Adjustment and decentralization in Ghana: a case of diminished sovereignty

Pergamon Political Geography, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 75-94, 1996

Copyright © 1995 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved

0962-6298/96 $15.00 + 0.00 0962-6298(95)00009-7

Adjustment and decentralization in Ghana: a case of diminished sovereignty

GILES MOHAN

Department of Environmental Management, University of Central Lancashire, Preston PR1 2HE, UK

ABSTRACT. Decentralization must be viewed as a fundamentally political process. In an increasingly global political economy 'national' politics no longer exists as supranational forces shape domestic policy. This is also true of decentralization and local governance, which this paper examines. The complex displacement of political power between global, national and local levels is analysed in the context of Ghana. Ghana has been implementing a structural adjustment programme since 1983. The paper looks at its impact on national politics and internal state restructuring in the form of a decentralization programme implemented in 1987-8. The World Bank was calling for fiscal accountability across all state institutions, while lenders wanted 'good government' involving formalized state structures and a measure of democracy. On the other hand, the Ghanaian government which took over through a coup d'4tat in 1981 was experiencing pressure from workers and students over the austerity brought about by structural adjustment. It too needed a political strategy to placate these pressures and avoid a legitimacy crisis. The solution that satisfied all parties was a renewal of an earlier decentralization programme involving managed local government elections. These elections were non-partisan, with the government talking of using the local councils as electoral colleges for a national assembly. The result on the ground was limited, with inadequate revenue, weak organizational support and limited political autonomy. The Ghanaian case shows that the intermingling of global and national territories produces complex effects which can filter down to the local level, Most people assume that central- local relations are an internal political matter, but this study shows that external involvement has a profound effect, both directly and indirectly. In this way the idea of national sovereignty is greatly compromised, although the nation-state remains a necessary link in the chain of causality.

In t roduc t ion

This article examines Ghana ' s decentra l iza t ion p r o g r a m m e of the late 1980s and in so

do ing treats decentra l iza t ion as a fundamenta l ly (geo)pol i t ical process (Samoff, 1979,

1990; Smith, 1985; Slater, 1989). There is a t endency a m o n g s o m e academics , especia l ly

those opera t ing at the po l icy-making interface, to v i e w decentra l iza t ion as a technocra t ic

exerc ise free f rom political pressures and effects (Rondinell i , 1981; Wunsch, 1991; O l o w u

76 Adjustment and decentralization in Ghana

and Smoke, 1992). This ideological position fosters a perspective that limits analysis to the state apparatus and ignores global influences as well as the actual impact of decentralization programmes upon local communities. A better approach examines the power relations bound up in the decentralization process. This allows us to examine simultaneously the politics of policy formulation and the complex mechanics of implementation.

The problem then becomes one of defining and understanding politics in an increasingly globalized setting. This is important in an academic environment that seeks to break from programmatic political models of development (HeRne, 1990; Esteva, 1993; Munck, 1993). Hence, it is best to follow Samoffs advice and go for 'situational specificity' where 'the extent of decentralization that is desirable can be determined only in concrete situations' (Samoff, 1990: 523), which justifies a case study approach over abstract theorization. However, there are some general themes within the globalization process which will help us define the parameters of politics in a globalized setting.

This article begins by examining debates around globalization and state restructuring, arguing that although much of the literature on globalization is Euro-American in orientation, we can identify some useful themes for a study of the Third World. It then goes on to outline briefly the importance of the state in African (under) development. This is necessary because the form and function of the African state is different from states in the west. The bulk of the article examines these themes in the Ghanaian context and concludes by suggesting research themes for African politics and globalization studies.

Globalization and the state

Globalization has become a key research theme for political geographers (Dalby, 1994). However, the process of globalization is contested theoretically and uneven in its geographical spread (Hirst and Thompson, 1992; Leyshon, 1992). Linked to this emerging research agenda is the problem of ethnocentrism in much of the literature. As Slater (1992: 311) comments, 'the Third World is largely present through its absence. This is a serious deficiency, given the large amounts of literature on the Third World from academics inside and outside the region.

While globalization is contested it is used here to refer to the spread of neo-liberalism. This is not simply an economic or political matter, but involves both factors in different combinations in different contexts (Underhill, 1994). As Gill (1994: 80) asserts, 'this neo- liberal restructuring is a combination of the globalization of production and finance and the fiscal crisis of the state (federal, local) in a period of much slower growth in the global political-economy'. This clearly augurs badly for the nation-state. As globalization proceeds it is argued that the nation-state will lose sovereign W to regional blocs and/or supranational actors in the shape of global corporations or 'regulatory' bodies such as the United Nations and GATF (Held, 1990; Leyshon, 1992; Jessop, 1993).

