DEFENSE SERVICES COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIRPOWER IN COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS:LESSONS FOR NIGERIAN AIR FORCE FROM THE SRI

LANKAN ELAM WAR IV

by

Squadron Leader MK Nanle (Nigeria)

Air Staff Course 2014-2015

December 2014

DIRECTING STAFF GUIDE

Wing Commander Zaheedur Rahman, psc, GD(P)

A dissertation submitted to the Defence ServicesCommand and Staff College in partial fulfilmentof the curriculum of Master of Science in

Military Studies under the Bangladesh Universityof Professionals.

ABSTRACT

The employment of airpower in CIO has remainedcontroversial because of the issue of collateraldamage. The lethality of air delivered weaponsmakes it difficult to selectively destroy theinsurgent enemy who is not averse to using humanshields. Despite the counter-productive effectsthat collateral damage can have on a CIOcampaign, airpower offers many advantages inCIO. The highly social and political nature ofCIO makes every CIO unique. However, the CIOconducted in Sri Lanka and being conducted inNigeria have some important similarities. BokoHaram (BH), like the Liberation Tigers of TamilElam (LTTE), is a highly motivated insurgentgroup in control of parts of a sovereign nationand it enjoys the support of some of thepopulation. BH like the LTTE has also employedtactics ranging from suicide bombings toconducting well coordinated conventional

attacks. The SLAF and NAF on the other hand areboth tactical air forces with very similarcapabilities and are tasked with supporting alarger CIO effort. From the research conductedon the air operations of the SLAF in the Eelamwar IV, the study finds that airpower wasdecisive in the success of the CIO campaignbecause it was employed strategically. The SLAFwas able to provide offensive and logistic airsupport to the entire campaign. This study,however, finds that the most crucial capabilityof the SLAF was its ability to provide enhancedsituational awareness by providing timelyintelligence to the appropriate commanders.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AI- Air Interdiction

BH- Boko Haram

CAS- Close Air Support

CIO- Counter Insurgency Operations

CG- Center of Gravity

C2- Command and Control

DAO- Director of Air Operations

DCAO- Defensive Counter Air Operations

FAC- Forward Air Controllers

LOC- Line of Communication

LTTE- Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

ORBAT- Order of Battle

PREFACE/ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A study of the Nigerian political dynamics would leadto a conclusion that insurgency will remain the majorsecurity challenge of the country for the immediatefurure. It is hoped that this work contributes to the

understanding of CIO. This research would not bepossible without the help received from variousquarters.

First, I must give God all the glory for being able tocomplete this work.

I thank my wife, Mrs Justina Nanle. Her sacrifices arean indispensible part of this work.

I would like to appreciate Wing Commander ZaheedurRahman, the supervising Directing Staff, for hisbenevolent guidance.

Many thanks go to the entire Air Faculty of the DefenceServices Command and Staff College for their invaluableassistance during the course of this research.

Finally special thanks go to the following; ProfessorRashed Zaman, Wg Cdr Dharaka Dias (SLAF), Major AmilaPerera (SLA), Sub Leiutenant Basnayake (SLN) and SqnLdr Niroshan Kiriwella (SLAF).

This work is dedicated to the memories of the fallenwarriors of the Nigerian Armed forces.

“You remain alive in our memory, inspiring and strengthening us. May allour memories be blessed”

, MK NANLE

Mirpur-Dhaka Squadron Leader

December 2014 Student Officer

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface/Acknowlegments ………………………………………………….

Abstract ……………………………………………………………………………..

List of Abbreviations …………………………………………………………...

CHAPTER – I: INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………

a. Problem Statement ………………………………………..

b. Research Questions ……………………………………….

c. Definitions …………………………………………………….

d. Literature Review ………………………………………….

e. Purpose of the Study …………………………………….

f. Hypothesis ……………………………………………………

g. Methods of Data Collection ………………………….

CHAPTER – II: AIRPOWER IN CIO ……………………………………..

CHAPTER – III: AIR OPERATIONS IN THE EELAM WAR IV ….

CHAPTER – IV: LESSONS FOR THE NAF …………………………….

CHAPTER – V: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..

Bibliography ……………………………………………………………………..

AIR POWER IN COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS: LESSONS FOR

THE NIGERIAN AIR FORCE FROM THE SRI LANKAN EELAM WAR IV

“To make war upon rebellion is messy and slow, like eating soup with a

knife”

- T E Lawrence

CHAPTER – I: INTRODUCTION

1. Airpower was first employed in Counter Insurgency

Operations (CIO) in 1913, just a few years after the

invention of the airplane (Schwartz, 2011). This was

when the French used aircraft to put down an uprising

in the then French colony of Morocco. Since then,

airpower has made contributions to CIO which, even if,

not always obvious have nevertheless been important and

consistent. These contributions have covered a broad

range of settings both in terms of geography and

capability. Powerful countries like the USA and UK have

employed airpower in locations such as Afghanistan and

Malaya. But less financially capable countries like Sri

Lanka and Nigeria have also had cause to use airpower

to fight insurgency.

PROBLEM STATEMENT

2. Airpower has become a dominant part of the military

instrument of power available to nation states in times

of conventional conflicts. This is because its inherent

characteristics make it the ultimate strategic weapon.

It is able to strike at the enemy’s weaknesses while

avoiding strengths. The CIO environment is however not

a conventional one. In this environment, some of

airpower’s strengths become weaknesses if wrongly

applied. The environment makes it difficult to

distinguish between the insurgent and the non combatant

populations. The lethal use of airpower has led to

cases of collateral damage which have had negative

effects on the strategic direction of CIOs.

Furthermore, despite great improvements in targeting

technologies, the cases of collateral damage abound.

This increase in collateral damage has been linked to

the wrong application of airpower in CIO (Dikshit,

2003).

3. Nevertheless, the military response remains the

only viable option for containing violence and

protecting populations in periods of insurgency. This

was amply demonstrated in Sri Lanka where the

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was defeated

after 3 decades of CIO. The Sri Lankans were able to

achieve this feat by conducting joint operations of the

Sri Lanka Army (SLA), Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) and Sri

Lanka Air Force (SLAF). The Nigerian armed forces are

facing a similar challenge in their CIO against Boko

Haram (BH). BH, like LTTE, wants to have control over a

substantial portion of a sovereign nation and also

enjoys protection among the non combatant population.

