An Unrecognized Aspect of Conflict: Isolationism andResolution in Cyprus

_______________________________________Paper Presented by Hilmi Ulas,

PhD Candidate at The School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, GMU

_______________________________________Presented for Conflict Studies and Global Governance: The New Generation

of Ideas

Tenth Biennial Graduate Student Conference at UMass Boston

October 31st – November 1st

Abstract

In this paper, which is based on and therefore borrows largely from

my dissertation, I aim to reconceptualize unrecognition as a policy such

that the policy's goals and ideology are independent from its

execution. Subsequently, I argue that the isolationist execution of

this policy is detrimental to the conflict resolution efforts

directed at Unrecognized breakaway states (UBSs) due to its

unexpected consequences with regards to the psychosocial, political,

and economic growth of the said UBSs (which are not evaluated), and

should therefore be treated as problematic. Therefore, I use Dynamic

Systems Theory (DST)'s metaphorical devices to capture the complex

and distinct dynamics inherent in both the UBSs themselves and the

conflicts in which they are involved and discuss the model's

applicability. I then proceed to map out the said dynamics and

demonstrate their link to isolationism. Ultimately, I hypothesize on

and provide some possible alternatives to the isolationism associated

with unrecognition that would render a resolution of conflicts

involving UBSs more plausible.

Introduction

Unrecognized breakaway states (UBSs) are quasi-states

established on territories forcefully or otherwise de facto taken from

an officially recognized state1. This feat is achieved through

1? Hereafter called a parent state.

mechanisms (such as civil wars, illegitimate referenda, etc.) which

lie outside of the accepted legal parameters for the establishment of

a novel nation-state. Subsequently, these states are not granted

'peer state' status by the international community, both to affirm

this community's rejection of the aspiring pseudo-state's extra-legal

'break' away from its parent state and to deter other peoples

aspiring for independent statehood from following similar

methodologies.

The conflicts involving UBSs tend to last for long periods of

time – usually decades2. In fact, these conflicts endure despite

powerful and persistent efforts of the international community,

including the costly deployment of peacekeeping forces and mediation

by third-parties for peace-making, which almost always prove

inefficient3. Moreover, the conflicts involving UBSs heighten

international tensions which increases the risk of violence as well

as the toll on the international community. In addition, these

unrecognized states become prime grounds for international crimes

such as trafficking and terrorism.

2? See Caspersen and Stansfield, p. 4, Table 1.1.

3? See Mulaj, p. 47-48.

Let us note that the first 14 years of the new millennium have

proven to be a busy time for UBSs. Russia was involved in the

creation of three new UBSs (Abkhazia4, South Ossetia5, and Crimea6) as

well as the destruction of one (i.e. Chechnya7). Additionally, the

Sri Lankan State militarily destroyed the Tamil Eelam with

considerable civilian casualties8. In Nagorno-Karabakh (NKR), more

than a dozen have been killed in the summer of 2014. The Israel-

Palestine conflict had claimed 9,028 Palestinian and 1,182 Israeli

lives in the new millenium9 until the conflict re-escalated to

violence on July 8th, 2014, when approximately 2,200 Palestinian

4? Established in October 1999.

5? Declared independence in 1991; de facto independence was established in the South Ossetian War of 2008.

6? Established in April 2014 after political unrest in Ukraine.

7? Checnya was re-absorbed by the Russian Federation with limited autonomy in 2003.

8? For more information, please see: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/may/10/sri-lanka-tamil-tigers-deaths [retrieved 06/26/2014].

9? See http://www.ifamericansknew.org/stat/deaths.html [retrieved 08/27/2014].

lives10 – 30% of whom were children11 – and 68 Israeli lives12 were

lost.

This apparent intractability of conflicts involving UBSs

indicates that the international community neither knows how to deal

with such conflicts efficietly, nor understands what motivates UBSs

behavior13. In spite of this lack of knowledge, the international

community consistently risks suffering from negative unintended

consequences14 as it utilizes standard policies15 to cover all cases

involving UBSs. Moreover and more worryingly, the domestic impacts of

10? See http://www.pchrgaza.org/portal/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10491:statistics-victims-of-the-israeli-offensive-on-gaza-since-08-july-2014&catid=145:in-focus [retrieved 08/27/2014].

11? Ibid.