There are some serious problems with using these concepts for an analysis of much of the Third World. First, the state has never been truly sovereign, given its creation under colonialism and subsequent neo-colonial intervention and Cold War destabilization. Secondly, the state was not fully formed in the way that the American or British states have been. For example, welfare functions have always been weak and the artificial nature of the 'national' boundaries has led to ethnic instability. However, two main insights from this globalization literature are useful.

GILES MOHAN 77

The internal~external dichotomy and the displacement of power

Ashley (1987) draws attention to the weaknesses of realist geopolitical analysis which treats domestic policies as 'internal' and the international arena as 'external', and tends to normalize existing power relations. His reformulation of geopolitics is born out of the seeming lack of order in global relations in which the 'international community can only be seen as a never completed product of multiple historical practices' (Ashley, 1987: 411). In fact, 'the sovereign state boundaries that realists honor, far from demarcating the limits of community, are plastic divisions of political space worked out within a community having a transnational reach' (Ashley, 1987: 421; see also Hettne, 1990; Underhill, 1994).

Related to the above is a realization As Jessop (1990: 9) notes, 'there are temporary and local hegemony within suggest that state actions should not subject'. This suggests that in an

that the state's power is no longer sovereign. often several rival "states" competing for a

a given national ter r i tory . . . These reflections be attributed to the state as an originating increasingly globalized world supposedly

domestic policies cannot be regarded as internal matters and may well reflect agendas outside the state's control. As Cox (1994: 53) notes, 'the old Westphalian concept of a system of sovereign states is no longer an adequate way of conceptualizing world politics'.

Local government or local governance?

Secondly, we must look at the problems associated with global-local dialectics. As Dunford and Kafkalis (1992: 5) note, the processes of globalization 'have also coincided with a transfer of competencies and functions to regional and local levels of the state'. Writing from a European perspective they see local politics as being a matter of responding to the hypermobility of capital. What this suggests is that central-local relations are weakened as global-local relations are strengthened.

Previous theories of local government tended to emphasize the observe of this, namely that local government was essentially a national political matter (Taylor, 1991). Local government was either constrained by the centre and used for legitimation (O'Connor, 1973; Cockburn, 1977), or involved in the sphere of reproduction while the centre regulated production (Castells, 1977; Saunders, 1984). In the Third World content these perspectives are echoed by Rondinelli (1981: 143), who asserts that 'the structure of government within a country is an internal political matter'. These analyses are, in contrast to the global-local theorists, avowedly state-centric in their premises and subsequent analyses.

This reversal in approach seems far too simplistic in the light of the foregoing discussions. Most usefully these debates suggest that local government is affected by developments in the global arena and cannot be regarded as a purely internal matter. Secondly, however, local institutions are still to varying degrees established by central government and are hence not immune from central control, This points towards a more complex analysis of politics and local governance. A better approach involves 'the intermingling of global relations, nation-states and local and regional oppositions' (Slater, 1993: 431). In this way we see that the locality is simultaneously empowered and disempowered through the process of globalization, with the national level acting as the still salient mediator.


Globalization, the state and decentralization in Africa

How then do these processes affect the fragile states of Africa? I have already mentioned the obvious, but crucial point that African states have always been affected by the 'intermingling' of various (geo)political powers (Rodney, 1972; Davidson, 1992). What is equally important is that the general processes of globalization I have identified--neo- liberalism, declining sovereignty and complex 'internal' politicking--are more traumatic for these financially and politically weak states and their citizens.

The politics of intervention

The state in Africa has received considerable attention over the years from scholars working in an essentially 'Africanist' mode (Leys, 1976; Saul, 1979; Hyden, 1983; Davidson, 1992; Bayart, 1993). It is surprising in an era when globalization is weakening states and the eastern bloc has crumbled that few scholars of globalization have drawn lessons from states that have over a hundred years' experience of 'global' intervention. I do not intend to go over old debates about the African state, but simply to reiterate a previous point that since its 'founding crisis' (Price, 1984) under colonialism it has never become a stable set of institutions. Callaghy (1987) usefully characterizes the African state as a 'lame Leviathan' given its paradoxical pervasiveness and weakness.

If the boundaries of African states have never been 'hard', then power has never been nationally centred. This tendency has been heightened by structural adjustment programmes, which were applied most strongly in the 1980s (Mosley et aL, 1991). These developments in the regulatory order amount to 'de facto dependency' (Corbridge, 1993: 186) where decision-making is circumscribed by lender conditionality. While Held (1990: 196) is right to say that 'it has to be borne in mind that IMF intervention is routinely at the request of governmental authorities or particular political factions within a state and, therefore, cannot be straightforwardly interpreted as a threat to sovereignty', it needs to be said that the position these states find themselves in has historical roots that go back to the colonial period. As Ninsin (1987: 36) rightly asserts, there is a 'new colonialism which finds its greatest advantages in the nominal independence of the countries of the continent'.

