PLANNING ALTERNATIVES, SLUM

UPGRADE & TENURE SECURITY IN WEST AFRICA

by

Alexander T. Deley

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

Master of Science

(Urban & Regional Planning)

at the

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

2010

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It Is a pleasure to thank all those who have been involved

in this thesis process.

This thesis could not have been completed were it not for

the support of my thesis committee, Chair Prof. Dave Marcouiller,

and committee members Susana Lastarria-Cornhiel and Prof. Kurt

Paulsen. Their individual and collective ongoing inputs and

assistance in this thesis writing process has been exemplary. I

would like to acknowledge each for the work they have done

reading drafts, recommending revisions and suggesting further

articles, readings or avenues of research throughout the course

of my writing this thesis. I cannot thank them enough for the

work and expertise that this thesis has benefited from.

I would also like to acknowledge Darrel Ramsey-Musolf for

his input, his common sense, moral support and the long hours he

spent reading and discussing this thesis with me. This thesis

benefited greatly from our many coffee meetings and I can only

say thank you.

iii

Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Aubyn Marath, CEO of

CardioStart International and Dr. John Amuasi of Komfo Anokye

Teaching Hospital in Kumasi, Ghana. I would like to thank Aubyn

for sending me to Ghana as an Urban Development volunteer for

seven months in 2009, an experience through which the

intellectual sinews of this thesis were first drawn. I would

like to thank John for the wonderful work experience he provided

me in Ghana, his exemplary attitude, ongoing support for my

research and his willingness to educate and help me gain the lay

of the land.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements..............................................ii1. Introduction & Research Question............................11.1 Conceptual Model Of Slum Formation.......................101.2 Research question........................................12

2. Review of Literature.......................................182.1 Slum Indicators And West African Demographic Trends......192.2 Factors Driving Rapid Urbanization & Development of Informal Squatter Settlements................................212.3 Landlords and Housing Units..............................282.4 Types of Squatters.......................................302.5 Types of Settlements.....................................312.6 Land Tenure Conditions for Squatters.....................322.7 The Legal Systems and Land Tenure........................362.8 Customary Land Systems...................................372.8.1 Slum Conditions In Sub-Saharan Africa Summary..............43

2.9 Slum Upgrade As Policy...................................482.10 Efficacy Of Infrastructure..............................512.11 Cost Recovery...........................................532.12 Effective Projects......................................562.13 Current Development & Effective Outreach Strategies.....572.14 Conclusions From The Literature.........................58

3. Research Methods...........................................613.1 Data Acquisition.........................................623.2 Slum & Informal Squatter Settlements Definitions.........653.3 Infrastructure...........................................65

3.4 Land Tenure Security.....................................683.5 Case Studies.............................................693.6 Determinant Factors......................................733.7 Process of Analysis......................................743.7.1 SITAR Model of Planning Theories...........................79

4. Results....................................................804.1 Results (a) Lagos, Nigeria...............................804.1.1 Physical Characteristics...................................80

4.1.2 Slum and squatter settlement locations.....................834.1.3 Socio/economic characteristics in lagos....................84

4.1.4 Administrative planning capacity...........................854.1.5 The Patronage System In Lagos..............................87

4.1.6 Status of Planning In Lagos................................904.1.7 Tenure Conditions For Squatters............................92

4.1.8 Project Implementation.....................................934.1.9 Theoretical Framework......................................95

4.1.10 SITAR Table: Lagos.......................................1024.1.11 Policy Recommendations For Lagos.........................109

4.2 Results (B) Accra, Ghana................................1134.2.1 Physical Characteristics..................................1134.2.2 Slum and squatter settlement locations....................115

4.2.3 Socio/economic characteristics in Accra...................1164.2.4 Administrative planning capacity..........................117

4.2.5 Status of Planning In Accra...............................1194.2.6 Tenure Conditions For Squatters and Customary Land Tenure. 120

4.2.7 Project Implementation....................................1234.2.8 Theoretical Framework.....................................124

4.2.9 SITAR Table: Accra........................................133

4.2.10 Policy Recommendations For Accra.........................140

4.3 Contrast of Two Case Studies............................1445. Conclusions...............................................149

5.1 Policy Recommendations......................................150

5.2 Gaps in Extant Knowledge And Areas For Future Research......155

References...................................................161

1. INTRODUCTION & RESEARCH QUESTION

Rapid urbanization within West Africa places an enormous

burden upon infrastructure within the region’s cities. While

West Africa remains predominantly rural; the rate of urbanization

has been estimated to be roughly 3.8 percent per year (UNOWA,

2007; UN HABITAT, 2009). If current trends continue, it is

estimated that two-thirds of all West Africans will be living in

cities by the year 2020 (Davis, 2006; UNOWA, 2007; UN HABITAT,

2009). Many of these urbanizing West Africans are poor, former

subsistence farmers or fisherman, who due to changes in climate,

the environment or resource availability can no longer continue

their traditional lifestyles and have been forced to urbanize in

order to survive. Many of these people are eventually forced to

settle within semi-legal or illegal slums or informal squatter

settlements. This has driven rapid slum growth throughout the

region.

This introductory chapter will explore rapid urbanization

and the growth of informal squatter settlements, the

infrastructure conditions within these settlements, the need to

improve infrastructure within settlements, some introductory

information on the evolution of development agency thinking on

slum improvement, the interaction between slum landlords and

tenants and their impacts on infrastructure improvement, the

conceptual model of this thesis, and finally the research

question and scoping of the thesis.

In West Africa, the growth of slums – the most obvious

effect of unmanaged and unplanned urbanization – has been the

norm with more than ninety per cent of the urban population

living in sub-standard conditions (Neuwirth; 2005; Davis, 2006;

UNOWA, 2007). In addition to being deprived of landownership,

slum dwellers suffer from poor access to sanitation, water

supplies, roadways, electricity and sewage disposal (Neuwirth,

2005; Davis, 2006; UNOWA, 2007). They also suffer from

‘”overcrowding”, the lack of sufficient living space due to the

habit of having large and extended families and to a shortage of

affordable housing (UNOWA, 2007, Neuwith, 2005; Davis, 2006).

Coastal regions of West Africa contain some of the heaviest

urban population densities and will likely continue to grow.

Approximately 270 million people live within the West African

coastal belt, including highly dense1 urban centers such as

Lagos, Nigeria; Accra, Ghana; and Abidjan, Côte D’Ivoire. The

population explosion2 within West Africa, when taken with

diminishing arable land supply, (Mortimore, 1993) further

compounds this problem of rapid urbanization. Rapid growth is

now not only limited to the coastal regions of West Africa, but

also to large urban areas within land-locked countries such as

Niger. This is particularly problematic in countries located

within the Sahel3, where natural resources, food and water are

scarce. In these cases, rapid population growth can diminish

already stretched food supplies, compromise natural resources

(such as firewood) and cause social strife (Neuwirth, 2005;

Davis, 2006).1 Urban densities are as high as 18,150 people per square kilometer in Lagos.

(CIA World Factbook)2 Birth rates within West Africa vary from 51.6 births per 1,000 in Niger to

28.74 births per 1,000 in Ghana. The net regional mean birth rate is around

34.6 per 1,000 people. The whole of the Economic Community of West African

States (ECOWAS) region is included in the top 50 countries with the fastest

growing populations. Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole is projected to see some

34% of the World’s Population increase over the next 50 years. (CIA World

Factbook)3 The Sahel is the semiarid sub-region region South of the Sahara that

stretches across the whole of the continent.

Rapid urbanization within many West African countries has

further driven social strife as related to resource competition.

Owing to the food insecurity situation, several countries are

compelled to import hundreds of thousands of tons of food every

year (UNOWA, 2007; UN HABITAT, 2009; Neuwirth, 2005). A huge

number of households in many West African countries use firewood

as their sole source of domestic fuel (UN HABITAT, 2009; UNOWA,

2007; Neuwrith, 2005). This has driven further deforestation

within the Sahel and large increases in fuel wood prices –

accentuating social instability (Mortimore, 1993).

Rapid population growth fosters instability, including

resource competition, environmental destruction and poor

sanitation conditions within the informal squatter settlements

where urban immigrants relocate. Without careful planning,

competition for basic resources such as drinking water and

electricity can be magnified, serving as a catalyst for ethnic

and religious conflict (Neuwirth, 2005, 13). Competition for

basic resources within squatter settlements has resulted in areas

around cities becoming heavily deforested (UN HABITAT, 2009).

Poor waste management has resulted in polluted water and severe

environmental degradation (Mortimore, 1993; UN HABITAT, 2009).

Furthermore, rapid urbanization without infrastructure also

tends to result in poor sanitation conditions and lack of waste

and sewage removal within slums, resulting in frequent outbreaks

of cholera and other sanitation related diseases (UN HABITAT,

2009; UNOWA, 2007; Gulis et al, 2004). These diseases can become

pandemic and result in large numbers of casualties, the spreading

of disease to wider segments of society, and can be very costly

to governments if they eventually have to step in to treat or

contain disease outbreaks (UNOWA, 2007; Gulis et al, 2004).

These problems can further affect wider populations, as, after

drinking water supplies within slums become heavily polluted,

many slum residents begin looking outside of slums for clean

drinking water supplies - some even going so far as illegally

tapping city water mains; which can affect water reliability to

wider urban populations as well. (Neuwirth, 2005; Davis, 2006).

A lack of meaningful infrastructure within many informal

squatter settlements creates numerous humanitarian problems. The

‘infrastructure’ missing within these slums that could be useful

in mitigating problems includes roads, sidewalks (or walkways)

and rudimentary sewers; and access to both clean drinking water

and electricity (Neuwirth, 2005; UNOWA, 2007). These services

remain most commonly in short supply, and have arguably the

largest impacts on quality of life issues within squatter

settlements (Gulyani & Basset, 2007). The presence of roads,

walkways and sewers are crucial as a means of insuring public

health and safety (White, 1989; Gulis et al, 2004). The presence

of designated roads and walkways insures access and limits

vehicle/pedestrian accidents (Forjuoh, 2003; Afukaar et al,

2003). The presence of sewer, even basic open-sewers or drainage

ditches, limits the spread of infectious diseases and other

hygiene related ailments (White, 1989; Gulis et al, 2004).

Finally, readily available drinking water and electricity

supplies are important from both a health perspective (in the

case of drinking water) and a conflict resolution perspective

because scarce resources can serve as the catalyst for larger

scale ethnic or religious conflict within many of these informal

settlements (Gulis et al, 2004).

The ability to plan and provide basic infrastructure (roads,

sewage, clean water, electricity) for these rapidly growing urban

populations remains one of the most pressing and salient issues

within both planning and development economics (i.e. The World

Bank). Careful planning for large-scale squatter settlements can

be an important factor in mitigating conflict, improving public

health conditions and limiting the environmental impacts of this

rapid urbanization within urban West African populations, and

Sub-Saharan populations as a whole. Infrastructure upgrades are

also the mechanism that can most affect tenure security for

squatters within a given settlement. For example, Kitale, Kenya

has seen dramatic environmental and quality of life improvements

through a participatory slum upgrade and urban planning process

(Majale, 2008). It has also seen important improvements in

squatter tenure security (Majale, 2008; Blocher, 2006). This has

also created numerous additional positive features; such as

localized employment creation and other related economic

benefits, all of which further positively affect tenure for

squatters (Majale, 2008).

Therefore, the provision of basic infrastructure

improvements for these informal squatter settlements would appear

to be a highly effective means of addressing many of the problems

resulting from rapid urbanization. However, though in some cases

improvements may improve tenure security for slum denizens, the

ability to implement infrastructure improvement may be difficult

due, in part, to the uncertain tenure of squatter settlements

prior to slum upgrade. This uncertainty has made some states and

local governments unwilling to directly address many of the

problems within slums (UNOWA, 2007). Despite the unwillingness

of municipalities to adequately address the slums, the need to

adequately plan for them remains prescient.

In places where the World Bank and other foreign aid

organizations have intervened to try to improve infrastructure,

they have frequently done so through macro projects involving

high levels of ‘slum clearance’. This form of redevelopment has

caused problems of displacement of slum denizens because of

inadequate strategies for replacing demolished homes (Obudho and

Mhlanga, 1988 [b]; Arimah, 2010). This has simply forced slum

denizens into other parts of cities where the slums are recreated

along with the same problems.

The 1960s and 1970s strategy of ‘slum clearance’ as a means

of addressing large-scale informal settlements within West Africa

is not an effective solution to slum mitigation. Slum demolition

rarely includes resettlements programs for those displaced

resulting in the slums often being recreated elsewhere (Arimah,

2010; Gulyani & Bassett, 2007; Obudho and Mhlanga, 1988 [b]).

Additionally, basic infrastructure and housing unit upgrades tend

to be less expensive per unit than a simple clean scrape

demolition (Obudho and Mhlanga, 1988 [b]). Cost savings related

to upgrade versus demolition could be as high as 60% of total

project costs (Obudho and Mhlanga, 1988 [b]). Government

involvement, in an infrastructure upgrade strategy, can also

eventually see rehabilitated areas units converted into legal

settlements that can be used for state-operated public housing

(Obudho and Mhlanga, 1988 [b]; Neuwirth, 2005, 241).

Additionally, the ability or willingness of West African

governments to effectively clear slums and construct new, legal

or building code standard housing remains highly limited as a

result of political considerations. Informal settlements are

often built by local elites, who serve as landlords to the

denizens of these informal settlements and collect rents despite

not owning the land upon which the settlements are built. Many

of these elites are involved in politics, and clearance of

informal settlements negatively impacts their incomes (Neuwirth,

2005; Davis, 2006).

Despite its advantages, slum upgrade has been a highly

controversial topic and for a long time was seen as a poor policy

option by both West African governments and NGOs (Gulyani &

Bassett, 2007). This is because many of the initial upgrade

projects instigated within the 1970s failed. First, the scale of

the projects was often very large and the projects were multi-

sector in nature (though predominantly housing based), making

completion difficult (Gulyani & Bassett, 2007).

Secondly, partly due to the scale of these projects, corrupt

government officials and bureaucrats skimmed large sums of money

from the projects (Werlin, 1988; Gulyani & Bassett, 2007).

Simply, the scale of the projects fostered low accountability.

As a result of these failures, slum upgrade had fallen out of

favor throughout much of the 1990s (Gulyani & Bassett, 2007).

This in turn led to a change in the scale of slum upgrade

projects attempted, with a shift away from large-scale slum

clearance and housing development projects, and towards smaller-

scale slum infrastructure improvement. Currently, almost all

slum upgrade projects are more modestly scaled and targeted

towards infrastructure (Gulyani & Basset, 2007).

Thirdly, clean scrape demolition has tended to not include

the rapid replacement of demolished housing units (Gulyani &

Basset, 2007). As a result, it has further undermined tenure

security for the urban poor. The displacement of slum dwellers

as a result of demolition projects leaves squatters marginalized,

unable to improve their socio-economic conditions, assuring that

they will remained trapped within conditions of extreme urban

poverty (Blocher, 2006; UNOPS, 2006; ECA, 2009). If squatters

are to improve their socio-economic conditions, security of

tenure must be a primary consideration (Blocher, 2006; UNOPS,

2006; ECA, 2009).

Meaningful infrastructure improvements can also be important

as a means of improving tenure security for slum residents

(Gulyani & Bassett, 2007; Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007). Slum

housing units are not generally owned by their residents, but

rather by external slum landlords (Neuwirth, 2005; Gulyani &

Bassett, 2007; Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007; UNOWA, 2007). Often

these slum landlords do not own the land on which these

settlements are built and have constructed low cost housing units

simply as a means of realizing a financial return (Neuwirth,

2005; Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007; UNOWA, 2007). Landlords are

often drawn from local elite, or political actors (Neuwirth,

2005). Thus, not only do they remain relatively immune to

prosecution for construction of these illegal housing units, but

they also remain indifferent to conditions within the settlements

they have constructed (Neuwirth, 2005; Gulyani & Bassett, 2007;

UNOWA, 2007). In some cases, landlords may even oppose

infrastructure improvements, because these improvements can

legitimize tenure conditions within informal squatter settlements

(Neuwirth, 2005) and also negatively impact landlord’s profit

returns (Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007).

This poses an important question of tenure security for

squatters as related to infrastructure upgrade upon which this

thesis will focus. The impacts of infrastructure improvements,

that can have enormous impacts on slum livability may either

strengthen or imperil tenure security for squatters. For the

purpose of this thesis, insuring tenure security is an important

goal. Insuring tenure security can be important in converting

slums into more livable and formal housing (Agbola & Agunbiade,

2007). This is accomplished as long-term tenure improvements for

squatters, as a whole, resulting in better economic conditions

for squatters and for the wider areas that they exist (Agbola &

Agunbiade, 2007; UNOPS, 2006; ECA, 2009). As a result,

infrastructure improvements must be tied to tenure, first as a

means of insuring squatters reap the benefits of infrastructure

improvements and secondly because squatter tenure security may

further drive economic growth within a slum, further aiding to

lift that slum from poverty (Blocher, 2006; ECA, 2009).

Slum infrastructure upgrade projects can be initiated

through one of three sources: through foreign aid and development

organizations, through central government intervention and

through local initiative (Gulyani & Bassett, 2007). The first of

these is by far the most common, with organizations such as the

United Nations, World Bank, the Gates Foundation and others

initiating the lion’s share projects within West Africa (Gulyani

& Bassett, 2007; UNOWA, 2007). The completion of these projects

is largely dependent on the scope of projects, the degree of

local participation, the level of local oversight and the type of

project being initiated (Gulyani & Bassett, 2007; UNOWA, 2007;

Amis, 1990). They may at times be implemented in settlements of

uncertain tenure for residents (Agbola & Agunbiad, 2007). The

results of these projects may in turn improve tenure security for

residents as under many informal customary or informal land

tenure scenarios in West Africa, infrastructure improvements

create a greater sense of permanence in the mind of many land

administrators. However, they may instead simply strengthen the

hand of slum landlords as improved infrastructure may be used

simply as a rationale for increasing rents (Agbola & Agunbiad,

2007; Neuwrith, 2005).

Central governments may also at times initiate projects,

however these tend to be both less common than those initiated

through foreign aid organizations, and tend to be less frequently

completed, as funding tends to be siphoned off through networks

of graft and corruption (Neuwirth, 2005; UNOWA, 2007; Gulyani &

Bassett, 2007). When proposed, these projects tend to serve

regional political interests of the dominant political party at

their time of initiation rather than more pluralistic communities

(Neuwirth, 2005). If projects are completed, they may improve

tenure security for residents, however, they are most often only

initiated in areas in which tenure is secure (Agbola & Agunbiad,

2007; Neuwrith, 2005; UNOWA, 2007).

Locally initiated projects are a relatively new development

(McAuslan, 1996; Neuwirth, 2005; Gulyani & Bassett, 2007). Due

to the high degree of centralization within many West African

countries, local governments tend to have highly limited ability

to initiate slum improvement projects; however, increasingly slum

denizens are beginning to self-finance improvements (i.e. via

microcredit or collective community investment) or to partner

with external aid organizations to initiate projects with partial

or project cost recovery (McAuslan, 1996; Gulyani & Bassett,

2007). While these locally initiated projects tend to be far

more modest in scope, they may be the most responsive to

satisfying immediate and local needs (Gulyani & Bassett, 2007;

Neuwirth, 2005). These local projects can also be implemented

within settlements in which tenure for residents is uncertain,

and once completed may be likely to improve tenure security of

those residents (McAuslan, 1996; Neuwirth, 2005; Agbola, &

Agunbiade, 2007). However, many residents will be unwilling to

invest in localized improvements if tenure remains uncertain

(Agbola & Agunbiad, 2007; Blocher, 2006).

1.1 CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF SLUM FORMATION

In determining how slums and informal squatter settlements

are formed, a conceptual model has been constructed which lays

the background for which slum upgrade projects are carried out.

This conceptual model operates as follows: rural and coastal

resource depletion within West Africa drives the rural poor to

move (White, 1989; UNOWA, 2007). They move into cities to attempt

to make enough to survive, where they remain impoverished and

thus are forced to live in slums (Myers and Murray, 1999 [a];

White, 1989; UNOWA, 2007; Gulyani & Bassett, 2007). These slums

lack basic infrastructure and slum dwellers suffer generally poor

quality of life, are often sick, and are forced to fight over

scarce resources within these slums (Gulis et al, 2004; Gulyani &

Bassett, 2007; UNOWA, 2007). The slums are often built by

external landlords who rent units to slum residents at usurious

rates, while maintaining indifference towards infrastructure

conditions within the slums as they view slums simply as means of

realizing a financial return (Neuwirth, 2005; Agbola & Agunbiade,

2007; UNOWA, 2007). As these slums have often been built

illegally, and slum landlords are indifferent to residents, slum

residents also lack tenure security (McAuslan, 1996; Neuwirth,

2005; Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007; UNOWA, 2007).

The underlying goal of any slum upgrade strategy is to

transform that slum into a more livable settlement type. Slum

and squatter settlement infrastructure upgrades can, in some

cases, help improve services and living conditions in slums such

that they cease to be slums. In the case of informal squatter

settlements, infrastructure improvements can help settlements

gain official recognition such that they cease to be squatter

settlements.

A slum improvement is only meaningful if it results in

improved tenure security for the slum dwellers that are the

recipients of an infrastructure upgrade. While a slum

improvement is likely initiated to benefit slum dwellers, in some

cases, following infrastructure upgrade squatters may find

themselves displaced. Conversely, in other cases, slum upgrade

may strengthen land rights of squatters and serve as stepping-

stones towards eventual formal land rights for squatters, which

can eventually lead to further economic development of slums and

aid in lifting squatters from poverty (Blocher, 2006). Slum

upgrade can both lift squatters from poverty over time while

providing immediate quality of life improvements (Blocher, 2006).

1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION

The research question of this thesis is the following.

Which planning approaches among those included within a

comprehensive planning theory framework are most effective in

slum planning (specifically infrastructure upgrade) in West

Africa?

In addressing slum planning, it is important, to address the

theoretical considerations of what type of planning is occurring.

Determining the dominant planning paradigm at work over the

course of a slum upgrade allows for wider generalizations to be

drawn, which if a project is successful can be subsequently

reproduced in other slum upgrade scenarios. Thus, utilizing a

planning theory approach to synthesize literature on

infrastructure upgrade and tenure security within West Africa is

useful as a means of determining what sort of planning strategies

or paradigms are most useful in infrastructure upgrade, likely

resulting in better planning outcomes. The goal is that these

strategies be reproducible.

Before this theoretical approach can be utilized, several

issues must be considered. Because the process of rapid

urbanization is difficult to disrupt, as it is dependent on a

multitude of factors that are difficult or impossible to address,

it is important to consider issues of who services are being

delivered to, how many are affected and how their tenure is

affected. Infrastructure improvement, unlike housing improvement

and other possible mitigating factors for squatters, helps whole

communities rather than simply individual beneficiaries (UNOWA,

2007; Gulyani & Basset, 2007).

It is also important to understand how this infrastructure

improvement may either aid or undermine tenure claims of

squatters. Ideally, in aiding these communities through the

improvement of infrastructure, not only can quality of life

improvements be made, but also tenure security can be

strengthened for slum residents through these improvements in

services (Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007; van Asperen & Zevenbergen,

2007). Conversely, tenure improvements may result in

displacement of squatters (Davis, 2006; Packer, 2006; Maier,

2005).

As this thesis is written from the perspective of the

planner, grounding this thesis in a planning theory framework is

important in order to aid in the drawing of conclusions that may

be reproducible elsewhere. This theoretical grounding is also

relevant as a means of illustrating predominant planning

paradigms implicit or explicit within a particular slum and can

help to provide greater planning context. My approach takes the

form of synthesis of extant knowledge through the lens of SITAR

as a means of determining which of these theoretical planning

approaches are most pertinent in improving infrastructure and

tenure security for squatters.

This literature will then be synthesized through the SITAR

planning theory approaches and conclusions will be drawn from

each of the planning approaches about each of the academic

articles, reports, or source used. Following this, wider

inferences will be drawn about each of the planning paradigms

included within the SITAR approach. Recommendations will then be

made as to which of the planning approaches has, in light of the

information synthesized within the literature, proven most

effective. Further recommendations will be drawn as to which

planning paradigms should be relied upon in future slum upgrade

projects. In this process, special gravitas will be paid to the

relationship between the proposed planning paradigms and their

impacts on tenure security for squatters following slum upgrade.

The SITAR planning theory framework Barclay M. Hudson (1979)

is that used within the synthesis process. This framework

details synoptic, incremental, transitive, advocacy and radical

planning elements. How implementation of infrastructure

improvement projects contrasts within these theoretical

paradigms, and with tenure security for slum dwellers, will be an

important process of determination within this thesis. Each of

the academic articles reviewed will be done so through the lens

of this SITAR approach.

These planning theory approaches will also serve as a means

to assess how appropriate differing infrastructure improvement

approaches are in securing tenure for slum dwellers within the

context of the different case studies. Whether projects have been

completed, how they may impact tenure of denizens, what planning

paradigms dominate, and how effective those planning paradigms

are factors of determination within this model.

A case study method has been selected for this thesis. This

is because the scale of factors affecting urbanization and slum

development within West Africa is enormous. A case study

approach allows for a contrast of two similarly situated and

equipped West African urban areas. As a result, I have selected

this approach in order to determine what strategies of slum

infrastructure development, as selected in each of the two case

studies, have been effective in improving tenure and which have

not been effective. The information used in drawing this

assessment stems from a combination of academic literature on

slum upgrade and tenure security in the selected case study

regions and agency project assessments related to slum and

squatter settlement infrastructure upgrade.

The case study method is comprised of two large urban sites

in West Africa: Lagos, Nigeria and Accra, Ghana. Both Accra and

Lagos share the following conditions: they are large coastal

metropolises, they are former British colonies that still use

land-tenure legal frameworks that date to the Colonial era and

they contain informal squatter settlements and/or slums.

However, despite this, both have radically different land-tenure

conditions for slum denizens. I shall argue that this likely

has more to do with cultural conditions than legal. Even though

this is a limited sample, there exist strategies for slum upgrade

within these two samples that may be generalized throughout both

the West African region and the world to improve both living and

land-tenure conditions for slum residents.

In drawing conclusions detailing slum upgrade within these

case studies, the key criteria used will be the efficacy of

infrastructure improvement in addressing ills present within the

slum, how these projects impact tenure security for slums

residents, how reproducible these individual slum upgrade

projects may be elsewhere, and to what extent each of the

theoretical planning paradigms are present. Thus, case study

selection must include both the presence of slums, the presence

of infrastructure projects implemented to improve those slums,

and measurable impacts on tenure for slum denizens following the

implementation of infrastructure. The case studies selected

must be somehow representative of differing types of slums extant

throughout West Africa.

I will examine both how infrastructure improvements affect

tenure security for slum denizens; but also to what extent the

different theoretical planning paradigms within the SITAR model

are present. I will use infrastructure improvements to

determine, within the context of an informal squatter settlement

in West Africa, if improved infrastructure results in improved

security of tenure for those residing within the slum. I will

also attempt to determine to what extent different theoretical

planning paradigms, and the reproducibility of these paradigms if

infrastructure improvements to slums improve tenure.

I am also limiting my exploration to slum and slum

infrastructure, which I define as the presence of roads and/or

walkways, the presence of sewage facilities, access to drinking

water and access to electricity. I chose these infrastructure

features because they are commonly associated with beneficial

quality of life improvements within West African urban slums, and

with tenure security for squatters (Gulyani & Bassett, 2007;

UNOWA, 2007; Obudho and Mhlanga, 1988 [b]). As noted above, I am

not including other potential infrastructure improvements; such

as housing improvement because they only benefit those directly

receiving improved housing. This is because slum infrastructure

improvements are more likely to benefit larger communities, at

lower cost, and with minimal displacement; and as a result to

mitigate the negative factors identified above as associated with

rapid urbanization (Neuwirth, 2005, 248).

I have also selected slum infrastructure improvements, as

related to squatter tenure, because infrastructure improvements

have greater potential to improve tenure security conditions for

a significantly larger number of slum denizens than simply

housing unit upgrades (Neuwirth, 2005; Gulyani & Bassett, 2007;

Agbola & Agunbiade; 2007). An important question becomes, in

implementing infrastructure improvement projects, do these

projects improve tenure for residents or do they improve tenure

for the economic/political elite acting as slum landlords? I

intend to demonstrate in this thesis that that slum-

infrastructure improvement represents an important planning

approach that benefits tenure security predominantly for tenants,

but to some extent, for slum landlords as well. This thesis will

include a limited examination of economic, sociological and other

development issues as they relate to infrastructure improvement

within slums. A more in depth study of these issues is beyond

the scope of my investigation.

There are also numerous other aspects of slum improvement

and slum tenure security that have not been included in this

study. Most notably, the quality and affordability of housing

within these settlements has not been included within the study

of slum upgrade strategies and their impacts on squatter tenure.

This is because housing is a separate, though related planning

policy issue from infrastructure within these informal squatter

settlements. It is also the case that in some ways,

infrastructure improvements can be deemed more meaningful to

mitigating many of these problems than housing unit improvements,

as infrastructure improvements benefit the slums as a whole,

while housing unit improvements merely benefit the recipients of

the improved housing units (Neuwirth, 2005, 248).

2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Slums or informal squatter settlements in Sub-Saharan Africa

have been studied extensively over the past forty years.

However, many of these studies have focused upon Eastern and

Southern Africa. The impact of urbanization within Western

Africa remains understudied. This is because it has only been in

the last several decades that rapid urbanization has become a

matter of concern within West Africa (Obudho and Mhlanga, 1988

[a]). It has only been in the last two decades that West African

mega-cities such as Lagos have developed large, informal squatter

settlements (Gulyani & Bassett, 2007). The lack of heavy

urbanization within much of West Africa prior to the 1990s has

further limited the literature available on the subject, and as a

result, more of the historical attempts at slum upgrade have been

implemented within an East African context. Additionally, poor

record keeping on the part of West African governments, partly

stemming from corruption, unclear land tenure and ownership, and

resource shortages has also made studying the region far more

difficult. However, there exists ample literature on

infrastructure upgrade projects implemented post-1990 within West

Africa.

The rapid rate of urbanization within West Africa makes the

region as a whole especially pertinent to study. West Africa as

a whole, is generally considered less urbanized than Eastern

African (Gulyani & Bassett, 2007), however this is beginning to

change as Western Africa increasingly urbanizes as a result of

environmental problems and resources shortages and conflicts

(UNOWA, 2007).