12? See http://www.ifamericansknew.org/stat/deaths.html [retrieved 08/27/2014].

13? See Coleman 2000, Coleman 2003, and Coleman 2011.

14? Any social action risks unanticipated/unintended consequences if the action is taken without extensive knowledge of the context, or where basic values regarding concepts such as justice and territorial integrity might prohibit alternative actions.

15? For the purposes of this paper, policies are conceptualized as social actions.

these policies are rarely assessed.

Therefore, this research project will firstly aim to identify

and evaluate the structural and social impacts of isolationist

unrecognition in the context of UBSs as they are experienced in the

Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). In addition, the project

also aims to simultaneously develop a framework to better understand

the TRNC and to strategize on how to more effectively intervene into

the Cypriot Conflict.

UBSs in the Literature:

“Frozen and forgotten”16 – such is the label most UBSs are stuck

with. On the one hand, this label indicates that the status quo

attained in the aftermath of a UBS's creation features only negative

peace due mainly to the involvement of third-party peacekeepers, i.e.

frozen. Subsequently, the sense of urgency to resolve the conflicts

surrounding such states as well as the international media's

attention to these conflicts decrease, and hence forgotten. Therefore,

such conflicts: a) fail to generate enough momentum to create any

16? See Ciobanu, 2008. See also Caspersen and Stansfield 2011, p. 2; Rutland 2007, available at: http://prutland.web.wesleyan.edu/Documents/Frozen_conflicts.pdf .

realistic hope for a resolution17; and b) beget a slim amount of

scholarly attention.

Nevertheless, there have been some important scholarly

discoveries. According to this literature, UBSs are small18,

authoritarian or semi-authoritarian states19 that have little chance

of recognition. Moreover, they cause regional security problems,

undermine the territorial integrity and sovereignty of other states,

provide a possible home for insurgent and terrorist movements and

criminal organizations, and lead to humanitarian problems20.

There are many commonalities across the cases of UBSs. First and

foremost, these states pretend at democratization for international

support and, therefore, for their survival21 22. Indeed, UBSs might

17? For example, the only instance of “hope” for a resolution in Cyprus was during the period of he Annan Plan. See Sozen and Ozersay, 2007.

18? Caspersen and Stansfield, p. 6.

19? Harvey and Stansfield, p. 11.

20? Caspersen and Stansfield, p.1.

21? Harvey and Stansfield, p.11; Closson, p. 66; Caspersen, p. 73-74.

22? Due to their small stature and insignificant economic resources, many UBSs usually cannot fulfill their functions of statehood without outside support.

have to democratize if only due to the need for good governance and a

strong, central state to maintain the unity of the social identity23

within its territories. These observations are congruent with

Bakke's, who underlines that unrecognized states endure due to

internal legitimacy24. In contrast to this, the UBSs' need for unity

might have an adverse effect on the plurality of a democracy as non-

nationalist sentiments have no place in these UBSs25. In fact, due to

the primacy of nationalist discourse and the perception of an ever-

present external enemy26, nationalist elites can get away with ruling

less transparently, less democratically, and less fairly27.

Secondly, the shadow economies (involving profiteering and

crimes such as trafficking28) appear due to the isolation of the

23? Caspersen, p. 84.

24? Bakke, p. 93.

25? Caspersen, p. 84.

26? Chorev, pp. 34-35.

27? Closson, p. 66.

28? Ibid., 75.

state from the international markets29 and they tend to collaborate

with the elites in power. This, in turn, provides resources to the

elite which allows them to oppress their rivals and ignore popular

sentiments30. Clearly, UBSs with strong support from their sponsors

are bound to become (semi-)authoritarian quasi-democracies.

The fact that quasi-democratization comes accompanied by a

strong, nationalist elite possibly with a hand in blood money is not

surprising. “Elite greed” appears to be a common theme in the UBSs

where the said greed encourages illegal activity and thus creates new

key actors with vested interests in the maintenance of the status quo

of unrecognition31. Moreover, this cadre of greedy plunder elite are both

involved in crimes and spend public funds on attracting strongmen or

voters who help them 'guard' their political positions32 33. Both these

29? See King 2001; see also Owtram, p. 134.

30? Caspersen, p. 76.

31? Ibid.; King 2001; Owtram, p. 134.

32? Wolff, p. 160.