Decentralization and governance

Partly as a result of the state's instability, decentralization has been a perennial tool for 'development' in Africa. Conyers (1983) notes that the interest in decentralization in the late 1950s and early 1960s was associated with the transition to independence and the desire to create democratic structures after the imposition of colonial rule. Through the 1970s, decentralization was advocated as a salve to unresponsive centralized planning (Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983) and avowedly as a means to increase popular participation in development (Conyers, 1983). More recently, as a result of external donor pressure 'there has been a growing awareness of the potentially productive role of local government in raising resources, providing services, expanding rural-urban linkages, stimulating private investment, and implementing national development policies' (Olowu and Smoke, 1991: 1). Despite decentralization being 'increasingly in vogue' (Slater, 1989: 501), 'many, perhaps most, decentralisation efforts appear not to have improved local service delivery or the general standard of living in rural areas' (Samoff, 1990: 514; see also Olowu and Smoke, 1992).

GILES MOHAN 79

Part of the structural adjustment package involves 'rethinking the state' (World Bank, 1991). This centres on the notion of 'good government' (Chalker, 1993), or to use World Bank-speak 'the enabling environment' (World Bank, 1992). This banner involves a number of related themes. First, pluralist democracy has been added to the list of structural adjustment programme conditionalities. As Michel Camdessus, the IMF's managing director stated: 'Good economics is good politics, and vice versa. A newly established democracy needs to establish, as quickly as possible, the basic framework for a viable economic system, and for this it needs very strong policies in its early days' (quoted in The Economist, 22 February 1992: 993). The overall message is that 'government must provide stable, predictable conditions in which to do business' (Chalker, 1993: 24). As 'democratic' experiments in Kenya and Nigeria have shown, such prescriptions are naive, because they ignore the complex realities of these countries and their governments.

Secondly, local government is implicated in this process of state restructuring and democratization. The sixth World Development Report made explicit the links between market reforms and administration whereby 'achieving improvements in economic performance requires both policy reforms and strengthened institutions for management' (World Bank, 1983: 39; see also World Bank, 1990). Whether to use public or private instruments should, according to the report, have nothing to do with political ideology, but simply efficiency, since 'competitive markets permit the necessary flexibility and responsiveness and, because they decentralize the task of handling information, also economize on scarce administrative resources' (World Bank, 1983: 53). Therefore, the scope of the public sector is narrowed or, where it is maintained, it should exploit the benefits of the market economy. In this light decentralization 'should be seen as part of a broader market-surrogate strategy' (World Bank, 1983: 123). The Ghanaian study is concerned with this most recent phase of decentralization's popularity and more generally examines globalization and the African state, drawing upon the themes outlined above.

Adjustment and decentralization in Rawlings's Ghana

The decentralization programme is interesting because it was born out of a number of intersecting forces of the type discussed above. In 1983 Ghana entered a structural adjustment agreement with the IMF and World Bank. This had profound effects upon the economy, state and society. The government--the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), headed by flight-lieutenant Jerry Rawlings--was a military government and lacked popular legitimacy. This was further undermined by the austerity brought about by the structural adjustment programme, while the IMF and World Bank were also calling for 'good government'. The response to these factors was a non-partisan local government programme. This section examines the background to these events and evaluates the impacts of the programmes upon the centre, the local authorities and the localities.

Political change in Ghana

In the decade of PNDC rule that this study covers there has been a significant change in political outlook. As one observer put it, 'the subsequent outcome has seen one of the most dramatic "U-turns" of any government in all post-independence African history' (Yeebo, 1985: 64). The basis of this U-turn was the move from 'radical populism' in the early 1980s (Kraus, 1987) to the wholehearted acceptance of a structural adjustment programme which transformed the country into a laboratory for neo-classical policies.


In 1957 Ghana was the first nation in- sub-Saharan Africa to achieve independence. Under the presidency of Kwame Nkrumah, it was held up as a shining example of the possibilities of modernization and 'Third Worldism'. The next 25 years witnessed a reversal of fortunes as each government tried to tackle the country's narrow economic base and poor infrastructure while relying increasingly on informal political support (Hutchful, 1989: Jonah, 1989). The net result was to bankrupt the country so that most people were forced to seek an existence outside the formal economic and political channels (Pellow and Chazan, 1986). By the early 1980s the situation was so bad that Rawlings and his youthful compatriots seized power through their second coup d'~tat on 31 December 1981. The so-called 'December Revolution' ushered in the most stable period of Ghainaian politics since Nkrumah's overthrow in 1966. In 1992 Rawlings won the country's elections, marking the high point of an incredibly successful and dynamic political career. We will now look in more detail at the PNDC period.