Table 1 below demonstrates various demographic indicators

for slums in West Africa as compared to the rest of Africa, and

to the developing world as a whole. It includes urban

populations, the number of slum dwellers and the percentage of

populations estimated to be living in slums. Table 2 (also

below) includes a wider breakdown of slum indicators for the

different West African countries. This includes future population

projections, population densities, country-by-country urban

growth rates, fertility rates, estimates of access to improved

drinking water, and per capita GNI.

2.1 SLUM INDICATORS AND WEST AFRICAN DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

Table 1. International Slum indicators: (Source: UNHABITAT, 2009)

Major Region Urban Population(thousands)

Number of Slum Dwellers (thousands)

Percentage of Urban PopulationLiving in Slums

North Africa 82,809 12,003 14.5Sub-Saharan Africa

264,355 164,531 62.2

Eastern Africa 104,075 61,404 58.9Western Africa 102,000 65,280 64.0Southern Africa 58,280 38,465 65.5Latin American &The Caribbean

434,432 117,439 27.0

Eastern Asia 593,301 216,436 36.5Southern Asia 468,668 201,185 42.9South-Eastern Asia

243,724 67,074 27.5

Western Asia 130,368 31,254 24.0Oceania 2153 519 24.1Total DevelopingCountries

2,219,811 810,441 36.5

Table 2. West Africa’s current demographic indicators: (Source: UNOWA, 2007)

Country SurfaceArea (in km2)

2006Total Pop (in millions)

Pop Density (person per km2)

ProjectedPop for 2050 (in millions)

% Avg Pop growth rate (2005 –2010)

% UrbanPop (2005)

% Urban growthrate (2005 -2010)

TotalFertility rate (2006)

Pop w/arable& permcrop land

% Accsto impvddrinkingwater

GNI per capita PPP$ (2004)

Benin 112,622 8.7 77 22.1 3.0 40 4.0 5.56 1.4 68 1,120

Burkina Faso

267,950 13.6 51 39.1 2.9 18 5.1 6.45 2.3 51 1,220

Cote D’Ivoire

320,783 18.5 57 34.0 1.2 45 2.7 4.64 1.2 84 1,390

Gambia 10,689 1.6 150 3.1 2.3 54 3.9 4.35 3.5 82 1,900Ghana 238,538 22.6 94 40.6 1.9 48 3.4 4.00 1.8 79 2,280Guinea 245,857 9.6 39 23.0 2.2 33 3.6 5.64 4.2 51 2,130Guinea Bissau

36,123 1.6 44 5.3 2.9 30 3.2 7.10 2.2 59 690

Liberia 99,065 3.4 34 10.7 2.9 58 4.1 6.80 3.5 62Mali 1,240,1

9813.9 11 42.0 2.9 30 4.7 6.69 2.1 48 980

Mauritania

1,035,000

3.2 3 7.5 2.7 40 3.3 5.57 3.0 56 2,050

Niger 1,186,408

14.4 12 50.2 3.3 17 4.4 7.64 0.8 46 830

Nigeria 923,768 134.4 145 258.1 2.1 48 3.7 5.49 1.2 60 930Senegal 196,722 11.9 60 23.1 2.3 42 2.9 4.63 3.2 72 1,720Sierra Leone

71,740 5.7 79 13.8 2.1 41 3.8 6.50 4.8 57 790

Togo 56,785 6.3 111 13.5 2.5 40 4.3 4.98 1.3 51 1,690ALL WA 6,046,2

81269.8 587.0 2.3 42 3.7 5.50 62 1,409

World Total orAverage

6.540billio

n

9.076billion

1.1 49 2.0 2.58 83 8,760range

=39,71

0

It is apparent from the above tables that many West African

countries are seeing very high urbanization rates; in many

countries double that of the world average. As many of those

constituting this rapid urbanization are being forced to settle

in slums (UNOWA, 2007) and many of these urban areas boast only

limited or inadequate infrastructure (UNOWA, 2007; Davis, 2006,

Gulyani & Bassett, 2007; White, 1989; Grandy, 2006), it is

necessary to study what slum infrastructure improvement

strategies have been implemented and to determine how well they

work.

In addressing the literature detailing slum upgrade, it is

important to first consider the context through which rapid

urbanization is under way, and its reasons; the legal issues

surrounding informal squatter settlements and the history of slum

upgrade policies within Western Africa. I review the literature

detailing the factors driving rapid urbanization; the types of

landlords and housing units; the types of squatters; the type of

settlements present; the land tenure conditions facing squatters;

customary land management and tenure conditions that may be in

place, the debate between slum upgrade versus slum clearance, the

debate between infrastructure versus housing; the efficacy of

infrastructure improvements; and finally the most recent

developments in slum upgrade policy.

2.2 FACTORS DRIVING RAPID URBANIZATION & DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMAL SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS

There are numerous factors currently in play that are

driving rapid urbanization within West Africa. They are internal

migration for employment opportunities or away from war both

internally within West African countries, and within the ECOWAS

region as a whole; rapid natural population increases within many

West African cities; climate change and desertification within

rural West Africa; and finally, natural resource shortages (most

notably food and water) resulting in further environmental

degradation competition for resources (Satterthwaite, 2009).

These subjects are in essence, interrelated; as a result, I will

deal with them together.

Additionally, many of the factors that drive urbanization,

and eventual slum development within West African Cities,

similarly come to bear upon the slums themselves. For example, a

rural West African forced to urbanize as a result of food

shortages may relocate to a slum in which similar food shortages

exist. Any of the factors that drive urbanization are also

highly related to informal squatter settlement or slum expansion.

Thus it is important to link factors driving rapid urbanization

with slum expansion where appropriate.

Immediately following independence, in many West African

countries, there was a migration trend from rural to urban areas

(UNOWA, 2007). The migration resulted because of a lack of rural

job opportunities, the coming of age of an educated middle class

within West Africa, and the transformation of cities into centers

for industrial, resource industry or other jobs (Peil, 1988).

High rural unemployment within much of West Africa further

suggested the economic necessity of urbanization for many rural

West Africans (Gugler & Flanagan, 1978, 58). Huge numbers of

people migrated to urban centers hoping to work within Africa’s

budding manufacturing industry and with the hope of escaping the

traditional confines of village life (Peil, 1988; Gugler &

Flanagan, 1978, 51). In this initial wave of urbanization,

migration instigated the beginnings of slums within many West

African cities (Peil, 1988; UNOWA, 2007). This was because of a

shortage of affordable housing options for the rural poor and a

general lack of resources and infrastructure to accommodate this

rapid population increases within many urban West African areas

(Peil, 1998).

The formation of these slums remains controversial. Critics

have noted that the sharp increase in slum housing throughout

this period had little to do with rural-urban migration patterns

but are the result of the Lewis urban-rural wage disparate wage

structure within West Africa rather than of excess migrants

(Amis, 1990 [a]). They further state that unequal and

inegalitarian urban land distribution issues influenced slum

creation (Amis, 1990 [a]). These countries operate with a legal

system based often upon strict colonial-era standards for land

ownership. Documents that certify land ownership are difficult

to verify and are often obtained by those who either have some

pull within the system, or those who can afford to pay the bribes

necessary to insure the court system sides in their favor (Amis,

1990 [a]). As a result, those seeking housing were forced to

squat illegally not as a result of overcrowding, but as a result

of corrupt conditions that prevented them from finding legal

housing (Amis, 1990 [a]).

Regardless of which version of events is correct; there is

no debate as to the conditions that emerged within many of these

West African slums. Public health conditions in many West

African urban centers, in which large numbers of people competed

for few, low quality housing units, were terrible throughout this

period (White, 1989 [a]). Density, poor infrastructure conditions

and heavy pollution from rapid industrialization throughout the

60s and 70s exacerbated a view among many West Africans that

cities are dangerous and dirty places to be avoided if possible

(White, 1989 [a]); UNOWA, 2007). As a result of this, the trend

of rural to urban migration was seen to slow during the 1980s

(UNOWA, 2007; Obudho and Mhlanga, 1988 [a]). In addition, the

so-called “green revolution” in agriculture also helped,

temporarily, to reaffirm agriculture within West Africa, and

encouraged many who would otherwise migrate to cities to stay

within their villages and pursue agriculture (UNOWA, 2007).

The second great wave of rural to urban migration began in

the mid 1980s. This was again partially driven by four factors,

growing rural unemployment and civil strife within rural areas in

West Africa, rapid population expansion in rural areas, and

environmental degradation in rural areas. These factors have in

turn fed back in such a manner that they have driven increased

ethnic and religious conflict within urban areas.

Growing rural unemployment, especially in the form of youth

employment within rural areas of West Africa taken with economic

stagnation, resulted in GDP growth plunging over the course of

the decade and urbanization, especially in the case of young

people (White, 1989 [a]). Additionally, large-scale migrations

stemming from numerous civil wars within the region in the 1980s

and 1990s, including those in Nigeria, Cote D’Ivoire, Liberia and

Sierra Leone saw urban populations again begin to swell rapidly

(UNOWA, 2007). These civil wars drove large numbers of new,

often impoverished, migrants into urban centers with the hope of

increased safety and security (UNOWA, 2007). Often these

migrants travelled not only within their own countries but also

into surrounding countries with the hope of escaping violence

(UNOWA, 2007). These migrants often came to cities with little

more than what possessions they could carry with them and found

themselves competing with others for accommodation within urban

environments (UNOWA, 2007).

Beginning in 1985, West Africa also began to see massive

population growth (White, 1989 [a]). Much of this population

growth occurred within cities (White, 1989 [a]). This is because

the majority of rural to urban migrants are young men and women,

aged between 15 and 34 (UNOWA, 2007; Environmental Science in the

21st Century, 2010; Amis, 1990 [a]; White, 1989 [a]).

Additionally, many who do migrate remain within the urban areas

that they migrate into, rather than eventually returning to rural

areas (UNOWA, 2007). As this 15 to 34 demographic is certainly

of reproductive age, migrants also tend to have children within

their new urban environments, further increasing already rapidly

growing urban populations. (UNOWA, 2007; Amis 1990 [a]) If these

migrants are unable to find steady and well-compensated work, or

lack external means of support, they are likely to end up within

the large-scale, informal squatter settlements that have come to

dominate West African cities (UNOWA, 2007; White, 1989 [a]).

This has resulted in rapid population growth within informal

squatter settlements within West Africa far more heavily than

other parts of West African cities (White, 1989 [a]).

The other factor, beginning in the late 1980s and early

1990s, driving the rise in rural-urban migration within West

Africa was desertification and increased competition for limited

resources (UNOWA, 2007; White, 1989 [a]). Indeed, it has been

estimated that climate change has been the largest cause of

migration over the past two decades (White, 1989 [a]). This is

particularly noteworthy within the Sahel region, which has seen

its already limited supply of arable land diminished due to

increased desertification (Environmental Science in the 21st

Century, 2010; Satterthwaite, 2009). This desertification has

likely resulted both from poor agricultural practice, but also

notably as a result of global climate change linked to greenhouse

gas emissions (Edelman & Mintra, 2006; Satterthwaite, 2009).

This desertification, when taken with decreasing natural resource

supplies, such as wild game, declining Atlantic fish stocks and

naturally growing fruit trees, has further increased competition

in rural areas for farmland and other resources. Many of these

processes are linked to rural and urban economic growth,

including more predictable agricultural yields, increase natural

resource stocks, sufficient water supplies and better prices for

cash crops (White, 1989; Satterthwaite, 2009). The conditions

necessary for rural economic growth are precisely those that are

increasingly threatened through desertification and environmental

destruction (Edelman & Mintra, 2006; White, 1989; Satterthwaite,

2009). As a result, attempts to improve rural economies, which

have in the past served to slow urbanization, have eventually

resulted in overuse of resources; instead resulting in further

increased rapid urbanization (White, 1989 [a]). These same

resource competitions then play themselves out again in urban

areas, which are also starved for resources (White, 1989 [a]).

This process of rapid urbanization and slum construction has

placed enormous environmental burdens upon urban areas (White,

1989 [a]). These include shortages of viable land, food

insecurity and environmental degradation (White, 1989; UNOWA,

2007). Urbanization entails a highly complicated set of

interactions between people and their natural environments

(White, 1989 [a]). The consumption of water, energy and food tend

to have large-scale regional consequences that can further impact

outlying rural areas thus further driving urbanization (White,

1989 [a]). This process also stresses competition for resources

and services within urban environments (White, 1989 [a]). This is

especially notable within informal squatter settlements, which

often house many of the poorest denizens and which feel the

impacts of these environmental problems the most directly (White,

1989; UNOWA, 2007; Edelman & Mintra, 2006; Satterthwaite, 2009).

Agricultural carrying capacity in areas surrounding urban areas

has decreased significantly, and several West African countries,

most notably, though not limited to those located within the

Sahel, are often dependent upon outside sources of food (Edelman

& Mintra, 2006; UNOWA, 2007).

The primitive infrastructure of many slums also makes

disposal of waste problematic, creating environmental hazards

locally for those living within informal settlements (Neuwirth,

2005, 12; White, 1989 [a]). This often impacts the safety of

drinking water supplies, and can create direct resource conflicts

within settlements (Neuwirth, 2005, 14; Edelman & Mintra, 2006).

These conflicts can sometimes become violent. (Ibid; UNOWA, 2007)

When resources are overstretched, wells and the like are often

unable to replenish, further limiting resources (White, 1989;

UNOWA, 2007). Current infrastructure conditions in many slums

are highly limited. Slums as a whole lack almost all basic

services, including clearly defined walkways, freshwater access

and electricity. Within many slums, services are largely limited

to one or two, highly polluted privately held well, often located

several miles from much of the a given slums population (Arimah,

2010; Abelson, 1996, Davis, 2006). The characteristics of these

services in place are generally noted as unsatisfactory, highly

limited and frequently polluted (Davis, 2006; Abelson, 1996).

These services are also frequently noted as being heavily

overused and as a result of scarcity, provided at usurious prices

(Davis, 2006). Creation or improvement of basic sanitation,

transportation, water and electricity infrastructure has,

beginning in the 1990s been the fundamental basis for much of

slum improvement.

Many of the conflicts that emerge as a result of resource

conflict eventually begin to take the form of ethnic or religious

conflict. People tend to agglomerate and align themselves with

others of similar backgrounds within slums (Smith, 1999). Many

of these conflicts will morph into wider urban communal violence

through which the dynamics become ‘natives’ versus ‘migrants’ or

‘hosts’ versus ‘strangers’ (Smith, 1999). While this element of

conflict is most frequently noted in Nigeria, it plays itself

across numerous West African cities, (UNOWA, 2007) and is often

reaffirmed by landlords of slums as a means of insuring they

retain control of slums (Warah, 2003). This process can limit

the ability to implement infrastructure improvements and has

important repercussions for land tenure conditions within

informal squatter settlements (Warah, 2003; Neuwirth, 2005).

2.3 LANDLORDS AND HOUSING UNITS

Once rural and other migrants have settled in slums, a set

of squatter/landlords power dynamics begin to take hold. These

dynamics often define the characteristics that will eventually

dominate the slum. Many of these dynamics can have important

repercussions for both living conditions and tenure security of

slum denizens. As a result, it is necessary to discuss the types

of landlords, the types of squatters, and the types of housing

units available to squatters within West African slums or

informal squatter settlements.

Landlords are often comprised of local elites who invest in

low cost housing units as a means of subsidizing their incomes

(UNOWA, 2007; Neuwirth, 2005, 17). Within West Africa, many

politicians and bureaucrats – often those charged with

enforcement of building codes – serve as landlords within

squatter settlements. Landlord-owned housing units within

informal squatter settlements are often incredibly small4, lack

basic infrastructure and are constructed illegally and not in

accordance with building codes (Neuwirth, 2005, 17; UNOWA, 2007;

Obudho and Mhlanga, 1988 [a]; Amis, 1990 [a]). Construction of

non-permanent units, built largely of tin, clay, mud, or other

waste materials, offer some degree of government laxity (no

required permit or regulation) (Obudho and Mhlanga, 1988 [a];

Amis, 1990 [a]). Landlords retain much of the power to make

decisions within squatter settlements, with slum denizens usually

having very little say in improvements or changes to their

dwelling space (Amis, 1990 [a]). 4 Typical housing unit sizes for tin sheds are around 200 square feet (Edelman& Mintra, 2006; Melesse, 2005).

For potential slum landlords, investing within squatter

settlements is an economically sensible move, and done

exclusively to maximize financial gain. Housing units, built of

earth, clay and occasionally tin, can be cheaply built, and often

begin to return a profit within 9 months (Neuwirth, 2005, 81).

Central authorities are generally paid-off to insure minimum

interference within informal settlements (Neuwirth, 2005, 93-94).

Tenants are generally responsible for most maintenance and

repairs on units, with the threat of eviction or involvement of

authorities often enough to prevent action against landlords

(Neuwirth, 2005, 94). Most squatter settlement landlords live

outside of the settlements themselves and often use secondary

agents to collect monthly rents, etc (Neuwirth, 2005, 94).

Overcrowding within many of these settlements insures no

shortage of potential tenants, and thus landlords are prone to

view tenants as expendable (Neuwirth, 2005, 94). Landlords are

unlikely to improve units or infrastructure on their own (Amis,

1990 [a]). Often construction materials remain cheap partially

in order to retain the illusion of impermanence – though large-

scale settlements are very rarely bulldozed or redeveloped. As a

result, building materials such as concrete or brick, which could

be used to create better housing for slum denizens are not used

as they would draw additional attention, and would more likely

result in the units being demolished (Neuwirth, 2005, 94; Peil,

1988). This also means that landlords tend to oppose housing unit

upgrades, as improved individual units would open them to greater

scrutiny by authorities and regulators (Peil, 1988). As

landlords frequently view infrastructure improvements with

relative indifference, they are unlikely to oppose such projects

as long as they are not made to pay for them (Obudho and Mhlanga,

1988 [a]).

2.4 TYPES OF SQUATTERS

It is also invaluable to determine the different types of

squatters living within slums. This is done very effectively by

Charles Abrams, who indentifies nine types of informal squatter

settlements as:

Owner squatter owns his shack, though not the land, he erects

the shack on any vacant plot he can find… (b) squatter tenant

is in the poorest class, does not own or build a shack, but

pays rent to another squatter… (c) squatter holdover is a

former tenant who has ceased paying rent and whom the

landlord fears to evict… (d) squatter landlord is usually a

squatter of lowly standing who has rooms or huts to rent,

often at exorbitant profit… (e) speculator squatter is usually a

professional to whom squatting is a sound business venture…

(f) store squatter establishes his small lockup store on land

he does not own, and he may do a thriving business without

paying rent or taxes… (g) semi-squatter has surreptitiously

built his hut on private land and subsequently come to terms

with the owner… (h) floating squatter lives in an old hulk or

junk which floated or sailed into the city’s harbor, and…

(i) squatter “cooperator” is a part of a group that shares the

common foothold and protects it against intruders, public

and private (Abrams, 1964, 21-22 via Obudho and Mhlanga,

1988 [a]).

This clearly demonstrates a wide variety of squatter types,

conditions and motivations. The different types of squatters

within any one studied region will vary based upon land legality

and tenure issues, individual rights given to squatters, level of

patronage and corruption with a studied area, regional economic

conditions, and topographical and environmental conditions

(Obudho and Mhlanga, 1988 [a]).

2.5 TYPES OF SETTLEMENTS

There is variation in the types of informal squatter

settlements prevalent within different areas. While some

settlements are in very poor condition, or are even slums, others

are fairly developed and can even have effective infrastructure

systems.

There is strong regional differentiation within squatter

settlements and the type of squatters present (Abrams, 1964, 21-

22 via Obudho and Mhlanga, 1988 [a]). Within West Africa, the

number of squatter settlements was traditionally limited due to a

higher rate of rural habitation than in more heavily urbanized

Eastern and Southern Africa (Obudho and Mhlanga, 1988 [b]). Also

important were different prevailing conceptions and laws for land

ownership, tenure, and a strong tendency towards family ownership

of occupied buildings than in other parts of Africa (Obudho and

Mhlanga, 1988 [b]). This began to shift during the late 1970s

(Obudho and Mhlanga, 1988 [b]) but rapid urbanization within much

of West Africa did not become more pronounced until the 1990s

(Gulyani & Bassett, 2007). The sole West African state with a

higher number of squatter settlements was Nigeria, (Obudho and

Mhlanga, 1988 [b]) with many squatter settlements existing as a

product of the colonial era (Obudho and Mhlanga, 1988 [b]). Most

slum settlements within Nigeria during this period were the

product of natural overcrowding due to urban population increase

(Obudho and Mhlanga, 1988 [b]) rather than as a result of

migration, which has become more the case recently (Gulyani &

Bassett, 2007).

Generally, within many West African urban centers, residents

that did historically rent accommodations did so within Central

Business Districts and temporarily, with the understanding that

they did not plan to stay permanently, in contrast to Eastern and

Southern Africa, where rental accommodations were often seen as

more permanent residences (Obudho and Mhlanga, 1988 [a]). As a

result, a significantly higher percentage of these rental units

within Western Africa tended to lack basic infrastructure such as

electricity, piped water, sewers, and paved walkways (Obudho and

Mhlanga, 1988 [a]). This lack of infrastructure within slums has

exposed slum dwellers to enormous numbers of additional health

risks, which appear in both chronic and acute forms (White, 1989

[a]). Because the competition for food and water within slums

tends to overshadow these risks, which include high numbers of

automobile-pedestrian accidents, diseases linked to hygiene and

water quality and industrial dumping, tend to be overlooked

within slums (White, 1989 [a]). Many of these conditions can

also impact land tenure within slums.

2.6 LAND TENURE CONDITIONS FOR SQUATTERS

Land tenure conditions for squatters vary across West

Africa. Many West African countries still have land tenure laws

in place that date to the Colonial period (Gulyani & Bassett,

2007; White, 1989 [a]). While slum denizens have access to land,

this access tends to be impermanent because they often inhabit

that land illegally (Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007).

Administrative and legal systems within most West African

countries tend to be highly centralized, limiting the ability of

local governments to resolve or regulate land tenure problems and

disputes (White, 1989 [a]). Instead what persists is a system

in which land tenure considerations are often resolved at the

local level, but informally (White, 1989; Neuwirth, 2005; Agbola

& Agunbiade, 2007). In this system, slum landlords, who own most

of the illegally constructed slum housing units are the principle

beneficiaries, while slum denizens have very little room for

legal recourse were they to be ousted from their housing

(Neuwrith, 2005; Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007). Thus, individual

arrangements are made with landlords, who may subject denizens to

escalating rents, etc. Eventually in some cases, as slums become

increasingly established and long-standing, de facto tenure

security for slum denizens becomes increasingly likely (van

Asperen & Zevenbergen, 2007).

These tenure arrangements are often derived through large

concentrations of residents from similar communities (van Asperen

& Zevenbergen, 2007; Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007). As these

communities increase, it becomes increasingly likely for slum

denizens to be able to gain a more permanent foothold within a

slum, as denizens tend to agglomerate near others from similar

backgrounds and thus develop group bargaining power (Agbola &

Agunbiade, 2007). However, landlords may in turn use this

process to their advantage by playing traditionally opposed

ethnic or religious factions against each other, to insure that

no faction gains too much bargaining power as to compromise the

position of the landlord (Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007; Neuwirth,

2005). This in turn often leads to widespread ethnic violence,

and strong ethnic or religious factions pitted against each other

for resources (Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007). This type of conflict

fosters insecurity and threatens tenure for the whole of the

slum.

As land is converted from agricultural and traditional

cultural uses into urban settlement; the result can be land

conflicts that can further endanger tenure for squatters (Gough

& Yankson, 2000; Otsuka, Quisumbing, Payongayong & Aidoo, 2003).

Farmland conversion on the peri-urban fringe for suburban

development for affluent West Africans, or in some cases for slum

construction, further stretches food resources within many West

African cities with slums, and can intensify resource conflicts,

and drive up rents – further threatening tenure security (UNOWA,

2007; Gough & Yankson, 2000; Otsuka, Quisumbing, Payongayong &

Aidoo, 2003; Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007). As resources fall

increasingly into short supply, the propensity for wider ethnic

or religious increasingly becomes a threat.

The lack of tenure security makes infrastructure improvement

projects difficult to implement within many slums (Agbola &

Agunbiade, 2007; Gulyani & Bassett, 2007). This is true of

projects initiated by governments, by foreign development and aid

organizations and at the local level. This is because, without

secure land rights, central governments do not formally

acknowledge slum denizens, and thus are unlikely to extend

services to them (Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007). At the NGO level,

uncertainty of tenure makes organizations unlikely to invest in

projects through which the recipients may be removed (Gulyani &

Bassett, 2007). Finally, at the localized level, slum denizens

are unlikely to initiate improvements or partially finance

improvements that they are uncertain as to whether or not they

will actually benefit from (Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007; van Asperen

& Zevenbergen, 2007).

Conversely, when infrastructure improvement projects have

been implemented in areas of uncertain tenure, they have often

resulted in better tenure conditions for slum denizens who are

the recipients of said projects (van Asperen & Zevenbergen,

2007; Neuwrith, 2005; Gulyani & Bassett, 2007). Thus, if a slum

neighborhood can be upgraded to include basic services, this can

strengthen the tenure situation of slum denizens. This is for

two reasons: firstly, infrastructure helps slum dwellers achieve

a greater sense of legitimacy in the eyes of both national and

local governments, meaning that these governments are more likely

to help them retain their housing (Neuwrith, 2005).

Secondly, access to basic services mitigates conflicts, thus

fostering security, which tends to result in better tenure

security for slum residents (Neuwirth, 2005; van Asperen &

Zevenbergen, 2007). These factors, however, are also likely to

improve security of tenure for landlords (Neuwirth, 2005; van

Asperen & Zevenbergen, 2007). This can be advantageous, as it

can mean that landlords will be less likely to interfere with

projects, however it also asks the question of whom is most

benefiting from improvement projects: tenants or landlords?

Beyond simple access to infrastructure, tenure security can

be further boosted for slum residents through access to jobs,

education and credit (Krueckeberg & Paulsen, 2002). These same

improvements for slum denizen tenure are not the case when

housing units are upgraded, as often slum denizens are forced to

pay higher rents following unit upgrade, and thus eventually

forced from the neighborhood through a process of gentrification

(Krueckeberg & Paulsen, 2002). While infrastructure improvements

can also increase rents, housing unit upgrade tends to affect

rents far more drastically than general infrastructure upgrade

(Neuwirth, 2005). For this reason, slum upgrade, and

specifically, slum infrastructure upgrade appears to be the best

mechanism for insuring improved tenure security for slum

denizens. They may also hinge on informal tribally driven legal

considerations (McAuslan, 1996). Ironically, however, this

upgrade may be dependent upon improvements in tenure security,

creating, depending upon the situation, either a positively

reinforcing mechanism in which the two mutually reinforce one

another, or a Catch-22 in which neither can happen without the

other.

2.7 THE LEGAL SYSTEMS AND LAND TENURE

From a legal standpoint, many West African governments may

also regard informal tenure claims made by slum dwellers

(McAuslan, 1996). There has been a growing international

consensus that, though squatters lack land ownership, by nature

of paying rents, etc, they have some right to tenure security

(McAuslan, 1996). While this process is one requiring

progressive interpretation of existing laws, in many cases,

interpretation of law regarding tenure within informal

settlements has become blurred. The legal situation of land

prior to its development is likely to influence its appropriation

for urbanization (McAuslan, 1996). Thus, that land developed

into slum housing is often that land in which legal claims to

ownership are ambiguous, or the land is publically owned

(McAuslan, 1996). This allows for a process of legitimization

once the property is developed (McAuslan, 1996). This can play

to the benefit of both squatter tenants and landlords, but in

physically occupying the land, tenants tend to have a stronger

legal hand (McAuslan, 1996). The development of infrastructure

services further indicate the permanence of settlement and can

give tenants an even stronger legal claim to legitimacy

(McAuslan, 1996; Gulyani & Bassett, 2007).

Within many West African communities, most land transactions

generally occur outside of the state (McAuslan, 1996).

Certificates of occupancy, which can be the deciding factors

within land tenure disputes, rely heavily, in some areas (most

notably Nigeria) upon customary tribal rulers rather than through

the formal legal system (McAuslan, 1996). Thus, there exists a

conflict between laws on the books, the decisions of tribal

courts, and more general inhabitation of the land. Development

tends to diverge from town planning law, with the vast majority

of structures built with only partial, or without any legal

documentation (McAuslan, 1996). In cases where formal

requirements need be conformed to, this is often done through

bribery rather than through actually conforming to regulation

(McAuslan, 1996). Thus, the de facto “legal” tenure for many may

be guaranteed through informal tribal enforcement mechanisms,

agreements or edicts that fall outside of the confines of the

formal legal system (McAuslan, 1996).

Indeed, due to the degree of corruption within the formal

legal system, and the serendipitous tendency on the part of

administrators to alter or reverse decisions based on pay-outs of

shifting tribal allegiances, (McAuslan, 1996) it may be far more

important for a slum denizen to secure land tenure through a

tribal elite, even if this contradicts what would be best for

them under the formal legal system. Again, the development of

infrastructure rarely hurts slum denizens, as the construction of

slum infrastructure may require the blessing of those informal

tribal authorities that have de facto legal say in how tenure will

be determined (Neuwirth, 2005).

2.8 CUSTOMARY LAND SYSTEMS

Land tenure can also be impacted through cultural

differences, most commonly tribal or customary land tenure

situations (Neuwirth, 2005; Gough & Yankson, 2000; Sjaastad &

Bromley, 1997; McAuslan, 1996). Indigenous land rights, or land

managed under “customary law” accounts for much of the land

within Africa as a whole and especially within West Africa

(Sjaastad & Bromley, 1997; Gough & Yankson, 2000; Mends & De

Meijere, 2006). These customary land systems can be of great use

in addressing many of the drivers of rapid urbanization and in

distributing lands more equitably among slum residents (Mends &

De Meijere, 2006). However they may also transform into a

mechanism for conflict through which newcomers are pitted against

the customary society (Gough & Yankson, 2000; Mends & De Meijere,

2006).

Customary land tenure systems, though often lacking official

legal recognition, often pre-date colonial land systems, and have

long been effective mechanisms for resolving land and tenure

disputes (Gough & Yankson, 2000). The ability of land markets to

manage land are often culturally based and highly localized

(Gough & Yankson, 2000). Within pre-Colonial Africa, how land

systems and land markets developed, and very notions of land-

ownership were often derived through localized religious or

monarchical systems and belief structures (Gough & Yankson,

2000). However, through this system, land was often vested and

managed through a collective process rather than by individuals

(Gough & Yankson, 2000; Mends & De Meijere, 2006). As a result,

rights to land-usage were collective (Gough & Yankson, 2000).