33? See: http://www.kibrishaber.com/haber-detay/parayi-kap-konvoya-katil-23322/ [retrieved 07/07/2014].

criminals and their partners-in-plunder not only benefit from the

status quo in the conflict34, but they also create new conflicts as

they use violence on civilians or commit crimes abroad, thus risking

regional stability35.

Thirdly, due to the level of isolation-driven dependency36 UBSs

have on their sponsors, the UBSs' governments, which tend to

outsource their administrative duties (and hence their autonomy and

independence) to the more powerful sponsor state37 and gain financial

support in return, guarantee their political survival externally. In

fact, such significant dependence is a sine-qua-non condition of non-

recognition38 and is inevitable as long as UBSs keep existing in a

state of limbo39. Simultaneously, this dependency reduces the UBSs’

34? Chorev, p. 34.

35? Wolff, p. 160.

36? Closson, pp. 67-68; Mulaj, p.47.

37? Harvey and Stansfield, p. 19.

38? Caspersen, p. 82.

39? Ibid., p. 84.

levels of democracy, as the latter do not depend on their citizens'

support for maintaining their power40. Additionally, the fact that the

sponsor state's support can virtually guarantee their continued

existence causes UBSs to lose interest in international acceptance,

which demotivates them from accomplishing democratizing reforms.

Fourthly, Mulaj's analysis of the UN peacekeeping mission in

Cyprus (UNFICYP) reveals that peacekeeping does not lead to

peacemaking41. In fact, according to Mulaj, there have been two dire,

unanticipated costs of peacekeeping: a) an unrecognized state was

born due to the relative stability brought about by the negative

peace sustained by UNFICYP; and b) the incentives to resolve the

conflict were much reduced as UNFICYP minimized the risks inherent in

the status quo42. Fiftly, Chorev underlines an important point by

arguing that media attention is critical for prompting international

action for the resolution of conflicts involving UBSs, yet the sheer

freezing of these conflict through the establishment of negative peace

40? Harvey and Stansfield, p. 23.

41? Mulaj, p. 47.

42? Ibid.

precludes this option43. Last, but not least, is Wolff's observation

that modern peace-building must involve civil society. Nevertheless,

as established above, the 'state' mechanisms governing UBSs are

virtually impervious to bottom-up pressures as their survival is

based on the goodwill of their sponsor rather than the approval of

their people.

All in all, the literature on UBSs draws a bleak picture of

their present as well as their future. First and foremost, UBSs are

bound to never be able to fully democratize. Secondly, their

political and military elite turn into plunder elite who are vested in

the maintenance of the status quo and the non-recognition of the UBS,

as recognition would destroy their mechanism of benefits much as a

resolution would. Summarily, their absolute dependence on their

sponsor not only makes them into quasi-puppet states, but it also

makes the resolution of their conflicts simply impossible according to

this literature. This conclusion, however, forgoes any effort at

producing alternatives, and they lie in engaging the TRNC as a UBS,

rather than a 'state-like' entity.

Conceptual Framework

43? Chorev, pp. 34-35.

The study of the impacts of isolationist unrecognition within

the TRNC's as well as the Cypriot Conflict necessitates the

development of a new framework. For the purposes of this research, I

will utilize a DST framework, which has its roots in complexity

science. While this approach's main methodology is the use of

simulations, which we will opt not to use, the DST also provides for

some important metaphorical tools to capture the complexity of UBSs.

The most pertinent concept DST has provided for conflict

resolution is those of the attractors. Attractors are states which

occur when a system settles at a point and refuses to budge from

there; moreover, even when forcefully budged, the system naturally

returns to the attractor state once the force is removed44 45. For the

purposes of our developing framework, we can definitely call the

status quo of “no war, no peace” - i.e. that of negative peace – an

attractor state within the context of UBSs (see Basin I in Figure A).

The two main mechanisms which sustain the negative peace in the

Cypriot Conflict are freezing and forgetting46 and the corruption-crime-

44? Lewin, pp. 12-13.

45? See Figure A for a visual depiction of attractor behavior within a system.

46? This policy appears to support the negative peace's entrapping effect as,

oppression-dependency (C2OD) structure47. These mechanisms act as positive

feedback loops (i.e. information flows which encourage the system’s

current behavior) and thus sustain the negative peace. Therefore, rather

than moving the system along, they further stabilize the Attractor Basin.