This research is therefore a study of the employment of

airpower in the Eelam war IV by the SLAF and is borne

out of the need for more study on how to better employ

airpower in CIO.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

4. To address the aforementioned need, the central

question that this study seeks to answer is: How is

airpower most effectively employed in CIO?

5. Before this question is answered, it is necessary

to address 4 secondary questions:

a. Was the use of airpower in the Eelam war IV

decisive?

b. What were the challenges of exploiting

available capabilities?

c. How can successes be replicated while avoiding

the failures in Nigeria?

6. These questions will shape the study which begins

with a general overview of airpower employment in CIO

before examining the use of airpower in the particular

case of the Sri Lankan Eelam war IV. Pertinent lessons

for the NAF will be drawn before making conclusions and

recommendations.

DEFINITIONS

7. CIO are basically reactive operations or to put it

directly, they are operations in reaction to an

insurgency. The term ‘insurgency’ does not have a

generally accepted definition and by extension, so does

CIO. Insurgency has been defined as “an organized,

protracted politico-military struggle designed to

weaken the control and legitimacy of an established

government, occupying power or other political

authority while increasing insurgent control” (US Army

FM, 2006). The definition covers a wide range of

conflict but this study will only consider the

conflicts that involve asymmetric engagements. “Actions

taken by a government to defeat insurgency” is how

counterinsurgency is defined by the same document.

These definitions capture the essence of CIO as

experienced in both Sri Lanka and Nigeria, and will

therefore be adopted for the purposes of this study.

8. Airpower will herein be defined as a collection of

lethal and non lethal capabilities which exploit

aircraft or air operations. The distinction between

lethal and non lethal capabilities is significant

because there are countries like India which have

restricted the use of airpower in CIO to only non

lethal forms. It would also be pertinent to define

strategic employment of airpower as distinct from

strategic air operations. Strategic air operation is a

capability. It a type of mission that is conducted by

air forces with such a capability. On the other hand,

the strategic employment of airpower will mean the use

of air power, as earlier defined, to achieve strategic

objectives.

LITERATURE REVIEW

9. Despite the considerably early employment of

airpower in CIO, the traditional airpower theorists

hardly gave any thought to the subject. However, they

were able to identify important characteristics of

airpower that are useful for its employment in CIO. In

particular, Douhet highlighted that airpower is

“unhampered by geographical barriers” (Mellinger, 2003)

and Trenchard argued that “nothing can be more annoying

than to be attacked by a weapon which you have no means

of hitting back at” (Mellinger, 2003). These statements

describe the characteristics of height, ubiquity and

standoff; capabilities which would give advantages to

any commander in CIO.

10. In their book, “Airpower in small wars”, Corum and

Johnson assert that after the Vietnam War, airpower was

not regarded by theorists as ideal for CIO because of

the effect of collateral damage on the political

situation (Corum and Johnson, 2003). During and after

the cold war, several writers such as William Olson,

Larry Cable and Dennis Drew wrote about the importance

of airpower roles in CIO. Drew in particular argued

that such roles are “so important that to call them

supporting is difficult” (Drew, 2006). However, there

is unanimity among most writers about the need to keep

collateral damage down to a minimum. Lethal airpower’s

role in CIO was therefore downplayed.

11. The air operations in the Sri Lankan CIO campaign

has received little attention. Most works dwell on the

politico-military strategy that was developed and

implemented by the Sri Lankan government. However,

according to LTM Chandradasa, the SLAF was not prepared

initially and all its responses were reactive, “the

experience of CIO was a learning process for the SLAF”

(Chandradasa, 2012). The significance of organizational

learning during CIO is echoed by John Nagl in his book

titled “learning to eat soup with a knife” (Nagl,

2002). In the book, he concludes that the ability or

inability to learn will ultimately result in success or

failure of a force engaged in CIO. This was based on

his study of the organizational structures of the US

and British forces in Malaya and Vietnam respectively.

This conclusion, while explaining some criteria for

success also raised questions about the continued

conventional approach to the unconventional military

challenges presented in CIO.

12. In an article titled “enemy as a system”, John

Warden, one of the more prominent contemporary airpower

theorists, advocates for the strategic employment of

airpower even in CIO. He asserts that an insurgent

organization could be defined using the system of

systems approach and hence its critical vulnerabilities

could be targeted by airpower. This, according to

Warden, would be strategic employment of airpower in

CIO (Warden, 1995). Frank Kitson, in his book “Low

Intensity Operations”, identifies the insurgent’s real

power as his ability to hide. In his words, “the

problem of destroying enemy armed groups and their

supporters consists very largely of finding

them”(Kitson, 1971). It is in this light that this

research will study the subject of airpower in CIO.

PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH

13. The purpose of this research paper is to study the

employment of airpower in CIO with a focus on the

conduct of air operations by SLAF in the Eelam war IV.

The paper aims to draw lessons for the NAF on how to

effectively use airpower in CIO.

HYPOTHESIS

14. Airpower is a multifaceted instrument. It could be

lethal or non lethal, it could support surface forces

or require their support. It could also be employed

tactically or strategically. This research will attempt

to show that airpower is only effective in CIO when it

is employed strategically. The central hypothesis is

that airpower is more effective in CIO when it is used

primarily to ‘expose’ rather than to ‘kill’ the

insurgent.

METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION

15. Data was collected through the following sources:

c. Books, journals, magazines and publications.

d. Lectures and Seminar on relevant issues.

e. Analysing available operational documents.

f. Interviews with several airmen and

professionals.

16. This research paper utilized a blend of primary and

secondary sources. To obtain primary information, the

survey method was used where data was collected in the

form of interviews with SLAF officers who took part in

the operations. Content analysis method was used to

collect secondary data. The data was collected from

various publications, books, review of the literature

and related web sites. The readily available advice of

experts was also sought and used throughout the

research process.

CHAPTER – II: AIRPOWER IN CIO

17. The history of airpower is almost the same as a

history of airpower in CIO. This is because almost as

soon as its military significance was proven, airpower

was adopted as a political tool to counter insurgency.

As early as 1922, air policing operations or air

control was a mainstay in the British colonial policy

in Iraq. Air control was then defined as “the use of

the aircraft as the primary arm to support the

political administration”(Maguinness, 2009) These

operations were a convenient means of maintaining

control over the colonies while appeasing the public at

home by not committing British ground forces. This is

reminiscent of current US policy of using airstrikes to

exert influence in the Middle East.