Land was not strictly seen as a commodity for which access could

be limited (Gough & Yankson, 2000). This notion was radically

different from the system of land ownership imposed by colonial

regimes, (Gough & Yankson, 2000) however, it is the vestiges of

these colonial land systems that often remain legally on the

books (McAuslan, 1996; Mends & De Meijere, 2006).

Colonial Administrations also actively tried to prevent free

movement of many Africans into urban areas and attempted to both

disrupt traditional land management systems and to set up market

economy systems with land as a commodity (Magobunje, 1992 via

Gough & Yankson, 2000). However, colonial authorities were often

not very successful in doing so, resulting in a dual system of

land management (Gough & Yankson, 2000). Post-independence, in

many countries, this dual system of land management has become

increasingly complicated, with a further designation of ‘state-

owned’ lands included as an additional land form (Gough &

Yankson, 2000). Corruption within many West African countries,

especially in cases of management of ‘state’ lands have resulted

in many again beginning to favor customary land management

mechanisms as being more egalitarian (Sjaastad & Bromley, 1997;

Gough & Yankson, 2000; Mends & De Meijere, 2006).

Many squatter communities within West African cities are

managed, in part through the interaction between customary land

systems, state agents, and informal systems of graft (Gough &

Yankson, 2000; Mends & De Meijere, 2006). These customary

systems however can create problems when implemented within urban

areas as they have been designed for management of rural rather

than of urban systems (Payne, 1997). However, collectivist

customary land management has aided many low-income urban

migrants gain access to land and enjoy significantly better

security of tenure than they would via the formal legal land

system (Gough & Yankson, 2000; Mends & De Meijere, 2006). There

also remain questions as to relationship customary land tenure

systems today have with their traditional forbearers, with the

argument that the current systems are merely corrupt caricatures

of the systems they are based upon (Amanor, 1999 via Gough &

Yankson, 2000).

Within Ghana, for example, a mixed land management system

was implemented involving a combination of federal land

ownership, traditional tribal land management and municipal

district ownership (Gough & Yankson, 2000). Most planning

authority lies with the districts, but due to a multitude of

problems, a lack of resources and a lack of enforcement

capability, districts are often heavily reliant on both the

federal and tribal authorities to achieve planning goals (Gough &

Yankson, 2000). Local chiefs often dominate land-use decisions

and decision-making processes (Gough & Yankson, 2000). This also

persists within urban areas, most notably, Accra, which while

experiencing rapid population growth has seen land conflict

between new migrants and those already settled in Accra (Gough &

Yankson, 2000; Mends & De Meijere, 2006).

Traditional land tenure mechanisms can include quasi-

mystical elements through which land belongs collectively to

many, including deceased ancestors and those that not yet born

(Gough & Yankson, 2000). As a result, in addressing land

conflicts, tribal chiefs, who are often the arbiters may at times

weigh ‘claims’ placed upon the land by past, present and future

generations (Gough & Yankson, 2000). This can result in what

can seem to be inefficient (Sjaastad & Bromley, 1997; Payne,

1997; Mends & De Meijere, 2006) or conversely more holistic

(Gough & Yankson, 2000; Mends & De Meijere, 2006). Many past

decisions are oral rather than written, (though current decisions

are now always written) which requires systems of conventions and

continuity of cultural knowledge in order to assure their long-

term enforcement (Gough & Yankson, 2000).

The effectiveness of management within many of these areas

too came down to the effectiveness of individual chiefs as

managers (Gough & Yankson, 2000; Mends & De Meijere, 2006). Some

argue that these systems, and the multitude of variation

introduced by said systems can introduce inefficiencies in how

land markets are managed, thus potentially driving up costs and

promote squatting, especially in cases in which officials are

susceptible to graft (Magobunje, 1992; Sjaastad & Bromley,

1997). It can also result in problems in cases in which those

from different tribes wish to acquire land in areas dominated by

a particular tribe (Gough & Yankson, 2000; Mends & De Meijere,

2006).

Land is frequently acquired through lump sum transactions,

however, which in cases in which installments are permitted by

tribal elites, can pose problems in cases in which those

purchasing the land are not able to make payments (Gough &

Yankson, 2000; Mends & De Meijere, 2006). The tendency towards

lump-sum land purchases also makes it difficult to build upon

acquired land, as often those acquiring the land lack the means

to build immediately, resulting in, at times, decade long

processes by which settlements are actually built (Gough &

Yankson, 2000; Mends & De Meijere, 2006). Lump sum purchasing

can also preclude the urban poor from ever acquiring land, as

they are likely to never have the capital necessary for a lump-

sum land payment (Magobunje, 1992; Mends & De Meijere, 2006).

Traditional land management systems are capable of reform,

and have already begun to see preliminary changes, mostly in the

form of documentation, which has brought them more into line with

extant formal legal systems (Gough & Yankson, 2000). While some

argue that these systems may be the most effective means of

managing land within West Africa, albeit following further

reforms (Gough & Yankson, 2000) there remains debate as to

whether they are salubrious to squatters or whether they are

simply another land management framework that squatters can fall

afoul of, further limiting their ability to achieve tenure

security (Magobunje, 1992; McAuslen, 1996). Conversely, notions

of collective land-ownership may be beneficial to squatters as it

encourages collectiveness and can allow for co-operative land use

and legal protections through customary norms if the formal legal

structure fails to protect their tenure (Magobunje, 1992; Gough &

Yankson, 2000; Mends & De Meijere, 2006).

A significant gap in the extant literature involves how

customary land administrators are involved in slum upgrade

policy. However, the acceptance of tribal elites of a particular

upgrade scheme can be of great importance in assuring that a

program can be implemented and this is certainly a dimension that

must be navigated within most slum upgrade projects and policies.

Acquiescence or support of upgrade projects by tribal chiefs can

also be of use in encouraging local ownership of upgrade

projects.

A summary of slum conditions across different regions and

countries of Sub-Saharan Africa can be found below in Table 3.

Countries selected include several notable (in terms of slum

conditions, tenure or legal conditions) countries from West

Africa as well as one from each of the Southern African and East

African regions to further illustrate variation across those

regions. The table includes summary data on slum

characteristics, land tenure characteristics and legal

considerations.

2.8.1 SLUM CONDITIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA SUMMARY

Table 3. Slum Conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa Summary Table

Region/ Country

Slum Characteristics Land Tenure Characteristics

Legal Considerations

Source(s)

West Africa

Minimal or no infrastructure, lack of basic services, including drinking water, sewer, roads, etc. Services. Electricity may exist minimally, often through illegal means. Severe problems with disease, resource conflict, sanitation. High birth rates + high unemployment. Poor or limited housing materials.

Generally poor tenure security for squatters (though varying from countryto country). Customary land tenure systems, where they exist mayimprove tenure for some. Tenure minimally determinedthrough legal norms but through patronage or customary systems.

Legal systems generally largely inherited through previous colonial model. Often someconsiderations made for traditional tribaland/other customary legal norms. Systems often (semi) dysfunctional.

McAuslan, 1996; Gough &Yankson, 2000; Mends & De Meijere, 2006; Magobunje, 1992; Payne,1997; Gulyani & Basset,2007; UNOWA, 2007; Otsuka, Quisumbing, Payongayong & Aidoo, 2003; Neuwrith, 2005; Obudho and Mhlanga, 1988 [a]; Obudho and Mhlanga, 1988 [b]; Kreukeberg & Paulsen, 2002; Davis, 2006; Sjaastad & Bromley, 1997; Abrams, 1964; Arimah, 2010; Abelson, 1996; White, 1989; Amis, 1990; Africa Upgrading Team, 2002

East Africa

Minimal or no infrastructure, lack of basic services, including drinking water, sewer, roads, etc. Services.

Tenure limited by extant socio-economic, patronage and other legal issues. Some

Legal systems largely inherited through pre-independence colonial systems.

McAuslan, 1996; Payne, 1997; Gulyani & Basset,2007; UNOWA, 2007; Neuwrith, 2005; Krueckeberg & Paulsen, 2002; Davis, 2006;

Electricity may exist minimally, often through illegal means. Severe problems with disease, resource conflict, sanitation. High birth rates + high unemployment. Poor or limited housing materials.

mechanism for recourse but minimalformal or informal mechanisms for securing land tenurethrough customary systems except in cases in which the state has broken down (i.e. Somalia).

Very little customary land tenure/security. Typically more means of legal recourse than in West Africa, through system still nominally dysfunctional.

Akatch & Kusuku, 2002; Gulis, Anam, Juma & Kakosova, 2004; Abrams,1964; Arimah, 2010; Abelson, 1996; White, 1989; Amis, 1990; Africa Upgrading Team, 2002; Melesse, 2005; Majale, 2008; Lee Smith& Memon; 1988; Kombe, 2000

Table 3. Slum Conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa Summary Table (cont’d)

Southern Africa

Minimal or no infrastructure, lack of basic services, including drinking water, sewer, roads, etc. Services. Electricity may exist minimally, often through illegal means. Severe problems with disease, resource conflict, sanitation. High birth rates + high unemployment. Poor or limited housing materials.

Tenure conditions limited by extant socio-economic, patronage and other legal issues. Some mechanism for recourse for tenuresbut minimal formal or informal mechanisms for securing land tenurethrough customary systems except in certain cases.

Legal systems largely inherited through pre-independence colonial systems. Post apartheid South Africa the exception. Some customary land tenure systems mayexist. Legal systems may be more functional.

McAuslan, 1996; Payne, 1997; Gulyani & Basset,2007; UNOWA, 2007; Neuwrith, 2005; Krueckeberg & Paulsen, 2002; Davis, 2006; Abrams, 1964; Amis, 1990; Africa Upgrading Team, 2002; Adams, Sibanda & Turner, 1999;Dengu & Lyne, 2007; UNECA, 2003; Hodson, 1998

Nigeria Slums are unplanned. Slums lack general services, notably water, paved roads and sewers. Those services that do exist are often provided privately. Slum dwellers usually forcedto travel and pay for high water. Electricity may exist but is often resold through illegal connections to city power mains. High rate of disease, especially

Very poor tenure conditions for squatters. Largely beholden to slum landlords + local elites who exploit slum dwellers while compromising tenure.Minimal legal mechanisms for recourse. Tenure largely determined by slum landlords +

High corrupt legalsystem built upon dysfunctional English colonial era laws. System highly open to graft and/or patronage, resulting in difficult tenure conditions for squatters. Very little mechanism

McAuslan, 1996; Magobunje, 1992; Gulyani & Basset, 2007;UNOWA, 2007; Otsuka, Quisumbing, Payongayong& Aidoo, 2003; Obudho and Mhlanga, 1988 [a]; Obudho and Mhlanga, 1988 [b]; Davis, 2006; Gandy, 2006; Abrams, 1964; Arimah, 2010; Abelson, 1996; White, 1989; Adelekan, 2009; Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007; Africa Upgrading Team, 2002; Aikin-Aina,1990

during the rainy season whenditches collect water providing as a result of lack of sewer + wastewater drainage. Patronage system often drives violence between factions. Housing materials largely tin, mud and other scrap.

patronage mechanisms, often toserve either economic or tribal ends.

(if any) for squatter recourse.Patronage system will also often see one ethnic minority pitted against another with minimal benefits to either.

Table 3. Slum Conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa Summary Table (cont’d)

Ghana Unplanned. Slums lack general services, including paved roads and sewers. Those services that do existare often provided privately. Drinking water supplies may be several miles from slum population centers, with slum dwellers forced to travel and pay forwater. Water may also be delivered, but at high costs. Electricity may exist and is often resold through tapping into extant legal or illegal connections. High rate of disease, etc within slums, especially during the rainy season when ditches collect water providing nesting grounds for mosquitoes + other disease carriers. Housing materials includes tin, mud and other scrap materials.

Strong customary landtenure system that helps provide for a far greater degree oftenure security for squatters and slum denizens. Customary system is codified within standard legal system. Minimal formal legal capability for appealfor very high informal and/or customary appeal mechanism. Eventual goal is to more fullyintegrate customary system w/ formal legal system and provide formal appeals process for squatters.

Though legal system is largelybased on English colonial era system, strong customary land rights protections + deferral to some tribal laws. Ability for tribal chiefs, etc to serve as customary land managers, thus providing for greater legal flexibility and in such a way that squatters are benefited. Minimal corruption withinlegal system.

McAuslan, 1996; Gough &Yankson, 2000; Mends & De Meijere, 2006; Magobunje, 1992; Gulyani & Basset, 2007;UNOWA, 2007; Otsuka, Quisumbing, Payongayong& Aidoo, 2003; Davis, 2006; Sjaastad & Bromley, 1997; Abrams, 1964; Arimah, 2010; Abelson, 1996; White, 1989; Asamoah, 2010; Africa Upgrading Team, 2002

Niger Slums lack planning. Tenure conditions Recent overhaul Gulyani & Basset, 2007;UNOWA, 2007; Davis,

Services, where existent minimal. Lack of reliable drinking water + electricityin most slums, though electricity may be achieved through illegal connection to city power mains. No roads within slums, resulting in health problems, especially during the rainy season. Building materials for housing largely earth, clay, tin andscrap materials.

poor. While minimal patronage system, etc, system, there exists very little mechanism for squatters to secure tenure or challenge tenure insecurity. Minimal patronage/ corruption means theyare less likely to bedisplaced than withinNigeria, and strong tribal alignments mayallow for some security of tenure through tribal leveraging on part oftraditional tribal chiefs, etc.

(within the last 5 years) with aimtowards decentralization.Highly regional +divisions along ethnic lines. System is widely viewed to favor Hausa and Zarma minorities at theexpense of others. Corruption relatively low, however, minimal mechanism for recourse on the part of squatters.

2006; Abrams, 1964; Arimah, 2010; Abelson, 1996; White, 1989; Gavian & Fafchamps, 1996; Neef, 2001; Vogt,Vogt & Bachir, 2006; Amis, 1990; Lavigne Delville, 1998;

Table 3. Slum Conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa Summary Table (cont’d)

Burkina Faso

Some slum planning. Slums are often have basic open sewers allowing for improvedwaste drainage. Greater access to drinking water than in many other countriesin region. Power often achieved through reselling

Tenure conditions mixed. Services + infrastructure provided by central government. Gov has taken initiative in providing services + guaranteeing tenure

Legal system has been overhauled within the previous decade to reflect greater decentralization + some

Gulyani & Basset, 2007;UNOWA, 2007; Davis, 2006; Abrams, 1964; White, 1989; World BankInfo, 2010; Neef, 2001;Amis, 1990; Africa Upgrading Team, 2002; Gavian & Fafchamps, 1996; Ouedrago, 2004; Lavigne Delville, 1998;

from legal or illegal connections to city power mains. Some paved roads within slum areas, resultingin greater order + preventing pooling of water during rainy season. Building materials for housing often scrap, tin + clay.

security. Few squatters as slum areas planned centrally + provided with services. Gov actively attempts to integrate urban poor into society + provide services for + grant legitimacy too.

representation oftribal/ customarysystems. Despite, this, system remains highly centralized. Legal system functional, allows for legal recourse for squatters, transparency + minimal corruption.

Lavigne Delville, Ouedrago & Toumlin, 2003

Kenya Slums lack planning. Services, where existent minimal. Lack of reliable drinking water + electricityin most slums, though electricity may be achieved through illegal connection to city power mains. No roads within slums, resulting in health problems, especially during the rainy season. Building materials for housing largely earth, clay, tin andscrap materials.

Tenure limited by extant socio-economic, patronage and other legal issues. Minimal customary land tenurearrangements with emphasis towards centralization + standardization of decision making through central gov. Land tenure arrangements viewed as highly inequitabledespite

System largely inherited throughEnglish system, though some legalmeans have been used to insure more equitable land distribution. Certain colonial era laws continueto hamper fairness of the system.

McAuslan, 1996; Payne, 1997; Gulyani & Basset,2007; UNOWA, 2007; Neuwrith, 2005; Davis, 2006; Akatch & Kusuku, 2002; Gulis, Anam, Juma& Kakosova, 2004; Abrams, 1964; Arimah, 2010; Abelson, 1996; White, 1989; Africa Upgrading Team, 2002; Mbote, 2004; Melesse, 2005; Majale, 2008; LeeSmith & Memon; 1988

redistribution policies. Increased ethnic basis for landtenure conflict.

Table 3. Slum Conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa Summary Table (cont’d)

South Africa

Slums lack planning. Services, where existent minimal. Lack of reliable drinking water + electricityin most slums, though electricity may be achieved through illegal connection to city power mains. No roads within slums, resulting in health problems, especially during the rainy season. Building materials for housing largely earth, clay, tin andscrap materials.

Tenure conditions limited by extant socio-economic, patronage and other legal issues. Various mechanisms for recourse for tenures. Extensive system of legal review, however increasing number of questions about equity within tenure system.

Post-apartheid system saw overhaul of legalsystem with greater emphasis on fairness + reduced corruption. During apartheid,system highly inequitable + minimal means forrecourse.

McAuslan, 1996; Payne, 1997; Gulyani & Basset,2007; UNOWA, 2007; Neuwrith, 2005; Davis, 2006; Abrams, 1964; White, 1989; Africa Upgrading Team, 2002; Adams, Sibanda & Turner, 1999; Dengu & Lyne, 2007; UNECA, 2003; Hodson, 1998

2.9 SLUM UPGRADE AS POLICY

While the consensus within development agencies increasingly

begins to revolve around slum upgrade, this has not always been

the case. This section will review literature detailing the

shifting ideology from how West African and aid agencies arrived

at the consensus of slum upgrade as policy and the rationale for

this shift.

Slum upgrade within Sub-Saharan Africa has traditionally

been heavily criticized (Gulyani & Bassett, 2007). Slum upgrade,

which has been spoken of as improvement to either individual

housing units or of infrastructure, has been depicted as an

expensive process, out of touch with the needs of slum denizens,

many of whom could be better served through the elimination of

slum settlements and resettled within state housing (Keivani,

2001). This view has discouraged many governments and

international development agencies from involving themselves in

slum-upgrade projects (Gulyani & Bassett, 2007). How to improve

slums still remains a subject of heavy debate, with many critics

favoring slum demolition and resettlement (United Nations, 1968;

Haeringer, 1972, 642 via Gugler & Flanagan, 1978, 46). The

current trend, however, now appears to be towards reconsidering

slum-improvement, due to the cost prohibitive nature of slum

clearance (Arimah, 2010; Neuwirth, 2005, 248) and issues of

corruption or patronage limiting the ability to implement large-

scale projects within many West African contexts (Wrong, 2005).

A large number of early slum infrastructure upgrade projects

undertaken within Sub-Saharan Africa were done so by the World

Bank beginning in the 1970s (Neuwirth, 2005; Gulyani & Bassett,

2007). Many of these projects focused upon affordable housing

supply and sought large multi-sector goals that “prioritized

community development and poverty alleviation in addition to

housing and physical development objectives” (Gulyani & Bassett,

2007). This period of large-scale projects is often

characterized as the “first-generation” of slum upgrade projects.

By the 1980s, a shift began to occur in the sorts of

projects conceptualized by governments and involved foreign

agencies (Gulyani & Bassett, 2007). The focus began to be

towards governments as “enablers of housing” rather than as

direct providers of affordable housing (Mayo and Angel, 1993;

Gulyani & Bassett, 2007). The second generations of slum

intervention projects have begun to focus more on direct upgrades

to existing housing and infrastructure and have stressed smaller

scale interventions. This has even included ‘multisector’

projects, which have tended to include fewer interventions

(Neuwirth, 2005; Gulyani & Bassett, 2007).

This shift in approach has also served to de-emphasize

notions of formal legal land rights, most notably in terms of

documentation (Gulyani & Bassett, 2007). This is likely because

squatters are likely to invest in housing and infrastructure

through informal or negotiated agreements rather than through a

formal legal process (Doeble, 1983, Zetter, 1984; Gulyani &

Bassett, 2007). This investment in housing can even be a strategy

as a means of insuring more long-term control of housing.

Upgrading can be a highly useful means of securing eventual legal

control of property being squatted on (UNOWA, 2007). Upgrading

slums is also highly practical for many as upgrades can help

prevent demolition, thus is likely to be endorsed by external

landlords who derive income through renting out the slum

settlements; and may also have dubious legal ownership of the

property (Obudho and Mhlanga, 1988 [b]). The process of slum

upgrade however is frequently decoupled from the legalization

process. “Institutional reforms to streamline legalization

processes make allocation mechanisms more transparent and improve

land information systems need to proceed separately” (Gulyani &

Bassett, 2007).

Infrastructure improvement appears to be the new mechanism

through which slum improvements are made. The rationale for this

is that the types of slum infrastructure improvements attempted

have changed significantly (Gulyani & Bassett, 2007). Rather

than large scale, multi-sector projects, the infrastructure

improvements attempted have become smaller, far more localized

and have begun to include the possibility of at least partial

remuneration (Gulyani & Bassett, 2007). The focus also seems to

now firmly lie with infrastructure rather than housing structure

improvement. This approach is useful in that it limits the

degree to which funds can be misappropriated and provides for

improvements to a whole community rather than simply individual

tenants. Improved access to basic infrastructure and services

has become the principal areas of intervention and away from a

focus on the housing unit itself (Gulyani & Bassett, 2007;

Gulyani, 2002).

Slum infrastructure upgrades have been implemented to

varying degrees of success throughout West Africa. Currently,

slum upgrades implemented have frequently targeted issues such as

drainage, fresh-water supply, sanitation, street lighting, and

paved footpaths or roads (UNOWA, 2007; Gulyani & Bassett, 2007).

These interventions to improve infrastructure have as a whole

been easier to implement and tend to have large impacts on

standard of living and general quality of life of slum residents

(Keare and Parriss, 1982; Lee-Smith and Memon, 1988; World Bank,

2002a). Where infrastructure has been improved, there have been

demonstrably positive impacts on overall living standards and

quality of life. These types of infrastructure improvements have

also improved tenure security within informal squatter

settlements (Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007; van Asperen & Zevenbergen,

2007; Neuwirth, 2005).

There have been numerous of these projects that have sought

to make these basic infrastructure improvements within West

Africa. The World Bank Community Infrastructure Upgrading

Project in Ghana has resulted in highly positive results within

implemented areas. Elements, including basic above ground sewer

construction have improved drainage and reduced occurrences of

waterborne diseases. Crime has also been reduced due to improved

street lighting (Africa Upgrading Team, 2002g via Gulyani &

Bassett, 2007). Similar projects have also shown great success

within slums in Nairobi, Kenya (Gulyani & Bassett, 2007).

2.10 EFFICACY OF INFRASTRUCTURE

There are two limitations on the efficacy of infrastructure

improvement projects that can mean the difference between an

effective infrastructure project and one that fails. These

limitations are defined by Gulyani and Bassett as: (1) a

determination of appropriate standards, and (2) the ability to

effect cost recovery for investments made (Gulyani & Bassett,

2007). Assuring appropriate standards for infrastructure

improvement is one of the most important issues to be addressed

when implementing upgrade projects. This section will review

literature dealing with these issues.

Many West African countries retain highly stringent

regulatory, planning, and building code regimes dating to their

colonial pasts, which can prevent infrastructure upgrades from

being implemented altogether (Okpala, 1999; Kombe, 2000; Payne,

2001; Gulyani & Bassett, 2007). “These regimes demand high

standards for infrastructure and housing such as wide road

reserves, high-grade tarmac for road surfaces, large parcels of

land for housing development and underground waterborne sewerage”

(Gulyani & Bassett, 2007). Unrealistically high standards,

especially within slums, result in defacto no standards at all as

builders, unable to permits or meet codes, may simply bribe

inspectors to approve poor quality work (Fernandes and Varley,

1998; Okpala, 1999; Kombe, 2000; Gulyani & Bassett, 2007). This

can result in far greater maintenance costs and threaten safety.

At best, unrealistically high standards result in increasingly

limited provision of service whereby the urban poor are the most

common victims.

Low-cost, low-standard infrastructure projects appear to be

the way forward for implementing slum upgrade programs. Many of

the more effective slum-upgrade projects have used more

reasonable, localized standards, designed to address specific

shortcomings. It has also insured that lower cost technologies

can be utilized to achieve particular infrastructure upgrade ends

(Okpala, 1999; Gulyani & Bassett, 2007). The use of these

technologies can also be important in insuring localized

construction jobs and small local contractors when improvements

are made, thus enabling some of the money put into an

infrastructure project to remain within the community being

improved (Africa Upgrading Team, 2002b via Gulyani & Bassett,

2007)

Lower standards have not always been embraced locally.

Opposition to alteration in standards has come both from

government and from localized opposition (Lee-Smith and Memon,

1988; Payne, 2001 via Gulyani & Bassett, 2007). Governments and

wealthier citizenry often want more modern facilities constructed

within their towns (Moavenzadeh, 1987 via Gulyani & Bassett,

2007) even if this means that they will be unable to improve

infrastructure at all. Occasionally, targeted users find these

lower standards unacceptable or demeaning, resulting in their

rejection of certain infrastructure improvement projects. In

order for higher standard projects to be implemented, demolition

and relocation must be implemented which both pits communities

against each other, and can raise overall project costs (Gulyani

& Bassett, 2007). However, this can reduce the meaningful

characteristics of infrastructure upgrade and render projects

self-defeating (Obudho and Mhlanga, 1988 [b]). As many slums are

built without a plan at all, the standards imposed within many

extant codes within West African countries can require heavy

demolition and relocation; and the underlying notion behind

infrastructure upgrades should be that the new infrastructure

conforms to existing footpaths and roads where possible (Obudho

and Mhlanga, 1988 [b]).

2.11 COST RECOVERY

Many current upgrading projects “aim for recovery of a

portion of infrastructure investment costs from project

‘beneficiaries’ or targeted users” (Gulyani & Bassett, 2007).

Cost recovery is useful in that it helps to reduce per capita

upgrade costs and because user charges for services are often

necessary in order to fund regular maintenance costs – a

component necessary in order to insure projects remain

sustainable (Gulyani & Bassett, 2007). Cost recovery is

beginning to become a component of many slum infrastructure

upgrade projects (Gulyani & Bassett, 2007). As aid organizations

are increasingly using ongoing sustainability of projects as a

determinant mechanism for project investment, the longer-term

advantages for cost recovery can be crucial in determining

whether a project is funded or not (Gulyani & Bassett, 2007).

This is even more the case in terms of projects that are locally

initiated, as opposed to those initiated by external aid

organizations or non-government actors. As many localities have

very little funding or authority to leverage funds for

infrastructure improvement - as centralization of authority means

that the leveraging of tax funds for improvement projects is

usually the responsibility of national governments within most

West African countries – many locally initiated projects will be

realized privately, requiring some degree of cost recovery in

order to encourage investors (Gulyani & Bassett, 2007; Neuwirth,

2005).

Some degree of cost recovery can also be of use in order to

insure that projects are completed (Gulyani & Bassett, 2007;

Hardoy & Saitterthwaite, 1989; Kaufmann & Quigley, 1986). Cost

recovery has been of great use in seeing project completion in

parts of Nigeria, as well as Ghana and other West African areas,

especially in projects dealing with water and sewage and

electricity (van Asperen & Zevenbergen, 2007; UNOWA, 2007,

Kaufmann & Quigley, 1986; Davis, 2006). Numerous projects

implemented without cost recovery additions see initial

infrastructure completed, but the final project not completed,

often resulting in elements of infrastructure, such as

unconnected pipes, being torn out and scavenged for scrap if they

remain un-used indefinitely (Neuwirth, 2005). This type of

scenario represents a disconnection between upgrade projects and

reality, however is common is projects that are poorly designed

(Hardoy & Saitterthwaite, 1989; Neuwirth, 2005, 83; Gulyani &

Bassett, 2007). Additionally, effective cost recovery requires

political will (Gulyani & Bassett, 2007) and a legal framework

that is willing to recognize the existence of squatters and help

to nominally connect them to services (Hardoy & Saitterthwaite,

1989; Neuwirth, 2005, 248). Otherwise, it is easier for many

squatters to simply acquire services such as water and

electricity by illegally tapping into city power systems; a

practice that can impact service to both squatter settlements and

non-squatter denizens alike (Neuwirth, 2005, 248).

Partial cost recovery is increasingly becoming the norm in

infrastructure upgrade projects. This can include increased

decentralization in funding for central government led or funded

projects. This change is beginning to be implemented

incrementally. In Ghana, for example, for all infrastructure

improvement projects, local governments are expected to pay 10%

of the costs, with the central government shouldering the other

90%. Previously the central government bore the full capital

costs of projects (Africa Upgrading Team, 2002b via Gulyani &

Bassett, 2007). When combined with microfinance schemes or with

charges for service, it can help assure community buy in, or

ownership of projects that can insure that projects are completed

and that the infrastructure projects undertaken are indeed those

for which there is the greatest need or desire. Cost recovery

has become an increasingly effective mechanism in order to assure

projects are seen to completion.

Cost recovery must also be reasonable, and scalable to the

type of project. While many squatters obtain services,

especially electricity, illegally5, they often still pay “rates”

through a process of bribery and regular re-installation when

services are disrupted through periodic clampdowns by governments

and utilities (Hardoy & Saitterthwaite, 1989; Kaufmann & Quigley,

1986; Neuwirth, 2005, 63). As a result, if given the option

between a legal option to receive services and continuing to

pirate services, many will opt for the legal option as long as

rates are reasonable and pricings are scalable based on level of

use (Neuwirth, 2005; Davis, 2006). In several countries, power

utilities and even subscription television services are

developing strategies to legally extend services to informal

squatter settlements (Neuwirth, 2005; Davis, 2006). Implementing

a cost recovery requirement, as applied to these cases can help

encourage utilities to legally to slums (Neuwirth, 2005; Davis,

5 An estimated 40% of squatters received electricity illegally in Lagos (Kaufmann & Quigley, 1986). This number is likely even higher today, perhaps as high as 50 percent (Davis, 2006).

2006; Arimah, 2010). In some cases, microfinance schemes are

used in order for slum denizens to pay part of the cost of

extending service (Kaufmann & Quigley, 1986; Neuwirth, 2005;

Gulyani & Bassett, 2007). This is most effective when tenure

security is more assured; however, the legitimate extension of

utilities to slums can help improve tenure security within many

of these settlements, thus improving both the propensity for

services to be extended and for cost recovery to be effective

(Gulyani & Bassett, 2007; van Asperen & Zevenbergen, 2007).