Subsequently, this necessitates a momentum of exponentially more

force to move the system towards a state where positive change is

plausible.

Figure A: Attractor Landscape

Freezing and forgetting is sustained through peacekeeping due to a lack

of violence, which removes the immediacy for addressing these

despite much internal momentum, the European Parliament failed to break this mechanism in favor of a less isolationist approach.

47? Let us note that the plunder elite are an integral part of this very structure.

conflicts. Moreover, freezing and forgetting helps strengthen the C2OD

structure as the lack of media attention, coupled with a lack of

international supervision over the UBSs’ territories, allows for

extra-legal activities. Indeed, according to Mamali48 and Schoiswhohl,

UBSs’ isolation from the mechanisms of international law is what

makes C2OD plausible in these quasi-states. Indeed, isolationism’s

unintended consequences in the long term appear to provide for a

significant portion of the impetus for the conflictual of UBSs.49

Reconceptualizing Isolationism

A third important DST concept is that of conflict traps. According

to Coleman, conflict traps are actions that are taken without

considering all of the possible consequences and which either creates

new problems or exacerbates the existing ones50. Given this, we can

conceptualize the isolationist approach to the policy of

unrecognition as a conflict trap51 within our framework. Subsequently,

48? pp. 34-35.

49 Figure A obtained from [unknown source] on the internet. All credit due to [source]; no personal credit taken.

50? Coleman 2011, p. 7.

51? As underlined in the literature review above, the isolationist execution of

it should be treated as an independent variable connected to yet

distinct from the policy of unrecognition itself.

To begin, let us expand on the idea of the difference between

policy and execution in the context of unrecognition. Even legal

scholars have yet to come to a consensus on when and why states

should be recognized52. Moreover, these laws appear to be interpreted

to suit the politics of the international community53. Subsequently,

the nature of the policy is one that is legally ambiguous yet

politically explicit. The politics behind the policy, therefore, are

clear and well-articulated:

a. because extra-legal means (such as the illegal use of force)

were used in their breaking away and this needs to be decried54 in

order to deter the use of force for independence;

b. because the principle of sovereignty is largely inviolable in

the international realm and therefore the UBSs' recognition

would set a bad future precedent55.

Given this, we can understant that politcal isolation is a par of

the unrecognition policy has never been evaluated.

52 see Grant's The Recognition of States

53 Caspersen, 2011, Mulaj, p. 54,Closson 2011

54 See http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf 55 See Krasner's Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy and Jackson's Quasi-States.

course for unrecognition to achieve its well-defined political ends.

However, isolationism as executed with regards to UBSs goes well

beyond the simple mandate of political punishment and has four faces:

1. Political Isolationism : The UBSs are not recognized as peer

states and thus cannot join the international community of

states. This type of isolation alone corresponds to the intended

aims of unrecogition as a policy.

2. Societal Isolationism : The UBSs' citizens are discouraged from

becoming a part of the ever-globalizing world society through

embargoes or difficulties to their travel, sports, etc. In the

case of the TRNC, traveling with a TC passport usually means

that one will have to jump through many more hoops than is the

norm, which creates a sense of rejection and alienation.

Moreover, the TC community cannot participate in professional

sports – which could instead be used for establishing a culture

of peace56.

3. Economic Isolationism : The UBSs' states and citizens cannot

participate in the international economy. This disallows the use

of free markets for liberalization, especially since the

economic sanctions are leveld at the whole of the UBSs' citizens

56 Ramsbotham et. al., Chapter 16.

and not just the spoilers, as has become the international

norm57. The 'apolitical' decision by the UK Courts, which inexorably

linked recognition and trade in the case of Cyprus, has

definitely contributed to this. Another contributor here is the

plunder elite as underlined above, who absorb most of the aid and

development money directed to the TRNC.

4. Legal Isolationism : The international law is executed over the

UBSs – as evident in their unrecognition. However, international

law is not executed within UBSs due to a lack of accountability spurred

on by the fact that internationally enforcing laws in UBSs might

spell their unwitting recognition. This type of isolation paves

the way to oppression, criminality, and human rights violations.

Indeed, while the TRNC's parliament has ratified the European

Convention on Human Rights into law, the execution of this

'law,' which explicitly forbids torture as a crime against

humanity, is absent58.

By now, it must be clear that isolationism as experienced is

significantly distinct from unrecogition as intended and has

unexpected consequences, thus turning into a conflict trap for all

intents and purposes.