18. For over hundred years, airpower has been used in

some form or the other in CIO yet this employment has

remained controversial. In particular, the issue of

collateral damage is one that has persisted. Studies

carried out based on data from the Vietnam war revealed

that the lethal use of airpower by the US was actually

associated with increased support for the Vietcong

(Lyall, 2013). More recently in Afghanistan, the drones

employed in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas

regions by US and NATO forces have led to the deaths of

scores of civilians and also been linked to escalation

of the conflict (Lyall, 2013). However, there are also

reports which make a case for the lethal application of

airpower. According to Rich and Duyvesteyn, in a large

number of CIO cases, “the coercive employment of

airpower achieved the desired result of pacification

and stabilization” (Rich and Duyvesteyn, 2012). The

evidence from the Sri Lankan Ealam war IV also seems to

support this assertion.

19. The use of airpower in CIO has a lot of appeal.

From a purely tactical point of view, it gives a

commander the advantage of standoff, firepower and

speed. These are advantages that will serve to counter

the insurgent’s ability to move, fire or concentrate.

At the operational level, it allows for rapid

concentration of force at decisive points but more

importantly, it is perfectly poised to provide

excellent real time intelligence. The ability of a CIO

commander to “see” takes away the insurgent’s greatest

strength, the ability to hide.

20. As earlier observed, the strategic political costs

of collateral damage can outweigh the short term

operational benefits of employing lethal airpower.

Cases of collateral damage have been on the increase

despite the increased sophistication of targeting

technology. Since war was declared on Al Qaeda after

the 9/11 bombings, the international spot light has

increasingly focused on the role of airpower in CIO.

The decision in September 2014 of the US and its

coalition partners to use airstrikes against the

Islamic State in Syria and the Levant (ISIL) shows that

despite the risk of collateral damage, airpower is

still the most convenient instrument available to fight

these new wars. The use of airpower in CIO would

therefore seem to be more out of convenience rather

than for its effectiveness.

21. The use of airpower in CIO has traditionally been

reserved for big powers such as US, UK, Russia and

France. It is not surprising therefore that most of the

CIO doctrine in that regard is written by western

writers and has been based on the experiences of

expeditionary forces. The general consensus in

available CIO doctrine is that the strategic center of

gravity is “winning the hearts and minds of the

people”. There are different schools of thought as to

how the hearts and minds are to be won. The

“population-centric” model is less violent and focuses

on the population. Conversely, the “enemy-centric”

model pays more attention to the enemy and is

associated with use of more lethal force. The situation

in Nigeria and Sri Lanka do not involve expeditionary

forces, this work therefore would also show that such

models are not adequate to deal with the particular

cases. The major air operations that are carried out in

CIO will now be discussed in some historical context to

provide a broad framework through which airpower in the

Elam war IV will be examined.

AIR OPERATIONS IN CIO

22. Air operations could be either combat air

operations or combat support air operations. Combat air

operations are further classified as strategic air

operations, counter air operations and anti surface

force operations. This work will study the air

operations in CIO under the following general heads;

strategic air operations, counter air operations, anti

surface force operations and combat support air

operations.

Strategic Air Operations

23. Strategic air operations, as noted earlier is a

capability. It allows an air force to project its

forces between theatres in a multi theatre campaign.

This ability also allows effects to be created at great

distances from the battle field. The fact that both Sri

Lanka and Nigeria are sovereign nations conducting

single theatre operations within their own territory

rules out strategic air operations from the context of

this study.

Counter Air Operations

24. These are operations conducted to deny the enemy

the ability to employ its airpower. Insurgent groups

generally do not use aircraft. However, the LTTE was

unique in that it was the first terrorist insurgent

group to acquire and employ air assets. The effort of

SLAF in this regard will be discussed in the next

chapter.

Anti Surface Force Operations

25. Anti surface force operations or surface attack

operations are the set of operations that best exploit

the use of lethal airpower in CIO. They are defined as

operations performed by fixed or rotary wing aircraft,

surface to surface fires, special or ground forces to

disrupt or destroy targets including air platforms,

supporting infrastructure and associated command and

control (C2) facilities (DSCSC AP-1A, 2014). Anti

surface force operations will be further discussed

under air interdiction, close air support and targeted

killings.

26. Air Interdiction.According to John Warden, any

operation designed to slow or inhibit the flow of men

or material from the source to the front, or laterally

behind the front is interdiction (Warden, 1988). Air

interdiction (AI) could then be regarded as air

operations carried out with the aim of disrupting enemy

lines of communications (LOCs). In this study, the

operations which are flown primarily to locate and

attack targets of opportunity and referred to as armed

recce would fall under this group of operations (DSCSC

AP-6A, 2014).

27. The ability of airpower to cover large distances in

short periods and deliver concentrated volumes of fire

make AI very effective in CIO. This ability to disrupt

the LOCs of the Taliban was why US airpower was

successful against it in the early stages of the war in

Afghanistan in 2001-2003 (Beck, 2008). Conventional

thinking assumes that LOCs travel in the same direction

as fielded forces. However, embedded insurgencies often

draw their sustenance from the local people, thus their

logistical LOCs do not exist in a manner which allows

for interdiction from the air (Beck, 2008).

Furthermore, the targets that would fall in the

category of AI targets would include roads, bridges,

infrastructure also used by the civilian population.

Even if immediate operational gains are made, the

destruction of such infrastructure would eventually

lead to feelings of resentment which will negatively

impact the overall CIO campaign.

28. The experience of the Israelis against Hezbollah in

2006 demonstrates how air interdiction could have

negative effects in CIO. Israel was able to destroy

important AI targets such as bridges, roads and

airports. The aim was to prevent Hezbollah from moving

Israeli prisoners and isolating the group from its

external sources of supply. The operations failed to

achieve this aim and also created negative effects for

Israel on the international arena.

29. For AI to be effective, there is need for

persistence and sustainability. However, persistence is

hard to achieve because of the high cost both in terms

of men and materiel, when such operations are

sustained. Warden cautioned on the need for weighing

the costs against the benefits when planning AI

(Warden, 1988). This caution is particularly valid for

air forces like SLAF and NAF where the loss of even one

fully trained operational pilot translates to a

considerable loss in overall operational effectiveness.