2.12 EFFECTIVE PROJECTS

What makes for effective slum infrastructure upgrade

projects is multifaceted. Projects that are effective require

(a) a plan, (b) predictable funding, (c) agreed upon and simple

operating rules and capacity (Gulyani & Bassett, 2007; Davis,

2006; Kaufmann & Quigley, 1986). Larger scale projects often

also require involvement by local governments and some degree of

honest brokerage in managing programs (Obudho and Mhlanga, 1988

[b]). Both large and small-scale projects can be effective,

however, larger-scale projects tend to require more supervision,

(Gulyani & Bassett, 2007; Davis, 2006; Kaufmann & Quigley, 1986)

which can further add to their costs. It is crucial for projects

to incorporate a community or demand-led approach if they are to

be successfully implemented (Gulyani & Bassett, 2007).

In improving slums, interviews with residents are rarely

performed with decisions instead deferred to local and tribal

elites (Obudho and Mhlanga, 1988 [b]). While this practice makes

some cultural sense, it can actually serve to undermine slum-

upgrade projects because the interests of these elites or chiefs

may differ significantly from those they speak for. As a result,

infrastructure improvement projects are often instigated by

squatter communities and implemented in order to address a

specific service need.

Projects instigated for which a broad consensus of slum

residents can be drawn can, surprisingly, fail due to local

undermining of the project (Obudho and Mhlanga, 1988 [b]). Thus

while many of these infrastructure improvements projects are

often implemented from the top down, some projects arise from the

bottom up. These bottom up projects, instigated by squatters are

more difficult to get underway; however they tend to be more

effective in serving the interest of the slum community and thus

are more likely to be able to achieve some measure of local

support which can aid in both cost recovery and higher levels of

project completion (Obudho and Mhlanga, 1988 [b]).

2.13 CURRENT DEVELOPMENT & EFFECTIVE OUTREACH STRATEGIES

The development of new systems of communication and outreach

within slums to determine what sorts of projects are desired is

important in insuring the success of future upgrade projects.

Often religious charities and organizations are ahead of NGOs and

governments in gauging this support, as they tend to make

improvements within areas of high church or mosque membership, or

within targeted potential membership areas (Neuwirth, 2005, 92).

Many of the projects of religious organizations tend to include

small-scale projects, including well construction, etc for at-

risk communities. As evangelicalism becomes increasingly

entrenched within many West African strategies, organizations and

governments hoping to implement projects should also try to learn

from the upgrade practices of these organizations while

simultaneously developing mechanisms for increased local

participation within infrastructure planning processes.

While slum infrastructure improvements are important to

begin addressing many of the problems within slums, these

upgrades alone are unlikely to completely solve problems by

themselves. Infrastructure upgrades may be most effective when

combined with housing improvement projects and other municipal

works projects (Werlin, 1988; Gulyani & Bassett, 2007). Also

important is overall improvement in socio-economic conditions for

slum dwellers as slum dwellers principle rationale for inhabiting

slums are socioeconomic.

These socioeconomic improvements are however, frequently

very difficult to implement due to wider issues of environmental

degradation, resources shortages and corruption, all of which

affect socio-economic conditions of squatters (Davis, 2006;

Kauffman & Quigley, 1986; Werlin, 1988; Gulyani & Bassett, 2007;

UNOWA, 2007; Neuwrith, 2005). However, the consensus seems to be

shifting within both development agencies and African governments

that slum upgrade is an important strategy in mitigating several

of the more glaring problems within slums. This shift in

consensus presents an important opportunity for both African

concerned aid organizations and African governments to make

necessary improvements within informal squatter settlements. It

is deeply important for potential upgrades to include inputs from

affected communities, and to be integrated, where possible with

other large-scale projects if they are to become truly effective.

2.14 CONCLUSIONS FROM THE LITERATURE

In attempting to implement infrastructure upgrade projects

within West African slums or informal squatter settlements, the

literature suggests that there are wide arrays of variables that

can affect the outcomes. It is of the utmost of importance to

understand not only what factors are driving rapid urbanization,

but also to acknowledge the type of squatters, landlords,

settlements and the land tenure scenario present prior to the

implementation of projects. Many of the factors that drive

rapid urbanization into West African cities can be recreated, or

further exacerbated within urban environments, often resulting

into ethnic or religious conflict as groups divide into factions

in order to compete for resources.

All of these factors can have important impacts on tenure

for slum denizens. Tenure security for many slum denizens

within West African cities exists within a semi-legal state that

is determined through a combination of formal legal frameworks,

but much more often through informal decisions by traditional

tribal elites, graft and inhabitation of settlements.

Infrastructure improvements can be important to help squatters

establish development and thus lay legal (or non-legal, as the

case may be) claim to the land that they inhabit.

Tenure security can further be heavily impacted by customary

land management systems. These systems often rely on tribally

administered land policy and conceptions of land ownership that

favor collective control and use. The impacts of these systems

are often determined culturally and by the effectiveness of

tribal chiefs in administering them. While there are some

problems that are implicit within customary land systems, and

questions as to whether they are better suited for managing rural

rather than urban lands, these systems are very robust, and have

adapted over time. They can either positively or negatively

impact tenure security for squatters based on a multitude of

factors, including how land is acquired, tribal flexibility in

permitting settlement by those from disparate tribes, local

recognition of indigenous land management and the openness of

these systems to graft. The impacts of customary systems upon

infrastructure upgrade remain understudied; however, buy-in or

approval of infrastructure upgrade by tribal chiefs can be of

great use in enabling improvement projects.

Infrastructure improvements as a whole also seem to be the

most effective means of improving squatter settlements for their

denizens. This is because slum infrastructure improvement

projects, unlike clean scrape demolition, displace far fewer slum

residents. Also, unlike housing unit improvement, whole

communities benefit rather than just the immediate recipients of

new units. This can help to mitigate or prevent many of the

resource conflicts that emerge within informal squatter

settlements. Additionally, simply laying infrastructure can help

towards formal acknowledgement of squatter settlements by local

governments (both formal and informal), thus improving tenure

conditions for slum residents.

The level at which infrastructure improvement projects are

initiated and implemented, as well as their scope, can be

determinant in project completion and efficacy. Developmental

agencies are increasingly finding that smaller scale projects,

filling particular infrastructure needs or niches are those that

are easiest to see to completion, encourage local ownership of,

and have serve their intended purposes. Some level of cost

recovery tied to infrastructure projects is also increasingly

coming to be seen as a useful mechanism for improving local

ownership of projects. Cost recovery insures that the projects

initiated will be those most wanted by those involved, and if

slum denizens bear part of the cost of service, they are likely

to help initiate for both project completion and ongoing project

maintenance.

3. RESEARCH METHODS

This thesis consists of a review and analysis of extant

literature on the subject of slum infrastructure upgrade within

two case study areas. This method of research and exploration was

selected as there have been numerous slum infrastructure upgrade

projects implemented within urban areas of West African over the

last several decades and thus a robust literature base.

International aid agencies, NGOs and West African

governments have all initiated infrastructure improvements

projects within the region. An exploration of the wider

generalizations of what types of projects work, focusing on case

studies, can be useful in aiding both governments and NGOs to

better target future projects. The results of implemented

projects have been recorded and accessed. Generalizations can be

drawn from these results as to what effective slum infrastructure

improvement projects look like. Further, assessments can be

drawn as to which of these strategies are the most regionally or

sub-regionally suitable and which can be extrapolated to Sub-

Saharan Africa as a whole.

The four types of infrastructure examined in this study are:

Basic roads and walkways

Sewers and waste water disposal systems

Fresh water access

Electricity access

The case study approach is practical in that it allows for

differentiation of urban areas and for sub regions within West

Africa. If generalizations can be drawn across the various

identified types of urban areas within this study, then those

generalizations can likely be implemented within the wider West

African region. Thus, the two case studies used were selected

because they represent large coastal metropolises that are facing

rapid urbanization and that are former English colonies (and thus

utilize vestiges of the British legal and British land tenure

systems.) What differentiates the cases includes cultural

division and local customary land tenure scenarios.

The two case studies selected are as follows:

Lagos, Nigeria

Accra, Ghana

3.1 DATA ACQUISITION

Data was acquired using primarily library research, both

online and in library. Additional data was acquired through

writing to agencies, including the World Bank and requesting

project reports cited within academic articles. These requests

for project reports were frequently not responded to by agencies.

Several books and articles used were recommended to me by

advising professors or by development agency personnel.

Several library databases were used to acquire articles.

These databases were: “JSTOR”, “Web of Knowledge”, “LEXISNEXIS

Academic” and “Academic Search”. In each of these databases, the

following search phrases were used: ‘slum upgrade + West Africa’,

‘tenure security + Africa’, ‘tenure security + West Africa’,

‘slum upgrade + Ghana’, ‘slum upgrade + Nigeria’, ‘slum upgrade +

Lagos’, ‘slum upgrade + Accra’, ‘informal squatter settlement +

West Africa’, ‘urban development + West Africa’, ‘urban

development + Ghana’, ‘urban development + Nigeria’,

‘deforestation + West Africa’, ‘urban migration + West Africa’

and other iterations thereof.

Literature selected was almost entirely academic literature

in the form of books and articles in peer-reviewed journals.

Also included were several reports and working papers published

by the United Nations, World Bank and other agencies detailing

slum conditions and upgrade strategies. Several project

assessment reports were also included, however these documents

were difficult to acquire and thus very few were used. The lack

of a substantial number of project assessments is a serious

limitation of this thesis.

However, there also exist several problems with those NGO

and agency projects reports that are made available (Fama &

Johnson, 1983; Burger & Owens, 2008; McGann & Johnstone, 2006;

Hailey & James, 2003; Veron et al, 2006; Weisbrod, 1998).

Specifically, due to the competiveness for grant moneys, NGOs and

agencies are relatively unlikely to publish project shortcomings,

which can highly limit the ability to build further capacity

through sharing information detailing project failures (McGann &

Johnstone, 2006; Weisbrod, 1998; Burder & Ownes, 2008; Hailey &

James, 2003).

Without agency access to internal documents and reviews

within many NGOs, and a shortage of project assessments completed

by third-party agencies (Hailey & James, 2003; McGann &

Johnstone, 2006; Burger & Owens, 2008), it may be difficult to

gauge to what extent certain slum upgrade and development

strategies may not be as effective as claimed by many agencies,

which has severely undermined the credibility of many agencies

and drawn wider questions about many agency project assessments

as a whole (Hailey & James, 2003; McGann & Johnstone, 2006;

Burger & Owens, 2008). Some academics (McGann & Johnstone, 2006;

Burger & Owens, 2008) even go so far as to accuse agencies of out

and out dishonesty in how they report project assessment results.

As a result, the exclusion of many of these agency project

assessments remains as a limitation to my approach to data

collection. However, academic assessments of projects, and

those of neutral institutions such as the United Nations are, as

a whole, more objective than individual agency project

assessments and thus were relied upon in this paper.

Plans and related planning documents for the two case

studies were also considered. However, these documents were not

relied upon, as they are out of date and not reflective of

current planning scenarios. Lagos, for example, last published a

comprehensive plan in the 1990s and has pushed a planning

strategy that can best be described as ‘anti-planning’ (Grandy,

2006, Packer, 2006). This ‘anti-planning approach includes a

failure to make plans, a failure to carry out what plans exist, a

lack of authority to plan or implement plans on the part of

formal planning agencies, and a refusal to negotiate or engage in

dialogue with affected or interested parties (Grandy, 2006).

This has resulted in planning scenarios frequently driven by

economic or patronage beneficiaries, most frequently corrupt

bureaucrats and slum landlords.

Literature was temporally bounded from the early 1960s (with

early projects launched immediately following the various West

African independence movements to the present. Articles selected

rely more heavily on more recent literature, dating to the past

10 years. Later literature was most heavily relied upon because

the types of projects implemented have shifted radically over

time and thus more recent literature is far more responsive to

the types of projects currently being implemented. Spatially,

literature was largely limited to West Africa and to the two

selected case studies, but also included some literature

detailing slum upgrade efforts in East Africa, some general

literature on slum upgrade in Sub-Saharan Africa in general and

some literature detailing slum upgrade efforts in general.

3.2 SLUM & INFORMAL SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS DEFINITIONS

A ‘slum’, for the purposes of this thesis is defined as a

squalid and overcrowded urban area or district inhabited by very

poor people. Slums generally lack infrastructure and basic

services.

An ‘informal squatter settlement’ is defined as an area or

district of uncertain ownership and land tenure in which

residents unlawfully inhabit an uninhabited buildings or unused

land. Thus, ‘squatters’ are a settler with no legal title to the

land occupied, typically one on land not yet allocated by a

government.

Though these terms are not mutually exclusive, many informal

squatter settlements are slums and vice versa. However, there

exist highly developed informal squatter settlements in some

regions of West Africa that can no longer be considered slums.

For the sake of simplicity, the two terms are used

interchangeably throughout this thesis as the scope of this

thesis is limited simply to slum settlements that are also

informal squatter settlements.

3.3 INFRASTRUCTURE

In determining ‘infrastructure’ upgrades within slums, the

criteria evaluated include: the presence of roads, sidewalks (or

walkways) and rudimentary sewers, and access to both clean

drinking water and electricity. These services remain most

heavily in short supply, and have arguably the largest impacts on

quality of life issues within squatter settlements (Gulyani &

Basset, 2007; UNOWA, 2007; Okpala, 1999).

Roads and walkways are crucial as a means of insuring public

health and safety. They provide slum denizens with a place to

walk, allow for the easy passage of traffic and help prevent

pedestrian/auto vehicular accidents. Paved roads can also aid

transportation of goods and services throughout slum and lessen

the heavy traffic jams that are increasingly common within West

African cities. As paved walkways are often taken over by street

vendors, it is important that walkways in slums near major

traffic arteries be wide enough to accommodate both a street

vendor and pedestrians. This means that they should be, on

average 8-10 feet wide. Designated or paved walkways within

settlements themselves are important as they impose order upon

settlements, and where tin sheds can be erected. Additionally,

they help prevent slum areas from turning into mud during heavy

seasonal rains common within West Africa. Roadways will be

assessed, where data is available, upon their presence or non-

presence, and their ability to accommodate the multiple uses -

including pedestrian areas, vehicles and, often, vending - that

are generally imposed upon them in slum areas.

Sewers, even open-sewers or drainage ditches limit the

spread of infectious diseases and other hygiene related ailments.

As many informal squatter settlements tend to be highly dense,

the presence of sewers can be among the most important

infrastructure elements affecting health and quality of life

within slums. Without sewers to aid wastewater management;

ground water supplies tend to become polluted, resulting in large

numbers of parasites, and even endemic diseases such as cholera

or plague. The ability to remove wastewater through a sewer not

only diminishes diseases but also improves general public

sanitation. Basic sewer infrastructure will be assessed based on

the noted presence of sewers in informal squatter settlements

within the literature, the standard of these sewers in relation

to more affluent parts of the cities, the general hygiene of

these settlements.

Drinking water availability within an informal squatter

settlement is an important issue that is related to sewers.

Clean water supplies for drinking, cleaning and cooking purposes

are crucial to life within these slums. Water is often is very

short supply, with wells often overtaxed or heavily polluted.

This makes it one of the resources that most often leads to

conflict within West African informal squatter settlements. Many

people are forced to walk great distances (as far as several

miles) daily in order to obtain water. Many also lack the means

to easily transport this water back, thus limiting the supply

they can carry. There are also often long lines for water

further increasing time spent acquiring it. It is also likely to

be charged for and the quantity that can be sold capped per

person. When water is brought to slums externally, it is often

done so at usurious rates and at unusual times or at irregular

intervals. This will be assessed based on what the literature

indicates as access or lack of access, the distance needed to be

travelled to access this water and how potable that water is.

Electricity access is important within slums. Like water, it

is heavily competed for and in limited supply. Access to

electricity can dramatically improve quality of life, improve

slum lighting conditions (thereby improving public safety), and

allow for time saving devices, such as grinders, etc for millets

and other grains that would normally have to be processed by

hand. Electricity supplies to slums are often achieved through

illegally tapping into municipal power supplies, however in some

municipalities, utility companies, realizing that slum denizens

often use less electricity than the more affluent, but acquire it

illegally are looking for ways to extend power lines into slums

at lower collective fees. Electricity access will be assessed

through the legality of access, the relative dependability of

power and the cost of power.

3.4 LAND TENURE SECURITY

This thesis will examine how infrastructure upgrade projects

in each of the selected case studies impacts land tenure

conditions for slum denizens and contrast how infrastructure

improvements affect tenure across the two case studies.

Infrastructure improvement has been shown to improve tenure

security for slum denizens; such that often projects are

undertaken even in cases of uncertain tenure for denizens with

the hope that project outcomes will result in improved tenure

conditions for project recipients. Additionally, local buy-in to

projects through some form of cost recovery may also result in

improved tenure. However, in some cases, infrastructure

improvements only come after tenure has been insured. This

thesis will assess which of these approaches is most beneficial

to slum denizens.

Tenure security as related to infrastructure improvement may

be difficult to gauge in certain cases, due to a relative lack of

follow up within project assessments. It has not been until

recently that tenure security for slum denizens has begun to be

assessed to determine the overall success of infrastructure

upgrade projects. Rarely are long-term tenure security studies

conducted following successful infrastructure upgrade projects.

Additionally, tenure security for residents should be weighed

against tenure security for slum landlords. Landlords, in some

cases, may take action to reduce tenure security for residents if

they perceive it to negatively impact their economic interests.

Thus, it is important, in assessing tenure issues resulting from

slum upgrade that slum dwellers are the principle beneficiaries

rather than landlords.

In assessing tenure security, I will examine to what extent

infrastructure projects help improve both short, and middle to

long-term tenure security (where data are available) for upgrade

projects. The indicators used for this will be length of tenure

within slums for denizens, in those cases in which there are slum

landlords. As this thesis is reliant upon secondary research, I

will not examine tenure security for slum landlords except where

data exists. Landlords’ tenure security following infrastructure

upgrade is an understudied subject and there exist few studies to

determine how projects improve tenure for slum landlords, despite

its impacts on tenure security for denizens. Additionally,

landlord tenure security need not always negatively impact

denizen tenure security, much is based on the case in question.

Finally, I will assess how well local buy-in to projects, through

cost recovery mechanism impacts tenure security for slum

denizens.

3.5 CASE STUDIES

The case study approach will be used in this thesis. The

case study method represents a mechanism through which wider

generalizations are drawn across a wider area or system based

upon the findings of several case studies (Yin, 1994).  A

multiple-case study approach has been utilized in this thesis.

This is because the multiple case study approach is better at

collecting divergent information in cases of radical

differentiation and mitigates oversimplification of complex and

varied issues (Flyvbjerg, 2006). However, in applying this

process holistically, a greater number of generalizations can be

drawn (Yin, 1994). These cases were selected using information-

oriented sampling as opposed to a random sampling mechanism. The

case selection was dependent upon the information richness of the

two selected-samples and because they represented some degree of

continuity across features while also boasting wildly divergent

power structures and relationships that affect the efficacy of

slum-upgrade projects and their impacts on tenure security for

slum denizens.

The cases were selected as critical cases, indicating that

they be defined as having strategic importance in relation to the

general problem (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Conclusions drawn from this

approach are done so through a process of verification

(Flyvbjerg, 2006). Verification indicates that in the positive

case, if findings are valid for this case, they are likely valid

for all or many cases. In its negative form, the generalization

would be, if it is not valid for this case, then it is not valid

for any, or only few, cases (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin, 1992).

Conversely, a process of ‘falsificationism’ must be applied to

conclusions derived from the case-study approach in order to

determine if results are indeed falsifiable (Popper, 1959). It

is often falsification, rather than verification that

characterizes conclusions drawn through a case study approach

(Popper, 1959; Flyvbjerg, 2006). This introduces an argument

against attempting to reduce results to generalizations and

instead to take each of the cases on their own terms. This

tension between the two tendencies within the case-study

methodology will play itself out throughout this thesis, with a

greater emphasis placed on Popperian falsificationism, and thus a

tendency towards treating the single, qualitative cases as

unique, and thus limiting wider regional generalizations based

upon the two-cases.

Two case studies were selected for this thesis. These two

case studies encompass a sample of two coastal urban areas. The

case studies will focus on slums and informal squatter

settlements generally within each of the two selected urban areas

rather than on particular slums in particular. This is because

the available literature tends to focus generally on slum and

squatter settlements within urban areas rather than on particular

slum settlements in particular. While studies have been done on

particular slum upgrades, these are not readily available via

libraries, Internet research or through writing to agencies and

requesting reports. This may limit the extent of analysis,

however, as noted previously, many agency project assessments are

likely to paint an overly optimistic picture of project success

and may fail to adequately address project problems and

limitations.

Beyond this initial specification, the two urban areas were

selected based on how each case went about implementing

infrastructure improvements, how well each case integrated

infrastructure improvements, how symptomatic each case is of the

wider trend of rapid urbanization, city size and regional

importance.

Lagos, Nigeria was selected as a case study because it is

the largest city in West Africa. It also contains some of the

largest slums, and is viewed as typifying many of the greatest

problems associated with slums. It is a large coastal metropolis

that contains a large number of regional migrants. As a result

of both migrations into Lagos from all over Nigeria, as well as

wider regional migration, Lagos is the 7th fastest growing urban

area in the world, with an annual growth rate of 4.44%.6 The

Lagos metropolitan area is one of the largest urban areas in the

world, containing an official population of over 9 million, but

6 http://www.citymayors.com/statistics/urban_growth1.html

an even larger unofficial population count estimated as high as

15 million (UNOWA, 2007). Lagos is afflicted with heavy

corruption, making it one of the most difficult urban regions

within West Africa to implement and complete effective

development projects. Despite this, Lagos has been one of the

largest recipients of development projects in Western Africa, and

has been targeted for infrastructure improvement projects by both

the government of Nigeria, a multitude of multinational

development agencies, and NGOs. Lagos is also located on the

interface between the Christian and Muslim regions of Nigeria,

making it the urban area studied most commonly seeing resource

conflict magnified into wider ethno-religious conflicts.

Accra, Ghana was selected because it, like Lagos, is a large

coastal metropolis. Accra’s population stands at 3 million

officially, with an unofficial population as high as 6 million.

(UNOWA, 2007) While experiencing rapid population growth, its

growth is slower than that found in Lagos, allowing for a longer

timeframe for infrastructure improvement planning. Additionally,

much of the urbanization in Accra, while not mono-cultural, tends

to be from Christian parts of Ghana and the surrounding region,

limiting the propensity for religious conflict within Accra’s

slums. Accra also has much lower levels of corruption than Lagos

experiences, further easing project implementation. As a whole,

Accra has been selected as a case study in order to contrast it

with Lagos, in order to demonstrate the extent to which cultural

differences can result in radically different infrastructure

planning scenarios and ease implementation.

Important socio-political, cultural, religious, governance,

and environmental differences exist between the two cases

studies. These include the pervasive culture of corruption

within Nigeria (Packer, 2006). This is not to say that corruption

and graft are not present within Ghana, however, within the

Ghanaian context, corruption is far less commonly present or

accepted, whereas corruption has come to characterize both

Nigeria and aspects of the Nigerian identity. (IRIN, 2006;

Packer, 2006)

Another important difference is the extent of customary land

tenure systems in place. Accra possesses a much stronger system

of customary land tenure than Lagos does (Mends & De Meijere,

2006). As a result, this system of customary land tenure

represents another important cultural distinction that can have

large impacts upon tenure security both following and preceding

an infrastructure upgrade (Mends & De Meijere, 2006).

Thirdly, there exist great differences in local governance

structures between the two studied case studies. Lagos operates

a Local Government Area (LGA) system, by which each LGA area is

administered by a Local Government Council consisting of a

chairman who is the Chief Executive of the LGA, and other elected

members who are referred to as ‘Councilors’. These districts are

then subdivided into wards. While the government structure in

Nigeria remains highly centralized, these LGAs are responsible

for tax collection and numerous other important government

functions and make direct recommendations to the state

governments to which they are constituent. They are also the

primary bodies responsible for localized housing and zoning

regulation where it exists. In Accra, meanwhile, a 104 member

Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) manages the city. This AMA is

then sub-divided into sub-metropoli assemblies. While these

assemblies have some administrative function, they have far less

administrative authority than Lagos’ LGAs. However, in terms of

land tenure policy, Accra is far more reliant upon indigenous

tribal leaders to set and enforce housing and settlement

standards.

These important differences will be noted within the case

studies and will be taken into account when drawing what limited

generalities will be drawn within the conclusions section.

3.6 DETERMINANT FACTORS

This thesis will include three determinant factors in order

to draw wider generalizations based upon on the findings. These

three are the drawing of commonalities across the project

literature, an assessment of tenure impacts, and finally an

assessment based upon a theoretical planning framework.

Because this exploration will largely take the form of a

review of extant literature and a conceptualization of what

infrastructure approaches may be more widely generalizable, the

case study approach in general seems to be the best one to

achieve this goal. In selecting different types of urban

environments and different scenarios through which slum

infrastructure improvements have been attempted, one can search

for commonalities and determine what type of approaches to slum

infrastructure improvement may be more universally generalizable

for the West African region as a whole.

Secondly, I will examine how these infrastructure

improvements impact tenure for slum denizens in order to

determine whether the approach of waiting for tenure security

conditions to exist before implementing projects is a favorable

approach, or if projects should be implemented in conditions of

uncertain tenure under the notion that an infrastructure

improvement may improve tenure security for denizens who are the

principal beneficiaries of infrastructure improvements. I will

also draw conclusions on how well localized buy-in to

infrastructure projects through a cost-recovery mechanism impacts

tenure. From this, conclusions can be drawn regarding what

infrastructure improvement mechanisms can be extrapolated to both

provide necessary services and reduce resource conflict, but also

to improve security of tenure for slum denizens.

3.7 PROCESS OF ANALYSIS

This thesis is primarily reliant on secondary information in

the form of academic articles, books, and, where available,

project assessments (completed either by the implementing agency

or by an independent reviewing body) of completed projects.

Because of the nature of the topic being analyzed and the types

of literature available, analysis will be qualitative. This

qualitative analysis will utilize a theoretical planning

framework in order to assess each of the infrastructure planning

scenarios. This process will also enable me to draw

generalizations about the tenure security impacts associated with

each of the different infrastructure upgrade projects within the

selected case studies through the lens of this theoretical

planning framework.

The theoretical planning framework I plan to use is the

comparative SITAR that put forward by Barclay M. Hudson in his

1979 essay “Comparison of Current Planning Theories: Counterparts

and Contradictions” (Hudson 1979). The SITAR planning model is a

commonly used planning framework that encompasses the multitude

of planning paradigms from both top-down and bottom-up

perspectives. It is used in planning analysis within much

planning theory and represents a means of conceptualizing

planning that is also frequently used by planning practitioners

in analyzing planning approaches (Allmendinger, 2002; Healey,

2003; Healey, McDougal & Thomas, 1982). Thus, the approach is

both practical and theoretical (Healey, 2003; Irazábal, 2009).

Though the SITAR approach is widely used as a planning

approach in developed countries, this approach has thus far, not

been applied to a developing world setting. However, each of the

different planning paradigms included within the SITAR approach

are used within different planning and infrastructure projects

within the developing world. As a result, the SITAR approach is

something a natural fit as a means of analyzing disparate

planning and infrastructure improvement approaches and their

outcomes. As SITAR represents different theoretical planning

paradigms, it is limited by the assumptions that underpin it, and

that underpin each of the paradigms. However, because these

paradigms are based upon real world approaches to planning, and

SITAR is more a descriptive model than a prescriptive model, many

of these limitations are mitigated.

Further, the SITAR planning theory framework has been

selected because it includes the predominant paradigms through

which planning is conceptualized: synoptically, incrementally,

transactively, from an advocacy approach and from a radical

planning approach. These are defined as follows:

Synoptic: “Synoptic planning, or the rational comprehensive

approach, is the dominant tradition, and the point of departure

for most other planning approaches, which represent either

modifications of synoptic rationality or reactions against it

(Hudson, 1979, 388).”

Incremental: Incremental planning is "partisan mutual

adjustment" or "disjointed incrementalism. Much of incremental

planning notes that the shortcomings of the synoptic approach,

declaring them unrealistic. Incremental planning “stresses that

policy decisions are better understood, and better arrived at, in

terms of the push and tug of established institutions that are

adept at getting things done through decentralized bargaining

processes best suited to a free market and a democratic political

economy. (Hudson, 1979, 389)”

Transactive: “The transactive planning approach focuses on

the intact experience of people's lives revealing policy issues

to be addressed. Planning is not carried out with respect to an

anonymous target community of beneficiaries, but in face-to-face

contact with the people affected by decisions. Planning consists

less of field surveys and data analyses, and more of

interpersonal dialogue marked by a process of mutual learning.

Transactive planning also refers to the evolution of

decentralized planning institutions that help people take

increasing control over the social processes that govern their

welfare (Hudson, 1979, 389)”.

Advocacy: “The advocacy planning movement grew up in the

sixties rooted in adversary procedures modeled upon the legal

profession, and usually applied to defending the interests of

weak against strong-community groups, environmental causes, the

poor, and the disenfranchised against the established powers of

business and government (Hudson, 1979, 389-390).”

Radical: “Radical planning is an ambiguous tradition, with

two mainstreams of thinking that occasionally flow together. One

version is associated with spontaneous activism, guided by an

idealistic but pragmatic vision of self-reliance and mutual aid.

Like transactive planning, it stresses the importance of personal

growth, cooperative spirit, and freedom from manipulation by

anonymous forces. More than other planning approaches, however,

its point of departure consists of specific substantive ideas

about collective actions that can achieve concrete results in the

immediate future. It draws on varying sources of inspiration-

economics and the ecological ethic, social architecture,

humanistic philosophy, and historical precedents (Hudson, 1979,

390).”

The SITAR approach represents the analytical lens through

which I will examine the different on the upgrade projects

studied within the two case studies. This will be done from a

public interest, human dimension, feasibility, action potential,

substantive theory and self-reflective dimension.7 Thus, how

each of these projects addresses tenure security concerns for

affected populations within the context of slum infrastructure

upgrade projects within the two case studies will be assessed

through the descriptive characteristics associated with the SITAR

model.

7 These dimensions are defined subsequently in Table 5.

The process of analysis then involves:

(1) Review of literature,

(2) Application of the SITAR model as unit of analysis for

the literature.

