the interests of local political elites (Diez 2002,Richmond 2006, Richmond and Franks 2009, Kappler and Richmond 2011, Richmondet al. 2011).

Conclusion

The EU has produced a discourse similar to the IFIs and UN’s ‘good governance’narrative, which depends on its cultural perception of itself as a historical site ofdevelopment towards peaceful, democratic and wealthy states. It has established a rangeof institutions, policy instruments and resource deployment to the end of governance forpeace. This has had varying degrees of impact on the ground as the above case studyanalyses illustrate. There are varying local assessments of the capacity, legitimacy andauthority of the EU’s claimed connection of governance and conflict resolution. In theorythe Union’s assumption about those links may be widely shared, but local concernspersist about policy implementation.

EU governance programmes, actors and processes do not always seem to worktowards the same ends. Geopolitical differences across conflict countries also undermineany unified approach, often dependent on the interests and role of another state e.g.,Russia, the USA or Turkey, in the cases we have examined. A particularly European mixof social democracy and (neo-)liberalism, notwithstanding its own internal contradictions,also is diluted by a range of local practices and agencies which follow different interestsand patterns of politics and do not necessarily concur with EU positions on governance orpeacebuilding.

Despite a coherent conflict resolution and peacebuilding rhetoric the EU oscillates inpractice between liberal peacebuilding and neoliberal statebuilding models. It deploysdifferent strategies depending on the level of integration pursued with a conflict country(ranging from trade integration to full membership), while using the standard liberalpeacebuilding consensus approach further afield (Richmond 2004). By virtue of itsclaimed normative power and institutional and technical superiority it assumes it isbeyond governmentality: it does not produce or maintain subjects, but instead attractsthem into the fold of the liberal peace or neoliberal state and its regional ambit. Ironically,however, it is forced to maintain subjects. Previous strategies of conflict managementhave physically separated identity groups or established biopolitical controls, grantingaccess to privileges (such as political power, jobs in the public service, access to territory,social benefits) based on ethnic identity. This has produced a legacy of reinforced self-identification and thus an ‘identity fetishism’, which hampers reconciliation between

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conflict parties at the societal level. In the face of reinforced ethnic identities, the EU’sexternal interventions are too limited in scale, too patchy in their contextual knowledge orlocal consent, and sometimes even too contradictory, to establish a governmentality thatchanges the conflict dynamics. Its governmentality, which may be termed ‘normative’ or‘soft’ power, fails to provide representation, rights and redistribution across the Union orits partners in a consistent manner, meaning its peacebuilding and statebuilding role isregarded by its subjects with suspicion. More needs to be done to address these problemsof inconsistency, limited contextual knowledge and a lack of broad ranging consentacross society.

Thus, one of the common dynamics across our cases relates to the way the subject’sagency tends to respond to the inconsistencies in the often ineffective application of theEU peace-as-governance framework. The EU is supposed to facilitate conflict resolutionthrough the conditional reproduction of liberal and neoliberal rationalities of governance.However, in BiH the EU has been trying to promote multi-ethnicity and reconciliationthrough institutional reform and eventual accession, but the elites and population aremore focused on material and political interests in a domestic setting. In Cyprus, the EUseeks to foster reconciliation through a bi-communal federation, but the Union did notfollow this through in the island’s accession process. Instead the Union ratherunstrategically condoned the status quo, at least in terms of sovereignty, enabling thenationalist mainstream within the Greek Cypriot community to maintain its veto on asolution. In Palestine the EU has assisted the governmentality of the occupation (in termsof normalising Israel’s constraints on effectively promoting a two-state solution), atendency that has been widely noted by Palestinian actors in civil society, businesscommunities and political institutions. In Georgia, the EU is promoting a federation in asituation when the different communities so far have no links whatsoever.

While the EU has adopted a distinct rhetoric on pluralism, social justice and theredistribution of wealth, in practice it has been left to individual country donors to gobeyond a minimum standard of peacebuilding and development. In Georgia, the EUapproximates liberal peacebuilding, whereas in Cyprus it has been unable to even go thisfar. In Bosnia it has played a role based on normative, technical and institutionaldevelopment via conditionality linked to material support and membership prospects. TheEU’s governance strategies tend to fall back on internationally predominant development,peacebuilding and statebuilding rationalities, seeking to appease post-conflict societiesthrough economic and political progress. Hence, conflict resolution approaches turn intostabilisation and pacification strategies.

This said, there are some examples of positive conflict resolution and transformationthat one can point to. In the Georgia case, the EU has funded significant Abkhaz civilsociety initiatives aimed at capacity building in order to assist civil society to develop itsown governance models (which remain far removed from the EU’s hope to seeAbkhazia’s reintegration into Georgia). In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the EU hasstarted focusing more consistently on Palestinian minority projects, aimed at makingIsrael a more open and inclusive society. Similar efforts are underway in BiH and inCyprus, but in very limited form. What is interesting here is that the EU is slowly movingaway from simply funding contact initiatives, and is thinking more about long-termreconciliation with coexistence as a waypoint. In some cases, as in Palestine, it mighteven be said to be controversially strengthening capacities for non-violent forms ofresistance. Yet, these initiatives often fail to be integrated into larger conflict resolutionapproaches, in which the EU deploys all its economic, political and diplomatic leverage

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towards the same ends. Especially in protracted conflicts where geopolitical alliances areat stake, such as in Cyprus or Israel-Palestine, the EU shies away from throwing itsweight behind concerted initiatives that could break the stalemate between conflictparties.