30. Close Air Support. Close Air Support (CAS) is air

action against hostile targets which are in close

proximity to friendly ground forces (DSCSC AP-6A,

2014). This definition assumes that, in the case of

CIO, the enemy has been isolated or is separated from

civilian population. Therefore CAS operations in CIO

would basically be the same as those in conventional

warfare. However, due to the nature of CIO there will

be considerably less time for planning CAS and this

adds to the challenge of effectively conducting such

operations. These missions would usually be called in

support of surface force objectives and involve

detailed integration with the fires and movement of the

surface forces so as to avoid fratricide. The effects

of CAS are usually felt immediately and if successful

will lead to decisive results. CAS missions have

largely been effective in CIO campaigns from Malaya to

Viet Nam to Afghanistan.

31. Targeted Killings. Due to the vulnerability of

insurgent organizations to the loss of their leaders,

airpower has been used to target the leaders of such

groups in operations that are known as targeted

killings. Such operations are capable of directly

attacking strategic leadership CGs. The operations are

heavily reliant on accurate intelligence gathering and

C2 for coordination and preventing or limiting

collateral damage. The US-led war against Al Qaeda and

the Israeli CIO campaigns have shown that the killing

of key leadership figures reduces the effectiveness of

insurgent organizations.

Combat Support Air operations

32. The preceding types of air operations in CIO all

employ some form of lethality would be considered as

the lethal or kinetic application of airpower. Combat

Support Air Operations, conversely, are operations that

involve the non lethal capabilities of airpower and

will now be further discussed as Casualty Evacuation

(CASEVAC), Tactical Air Transport, Special Air

Operations and Intelligence Surveillance and

Reconnaissance (ISR).

33. CASEVAC. Rapid evacuation of the wounded from the

battle area ensures early treatment, contributes to

morale and eases the administrative burden on forward

commanders (DSCSC AP-4B, 2014). The availability of

airpower resources for CASEVAC, particularly

helicopters in a combat zone, would therefore be a

force multiplier to any field commander in CIO.

34. Tactical Air Transport. CIO are often conducted

in very inhospitable terrain where airpower’s ability

to defeat geography becomes even more important. The

CIO environment is usually also insecure and airlift is

the safest and fastest method of mobilizing troops in

the high tempo that the operations demand. It provides

resupply of time sensitive operational requirements

while reducing exposure of convoys which are prime

targets for ambush by insurgents. Tactical air

transport could be provided by fixed wing transport

aircraft as well as helicopters. These missions are

considered by some writers to be airpower’s greatest

contribution to the global counterinsurgency effort

(Schwartz, 2011). Tactical air transport missions have

also played decisive roles in CIO campaigns. The

Colombian government’s recent success in degrading the

effectiveness of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of

Colombia (FARC) has been attributed largely to its

improved tactical air transport capability. The country

now possesses the 3rd largest UH-60 Blackhawk fleet in

the world (Schwartz, 2011).

35. Special Operations. The fluid and changing nature

of CIO will place demands on air planners that would

require ingeniousness. There will often be need for

some operations that won’t fit into any of the set air

operations but which are nevertheless very important.

Such operations include fire coordination by Forward

Air Controllers (FAC), Force protection, ground

logistics operations and Psychological Operations

(PSYOPS). Such operations would require specially

trained personnel usually working in close coordination

with the surface forces. They might also fall in the

purview of Operations Other Than War in support of the

CIO.

36. ISR. The ability to give a surface commander the

aerial picture of enemy dispositions is one of

airpower’s oldest roles. It is also a role that it is

highly capable of performing. Across board, there is

agreement that in CIO, intelligence is paramount.

Airpower ISR capability was responsible for the ability

of US forces to wipe out Al Qaeda top leadership and

render the group relatively ineffective. In the

operation that killed Abu Musab al- Zarqawi in 2006,

airpower ISR effort provided most of the intelligence

which was used in the planning while the strike was

enabled by special operations forces. Some military

strategists have even declared that in the present CIO

environment, “intelligence is operations, and is the

key to success in CIO” ( Flynn, Juergens and Cantrell,

2008). This statement underscores the importance of

having access to and being able to use real time

battlefield intelligence in CIO. The insurgent is

necessarily the weaker adversary in CIO. The strength

of the insurgent lies in the ability to hide identity,

position and intention. The battle becomes a lot easier

when this ability to hide is taken away.

37. The capability of airpower ISR therefore provides

very specific advantages to operational commanders in

CIO. Apart from these advantages to operational

commanders, the real or imagined presence of ISR assets

over the insurgent’s environment may have influencing

effects in the insurgent’s mind. It may instill fear by

creating the perception that there is nowhere to hide.

It may also force the insurgent to divert his resources

and time towards countering the ISR threat. These

influencing effects may have significant impacts at

higher levels of warfare and should be considered in an

effects based approach to CIO (AFDD, 2007).

CHAPTER III: AIR OPERATIONS IN THE ELAM WAR IV

38. In this chapter some background to the Eelam war IV

will highlighted for context. Thereafter, the study

will attempt to focus on the operational level of the

Eelam war IV by discussing the major air operations

conducted by SLAF and the LTTE air arm, the Air Tigers.

BACKGROUND

39. Sri Lanka is an island nation located near the

southern tip of India and is surrounded by the Indian

Ocean. The country has a land mass of 25,332 square

miles inhabited by a population of about 21 million

people. The population is roughly split into 3 distinct

ethnic groups; Sinhalese (74%), Tamils (18%) and

Muslims (7%). Sri Lanka has a well documented history

dating back to over 2500 years. The island nation was

partially colonized, initially by the Portuguese in

1505 and later by the Dutch in 1656. However, in 1815

the British were able to conquer the entire island and

establish it as a colony. The British colony of Ceylon

as it was then called with its abundance in natural

wealth and beauty, also offered the British access to

its strategically located deep ports. In 1948, Ceylon

gained its independence and was renamed Sri Lanka in

1972.

THE CONFLICT

40. As early as 1921, the first Tamil social movements

came into being with the formation of Tamil Peoples

Forum. Other similar groups such as the Tamil League

and the Ceylon Youth Congress were founded in 1923 and

1926 respectively. These groups were formed to mobilize

the Tamil youth and give a voice to their grievance. As

a minority group in the Island nation, the Tamils felt

marginalized due to the lopsided division of power and

resources especially after the electoral process was

changed in 1978 to favor the majority Sinhalese. These

groups were initially non violent but the short sighted

policies of consecutive Sri Lankan governments made it

easier for the Tamils to accept more violent ideologies

of groups that began appearing in the 1970s (Perera,

2012).

