Arctic Security: All Quiet on the Northern Fronst
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Transcript of Arctic Security: All Quiet on the Northern Fronst
ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 10 1
Volume 2 - Issue 10, October 2012
Contents: Global Pulse: Why the Arctic Matters: Care More, Worry Less
Jason Wiseman examines the issues surrounding global efforts to sustain a cooperative
framework among nations with a stake in the Arctic Circle. He argues that Canada, with the
assistance of NATO, should take the diplomatic lead and work to prevent conflicts.
Arctic Security: All Quiet on the Northern Front
Djan Sauerborn and Bastian Matteo Scianna examine the claims that climate change in the
Arctic will lead to an economic “gold rush” in which various countries come into conflict
over Arctic resources. The authors conclude that the risk of such conflicts is overstated, and
that most disputes in the area have a high probability of being resolved peacefully.
The Canadian Arctic Dossier
Amina Abdullayeva presents an overview of the various disputes between Canada and other
actors over Arctic territory. She concludes that Canada should attempt to resolve these
conflicts through diplomatic skill and scientific evidence rather than force.
ARCTIC CLIMATE CHANGE
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL SECURITY
Recently, there has been a lot of discussion about
the implications of Arctic climate change for global
security. Analysts are concerned that competition
over newly accessible natural resources could lead to
conflicts. The five states bordering the Arctic Ocean,
known as the “Arctic Five” nations - Canada, Russia,
the United States, Denmark, and Norway - are all
highly interested in these resources, as are other
entities including the EU and China.
Despite the potential for conflict, the changes in
the Arctic also present certain opportunities. As the
Bering Strait is increasingly less blocked by ice, espe-
cially in summer, travel time between Asia and Eu-
rope can be reduced through this northern
“shortcut.” This has the potential to reduce costs and
increase trade.
The role of the international community, includ-
ing NATO, should be to ensure that disputes over
Arctic resources can be resolved peacefully. One of
the key organizations is the Arctic Council, an inter-
governmental forum which consists of the “Arctic
Five” plus Finland, Iceland, and Sweden. In May
2011, the Council members signed their first binding
agreement, the International Search and Rescue
Treaty. The Council should build on this positive first
step and continue to promote cooperative measures.-
Linda Benesch
As Arctic ice melts, ships have a easier time passing through (Photo: SeaNews)
ISSN 229
4-12
74
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 10 2
As one of the most important emerging challenges for sever-
al NATO members in the 21st century, the Arctic Circle has
become a critical issue for the future of the northern hemi-
sphere. Overview
Although it is a massive area overlapping the nautical borders
of several states, the Arctic is also a highly regulated area making
legal and political questions simpler than expected.
For starters, the Arctic Circle
is a sea surrounded by a landmass
(not vice-versa) and is thus regu-
lated by UN Laws of the Sea
(UNCLOS). Under international
law, this means that all states own
up to 200 nautical miles off their
own coasts. Thus, Canada, Den-
mark and Norway each own the
fish, minerals, oil and gas within
200 nautical miles of their north-
ernmost landmasses. In addition,
each state can claim an extra 150
miles if they can scientifically
prove that the seabed is connected
to the continental slope within
their own 200 nautical mile range.
According to a US geological
survey, the Arctic region holds
roughly one fourth of the world’s undis-
covered oil and natural gas, 84% of which lies beneath the ocean
floor. Oil companies already involved in the region include:
ConocoPhillips, Statoil, ExxonMobil, BP, Imperial Oil, Chevron
and Royal Dutch Shell. Due to the potential richness of this re-
gion, it is safe to assume that each state will claim the extra 150
nautical miles if possible.
Second, in an effort to avoid political tensions, each country
in the area founded and joined the Arctic Council in 1996 to
establish a forum where issues can be discussed and resolved.
This Council is made up of eight members: Canada, US, Nor-
way, Denmark, Russia, Iceland, Sweden and Finland but has
both permanent and ad-hoc observer states that includes France,
Great Britain, Germany, China and several others.
For the eight member states, each country is obligated to
submit its claim in the Arctic with-
in 10 years of ratifying UNCLOS.
This ensures that each state
acknowledges the framework and
is bound by international law to
resolve any disputes through the
forum.
Third, as the ice caps continue to
melt the Arctic takes on a whole
new meaning. Transit.
With the opening of the Arctic
Passage Way, the need to rely on
these routes is much reduced. So
much so that the Arctic Passage
Way will save roughly 40% of the
distance, fuel costs and carbon
footprint for all sea traders using
this new transit route.
Challenges
There are several issues that have arisen in the arctic that
have complicated the framework for cooperation.
First, as a resource rich and strategically important area,
Russia views the Arctic as the solution to their socio-economic
problems and are dead set on being the dominant player in this
Why The Arctic Matters: Care More, Worry Less
By Jason Wiseman
GLOBAL PULSEGLOBAL PULSEGLOBAL PULSE
The Arctic Circle (Photo: Wikimedia)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 10 3
region. Because of this, Russia has begun a major drilling and
expansion program in the area which has made fellow Arctic
states weary of developing their own Arctic borders too much
out of fear of provoking Russia.