(3) Summarizing of literature with generalizations

drawn, based on efficacy of the different SITAR approaches

as mechanisms for initiating infrastructure improvements

projects and their impacts on tenure for slum denizens.

As the unit of analysis, the SITAR model of planning

theories represents the various analytical frameworks through

which the various literatures represented within the two case

studies will be observed. Specifically, the five planning

frameworks presented in Table 4 below, which outlines the major

criteria and descriptive characteristics of the five planning

approaches incorporated in the SITAR model, will be applied to

the literature. This table is important because it summarizes

the criteria to be considered within the SITAR model that serves

as the unit of determination for this thesis. Table 5, also

below, defines the characteristics and application of the various

major criteria in Table 4.

3.7.1 SITAR MODEL OF PLANNING THEORIES

Table 4. SITAR Planning Table: (Source: Hudson, 1979, 392)

Major Criteria/Descriptive Characteristics

Synoptic Incremental

Transactive

Advocacy Radical

Public Interest O O O X XHuman Dimension

    X   O

Feasibility X X      Action Potential O O O O OSubstantive Theory

  O O   O

Self-Reflective     O O O 

CODE: X = Major strength or area of concernO = Partial or one-sided treatmentBlank = Characteristic weakness

Table 5. SITAR Criteria for describing and evaluating planning traditions, characteristics and applications: (Source: Hudson, 1979, 391)

Criteria Characteristics and ApplicationsPublic Interest Explicit theory of the public interest, along with

methods to articulate significant social problems and pluralist interests in outcomes. May include principles of distributive justice,and procedures for dealing with conflict.

Human Dimension Attention to the personal and spiritual domains of policy acts, including intangible outcomes beyond functional-instrumental objectives –for example, psycho-social development, enhancementof dignity and capacity for self-help. 

Feasibility Ease of leaning and applying the theory. Implies thetheory is practical to translate into policy implications, and adaptable to varying types ofproblems, scales of action and social settings.  

Action Potential Provision for carrying ideas into practice, building on experience underway and identifyingnew lines of effective solutions to problems.

Substantive Theory  Descriptive and normative theory of social problems and processes of social change. Predictive capacity based on informal judgments, not just trend extrapolation, ability to trace long range and indirect policy consequences; historical perspectives on opportunities and constraints on action.

Self-Reflective  Capacity for laying analytical assumptions open to criticism and counter-proposals provision for learning from those being plannedfor, capacity for depicting concrete experiencein everyday language, as well as conceptual models using aggregate data.

4. RESULTS

4.1 RESULTS (A) LAGOS, NIGERIA

Lagos, the former capital city of Nigeria, is a sprawling

and largely squalid megalopolis on the Atlantic. It is highly

populous and responsible for generating some 30% of Nigeria’s

total economic activity. (CIA World Factbook) It is one of the

largest cities in the world and, after Cairo, the largest in

Africa. Lagos is very much an urban growth machine. It is

existentially integral to the Nigerian national character and is

notorious for the largely unlivable conditions that afflict the

majority of its inhabitants. Geographically, Lagos lies in

southwestern Nigeria, in the Gulf of Guinea, just west of the

Niger River delta.

4.1.1 PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS

Lagos exists in a stretch of the West African coast that

receives high-rainfall for much of the year, causing swampy

lagoons, notably Lagos Lagoon, which exists as an extension of

greater Lagos. Lagos Lagoon contains several small Islands as

well as three major urban islands: Lagos Island, Ikoyi Island,

and Victoria Island. These islands are separated from the

mainland by the main channel draining the lagoon into the

Atlantic, which forms Lagos Harbor. The islands are separated

from each other by various waterways, but are connected to Lagos

Island by bridges. However the smaller sections of some creeks

have been built over or filled in so today in places there is

scarcely any water dividing Lagos Island and Ikoyi.

Lagos’ population was 1.4 million in 1963, reached 3.5

million in 1975. It is well over 17 million today (Gandy, 2006)

and is projected to top 24 million by 2020 (Agbola & Agunbiade,

2007). It is estimated that 606 people enter Lagos every

minute and growth post 1951 has been explosive (Agbola &

Agunbiade, 2007). The majority of migrants live within illegal

informal squatter settlements on Lagos’ mainland (Agbola &

Agunbiade, 2007).

Lagos is highly segregated in a fashion heavily enabled by

this “island” city structure, with the three islands operating

relatively independently of one another; and possessing

stridently different populations. Lagos Island, for example,

contains many of the largest markets, mosques and is typically

thought of as the business center of Lagos. Much of it, however,

specifically the Isale Eko area, contains one of the worst slums

in Lagos. The results are a well-planned part, highly functional

formal business area on Lagos Island while wooden floating slums

sit in the Lagoon - which is itself filled with black,

contaminated water. Ikoyi Island, meanwhile, contains much of

the administrative structure of Lagos and of Nigeria as a whole.

It is heavily populated by the middle and upper classes, the

majority of whom either work for the state or in the financial

district in Lagos Island. Finally Victoria Island boasts the

ruling elite of Lagos and remains the furthest separated from the

rest of the city. All three of these islands are highly

functional, highly gentrified and resemble potential equally

developed counterparts in Europe and North America.

Outside of the affluent (with the exception of the Isale Eko

area) Lagoon, things become dramatically different. The majority

of Lagos’ residents live on the mainland, which is connected to

the islands through a system of bridges. The mainland is almost

uniformly socioeconomically poor and largely consists of large

informal squatter settlements. Despite much of the wealth and

the bulk of the commercial and banking enterprises being based on

the Islands, the bulk of Nigeria’s industrial capability is

located in the mainland suburbs, most notably in the Ikeja

region.

In discussing informal squatter settlements within Lagos,

this paper focuses upon mainland Lagos, as well as poorer parts

of the Lagos lagoon area, most notably Isale Eko. “Slums” will

be determined and defined through looking at blighted areas

within Lagos that have large populations of squatters. Not all

slums within Lagos are informal squatter settlements, however

there exists a high correlation between the two.

Figure 1, below, shows the location of numerous blighted

areas within the Lagos Mega City Region. These blighted areas

represent the locations of slum and squatter settlements within

Lagos. This figure is included to provide a geographic reference

for slum settlement locations.

4.1.2 SLUM AND SQUATTER SETTLEMENT LOCATIONS

Figure 1. Slum and Squatter Settlement Locations in Lagos (Source: Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007, 7)

4.1.3 SOCIO/ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS IN LAGOS

While Lagos as a whole boasts a higher standard of living

than the rest of Nigeria, with far greater access to food, fresh

water, plumbing and technology, the living conditions in these

slums are some of the worst in the world, earning Lagos a

reputation as one of the least livable cities in the world

(Gandy, 2006) – rated the eighth least livable country in the

World by the popular periodical The Economist.8

The migration of the rural (now-urban) poor into Lagos

occurred in two phases; the first during the late 1960s and early

1970s, in the period preceding the Biafran war, in which the

booming Nigerian economy encouraged migration towards urban

centers (Taylor, 1993 [b]). The second Nigeria wave of migration

into Lagos has been fostered by ethnic violence, political

instability and the collapse of rural farming communities

throughout Nigeria; fostering wave after wave of migration of the

destitute rural poor into the slums (Akin Aina, 1990; Taylor,

1993 [a]; Taylor, 1993 [b]; Packer, 2006). This new wave of

immigrants generally arrive in financial ruins, with little more8 Liveability: Where the Grass is Greener. The Economist, August 22, 2007.

than the clothes on their back and find themselves immediately

locked into a struggle for their very survival (Akin Aina, 1990;

Taylor, 1993 [a]; Taylor, 1993 [b]; Packer, 2006; IRIN, 2006).

Most of these new arrivals lack formal education,

skills training, or capital that would allow them to

participate successfully in the formal economy (housed

largely within the offshore Lagoon region) and as a result

many in the slums manage to (irregularly) feed themselves

and otherwise survive through collecting and selling bits of

scrap metal and other trash scavenged from more affluent

areas (Akin Aina, 1990; Taylor, 1993 [b]; IRIN, 2006;

Packer, 2006). Anything of any material worth whatsoever

will be rapidly collected traded and otherwise exchanged the

informal economy that dominates the slums (Packer, 2006).

The two largest ethnic factions within Lagos are the

Christian Yourubas (from the South of Nigeria) and the

Muslim Hausas from the North of the country (Dennis, 1985;

Packer, 2006). Within the pressure cooker environment of

informal squatter settlements, resource conflict between

these two factions is often frequent. This is because many

slums are integrated between the two factions and petty

arguments over resources can incite armed roving gangs

(Packer, 2006).

There also exist ongoing problems with Lagos’ Ebo minority,

whom continue to be persecuted, especially by the Hausas after

the failed attempt to cede from the rest of Nigeria to form the

independent state of Biafra (Taylor, 1993 [b]; Maier, 2003;

Packer, 2006). With many Biafran politicians still at large and

calling for future attempts to exit Nigeria, these announcements

are often met with reprisals against the Ebo (Taylor, 1993 [b];

Maier, 2003).

4.1.4 ADMINISTRATIVE PLANNING CAPACITY

Much of what enables the wide variations in social services

and infrastructure across Lagos stems from the issue that Lagos

administratively is not a singular municipality and therefore

lacks any overall city administration. The Municipality of Lagos,

which covered Lagos Island, Ikoyi and Victoria Island; as well as

a narrow stretch of some of the mainland territory; was

traditionally managed by the Lagos City Council. This council

was disbanded in 1976 and divided into several Local Government

Areas (most notably Lagos Island LGA, Lagos Mainland LGA and Eti-

Osa LGA). The mainland beyond the Municipality of Lagos is

comprised of several separate towns and settlements, each with

their own administrative agencies (but few of whom have the

administrative teeth to actually do much in the way of governing

their respective regions).

The creation of these new municipal regions was Lagos’ way

of grappling with its population explosion during the 1970s oil

boom (the period in which oil was first discovered in the area of

Lagos, which spurred a massive wave of urbanization), a process

that has resumed with a second wave of influx of rural migration

to Lagos; and so the city now, as then is growing faster than it

can develop the administrative capacity to manage this rapid

urbanization. Lagos remains surprisingly economically and

socially functional in its more affluent and centrally planned

areas; the squalor of its generally non-administrated mega slums

aside. Much of the former Municipality of Lagos is now

contained in the federally designated Lagos State, which is

composed of 20 LGAs. Lagos State is responsible for utilities

including roads and transportation, power, water, health, and

education.

Metropolitan Lagos (a statistical division and not an

administrative unit) extends over 16 of the 20 LGAs of Lagos

State, and contains 88% of the population of Lagos State,

including several semi-rural areas. Most of the existing

infrastructure in mainland Lagos was built in the 1970s by a

Yugoslav engineering company as part of a scheme to woo Nigeria

towards the Eastern bloc (during the cold war). As a result,

much of the architecture in Lagos has the severe look of sorts of

soviet style; Le Corbusier inspired mega-projects, which are huge

concrete structures with severe architecture. These areas have

since become slums unto themselves and the buildings have been

locally retrofitted and converted so as to enable increased

density.

4.1.5 THE PATRONAGE SYSTEM IN LAGOS

Each of the disparate ethnic and religious groups within

Lagos retain some of their own regional autonomies; but this

power is increasingly subverted and re-centralized into the hands

of local government officials who pay lip service towards

representation of the various ethnic factions (Taylor, 1993 [a]).

Local politicians, bureaucrats and tribal chiefs then play

these autonomous ethnic factions off against each other,

stripping them of their authority and bringing them in-line with

the existing patronage system - insuring that they are only able

to operate by servicing the highly sophisticated system graft

under which the bureaucrats dominate. This method of breaking

down pre-existing ethnic autonomies continually reaffirms the

settlement patterns that dominate the slums (Akin Aina, 1990;

Packer, 2006). Bureaucrats are also frequently paid to look the

other way when conflicts arise, or have a vested financial

interest, as violence negatively affects tenure for many slums

residents, often strengthening the tenure position of those

bureaucrats who may also be serving as slum landlords (Akin Aina,

1990; Taylor, 1993 [a]).

This patronage system has been furthered by the success of

the oil industry, which has further entrenched the strength of

the bureaucrats through the influx of foreign capital and through

the need for foreign oil companies to work through many of these

bureaucrats for oil extraction rights around Lagos and to secure

a labor supply (Akin Aina, 1990; Taylor, 1993 [a]; IRIN, 2006;

Packer, 2006). This has increased the single party dominance of

national politics, and regional politics both within Nigeria as a

whole, and within Lagos specifically. Additionally,

electioneering funded in part by foreign oil cartels, which want

to see stability and thus ensure the same political partners has

further cemented these patronage systems (IRIN, 2006; Packer,

2006). As the UN office for the Coordination of Humanitarian

Affairs (IRIN) has noted:

Nigeria is one of the most corrupt countries in the world,

according to international NGO Transparency International.

Since independence in 1960, billions of dollars of Nigeria’s

oil revenue have been siphoned from state and government

coffers into Swiss bank accounts of the country’s rulers.

Nigeria’s rampant corruption and lack of enforced

regulations have enabled buildings to go up unchecked – only

30 percent of houses in the city have an approved building plan (IRIN, 2006,

12-13) (Author emphasis added).

The Zorion predatory government model operated by

Lagos' governmental bureaucrats is rooted in the ability of

these bureaucrats to not enforce regulation; or more

accurately, to selectively enforce regulation. This

corruption has, according to many, “seeped into the very

fabric of society” (Packer, 2006), meaning that patronage

has effectively become the de facto form of governance, and

for that matter, planning for the majority of Lagos.

Tellingly, the failure of traditional local elites such as

tribal chiefs, who, as mentioned earlier, hold pre-existing

autonomy and planning capability have had their power

diminished or have been assimilated, into the bureaucracy,

thus increasing the totality of the edicts of the system

under which this predatory government dominated.

Traditional tribal elites, who for many of the slum dwellers

had provided and insured social services and social justice prior

to the waves of immigration that brought many to Lagos, have also

been either negated or integrated into the unofficial system of

patronage.

The traditional instability of the central government in

Nigeria, which has been further affected by a series of coup

d'états and collapses of civil society as a whole, undermines

attempts at central planning within Lagos and strengthens

patronage. Post-independence, power has only passed peacefully

from one civilian government to another in the 2007 presidential

election - although the election has been highly criticized by

international observers and was likely rigged. (Herskovitz, 2007)

This newfound stability at the top has gone to further increase

the power of existing elites. Even in cases in which changes

have occurred at regional government levels, many of the

bureaucratic elites have managed to, in chameleon-like fashion,

shift economic and political allegiances and thus insure they

retain their positions (Herskovitz, 2007).

The embededness of these officials has enabled them to claim

to speak for the entirety of their constituencies without

actually serving them. The reality has been that they have

served the interest in failing to enforce regulation for those

that have been able to afford to pay them, while what enforcement

that has occurred of things like building regulations has

occurred in cases in which these elites have wanted to make a

point as to the consequences of failing to grease the correct

wheels within the patronage system (Packer, 2006).

The bulk of planning within Lagos stems from matters of

economic necessity rather than the desire to improve social

conditions and make the city more livable (Taylor, 1993 [a]).

Those in most need of planning for their communities are too

focused on their survival and too indebted to corrupt local

authorities to be able to actively advocate for themselves.

Infrastructure, when maintained or expanded, is done so only in

areas in which it serves the underlying economic interest, and in

which authorities must be paid off in order for them to allocate

municipal resources (Egunjobi, 1993). This is true of the

suburban train lines, which have not seen maintenance for the

better part of the last two decades and as a result are no longer

used except occasionally when people erect homes on top of them

(Egunjobi, 1993).

4.1.6 STATUS OF PLANNING IN LAGOS

Despite several large-scale planning projects outside of the

Lagoon region - many the brainchildren of Nigeria’s numerous

dictatorial regimes as methods of personal self-aggrandizement

(Packer; 2006) - the bulk of Lagos’ mainland population live

within unplanned mega-sized slums (Taylor, 1993 [a]; IRIN, 2006;

Packer, 2006). These mega slums are sprawling, unspeakably

squalid areas located some distance from the administrative core

of the city. The slums are filled with semi-permanent tin and

cardboard shacks of semi-legal9 standing. Most have been

unofficially ‘permitted’ through a system of patronage and

bribery operated by corrupt bureaucrats imbedded within the

various government agencies and districts that govern Lagos.

There exists limited road infrastructure to most of these slums,

and no sewage or water treatment systems serve these slums.

Lagos’ slums and/or informal squatter settlements generally

lack formalized central planning, resulting in severe congestion

and extreme population density within them (Taylor, 1993 [a];

Braimah, 1993; Adenji, 1993). Formal planning is defined as: the

act of formulating a course of action(s) to be taken by a state

or regional actor(s) in order to determine settlement patterns

9 These settlements are without official legal recognition or building plans, however they have been unofficially permitted through bribery or a failure to enforce regulation.

for and to extend social services to the inhabitants of the

region being planned for. (Hudson, 1979) The underlying aim

behind this planning, in the case of public sector planning, is

that of the ‘public good’ (Hudson, 1979).

Lagos sees an aberration of this system where those that are

in a position to institute public planning policy for the

inhabitants of Lagos' slums are more concerned with personal

enrichment than working for the public good (Taylor, 1993 [a];

IRIN, 2006; Packer, 2006). Tin shacks only go up after the

appropriate officials have been paid, not for a permit, but

simply to look the other way –thus preventing what existing civil

infrastructure from functioning properly (IRIN, 2006; Packer,

2006). Many times, it is the officials themselves that finance

the construction of these tin shacks or collect rent from them.

These shacks are often built on top of existing roads and train

tracks (because they are on stable ground) often preventing train

and road access to certain parts of the city (Packer, 2006).

Because of their inherently “non-legal” status,

squatter settlements have services and infrastructure below

the adequate minimum levels (Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007).

Most households within squatter settlements lack access to

water supplies, markets, health centers, roads, drainage or

electricity (Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007). As a result of

these sites being illegal, despite the political embededness

of landlords who actually own the housing units, the Lagos

government and LGAs are largely unwilling to plan

construction services or infrastructure systems within the

squatter settlements (Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007). As a

result, most infrastructural improvement is locally

initiated and funded by squatters, or more frequently,

initiated and funded by external aid agencies, such as the

United Nations, World Bank or others (Agbola & Agunbiade,

2007; Packer, 2006).

4.1.7 TENURE CONDITIONS FOR SQUATTERS

The extant land tenure system within Lagos is highly

complex, and is generally designated by civil as well as tribal

authorities (Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007). Efficient functioning

land systems generally need land registration systems that

clearly designate ownership and development rights. This however

is not the case in Lagos, with no documentary evidence whatsoever

for up to 90 percent of parcels within the Lagos area (Akin Aina,

1990; Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007). Of those parcels for which

documentary evidence does exist, it is frequently fraudulent

(Akin Aina, 1990; Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007). As a result, within

the context of Lagos, most occupied lands can be said to have no

formal owners whatsoever (Akin Aina, 1990; Agbola & Agunbiade,

2007).

Within many squatter settlements within Lagos, a single

large ‘landowner’, often a single family owns the majority of the

housing units within a slum and serves as the landlord for almost

all of the settlement’s denizens (Akin Aina, 1990; Agbola &

Agunbiade, 2007). This gives these landlords a great deal of

power is determining tenure conditions within the settlements.

It is also a system that favors the position of the landlord

beyond that of the squatters. From a legal perspective, tenants

require a certificate of occupancy issues by the administrating

LGA in order to insure legal tenure within an area (Agbola &

Agunbiade, 2007). However, squatters are infrequently formally

recognized, and these certificated often must be paid for, as

they are, in practice, rarely given without paying bribes to the

officials responsible (Packer, 2006; IRIN, 2006; Agbola &

Agunbiade, 2007). Thus, even in cases where squatters have legal

ownership right to land, obtaining formal title is expensive and

laborious and as a result, many will not obtain necessary legal

documents, or will obtain lesser-priced forgeries of documents

(Akin Aina, 1990; Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007). Lagos lacks a

strong customary land title system, further placing tenure

security determination in the hands of slum or squatter

settlement landlords (Packer, 2006; Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007).

Many squatters may also attempt to inhabit land without the

consent of other squatter “landowners” (Akin Aina, 1990; Agbola &

Agunbiade, 2007). This often results in the activation of

policing systems by landlords, often using other residents of the

slum to threaten, or inflict violence upon those unless they are

willing to pay rents or decide to relocate (Packer, 2006; IRIN,

2006; Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007). Additionally, this policing

mechanism often involves appeals to existent tribal or religious

affinities, and may at times get out of control of the hands of

landlords using them, as inter-ethnic or religiously fueled

violence, or threats thereof, may result in wider tenure

insecurity for residents across the settlement as a whole (Akin

Aina, 1990; Packer, 2006; IRIN, 2006; Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007).

4.1.8 PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

Infrastructure project implementation within Lagos is highly

difficult. Lagos is undergoing what has been characterized as an

infrastructure crisis (Gandy, 2006), but despite this, Lagos’

central government remains largely unwilling to address many of

the infrastructure shortcomings (Maier, 2005). The scale of this

task in addressing Lagos’ infrastructure shortcomings remains

immense (Gandy, 2006). Indeed, the public realm concept of

project implementation is rendered nearly impossible in the

context of immense social inequalities, ethnic tensions and on-

going political instability affecting the capacity of the state

to intervene on behalf of the city as a whole (Gandy, 2006).

Many of the infrastructure upgrade projects being

implemented currently in Lagos are public/private-combined

projects that are largely led by external development agencies

(Gandy, 2006). The ability of these projects to respond to local

needs within many of Lagos’ slums has much to do with both the

need to work under the auspices of the government structure

within Lagos (Maier, 2005) and project cost limitations that

limit post project assessment (Gandy, 2006; Oguine, 2006). As a

result, both project implementation and assessment are often

based upon models that limit the efficacy of an infrastructure

project (Oguine, 2006).

Agency program planning that has tended towards small scale

improvement, especially in addressing singular infrastructure

issues has only really been successful in cases in which the

implementing or financing agency has both cultivated local buy-in

to projects, but has also provided long-term technical staff

oversight (Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007). This process is expensive

and tends to preclude many projects (Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007).

Additionally, the use of localized labor supplies for project

ends has also been useful for project completion (Grandy, 2006;

Oguine, 2006; Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007).

Long-term project assessments on Lagos remain rare and

the results of them are often not widely shared, thus

limiting the degree to which wider project implementation

learning can occur (Maeir, 2005; Grandy, 2006; Agbola &

Agunbiade, 2007). This means that what is known about

effective project implementation within Lagos is sparse,

however, those projects that have worked appear to have

worked because of a willingness of landlords or other

patronage authorities to support the planning process

(Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007). There is some evidence,

however, that slum upgrade will likely, as a result of a

lack of external means of assuring land tenure security to

slum dwellers, create an opportunity for slum landlords to

increase rents, thus threatening the tenure security of slum

denizens (Maeir, 2005, Packer, 2006).

This tends to see more projects implemented that may

have negative tenure implications for slum denizens (Packer,

2006). A lack of information as to what projects have been

effective in improving tenure for slum denizens in Lagos is

a serious limitation of the existing literature on

redevelopment in Lagos. However, it follows that in

implementing improvements, there are some important trade-

offs and limitations that much be negotiated as a result of

the patronage system within Lagos.

4.1.9 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Attempts by aid agencies to implement infrastructure

improvement projects within Lagos can be assessed through a

theoretical planning framework. The theoretical planning

framework advanced by Barclay M. Hudson, in his 1979

article, “Comparison of Current Planning Theories:

Counterparts and Contradictions”, provides an analytical

framework through which project planning in Lagos can be

assessed.

Slums in Lagos are created through a process of

bureaucratic decision-making and a complex system of graft.

As a whole, foresight and impact assessment are not part of

the process, but this does not mean that the slums of Lagos

are entirely unplanned. It is more accurate to say that

what planning does occur is informal, person-to-person

arrangements in which many existing geographical and

infrastructure are ignored or implemented after the fact,

rather than during the settlement process. Decisions as to

where, for example, people will dump their sewage, which

sits in raw, unprocessed cesspools within the slums, are

made almost unconsciously, and are responsive to a strong

person-to-person social learning component; as those caught,

say defecating on someone else's tin shack will likely face

violent reprisal.

Formalized planning in Lagos occurs largely within the

affluent Lagoon region and principally through a highly

centralized top down administrative approach. This style of

planning has been functional within those regions of Lagos

where it has been implemented. Large scale projects that

have been implemented to help the poor within Lagos have

largely been the result of desire on the part of the central

government of Nigeria as a whole to court western aid

moneys.

These projects tend to be conceptualized centrally, and

they tend to result in civil infrastructure projects being

commenced; however the actual implementation of these large-

scale projects tends to fall to the local government

bureaucrats, who are well positioned within the patronage

system. This results in frequently uncompleted projects and

the resources for completion slowly pocketed through graft.

On the other hand, the majority of planning that does occur

is informal, a sort of de facto planning whereby settlement

patterns are determined by the decisions of local elites to

simply agree to look the other way. This is then planning

by bureaucratic fiat, or more accurately, simple enablement

of the anarchical planning arrangements already at work in

the mega slums.

Again, social mobilization and social learning have not

been able to occur in Lagos due to the unwillingness of the

formal planning system to even acknowledge the existence of

the problem, let alone the individuals involved.

Additionally, because the individuals involved are not

advocated for, and more radical attempts at self-advocacy

are frequently thwarted, squatters are left completely at

the mercy of the patronage system. Squatters simply hope to

be ignored and thus allowed to survive in relative peace, as

further attention of either the slum landlords or of Lagos’

formal planning agencies - which would likely come in the

form of an attempt to enforce housing codes or a synoptic

redevelopment project based on slum demolition - is likely

to lead to their displacement. This in the end negates the

effectiveness of any genuine radical planning process.

People are quite simply too poor, and rendered too dependent

upon the stability of the status quo for their very

survival. This is hardly an ideal system, but to protest

the system would likely mean simply not eating. To

challenge the patronage model from the bottom up is in

effect to sign one’s death warrant, while the illegality of

the system as a whole prevents any top down policy analysis

or social reform.

Despite this, the various planning approaches associated

with Hudsons’s SITAR planning model have been attempted at

different points in attempting to improve slum infrastructure

within Lagos.

The synoptic planning approach has thus far failed in Lagos.

This top down model of project planning and implementation is

very much a product of old planning paradigms of the 1960s, 70s

and early 80s that resulted in slum demolition, rather than slum

improvement. This process has been poor in serving a public

interest or in realizing a human dimension as a result of two

factors. First, slum demolition without construction of new

units tends to simply displace slum residents and result in them

squatting elsewhere, thus simply moving them to another part of

the city rather than solving the problems of them. Additionally,

the top-down synoptic approach is far more open to manipulation

by Lagos’ patronage system than smaller, more directed

infrastructure improvement projects. This often results in

project completion failure and a lack of localized ownership of

project outcomes. Additionally, the tendency towards demolition

and large-scale redevelopment threatens tenure security for

denizens. While the action potential (or ability to initiate

projects) of this approach remains relatively high, the practical

ability to achieve desired outcomes remains highly limited within

the context of Lagos.

Incremental planning in Lagos is also problematic, in

that is largely requires a top down approach. Thus as a

result, though the process is slowed, many of the same

problems persist as with the synoptic approach. On the

other hand, the incremental approach appears, by nature to

be sensible in addressing problems with the scope and

complexity of slums within Lagos. This is because the scale

of many of the infrastructure shortcomings within Lagos’

slums is immense, and providing basic infrastructure across

one category at a time can be of use in incrementally

improving slum infrastructure. Thus, a bottom up approach

to incremental, in which projects are built upon one

another, seems sensible. However, due to a lack of

continuity within both slum population and demographics,

this approach may also prove problematic.

An alternative to incremental planning is a more transactive

or collaborative planning approach. Collaborative planning has

the advantage of a “people centered” approach, as any changes

made to plan the mega-slums requires highly specialized and

selective local knowledge rather than via use of science-derived

planning methods. The problem with this approach in the context

of Lagos is that there exists no single majority demographic to

be responsive to. Local knowledge then descends into a quagmire

of instability. The underpinning patronage system and slum

landlords within Lagos further propagate much of this ethnic and

religious instability in order to prevent collective action that

may require them to reduce rents or provide further services.

Thus, incremental and collaborative planning hold high action

potential and act to serve public interest, and may be effective

as a mechanism for pushing infrastructure improvements, but it

appears to do little for slum resident tenure security, as such a

process tends to be open to derailment by slum landlords.

The extent of advocacy planning is highly limited

within Lagos. Agencies are hard pressed to directly

advocate for slum dwellers as often, they are there

illegally, and unlike in, for example Ghana, with its strong

customary land rights, there is little avenue for recourse.

Additionally, many project attempts to improve matters and

actually implement some formal planning regulation within

the slums on the part of radical planners are likely to

result in project failure due to landlord opposition.

Again, as a result of the semi-legal status of the housing

developments of many of the residents being planned for, few

are willing to stand up to elites who can easily have their

tin sheds demolished and relocated. With the borderline

survival faced by many of these slum residents, they cannot

afford to rebuild and thus will be forced to live on the

streets. Thus, trying to push an infrastructure project

that a landlord opposes can further endanger tenure for slum

denizens.

Additionally, the disunity within the populations of

these slums means that individual empowerments can easily

have the legs cut from under them by appealing to ethno-

religious divisions. The advocacy-planning notion of “a

thousand tiny empowerments” as championed by Leonie

Sandercock may work in regions or communities that have

relatively homogenous, populations. But in Lagos, where

ethnic communities have been continually pitted against each

other and as factions fight it out tend to dissolve into

street fights between machete armed gangs (Packer, 2006;

UNOWA, 2007), often armed by local elites, any sense of

community empowerment is likely thrown to the wind.

The notion of drawing together these theories seems somehow

quaint in light of the realities of the crushing poverty of

Lagos' slums. The goals behind many of the models outlined is

entirely appropriate, however, the intellectual planning frame-

work that goes along with many of these models seems to be

heavily rooted in developed world planning. A greater sense of

social justice is far more easily achievable in developed

countries because the sorts of patronage systems found there (of

which the models discussed by Healey et al. can be said to be

implementable) are nowhere near as a pervasive as those patronage

systems that dominate the developing world (Shepherd, 2003; Khan,

2006).

