Acting on climate finance pledges: Inter-agency dynamics and relationships with aid in contributor...

World Development Vol. 68, pp. 149–162, 20150305-750X/� 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddevhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.10.033

Acting on Climate Finance Pledges: Inter-Agency Dynamics

and Relationships with Aid in Contributor States

JONATHAN PICKERING a, JAKOB SKOVGAARD b, SOYEUN KIM c, J. TIMMONS ROBERTS d,DAVID ROSSATI e, MARTIN STADELMANN f and HENDRIKJE REICH g,*

a Australian National University, Canberra, Australiab Lund University, Sweden

c Sogang University, Seoul, South Koread Brown University, Providence, USA

e University of Edinburgh, UKf University of Zurich, Switzerlandg University of Potsdam, Germany

Summary. — Developed countries have relied heavily on aid budgets to fulfill their pledges to boost funding for addressing climatechange in developing countries. However, little is known about how interaction between aid and other ministries has shaped contribu-tors’ diverse approaches to climate finance. This paper investigates intra-governmental dynamics in decision-making on climate financein seven contributor countries (Australia, Denmark, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the UK, and the US). While aid agencies retainedconsiderable control over implementation, environment and finance ministries have played an influential and often contrasting roleon key policy issues, including distribution between mitigation and adaptation and among geographical regions.� 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Key words — climate policy, climate finance, development assistance, bureaucratic politics

* For helpful comments we gratefully acknowledge Harro van Asselt,

Smita Nakhooda, Erik Lundsgaarde, two anonymous reviewers for our

submission to World Development, and participants at the Tokyo Earth

System Governance Conference in January 2013, where we presented an

earlier version of this paper. Final revision accepted: October 31, 2014.

1. INTRODUCTION

Longstanding debates over whether and how aid maysupport developing countries’ efforts to address climate changehave intensified since 2009, when developed countries signifi-cantly raised the ambition of their funding commitments.Under the Copenhagen Accord, developed countries promisedcollectively to provide “fast-start” climate finance approaching$30 billion during 2010–12, and to “mobiliz[e] jointly” US$100billion a year in climate finance by 2020 (UNFCCC, 2009).The scale of the long-term commitment is significant whencompared with current Official Development Assistance(ODA 1) flows of around $135 billion in 2013 (OECD,2014). This commitment reflected growing international recog-nition that an effective global response to climate changerequires considerably greater funding for developing countriesto limit or mitigate their growing share of global greenhousegas emissions, as well as measures to enable them to adaptto the increasingly apparent impacts of climate change.

Much climate finance is currently sourced from existing aidcommitments and flows through a decentralized system dom-inated by a large number of bilateral aid agencies and a seriesof multilateral funds. Over the longer term, institutional inno-vations such as the UN’s new flagship Green Climate Fund(GCF) may help reduce fragmentation in the governance ofclimate finance. However, the United Nations FrameworkConvention on Climate Change (UNFCCC; Art 11(5)) andmore recent decisions under the UNFCCC vest individualcontributing countries with significant discretion over howthey deliver on their commitments. Consequently, in keepingwith the more “bottom-up” (or nationally driven) approachto climate change mitigation witnessed since Copenhagen

149

(Keohane & Victor, 2011), the diverse approaches of contrib-uting countries are likely to have a continuing role in shapingthe “landscape” (Buchner et al., 2013) of climate finance.

Some analysis has explored the role of relations between con-tributor and recipient countries in shaping this landscape (seee.g., Ciplet, Roberts, & Khan, 2013) or compared contributors’positions on aspects of climate finance (e.g., Michaelowa &Michaelowa, 2011; Nakhooda, Fransen, Kuramochi et al.,2013; Stadelmann, Michaelowa, & Roberts, 2013). Much lessresearch has addressed the influence of political and economicfactors within individual governments. For both contributorand recipient countries, climate finance represents a complexexample of national decision-making, since it engages an arrayof ministries, departments and implementing agencies (whichwe will refer to generically as “ministries”) ranging from envi-ronment and climate change through to development, foreignaffairs, and finance. However, little is known about variationsin inter-agency configurations within the governments of indi-vidual contributors or the preferences of different agencies thatmay have influenced those configurations. Nor—despite thefact that contributors count the bulk of their climate financeas aid—has existing research systematically identified the spe-cific dimensions along which contributors’ climate financeand aid practices 2 align or differ.

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150 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

Analyzing how intra-governmental dynamics have influ-enced decision-making on climate finance so far is crucialfor understanding how this area is likely to develop in thefuture, and how likely it is that recipients’ demands in this con-text will be met. In addition, comparative analysis of climatefinance and aid practices can inform scholarly understandingof how non-development ministries influence developmentpractice, and how different institutional standpoints may giverise to varying understandings of the contested concept ofadaptation and its relationship to development.