Radical populism

Following the coup, Chairman Rawlings announced that 'power will not be concentrated at the top any more, and nobody at the top can enslave us because there is no way anybody at the top, whether he is a saint or a devil can do what he likes' (quoted in Yeebo, 1985: 66). Rawlings called for a 'revolution' which would entail 'ensuring a fundamental break from the existing neo-colonial relations' (PNDC, 1982: 2). Economic policy was centred on checking corruption and subsidizing food prices in urban areas. As such it was described as a 'moral' approach to the economy (Haynes, 1989a) rather than radical anti-imperialism.

Despite this posturing there was a divide between the left and the right within the PNDC. The left itself was divided between the moderates who believed in some foreign assistance to promote socialism and the radical elements who believed in severing all links with foreign capital, but beyond that lacked a common ideological viewpoint. The right was not ultra-conservative, but essentially bourgeois and therefore opposed to popular government. It consisted of various professional management and business associations united politically under the Association of Recognised Professional Bodies (Ninsin, 1987).

The defence committees. The defence committees were the organ of the populist government and modelled on the Libyan jamahiriyya system which, in theory at least, saw national politics and a central state as obsolete; hence the 'provisionality' of the PNDC. The lack of guidance over these political bodies precipitated a situation where 'the spontaneity of the revolution and the weakness of the structures intended to guide it along led almost inevitably to clashes with "the people" ' (Bing, 1984: 92). Indeed, in July 1982 the National Defence Committee replaced the interim National Co-ordinating Committee in an effort to check the illegal radicalism and contributed further to the centralization of decentralization (Haynes, 1989b).

More formal decentralization policies throughout this period were characteristically vague and confused. In their policy guidelines issued in May 1982 the PNDC stated that 'one of the aims of the Revolution would be to decentralize the public services to ensure efficient administration' (PNDC, 1982: 5). In late 1982 the PNDC announced an 11-point decentralization programme in which they criticized former administrations for failing to implement decentralization. The PNDC defined their vision of decentralization as 'the devolution of central administrative (Not Political) authority to the local level (Regional,

Gitas MOHAN 81

District/Local) in order to ensure popular grassroot participation in the administration of the various areas concerned' (PNDC, 1983: 3). The thrust therefore was on deconcentra- tion for more efficient service delivery to support their democratization efforts through the discredited defence committees. This split between 'political' and 'administrative' organs was to dog the programme over the next decade.

Despite this initial flurry of activity, which saw the creation of a tenth region in the Upper West, the efforts remained largely unchanged until 1987 and the publication of the 'Blue Book' outlining the district assemblies, despite the work of the Public Administra- tion Restructuring and Decentralisation Implementation Committee (Pardic) (Rothchild and Gyimah-Boadi, 1986). These later more problematic phases included the deployment of personnel from the central ministries to the decentralized units and the devolution of the promised financial and administrative authority and autonomy.

The economic recovery programme

Most observers of the PNDC era see the beginning of the second phase as the announcement of the economic recovery programme (Ray, 1986; Haynes, 1989a; Herbst, 1993). In spite of some weak justification, it was basically a structural adjustment programme calling for policies of economic liberalization and political restructuring. The negotiations with the IMF began shortly after the 'December Revolution' and some form of consensus emerged by August 1982. So-called socialist countries such as Libya, Cuba and the Soviet Union had been approached for some form of reconstruction finance, but the amounts released were inadequate.

The consensus that the PNDC reached was not so surprising as one would have imagined in December 1981, since as we have seen the left and right radicals had been expelled and one questions the PNDC's initial integrity anyway. 1 It was the objective economic conditions and not so much the avowed political leanings of the government which were crucial. In fact 'the task of securing financing for the participatory approach might well have been more difficult than the technical approach' (Bing, 1984: 102). As Mosley et al. (1991: 287) note more generally, 'where there is articulate opposition to policy reform, as there usually is, that opposition must be overcome somehow if implementation is to take place'. This shows that IMF conditionality is not consequent upon the loan but in fact precedes it.

The first economic recovery programme (1984-6) focused on increased output, the export of a higher percentage of this output, controlling inflation, improving international creditworthiness and rehabilitating Ghana's infrastructure. The second programme, from 1987 to 1989, also emphasized growth and balance of payments, but stressed improvements in the public sector (Toye, 1991) with such paradoxical policies as privatization and repricing of government services. As the World Bank (1984: 34) put it: 'it is expected that the first phase should result in reduction in price distortions, the second in improving the capacity utilization of existing capital assets and the third in trade liberalization and min imi z ing Government inwrvention' (emphasis added).

The economic recovery programme was seen as a success by the World Bank since there were five years of economic growth between 1984 and 1989 which brought GDP back to the levels of the early 1970s, although much of this recovery was due to improved environmental factors rather than specific policy (Loxley, 1992; World Bank, 1994). However, the wider social impacts are harder to assess since no adequate studies have yet been published (Gibbon, 1992; Loxley, 1992).