Advocacy planning is hindered in Lagos by its legalist

standpoint. The ability of legal repost on the part of the slum

inhabitants is rendered utterly nil by the lack of legal

recognition for these people. There remains no venue for legal

repost when one is settled illegally within a slum. A political

economy approach seems the closest to reality with its focus on

pragmatism and its acknowledgment of the entrenchment of a

societal system that is detrimental to people as a whole. The

problem with this model is that it is explicitly defeatist. It

is effectively the status quo, in which strong market actors in

the form of patronage system that "determine policy" for the

slums will simply continue to dominate. The market system is

such that there is no ability for social mobility as the majority

of the inhabitants of any given slum within Lagos are focused on

borderline survival. The market then, despite how pragmatically

it is approached has failed Lagos' inhabitants. Planning must

occur at some point. It is this methodology of acting first,

without knowledge and along purely economic grounds that has

allowed for the ascendancy of the patronage system in the first

place. Planning policy change within Lagos requires dramatic

system re-calibration.

Finally, the radical or equity planning approach seems

to have a great deal of long term potential for Lagos. But

in order for it to be successful, it, like the legalist

perspective, must first address the lack of political and

legal representation for the slums dwellers. It also

implies that equity planning can take place through the

action of enlightened bureaucrats operating within the

system. This approach seems a little naive when applied to

Lagos. Bureaucrats get into the position to be able to make

policy decisions only through effective manipulation of the

patronage system in order to achieve their ends, which is in

effect abusive. Thus, one must first enter into the system

of bribery and graft in order to advocate for the slum

dwellers, but at the same time, operation within the

patronage system is universally corrupting - which has been

seen across the board in Nigerian politics. This approach

however, is one I will return to later as, it seems to

contain a kernel of usefulness because while bureaucrats are

unlikely to ever clean up their acts and be depended on to

advocate for the slum dwellers; they can, perhaps, be

coerced into enabling more planning practices if these

practices can be demonstrated to be in their material

interest.

The SITAR method was applied to infrastructure planning

considerations in Lagos. Table 6 below is a summary table

of the SITAR planning theory matrix as applied to the

articles reviewed on the topic of slum upgrade in Lagos.

The article is analyzed through the lens of each of the five

planning approaches: synoptic, incremental, transactive,

advocacy and radical. Also included is a column that

summarizes additional pertinent article content.

4.1.10 SITAR TABLE: LAGOS

Table 6. SITAR Planning Table As Applied To Lagos:

Descriptive Characteristics/ Article

Synoptic Incremental Transactive Advocacy Radical Summary ofArticleContent

Abiodun, 1983 Synoptic planning for housing for the urban poor has resulted in poorhousing scenarios, poor infrastructure scenarios and has advanced further environmental degradation in the wider Lagosian region.

Incremental project implementation rarely occurs, except on paper. Incremental planning shouldoccur with greater frequency in order to insurethat the planning process can be responsive to changing environmental considerations.

There is littlenegotiation within the planning process. Instead, decisions are usually made synoptically without consultation from other interested parties. This has only resulted in intensifying environmental devastation.

Attempts at advocacy planning have failed. Environmental considerations in developing housing for theurban poor should be considered to prevent environmental degradation, however these considerations rarely play into the decision makingprocess.

Radical planning does not occur in housing constriction orin addressing environmental policy. Directadvocacy on thepart of urban poor populations forlow cost housing and infrastructure improvement projects.

Housing and infrastructure construction mayresult in environmental degradation, especially if appropriation ofthese services remains unplanned. Planning strategies need to be implemented to allow for creation of housing + infrastructure for the urban poor in such a way that mitigate environmental degradation.

Table 6. SITAR Planning Table As Applied To Lagos (cont’d)

Adelekan, 2009

The approach to dealing with environmental change has been largely synoptic, however this strategy has produced little in the way of meaningful policies or cohesive environmental goals.

An incremental approach to environmental planning and infrastructure could likely bemore realistic than a synopticapproach, however, the approach shouldinclude both top-down and bottom-up derived planning and implementation.

Effective communication between affected and interested parties is important. This thus far, has not largelyoccurred; however there has been limited negotiation between external agencies and the Lagosian government.

Advocacy planning for affected squatter communities is crucial. This planning most frequently happens when external agencies advocate for affected squatters, however, results have been mixed in terms of project

Radical planning to insure better resource management on behalf of squatters and other urban poor may be helpful, however radicalplanning may help reinforce ethnic and religious factionalism, which can result in further

Slum dwellers and squatters who lack infrastructure are the most vulnerable to climate shift and resource conflict. This vulnerability iscompounded by a lack of a cohesive planning strategy throughwhich they can achieve services. Environmental

outcomes. resource competition problems.

concerns may also further adversely affecttenure security.

Agbola &Agunbiade,

2007

Planning strategies within Nigeria have historically been largely synoptic. Planning, however, largelydoes not occur at all at this point.

While some development occurs in phases, incremental planning, when it occurs has largely been too much time between increments, largely resulting in projects being appropriated for other uses.

Transactive planning has thus far not occurred. However due to the limitationson planning placed through both the failure of the central government to plan, and the patronage/ informal land management system that exists, negotiation between interested parties must occur.

Agencies generally attempt to advocate on thebehalf of squatters, however, squatting oftenoccurs without consent of landowners making this advocacy largely ineffective. Tenure insecurity on the part of squatters limits the degree to whichthey can be advocated for.

Radical planning does not occur as much project implementation within the Lagosian context is top-down, rather than bottom-up.The urban poor are largely disempowered toadvocate for themselves or push for planning outcomes that will benefit them.

Especially in terms of providing services for theurban poor, planning largelydoes not occur within Lagos. This process needs to shift in order to address the problems of rapid urban population growth and environmental problems associated therewith. Some formof transactive or advocacy planning needs to occur.

Table 6. SITAR Planning Table As Applied To Lagos (cont’d)

Agdeboye,2003

The Lagos masterplan is highly synoptic. However, it features little enabling power, no enforcement capability and fails to addressnecessary projects + realities. The most recent draft of the plan remains the2000 plan.

Plan is out of date and non-incremental. It includes stages for project development, but no process for feedback and is based ongoals that are unrealistic andunachievable.

No negotiation takes place. The Master Planfails to acknowledge realities or provide mechanism for community inputs. It exists merely to satisfy the constitutional requirement fora plan but is unrealistic especially vis-à-vis squattersand/or slum dwellers, whilenot saying anything that could be objectionable to local elites, who, through patronage, makede facto planning decisions.

Advocacy planning in theform of external funding + for projects needs to occur as theMaster Plan itself fails toactually provide an executable plan, due to itbeing badly outof date, non responsive to actual conditions and lacking any mechanism for community input.

Radical planning mechanisms may be possible within the context of Lagos as the Master Plan fails to actually plan for Lagos. Instead, community initiated projects could conceivably hold precedence.

The Lagos masterplan remains heavily outdated. It fails to respondto current realities and needs, especially regarding the infrastructure crisis and squatters. The planning processfails to incorporate community inputsand instead simply pays lip service to widereconomic development w/o respect to actual conditions on the ground. Theplan also lacks a revision process, timeline for implementation, etc.

Table 6. SITAR Planning Table As Applied To Lagos (cont’d)

Akin Aina,1990

Synoptic planning does not occur. Decisions are not made from a top-down perspective, butrather are decided by individual pettylandlords frequently at the expense of tenants. Synoptic planning that does occur has

Incremental planning largely does not occur. Thetime-frame on many incremental style projects requires consistency andrational decision making, while slum landlords frequently makeimpulsive decisions, many

Transactive planning does not occur. Slum landlords make decisions rapidly and frequently without consulting other stakeholders. Decisions are enforced through patronage arrangements. This scenario

Attempts at advocacy planning have not been very effective. Attempts to advocate for slum dwellers have not been headed by slum dwellers and attempts at advocacy planning may result in negative consequences

Radical planning occurswhen landlords make spur of the moment decisions that have repercussions for squatters. This is, in effect, top-down radical planning by petty landlords. Squatters may occasionally

Petty landlords frequently dominate tenure and living situations for urban poor populations. They are likely to prevent extension of services for most squatters and this frequently results in inconsistent planning

failed to yield housing or infrastructure services for slum denizens.

of which have precious littlefollow through in the decisionmaking process.

fails to benefit slum denizens, who frequently mustdeal with the results.

for slum denizens in reprisal.

pool resources,etc, to attain services (also engaging in a form of radicalplanning).

scenarios and de facto regulation, often to the detriment of squatters.

Grandy, 2006 Synoptic planning occurs in name, and hasoccurred historically in the form of large-scale housing and infrastructure projects, often with poor results. Currently, thereis no planning process that is ongoing.

While historical project design has been synoptic, for those projects that have been completed, the process is often far more incremental as lack of completion seescertain elements of projects given over to alternative uses.

Transactive planning does not occur. Theplanning approaches utilized reflect mechanisms for personal enrichment by slum landlords and do not reflect inputs for slum dwellers. Thisis part of a wider anti-planning mechanism at work in Lagos, in which mechanisms for community inputs are closed.

Lack of means of or interest on the part of those ‘planning’ to garner public input for planning process. Some projects may beinitiated and advocated for by external agencies but they are rarelycompleted.

Radical planning does not occur, but decisions are made by bureaucrats andslum landlords as well as by squatters. Projects may beinitiated locally from slums but theseprojects are rarely completed and can compromise squatter tenure.

Lagos is prone to anti-planningactions, which promote squatting, and rule by patronage. Pooroutcomes are achieved throughthis anti-planning approach. The urban poor and/or squattersare frequently the most likely to suffer from this ‘anti-planning’ approach. This anti-planning approach has created an infrastructure crisis that willincreasingly negatively

impact the urbanpoor.

Table 6. SITAR Planning Table As Applied To Lagos (cont’d)

Maier, 2003 Typical project structure and planning processhas been synoptic. This has served more affluent interests but has had negativeconsequences forthe urban poor. This has also promoted regionalism, ethno-religious division and reinforced corruption.

Due to rapid population expansion, incremental planning seems to be an important mechanism, allowing for systemic feedback and variations in strategy with changing reality. In reality, low project completion rates generallymean that this does not happen, and synoptic macro projects are generally favored as a result by the Lagosian governance

Planning process has generally been dominated by external agencies and, particularly the patronage system. As a result, it has been responsiveto the wants ofthose parties, but rarely of those who have to bear the results of the planning process. Minimal communication between communities planned for andplanners.

Advocacy planning largely initiated on behalf of external organizations on behalf of particular communities. This process can be effective depending upon the scale of projects and the ability to incorporate localized powerstructures, butco-opting one patronage mechanism may cause problems with other patronage mechanisms.

Radical planning does not occur as there is minimal mechanism for community inputs and squatter communities that attempt toadvocate for them are frequently suppressed by the governance structure within Lagos.

Zorian predatorygovernance structure makes project planningcoordination andcompletion very difficult. Urban poor generally sufferas a result of patronage system. Projectimplementation should reflect realities of this patronage system, but without divisionof state into smaller, better-managed administrative regions, this isunlikely to occur.

structure.

Obudho &Mhlanga,

1988

Synoptic planning has failed to createenvironmental and infrastructure outcomes that benefit squatters. Alternative planning strategies are needed.

Incremental planning has also failed to create the necessary planning outcomes that will benefit squatters. This is largelydue to the longtime frames between projectinitiation and further increments, anda failure to follow up beyond the initial phase of most projects.

Transactive planning is a necessary planning strategy. There are numerous interested parties in the case of any attempt at slumupgrade; however, most of the interested stakeholders are not broughtto the table within the current planning paradigms.

Advocacy planning may occur in cases in which agencies advocate for squatters, however there is very little advocacy for squatters on the part of theLagosian government.

Radical planning does not occur. As squatters lack tenure security, they are largely unable to advocate for themselves and for project outcomes. Tenure considerations must be addressed if radical planning is to occur.

Traditional planning strategies for slum upgrade in Lagos have not been very effective. Instead of a top-down synoptic or incremental process, a transactive or advocacy planning processis likely to yield better planning outcomes for squatters and slum dwellers.

Table 6. SITAR Planning Table As Applied To Lagos (cont’d)

Oloyede,Ajibola, & Oni,

2007

In terms of landdelivery system,synoptic land management exists on paper but rarely actually takes

Incremental planning for land delivery does not exist.Land is generally designated

Negotiations for land delivery generally occurbetween the government, interested

Advocacy planning for land managementexits only in cases in which external agencies can

Minimal radicalplanning in land designation forsquatters and/or slum dwellers.

Land delivery systems are largely managed informally. A complex, illegaland informal system,

place in practice.

formally for one use, but informally usedfor a differentuse. Lack of enforcement mechanisms prevent incremental shift in land-use.

patronage parties, external agencies and tosome extent squatters. This introducessome mechanism of transactive planning, however the conversation israrely balanced. However, this results in a process throughwhich land is eventually managed or used, especially in squatter settlements.

directly acquire parcelsof land permanently foruse. However, as squatters and slum landlords are generally usingsaid land illegally, or against its designated use,without co-option of the informal, land management system.

Direct advocacyand/or ability to get projectsunderway generally requires money + influence upon the system, both ofwhich squatterslack.

involving patronage, current use, etcis in place thatresults in how land is managed within Lagos.

Packer, 2006 Synoptic planning may occur in name, however projectsare rarely initiated or completed as funding for projects is

While historical project design has been synoptic, for those projects that have been completed, the process is

Transactive planning does not occur. Theplanning approaches utilized reflect mechanisms for personal

Advocacy planning takes the form of bribery. Moneys put forward for projects by external agencies rarely

Radical planning cannotoccur due to the degree of patronage. Bottom-up project initiated by squatters

Planning cannot occur as a result of the patronage systemin place. It isimpossible to effectively advocate for squatters, and

often stolen prior to projectinitiation or completion.

often far more incremental as lack of completion seescertain elements of projects given over to alternative uses.

enrichment by slum landlords and do not reflect inputs for slum dwellers. Patronage decided panningpolicies.

achieve desiredresults. Influence + capacity is purchased through patronage.

unlikely to succeed or evenmake it beyond the planning stages.

they remain beholden to slumlandlords and others who play ethnic factions off against eachother, generallyresulting in violence.

Table 6. SITAR Planning Table As Applied To Lagos (cont’d)

Smith, 1999 Synoptic planning strategies focusing on rural improvement (thus mitigatingurban migration)have thus far failed.

Incremental planning has far too long a time frame for varying phases to be effectivein preventing rapid rural-urban migration, and thus in preventing urban conflict in resource competition.

Transactive planning is likely an effective approach for procuring infrastructure and basic services and thus reducing conflict. However, it is difficult to get all of the affected and interested parties to the table.

Advocacy for those migratingis necessary, however, this advocacy cannotcome at the expense of other ethnic orreligious factions, (which it may be construed as,) further causing conflict.

Bottom-up radical planning does not seem to result in planning at allin Lagos, rather it instead enablesongoing violence between varyingethnic and religious factions.

Internal migration withinNigeria, especially into the Lagos regionresults in ethnic and religious violence. Much of this violencecould be mitigated by improved planning strategies that reduce resource competition. The patronage system is highly

involved in encouraging these conflicts as well as a means of preventing empowerment of squatters and other urban poor.

Taylor, 1993 Historically, planning in Lagos has been synoptic. This has resulted in mixed results. While several large-scale housing projectswere constructedearly for the urban poor, veryfew of these projects have been completed. This has been true of infrastructure projects too.

Incremental planning, usually due to project incompletion and components of half built projects being appropriated for alternativeuse. Attempts at clean scrapedemolition haverarely been followed up with alternatives for slum denizens, resulting in eventual recreation of same slums.

Transactive planning does not occur except in casesof negotiation between government and implementing foreign agencies. Foreign agencies rarelycan affect project outcomes, despite stipulations places.

Advocacy planning rarelyoccurs, except in cases where external agencies targetparticular communities viasmaller scale projects. These projects also often havelow completion rates without follow-up.

Radical planning does not occur within the Lagosian planning context. Squatters have very little influence over infrastructure improvement projects and these projects,if completed frequently do no serve squatters due to squatter displacement asa result of poor tenure security for

The synoptic approach has traditionally dominated planning within Lagos. Project completion remains mixed. More incrementalplanning strategies focusing on smaller, more easily completedprojects recommended as well as interagency/governmental coordination + cooperation.

squatters.

4.1.11 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LAGOS

For infrastructure construction and maintenance, a more

synoptic approach to planning on the part of the LGAs or the

central Nigerian government is in order. This seems to be the

only way to subvert the permanence the patronage system, which

has too much invested in allowing for change and thus has created

a system of formal planning stagnation. The problems of poverty

in Lagos are obscene, however the response to this sort of

poverty in developed countries is increasingly becoming

unrealistic. To paint habitation in these slums as in any way

“dynamic mechanisms for economic development and profit making”

or “aspirational shantytowns”, as has been advanced by Stewart

Brand (Brand, 2006), the founder of the Whole Earth Catalog, is

to misunderstand the true implications of this poverty of

patronage system within Lagos.

Furthermore, there is a need for a centralized push to

legalize the slums, perhaps in the form of some sort of blanket

permit to their residents issued by the either the LGAs or by the

central Nigerian government. Doing so would cut the power of

local bureaucratic elites from continuing to control the

situation through use of the patronage system. Such an idea

would effectively limit the power of local corrupt bureaucrats.

However, imposing limitations on bureaucrats through the LGAs is

highly unlikely as the LGAs are often directly or indirectly

controlled by slum landlords who economically benefit from the

system. This sort of top-down legislation is a pre-requirement

for any other model of planning to be implemented. The necessity

for legal identification and validation of those living within

the slums is the first in, as Hudson would have it, an

incremental planning process.

While these bureaucrats cannot be said to specifically write

the laws themselves, the means by which these bureaucrats decide,

on the spot how and to whom these laws will be made to apply is

in many ways a form of legislation. A singular, synoptic piece

of legislation must come first in order to allow for the other

approaches to be considered. It is the shock to the system that

must come to allow for systemic change of any sort, tearing at

the underlying largesse and undermining the informal legislative

capability of those current in power. While a purely synoptic

approach with, say, permits being issued at a national level -

and with federal enforcement – is the only realistic means begin

addressing the underlying issue of planning in Lagos' slums.

Additionally, passage of this blanket legalization of the

slums would finally allow the residents of said slums to advocate

for themselves and may allow for the some genuine planning both

top down and bottom up; complete with enabling genuine radical

planning. To wit, it will take a single large empowerment,

legitimizing the right of the citizenry to live where they do

before Sandercock’s “thousand tiny empowerments” can be put into

practice. Until such a change is made, planning, whether top down

or bottom up will continue to be highly ineffective if not

impossible as it can be too easily blocked by the patronage

system.

The mega slum scenario has managed to create of a system of

inequity so deep that people are completely prevented from

advocating for themselves. A centralized push to at least

prevent them from losing what little they have, which is

effectively a death sentence on the streets of Lagos, must take

place before other empowerments can gain some traction. The

United Nations Human Settlements Program issued a 2003 report on

mega slums, of which Lagos was one of the principle cities

studied, declared:

The urban poor are trapped in an informal and ‘illegal’

world—in slums that are not reflected on maps, where waste

is not collected, where taxes are not paid, and where public

services are not provided. Officially, they do not exist

(UNHSP, 2003, 4).

A redistribution of authority must occur before any other

approach can be taken. This redistribution of authority is

highly unrealistic due to the degree that the patronage system is

embedded in Lagos. Even following a redistribution of authority,

however, it is unlikely that the synoptic approach will be

effective in remedying the many social problems within the slums.

This is because such an approach will likely require forced re-

localization of many within the slums, building much of the

necessary infrastructure will be highly difficult in light of the

population density of the slums, on which almost every inch of

settleable land now has people living on it. Official

recognition of slum denizens and their plot of land would allow

for improved tenure for those denizens. Nigeria’s milieu of

corruption prevents even the most basic of infrastructure

improvements from improving tenure.

A decentralized, highly localized planning approach should

be taken to address many of the social woes on the ground. NGOs

and the like must be permitted to work within individual

communities in order to develop minimum social services, such as

non-contaminated wells and some form of waste management. The

solutions to these problems will likely vary greatly from one

slum in Lagos to the next as they all have their own individual

characters and with that, set of social issues. A mega slum off

the affluent Lagos Island has certain economic advantages (being

near affluent communities makes scavenging valuable garbage far

easier) over mainland slums far removed from Lagos’ principal

economic activity and as a result, far more prone to societal

implosion.

As mentioned previously, much planning will have to interact

through existing bureaucrats who would likely be sent scrambling

to re-secure power. The end result is that a much more radical

planning approach would become necessary to continue to subvert

the existing patronage system. However, it is likely that any

further planning will have to be done through this patronage

system, as said system is firmly entrenched institutionally, and

as a result, impossible to completely remove. The correct

parties will still need to be paid off for anything to be done;

and those officials who can be removed will likely be instantly

replaced by others who are waiting in the wings to take their

place, insuring that the propagation of this system of corruption

cannot be deterred for long.

What this means is that the bureaucracy, which effectively

speaks for the people, must be made to realize that improving

social conditions within the mega slums is very much in their

best interest, as the kickbacks from planning projects are

greater than the piece-meal they currently receive by looking the

other way as impoverished émigrés build tin shacks illegally. In

other words, because of the degree to which corruption is

embedded within Nigeria; any planning model used requires

striking a Faustian bargain with slum landlords. If

infrastructure projects are to adequately improve conditions for

slum and squatter settlement denizens within the context of

Lagos, they must be implemented under the auspices of slum

landlords. Additionally, these projects are largely unlikely to

improve tenure security for slum denizens, and may instead

improve security of tenure for slum landlords, or allow them to

further increase rents.

4.2 RESULTS (B) ACCRA, GHANA

Accra, the capital of Ghana, is an Atlantic metropolis. It

also doubles as the capital of the Greater Accra Region of Ghana.

It is the largest city in Ghana, with the metropolitan region

boasting a population of some 4.5 million (CIA World Factbook).

This population has more than doubled from the estimated

population of 1.9 million in 2000 (CIA World Factbook). Accra

remains an important city within Ghana, containing not only the

sinews of state but also 70% of Ghana’s manufacturing (CIA World

Factbook). It is considered very safe for a city of its size

within Africa and is afflicted with little of the crime that

afflicts cities such as Lagos. It lies in the Southwestern part

of Ghana and sits upon the Gulf of Guniea.

4.2.1 PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS

Accra exists in a tropical climate and has two rainy

seasons. It also experiences a hot season in which it

experiences very dry weather. The city itself is relatively

sprawling with slums located in various points across Accra. The

city is anchored to the Gulf of Guinea and extends from the lower

coastal area until it is naturally bounded by mountainous hills

on the outskirts of the greater Accra municipal area. The

Greater Accra Region is the smallest of the 10 administrative

regions of Ghana in terms of area, occupying a total land surface

of 3,245 square kilometers. It accounts for 15.4 per cent of

Ghana’s total population.

Accra is subdivided into various districts, including the

affluent Asylum Down district and trendy Osu suburban region.

Accra also boasts some large-scale slums in both suburban areas

and the urban core. Most notable of these are Nima and Maamobi.

Upwards of one third of Accra’s residents are now said to live in

slums, and it is these slum areas that are the fastest growing

areas of Accra (Asamoah, 2010).

Though Accra’s population currently stands at an estimated

4.5 million, it is projected by the United Nations double again

by 2020 (UNOWA, 2007). Accra is also experiencing

suburbanization. This process takes on both European and North

American characteristics in different parts of the city. Middle

class Ghanaians are increasingly moving out of the inner city and

building large compounds on the exurban fringe. These suburbs

tend to be very spread out with only a few housing units per

acre. At the same time, numerous other suburbs are also being

hastily constructed through squatting. These squatter

settlements are highly dense and can see over one hundred tin

shed units per acre (van Asperen & Zevenbergen, 2007). Many of

these suburban areas have sprung up seemingly overnight (Yankson

& Gough, 1999). Land that had previously been used exclusively

for agricultural purposes only two decades prior, are now

completely covered in settlements (Yankson & Gough, 1999).

In discussing informal squatter settlements within Accra,

this paper focuses upon both urban and suburban squatter

settlements. “Slums” will be determined and defined through

looking at blighted areas within Accra that have large

populations of squatters. As with Lagos, though not all slums

within Accra are informal squatter settlements, there exists a

high correlation between the two.

Figure 2, below, demonstrates the location of numerous slum

and squatter settlements within the Accra Metropolitan area.

This figure is included to provide geographic reference for slum

settlement locations.

4.2.2 SLUM AND SQUATTER SETTLEMENT LOCATIONS

Figure 2. Slum and Squatter Settlement Locations: (Source: Yankson & Gough, 1999, 2490)

4.2.3 SOCIO/ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS IN ACCRA

The major ethnic groups in Accra are the Akan (39.8%), Ga-

Dangme (29.7%) and Ewe (18%). The Gas however forms the largest

single sub-ethnic grouping, accounting for 18.9 percent.

Religiously, Christians constitute the largest religious group

(83.0%), followed by Muslims (10.2%), people who profess no

religion (4.6%) and adherents of traditional religion (1.4%) (CIA

World Factbook). Within informal settlements, and in contrast to

Lagos, differences religion has not thus far proven a major cause

of conflict within Accra (Benneh et al, 1993).

Compared to the rest of Ghana, Accra has a relatively high

standard of living. Food access is non-problematic in the

greater Accra area, and Ghana has a whole has rarely been heavily

affected by many of the food crisis that have afflicted much of

Sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of the arid north of the

country (Benneh et al, 1993). Though there remain important

infrastructure shortcomings in much of Accra, the city remains

relatively livable for many, largely due to the general safety of

Ghana (Benneh et al, 1993; Yankson & Gough, 1999).

Much migration into Accra has been economically driven. As

in the case of Lagos, migration into Accra has occurred in

phases. These phases have largely corresponded to changes in the

Ghanaian economy, economic possibility and conditions in the

countryside (Yankson & Gough, 1999). As with Lagos, much

migration has been rural to urban (Benneh et al, 1993; Larbi,

1995). The first wave of migration into Accra began in the 1960s

with decolonization and the development of industrial capacity

within Accra.

The second wave occurred during the 1970s, when the

countries then autocratic ruler, Jon Jerry Rawlins mismanagement

of the economy, taken with a global economic recession, resulted

in a period of economic stagnation. This economic malaise was

especially pronounced in the rural parts of the country and drove

waves of impoverished rural migrants into Accra (Yankson & Gough,

1999). The period of structural readjustment in the 1980s

eventually saw the economy recover, however, Ghana has continued

to see, at best, limited economic growth in rural areas,

intensifying incentive to urbanize for many (Yankson & Gough,

1999).

As with Lagos, many of those moving into slums in the Accra

area are doing so in order to improve their economic conditions,

however, within he context of Accra, many are not quite as

desperate as many of those migrating to Lagos are.

4.2.4 ADMINISTRATIVE PLANNING CAPACITY

The political administration of the region is through the

local government system. Under this administration system, the

region is divided into five districts namely, Accra Metropolitan

Area, Tema Municipal Area, Ga East District, Ga West District,

Dangme West District and Dangme East District. Each District,

Municipal or Metropolitan Area, is administered by a Chief

Executive, representing central government but deriving authority

from an Assembly headed by a presiding member elected from among

the members themselves (Yankson & Gough, 1999). This area

together is known as the Greater Accra Municipal Area (GAMA)

(Yankson & Gough, 1999).

The metropolitan area has only recently been expanded to

include five district areas, and previously only included the

Accra Metro Area, Tema District and Ga District - a scenario that

persisted from the 1980s until 2006. The fixing of these

administrative districts, heavily limited administrative

capability to plan, as much of the growth in GAMA occurred

outside of the three initial, set administrative districts

(Yankson & Gough, 1999).

Lands in Accra are managed both through the customary land

laws and through the British Conveyancing System (Gough &

Yankson, 2000; Mends & De Meijere, 2006; Larbi, 1995; Yankson &

Gough, 1999). Much of the underlying planning authority lies

with The Town and Country Planning Department (TCPD) of Ghana.

This department is responsible for formulation of goals and

standards related to the use and development of land (Yankson &

Gough, 1999). It is also responsible for developing

comprehensive development plans in order to direct areas of

growth and development (Yankson & Gough, 1999).

Additionally, much of the local government is

administratively divided into regions and then into traditional

tribal ‘stools’ or kingdoms. These localized authorities often

overlap various regional administrative authorities, thus

creating land-use and land-administration conflicts between

traditional tribal governments and the central government as a

whole

Under this planning authority, a minister is declared

responsible for a particular statutory planning area, and then a

planning committee is assembled in order to determine present and

future planning needs for that area (Yankson & Gough, 1999). The

TCPD is supposed to solicit information from state agencies;

affected communities land owners and expected beneficiaries of

any development plan before development can take place (Crook &

Manor, 1995; Yankson & Gough, 1999). However, the TCPD does not

have the resources it needs to fulfill this roll, and as a

result, it’s efficacy has been limited to issuing guidelines for

development, many of which are simply ignored (Yankson & Gough,

1999). Additionally, because of the TCPD’s lack of resources,

comprehensive plans that do exist are often well out of date, and

as a result, are rendered meaningless by the development of a

radically different physical scenario (Yankson & Gough, 1999).

Within the districts making up GAMA, most development has

occurred in a relatively haphazard manner without the benefit of

central planning (Yankson & Gough, 1999). This has largely meant

that infrastructure has lagged well behind development resulting

in poor infrastructure conditions in most of the new suburbs

(Yankson & Gough, 1999). It has only been the more affluent

suburbs in which homeowners have privately extended, or paid the

cost of extending, sewer, piping and electricity lines that have

service (Crook & Manor, 1995; Yankson & Gough, 1999). Often

paved roads also serve these areas, however this is not always

the case (Yankson & Gough, 1999). The slum suburbs on the other

hand largely lack the means to extend these infrastructure

features and as a result are underserved (Yankson & Gough, 1999).

The TCPD may also at times lack administrative capability, as

well as resources to formally extend infrastructure features to

these areas (Yankson & Gough, 1999).

4.2.5 STATUS OF PLANNING IN ACCRA

Ghana possesses no strong planning tradition, which limits

planning efficacy and possibility while undermining the

legitimacy of what planning does occur (Yankson & Gough, 1999).

Furthermore, the tendency toward rapid suburbanization, often

immediately outside of areas for which the TCPD has planning

authority, further limits the extent that planning can occur

(Yankson & Gough, 1999). The underlying problem with much slum

development seems to be a combination of a lack of planning and a

lack of budget to extend services even in areas that are planned.

Thus, what persists is a system of suburbanization that favors

service scenarios for those that can afford to provide them

privately.