57 Charron, p. 179.58 Mamali, p.45.

To further elaborate on isolationism’s nature as a conflict

trap, let us recap that the isolationist execution of the policy of

unrecognition tends to bring: a negative peace kept by peacekeepers

which reduces the incentives on all sides for a resolution; an

economic isolation which establishes a shadow economy that, in its

turn, promotes the existence of a plunder elite with vested interests in

perpetuating the status quo on the island; a plunder elite which then

invites criminal elements to the island, thus creating yet another

group with vested interests in maintaining the status quo; a

dependence on a sponsor which strengthens the state and the elite at

the expense of the civil society; a dependence which causes UBSs to

prioritize the interests of their sponsors over their own citizens’

preferences. Clearly, isolationism – related to, yet independent from

unrecognition – is a variable that perpetuates conflicts such as the

Cypriot Conflict while also creating novel domestic and regional

conflicts.

Applying the Framework to the TRNC

For the purposes of confirming the fit of our framework with the

TRNC, I have conducted archival research in newspapers and books

which held news and analyses regarding some of the most significant

aspects of UBSs as underlined above. On that note, this UB exhibits

all the sure-fire signs of the expected conflict-sustaining59 and

conflict-producing60 outlook. In fact, the signs for the need to study

and treat the TRNC as a UBS are aplenty.

First and foremost, the Cypriot Conflict is stuck in a state of

negative peace as expected. As established above, the UNFICYP

provides for a disincentive for the conflict parties to compromise or

even negotiate. Subsequently, this provides for a lack of media

attention to the Cypriot Conflict in general and the TRNC’s domestic

affairs in particular, thus strengthening the elites’ hands while

also weakening the TC social movements. Further pegging social

movements down is the fact that those employed by the state cannot

sustain a strike as workers can easily be transferred from Turkey to

replace them61.

Secondly, the predictable quasi-democratization of the de facto

59? i.e. the mere existence of these states serve to keep the fire of the

original, breaking-away conflict burning.

60? i.e. this UBS’s nature as an extra-legal black hole leads them to create

further domestic and international conflicts and promote regional instability.

61? For example, see http://devrimciproletarya.net/kthy-iscileri-gider-

yerlerini-atlasjet-iscileri-alir/ [retrieved 09/04/2014].

authoritarian state is also apparent in the case of the TRNC. For

example, the TRNC is free according to its FreedomHouse scores62;

however, the same institution contrarily denotes some significant

areas of concern. Among these are the police oppression of civil

society, the oppression of opposition media, lack of transparency,

widespread corruption, as well as humanitarian problems and the lack

of religious freedom63.

Thirdly are the humanitarian problems expected of a UBS which

can be found in abundance in the TRNC. Indeed, the TRNC has been

noted as a criminal haven64, and the criminal cases which have gone to

court have skyrocketed in the last five years65 and include widespread

62? See http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/northern-

cyprus#.VAgC3_lkVpk [retrieved 09/04/2014].

63? Ibid.

64? See http://northcyprusfreepress.com/cyprus-news/north-cyprus-news-haven-

for-criminals/ or http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/wish-you-were-here-cyprus-becoming-popular-bolthole-for-british-criminals-8107009.html or http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/344295/Crime-busters-fear-Cyprus-is-safe-haven-for-villains [retrieved 09/04/2014].

65? See http://www.gundemkibris.com/suc-cenneti-kktc-24614h.htm and

http://www.kibrispostasi.com/index.php/cat/35/news/100387 [retrieved on 09/04/2014]. I have also consulted original activity reports from the TC courts forthe time period of 2009-2013.

smuggling of historical artifacts, forgery, drug trafficking, human

trafficking, organized crime, beatings, rape, and murder66. Not only

do some of these crimes constitute crimes against humanity, but they

also provide for destabilizing factors in the region due to the

presence of international criminal organizations which sustain such

efforts.

Fourthly, militarization of the TC community and the subsequent

societal push towards a unitary, patriarchal identity is also a

feature of the TRNC’s status as a UBS. Both the oppression of the

opposition and the discrimination against women, as denoted by

FreedomHouse67, are linked to rampant militarism - a mechanism of

control for the status quo. Indeed, the military in the TRNC is in

direct control of the police, and the military reports to Turkey.