In this article we seek to improve understanding about thedynamics of decision-making on climate finance in key contrib-utor countries. Our analysis proceeds by exploring (i) the differ-ing views of ministries on key policy and implementation issuesin climate finance; and (ii) the extent to which contributors’practices on these issues differ from their practices on relatedaid issues. Drawing on literature from bureaucratic politicsand development policy, we develop preliminary insights thatmay explain why ministries’ views differ within individual coun-tries; and why the relative influence of ministries within contrib-utor governments may lead contributors’ practices on climatefinance to differ from both their own aid practices and the cli-mate finance practices of other contributors. Our research isbased on interviews with government officials from seven con-tributor states—Australia, Denmark, Germany, Japan, Swit-zerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States—andquantitative comparison of key indicators of climate financeand aid for these states. Our findings address selected outcomesof the global climate change regime (that is, behavioral changein contributor countries flowing from implanting their interna-tional commitments) as opposed to the outputs of the regime(i.e., the UNFCCC’s provisions on climate finance) or itsimpacts (the effectiveness of regime outcomes on addressing cli-mate change within developing countries; our terminology heredraws on Young, 2001, pp. 114–115).

The article is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out aworking definition of climate finance and outlines the complexinstitutional architecture of climate finance and its relationshipto aid against the backdrop of existing literature on climatefinance. Section 3 sets out a conceptual framework for analyz-ing inter-agency dynamics in the national governance ofclimate finance. Section 4 then discusses our methods, andreport and compare the results of our interviews with govern-ment officials. Section 5 explores the main insights emergingfrom our results, focusing on typical configurations of inter-agency dynamics that are identifiable across several countriesand areas of greatest conflict and agreement, and offeringpreliminary explanations for our main findings. Section 6concludes while proposing directions for further inquiry in thisnew area of research.

We find that disagreement among ministries has largelycentered on the balance between mitigation and adaptationsupport and the criteria applicable to allocating funds amongrecipient countries. In some cases, inter-agency differencesover the role of mitigation and adaptation reflect different con-ceptualizations of these terms, while in other cases ministriesappear to hold shared interpretations of the terms but assignthem different priorities based on their organizational man-dates. Despite contributors’ climate finance practices display-ing considerable similarities with their aid practices, somedifferences are notable. Some of these differences may beattributable to the greater involvement of other ministries—and the consequent diminishing policy influence of develop-ment ministries and in some cases environment ministries—in policy-making on climate finance as its monetary valueand political importance has increased in recent years.

2. THE CONTESTED RISE OF CLIMATE FINANCEWITHIN A FRAGMENTED GOVERNANCE

ARCHITECTURE

(a) Climate finance: scope of analysis

As we elaborate below (Sections 2(b) and 5(c)), the questionof what constitutes “climate finance” is itself contestedinternationally. However, for working purposes we adoptthe following definition: “financial flows mobilized by industri-alized country governments and private entities that supportclimate change mitigation and adaptation in developing coun-tries” (Stadelmann et al., 2013, p. 720).

We focus on public flows of climate finance mobilized underdeveloped countries’ pledges of fast-start finance over 2010–12. As Nakhooda, Fransen, Kuramochi et al. (2013, p. 4)observe, the fast-start period “was intended to inform futureefforts to scale up the delivery of long-term climate finance,and many of the approaches that have been adopted maypoint the way to future practices”. Consequently, other flowsof climate finance—including through market-based instru-ments such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM;on which an extensive literature has emerged: see Paulsson,2009) and private investment—remain beyond the scope ofthe present article. While the private sector provided themajority of climate finance in 2012 (62% or US$224 billion),much of it was enabled by public finance, with the lattermaking up 38% of climate finance in the same year (US$135billion (Buchner et al., 2013)). Public flows of climate financemay fulfill important roles through mobilizing private financeby reducing investment risks and generating knowledge,as well as through addressing climate-related needs incountries and sectors (especially relating to adaptation) thatstruggle to attract private investment (Bowen, 2011, pp.1021–1022).

Although a substantial literature has emerged on nationaldecision-making in international development assistance (seeSection 3), far less scholarly research has addressedclimate finance (for significant collections see Haites, 2013;Michaelowa, 2012; Stewart, Kingsbury, & Rudyk, 2009).None, as far as we know, investigates national decision-making by contributor countries in this area. Here wehighlight two important and related dimensions that havecharacterized the emerging global architecture for climatefinance: normative contestation between developed anddeveloping countries regarding the relationship between cli-mate finance and development assistance; and the frag-mented nature of the global architecture for governingclimate finance. As subsequent sections will show, thesedimensions together provide considerable scope for varyingapproaches within and across governments of contributingcountries.

(b) Normative contestation over climate finance and aid

The current climate finance architecture has emerged againstthe backdrop of longstanding differences between developedand developing countries over the nature of climate financeand its relationship to aid. Here we highlight two notablepoints of difference among countries: the objectives and obli-gations underlying each type of funding; and attitudes towardfunding for global public goods or local needs.

First, developing countries have persistently argued thatclimate finance should be treated differently from developmentassistance, since it is based on a distinct obligation flowingfrom developed countries’ disproportionate contribution to

ACTING ON CLIMATE FINANCE PLEDGES: INTER-AGENCY DYNAMICS AND RELATIONSHIPS 151

climate change, whereas aid is based primarily on theresponsibility of the wealthy to assist the poor (Moore,2012; Ciplet et al., 2013). For these reasons, developing coun-tries have argued that climate finance should be: generatedaccording to effort-sharing arrangements different from thosefor aid; “additional” in the sense of supplementary to existingaid commitments (Stadelmann, Roberts, & Michaelowa,2011); delivered through channels separate from aid; anddelivered in a way that reflects developing countries’ “entitle-ment” to funds, that is, with minimal conditions attachedand preferably in the form of grants rather than loans(Schalatek, 2012; Werksman, 2009). Developed countries, bycontrast, have argued for a more integrated approach to cli-mate finance and aid, often emphasizing the complementari-ties between addressing climate change and promotingdevelopment (Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2007).