Having recently established the world’s northernmost port
in Dudinka, while also planning on establishing an Arctic brigade
on the border with Norway, Russia is heavily invested in devel-
oping this area and occasionally sends submarines around the
Arctic to remind its neighbours that it is not to be ignored.
Second, Canada has a territorial dispute with Denmark at the
top of the world on a little rock called Hans Island. This issue is
yet to be resolved.
Third, due to the high volume of Rare Earth Elements (REE)
in the Arctic, China has become a very interested party in the
region. Since 97% of the worlds REE are currently exported by
China, resources in the Arctic have forced Beijing to pay close
attention to this region. Having already signed energy agree-
ments with Iceland, China has used its economic influence to get
a proxy seat at the Arctic Council. What
kind of role Chinese investment and
political influence will play is largely
dependent on the future of US-China
relations.
Fourth, Russia, China and the EU are
all weary of the NATO card being played by anyone in the re-
gion. This has led to a suppression of security dialogue and am-
biguous communication between Arctic member states.
Fifth, environmental disasters cannot be ruled out. Since it’s
an iced environment, prevention and emergency response are
even more difficult. The ability to clean up an oil spill or per-
form a rescue mission on a sea of ice requires a high level of pro-
fessional training and operational capability that is yet to be real-
ized by any of the Arctic states.
Sixth, states are currently unable to agree on how best to
deal with threats such as eco-terrorism, “COD Wars” or the
potential for Greenland to “Break Away” from Denmark. Con-
tingency plans must be crafted for all these scenarios. Failure to
do so can polarize the Arctic Council due to each state’s own
national interests and domestic pressures, causing a rift through-
out the Council that can eventually lead to a massive disruption
in Arctic dialogue and cooperation.
Seventh, people live in this area. Depending on where you
draw the boundary, almost four million people inhabit the Arctic
today. This includes indigenous peoples and recent arrivals. De-
spite having Permanent Participant status at the Arctic Council,
the role they will play in the future of the Arctic is uncertain.
Finally, as Arctic states compete to strengthen their hand,
they will need to invest more heavily in vessels and equipment,
something everyone but Russia seems reluctant to do. As of
now, Russia leads the world with 25 icebreakers, with Finland in
second place with 9, while Canada is third with only 6 icebreak-
ers. Many of which desperately need to be refurbished.
According to the US Congressional Research Service, the
Americans need at least $3 billion in additional vessels and
equipment just to provide basic services along their coastline.
Without a sufficient amount of functioning icebreakers, we will
all have to rely on Russia’s generosity to clear the paths for
trade.
Conclusion
It is critical that NATO members adhere to the established
framework and continue in their efforts to sustain a cooperative
framework amongst Arctic nations. The current lack of Canadian
-Russian cooperation, US investment and
formulated EU policy are all major obsta-
cles to resolving any problems.
Since the US role is small and the eco-
nomic pressures facing the EU will con-
tinue for the foreseeable future, Canada
is in the best position to lead diplomatic efforts and ensure that
the Arctic be adequately shared while avoiding any potential
danger of conflict. For the future of NATO’s Arctic policy, its
members must encourage Canada to take the diplomatic lead to
ensure that policy remains focused and conflicts are prevented.
NATO must assist in this effort by encouraging and support-
ing its Arctic members by taking small measures such as joint
scientific and environmental projects or joint coastal training of
search and rescue missions, to help ease the tension and build
trust between all Arctic players. Failure to do so undercuts
NATO’s potential as a stabilizing force and incentivizes states to
disregard the institutional framework set forth by the Arctic
Council.
Jason Wiseman is the Program Assistant for the Atlantic Trea-
ty Association and a Senior Research Analyst with the Atlantic Council of Canada. He holds an MA in Government with a Spe-cialization in Counter-Terrorism and Homeland Security and a BAH in Political Science. .
For the future of NATO’s Arctic Policy, its members must encourage Canada to
take the diplomatic lead
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 10 4
by Bastian Matteo Scianna and Djan Sauerborn
W hen Russia planted a flag on the ground of
the Arctic in August 2007 numerous articles
followed that described a upcoming
“scramble for the Arctic”, a new geopolitical hotspot with conflicts
being waged in the high north. Climate change has an effect on this
region and will continuously transform its economic and political
character. Yet, the often openly postulated panic does not match the
realities on the ground.
An Arctic “Gold Rush”?
Climate change has turned into an overarching global phenome-
non and one area that will be visibly affected in its entirety is the
Arctic. Man-made global warming differs in intensity across the
globe. The Polar Regions are experiencing the greatest temperature
increase and are often considered to be a global “early warning sys-
tem”. The repercussions of an increasingly ice free Arctic has already
altered the daily life of the indigenous populations within the region,
as traditional lifestyles can no longer be pursued and patterns of life
have had to be changed accordingly. Additionally, if ice on Green-
land breaks off from the landmass, this will cause sea levels to rise.
Thus, the local effects in the Arctic will turn into a global concern.
Yet, ironically, the Arctic has gained more attention in
recent years because the consequences of climate change also bear
possibilities for a “race towards resources.” New sea trade lanes and
geopolitical concerns led many to fear a “Gold Rush” in the high
north.