As a result the EU has developed mixed and unstable relations with the localpopulations and elites it is supposed to be reconciling. In practice the EU governance-as-peace approach is internally and externally too contradictory and incoherent to constitutea distinct governance culture29 when compared across our cases. There is an attempt to beinclusive, open, not instrumental, but in practice EU governance in post-conflict zonesfalls into the usual traps: strategic, ideologically biased, ineffective, under resourced,suffering from a lack of local and EU level consensus, or clarity on how governancerelates to legitimacy and peace at the local level. Thus governance is more related toefficiency rather than to peace or justice.

AcknowledgementsWe would like to thank the European Union for sponsoring this research. This article is based onresearch carried out for a project entitled ‘The Role of Governance in the Resolution ofSocioeconomic and Political Conflict in India and Europe’ (CORE). It has been funded by theSocio-economic Sciences & Humanities in the European Community’s Seventh FrameworkProgramme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement n° 266931.

Notes1. For an overview of the three waves of Europeanisation literature, see Treib (2008).2. Administrative, legal and security sector reforms are all part of the statebuilding package since

they are mutually dependent (Hendrickson and Karzoszka, p. 24).3. For a distinction between the concepts of statebuilding, peacebuilding and liberal peace: see

Richmond and Franks (2009, 2011, pp. 181–183).4. In the EU’s 2003 security strategy the European Council defines ‘bad governance’ as

corruption, the abuse of power, weak institutions and the lack of accountability (Council of theEU 2003, p. 4).

5. Interview, UN PBSO, New York, February 7, 2012; see also Suhrke (2011).6. Estimates suggests that the aid earmarked for good governance-related projects increased from

€2 billion (out of €10 billion development aid) in the funding period 2002–2007 to €2.7 billionbetween 2007 and 2013 (Commission of the EC 2003a, Gourlay 2009).

7. See the greed and grievance debate.8. Ivan Martin argues for the case of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership that the adjustment costs

of less competitive economies far outweigh the vague prospects of future growth, seeMartin (2004).

9. Prospective members have to implement the acquis communautaire, containing more than80,000 regulations, directions and laws (Miller 2011).

10. Renegotiating these power-sharing arrangements, however, might unravel the negative peaceand unleash renewed violent competition over power between ethnic factions.

11. For Bosnia-Herzegovina: see Pajíc (1998, p. 136).12. The PLO, Israel and Lebanon participated in the Barcelona Process and the Neighbourhood

Policy at the time of the conflicts. However, some partner countries boycotted multilateralconferences rather than used them as platforms for conflict resolution.

13. Interview with EU official, Cyprus, 1 March 2012.14. The recent layoff of EU-trained Cypriot public servants and their later replacement with

Turkish employees (unskilled in EU law) suggests that Turkey as the TRNC’s majorgeopolitical supporter boycotts reunification as a conflict resolution strategy (Interview: EUofficial, 1 March 2012).

15. Interview: Georgian economist, 7 March 2012.

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16. After securing $4.5bn from the IMF the Saakashvili government might have lost its interest in aconditional Association Agreement with the EU (Georgian economist 7 March 2012).

17. Interview with Georgian economist, 7 March 2012.18. Georgia secured funding from the IMF in September 2008 and $4.5bn in post-war donor aid in

October 2008 (Georgian economist 7 March 2012).19. Technically the whole island became part of the EU. Since the Greek Cypriot government does

not exercise control over the territory of the TRNC though, EU legislation is suspended in linewith Protocol 10 of the Accession Treaty 2003. Hence, the North remains outside the customsand fiscal territory of the EU.

20. Council Regulation (EC) No 389/2006 of 27 February 2006 ‘establishing an instrument offinancial support for encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriotcommunity’ page 2, online at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:065:0005:0008:EN:PDF

21. Suggestions to negotiate via third country regulation have been opposed by the Republic ofCyprus, arguing that the TRNC does not exit as a separate legal entity and thus cannot enterlegal agreements.

22. Interview: European diplomat, 1 March 2012.23. Interview EU official, 26 April 2012.24. EU sponsorship comes with a ‘sunset clause’, stating that if projects are not implemented

within three years, earmarked funding will be withdrawn (interview EU official, 26April 2012).

25. Interview: Palestinian NGO employee, March 2102.26. Interviews with representatives of municipality Trnovo (RS) and municipality Trnovo (FBiH),

10 May 2012, Trnovo. Thanks to Elena Stavreska for making this argument.27. Interview with Georgian academic 9 March 2012.28. At the moment, conditional agreements with the EU might not be appealing for the Saakashvili

government since Georgia secured funding from the IMF in September 2008 and $4.5 billion inpost-war donor aid in October 2008 (Georgian economist 7 March 2012).

29. This evaluation is based on Ruth Benedict’s definition of culture as a ‘more or less consistentpattern of thought and action’ (Benedict 1934).

Notes on contributorsSandra Pogodda is a Lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Manchester.

Oliver Richmond is a Research Professor at the Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute, andthe Department of Politics, Manchester University, UK. He is also International Professor, Schoolof International Studies, Kyung Hee University, Korea.

Nathalie Tocci is Deputy Director of the Instituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, and Editor of TheInternational Spectator.

Roger Mac Ginty is Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at the Humanitarian and ConflictResponse Institute, and the Department of Politics, University of Manchester. With OliverRichmond, he edits the journal Peacebuilding.

Birte Vogel is a PhD candidate at the Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute at theUniversity of Manchester.

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