This contention over the relationship between climatefinance and aid echoes a debate in the literature (upon whichwe elaborate in Section 5(c)) over how to conceptualize adap-tation and its relationship to development and mitigation. Onthe one hand, the need to adapt to climate change generatesfunding needs that are additional to those for pre-existingdevelopment challenges (Narain, Margulis, & Essam, 2011).Moreover, while some mitigation actions may promote bothadaptation and development (as where reducing deforestationmay help to protect watersheds and control floods), otheractions may generate tensions among these objectives (forexample if biofuel production reduces food security) (Moser,2012). On the other hand numerous scholars have underscoredthat promoting resilience to external shocks—including bothhuman-induced and pre-existing climatic variability—needsto be integrated with ongoing development efforts (Burton,2004; Smith et al., 2011; Khan & Roberts, 2013). Accordingly,some commentators view adaptation as “development in amore hostile climate” (Stern, 2009, p. 68). In addition to theseconceptual differences, pragmatic considerations have nodoubt also influenced these contrasting positions, withdeveloping countries seeking to maximize the resourcesavailable to them, and developed countries seeking to mini-mize the fiscal impacts of their international financingcommitments.

A second area of difference between developed and develop-ing countries concerns the type of climate finance that they seeas most important. Many developing countries have called foran even split between mitigation and adaptation finance, whiledeveloped countries have generally expressed a stronger inter-est in contributing mitigation finance (Stadelmann, Brown, &Hornlein, 2012, p. 134). A prominent reason for this differenceis that adaptation finance primarily provides local or regionalprivate or public goods to recipient countries, while mitigationfinance provides a global public good (in the form of a safeclimate) that benefits contributors and recipients alike(Rubbelke, 2011). While some conventional aid also providesinternational public goods—such as infectious disease controland development of new crop varieties—its justification fordoing so is contested, and such funding is typically seen tobe competing with funding that is primarily or exclusivelyoriented toward beneficiaries in developing countries (Kaul& Goulven, 2003).

(c) Navigating vague and contested commitments within afragmented institutional architecture

As noted above (see also Section 4(f) for details), a widerange of bilateral, multilateral, philanthropic and commercialactors are involved in delivering climate finance (Stadelmann

et al., 2012; see also Greene, 2004). The fast-start financepackage was assembled relatively rapidly, with the result thatcontributors relied heavily on existing aid institutions for itsdelivery. Even once the Green Climate Fund is operational(which will be no earlier than late 2014), contributors intendto rely on other channels for a substantial share of overall cli-mate financing (Ciplet et al., 2013). Thus, over the short tomedium term, governance of climate finance is likely toremain largely decentralized (Ballesteros, Nakhooda,Werksman, & Hulburt, 2010, p. 268; compare Keohane &Victor, 2011).

Indeterminate language in UNFCCC decisions on contestedissues has tended to entrench the fragmentation of climatefinance. Some broad agreed parameters include that climatefinance should be “new and additional”, “balanced” betweenadaptation and mitigation, and generated “from a range ofsources” over the longer term (UNFCCC, 2009, Paragraph8; (UNFCCC, 2011, Paragraph 95). However, due to lack ofpolitical agreement, there remains neither a universally agreeddefinition of climate finance or its constituent objectives(Streck & Chagas, 2011, p. 351), nor consensus on how partiesshould interpret and apply agreed parameters.

The fragmented architecture yields two implications for thenational decision-making processes we will study in this arti-cle. First, the current degree of fragmentation has left consid-erable discretion to contributor countries as to how toimplement climate finance, particularly how to interpret issuesthat are contested in the negotiations. Second, the discretiongiven to contributors in turn allows considerable scope forindividual ministries to influence the outcome of decisionson climate finance. We now turn to this second aspect in moredetail.

3. INTER-AGENCY DYNAMICS IN GOVERNINGINTERNATIONAL FUNDING COMMITMENTS

(a) National decision-making on climate finance: an overview

The scant literature on contributor nations’ approaches toclimate finance mostly seeks to map and compare existing pol-icies and programs, either for climate finance as a whole(Buchner et al., 2013), a subset of climate finance (e.g., fast-start finance: Nakhooda, Fransen, Kuramochi et al., 2013),or on particular policy issues faced by contributors such asadditionality (Stadelmann et al., 2011) and methods for classi-fying aid activities as climate-related (Michaelowa &Michaelowa, 2011). The literature highlights considerablediversity among contributors on key policy issues and institu-tional arrangements for delivering climate finance, includingeffort-sharing, understandings of additionality, allocation pri-orities and choices about delivery channels, and financinginstruments. Most of this research does not seek to explainsuch variations, but some analysis points to the relevance ofinternal political factors. Michaelowa and Michaelowa(2011), for example, argue that the tendency of contributorsto miscode aid activities as climate-related (which on averagetends to overestimate the climate-related share of their aidbudgets) might be due to internal factors within each contrib-utor state, such as aid ministries’ responsiveness to publicinterest in the issue of climate change. Halimanjaya andPapyrakis (2012) find that countries with higher domestic envi-ronmental expenditure and higher aid budgets tend to supplymore climate finance.