41. The LTTE was formed on 5 May 1976 by Vellupillai

Prabakaran. Through the 1980s and 1990s, the LTTE was

gradually built up from a skeletal criminal

organization into one of the most robust insurgency

organizations in the world. By the late 1990s, it could

boast of disciplined and well trained force of over

10,000 cadres comprising land, sea and air arms

(Hashim, 2013). The LTTE aspired to create a separate

Tamil homeland in the northern and eastern part of the

country and had support from the considerable Tamil

population in Diaspora. It went about achieving its

aims with a combined political and military strategy

adopting a variety of tactics ranging from suicide

bombings to conducting well coordinated conventional

attacks.

42. The Sri Lankan armed forces on the other hand had

been founded soon after independence. The forces were

small and largely ceremonial (Hashim, 2013). The Sri

Lankan armed forces were largely unprepared when the

war first broke out in 1983. This is not odd, given

that they had been only trained in conventional warfare

along 1950s British doctrine. They had no doctrine for

or training in large scale military operations, not to

mention small unit training against non state actors

(Hashim, 2013). The period from this breakout of the

Eelam war I up to the Elam war III which ended in 2000

was a period of learning for the Sri Lankan armed

forces. The armed forces had to expand enormously and

faced the attendant problems of absorption and

training. Logistics had to be expanded to sustain the

protracted nature of the conflict. Most importantly,

effective doctrine was developed and a C2 network was

designed to ensure coordination of joint operations.

THE ROLE OF THE SLAF

43. When the war broke out in the 1980s, the SLAF was

the least developed of the 3 armed services in Sri

Lanka. All its attack air craft were both “obsolete and

unairworthy” (Hashim, 2013). However, by 2006 when the

Ealam war IV erupted, the SLAF had become a force to

reckon with. The war was conducted in 2 consecutive

phases. The initial Eastern offensive began on 26 July

2006. Victory in the East was proclaimed by the Sri

Lankan government on 19 July 2007. The second phase

called the Northern offensive commenced in the same

month and on 18 May 2009, Mahinda Rjapaksa, the Sri

Lankan president announced complete victory over the

LTTE. There was a single theatre of operation in both

phases and the Director of Air Operations (DAO) was the

de facto Air Component Commander (ACC). Most of the

operations undertaken by SLAF during the campaign were

conducted in support of the surface forces. The air

operations in the Elam war IV will now be further

discussed using the earlier established framework.

Counter Air Operations

44. The existence of the Air Tigers was confirmed on 26

March 2007 when 2 Air Tigers ZLin 143 ac penetrated the

outer defenses of Katunayake base near Colombo, the

capital city (Warnes, 2008). This was the first of a

series of air attacks by the Air Tigers targeted at

SLAF air assets. There were at least nine of such

attacks targeting air fields, ports and other military

targets including one which was a kamikaze style

suicide air attack (Fuard, 2009). The counter air

operations conducted by the Air Tigers were largely

ineffective because they were not able to affect the

operations of SLAF to any appreciable degree. However,

the attacks led to considerable loss of life and

property.

45. The LTTE was able to conceal the location of its

airfields until they were captured by the Sri Lankan

Army (Sri Lanka MOD, 2010). This might explain why the

SLAF was not able to mount any major Offensive Counter

Air Operations (OCAO) against the fields. However, the

SLAF made considerable efforts at Defensive Counter Air

Operations (DCAO). The acquisition of the INDRA-II

radar from India considerably enhanced the detection

capability of SLAF and this would account for the

ability of SLAF AD to engage LTTE ac with Anti Aircraft

Artillery. The SLAF was also able to carry out several

successful interception of LTTE ac, unfortunately there

is only one unconfirmed kill of an LTTE Zlin 143 by a

SLAF F-7 with a PL-5E air to air missile. The claim was

disputed by the LTTE leadership (Warnes, 2008). The

SLAF Air Defence gunners are credited with destroying 2

LTTE Zlin 143 ac. The inability of Air Tigers to

conduct any more air attacks after February 2009 is

evidence of the effectiveness of SLAF DCAO. The

ultimate aim of conducting counter air operations is to

achieve air superiority. In this regard, the SLAF

achieved its aim.

Anti Surface Force Operations

46. Over the course of the campaign, the SLAF launched

over 15,000 sorties and engaged over 1,900 targets

(Mehta, 2010). Anti surface force operations were

conducted by SLAF squadrons with Kfirs, Mig-27s and Mi-

24s. The nature of the operational theatre demanded

that the LTTE be isolated from access to reinforcements

especially during the initial Eastern offensive. The

SLAF conducted considerable AI missions over both land

and sea to disrupt LTTE LOCs. Offensive Air Support

(OAS) was also provided to the SLN on request to

intercept Sea Tiger (LTTE naval arm) vessels. CAS

missions were flown by both fixed and rotary SLAF ac

and were successful in turning around many tactical

encounters in the favor of the SLA. In the words of a

SLA officer who experienced firsthand the effect of

these CAS missions, “even the sound of the aircraft

passing overhead, had a positive impact on the morale

of soldiers on the ground” (Perera, 2014). Despite some

cases of fratricide, the offensive air support provided

by the SLAF was effective in demoralizing the LTTE

cadres and hindering their freedom of movement during

the campaign (Perera, 2014).

47. Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) units of

the SLA and special intelligence squads were able to

infiltrate LTTE defenses and vector attacks targeted at

LTTE leadership (Chandradasa, 2012). Several top LTTE

leaders were killed by air delivered precision guided

missiles provided by Pakistan (Mehta, 2010). The most

notable was the killing of Suppiah Paramu Thamislevan,

an LTTE political leader on 2 Nov 2007 by SLAF

precision attack (Chandradasa, 2012). The fear of

exposure to this type of targeted killing is likely to

have severely restricted the movement of LTTE top

leadership and in many cases adversely affected their

decision making.

Combat Support Air Operations

48. Air Transport. The SLAF contributed enormously to

the mobility of Sri Lankan forces by conducting

insertion and exfiltration missions for the special

forces operating in deep LTTE territory. Combat Support

Air Operations also ensured that ground forces in

contact with LTTE were supported with adequate

logistics. Fixed wing transport ac such as C-130 and

An-32 were used for troop and logistics transport while

rotary wing Mi-17 were used to transport and support

the special LRRP teams.