A US geological survey found that the Arctic contains
around 30% of global unexplored gas and 13% of the unexplored
oil, with most of it in off-shore regions. This led to claims that the
Arctic has the potential of turning into the backbone of 21st century
oil producing. However, estimates vary greatly and all numbers
have to be read with caution. Predictions about easy access to these
resources have proven to be incorrect, and even with rising oil pric-
es the costs of exploiting oil and gas in the Arctic remain too high to
be economically feasible. Unlike gold, oil needs large investments,
infrastructure and companies. Additionally, the costs for transport
to distant locations remain too high, with gas prices rising. There-
fore, the Iceland based expert Professor Valur Ingimundarson wrote
in a report for the European Parliament that the complexity of prob-
lems facing beneficial exploration of natural resources in the Arctic
is further enhanced by the rough climate in the high north which
makes other, more easily accessible, resource locations more attrac-
tive. Fishing grounds and agriculture are also affected. While the
former introduces new possibilities for exploitation and possible
quarrels and fishing rights, the latter influences the very way of life
for the population in the Arctic.
With the Arctic ice melting rapidly, new sea lanes might
become a reality sooner rather than later. The speed of trade could
be enhanced and geopolitical hotspots such as the Suez Canal, the
Gulf of Aden or the Strait of Malacca could be circumvented. The
new route would also save fuel, thus reducing costs. However,
there are also obstacles to an increase in Arctic shipping. Protecting
trade littoral waters, and the environment are paramount for a po-
tential success story. Charles Emmerson (The Future History of the
Arctic, 2011, p.185) states that a less icy Arctic may see more
storms. Ice variability may pose too many risks and could lead to
time delays regarding the shipment of sensitive cargo. Emmerson
concludes that “large-scale trans-Arctic shipping is a decade or more
away.” The shifting dynamics of the Northeastern and the North-
west Passage have the potential to spur tensions between Norway
and Russia and the US and Canada, respectively.
In summary, the exploitation of resources and an economi-
cally feasible transport to the customers remain medium-term goals.
There is no easy way to access the resource rich Arctic. Additional-
ly, the great majority of resources were found to be situated in the
Arctic Security: All Quiet on the Northern Front
The Polar Regions are Experiencing the Greatest Temperature Increases Due to Climate Change (Photo: CBC)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 10 5
as a result of global warming. The changes would be too small to be
worth the diplomatic and political costs of reopening discussions.
Maritime borders in the Arctic will probably remain as they
are.”(2011, p.116)
There is a second tool used to mediate between the Arctic
Five - the Arctic Council set up by the Ottawa Declaration in 1996.
It combines several initiatives of peace, fostering dialogues and sus-
tainable development in the Arctic. The initiative goes back to Gor-
bachev’s call for a “peaceful Arctic” and bundles all Arctic states in a
flexible forum. Whilst meeting every two years at the ministerial
level, there are also numerous permanent bodies who mainly tackle
environmental concerns and development. Besides indigenous
groups, a great variety of stakeholders can benefit from and take
part in this process of knowledge creation. The Council formulates
guidelines and recommendations and can thus function as a forum
for dialogue and exchange of knowledge and interests. It should not
be dissolved prima facie as a “paper tiger”
just because it does not possess binding
authority. It remains however a matter of
fact that neither the UN organs nor the
Arctic Council has any legal authority in
settling disputes. Unsurprisingly, this
often leads to insecurity.
Certain parties, especially non Arctic Five states, occasion-
ally call for a more binding legal framework and list the Antarctica
treaty as an example. However, the Arctic is different as no one
owns it and it is a sea surrounded by land not vice versa. Additional-
ly, there is no support by any of the Arctic Five for such a treaty and
such a complex multilateral task could take very long and would
constitute an effort no one is willing to accept. Nonetheless, with
decreasing ice coverage and more trade in the Arctic, it will gradual-
ly become more difficult for the Arctic states to prevent initiatives
aimed at generating greater internationalization and reluctance to
accept an Arctic Five mare nostrum with climate change in this partic-
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of the states and not in “disputed”
territory.
Who Owns What? UNCLOS and the Arctic Council
Given the numerous resources spread over such a vast territory,
a number of countries raise claims and have interests. There are
mainly three forms of mediation: the UN, the Arctic Council and
several bi- and multilateral treaties. Generally, the Arctic states
consist of the “Arctic Five” being Canada, Denmark, Norway, Rus-
sia, and USA. Additionally the Arctic states are usually considered
to include Finland, Sweden and Iceland, but the indigenous popula-
tion has very little accurate representation. The Arctic Five held
meetings which ended in declarations to respectfully and peacefully
solve disputes (Ilulissat Declaration 2008), yet led to outspoken
frustration by Finland, Sweden and Iceland. However, only the
Arctic Five can legally claim rights on Arctic territory which still
leaves us with the pressing question of: “who owns what” in the
Arctic?
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) serves as a legal framework where states have submitted
claims since 1982, for example regarding seabeds that go beyond
their exclusive zones of 200 nautical miles. UNCLOS is generally
accepted as arbiter, even though the US did not sign the convention.