The literature surveyed so far highlights two major gaps thatwe seek to address in this article. First, little is understood


about how decision-making takes place in contributor coun-tries and how different government actors influence policy out-comes. In particular, much of the existing literature focusesprimarily on quantitative analysis or broader comparativeanalysis of policy documents, rather than on a more fine-grained analysis of inter-agency dynamics. Second, to theextent that the literature discusses the relationship betweenclimate finance and aid, little is known about how dynamicsbetween the ministries that respectively govern these two typesof funding inform that relationship. The remainder of thissection discusses how the literature on bureaucratic politicscan help to address these gaps.

(b) The influence of bureaucratic politics on policy outcomes

The public choice literature on government decision-makinghas underscored the interests of bureaucratic entities in maxi-mizing their discretionary power through increasing the size oftheir budgets (Muller, 2003, pp. 359–385). But in order toexplain the more complex range of interests that bureaucraciesappear to pursue in practice, public policy scholars havestressed the importance of organizational culture, particularlyhow officials from different institutions perceive policy prob-lems in varying ways and influence policy processes accord-ingly (Drezner, 2000; Kingdon, 2003). According to thisview, each ministry acts to pursue its specific “mission”. Attimes its mission may point in the same direction as budgetmaximization but at other times may not. Importantly, thisstrand of the bureaucratic politics literature emphasizes thatorganizational culture encompasses not only overarching val-ues that shape the ministry’s perspective on what is desirable,but also beliefs about the salient features of specific policyissues and the causal relations underpinning them (March &Olsen, 1989, p. 124; Martinsen & Jørgensen, 2010, p. 744).Consequently, disagreements among ministries can be harderto solve according to this perspective than according to thepublic choice literature, which defines such overlaps in termsof distributive games.

Importantly, the responsibilities of different ministries oftenoverlap on specific policy issues. Particularly new issues—ofwhich climate finance is one—may provoke contestationregarding how the issue should be addressed and by whichagency (Kingdon, 2003). Scholars of bureaucratic politicswidely agree that the institutional avenues for accommodatingministries’ varying preferences may have a significant influenceon policy outcomes, including: which agency holds responsi-bility for steering the policy; which ministries are involved indecision-making and what roles they play; the extent to whichdecision-making processes are centralized among one or a fewministries or fragmented among many; and whether decision-making processes and power relations are hierarchical or col-legial between ministries (Egeberg, 2012; Kaarbo, 1998).

Of all institutional configurations that could provide analo-gies with the bureaucratic politics of climate finance, aid isarguably the most relevant due to the common element ofcross-border transfers of public resources from developedcountries for the intended benefit of developing countries.While the predominantly quantitative literature on determi-nants of aid allocation has analyzed a range of domestic polit-ical factors (compare Therien & Noel, 2000; Tingley, 2010),the way in which aid policy and implementation is organizedwithin government bureaucracy has received much less atten-tion, possibly due to the difficulty of formulating correspond-ing quantitative variables (Faust, 2008). While some publicchoice analyses of aid address factors internal to bureaucraciessuch as principal-agent concerns and incentive structures

for public officials (e.g., Gibson, Andersson, Ostrom, &Shivakumar, 2005), relatively few analyses provide insightson inter-agency dynamics from the perspective of bureaucraticpolitics (notable exceptions include Drezner, 2000; Lancaster,2007; Lundsgaarde, 2013). Nevertheless, it is plausible to thinkthat organizational factors are likely to play as significant aninfluence on aid policy outcomes as on other policy outcomesstudied in the bureaucratic politics literature (Lancaster, 2007,p. 7).

In the remaining sections we draw on findings from the lit-erature on bureaucratic politics and aid to develop hypothesesfor climate finance on two areas: (a) the substantive positionsthat ministries are likely to adopt; and (b) the relative influenceof different ministries on policy outcomes.

(c) Theorizing agencies’ positions

In the sub-field of bureaucratic politics research relating tobudgetary politics it is common to draw a distinction betweenministries that are “guardians” of public revenue and thosethat are “advocates” of spending (Wildavsky, 1986). Financeministries and sometimes other central ministries typicallyplay the role of guardians. Other ministries with specific mis-sions—such as aid agencies, whose primary avowed missionis typically to promote international development and reducepoverty—tend to play the role of advocates for expenditureon their respective missions (t’Hart and Wille, 2012, p. 371).Aid donors vary significantly in the extent to which their aidprograms in general and their environmental aid in particularpursue altruistic (developmental) rather than self-interested(diplomatic or commercial) purposes (Berthelemy, 2006;Lewis, 2003; Hicks, Parks, Roberts, & Tierney, 2008). Thisvariation may be attributable not only to differences in the rel-ative power of aid ministries across countries (as discussedbelow) but also to the different ways in which aid ministriesthemselves interpret the mission they advocate.

In the area of climate finance, bilateral development agen-cies have traditionally played a pivotal role in implementation,but more recently other ministries (notably environment andfinance) have increasingly taken a stronger interest in this area(Skovgaard, 2012). We hypothesize the missions of differentministries on climate finance as follows:

(i) Both aid and environment ministries are likely to playthe role of advocates of spending on climate finance,since climate finance may help to promote each agen-cies’ respective missions of international developmentand environmental protection.