Adjustment and local government

Chazan (1989) sees three phases of democratic implementation in Ghana under the PNDC. She too identifies the populist phase, but sees an intermediate phase of experimentation between this and the third phase establishing viable channels of participation of which the district assemblies are an integral part. Again two comments are appropriate. First, when does 'experimentation' become procrastination, since the government's efforts were focused on the economy? The crucial point to note is that such stalling tactics were only reversed when the PNDC felt that its legitimacy was threatened because of the pressures engendered by austerity.

Two of the most notable examples are worth mentioning. In January 1986, 20 000 workers took to the streets protesting against price increases, while in March the following year students organized campus rallies protesting against the education reform programme of the second economic recovery programme (Yeebo, 1991). As Rothchild (1993: 15) observes: 'with domestic and international donor community pressures building up for democratization, Rawlings, recognizing the need to establish a new support coalition, moved cautiously to link political reform with economic reform' (see also Herbst, 1993). The PNDC was being squeezed between the donors and key sections of Ghanaian society. Therefore, it had to placate two different sets of demands while retaining power. This it did through its decentralization programme. Secondly, as examined in detail below, the district assemblies only marginally improve the 'viability' of channels of participation. The next section analyses how these complex political pressures produced the somewhat contradictory decentralization programme of the late 1980s.

The district assemblies

The district assemblies formed the basis of the decentralization programme although there were other initiatives, including reorganizing the civil service. The reforms involved the creation of 110 districts compared to the 65 which had existed before (Figure 1). They were formally recognized in PNDC Law 207 and established individually through legislative instruments. As Law 207 states, 'a District Assembly shall--(a) be responsible

TABLE 1. Votes cast in various Ghanaian elections

District District Assembly Council

Region (I978) 1988/89 1994

Western 20.6 55.3 32.3 Central 22.2 59.3 28.2 Eastern 16.6 60.8 30.5 Volta 15.3 59.4 29.8 Ashanti 24.9 60.8 31.9 Brong Ahafo 18.7 60.2 34.4 Northern 18.2 60.6 N.A. Upper 16.8 64.7 30.4 Greater Accra 10.2 44.3 16.7

National average 18.4 59.0 26.02

GILES MOUAN 83

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for the overall development of the District and shall ensure the preparation and submission to the Council for approval the development plan and budget for the District' (PNDC, 1988: 7). Most of the functions assigned to the district assemblies are related to the provision of services at the local level.

Membership of the assemblies comprises two-thirds elected members and one-third appointed. The elections were held between December 1988 and February 1989. Prior to the elections a massive public information campaign was launched which was linked to voter registration. If official figures are correct, the campaign was successful, with an average voter turnout of 58.9 percent (Table 1). Crucially, the candidates stood on a non- partisan basis since it was argued that party politicking occluded 'genuine' politics. However, the pledge of the newly elected assembly members included the phrase 'I will uphold and defend the revolutionary objectives of the PNDC', which suggests that 'non- partisan' meant anything except the PNDC.

The assemblies are made up of both a political body and an administrative body comprising 22 government departments (see Figure 2). The aim is to coordinate the activities of the departments through a fused organizational structure. Previous local governments in Ghana had been plagued by the colonial legacy of 'institutional dualism' whereby the political body only weakly interacted with the administrative body, which was itself tied into the rigid ministerial hierarchies (Tordoff, 1980; Amonoo, 1981).

At the sub-district level the assembly members are duty bound to promote development in their electoral areas but were warned that 'assembly members should not see themselves as the final repository of power which rightly belongs to the people' (Rawlings, 1989: 30). The problem arises as to how the assembly members work with pre- existing political structures such as the chief and his council or the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs). The leadership role of the assembly member must be sensitive to local institutions so that, for instance, chiefs 'are seen as partners in the development of their districts' (Ministry of Local Government, 1990: 21), while infrastructural projects should be approached 'as partners, that is, people and government' (Rawlings, 1989: 30). Clearly, the emphasis on 'partnerships' is aimed at smoothing over the introduction of yet another political body at the local level. To assist the assembly members, unit committees were introduced which are based in the electoral area and again comprise a 1:2 ratio of appointed to elected members. The guidelines for these committees were vague and the unit areas coincided with the unit boundaries of the CDRs, which was bound to excite competition and conflict.

Implementation of the district assemblies

The main problems in the implementation of the assemblies resulted from their inadequate conceptualization and lack of political will on behalf of the central state. These problems come under the general areas of finance, organization and democratization.

Financial difficulties. The main problems arise with finance. The revenue sources available to the assemblies are made up of local taxes and central grants. The PNDC added some ceded revenue to the central allocation based on population size, development need and a fixed amount. However, the most this amounted to was Cedis 2.25 million (approximately £3500) for a population of 225 000. On a comparative basis Ghana is still well behind other countries in its allocation of central resources to the local level. According to World Bank figures only 3.3 percent of centrally collected revenue is

GILES MOHAN 85

P N D C

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FIGURe 2. The organizational structure of Ghana's local government system.