Yet, beyond the seabed, states can also claim that their continental
shelf forms a natural extension and thus is their territory. Different
court responsibilities and regulations of international law make it
very difficult to create a binding character. Thus, maritime border
disputes and land questions are inter-
twined. Time also plays a role as states
only have 10 years after signing UN-
CLOS to submit their claims. Making
such a claim involves a lot of documents
and research material which is expensive.
For this reasons, countries such as Canada and the US have pooled
resources and strengthened cooperation. Disputes do not necessarily
lead to tensions or conflicts. The will for cooperation was demon-
strated in the case of Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea. A con-
flict between the US and Canada over the Beaufort Sea also seems
highly unlikely.
So beyond the aspect of uncertainty and overlapping legal
frameworks, there is a modus vivendi and customary law approaches
to settle different interests. As Charles Emmerson stated in his “The
Future History of the Arctic”: “Coastal states in the Arctic are un-
likely to accept a redrawing of their maritime borders, even if some
areas of land, say in northern Siberia or Alaska, become submerged
Disputes Do Not Necessarily Lead to Ten-sions or Conflicts. The will for
cooperation was demonstrated in the case of Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea.
NATO Troops in Norway (Photo: Wikimedia)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 10 6
ular region having global effects.
Beyond the group of states mentioned one has to consider
more players involved. The EU and China share a great interest in
the possibility of new resources and shipping lanes and were there-
fore always interested in influencing the Arctic Council and attaining
an observatory status. The problem of the indigenous people cannot
be highlighted enough. The Arctic Council solves some of the disad-
vantages they face. As it is often the case the weakest lobby group is
hit by the consequences the hardest. Globally operating companies
such as Exxon and Shell and environmentalists such as Greenpeace
are also important groups who pursue their own interests.
A “Great Game” in the High North?
Together with the fear of a new “Gold Rush” and the hardships
in governing the Arctic, there is a perceived threat of a militariza-
tion of the Arctic. During the Cold War this marked the shortest
possible way for the US and the Soviet Union to attack each other
directly. Thus, countries like Iceland had a
strategic role for NATO. Today the prob-
lem remains that the Arctic Five remain
skeptical about outside interference by
other organizations, such as the EU, NATO
or states like China, yet can be truly prag-
matic and cooperative when it comes to eradicating diverging inter-
ests.
Russian muscle flexing rhetoric and repeated “public rela-
tions” statements on the importance of the Arctic for the Russian
energy sector should not be overstated, as they often have domestic
policy motivation. Moscow showed remarkable willingness to coop-
erate with the Arc-
tic states and negoti-
ate disputes. A clear
lack of environmen-
tal concern marks a
contrast to this
positive develop-
ment. Nevertheless,
Russia strictly op-
poses the involve-
ment of any other
organization or
states in Arctic
affairs and it should
not come as a sur-
prise that Russia is very keen on shifting its focus to the Arctic re-
gion. As a nation dependant on energy exports, the ice cannot melt
fast enough for Moscow. This strategic train of thought also unveils
itself in the Russian Federation’s State policy “In the Arctic until
2020 and beyond”. This program is aimed at training and equipping
specifically trained “Arctic warriors”. A closer look unravels the fact
that these Special Forces would mainly be used to protect the north-
ern regions of Russia. Most of the Russian air fleet is not capable of
operating in the Arctic region. Surveillance and reconnaissance
flights have, however, been on the rise since 2007 as have Ship Sub-
mersible ballistic Nuclear (SSBN) missions. Russia’s biggest asset is
the high end ice breaker fleet and the experience of navigating
through the Arctic.
The increasing role played by non-state actors and the resulting
security concerns make the protection of the new coastal waters
more important and the Kremlin is not alone in acquiring new
equipment and technologies. Yet, Russia has the know-how but
lacks the complete port folio, especially regarding finances and tech-
nology.
In his background paper “Military
Capabilities in the Arctic”, Siemon T.
Wezeman summarizes and analyzed the
repertoire of Arctic States and found that
even though all other Arctic Five states are
NATO members, their stance on NATO involvement and the secu-
rity concerns differ. Canada is very skeptical about using the NATO
-Russia forum to negotiate, where the European states have Russian
interests “next door” and often feel neglected and unsupported as
the NATO “front line” states in this respect. Canada and Norway
invested in new coast guard ships and shifted some interest to
“Arctic security”
whereas the US and
Denmark do not see
any benefits in such a
policy. Especially
Washington did not
get influenced by the
“ A r c t i c f e v e r ”
whereas Copenhagen
has to fear a Green-
landic strive for
independence with
increasing resource
richness. A SIPRI
report by Kristofer
Bergh thus highlights the need for a closer alignment of US and
The Arctic Five remain skeptical about outside interference , yet can be truly
pragmatic when it comes to eradicating diverging interests
The Canadian Rangers (Photo: Canadian National Defense)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 10 7
position, Denmark profits from multiple different geostrategic bases
and outposts. Thus, when looking at recent developments one has
to put this in context. It might be true that the Canadian rangers
have been strengthened, that the Russians set up brigades of Arctic
military personnel and that Norwegian military units have been
shifted further north, but these are all steps implemented to patrol
and protect the borders that are and NOT the borders that should
be. Further, given the size and scope of these steps one cannot iden-
tify any form of aggressive militarization. Additionally, the US, as
the greatest military power, is pursuing a wait-and-see strategy as
Washington could increase Arctic forces rapidly if the need should
arise.