However, differences in agencies’ missions are likely to influ-ence the type of spending they are likely to advocate:

(ii) The development-oriented mission of aid ministries islikely to predispose them more than other ministriestoward adaptation finance (which primarily benefitsrecipient countries) and the positions of recipient coun-tries on policy and implementation issues.

The mission of environment ministries, by contrast, encom-passes both domestic and international environmental protec-tion objectives. In addition, many environment ministries leadtheir national delegations in the UNFCCC negotiations. Thus:

(iii) Environment ministries are likely to seek to use climatefinance as a bargaining chip to achieve their environ-mental mission (preventing dangerous climate change),with a preference for mitigation finance (which gener-ates domestic as well as global benefits).

Finally, as Skovgaard (2012) notes, finance ministriesinvolved in climate policy may either aim to minimize short-term costs to the state budget (Muller, 2009) or to minimize


long-term costs to the economy as a whole. Both positionswould be consistent with a broad understanding of their roleas guardians of the treasury. Accordingly:

(iv) Finance ministries’ mission to limit public expenditureand optimize long-term growth will lead them to seekeither to minimize the amount spent on climatefinance, or to prioritize mitigation over adaptation.

A further practical reason for both environment and financeministries to prefer mitigation over adaptation may be theirdepth of experience in domestic policy-making in each of theseareas. Moser, for example, argues that since many govern-ments have considerably greater practical experience in emis-sions reductions than in adaptation, “adaptation planningand actions typically fall into an uneven policy landscape”and struggle to achieve equal priority with mitigation(Moser, 2012).

(d) Power dynamics and inter-agency configurations

Lancaster’s qualitative study on the domestic politics of for-eign aid, which includes five major donor countries covered inour analysis (Denmark, Germany, Japan, UK and the US),highlights a considerable degree of variation in the institu-tional configurations and relative influence of key ministriesinvolved in aid policy and implementation (Lancaster, 2007).Lancaster concludes that the extent to which donors pursuedevelopmental (rather than self-interested) purposes dependson whether the aid ministry is represented independently atministerial or cabinet level (as in the UK and Germany),and whether decision-making is fragmented among manyactors (as in Japan and the US). However, she finds that anaid program may still pursue a strongly developmentalpurpose even if integrated within another ministry (such asForeign Affairs, as in the case of Denmark) provided thatthe ministry’s own mission is similarly development-oriented(Lancaster, 2007, p. 220).

Accordingly, in the area of climate finance we expect that(v) Central agencies (in particular finance and foreign

affairs ministries), and aid and environment ministrieswith ministerial or cabinet level representation, will havegreater influence over climate finance policy than otherministries.

While this characterization is likely to apply to policy deci-sions, less powerful implementing agencies may neverthelessbe able to use their expertise to retain decision-making powerover technical and implementation decisions (Kaarbo, 1998, p.83). For these reasons, we may expect that:

(vi) Regardless of their status in the hierarchy of bureau-cratic policy-making, aid ministries will retain consid-erable influence over the implementation of climatefinance.

Our final set of hypotheses addresses the degree of similaritybetween climate finance and aid within contributor countries.Following from (ii) and (v), we may expect that:

(vii) A contributor’s climate finance and aid policies arelikely to diverge as ministries whose missions stronglydiffer from those of aid ministries become moreinvolved in decision-making on climate finance thanthey are on aid.

Thus we may expect that aid and climate finance policieswill be more closely aligned in countries where foreign policypriorities already substantially inform aid, whether those pri-orities display a greater orientation toward national interests(as in Japan, the US and to some extent Australia) or towarddevelopment (such as Denmark). Finally, following from (vi),we may expect with regard to implementation that:

(viii) A contributor’s institutional practices for implement-ing climate finance will reflect those that it adopts foraid generally.

4. DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY

By examining a series of seven national case studies, we seekto assess the nature and extent of different ministries’ influenceon national climate finance policy in order to test the hypoth-eses outlined above. Reflecting the need for qualitativeanalysis to address these hypotheses, our methods included areview of the secondary literature on climate finance, keyinformant interviews in each country, and a review of nationalreporting on climate finance, including fast-start financereports. The qualitative analysis is supplemented by and trian-gulated against a snapshot of key quantitative indicators onclimate finance and aid for each country (Table 2).

We sought to capture most of the main contributors to cli-mate finance, especially to fast-start finance, but we alsowished to compare some smaller contributors and to capitalizeupon the authors’ professional contacts with officials. In defin-ing the substantive scope of analysis, we sought to cover arange of themes that (i) were representative of the main areasfor national decision-making in climate finance, ranging fromissues of high policy importance domestically or internation-ally to those of a more technical or implementation nature;and (ii) enabled a comparison of practices between climatefinance and aid.

We conducted a total of 29 interviews, primarily betweenAugust 2012 and January 2013. 3 In all countries we inter-viewed personnel from the lead ministry on climate financepolicy, in addition to personnel from other ministries involvedin policy and/or implementation. As contributors’ overall cli-mate finance policies have been driven by ministries based intheir respective national capitals—and given the focus of ouranalysis on regime outcomes rather than impacts—we limitedour coverage of interviews to officials based in nationalheadquarters rather than in recipient countries.