49. CASEVAC. In situations where the difference between

life and death is measured in minutes, the prompt

arrival of a helicopter crew probably saved the lives

of hundreds of soldiers. The availability of

helicopters for CASEVAC in the operational theaters was

a constant source of comfort to the tactical field

commanders who had to deal with the injured and dying.

The Bell 212 crews from No 7 Sqn who conducted these

CASEVAC missions were very popular with soldiers and

logged the highest flying hours due to the nature of

their mission and the intensity of fighting (Warnes,

2009). This mission was particularly a great source of

motivation to the troops in the frontlines. The

helicopter crews performing this important mission were

however severely restricted by the lack of night

capability.

50. Special Operations. During the previous Elam wars,

several SLAF airbases had been successfully attacked by

LTTE surface forces and had led to considerable loss of

lives and operational effectiveness. The importance of

force protection cannot be over emphasized especially

for a small air force like SLAF. During the Elam war

IV, SLAF airbases were under constant threat of attack

by LTTE forces but the vigilance of the SLAF Regiment

units ‘the Rock Apes’ ensured that there was no

successful physical security breach. The Rock Apes in

charge of base defenses were organized into groups of 8

man teams that were specially trained and deployed

specifically for base defenses. The size of the SLAF

Regiment had to be doubled from 6,000 to 12,000

personnel between 2007 and 2009 because of the need for

better force protection (Warnes, 2009).

51. The challenge of coordinating the effects of

airpower with the fire and movement of surface forces

has already been mentioned. To address this challenge,

deep penetration units of the army and navy were

trained to direct precision airstrikes on enemy

targets.

52. Ground logistics operations also played a very

important role in the conduct of operations. The

ability of SLAF to go on fighting despite the

considerable losses inflicted by the LTTE is

attributable to its robust logistics. The SLAF was able

to effectively deliver logistics support to the entire

CIO campaign. It developed an efficient logistics

infrastructure which enabled it to support the

requirements of the high intensity military operations

during the Eelam war IV.

53. The SLAF was a key player in the PSYOPS carried out

against the LTTE. Air transport assets were used to

carry feigned troop movements, deployments or

reinforcements which reported back to the LTTE

leadership by their intelligence assets and observer

units. Extensive use of aircraft was also made in

leaflet dropping operations targeted at the hearts and

minds of the general civilian Tamil population (Dias,

2014).

54. ISR.One of the most important developments for the

SLAF was the introduction of the Israeli made Blue

Horizon and Searcher UAVs into its ORBAT. This gave the

SLA ground commanders greater access to the aerial

picture of the battlespace. The SLAF integrated this

system through a secure, high speed data transfer link,

to its centralized command and control center in

Colombo. It operated both day and night, providing Sri

Lankan military commanders with enhanced situational

awareness. The system was also used for target

acquisition and weapon guidance in support of CAS

missions. In addition, the UAVs were used for

reconnaissance and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)

missions.

55. The LTTE air attack on SLAF airbase Anuradhapura on

23 October 2007 destroyed the sole SLAF Beech 200 which

had been fitted for ELINT/COMMINT role (Warnes, 2008).

The aircraft was replaced almost immediately

underscoring the importance of the role it was

fulfilling. This replacement was fitted with a Hughes

Integrated Synthetic Aperture Radar which gave the SLAF

an even greater capability of monitoring the

battlespace. The information so received was

transmitted back to commanders at operational and

strategic levels where crucial decisions were taken.

This crucial ability to monitor the battlespace from

manned and unmanned aerial platforms provided the Sri

Lankan field commanders with a level of situational

awareness that the LTTE commanders could not match.

56. In the Eelam war IV, the SLAF was able to use

airpower effectively as part of a larger effort to

defeat the insurgent forces of the LTTE. It was able to

completely destroy the LTTE air arm. The SLAF fulfilled

its roles by conducting counter air operations, anti

surface air operations and combat support air

operations. However, there were some challenges. There

were cases of fratricide in the Eelam war IV. The

prevention of fratricide is a major challenge faced

while providing CAS due to the requirement for detailed

coordination with surface forces. Additionally, the

need to prevent collateral damage placed restrictions

that required the use of high precision weapons. The

high cost of acquiring such weapons makes it difficult

to sustain operations which require precision strikes.

Despite these difficulties, the SLAF was able to

achieve a high degree of success in joint precision

strikes with the SLA and SLN using the Kfir mounted

Weapons Delivery Navigation System (Warnes, 2009).

57. The non lethal capabilities of the SLAF greatly

contributed to the entire campaign. The SLAF was able

to provide sustained logistics support to the CIO and

CASEVAC of wounded soldiers from the battle fields.

Most importantly, it was able to provide the field

commanders with timely intelligence collected from its

ISR assets. There were also challenges most notably

which was the lack of night capability for the CASEVAC

helicopter crews. However, the Blue Horizon UAV has

night capability and the SLAF therefore had the

capability of providing important intelligence even at

night.

CHAPTER IV: LESSONS FOR THE NAF FROM THE ELAM WAR IV

58. Countering insurgency as TE Lawrence observed

almost hundred years ago and the SLAF experienced more

recently, takes time and is messy. The NAF must

therefore prepare for the long messy period of

learning. However, this learning period could be

considerably reduced if the NAF as an organization is

poised to learn from its combat experiences and use

those lessons to design effective training and

doctrine. The importance of doctrinal development

cannot be over emphasized because of the effect it has

on the way a force fights. Doctrine influences language

and language influences thinking. A force fights the

way it thinks. The NAF would therefore do well to also

study the experiences of other air forces such as the

SLAF who faced challenges similar in context to the BH

insurgency. This work has extracted some lessons from

its study of the air operations conducted by SLAF in

the Eelam war IV. The lessons will be discussed under

the following heads; Logistics, Force Protection,

Special Operations, Command and Control and

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.

LOGISTICS

59. The ability of SLAF to continue operating its

aircraft for sustained periods in the high tempo that

the operations sometimes required was a critical

strength. The SLAF had developed a robust maintenance

and logistics system which ensured there were no major

failures in providing the required air support. In the

organization of both the SLAF and the NAF, the

responsibility for procuring necessary technology and

ensuring its effectiveness lies with Logistics.