Unsurprisingly, the police is known for aggression against parties

not aligned with the TC State’s ideologies. Moreover, they are also

known for committing crimes against humanity through the systematic68

66? Ibid.

67?See http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/northern-

cyprus#.VAgC3_lkVpk [retrieved 09/04/2014]..

68? This is disputed by an investigation conducted by the TC Parliament.

use of torture69. Given that these crimes go largely unpunished and

the civic control of police is a taboo idea70, we can say that the abuse of

human rights is sustained by TRNC's unchecked militarism.

The relationship among all these variables and isolationism is

made painfully clear whence we dynamically map the conflict, with

inspiration from both the DST literature and the Protracted Social

Conflict (PSC) framework of Azar71 (see Figure B). Given that

isolationism is the single variable supporting the status quo over which

the international community has direct control, and that

unrecognition is a policy that can be executed in an alternative

fashion, we can argue that a change in the policy's execution appears

to be a sound bet towards resolution.

69? See Mamali’s The Island of Torture.

70? See http://www.kibrispostasi.com/index.php/cat/35/news/131927/PageName/

KIBRIS_HABERLERI [retrieved 09/04/2014] and Mamali, with emphasis on pp. 21-64.

71 Ramsbotham et. al., Chapter 4.

Figure B: DST Map of the TRNC72

Implications for Resolution

As the phenomenon of isolationist unrecognition has rarely been

studied, it comes as no surprise that the alternatives which

attempted to overturn the isolationist portion of the said policy went

72? Key: NFL – Negative Feedback Loop; PFL – Positive Feedback Loop

virtually ignored. However, two works jump out of the literature:

Anne-Marie Gardner's Democratic Governance & Non-State Actors, and Call and

Wyeth's (eds.) Building States to Build Peace. In fact, while neither of

these works are from a conflict resolution perspective, they could

arguably form the main body of reference for future attempts at

resolving conflicts involving UBSs.

To begin, Gardner identifies two important variables for

understanding the impact of international policies on the internal

dynamics of a UBS: international empowerment and democratic

capacity73. Moreover, the author underlines that legitimate governance

based on human rights and democracy serves as the basis for security

in the post-Cold War world. Gardner finds that the two variables of

international empowerment and democratic capacity are not only

positively correlated, but this correlation is strong and almost

constant74. Indeed, according to Gardner's findings, if the

international community responds to the efforts of UBSs at

democratizing through further empowerment and international

73? Gardner, p. 7.

74? See Gardner, pp. 68-70, 100-103, and 132-134, as well as Chapter 6, pp. 135-141.

engagement75 yet punishes authoritarian tendencies (almost in a tit-

for-tat manner), then UBSs can fully democratize76.

On this note, democratization of the UBSs would increase the

likelihood of their conflicts' resolution. This is due to the facts

that: a) democratization would allow for the growth of a stronger

civil society; b) the marginalized voices which do not pertain to the

ruling, plunder elite would be strengthened; and c) a democratic

government would be more accountable both internally and externally,

which could keep the Turkish interference in the internal affairs of

the TRNC, with a special emphasis on its government's authoritarian

tendencies, criminal activities, and frequent use of oppressive

tactics, in check77.

How can the international community proceed to transform UBSs?

Menkhaus's case study of Somalia78 reveals that elites who benefit

from controlling the states resources as well as international aid

and loans, taxes, troops under the cloak of legitimacy prove too

75 Ibid., p. 138.76

? Ibid., pp. 135-136.

77 See http://ciep.itam.mx/~martinel/failingstate8.pdf 78

? Call and Wyeth, pp. 187-216.

tempting79. Indeed, even when Somali politicians set out to build a

legitimate state, they only spurred plunder elite on80 - much like the

case of the TRNC UBS, where even the 'pro-peace, pro-Europeanization'

elite turned into plunder elite once in power81. Subsequently, economic

engagement with such states should be on the condition that they

distribute resources justly and that their elite are accountable to

their populace as well as the international community.

Another important point here is the overly powerful security

forces which soldier or police the UBSs' territories. According to

Call and Wyeth, they “....can foster human rights abuses, political

exclusion, state delegitimation, and even war”82. Indeed, such fears

are constantly realized within the TRNC where human rights violations

and political 'exclusivity' run rampant. Therefore, we can underline

that any third-party intervention into this context must be

79? Ibid., pp. 214-216.