For the interviews we developed a 21-question interviewscript organized around seven general themes spanning thegovernance, generation and delivery of funds. Theme (a)addressed overall governance arrangements, including howdifferent agencies interacted, which agency led the charge onclimate finance, and their degree of impact. Themes (b) and(c) addressed the generation of funds, focusing on (b)ministries’ views about what their country’s “fair share” of col-lective financing commitments would be, and (c) in what senseministries considered their pledges to be “new and additional”.The remaining four themes addressed a range of choices aboutthe delivery of funds, including: (d) the balance between mitiga-tion and adaptation funding; (e) whether funding should bechanneled through bilateral agencies or through multilateralfunds; (f) how funding was allocated among different recipientcountries; and (g) how agencies decided on funding modalities,including whether funding would be delivered as grants orloans. We report our findings on each of these areas in turn.

5. RESULTS

(a) Inter-agency configurations

Table 1 provides an overview of the ministries responsiblefor national governance of climate financing and aid. Someaspects of the configuration for climate finance were similar

Table 1. Inter-agency configurations for climate finance and aid in case study countries

Australia Denmark Germany Japan Switzerland UK USA

Climate financea Policy En* (negotiations)D (multilat funds)F; FA

En* (M)D* (A)F; P

En* (negotiations,M)D ministry (A)F

FA* (oversight)Ec* (M)En* (A)AFF* (REDD+)F (IFIs)

En*

D; Ec*

En* [climate/energy](M)D* (A)En [env’t] (REDD+)

FA*

P

Implementation DEn

D EnD agencies*

D* (ODA and otherflows)FA* (ODA grantsand multilat UN)F (multilat IFIs)Ec*; En*; AFF*

DEc*

As above F* (multilat)D agency (bilat)Overseas PrivateInvestment Corp*;En*

Aid Policy DFA; F

D D ministry FA (bilat/multilatUN)F (bilat/multilatIFIs)Ec; P

DEc

DFA

FA

Implementation D D D agencies D DEc

D D (bilat)FA (multilat)F (IFIs)

Configuration ofaid organization(s)

Agency within FAportfolio

Activities integratedwithin FA ministry;D minister

Cabinet-levelministry;implementingagencies

Implementingagencies for aid andother official flows

Activities integratedwithin FA and Ecministries

Cabinet-levelministry

Implementingagencies for aid andother official flows

Abbreviations for organizations: D = Development; F = Finance/Treasury; FA = Foreign affairs; En = Environment/climate change, P = prime minister’s/president’s office; Ec = Economic affairs;AFF = Agriculture, forestry and fisheries; IFIs = international financial institutions. Other abbreviations: M = mitigation; A = adaptation.a Asterisks show organizations interviewed in this study. Bold text shows lead agency/agencies. Other organizations are listed only where prominently involved in policy and/or implementation.Organizations involved in other (non-aid-eligible) official flows for development are listed only for countries with non-aid-eligible climate finance flows.

154W

OR

LD

DE

VE

LO

PM

EN

T

Table 2. Overview of key fast-start finance (FSF) and aid indicators for case study countriesa

Indicators Australia Denmark Germany Japan Switzerland UK USA

i. Effort-sharing % of total FSFpledged

2 0.4 6 44 0.5 8 23

% of total DACdonors’ ODA, 2011

4 2 11 8 2 10 23

ii. Additionality Robustness of FSFinterpretation

Moderate High Moderate Low Moderate Moderate Low

ODA/GNI ratio(2011 vs 2009)

Moderate,increasing

High,declining

Moderate,increasing

Low, steady Moderate,increasing

Moderate/high,increasing

Low, declining

iii. Mitigation/adaptationbalance

% of FSF foradaptation

55 25 27 11 36 32 15

% of ODA forglobal public goods(2010)b

9 20 21 13 8 13 30

iv. Fundingthroughmultilateralchannels

% of FSF 30 42 46 10 34 80 20% of ODA (2011) 14 27 38 39 23 39 12

v. Recipientcountries

% of FSF to Africac 6 16 24 10 14 20 25% of ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa(2010–11)

13 55 37 37 43 54 43

vi. Financingand accessmodalities

Grants (% of FSF) 100 100 59 21 100 85d 60Bilateral grants (%of gross ODA, 2011)

85 72 48 41 74 59 88

a Sources for FSF indicators (average, 2010–12): Nakhooda, Fransen, Kuramochi et al. (2013). Sources for aid indicators: OECD (2014) (i, ii, iv–vi);Kharas and Rogerson (2012) (iii). In accordance with reporting practices for available data, climate finance figures refer to commitments, while aid figuresrefer to disbursements.b Goods covered include (among others) protection of transboundary environmental resources, infectious disease control, research and security.c Includes funding channeled to Africa via contributions to dedicated multilateral climate funds.d Also includes grant equivalent (75%) of capital contributions; proportion of grants is 47% if capital contributions are excluded.


across the countries we analyzed. In all countries, ministriesresponsible for environment, development (either indepen-dently or represented by the foreign affairs ministry) andfinance/economic affairs were involved in policy decisions. Ingeneral the lead decision-making role lay with the environmentand/or development ministry, with the finance ministry play-ing a less directly active role. Whereas development ministriesoften held primary responsibility for implementation, environ-ment ministries generally played a greater role in overall pol-icy-making and international climate negotiations.