86

80

Adjustment and decentralization in Ghana

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• Korea

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Malawi •

G h a n a • Chile •

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Gam0i~ • Sri Lanka •

30 50 70 90

Own-source revenue (as % of gross revenuel

Source • World Bank 1989

FIGURE 3. Ghana's relative position in terms of local government financing.

spent through local governments, placing Ghana 37th out of a sample of 38 countries

(Figure 3). Local revenues are not adequate to make up for this shortfall. Data showed that the

average per capita revenue in 1988 was Cedis 261 (approximately £0.40). The main

source of revenue comes from market fees, but fixed and sizeable markets are only found

in the few medium-sized towns. The result is a fiscal gap which limits the ability of the

assemblies to provide decent services. As the World Bank Mission noted:

This declining ability of local government to invest in infrastructure and other public goods has led to an erosion of public confidence in the ability of district authorities to promote development, and has consequently affected their ability to raise resources . . . . [therefore]... districts will need to look to the centre for an infusion of resources to finance their development projects. (World Bank,

1989:24-25

The World Bank document argues that fiscal decentralization is necessary and

recommends other revenue sources, the most crucial of which is user charges (World Bank,

GILES MO~N 87

1989: 35). They claim that 'there would be no shift in relative rewards to other activities, simply a substitution of expenditure from other goods or from s a v i n g . . , the payment would be fair, since it would depend on the benefit received' (World Bank, 1989: 35). However, they are at pains to stress that 'the poorest members of society may not be able to afford some se rv ices . . . [hence] . . . Whenever user charges can not be levied for practical political reasons, taxes will have to be levied for public services' (World Bank, 1989: 35).

Two comments should be made at this stage. First, so-called 'cost recovery' methods have alredy been introduced in the health and education sectors (Gould, 1990; Waddington and Enyimayew, 1990) without much recall to practical and political rationality. A second and related point concerns how the World Bank defines 'political reasons', since not only are its policies implemented without referral to the public, but the PNDC with whom it works is not a representational government nor have state officials shown much accountability in the past. While such things sound fairly innocuous on paper, the realities of user charges will never benefit the poorest group, into which the vast majority of rural dwellers fall.

The Ministry of Local Government has wholeheartedly adopted these principles. For example, the Local Government Information Digest stated that user charges were needed 'to recover in part or in whole the cost of providing, maintaining and improving upon the quality or extending/expanding the se rv ice . . . [which] . . . ensure fairness in the distribution of the cost recovery or tax burden among the target groups' (Ministry of Local Government, 1991: 17). Clearly, decentralization is being used as part and parcel of broader changes aimed at reducing state activity in the economy and thereby encouraging private investment.

Organizational difficulties. Another area of concern comes from the organizational relationship between the assembly and the administration. Despite the aim of fusing the two strands of government, evidence shows that at the district level there is weak coordination. There are a number of examples of the assembly implementing a scheme without recall to the technical experts in the decentralized government departments. This has produced costly and inefficient mistakes. For example, a cassava-processing plant was built at the other end of the district from the cassava-growing areas, which entailed large transportation costs. At no point was the town planning department consulted. Similarly, the assembly in one district set up a cattle farm, but did not consult the well- qualified veterinary officer. Consequently, it bought three cows at inflated prices and one of the females was barren so that the planned breeding programme was set back.

A similar problem emerges in the political forum of the assembly. Assembly members are not paid so any assembly business has to be self-financed. This ultimately discourages participation, as shown by falling turnouts at the quarterly assembly meetings. Similarly, the district secretary is a PNDC appointee and is very powerful within the assembly, which ultimately compromises autonomy. As one civil servant stated: 'Policy emanates from the district secretary-- the district secretary is very powerful' (personal communication, 15 December 1990). An assembly man described the district secretary as being above the presiding member, while the civil servant cited above added that assembly members 'would never overrule a decision by the district secretary despite having the power to do so. Generally they just make suggestions'. Hence, the presence of the government appointee compromises the assemblies' autonomy.

The locality. At the village another set of conflicts emerge. First, the unit committees have been hijacked by the CDRs. As we saw, the CDRs were set up by the PNDC in the early


1980s and have held official political pr imacy for a decade• The unit committees are des igned to make the relationship be tween the district and the grassroots more formal. As Kwamina Ahwoi, the Secretary for Local Government, stated: 'No matter the new institutions we introduce (i.e., the district assemblies and unit c o m m i t t e e s ) - - o n e point never changes--CADRES DEFEND THE REVOLUTION' (Ministry of Local Government, 1989: 15). Hence 'the first thing to do is distinguish the new democrat ic institution of the district assembly as a structure of state from the CDR as a structure of the revolution, a mass organ for that matter' (Ministry of Local Government, 1989: 15). To clarify this the district secretary is head of the district mass movement and on the district assembly, while the district organising assistant (DOA) of CDRs and other recognized cadres are members of the district assembly. Clearly there is confusion over the role of these new committees and fieldwork showed that the CDR members have simply installed themselves in the unit committees through a variety of fraudulent methods.