Technology played a very great role in the ability of

the SLAF to fulfill its role in the Eelam war IV,

particularly in the use of air launched precision

munitions and ISR. In the increasingly sophisticated

modern battlespace, within which technology offers so

many advantages, there is a growing need for synergy

between Logistics and Operations. Night capability is

an area that technology would offer advantages to the

NAF.

60. On the other hand, the LTTE logistics system was

not able to cope with the sustained nature of the

operations. LTTE LOCs were vulnerable and were

repeatedly attacked by SLAF AI missions both on the

land and in the sea. This study identifies the LTTE

logistics structure as one of the organization’s

critical vulnerabilities.

FORCE PROTECTION

61. The high value of airbases as a target makes it

essential to have excellent physical security to guard

the bases. In the first 3 Eelam wars, the SLAF suffered

considerable losses due to LTTE attacks on its bases

from both the air and ground. The SLAF Regiment, which

like the NAF Regiment is responsible for AD, quickly

learned its lessons well. In Elam war IV, there were no

breeches of physical security on SLAF bases by LTTE and

the Rock Ape AD gunners are credited with the

destruction of 2 LTTE ac.

62. The challenge of coordinating proper base defenses

in the chaos ensuing after an attack requires a force

solely dedicated to providing base defenses. In cases

where the air threat and AD requirement is minimal or

nil, as exists in the Nigeria, Regiment units could be

employed specifically for base defense.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

63. The fluid nature of CIO requires that commanders at

all levels be ready to improvise at short notice. There

will therefore always be need for some special

operations. The challenges involved in coordinating the

effects of kinetic airpower with the movement of ground

troops led to cases of fratricide. The SLAF did not

have airborne FACs to direct its CAS ac. During the

war, special ground forces were trained on OAS request

procedures, target designation and weapon guidance.

This enhanced the ability of SLAF to carry out more

precision strikes and avoid collateral damage. The NAF

could also start training special forces personnel on

such procedures. These special forces could then be

embedded with surface troops or be otherwise ready to

respond to special missions.

64. The “hearts and minds” of the general population is

generally identified as the strategic Center of Gravity

(CG) of most CIO campaigns. The ability to control what

people observe is a step towards getting into and

changing their minds (Rahman, 2014). Thus, the ability

of SLAF to send deceptive messages to the LTTE

leadership demonstrates the effectiveness of using

PSYOPS to attack the LTTE decision making process.

Through the leaflet dropping missions, the SLAF was

able to create effects at the strategic CG. The NAF

would stand to gain a lot of advantages if it is able

to effectively target the BH leadership through PSYOPS.

To conduct PSYOPS in the BH insurgency, careful

consideration must be given to the particular behaviors

of the enemy. This is another area where technology in

the form of Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities could

be exploited by the NAF.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

65. Command is authority vested in an individual

commander and comes with judicial notice. Control, on

the other hand is more active. It is the degree of

influence that a commander can exert to all the

elements under command. Control will therefore vary

depending on the ability of the commander to

communicate intentions. Good communication is thus a

prerequisite for achieving effective command and

control. Communication is another function that is

dependent on technology.

66. Effective communication is also achieved by

designing the appropriate command structure suited to

general or particular operations. The ideal structure

ensures economy of effort by providing for centralized

control and decentralized execution. The C2 structure

of the SLAF ensured unity of command. The DAO was

located in the fully integrated central command center

in Colombo from where he received inputs and guided the

conduct of all air operations. All the flying squadrons

and all other branch heads reported directly to the

DAO. The DAO always had the complete air picture and

was therefore able to guide the air operations with

economy of effort.

INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

67. Intelligence could be defined as the ability to

have a clear understanding of the battlefield. This

understanding could be strategic or over an extended

period. The understanding could also be about

battlefield changes of more immediate nature or

tactical intelligence. The process of obtaining

strategic battlefield intelligence is surveillance

while that of obtaining tactical battle field

intelligence is reconnaissance. There is probably no

other field commander who understood this need for

intelligence than Napoleon Bonaparte. He is known to

have commanded an army of spies and informants who were

constantly carrying out surveillance on his enemies for

him (Hollins, 2008). Napoleon was also known to make

use of extensive reconnaissance before tactical

engagements (Holllins, 2008). His increased

understanding of the battlefield gave him an increased

situational awareness over his opponents. This

increased situational awareness was undoubtedly, a

product of the considerable ISR assets available to

Napoleon.

68. With the addition of the third dimension to war,

the term ‘battlefield’ is replaced by ‘battlespace’.

Intelligence, then would mean to have an understanding

of the battlespace. The bird’s view of the battlespace

commands the greatest reach and offers opportunities

for both surveillance and reconnaissance. Field

Marshall Rommel was known as the desert fox for his

ability to outfox his opponents on the battlefield. As

a field commander, he is also known to have personally

flown over enemy territory on several occasions, at

great risk to his safety, to obtain the bird’s eye view

of the battlefield for himself (Greene, 2006). His

superior understanding of the battlespace or superior

intelligence is probably responsible for a lot of his

remarkable achievements. Rommel understood and reaped

the benefits of combining C2 and airborne ISR to

achieve superior situational awareness.

69. In the Eelam war IV, the SLAF was responsible for

making this important connection between C2 and ISR for

the Sri Lankan armed forces at the operational level of

the campaign. The intelligence collected from SLAF

surveillance of LTTE dispositions made it easier to

predict the LTTE courses of action (COAs) beforehand.

The SLAF was also able to give Sri Lankan field

commanders a high degree of situational awareness over

the battlespace, which by effect, produced a higher

degree of control over elements under command.

70. The airborne ISR capability also proved critical

for Sri Lanka at the strategic levels of the CIO

campaign. Though the paper has avoided this level of

warfare, it would be worth briefly discussing the issue

of collateral damage because of the effect it has on

the operational level of a CIO campaign. The Sri Lankan

government had declared to the international community

that its actions in the Elam war IV were humanitarian

operations. They claimed to have had a zero civilian

casualty policy. After the successful military defeat

of the LTTE, the government has come under pressure

from western governments and some NGOs to subject some

of its commanders to independent investigation.