However, within these broad parameters there was consider-able variation. In some countries (Denmark, Switzerland andthe UK) there was a more or less institutionalized split ofresponsibilities, with the development ministry focusing onadaptation funding and another ministry (environment or eco-nomic affairs) focusing on mitigation funding. In the UK, theinstitutional division of labor is overseen by an inter-depart-mental board that governs overall programing allocations(Nakhooda, Fransen, Caravani, & Stasio, 2012, p. 8). InJapan and the US, implementation was also split between mul-tilateral and bilateral climate finance, with the foreign affairsministry leading on the former and development agencies onthe latter.

In comparing organizational arrangements for climatefinance and aid, it is apparent that a substantially larger rangeof ministries are closely involved in climate finance policy thanin overall aid policy (although the extent of involvement ofother ministries in specific aid sectors may vary). However,subject to the exceptions noted above, development ministriespredominate in the implementation of both climate financeand aid.

(b) Effort-sharing

Effort-sharing arrangements varied considerably, with a fewcontributors (notably Japan, US and EU members collec-tively) making up the large bulk of fast-start finance. In mostcases, countries’ share of the climate finance effort was some-what lower than their share of overall aid, due in large mea-sure to Japan’s large fast-start pledge (accounting foraround half of the total) far outweighing its share of globalaid (see Table 2, row i).

Participants reported relatively little disagreement amongministries about principles for effort-sharing, but views oneffort-sharing nevertheless showed considerable divergencesacross countries. In the absence of specified effort-sharingarrangements in the Copenhagen Accord or subsequentUNFCCC decisions, participants reported that their share ofthe fast-start finance commitment was devised on a relativelyad hoc basis, despite some consultation among contributors.

In general, European countries tended to favor effort-shar-ing principles tied closely to objective criteria such as emis-sions and national income, which in turn are frequentlyassociated with the Convention’s principle of “common butdifferentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”(CBDR&RC) (UNFCCC, 1992, Article 3; see also EuropeanCommission, 2011). Both the US and Australia placed greateremphasis on burden-sharing measures in other internationalorganizations such as the UN or the World Bank as a refer-ence point for climate finance contributions (see also Jotzo,Pickering, & Wood, 2011). Indeed, the US explicitly chosenot to base its share of fast-start finance on a quantified mea-sure of CBDR&RC. The ability of the US to announce an


overall multi-year share of fast-start finance was constrainedalso by its congressional budgetary processes and decentral-ized budgeting across the diverse agencies involved.

Some participants noted the potential influence on effort-sharing measures of broadening the pool of contributor coun-tries. Countries such as Australia have made increasing thepool of participating countries a broader focus of their nego-tiating stance on mitigation as well as on finance. This was oneof the few areas where other participants reported a divergenceof views among ministries. One finance ministry reportedlysaw considerable value in encouraging major emerging econo-mies to contribute finance, whereas other ministries alsoacknowledged the considerable domestic investments in miti-gation already being made by these economies, and that takingsuch a position would have a negative impact on negotiations.

(c) New and additional finance

While contributors agreed to report annually to theUNFCCC on the progress of their fast-start pledges, by theend of the fast-start period they had not set agreed standardsfor how “new and additional” climate finance should be mea-sured in relation either to aid or to innovative sources offinance (Stadelmann et al., 2011). Thus, it is not surprisingthat different understandings of additionality exist amongcountries as well as individual ministries (see Table 2, row ii).

On the additionality of aid, while some officials were skepti-cal about the practical relevance of the issue, all participantsclaimed that their government’s climate finance was new andadditional in at least some sense of the phrase. This was eitherbecause their overall level of aid had been increasing (Austra-lia and Switzerland), above 0.7 per cent of Gross NationalIncome (Denmark), and/or because specific additional budget-ary resources had been earmarked for climate aid compared toprevious levels (UK, Germany, Japan, and Switzerland). USofficials claimed that each annual budgetary amount dedicatedto climate finance should be counted as new and additional,since they have to vie for climate finance resources each budgetyear. Finally, some participants confirmed previous findings(Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2011) that donor countries haveat times relabeled existing aid as climate-related in order tocount it toward their climate finance portfolio. In general,the robustness of a country’s definition of additionality wascorrelated with the size of its aid budget (as a share of GrossNational Income) and whether the aid budget was increasingduring the fast-start period (see Table 2, row ii).

Within most countries ministries seemed to share a commonview on the interpretation of additionality, but there weredivergent views within one administration on whether the2020 commitment must strictly be “new and additional”, sincethe Copenhagen Accord and subsequent decisions only explic-itly mention this requirement in relation to fast-start finance.In Australia, the aid agency was primarily responsible for ini-tiating discussions about a definition of additionality, due toits concern that aid could be diverted from existing develop-ment priorities to meet climate finance commitments. As notedin the next sub-section, differences among Australian minis-tries over the interpretation of additionality may also haveinformed their varying approaches to delivering adaptationfunding.