Secondly, with respect to local projects 2 a number of interesting patterns emerged. The most striking feature is that communit ies largely ignore the district assemblies• As one assembly member pointed out: 'If they [the communities] have enough resources to carry out the project themselves then no reference has to be made to the assembly' (personal communicat ion, 12 November 1990)• Only when communit ies bel ieve they can get money from the assembly do they approach it. A senior civil servant in one district admitted that 'most peop le have forgotten we have district assemblies ' (personal communication, 17 February 1991), and that they have created awareness but 'apart from that. What? Propaganda ' . The case studies confirmed an increasing disengagement of communi ty-based deve lopment from the formal state structures. The formal structures put in place to link the localities with the district administration have been badly implemented and polit icized by the CDRs, who are clinging to an ever-decreasing power base. These communites look inward or, where possible, to non-governmental organizations. These initiatives in turn undermine the local state because revenue circulates within the village. The overall effect is the spiralling fiscal gap ment ioned above.

Decentralization and democratization

We have already seen that the assembly elections were contested on a supposedly non- partisan basis. In mid-1989 the PNDC began a process of national democratization. This was coordinated by the National Commission for Democracy (NCD), which was established to promote political education. However, since it was a creation of the PNDC it s imply acted as a p ropaganda organ. For example, when the PNDC announced the decentralization programme, the NCD publ ished a pseudo-academic document which

stated:

• . . the country cannot talk of representation at the national level until and unless all our government units are in place and functioning properly. It is at this level that we can learn very quickly to give and demand accountability as we prepare to link the lower units with the centre without losing touch with our local power base completely. (NCD, undated: 6).

In 1989 the NCD was also involved in organizing regional forums to discuss the future of Ghana 's political system. Not surprisingly they concluded that a non-party system based on the district assemblies as electoral colleges was the best system. Since the assemblies are implicitly pro-PNDC this amounted to desperate attempt to prolong their unconstitu-

GILES MOHAN 89

tional position but with the veneer of democracy. As Herbst (1993: 56) notes, 'the Rawlings government, not dependent on the electorate for gaining or retaining power, was uncomfortable with the prospect of actually developing real political support for the changes it had wrought' .

However, largely as a result of donor pressure, Ghana was forced to hold national, multi-party elections in November 1992. Chairman Rawlings won the country's presidential elections (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993; Nugent, 1993) and his party, the National Democratic Congress, also took the parliamentary elections unopposed since opposition parties boycotted the elections. Hence, Rawlings and his party have maintained one-party rule and, if elections are any indicator, proved their legitimacy. There is debate as to whether Rawlings won the elections because of positive support- building or whether the oppostion simply did not offer a convincing alternative.

Following the elections the decentralization programme was suspended until the government 'settled in'. To date the all-important devolution of decision-making has not been resumed, despite the assemblies being recognized in the 1992 Constitution. This suggests that the initial impetus for decentralization was for reasons of political credibility. The second round of assembly elections was held early in 1994 and, as Table 1 shows, turnout was much lower at an average of 26.02 percent. This suggests that without the large public education campaign and with five years of poor results the electorate have lost interest in the assemblies. The only significant change is the setting up of a District Common Fund which will channel not less than 5 percent of national revenue to the districts. However, the formula for disbursal is not transparent and the institutional capacity may not be there to administer such large sums of money. Additionally, some commentators see it as a 'bribe' to the electorate for the 1996 elections looming on the political horizon.

Conclusion

This study has shown that the PNDC government was forced into a dual ideological play whereby it attempted to satisfy local and global calls for political restructuring. The decentralization programme gave the impression of democracy and the assemblies offered an avenue for a national democratic body that would prolong the tenure of the PNDC. Hence, neo-liberal discourse became internalized by political leaders.

The adjustment programme emphasized stabilizing the balance of payments so that local government became the focus for 'fiscal decentralization'. Local financial accountability seemingly fits with notions of devolution, but the political aspects of decentralization, namely participation and democracy, are not central to this process, although the semblance of political order is vital for countries wishing to attract inward investment. This domination of the policy process by the lenders can be seen as part of what Slater (1989) refers to as the mask of decentralization, whereby it is used to promote deregulation and privatization.

The adjustment programme's austerity measures also placed financial pressures on critical social groups. The ensuing legitimacy crisis that the PNDC faced forced the revitalization of the decentralization programme of 1982. This is a clear example of what Slater (1989) refers to as decentralization as myth: that is, a situation where no real decision-making power is vested in the people so that the transfer of administration only serves to strengthen the central state. Ideological discourses about empowerment, participation and welfare (Mullard, 1987) are used to legitimate the state's fragile hegemony.