71. CIO are messy and in the heat of battle, it might

become necessary for commanders to take decisions that

could later be interpreted as war crimes. The fear of

prosecution could have adverse effects on the decision

making process of commanders at the operational level,

hence the need for clear guidance on ROEs to field

commanders. The Sri Lankan government, however, has

staunchly defended the actions of its armed forces and

has done so with a lot of evidence to support its

assertions that its commanders acted in order. This

evidence has largely consisted of image and video data

collected by the Blue Horizon UAV and Beech 200 ac. The

capability of SLAF ISR assets to collect this

battlespace intelligence was therefore critical to the

Sri Lankan CIO at all levels of war.

72. The NAF’s considerable ISR capability should be

enhanced. This would be achieved by providing more

realistic doctrine and joint training that is based on

combat challenges. Having this capability especially at

night would be highly desirable.

CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

73. For over hundred years, airpower has been used in

some form or the other in CIO yet its employment has

remained controversial particularly because of the

issue of collateral damage. However, the employment of

airpower has often achieved the desired result of

pacification and stabilization. The evidence from the

Sri Lankan Ealam war IV seems to support this

assertion.

74. Airpower gives a tactical commander the advantage

of standoff, firepower and speed. These are advantages

that will serve to counter the insurgent’s ability to

move, fire or concentrate. At the operational level, it

allows for rapid concentration of force at decisive

points but more importantly, it perfectly poised to

provide excellent real time intelligence. The ability

of a CIO commander to “see” takes away the insurgent’s

greatest strength, the ability to hide.

75. In the Eelam war IV, the SLAF was able to use

airpower effectively as part of a larger effort to

defeat the insurgent forces of the LTTE. The LTTE was a

very robust insurgent organization which at its peak

could boast of over 10,000 cadres comprising land, sea

and air arms. The SLAF fulfilled its roles by

conducting counter air operations, anti surface air

operations and combat support air operations.

76. Countering insurgency takes time therefore, the NAF

must prepare for the long period of learning. The

learning period could, however, be considerably reduced

if the NAF as an organization is ready to learn from

its combat experiences and use those lessons to design

effective training and doctrine. The NAF would also do

well to study the experiences of the SLAF in the Eelam

war IV which has similarities to NAF efforts against

the BH insurgency. Some lessons extracted from the

study of air operations conducted by SLAF in the Eelam

war IV are highlighted hereafter.

77. The ability of SLAF to continue operating its

aircraft for sustained periods in the high tempo that

the operations demanded was a critical strength. On the

other hand, the LTTE logistics system was not able to

cope with the sustained nature of the operations. LTTE

LOCs were vulnerable and were repeatedly attacked by

SLAF AI missions both on the land and in the sea. The

study concludes that the LTTE logistics structure as

one of the organization’s critical vulnerabilities and

SLAF’s capability to attack it was key to the defeat of

the LTTE. The logistics infrastructure of BH could

likewise be analyzed and targeted. Exploiting night

fighting technology for its combat ac would enhance the

NAF’s capability in this regard.

78. The high value of airbases as a target makes it

essential to have excellent physical security to guard

the bases. However, comprehensive security would

require a force specifically dedicated to this purpose.

This is because of the challenges involved in

coordinating proper base defenses especially in the

ensuing chaos after an attack. Due to the reduced

requirement for AD in the Nigerian situation, the NAF

Regiment units could be employed specifically for base

defense.

79. The fluid nature of CIO requires that commanders at

all levels be ready to improvise at short notice. There

will therefore always be need for some special

operations. During the war the SLAF had no FACs so

special ground forces were trained on OAS request

procedures, target designation and weapon guidance. The

NAF could also start training special forces personnel

on such procedures. These special forces could then be

embedded with surface troops or be otherwise ready to

respond to special missions.

80. The vulnerability of the “hearts and minds” of the

general population to attack by PSYOPS was exploited by

the SLAF. Leaflet dropping operations were conducted to

send messages to the civilian population. The SLAF was

also able to use random aircraft movements to deceive

the LTTE leadership. The NAF would stand to gain a lot

of advantages if it is able to effectively target the

BH leadership through PSYOPS. To conduct PSYOPS in the

BH insurgency, careful consideration must be given to

the particular behaviors of the enemy. The NAF could

exploit the use of EW capabilities to carry out PSYOPS.

81. The C2 structure of the SLAF ensured unity of

command. All the flying squadrons and all other branch

heads reported directly to the DAO who was the de facto

ACC. The DAO was located in the fully integrated

central command center in Colombo from where he

received inputs and guided the conduct of all air

operations. The DAO always had the complete air picture

and was therefore able to guide the operations with

economy of effort. Good communication is a prerequisite

for achieving effective command and control. To take

advantage of the numerous advantages that technology

offers in air operations, logistics and communications

must be understood as a vital part of operations.

82. In the Eelam war IV, the SLAF was able to make the

important connection between C2 and ISR for the Sri

Lankan armed forces at the operational level of the

campaign. The intelligence from surveillance that had

been collected by SLAF assets made it easier to predict

the LTTE COAs beforehand. The SLAF was also able to

give Sri Lankan military commanders a high degree of

situational awareness over the battlespace, which by

effect, also produced a higher degree of control over

elements under command. The ISR capability also proved

critical at the strategic levels when after the

successful military defeat of the LTTE, the government

came under pressure to subject its commanders to

investigation. The Sri Lankan government has defended

the actions of its armed forces with data collected by

the Blue Horizon UAV and Beech 200 ac. The capability

of SLAF ISR assets to collect this battlefield

intelligence has therefore also been important the Sri

Lankan government’s defense of its actions.

83. The paper concludes that in the Eelam war IV,

airpower was strategically employed in support of the

larger CIO campaign. The aerial campaign at the

operational level was effective, professionally

executed and conducted in synergy with other services.

The research finds that the capability of SLAF to

provide critical and timely intelligence to the

appropriate commanders was the single most important

factor in its campaign against the LTTE. The enhanced

situational awareness of the Sri Lankan commanders,

thus provided, proved decisive.

RECOMMENDATIONS

84. It is recommended that HQ NAF should:

a. Establish a committee to review and update its

existing CIO doctrine.

b. Train and deploy special NAF Regiment units

specifically for base defense.

c. Train selected special forces personnel as

FACs.

d. Upgrade its combat aircraft with night

capabilities.

e. Exploit EW capabilities for its PSYOPS

requirements.

MK NANLE

Mirpur- Dhaka Squadron Leader

December 2014 Student Officer

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