80? Ibid.

81? See http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/24977152/ as well as http://karsiyorum.blogcu.com/kktc-de-yolsuzluk-arsizlik-yuzsuzluk-ve-piskinlik/1814991 [retrieved 09/08/2014].

82? Call and Wyeth, p. 377.

conditional upon increased inclusiveness, accountability, and

democratization, as well as a reduction in the powers of the military

and the police. In fact, the simple establishment of civil control of

the police forces could go a long way for this purpose.

One last caution concerns the handling of the two sets of

spoilers: the plunder elite and the sponsor state. In the light of the

double-teaming spoilers inherent in isolated UBSs, there is clearly a

need for the international community to realize two facts. Firstly,

any intervention into UBSs will necessarily beget adverse reactions

from those who benefit from the status quo. Secondly, if these

interventions are to be successful, the third-parties must ensure

that they have strong domestic support and that the spoilers can be

contained. Subsequently, we can underline the fact that any

intervention into the TRNC will require the strengthening and

subsequent protection of moderates and pro-peace civil society

organizations. Transforming the militaristic culture through peace

journalism, sports and arts activities, as well as the pursuit of

superordinate Cypriot goals might also be helpful and might avoid

elite suspicion. Moreover, the targeted punishment of spoilers to the

resolution of the Cypriot Conflict, as is the current international

norm83, could prove to be effective.

Nevertheless, there are two important shortcomings of this tit-

for-tat approach to integrating UBSs. Firstly, as the national elites

of UBSs have higher stakes in the status quo, committed, long-term outside

assistance is necessary to enact changes in the UBSs84. However, this is

hard to generate as these conflicts are frozen and mostly forgotten.

Secondly, the turbulence of change might be less preferable than the

preservation of the no war, no peace state. Therefore, convincing

policymakers that this high-risk, high-cost strategy hitherto

unimplemented would realistically generate powerful enough results to

justify the tactic's espousal might be the largest hurdle.

Subsequently, certain higher goals such as increased regional security or

trade and resource extraction might be required to be invoked.

Ultimately, however, there is evidence that democratization can be

achieved in the TRNC, and that its subsequent integration into the

international community can lead to a resolution. Firstly, as Paris

has observed, the building of democratic institutions and a

83 See Charron's UN Sanctions and Conflict.84

? Ibid.

democratic culture should precede democratization85. Given this, UBSs

appear as prime candidates for democratizing as their quasi-

democratization has prompted them to build a state capacity and

political culture with suitable undepinnings for this feat86.

Secondly, the tit-for-tat integration approach has already worked in

the TRNC once during the Annan Plan, where the E.U.'s promised

rewards of social integration and economic growth prompted the TC

community to agree to a federal resolution in 2004 – although the

Plan eventually fell through. To conclude, then, we can claim that a

tit-for-tat approach to the TRNC, as well as other UBSs, can help produce

less conflictual and more democratic entities that would be more

likely to help resolve their conflicts.

Conclusion:

The international community approaches UBSs and their

unrecognition in a manner which assumes the form of deterrence and

punishment through isolation. However, this isolation, instead of

reintegrating these states and resolving their conflicts, instead

renders them evolutionarily entrenched in their own unrecognition, in

addition to ensuring their states' authoritarianism and

85 At War's End.86 See Richards and Smith, Statebuilding and Nonrecognition.

conflictuality both within and without. Therefore, this paper has

argued for the use of tit-for-tat tactics to complement the stick of

political isolation with conditional economic, social, and legal

integration to help break the intractability of the current conflict

systems surrounding these quasi-states.

In the case of the Cypriot Conflict, such a tactic would pose a

high risk – that of making the TRNC a strong state which can resist

international efforts at reunifying the island. However, the reward

are arguably higher. Indeed, such a tactic would not only lessen the

primacy of Turkey, the plunder elite, and criminal organizations as

shadow negotiators, but it would also strengthen the existent social

movements which go against the status quo while also deconstructing

the authoritarian mechanisms in the TRNC. The question for our

community will be: can we persuade the world that the theoretical

rewards outweigh the risks which appear comparatively more real?

Given our analysis of the TRNC as a UBS, if the resolution efforts in

Cyprus are to succeed in generating a healthy environment for

building sustainable peace, then this is a necessity.

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