For the study of globalization this points to the fact that the national level is still relevant. Far from losing salience it has become the level at which neo-liberalism is brokered, negotiated and implemented. This creates yet another paradox for the African state 'whereby the I.M.E requires a strong state in order to implement structural adjustment programmes, while weakening the government with its conditionalities' (Riddell, 1992: 61). Contrary to pure neo-liberal doctrine, which stresses market over state, certain parts of the state are strengthened, especially the technocratic elements in the finance ministries. In reality neo-liberalism restructures political institutions but they still remain a necessary link in the chain of causality. In both cases these tendencies increase centralization.

As Slater remarks, 'so long as the issues of national self determination and popular sovereignty are suppressed, or replaced by circumscribed discussions of local and regional government, the realities of power and domination will tend to be occluded' (Slater, 1989: 520). This opens up debates about the role of decentralization for development trajectories and counter-hegemonic strategies. These emerge at the local, national and regional levels.

Most generally political activity should be fostered at the local level. The Ghanaian study showed that local social structures are capable of organizing and promoting social change. If these structures are to be enabled in a systematic way and not in the existing ad boc manner then there is a need for some space-transcending structure. In the absence of any other institutions it seems that the much maligned nation-state could provide the necessary framework for incorporating and guiding these social structures. This is especially important if we wish to avoid excessive normativism in development planning and a situation where fiscal decentralization penalizes those authorities most in need of financial assistance. This then points to more rather than less decentralization.

In addressing similar problems in Tanzania, Samoff (1979) warned that

• . . the mobilisation of the energies of Africa's population requires a challenge to the structure of Africa's political economy. The peasantry cannot end its poverty without attacking the causes of its impoverishment• And that task is neither administrative nor technical. (Samoff, 1979: 57)

Hence, a more decentralized state apparatus alone will not tackle deeper structural problems. One of the main difficulties confronting countries like Ghana is the narrow and externally directed economic base which structural adjustment programmes only encourage. Paradoxically, the type of purposive state action that is required to alter this situation is precisely what structural adjustment discourages. It is this central dilemma which points towards a reassertion of sovereignty that the programmes have eroded,

If we are living in a 'post-Westphalian' world then the hope of regaining any sort of sovereignty is narrow. Similarly, we have noted that the state-market dichotomy is too simplistic. In general, Africanists are pessimistic about the state in Africa, but there is evidence of a slight shift (see Rapley, 1994). The argument regards the possibilities of the 'developmental ' state which is purposive but does not become predatory. While analysts are reluctant to prescribe the precise features of the developmental state, they stress two important preconditions: first, an autonomous civil service which is at the disposal of the executive (Brett, 1988); secondly, as in Cote d'Ivoire, a more productive allegiance between state and capital. The state's role should be semi-autonomous in that the governing class are dependent on accumulation, but also retain sufficient authority to discipline businesses. It may be here that structural adjustment programmes produce some beneficial change by clearing the political undergrowth for coordinated development planning and regulation.

GILES MOHAN 91

At the regional level there have been some notable efforts to redirect adjustment away

from the lender 's agenda. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) produced the Lagos Plan in 1980 while the United Nation's Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) brought out an Alternative Framework to Adjustment in 1989. The Lagos Plan emphas ized de- linking from existing supra-national institutional arrangements and forming Africa- centred ones. The UNECA report focused on domestic policy and argued against the neo- classical assumptions of structural adjustment programmes. While the tone of both reports was justifiably aggressive, some of the recommendat ions were vague, especially on the role of the state (Herbst, 1993). This points to a critical reappraisal of the state's role, as outl ined above.

It may be that eventually 'smaller and more meaningful entities operat ing within larger regional structures may sooner or later replace a number of African states' (Riddell, 1992: 59-60). Bratton (1989: 425) is perhaps more realistic when he claims that 'the state in Africa may be incompletely formed, weak, and retreating, but it's not going to whither away'. Only once political debate has been fostered might this process begin and again that might involve strengthening the state in the short to medium term. The key at a number of socio-spatial scales would seem to be 'an adequate allocation of responsibili- ties be tween communal , regional and national authorities as wel las p roper co-ordination of their activities' (Perrin, 1988, cited in Jessop, 1993: 19). The model is one of decentralization within a negotiated and sovereign centralization.

Notes

1. There is considerable evidence to suggest that Rawlings was backed by a group of indigenous businessmen who would benefit from strengthened international linkages. This contradicts the image of a spontaneous anti-imperialist coup that the PNDC sought to portray.

2. A field survey of six villages was carried out in two districts in South-Central Ghana between August 1990 and March 1991.

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Adjustment and decentralization in Ghana: a case of diminished sovereignty

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