This process has been destructive environmentally to the

area immediately surrounding Accra, and may eventually pose a

threat to food systems (Maxwell & Armar-Klemesu, 1998). As long

as agricultural land on the peri-urban fringe continues to be

transformed into housing areas without services, the process has

the propensity to eventually disrupt local food systems, which

can cause further problems, especially for slum dwellers and

squatters (Maxwell & Armar-Klemesu, 1998; Yankson & Gough, 1999).

Further, declining Atlantic fish stocks, upon which many of

Accra’s poor are dependent on as a food source may further

require eventual planning and resource management, for which

there is currently highly limited capacity (Yankson & Gough,

1999). This is, in a way, comparable to the anti-planning of

Lagos.

This planning crisis in Accra has also been compounded by a

housing deficit (IHC, 2006). Greater Accra includes a large

number of homeless and a large number of housing units that are

over occupied (IHC, 2006; Grant, 2009 111). Of available housing

units, almost none are affordable and few have access to

appropriate infrastructure (IHC, 2006; Grant, 2009 112). What

planning efforts within Accra that have been attempted have been

unresponsive to this housing and infrastructure crisis, and have

tended to focus on roadway maintenance and expansion instead

(IHC, 2006). As a result, this has encouraged squatting, illegal

construction of tin sheds and has placed the onus upon external

agencies to improve sewage, water and basic electricity

infrastructure for many within the GAMA (Gough & Yankson, 2000;

IHC, 2006; Grant, 2009, 113).

4.2.6 TENURE CONDITIONS FOR SQUATTERS AND CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE

Security of land tenure is of great import for denizens of

informal squatter settlements within Sub-Saharan Africa including

in Ghana. Ghana is in a position in which many of its land laws

date to the British Colonial period, which makes insuring tenure

security for squatters difficult to achieve from a legal

perspective. While the Ghanaian constitution defines formally

‘unsettled lands’ as public and their use to determined by the

President of Ghana on behalf of its people, the constitution also

calls for a Lands Commission to help resolve use conflicts. This

Lands Commission is vested with the following responsibilities

land management responsibilities:

(a) on behalf of the Government, manage public lands and any

lands vested in the President by this Constitution or by any

other law or any lands vested in the Commission;

(b) advise the Government, local authorities and traditional

authorities on the policy framework for the development of

particular areas of Ghana to ensure that the development of

individual pieces of land is co-ordinated with the relevant

development plan for the area concerned;

(c) formulate and submit to government recommendations on

national policy with respect to land use and capability;

(d) advise on, and assist in the execution of, a

comprehensive programme for the registration of title to

land throughout Ghana (Constitution of Ghana).

While many slum denizens have access to land, this access

tends to be impermanent because they often inhabit that land

illegally (Fernandes & Varley, 1998). However, through the

Lands Commission process for land use determination, the deferral

to local authorities and traditional land managers may become a

source of legitimacy for squatters. Additionally, while the

overarching administrative and legal system within Ghana is

highly centralized, limiting the ability of local governments to

resolve or regulate land tenure problems and disputes (White,

1989 [a]). Instead what persists is a system in which land

tenure considerations are often resolved at the local level, but

informally (Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007).

While the national lands commission is charged with

resolving land conflicts within Ghana, it’s authority, while

vested in the office of the President, often genuinely stems from

localized traditional authorities. This is because, in many

cases, traditional tribal authorities are still seen as having

greater authority than the national government and as a result as

necessary mechanism for collecting taxes and the like (Grant,

2009).

Thus, the legal framework concerning land tenure and tribal

customary land tenure systems that may have no formal legal

basis, they are seen as having legitimacy under the Ghanaian

constitution, and by the Lands Commission, giving them the de facto

authority of developing land regulation throughout much of Ghana.

These tribal land laws, however, often compete with existing

colonial era land laws. The complexity of these seemingly

competing legal systems regarding land-tenure makes tenure reform

difficult within Ghana.

Land developed into slum housing is often that land in which

legal claims to ownership are ambiguous, or the land is

publically owned (McAuslen, 1996). This allows for a process of

legitimization once the property is developed. Through the

customary land system however, squatter in Ghana are likely to

have a stronger legal tenure claims than they might elsewhere.

These customary land management arrangements tend to exist

outside of the formal legal system and are rarely implemented

impartially across varying tribes or ethnic groups. However,

despite the seeming unfairness of many customary land scenarios,

they are, as a whole perceived as more ‘fair’ than many formal

legal systems that they may compete with. They are also widely

viewed as having greater legitimacy than many formal legal norms,

and in this view tends to be true in practice (Gough & Yankson,

2000). They may also prove more impartial and less open to graft

than the formal system in Ghana and, depending upon the chief or

other that is serving as the arbiter of land disputes, can be

very efficient and effective land management systems.

4.2.7 PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

Infrastructure project implementation within Accra has

largely been privately, or NGO driven, rather than driven by

governments. There is a trend extant whereby NGOs and citizens

are increasingly appropriating urban government functions within

Accra (Taylor, 2005; Grant, 2009). These functions pre-eminently

include infrastructure project implementation. This is the case

especially, in terms of slum denizens pooling resources and

implementing infrastructure projects themselves, which is not

practiced to the same extant in many other parts of West Africa

(Grant, 2009). Part of this may stem from the culture of

privately providing services that exists within the more affluent

parts of Accra – thus promoting a culture of individual or

community service and infrastructure provision.

The literature remains mixed as to how effective these forms

of community initiated projects in Accra really are in providing

necessary infrastructure services. Proponents argue that these

projects fulfill greater local niches, provide localized project

ownership and provide other similar benefits as those associated

with cost-recovery schemes (Grant, 2009). Critics meanwhile

believe that these forms of projects are illusory, as they often

see corners cut to lower costs, due to a lack of planning may

interfere with existent waste management or power systems if they

involve illegal connection to these systems (as locally initiated

projects often do) and in the end, encourage central authorities

not to invest in other localized infrastructure projects under

the precept that slum residents will eventually solve the

problems themselves (Davis, 2006).

Further, there remains debate as to how project

implementation impacts tenure for slum denizens. Proponents of

localized project implantation argue that these projects create

more permanent communities that improve tenure security for

tenants, especially in the eyes of Accra’s customary land

administrators (Grant, 2009). Critics argue that these systems

improve tenure for landlords rather than for squatters/tenants,

allowing them to increase rents after projects have been

completed, thus depriving slum residents of the fruits of their

investments (Davis, 2006). A lack of available information on

how slum infrastructure impacts tenure security makes both of

these claims difficult to substantiate, however some evidence

seems to point towards the former in Accra (Yankson & Gough,

2000).

NGO initiated projects have also been common, and these have

been implemented to varying success (Davis, 2006; Grant, 2009).

Smaller scale projects, as a whole have been more effective in

that they are more likely to fulfill a localized need and have a

greater chance of achieving completion (Davis, 2006; Grant, 2009;

Gulyani & Bassett, 2007). As with many NGO initiated projects,

the success or failure of infrastructure projects may depend on

the acceptance of the projects by slum denizens, units of

government (both formal and traditional), and the ability of the

agency to provide oversight, maintenance and follow-up following

project completion.

4.2.8 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

As with my assessment of infrastructure upgrade in Lagos, I

will assess infrastructure upgrade projects through the

theoretical planning framework of Hudson (1979). This planning

theory framework, as with the Lagos section, will provide the

framework through which slum upgrade planning in Accra is

assessed and through which policy recommendations are made.

Slums in Accra are largely unplanned (in a formal sense) and

emerge through an inability of the TCPD to impose a planning

framework upon Accra’s suburbs. This is due to both a lack of

resources to implement plans, and often a lack of administrative

authority in the areas being planned. As a result, slums are

often constructed such that they lack basic infrastructure

services. What planning that does occur is accidental and

largely originates with trying to satisfy traditional or tribal

norms through customary land tenure restrictions or insisted upon

by external agencies implementing projects or providing funding.

These projects implemented in Accra are often locally or

externally lead and implemented and serve a targeted community.

This largely means that most social mobilization and learning

that does occur is on a localized level, rather than through

national agencies, such as the TCPD, that theoretically have

planning authority within Accra, but in practice do not. Thus

planning in Accra is almost always bottom up rather than top

down, which due to economic constraints also limits the scope of

most projects. Thus a radical planning, social change model

seems to be the mechanism through which many projects may be

implemented, however, local advocacy for projects must be backed

with external or internal mechanisms for project financing.

However, this radical planning approach, unlike in Lagos, may

strengthen tenure conditions for squatters, and thus improve

local ownership of infrastructure improvement projects.

Despite this, the various planning approaches associated

with Hudsons’s SITAR planning model have been attempted at

different points in attempting to improve slum infrastructure

within Accra.

Much as in Lagos, the synoptic planning approach has thus

far failed in Accra. The top down approach prescribed by

synoptic planning has, as a result of the ongoing inability of

centralized project implementation and planning in Accra, not

resulted in infrastructure improvement projects. This stems, as

mentioned above, from the failure of the TCPD to extend services

to slums as a result of both a lack of planning capacity due to

lack of funds within many of the more far-reaching suburban slums

as well as a lack of planning authority by the agency within

those suburban slums, as they fall outside of its administrative

reach. While this failure is not a result of a patronage system

as it is in Lagos, it holds many of the same implications for

Accra’s slum dwellers.

Synoptic planning projects in Accra have also rarely

included clean scrape demolition and redevelopment. Instead it

has focused on large-scale central works projects. Some of these

projects, many resulting in large-scale, housing projects, have

been of some success within central Accra. However, many of

these projects date to the 1960s and have subsequently been

discontinued following Ghana’s economic collapse in the 1970s.

Historically, the much lower degrees of patronage within Accra

than in Lagos have seen far more of such projects completed.

Were such projects to be restarted, they may prove

efficacious, however, the rate of urbanization, lack of funds,

and lack of administrative capacity in many of the areas in which

squatter housing is being built means that such efforts are

likely misplaced. This is because, large-scale centralized

housing projects are expensive, and take a great deal of time of

construct, especially in the West African context in which

projects are often commenced and then completed decades later.

The current rate of urbanization within Accra also recommends

action that will result in improved infrastructure conditions for

slum and squatter settlement denizens as rapidly and as

economically as possible. Additionally, the top down approach to

upgrade implicit within the synoptic approach to project

initiation is not representative of the current process through

which projects are initiated, which is almost always bottom-up.

As a result, it is likely both more economical and practical to

pursue smaller-scale targeted infrastructure upgrade projects

that would suggest alternative planning approaches to the

synoptic one.

Incremental planning in Accra may be of some use. Like

synoptic planning, it largely relies on a top down approach;

however it tends to focus on smaller-scale planning projects and

improvement by increment. It can be argued that many of the

projects that are being implemented in Accra, especially those

few that are initiated by TCPD are incremental. The planning

process through incremental planning is likely slower than

through other top-down planning mechanisms, but the results are

likely to be more respondent to extant infrastructure needs. It

is also an approach that can be responsive to the lack of

funding, as projects can be amended and improved as more funding

becomes available over time.

Bottom-up incremental planning again appears to be even more

effective as it allows for localized designation of planning

processes, however, do to administrative shortcomings, there is

unlikely to be an implementing planning authority accessible to

many of Accra’s suburban slums that can aid in the actual

implementation. However, unlike it Lagos, due to the higher

degree of tenure security enjoyed by squatters, as a result of

Ghana’s strong customary land tenure tradition, squatters and are

more likely to reap the benefits of projects than their Lagosian

contemporaries.

As noted in the Lagos chapter, strong collaborative planning

elements, providing for a “people centered” approach is likely to

be far more beneficial than a strictly synoptic or incremental

approach. The relative demographic and religious consistency

within Accra, taken with the tendency towards greater security of

tenure for slum and squatter settlement denizens further makes

this approach a desirable one for planned infrastructure

improvement in Accra. Thus, incremental and collaborative

planning holds high action potential, but may be limited in

effect by the overall synoptic tendency of the approach.

The lack of planning authority within Accra’s slums requires

an expansion of both planning authority on the part of the TCPD

in order to be affective. The seemingly ‘go slow’ approach

recommended through incremental planning also seems to be in line

with the lack of funding available to the TCPD. However, the

rate of urbanization within many of Accra’s slums seems to, by

nature, demand a more rapid planning approach as the need for

infrastructure within these slums continues to intensify with

population increase. As a result, while the incremental planning

process appears to make the most sense from a structural and

economic sense, it is unlikely to operate on a sufficiently rapid

time frame.

Much as in Lagos, advocacy planning appears to make a great

deal of sense in Accra, but exists to a limited extent. Agencies

can directly advocate for slum dwellers without fear of

displacement as strong customary land rights within Accra help

assure squatter tenure security. Ideally, planning would

mitigate the extent to which slums exist by providing

infrastructure and creating mechanisms through which slum

dwellers are not required to ‘squat’.

While many project attempts to improve matters and actually

implement some formal planning regulation within the slums may be

met with limited success due to the inability of the TCPD to plan

for the slums, what much of advocacy planning does is place the

planning burden upon implementing agencies. However, slum

landlords in Ghana are more likely to welcome infrastructure

improvement than their equivalents in Lagos, as they are often

beholden to traditional tribal land authorities and

administrators, and thus may also be pressed into greater

advocacy, or at least acquiescence for slum infrastructure

upgrades.

The wider radical advocacy-planning notion of “a thousand

tiny empowerments” as championed by Leonie Sandercock may not be

the ideal course of action in Ghana. Rather, advocacy planning

within Accra should focus upon empowerments of full squatter

communities, making use of customary land-tenure systems as a

means of promoting legitimacy for squatter settlements. As

Ghana’s overarching planning structure calls for coordination

with customary land-mechanisms, acknowledgement of the legal

right to exist on the part of a customary or tribal ‘land

manager’ may result in the eventual formal recognition of tenure

rights for squatters.

Improved infrastructure within a given squatter settlement

may further push the idea of permanence in the minds of customary

‘land managers’ who are likely to, in some part oversee or

collect ‘fees’ in the form of tribute from any infrastructure

system. Thus, advocacy planning through Accra’s customary land

management system often sees the management, or at least

oversight of projects placed in the hands of tribal elites.

While these elites, through the collections of fees may be in

these elites economic interests, they are, as a whole, far more

likely to accommodate projects than the Zorian patronage

mechanism in Lagos. Part of this stems from the notion that

widening the group for whom they advocate for provides them with

greater political authority through which they can advance

independent aims. As a result, the system is not dissimilar to

the patronage system in Lagos, however, unlike Lagos, it is a

system that far more widely benefits squatters.

Through Ghana’s legal system, which acknowledges the

underlying authority of many traditional and tribal elites, (and

often these elites not only serve as land-managers, but also as

tax collectors) further aids advocacy planning attempts. Ghana

as a whole is more regionally stratified with traditional elites

relying on localized alliances that can be leveraged politically

in differentiation to other regions. As a result, localized

conflict is highly limited, and as a result, the advantage of

insuring tenure security for squatters within Accra is that

traditional land managers can improve their individual localized

alliance by accommodating squatters. While economic and

authority limitations may limit the extent to which the TCPD can

be pushed to provide services, however, at the least, this

advocacy is unlikely to be used to displace squatters. In the

end, if infrastructure is provided by squatters through common

pool, customary land authorities are likely to serve as a means

of resolving conflict and reducing the ability of some to attempt

to ‘free ride’.

Advocacy planning in Accra, in contrast to Lagos, seems to

be the most plausible option. Due to the significantly stronger

tenure security enjoyed by squatters and slum dwellers within a

region, advocacy for slum communities is, at least, unlikely to

result in expulsion for squatters. However, the underlying

economic and planning authority problems in Accra mean that the

extant planning authorities are highly unlikely to possess either

the will or means of providing infrastructure services. As a

result, those services that are provided must either be done so

directly by agencies or developed individually by communities.

As a result, the embededness of local elites aids, rather than

hinders infrastructure improvement in Accra and allows squatter

communities greater means for advocacy. However, that projects

are being completed externally by aid agencies or locally by

communities further removes the onus for the TCPD to provide

projects itself, which in the end may be to the detriment of

squatters as they projects they can afford may not be of the same

standard as those that would otherwise eventually be provided by

the TCPD. However, immediate infrastructure services in the

short run are likely more to benefit squatters than eventual

theoretical projects that can be commenced if the TCPD is able to

extend planning authority to settlements and secure the necessary

capital from the central government to finance these projects.

As a result, within Accra, an element of cost-recovery tied

to infrastructure improvement projects may be appropriate. This

process assures both local ownership of projects, and involve

customary land-management agents in helping to assure protect

projects. This sense of public ownership can further be

strengthened through the use of local labor pools in project

construction. Some element of cost recovery tied to advocacy

planning project also makes projects more responsive to immediate

community needs and results in services delivered at costs that

are affordable to the community. The underlying problem with

this model is that it only assures services to those communities

that can afford, or have the underlying coordination to meet

cost-recovery goals.

The SITAR model has been applied to planning projects in

Accra. Table 7 below is a summary table of the SITAR planning

theory matrix as applied to the articles reviewed on the topic of

slum upgrade in Accra. The article is analyzed through the lens

of each of the five planning approaches: synoptic, incremental,

transactive, advocacy and radical. Also included is a column

that summarizes additional pertinent article content.

4.2.9 SITAR TABLE: ACCRA

Table 7. SITAR Planning Table As Applied To Accra:

Descriptive Characteristics/ Article

Synoptic Incremental Transactive Advocacy Radical Summary ofArticleContent

Asamoah, 2010 The synoptic approach typically fails to address slum and squatters settlements. A general lack of planning authority on thepart of the TCPAand other planning bodies mean that settlements, many of which fall outside of the TCPA administrative limits cannot beplanned for through this synoptic planning approach.

The time frame of the incremental approach has thus far limited the effectiveness of this planning strategy. The rate of urbanization within Accra requires planning processes that have more rapidtime-frames forresults and which are, as awhole more modest in scalethan many of the top-down directed

Transactive planning has had positive outcomes when the government has involved itself with external agencies in order to provide services. These include successful water sanitation projects for some slum dwellers. The However, these projects are relatively infrequent. This planning approach

NGO advocacy for slum dwellers has been somewhat effective in seeing projectsrealized. Thishas, however, resulted in a non-cohesive planning strategy in which differenttypes of projects are implemented within different slumswithin Accra, creating inequities.

Radical planning may result in improved planning outcomes for slum dwellers, however this strategy has not been widelyused within Accra. Involvement of local customaryland managers as agents for assisting radical planning may result in further positive planning outcomes for slum dwellers.

Current planning strategies do notfavor slum denizens. Services remain inadequate and the synoptic planning approachtraditionally in place effectivelyamounts to no planning. Ongoing rapid urbanization requires rapid planning action, which is non-ongoing. More bottom-up panningstrategies need to be used.

incremental projects.

however, seems to well benefitslum dwellers.

Table 7. SITAR Planning Table As Applied To Accra (cont’d)

Bello, 2009 Synoptic planning has, asa whole, failed to improve tenure security for slum dwellers. As infrastructure improvement projects are most meaningful when slum dwellers can benefit from them, the synoptic approach, which

Incremental planning, in its top down form rarely benefits slum dwellers as it is unlikely to include immediate tenure securityfor those slum dwellers. An incremental process of enabling tenuresecurity may prove

Transactive planning may beused as a mechanism to negotiate land tenure securityand eventually service improvements within informalsquatters settlements. The process requires not simply negotiation between

Advocacy planning on thepart of customary land managers for their tribes, etc, is likely to result in wider tenure security for squatters and eventually infrastructure and service improvements. Insuring equal advocacy on the

Radical planning is uncommon as without access and advocacy onthe part of customary land managers, slum dwellers have little avenue to advocate forservices or land tenure security on their own. Even if squatters work

Accessibility of land though a radical planning approach may be necessary in eventually providing necessary services to squatters. Assuring land tenure security for squatter and slum dwellers is a necessary precursor to infrastructure

frequently includes clean scrape demolition is undesirable.

beneficial in eventually securing tenurefor slum dwellers. However, this long time frametends to push squatters to goabout securing services illegally or informally.

squatters and the central government, butalso with customary land managers. Negotiation between different customary land managers is important.

part of different land managers and tribal leaders is important, however. External agencies can also advocate on behalf of land for slum dwellers.

together, they are still likely to need to co-opt a customary land manager or tribal elite inorder to achieve desiredtenure and planning outcomes.

improvement. With tenure security guarantees, better planning outcomes are morelikely.

Benneh et al,1993

Synoptic planning has failed to mitigate environmental devastation associated with rapid urbanization andto create betteroutcomes for those urbanizing. Lack of planningauthority or competing agencyplanning authority has further undermined this planning

Incremental planning failedto prevent environmental devastation linked to rapidurbanization. The time frame of the incremental process furtherundermines the incremental planning withinAccra and recommends alternative planning processes.

Transactive planning rarelyoccurs within the GAMA. It is difficult toinsure input from the all interested parties in planning process, or to find consensus for planning strategies to use. Environmental degradation recommends transactive planning

Advocacy planning has thus far failedto result in effective planning strategies thatboth provide services to slum dwellers and mitigate environmental destruction. It has also resulted in a scatter-shot planning approach.

Radical planning has not occurred but may result in further failures of coordination ofplanning strategy unlessit is also paired with some form of transactive planning approach.

Rapid slum development has numerous negativeenvironmental impacts on the wider Accra area.The failure of synoptic planningstrategies to address environmental problems further complicates urbanization. Planning strategies responsive to local realities are necessary.

approach.Table 7. SITAR Planning Table As Applied To Accra (cont’d)

Edelmen &Mintra, 2006

Synoptic planning has largely been ineffective in assuring services for squatters and slum dwellers. The top-down nature of the synoptic planning processmakes the co-option of localized political elitesand/or customaryland managers difficult thus limiting the positive planning outcomes of the synoptic process.

Incremental planning, in its common, top-down form is ineffective in that the time frames prevent the showing of rapid results, that allow for the support of localized political elites and/ or customary land managers. As aresult, much aswith the synoptic approach, this planning approach is only likely to see very limited successin providing services to squatters and slum dwellers.

A transactive planning approach can behighly effective if customary land managers can beincorporated into the dialogue. These land managers are likely to be the key to seeing infrastructure improvement projects implemented within Accra and are likely to negotiate with squatters and slum dwellers over the scope and scale or projects to be implemented.

Advocacy planning on thepart of external agencies and customary land managers is likely to result in positive planning outcomes. Service provisions generally follow skilful navigation of the political system and the involvement of customary land managers. Thisapproach may result in positive planning outcomes for squatters.

Radical planning may beeffective if localized customary land managers can beco-opted as advocates for squatters and slum dwellers. The involvementof these customary land managers may behighly effective in enabling services to squatters and mitigating conflicts. This process however, is highly politicized andmay result in the favoring ofone ethnic group over others.

Localized political elites and customary land managers arenecessary to co-opt within any planning process that will be successful in providing infrastructure and services to slum dwellers. This is because it is frequently these elites and customary land managers that have real (thoughinformal) planning authority within slum and squatters settlements. Care must be taken to insure that multiple land managers arebrought to the

table to insure that planning outcomes benefit squatters as a whole and not simply those fromone ethnic or religious faction.

Table 7. SITAR Planning Table As Applied To Accra (cont’d)

Grant, 2009 Synoptic planning has been the historical vehicle through which slum upgrade projectshave been initiated. However, as a result of resource

Incremental planning has also been utilized; in it’s top-down form. However,due to the longtimes between phases, partially builtinfrastructure is often

Transactive planning, involving negotiation between squatters and slum dwellers, local tribal elites, the Accra regional government and external

Through advocacy, NGOs are increasingly absorbing typical government function. Thisis problematic as without coordination between these

Radical planning is possible through direct appeal to traditional land managers. This approach is likely to most greatly benefit squatters and

Informal settlements are largely marginalized through the planning process,both by the government of Accra and by advocating NGOs. It is important to enable slum

shortages and lack of planningauthority, this approach has no been effective in implementing projects within Accra’s slums.

expropriated and put to different uses than those intended. Additionally, gaps in administrative authority make long-term and phased planningdifficult.

agencies and NGOs is likely to lead to the best planning scenarios. Lack of planning authority on the part of thecentral government and lack of fundinglimits the extent to whichit can be involved in planning decisions.

external agencies and involvement by traditional land managers, this may push different projects into direct conflictwith each other.

slum dwellers as it allows them to directly express infrastructure and service needs. However, if slum dwellers lack tenure security, they will be hard placed to effectively organize.

dwellers a greater voice andto more thoroughly involve traditional tribal power structures in better advocatingfor slum improvements. A mixed planning strategy based ona bottom-up approach is likely to yield the best infrastructure planning results.

Larbi, 1996 The synoptic planning approach, as a lack of both funding and planning authority on thepart of central planning agencies within Accra results inpoor planning scenarios. The synoptic

The incrementalplanning approach, as itstands, boasts many of the same shortcomings asthe synoptic. The longer timeframe of the incremental process also further limits the extent to

Transactive planning can only occur if those affected can be brought to the table. It is rarely the case that this happens asthose that making planningdecisions lack official planning

Advocacy planning is thepredominant mechanism through which much service delivery happens. This is usually in the form of external agencies advocating for and funding

Radical planning occurs. The private acquisition of services or desired features predominates. This can, at times, result in what effectively results in non-

Problems in planning authority are resulting in poorplanning outcomesand general spatial and urbanfragmentation. Planning scenarios must beresponsive to service needs butmust also be delivered in a

approach as it stands fails to provide basic services to mostof the urban poor within Accra.

which projects can be completed, especially within the context of Accra.

authority and thus make planning decisions through an informal process with minimal coordination ofefforts.

particular a project for a particular community. As a result planning scenarios rarely see muchcoordination.

planning. Thisscenario also favors more affluent communities whocan afford to pay to have services extended to them.

way that is standardized and which assures services to slum residents. Asymmetrical services through private provisionremain problematic.

Table 7. SITAR Planning Table As Applied To Accra (cont’d)

Mends & DeMeijere, 2006

Synoptic planning has largely failed in assuring services for squatters and slum dwellers. The top-down nature of the synoptic planning processmakes the co-option of localized political elitesand/or customaryland managers difficult thus limiting the positive planning

Incremental planning includes many of the problemsassociated withsynoptic planning + a protracted timeframe. This fails to benefit tenure for squatters and slum dwellers. Lackof planning authority and rapidly changing urban conditions meanthat the protracted

Transactive planning, involving negotiation between squatters and slum dwellers, local tribal elites, the Accra regional government and external agencies and NGOs is likely to lead to the best planning scenarios. Lack of planning authority on the part of the

Advocacy planning on thepart of external agencies and customary land managers is likely to result in positive planning outcomes. Service provisions generally follow skilful navigation of the political system and involvement of customary land

Radical planning is uncommon. Without access and advocacy bycustomary land managers, slum dwellers have little avenue to advocate forservices or land tenure security on their own. Even if squatters work together they still need to co-opt a customary land manager or

Co-option of customary land managers is crucial in both securing tenure for slum and squatter settlement denizens and in eventually extending infrastructure and services to those squatters. Customary land managers can serve as important advocates for squatters in order to insure

outcomes of the synoptic process.

associated withthe incrementalplanning process may fail to render desired results.

central government and lack of fundinglimits the extent to whichit can be involved in planning decisions.

managers. Thisapproach may result in positive planning outcomes for squatters.

tribal elite inorder to achieve desiredtenure and planning outcomes.

better panning outcomes and scenarios.

Okpala, 1999 Synoptic planning’s focuson large-scale projects as a whole has poorlyserved squattersand slum denizens within Accra. Problemswith planning authority in most slums further limits the impacts thatsynoptic planning can have as a mechanism for slum infrastructure improvement.

The time frame of incremental planning hampers it’s effectiveness as a planning paradigm. Additionally, the tendency for incrementalprojects to seecompletion and for completed elements of those projects to be used for alternate purposes further limits the effectiveness of incrementalism.

Transactive planning can insure better project outcomes in cases in which stakeholders can be brought to the table. However, slum denizens are rarely consulted even when they are project recipients. The inclusion of strong advocates for slum dwellers results in better project outcome results.

Advocacy planning on thepart of external agencies is likely to result in positive planning outcomes. Service provisions generally follow advocacyis funding can be tied to planning scenarios. This approach may result in positive planning outcomes for squatters.

Radical planning a whole tends to favor more affluent communities whocan afford to pay to have services extended to them. As a result, within the context of Accra, is a poor planning paradigm to enable the extension of infrastructure and services tosquatter and slum populations.

Small-scale projects that address particular infrastructure needs are the most cost-effective mechanism for slum upgrade. These projects require strong advocates, eitherthrough external agencies, local governments or customary land managers. Coordination of smaller projects can also lessen costs and projectefficacy.

Table 7. SITAR Planning Table As Applied To Accra (cont’d)

Owusu, 2008 The synoptic planning approach, as a lack of both funding and planning authority on thepart of central planning agencies within Accra results inpoor planning scenarios. The synoptic approach as it stands fails to provide basic services to mostof the urban poor within Accra.

The incrementalplanning approach, as itstands, boasts many of the same shortcomings asthe synoptic. The longer timeframe of the incremental process also further limits the extent to which projects can be completed, especially within the context of Accra. If squatters lack tenure security, the incremental planning process may further undermine squatter tenure.

Transactive planning outcomes rely on customary land mangers advocacy for planning decisions + formal planningsystems, if they have planning authority within a particular squatter settlement, willingness to negotiate with these land managers. Squatters themselves are unlikely to be directly represented, but rather indirectly by acustomary land manager.

Advocacy planning on thepart of customary land managers is likely to result in positive planning outcomes. Co-option of customary land managers may benecessary for service provisions. This approach is likely to result in positive planning outcomes for squatters.

Radical planning as a whole is non-efficacious as uncertain tenure for squatters and slum denizens limits the extent to whichthey can advocate for themselves. Access to land and the abilityto advocate forinfrastructure improvements rests with customary land managers who can initiate radical planning processes but are more likelyto act as advocates.

Co-option of local land managers in orderto improve slum infrastructure isnecessary for projects to be effective. Improvement of infrastructure should be responsive to local needs and should make use of localized informal planningauthorities that make de facto planning decisions.

Sarpong, 2006 The synoptic planning approach, as a lack of both funding and planning authority on thepart of central planning agencies within Accra results inpoor planning scenarios. The synoptic approach as it stands fails to provide basic services to mostof the urban poor within Accra.