Conclusion
The economic gold rush is not likely to happen under current
circumstances. Additionally, the resources do mainly not lie in dis-
puted territory. Economic exploitation will still take decades to be
fully effective and economically reasonable. Everyone seems willing
to settle and to negotiate disputes or confronting interests. Even
though the international organizations and
councils in place are far from perfect they
constitute an effective and flexible tool for
negotiation. Stewardship is needed as well
as a balance between national egoisms and
global solutions for global concerns. It is an
imperative to find equilibrium between legal rights, states interests
and accountability for their actions.
The increase of Arctic military capabilities by some nations
does not mark militarization or a military build-up. A conflict would
only become a realistic scenario if the Arctic were to get enmeshed
in other disputes or if rigid nationalistic momentum prevailed over
pragmatic cooperation.
Clashing interests may only delay this process and no imme-
diate threat of an escalation or militarization in the region is foresee-
able or realistic. The demand for security and stability amongst the
actors will surely not melt as rapidly as the ice. So for the moment
all is quiet on the Northern Front.
Canadian interests for an improved standing and leading example for
Arctic stewardship.
Canada has made it quite clear in the recent years that its
arctic claims should be taken seriously. In 2010 Foreign Affairs Min-
ister Lawrence Cannon made this abundantly transparent during his
visit to Moscow, basically stating that Canada’s “Arctic Sovereignty”
was a priority. Both Russia and Canada claim the 1,800 kilometer
submarine Lomonosov range, between Canada’s Ellesmere Island
and Russia’s new Siberian Islands which both countries see as a po-
tential source for large fuel deposits. Canada has not only found a
new sense of confidence, but also has the technical and organization-
al clout to back its aspirations. From an operational standpoint,
Canada is able to act flexibly and swiftly due its four secondary air-
craft bases in northern Canada. The 1.5 billion Canadian dollar
project “Joint Uninhabited Surveillance and Target Acquisition Sys-
tem” (JUSTAS) for maritime and Arctic patrol, is another indicator
for Canada’s commitment. Besides five large and six small icebreak-
ers and fifteen major surface warships and four conventional subma-
rines, the numbers of the Canadian Rangers, a lightly equipped,
highly professional paramilitary unit have
increased from 4,100 in 2008 to 5,000 in
2010. Canada is well prepared, but the
question remains for what exactly?
The Arctic region is at best a low
profile security concern for the US. It was
not mentioned in a 2012 report on security priorities of the 21st
century. Although the US has the most capabilities of all five actors
it has hardly any troops specifically trained for Arctic missions. It has
less high end Ice breakers than Russia and the Navy only had one
experimental vessel, the MV Susitna, which was eventually sidelined
and reused for civilian purposes only. The SSB’,s however, do regu-
larly patrol the arctic waters. The trend at the moment is investing
in civilian ice breakers which are deployed to the region for scien-
tific purposes.
The focus of Norway’s Arctic strategy lies in balancing Rus-
sia’s influence. The nature of relations between Moscow and Oslo
has improved over the course of the last years. Cooperation is on
the rise in the European Arctic Area and military joint exercises
between Norway and Russia have been held repeatedly. The fact
that the Norwegian chief of defense has called for shutting down one
of the two battalions of the “Brigade Nord” is a clear indication for
the diminishing fear of Russian aggression.
Denmark has forged the Arctic Military command between
Greenland and the Faroe Island as a result of the adoption of a spe-
cial Arctic Strategy adopted in 2011. Due to Greenland’s favorable
The demand for security and stability amongst the actors will surely not melt
as rapidly as the ice.
Djan Sauerborn is currently pursuing a Master's Degree in Political Science
of South Asia and Anthropology at the Heidelberg University. His main interests
are ethnic and civil conflict, civil-military relations, EU-South Asia relations.
Bastian Matteo Scianna is pursuing his MA/MSc in International and
World History at Columbia University and the LSE and Political Science. He
focuses on European military history, the development of strategic thought and
current European defense policy.
About the authors
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 10 8
by Amina Abdullayeva
N o action is taken until a crisis hits, and the Arctic has
been no exception to this rule. Climate change brings
with it unexpected developments, and suddenly we
find that a large swath of the ocean that used to be permanently un-
der ice has turned into a source of major international disagreements.
Canada, being among the five nations with an Arctic coast-
line, is anxious to prove irrevocably its rights to the Arctic territory
that it considers its national property. To that end, Ottawa has been
undertaking various projects, mostly military in nature, to assert its
sovereignty in the Far North. For example, Canada has embarked
upon the largest shipbuilding program in its history, which will in-
clude a $25 billion (CAD) order on warships. Some observers argue
that these and other recent defence expenditures are not justified by
Canada’s commitments in Afghanistan and other parts of the world,
but by its policy of increasing militarisation in the Arctic.
This article explores Canada’s Arctic policy by first setting
the stage and explaining the background of the issues. Next, Canada’s
Arctic disputes are listed, followed by an examination of their signifi-
cance. Finally, mechanisms of resolving these disputes are discussed.
Background
Before the rise in global temperature, the Arctic was regarded as
“a massive quantity of ice and no one had particular pretensions to
it,” says Russian energy expert Ser-
gey Pikin. Climate change has trans-
formed the situation – not only
drastically, but also rapidly. This is
because the results of global warm-
ing in the Arctic are far more dra-
matic than elsewhere due to the
sharper angle at which the sun’s rays
strike the polar region during summer
and because the retreating sea ice is turning into open water, which
absorbs far more solar radiation. This dynamic is creating a vicious
melting cycle. According to Jacinthe Lacroix, senior science adviser
for Environment Canada, the ice in Canada's Arctic has shrunk 32%
since the 1960s. In addition, global warming has raised the tempera-
ture in Canada’s northern archipelago by 1.2 degrees over the last
century - twice the average rate the temperature is rising worldwide.
Each year the ice shrinks by approximately 70,000 km2, the equivalent
of Lake Superior.
Whereas exact boundaries in the Far North were not of great
concern before, it is becoming increasingly important to delineate
Arctic territory clearly. The United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS), which came into effect in 1994, is the mechanism
used for this purpose. Countries that ratified the Convention can file
claims to parts of the world seas, in this case the Arctic Ocean, to the
UN Commission that will then evaluate them based on a scientific
method. According to UNCLOS, a country is entitled to 200 nautical
miles of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) off its coastline, in which it
controls the rights to marine resources. However, if a state can prove
that its continental shelf extends beyond its EEZ, it gets the right to the
seabed and the minerals that come with it for as long as its continental
shelf extends, but not the waters above that shelf outside of the EEZ.
There is currently no unified set of multilateral norms and
agreements that govern the Arctic. The fast pace of the global warming
is forcing the states implicated in this region into action now, and any
decisions made by the Arctic powers today will have a long-lasting
influence in the coming years.
Canada’s Arctic Disputes
Canada has unresolved territorial disputes with three other arctic
nations. They range from the big question of the ownership of the
Beaufort Sea to the small but potentially highly consequential disagree-
ment over Hans Island. The former issue
is between Canada and the US, while the
latter involves Denmark. Canada also
needs to agree with Russia over certain
continental ridges. The biggest question,
that virtually pits Canada against the rest
of the world, is the status of the North-
west Passage.
Canada vs. the World
The Northwest Passage is a sea route that connects the Atlantic and the
Pacific Oceans by passing through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.
Seafarers and explorers dreamed for centuries of discovering this fabled
passage that would serve as a shortcut to the riches of the Orient. Many
lives were lost in the pursuit of this seaway, but when it was finally
discovered, it became obvious that it would be unusable to the shipping
industry, as most of it was permanently covered in ice with only small
Northwest Passage Routes (Photo: Wikipedia)
The Canadian Arctic Dossier
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 10 9
Canada uses the 1825 St. Petersburg Treaty between the British and
Russian Empires, while the US asserts the principle of equidistance in
determining the boundary. In practice this means that Canada
“contends that the maritime boundary should follow the land bound-
ary along the 141st meridian out 200 miles,” essentially extending
the land boundary between Yukon and Alaska out to the ocean in a
straight line. The US, on the other hand, relies on the principle of
equidistance, which draws the boundary along a median line equidis-
tant from the shores of both Canada and the US.
As the two sides use different methods of measuring their
Arctic maritime boundary, the dispute –not surprisingly – remains
unresolved. In the meantime, the disputed area is a wedge the size of
Lake Ontario, or approximately 21,000 km2. Ironically, beyond the
200 mile EEZ, “the Canadian line is better for the US - and the US
line better for Canada”.
Canada vs. Denmark
One of the smallest disputes in the Arc-
tic is the question of Hans Island. It is literally
the smallest issue, because the island has an area
of only 1.3 km2. There are no reserves of any
valuable minerals either. It is just a tiny island
between Canada’s Ellesmere Island and Den-
mark’s Greenland.
Both countries have a strong claim to it, and
each has tried to assert its own sovereignty over the island via official
visits over the years. Each time a Canadian politician or squad of
soldiers lands on the island, the Danish side issues an official state-
ment of protest and vice versa.
Recently there have been reports that the two sides are pre-
pared to reach a settlement whereby the island would be split into
two - almost exactly in half, but these reports are as of yet uncon-
firmed by either government. It can be politically embarrassing to
acknowledge a compromise when each side had been signalling re-
lentless determination.
Canada vs. Russia
This argument is over stretches of the Arctic Ocean as deter-
mined by the geology of the Lomonosov Ridge, a long trench run-
ning along the floor of the Arctic Ocean from Siberia to Ellesmere
Island. Whoever can prove that the ridge is an extension of their
continental shelf will earn the right to claim the ocean floor and all
the minerals trapped in it, although not the waters over the seabed
itself.