The incrementalplanning approach includes many of the shortcomings asthe synoptic. The longer timeframe of the incremental process also further limits project completion. Ifsquatters lack tenure security, the incremental planning process may further undermine squatter tenure.

Transactive planning can improve tenure and infrastructure for squatters. However, slum dwellers are unlikely to directly represent themselves within a transactive planning process, undermining howresponsive outcomes can beto the service and infrastructure needs of squatter and slum dwellers.

Advocacy planning for squatters by external agencies or customary land managers is thebest possible planning scenario to improve tenure and services. Advocacy by a customary land manager is likely to see tenure securityimprovements and provide a mechanism for squatter recourse.

Radical planning is uncommon. Slum dwellers have little avenue to advocate forservices or land tenure security on their own and even if they pool resources,they are likelyto need an advocate to achieve desiredaims.

Co-option of customary land managers and tribal power structures is thebest mechanism through which squatters can improve tenure security. Customary land systems provide an important pseudo-legal basis through which squatters can insure permanence. They can then use thistenure security as a means to advocate for further services.

Table 7. SITAR Planning Table As Applied To Accra (cont’d)

Yankson &Gough, 1999

Synoptic planning has failed to mitigate environmental devastation and

The incrementalplanning approach includes many of the same shortcomings as

Lack of planning authority and budgetary restraints on the part of

Customary land managers, acting as advocates can result in better

Radical planning only occurs in casesin which denizens opt toself-finance

Rapid urbanization continues to inflict environmental devastation upon

resource conflict. Part of this is as a result of limited planningauthority on thepart of Accra’s formal planning agencies. Without extensions of authority and capital, the synoptic planning processis likely to remain dysfunctional.

the synoptic. The longer timeframe of the incremental process furtherlimits the extent to whichprojects can becompleted. Thelong-term nature also limits effectiveness in cases where immediate action is necessary.

government planning agencies while tenure insecurity and general disempowerment on the part of squatters prevents meaningful dialogue. Transactive planning can only occur if enabled by customary land managers actively seeking to coordinate planning efforts.

environmental and resource management. This process can be effective in slowing the rate of urbanization and thus allowing for longer time frames for planning withinthe context of slums and squatter settlements.

services. This most frequentlyoccurs in areasof uncertain ornon-existent planning authority. This process has, as a wholeresulted in poor panning scenarios that have only worsened environmental considerations and encouraged resource conflict.

the greater Accraarea. This process also may indirectly increase the rateof urbanization. Better resource management and land management by customary landmanagers may be crucial in insuring more durable long-termenvironmental scenarios and in slowing urbanization rates.

4.2.10 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACCRA

For infrastructure construction and maintenance, a more

advocacy planning approach appears to make the most sense in

Accra. The financial and authority limitations placed upon the

TCPD – the principle planning authority within the Accra region –

would seem to rule out much of the possibility of most synoptic

planning attempts. While increased centralized, or even regional

planning would likely prove beneficial within Accra, and is

highly possible at a theoretical level, it seems highly

implausible at a practical level. Services as a whole are

largely provided locally, and as a result, focusing on local

advocacy planning within Accra seems to be the infrastructure

upgrade mechanism with the greatest chance of success.

The high standing of customary land tenure systems within

Greater Accra further recommends the advocacy planning approach.

These systems provide squatters and slum dwellers a much higher

level of tenure security than is available in many other West

African countries. What this means is that squatters can

actively be advocated for, or can advocate for themselves without

the threat of displacement. Indeed, the more infrastructure and

services are integrated in slums, the greater the tenure security

afforded to Ghanaian squatters under this system (Blecher, 2006).

While squatters have a great deal of ability to advocate for

themselves, meaningful infrastructure improvements must be

implemented locally. This tends to favor conditions for better-

off squatters, who can afford to either invest in low-level

infrastructure themselves or can effectively pool resources.

Additionally, the necessity of at least some level of cost

recovery in Ghana, if not to provide services, than to provide

maintenance for them, further favors those of some economic means

over the destitute. However, it is likely those who are poorest

who are most lacking services to begin with, resulting in a

highly inegalitarian planning scenario. Ironically, the ability

of more affluent squatter settlements to provide services for

themselves may further lessen the incentive for the TCPD to

actively advocate for increased funds and planning authority to

improve infrastructure across all of Accra’s suburban slums.

A solution to this problem may be access to microfinance

systems to squatters for the purpose of infrastructure

improvements. While cost-recovery appears to be a necessary

project component to improvement projects, a mechanism through

which credit could be extended to the poorest of squatters to

allow them to cooperatively finance basic water, sewer and

electricity services could be of great benefit. Infrastructure

services a whole can have important economic benefits to squatter

settlements.

These can include not only obvious benefits such as economic

opportunities enabled by electricity, but also cost and time

saving benefits afforded by roadway and sewerage infrastructure.

Accidents related to poor road infrastructure; especially in

slums cost Ghana almost 1.7 percent of its GDP according to the

United Nations (UNHABITAT, 2007). Unsafe roads, lack of

pedestrian walkways and failure to stratify roadway uses between

vehicles, pedestrians and vendors contribute heavily to the

number of accidents within Accra’s slums and have high associated

medical costs for those injured (Afukaar, Antwi & Ofosu-Amaah,

2003; Forjuoh, 2003). Many of these injuries would be avoidable

given improved roads and walkways (Afukaar, Antwi & Ofosu-Amaah,

2003; Forjuoh, 2003; Davis, 2006).

Similarly, treatment of illnesses and parasites resulting

from inadequate or non-existent sewer and water delivery systems

often consume what meager resources Accra’s many slum dwellers

may have (Davis, 2006). Thus, it is clear that many

infrastructure components, as well as having quality of life

improvements, may also result in cost-savings for their

recipients. Extension of microfinance, through an advocacy

planning mechanism, to allow Accra’s slum dwellers to finance

construction of basic infrastructure may be an important

mechanism through which Accra’s slum and squatter settlement

dwellers can achieve many of these services.

Local customary land management authorities can also be

important mechanisms through which microfinance loans for

infrastructure improvement or maintenance can be brokered. These

customary land managers already play an important role in

guaranteeing greater tenure security for squatters and slums

dwellers and are likely in a position in which it could prove

personally advantageous to serve in advocacy positions for slum

dwellers. This is because often these traditional land managers

have important tribal/social functions associated with their

positions. They may also have access to credit system, even

microcredit systems, that would otherwise be inaccessible to slum

dwellers without the advocacy of these land managers.

This pragmatic implementation of advocacy planning,

utilizing local customary land-managers to aid squatters in

achieving greater access to credit systems is likely the most

effective means of improving slum infrastructure within the

context of Accra. The utilization of these customary land

managers is important as customary land managers can both speak

directly to the localized conditions afflicting squatters while

also being in a position of local respect and authority – both

formal and informal, that provides them with a greater mechanism

for leverage. It is also advantageous to the land managers

themselves, as processes that result in economic betterment of

slum and squatter settlement denizens they are managing may

result in both improved tax returns for them (of which most

collect a percentage) and confer greater regional authority upon

them. As a result, this mechanism of advocacy planning through

customary land-managers is likely the most effective in seeing

improved slum and squatter settlement infrastructure systems.

There are various similarities and differences than can be

contrasted in planning attempts within the two case studies.

Table 8, below, attempts to contrast the two case studies in

order to better illustrate those similarities and differences

implicit within project implementation and project success

through the lenses of tenure, legal considerations, slum

conditions, patronage, customary land management, planning

conditions and the conclusions derived from SITAR analysis.

4.3 CONTRAST OF TWO CASE STUDIES

Table 8. Comparison Between Lagos & Accra

Feature Lagos AccraSlum

ConditionsSlums are unplanned, squalid and lack infrastructure: sewers, fresh water and roads and walkways. Sanitation born illnesses are rife. Electricity may exist but is frequently achieved throughillegal ‘tapping’ of city power mains. While there are much clearer cases of planning authority, the dominance of thepatronage system largely prevents regulation or slum improvement from taking root. The patronage system - consisting of corrupt slum landlords andbureaucrats - has pre-eminent power within the slums.

Slums are very poor and lack infrastructure. Sanitation born illnesses are common. Slums lack sewers, fresh water and roads and walkways. Electricity may exist but is frequently achieved through illegal ‘tapping’of city power mains. In some cases, power may be extended legally. Those services thatdo exist are frequently provided privately and there are questions of planning authorityon the part of planning agencies. Customary land managers generally have a great deal of power in affecting conditions.

TenureConditions

forSquatters

Tenure conditions are poor and prone to change from day to day. The patronage system largely has power over squatters and the living conditions within slums. Attempts at self-advocacy by squatters may result in corrupt officials or slum landlords playing ethnic and/or religious factions off against each other, suddenly increasing rents or

Squatters have strong tenure security throughcustomary land managers. Customary land managers as a whole protect squatter tenure and can be used to advocate for squatter interests. Squatters part of a dominant regional tribe or that have received the blessing of customary land managers have evenstronger tenure security. This tenure security is further semi-protected through

otherwise undermining squatter tenure security.

the Ghanaian constitution, with further normalization of customary tenure laws and the legal system ongoing.

LegalSystem

Lagos’ legal system is tied heavily to former English colonial codes and laws. The system both fails to directly serve many interests but also is highly open to corruption. Attempts at legal reformhave largely been thwarted through bribery and graft. The legal system thus fails to function as a legal systemand instead favors moneyed interests that can afford to navigate it, largely at the expense of squatters. There is no mechanism for customary land managerswithin the legal system.

Accra’s legal system is tied heavily to former English colonial codes and laws. The system however does include some modificationsuch that it allows for disputes to be resolved informally and grants powers directly to customary land managers and tribal leaders. Attempts are being made to normalize and coordinate this informal customary decision making process with the formal legal system. The system is relatively transparent and free from corruption.

Table 8. Comparison Between Lagos & Accra (cont’d)

Degree ofPatronage

The patronage system is all-pervasive within Lagos. Corruption is said to have touched the very roots of society. This patronage system must be navigated by squatters and can have profound impacts on squatter tenure security and slum conditions.

While patronage does exist within Accra, it is relatively light in degree. The legal system operates, as a whole, transparently thus mitigating corruption. Areas of administrative oversight in some areas may strengthen patronage in those areas, however,customary land managers more frequently fillsthese gaps.

CustomaryLand

Management

Lagos lacks strong customary land managers. Tribal leadership exists, however these tribal relationships

Accra boasts very strong customary land tenure systems and customary land managers. These managers have a great deal of authority

rarely serve as means of mitigating conflict or managing land but instead are frequently manipulated by agents of Lagos’ patronage system, frequently resulting in violence.

in determining tenure conditions for squatters and slum dwellers. Customary land managers are increasingly integrated into formal planning and legal systems.

PlanningConditions

Anti-planning scenario in which patronage, corruption and conflict undermine planning altogether within Lagos. Patronage system has effective planning authority however is unlikely to attempt planning. Planning projects initiated by external agencies are frequently not completed and funds are siphoned off. Attempts to privately attain services are frequently prevented.

Planning agencies lack both planning authority (in many slums) and funding. This prevents extensive slum planning. However, advocacy on the part of external agencies andcustomary land managers can result in de facto planning within Accra’s slums and squatters settlements. Services are frequently attained privately.

SITARDerivedDominantPlanningParadigmsin SlumUpgrade

Formal synoptic planning in name only. Actual planning that does occur is frequently done through transactive planning strategy. Transactive planninglimited by patronage conditions, but discussions between bureaucrats, slum landlords, squatters and implementing agencies can be potentially useful in achieving planning outcomes. As a whole, anti-planning conditions are verydifficult to mitigate and both a top-down and bottom-up attempt to mitigate corruption, likely through a synoptic strategy should occur first. Micro-

Formal synoptic planning in name only. Advocacy planning, with customary land managers and external agencies serving as advocates for squatters and/or slum dwellers likely the most effective means through whichto realize planning projects. Further synoptic and incremental efforts to achieve large-scale projects may be of use if involved planning agencies can attain greaterplanning authority and resources, however, the focus should lie with advocacy and a focus on smaller-scale projects. Micro-finance may also be useful as a means to finance small and medium-scale infrastructure

finance may also be useful as a means tofinance some projects where squatters have greater tenure security.

projects.

There exist clear differences between these two case

studies. Notably, Accra, despite its problems with funding and

planning authority, is a far easier environment to implement

infrastructure improvement projects that serve squatters and slum

dwellers. This is due to the much greater degree of tenure

security afforded to squatters through Accra’s strong customary

land management system. This system is increasingly codified in

Ghanaian law, further strengthening tenure claims for squatters.

It is also possible that this strong customary land system has

helped mitigate what corruption does exist within Accra. Lagos,

on the other hand, includes an entrenched culture of corruption

and patronage. This culture makes project implementation

incredibly difficult as squatters are frequently of uncertain

tenure. This makes comparison between the two case studies

difficult.

Despite these distinctions, it is clear in both cases that

in order to realize infrastructure improvement projects that

benefit squatters, implementing agencies must work within, or

include inputs from the extant power structures, be they the

customary land managers or Accra or the patronage culture of

Lagos. Transactive planning approaches that include as many

stakeholders as possible may be of great use in assuring better

project outcomes. However, it is often very difficult to bring

all affected or interested parties to the table, with squatters

and slum dwellers frequently the most underrepresented. As a

result, strong elements of advocacy and radical planning must

exist in order to insure that squatters’ needs are in some way

represented.

An important similarity within both cases is that the formal

system of planning remains synoptic. However, in both cases,

through corruption (within Lagos) or lack of funding and planning

authority (Accra) synoptic planning rarely occurs. Additionally,

incremental planning is also problematic due to the long time

frame associated with it and the tendency for materials used in

incomplete or partially completed projects to be scavenged.

Indeed, much of the planning apparatus in both countries is based

upon older planning paradigms, dated to the 1950s, 60s and 70s.

While this mindset appears to be embedded, it hardly matters.

The inability of either country’s formal planning body to

effectively plan is best illustrated by both cities boasting

comprehensive plans that are over a decade out of date and which

fail to reflect realities on the ground.

External agencies, which instigate many of the

infrastructure projects in both Lagos’ and Accra’s slums tend to

attempt smaller-scale projects based upon immediate local needs

and serving individual communities. This approach has largely

yielded in a higher rate of project completion, however, lack of

long-term follow-up and reporting on project efficacy and project

tenure impacts, draws questions about the real effectiveness of

these approaches in benefitting squatters in the long-term.

Furthermore, agencies have historically frequently failed to

incorporate local labor and expertise within slums, undermining

project ownership, though this is slowly changing.

What can be concluded is that transactive planning

processes, which normalize negotiations and decision-making

between affected and interested parties, have been most effective

at improving infrastructure conditions within slums. Effective

processes incorporate inputs from: formal/governmental planning

agencies, external aid agencies, squatters, slum dwellers and

other affected parties, and extant power structure, be they

customary land managers or bureaucrats that make de facto planning

decisions. Additionally, in cases where customary land managers

hold precedence, as in Accra, increased formal authority given to

customary land managers, with eventual co-option of these

managers into formal planning agencies has been effective. This

is because inclusion of customary land managers enables agencies

to increase planning authority, while customary land managers are

further empowered to represent their constituencies in larger-

scale planning projects.

Finally, improved infrastructure, can, in many cases,

improve tenure claims for squatters. As a result, mechanisms for

radical planning styled locally initiated infrastructure

projects, financed by either external agencies with some

mechanism of cost recovery, or through local microfinance or

community chests have been of great use in both providing

services and in aiding to secure improved tenure security for

squatters (Agbola & Agunbiade, 2007; Blocher, 2006). In these

cases, customary land managers and others often serve as

advocates for squatters to aid them in both achieving financing

for these projects and in helping them to secure tenure such that

they can enjoy the benefits of the investments they make

improving slum infrastructure. Further normalization of formal

with customary land management systems has aided in guaranteeing

squatter tenure and encouraging squatter financing of

infrastructure improvement projects.

5. SUMMARY, POLICY IMPLICATIONS, AND FURTHERRESEARCH NEEDS

The central research question of this thesis concerned how

different planning approaches included within the SITAR model

were used in infrastructure upgrade in West Africa and how these

approaches affect tenure security for squatters and slum

denizens. My approach involved a synthesis of extant literature

through the lens of five theoretical planning frameworks of the

SITAR planning theory model.

My approach was limited by several important caveats. The

most important caveat to this approach was the lack of primary or

secondary empirical data in assessing slum upgrade. Empirical

data could be of great use in strengthening the largely theory

derived policy recommendations of this thesis. Some hybrid of

the SITAR approach, taken with empirical indicators of improved

public hygiene, the decline of disease, etc, in improved slums,

as well as longitudinal studies of the tenure for slum upgrade

recipients would strengthen the analysis.

Another caveat included limitations of the SITAR approach,

which, while comprised of five uniquely different theoretical

planning paradigms, remains limited by narrow definitions.

Additional planning paradigms, including several hybrids of the

paradigms outlined within the SITAR approach may exist, however,

as a result of the compartmentalization implicit within SITAR,

these individual approaches were treated discreetly.

The SITAR approach also included a reliance on Western

planning paradigms, many of which may be dated. However, within

the context of a developing world setting, in which most formal

planning that does occur remains overwhelmingly synoptic or

transactive, this proved to be useful as a means of analyzing the

formal planning process. As a result, that SITAR included what

would be considered dated planning paradigms within a developed

world context, the inclusions of these approaches likely served

to strengthen the synthesis and analysis derived.

In some cases, in which planning approaches were not

directly spelled out, inferences had to be drawn based upon what

the article or report author’s argued about the project

implementation and outcome. While this is not, in and of itself,

problematic, it still required, in some cases simplification of

what was described within the articles and thus must be

considered a caveat.

Finally, the planning scenarios for infrastructure

improvement within Lagos and Accra were two examples of many

throughout Western Africa and elsewhere. As these two case

studies appear to be highly dissimilar, generalizations are

limited to the two geographies.

Given these caveats, policy implications appear of logical

outcomes of my work. I will address these implications below, as

well as the gaps in extant knowledge that may have impacted the

analyses conducted in this thesis. I will discuss both the

strengths of this analysis and the above-mentioned gaps in

knowledge, how I think these strengths and gaps may have affected

the analysis, and how I think they can be best addressed through

future work.

5.1 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

From the generalizations drawn within this thesis, several

wider policy recommendations can be made. These policy

recommendations include not only recommendations for

infrastructure improvement projects in informal squatter

settlements in general, but also the scope at which projects

should be implemented, the best theoretical planning approach to

use, issues of tenure and finally, recommendations on the

involvement of local agents and the impacts of these agents on a

given project.

Firstly, the literature indicates that slum upgrade is

likely the best strategy through which to improve living and

infrastructure conditions for slum and informal squatter

settlement denizens. Prior synoptic planning mechanisms, such as

clean scrape slum clearance rarely resulted in the desired

affects. Cleared slums and squatter settlements often re-emerged

elsewhere with many of the same problems, and even in cases where

settlement replacement was to be included as part of slum

demolition, this was rarely the case due to economic

shortcomings, corruption and other factors. Slum infrastructure

upgrade, as a whole, represents a more pragmatic approach to

providing services to squatters and likely has the best long-term

results for tenure security.

Secondly, the scope of projects is very important. The

literature on both Accra and Lagos indicates that smaller scale

projects that are directly to specific community needs tend to

fair both a better chance of completion as well as in improving

living conditions for squatters. While large-scale synoptic

projects tend to be the most appealing on paper, they tend to be

much slower to develop, be far less likely to see completion, be

open to misappropriation of funds through graft, and as a whole

prove less successful in alleviating negatives relating to lack

of infrastructure. They also tend to do little to benefit tenure

for slum and squatter settlement denizens.

The literature indicates that there has, as a whole, been a

shift across agency thinking towards smaller-scale projects. The

higher efficacy of these projects in providing the desired

service, at least for the community the project is implemented

within is given as the primary rationale for this. Additionally,

as these smaller scale infrastructure improvement projects are

more likely to successful, or at least, completed, they provide a

wider range of data from which social learning can occur. This

social learning is enormously important as a means of assuring

improvements to future projects and in developing projects that

even more fully benefit squatters.

Thirdly, an advocacy planning approach seems to be the best

course of action for integrating slum improvement. This approach

can include both top-down and bottom-up elements. A mistake that

appears to be frequently made in infrastructure improvements is a

failure to develop projects that are responsive to local

requirements and wants. Thus, projects will be initiated without

local support or buy-in because they fail to respond to a

particular local niche. Advocacy planning allows slum and

squatter settlement denizens to advocate for projects in their

best interests, or for implementing agencies or local elites to

advocate on these denizens behalves. The result is that projects

initiated through this advocacy planning approach are more likely

to achieve localized ownership of a project, thus improving

chances of project completion and enabling local ‘protection’ of

a project.

This can also be important in enabling cost-recovery

mechanisms that are increasingly becoming part of many

infrastructure improvement projects. Cost-recovery mechanisms

can further be assisted through an advocacy planning approach

towards enabling localized microfinance or microcredit schemes.

These schemes, if locally initiated can aid in providing

necessary capital for projects, or in financing maintenance.

Smaller NGOs as a whole have been shown to be more effective in

developing the types of smaller-scale projects that are community

accessible, however they frequently require a higher level of

cost-recovery as they generally have less capital to invest going

in. Local finance of a project, especially through an advocacy

planned, microfinance funded mechanism is likely to see increased

use of local labor and improved local ownership of a project. It

also diminishes the ability for funds to be misappropriated.

This can both provide further assurances towards project

completion, but also can result in additional community economic

development within a slum or squatter community tied to an

infrastructure improvement project.

Fourthly, tenure security for squatter and slum denizens

should be an important factor of consideration in initiating

infrastructure improvement projects. One should ask not simply

if a project represents an improvement of services for residents,

but if those residents will see improvements in tenure security

that will result in them remaining the principle beneficiaries of

infrastructure improvements. A second question about tenure that

should be asked in the context of a given slum improvement

project is who tenure is being improved for, the denizens or

landlords and other local elites? This issue is very difficult

to gauge, and infrastructure improvements may be to the tenure

benefit or detriment of both.

How an infrastructure project impacts tenure security is

likely to be highly locally determined, and is an issue that

remains understudied. However, as a whole, improved

infrastructure within a squatter settlement tends to provide more

of a sense of settlement permanence, both in the mind of

localizes governments, and in the minds of slum denizens. As a

result, slum infrastructure improvement, generally speaking and

acknowledging certain caveats, results in improved tenure

security for slum denizens and thus should be promoted as such.

Fifthly, it is necessary, in integrating infrastructure

upgrade projects in slum and informal squatter settlements to

include localized power structures. This can include both the

corrupt bureaucrats of Lagos and the customary land managers of

Accra. While these local agents may at times hinder the process,

or merely be involved for a financial pay off or to raise their

local prestige, they remain an integral part of the system in

many countries and to ignore them, or preclude them from input,

may endanger a project. Integration or co-option of local

authorities in initiating infrastructure improvement is likely a

must. In many cases, it is these local agents that determine

tenure, be it in the quasi-legal sense that customary land

managers in Ghana do, or in the context of Lagos in which slum

landlords and local bureaucrats and elites determine de facto

planning and land-use through their ability to enable or limit

squatting and socio-economic-religious conflict within slums and

squatter settlements.

Finally, in cases in which these local agents are benign,

they may very well help in both promoting projects, encouraging

local ownership and/or in improving tenure security for project

recipients. Even in cases where the involvement of local elites

is, as a whole negative, or may add to project costs, the

acquiescence of these local agents is likely to mean the

difference between the project being completed or not. A corrupt

bureaucrat receiving a kick back from a given project is much

more likely to help insure that project is completed and that

other projects like it are enabled than one who feels that the

project is being initiated in such a way that it is to their

detriment or in opposition to their position. In cases in which

these local agents are more benign, going through local elites or

land-managers in project initiation is likely to insure both

formal or informal blessing given for projects and may aid

project recipients through project advocacy if a given project is

met with opposition by higher levels of government. As a result,

it is essential that infrastructure improvement projects in slums

and informal squatters settlements involve local affective or

affected agents.

5.2 GAPS IN EXTANT KNOWLEDGE AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

There are several notable gaps in extant knowledge that need

to be addressed. These knowledge gaps undermine the strength of

analysis that can be performed and should result in further

research in order to rectify these problems. Finally, the method

of analysis in this thesis was theoretical in nature. While

theory can be useful, and I have tried to utilize a pragmatic

approach to this theory, it still remains theoretical and thus

beholden to the underlying deficiencies of the theoretical model

used, most notably the tendency of theory to generalize

conditions which may be discrete from case to case and the

further generalizations drawn through assessment through a

theoretical model. These gaps in information impact that the

quality of analysis in that they limit the extent to which one

can speak directly to impacts and affects of slum upgrade.

The first of these gaps is a lack of available data on the

impacts of slum upgrade projects. While these project impact

assessments are often performed by project implementing agencies,

such as the World Bank and IMF, the results of these reports are

rarely publicized. Part of this seems to stem from a desire on

the part of many NGOs to prevent their upgrade practices from

being easily reproducible as they are in competition with one

another for grant moneys resulting in problems with NGO

accountability (Fama & Johnson, 1983; Burger & Owens, 2008;

McGann & Johnstone, 2006).

This process is, as a whole, highly problematic. The goal

behind aid projects should be to serve those for whom projects

are being implemented and to create models that can be used

elsewhere. As a result, additional assessment needs to be

conducted by independent agencies in order to determine the long-

term efficacy of infrastructure projects and to determine to what

extent the recipients of those projects benefit, and if through

cost recovery, or other functions, for how long infrastructure

can be maintained and retained.

The second of these knowledge gaps is the lack of empirical

evidence as to the extent to which slum upgrade impacts tenure

security for slum denizens. While the literature frequently

indicates that slum upgrade should, at least in theory,

positively impact tenure security for denizens, there is a lack

of empirical evidence to support these claims. Neutral or

academic assessors, following project implementation, should

conduct longitudinal studies to determine the extant that

infrastructure upgrade projects affect tenure security for slum

and informal squatter settlement denizens. It goes without

saying that the results of these studies need to be made

publically available such that information can be learned from

and applied to future projects.

Additionally, there is a lack of information on other

benefits associated with infrastructure upgrade. These benefits

can harder to gauge qualitative factors, including increased

social, religious and political stability and conflict

mitigation, as well as more quantitative factors, including

economic development linked to infrastructure improvement. While

I have included literature suggesting that infrastructure

improvement may result in wider cost savings through averted

health care and other costs, the extent to which this is the case

is largely unknown. Also largely unknown is the extent to which

infrastructure improvements may trigger local further community

economic stimulus. Both of these subjects represent different

avenues for future study.

The third problem lies in the use of a theoretical model as

the unit of analysis. I have elected to utilize a relatively

pragmatic theoretical model and to apply that model in a way that

is, in and of itself, pragmatic. However, the model itself is

limited, as all models are, as theoretical models represent

simplifications and generalizations about systems and that are

unlikely to prove accurate in each and every case. While theory

is useful in providing for a conceptual framework with which to

deal with, in this case, slum upgrade and tenure issues,

conclusions derived through a theoretical model should not be

viewed as the final word on a topic. Theory is also highly

qualitative. Thus, theoretical analysis is at its most useful

when the deficiencies of a given theoretical model are known and

can be accounted for within the wider subject analysis.

These underlying shortcomings of the available literature

severely impact the accuracy and applicability of conclusions

drawn. While the literature generally speaks to slum denizens

benefiting from infrastructure upgrade, and a compelling case

seems to be made for the shift towards infrastructure upgrade

projects and away from more synoptic style slum clearance and

redevelopment projects, the lack of data on the longer term

benefits of infrastructure projects on both quality of life and

tenure security of slum and squatter settlement residents is

important. Many of the assumptions implicit within the extant

literature seem to point towards these projects being of great

benefit.

The lack of quantitative data is the greatest deficiency

within this thesis. The acquisition of this quantitative data,

and its integration with the qualitative data and theoretical

analysis that make-up this thesis, would be useful in

strengthening the overall analysis. As a result, quantitative

data on slum infrastructure upgrade and data illuminating the

long-term tenure scenarios of squatters that are the immediate

beneficiaries of infrastructure upgrade projects are the areas

for future research work suggested by this thesis.

Finally, the complexity of the problems within many slum and

squatter settlements limits the extent to which this analysis is

helpful. The interrelated factors, including economic, social,

religious, environmental, political and other that come to bare

upon a particular settlements and local, national and regional

levels all impact conditions within settlements. It is difficult

to impossible to develop a conceptual model that considers each

of these factors and as a result any analysis on the topic of

slum and squatter settlements will be in some way, incomplete.

Slum upgrade as a whole may vary from location to location,

however as a whole there are certain generalities that remain.

These include the need to appropriately scale projects, the

ability of local elites or customary land managers to affect

project outcomes and the general tendency for projects to

positively impact tenure security for slum denizens. There is

also an underlying lack of publically available information for

many aspects of slum upgrade, and as a result generalizations

that can be drawn are limited by that lack of information.

It is increasingly clear that those implementing slum

infrastructure upgrade project, be they NGOs, International Aid

Agencies, African Governments, or local movements doing so

through microfinance, must work with rather than around or

against local power structures and customary land managers.

These indigenous or bureaucratic power structures exercise a

great deal of power, directly or indirectly upon slum and

squatter settlements, especially in terms of issues of tenure

tied to upgrade projects. Local bureaucrats and land managers

must be included within the planning process. They must be

become advocates for the squatter populations whom they are

planning for. If this is not the case, the best efforts of many

planning projects are likely to be consigned to incompletion or

in projects that fail to serve the needs of squatters.

Slums and informal squatter settlements are likely to

continue to persist. As environmental conditions continue to

worsen across West Africa, and issues of poverty become more

pronounced across much of West Africa, the needs of impoverished

urban West Africans are unlikely to be adequately met through the

synoptic planning approach applied by many West African

governments. As a whole, this approach, through lack of funds,

corruption, lack of planning authority and other limitations has

largely failed to provide basic infrastructure to the poorest

urban residents. These residents continue to make up the largest

population segments in many African cities.

As inequality becomes further ingrained within many African

countries, and slums continue to expand at alarming rates due to

a combination of ongoing environmental degradation, resource

shortages, rapidly growing populations in many West African

countries and other factors driving displacement and relocation,

the need for slum infrastructure upgrade projects will only

increase. As a result, it is necessary to further study the

impacts of slum infrastructure upgrade projects upon squatter and

slum tenure security, and to work towards a pragmatic advocacy

planning model that involves localized power structures as

advocates for squatters.

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