It turns out that there are two scientific ways to measure
continental shelf, which is where the problems arise. “The juridical
definition of continental shelf is broad in scope, as it does not differ-
parts navigable for a few summer months. However, with the advent
of global warming scientists are now predicting that it will be fully
navigable in the coming decades. The Northwest Passage is roughly
7000 kilometres shorter than the current shipping route through the
Panama Canal, which equals about two weeks of travel time. This
translates into millions and even billions of dollars in savings for the
shipping industry, as well as large potential gains for governments
controlling the passage, and constitutes one of the primary reasons for
Canada’s claim to it.
The problem is that many countries – notably the US – be-
lieve that the Northwest Passage is an international strait. A waterway
that connects one area of high seas to another is considered an interna-
tional strait, and the proponents of this argument claim that the
Northwest Passage qualifies as such because it links the Davis Strait
with the Beaufort Strait, both of which are
part of high seas. To be clear, this does
not question Canada’s territorial rights
over the passage, but challenges the no-
tion that Ottawa can decide which vessels
could pass through. In case of internal
waters, it is at the discretion of the con-
cerned government to open or close pas-
sage for any vessel; but if the Northwest
Passage is acknowledged as an international water-
way, Canada’s permission will not be necessary.
There have been several instances when the US sent its sub-
marines or icebreakers through the Passage without asking Ottawa for
permission. The most serious case occurred in 1985, when the US
Coast Guard icebreaker “Polar Sea” travelled through the passage
without notifying the Canadian government. It was considered a di-
rect challenge to Canadian sovereignty and caused a diplomatic row,
which resulted in the signing of the Arctic Co-operation Agreement in
1988 by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and President Ronald
Reagan. According to this agreement, the US promised never to send
vessels through the Northwest Passage without Canada’s consent; in
return, Canada promised always to grant its consent. In addition,
Canada reserves the right to send an accompanying vessel with the one
it lets through.
Apart from that agreement, which was a diplomatic way to
overcome an embarrassing incident, no formal treaty has been reached
as to the status of the Northwest Passage. It remains a murky issue to
this day, but time is running out.
Canada vs. the US
The dispute between the US and Canada revolves around the delimita-
tion lines that divide the Beaufort Sea between the two countries.
Hans Island (Photo: Wikipedia)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 10 10
Another security issue is not environmental, but human. If
the Passage becomes fully navigable, chances are that not only com-
mercial vessels, but various groups with malevolent intentions can
also take advantage of this route. Such groups could be comprised of
pirates, or terrorists, for example. Although a distant and unrealistic
proposition for the moment, it is probably not more remote or un-
likely than Arctic ice melting at a rate no one had envisioned fifteen
years ago. If temperatures rise enough for the Northwest Passage to
become a profitable and preferred sea route, it is possible that smug-
glers, traffickers, or even pirates will try to take advantage of the
business going through here. Once again, if that happens, Canada will
be the country most exposed to risk. Having the Northwest Passage
as its internal waters would give it the right to close it to any vessel it
chooses, but without that power it would have no control over who
goes through.
The second issue concerns economic interests. It is no secret
that the Arctic has large amounts of minerals and fossil fuels that
were previously unreachable. It is not known exactly how much
there is, but interestingly, most Eng-
lish-language sources state that Arctic
energy reserves are roughly one-
quarter of the world’s supply, while
the Russian-language sources pre-
dominantly claim it is one-third. The
higher estimate on the Russian side
betrays their hope for more, which
has to do with the fact that the energy
sector comprises 18.5% of the Rus-
sian GDP, compared to 6.9% in Can-
ada. Since Russia relies so much on its
energy sector, it will try hard to make
large gains in the Arctic. This is where the Lomonosov Ridge ac-
quires a price tag.
In fact, none of the Arctic disputes are purely symbolic, despite the
word “sovereignty” being used more often than any other.
While the issue with Russia is about economic power, the
question of the Northwest Passage, as explained above, can seriously
undermine Canadian security. The wedge in the Beaufort Sea claimed
by both the US and Canada is also potentially very rich in minerals,
while Hans Island – worthless on its own – is important for Canada
to be able to show that it can get what it claims. If it loses that, it may
be difficult to reach favourable agreements in the other, more im-
portant, disputes.
entiate between the different types of continental margins.” Of
course, each country prefers the measurement that will give it more
territory. Those are the measurements they will put into their claims
to UNCLOS. Matters get even more muddled because these claims
are confidential, thus, no one knows exactly what the others will
write in their claims, turning it into a guessing game. One thing that
is certain is Canada’s obligation to submit its claims to UNCLOS
before the 2013 deadline.
The Stakes
As the ice melts in the Arctic, Canada has both economic and securi-
ty interests at stake. Security is mainly an issue with the Northwest
Passage, while the disputes over the Beaufort Sea, Hans Island, and
the Lomonosov Ridge are about potential economic gains or losses.
If Canada loses the Northwest Passage to the international
community the government will not be able to enforce Canadian
laws and regulations over it. As the environment of the region is
fragile, any accident could disrupt it dramatically. If an oil tanker, for
example, causes an accident
while crossing the Passage,
Canada will be the one to clean
up and pay the highest price –
both literally for the clean-up
costs and in terms of the health
of its natural environment and
people who live in the North.
We saw, for example, the
disastrous results of oil spills in
the much safer waters of the
Gulf of Mexico. According to
World Wildlife Fund Canada,
an oil spill in the Arctic would be “impossible to clean up.” “[T]here
is a lot more capacity to respond to an oil spill in the Gulf; there is no
capacity in the Arctic – there is not even a harbour on the Arctic
slope of Alaska, which could be a staging base to respond to a spill.”
Besides, the waters of the Northwest Passage are practically
uncharted, which makes sailing in them dangerous even when the ice
has melted. Therefore, if Canada had more control over this seaway
as part of its internal waters, it would have the right to impose tight-
er regulations on vessels passing through in order to ensure the safety
of its land and people.
“If an oil tanker causes an accident...Canada will pay the highest price (Photo: Wikipedia)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 10 11
About the author Amina Abdullayeva Amina Abdullayeva is a Security Analyst with the Atlantic Council of Canada
focusing on the European Union, Russia and the former USSR. She holds a
Master’s Degree from the University of Toronto – Centre for European, Russian,
Eurasian Studies.
these countries do not have an Arctic coastline, they would like to
be included, even if only as observers, in the decision-making pro-
cess concerning such a large and important part of the world.
Canada has the upper hand here, being the founding mem-
ber of the Arctic Council, which was created by the decree of the
1996 Ottawa Declaration. In addition, Canada will resume chair-
manship of the Council in 2013 for two years, which it can use to
achieve peaceful resolution of the remaining disputes. However, it
needs to approach its future chairmanship with the right mindset and
concrete goals. Diplomacy must take priority over
populist rhetoric.
Conclusion
Considering what is at stake - the security and
prosperity of Canada, as well as the health of its Northern environ-
ment - the government should base its Arctic strategy not on flashy
demonstrations of force and military capability, but on a flexible
approach firmly rooted in legitimate international agreements and
backed by scientific proof. The Arctic Council should continue to be
the forum to discuss all Arctic issues and UNCLOS should be the
tool to lay territorial claims. It should be reformed, if the current
version causes confusion, but this multinational institutional frame-
work should not be discarded at any cost. It is important, because it
bestows legitimacy on state actions in the Arctic, and also because it
makes bilateral agreements possible. Without the overarching
framework provided by UNCLOS, countries would not be able to
centre their negotiations on any accepted basis. Therefore, Canada
has a unique opportunity coming up: the timeline of the fast-melting
ice overlaps with the schedule of Canada’s chairmanship of the Arc-
tic Council. This is an important moment in history, and decisions
taken in the next few years will have a profound impact on the fu-
ture of the region. Canada must use its international reputation,
legitimacy and diplomatic skill to achieve the best results.
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
There are three ways a country can choose to pursue dispute resolu-
tion in the Arctic: bilateral, multilateral, and institutional.
The bilateral method is the best, because often a dispute is just be-
tween two states, so they can reasonably negotiate a settlement.
Moreover, it was the method officially adopted by the five Arctic
nations in the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration. It proved to be very effective
when in 2010 Russia and Norway surprised the world by settling their
40-year-old dispute over the Barents Sea. While Russia has a reputa-
tion as a difficult partner, it can be surprisingly
cooperative when it is in its interests. As Russia
is heavily dependent on Arctic energy re-
sources, it was in its interest to resolve the
Barents dispute as soon as possible and start
exploration. Canada should keep that in mind when dealing with Rus-
sia over the Lomonosov Ridge.
Instead, Canada tends to overreact to certain Russian actions
in the Arctic. For example, Moscow lowered its flag to the Arctic
seabed in 2007, and in June 2011 symbolically sailed two koch boats
(an ancient wooden boat used by early Russia explorers) in the Arctic
Ocean. These actions caused a stir in Canada with angry official state-
ments condemning Russia’s “flag planting antics.” According to Mi-
chael Byers, an international law professor from the University of
British Columbia and an outspoken expert on Arctic issues, “everyone
else is sorting out their differences, we really are the laggards.”
In this situation a multilateral and institutional framework can
be helpful. When Canada-Russia relations became particularly tense,
Norway offered to mediate, based on its recent success with Russia
over the Barents Sea. Such cooperation should be expected to happen
more and more, because there are only five countries in the Arctic
and it is easier to agree in smaller groups. Also, nothing can be re-
solved by resorting to military action, and all the implicated actors
know that. It is clear that talking with each other and cooperating is
the only way to move forward, even if they are ultimately competing
against each other for a bigger piece of valuable territory.
Finally, multilateral cooperation is possible within a clear
institutional framework, where norms and rules are understood by all.
This is why the Arctic Council and UNCLOS are so important. Alt-
hough the Arctic Council is merely an advisory body, it is the only one
created specifically for the Arctic and it is taken seriously. This is
evident by the fact that six non-Arctic nations - France, Germany, the
Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and UK - have a permanent observer
status. Even China is showing strong interest in joining. Although
Canada chairmanship of the Arctic Council must archive
diplomatic success.
Atlantic Voices is the monthly publication of the Atlantic Treaty Asso-
ciation. It aims to inform the debate on key issues that affect the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, its goals and its future. The work pub-
lished in Atlantic Voices is written by young professionals and researchers.
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