(d) Mitigation and adaptation

Adaptation accounted for around 20 per cent of overall fast-start finance, with the large bulk of the remainder being allo-cated to mitigation (Nakhooda, Fransen, Kuramochi et al.,

2013). However, there was considerable variation among indi-vidual contributors (see Table 2, row iii). Most interviewedofficials indicated that the requirement in the CopenhagenAccord to achieve “balanced allocation between adaptationand mitigation” (UNFCCC, 2009, Paragraph 8) was impor-tant in guiding their funding decisions. However, countriesadopted different interpretations of “balance”. Of the coun-tries surveyed, only Australia achieved a roughly equal splitbetween mitigation and adaptation (the interpretation pre-ferred by developing countries), reflecting the strong focus ofAustralia’s aid program on Pacific island countries, for whomadaptation (especially to rising sea levels and increased stormintensity) is a high priority. The UK set an equal split as anon-binding target but did not achieve it during the fast-startperiod. Japan’s focus on mitigation reflected the government’said strategy, which prioritized growth-oriented infrastructurelending to industrializing countries (Kim, 2012). US officialsdescribed balance between three programs: adaptation, energyefficiency and mitigation, and aid for “sustainable land-scapes,” which includes efforts to reduce tropical deforestation(and which counts as mitigation). As Table 2 illustrates, therewas no discernible link between the proportion of mitigationfinance that each country committed and its proportion ofaid for other global public goods. This may be due to thediversity of objectives (many non-environmental in nature)that aid for global public goods supports, and the associateddiversity in the incentives that countries have to supply thosegoods (Barrett, 2007).

The different interests and views of ministries played a majorrole in informing debates about thematic balance. Develop-ment ministries generally favored more adaptation fundinggiven the close links between promoting adaptation and devel-opment objectives. In one country, the development ministryquestioned the very concept of “climate finance” on the basisthat ultimately all financing is for development, whether or notit produces co-benefits for the climate. In some countries, rea-sons of administrative efficiency complemented the greateremphasis that development ministries placed on adaptationrelative to mitigation, as development ministries could incor-porate adaptation components more readily into their existingdevelopment programs. Nevertheless, convincing officialsalready responsible for other development priorities to priori-tize adaptation remained a challenge in some cases.

By contrast, some non-development ministries took a differ-ent approach to adaptation, for both conceptual and practicalreasons. In Australia the development agency’s approach tomainstreaming adaptation funding gave rise to perceptionsby the environment ministry that the development agencywas re-badging existing development projects. The environ-ment ministry obtained direct budgetary responsibility for asubstantial proportion of adaptation funding and opted todeliver much of it through standalone implementationarrangements. These arrangements complemented the envi-ronment ministry’s domestic expertise in climate science. How-ever, an independent review of Australia’s adaptation fundingin the Pacific found that many of the projects managed by theenvironment ministry “were not clearly designed and directedtoward the essential goal of resilient development, but wereconcerned with supporting climate adaptation as a discreteactivity” (Hunnam, 2013, p. 11). The review attributed thisdiscrete approach in part to a misinterpretation of the require-ment that fast-start finance should be “new and additional”:“The requirement was for assistance with climate adaptationto be additional to existing aid funding, but this wasmisconstrued as needing to be discrete or separate”(Hunnam, 2013, p. 11). Ultimately, however, the environment


ministry’s preference for standalone implementation may havebeen driven at least as much by practical considerations as bya particular conception of additionality.

Furthermore, many non-development ministries called for afocus on mitigation, which they justified on the basis of theirown expertise and the interest of industrialized countries inreduced emissions in developing countries. While some coun-tries split the institutional responsibilities for delivering miti-gation and adaptation funding (as noted above), in mostcountries most ministries remained involved in both areas.

(e) Multilateral and bilateral channels

On average contributors have preferred bilateral channelsfor climate finance and aid over multilateral ones, with aroundtwo-thirds of fast-start finance and aid flowing through bilat-eral mechanisms (Nakhooda, Fransen, Kuramochi et al.,2013; OECD, 2014). To the extent that contributors haverelied on multilateral funds for channeling climate finance,they have overwhelmingly preferred channels outside theUNFCCC (notably the Climate Investment Funds, withwhose operations the World Bank and other multilateraldevelopment banks are closely involved), with only two percent of pledged fast-start finance flowing through UNFCCC-related funds (Ciplet et al., 2012).

Beyond these two broad trends, the mix of channels variessignificantly among contributors (see Table 2). At one endof the spectrum, the UK relied heavily on multilateral chan-nels, while, at the other, Japan and the US acted mostlythrough bilateral agencies (Nakhooda, Fransen, Kuramochiet al., 2013). Most countries occupied a middle ground withbetween one-third and two-thirds of their funding flowingthrough multilateral channels (Table 2, row iv). German andSwiss participants reported that their approach to selectingchannels for climate finance was essentially the same as foraid. While Germany’s development ministry exhibited a pref-erence for practices of the World Bank Group, its environ-ment ministry was more favorably inclined towardUNFCCC-related institutions. Japan was the only countrywhose multilateral share of climate finance was substantiallylower than its multilateral share of aid. This trend accordswith Japan’s emphasis on mitigation and private finance, forwhich its existing bilateral loan program provided a readymeans for delivery (Japan, 2013).

Participants generally justified their choice of intermediarieson the basis of their efficiency and capacity to pool and scaleup different sources of finance into more ambitious programs.In the UK, an additional factor was the limited availability ofhuman resources within the development ministry for manag-ing a large bilateral climate finance portfolio. Despite the factthat responsibilities for multilateral and bilateral climatefinance were split across ministries in Japan and the US (seeSection 5(a) above), we did not find evidence that this led tosubstantial disagreement among agencies in these or othercountries about the share of funding that should flow througheach type of channel.

(f) Recipient countries

Participants reported that the geographical allocation offast-start finance across recipient countries followed similarpatterns to development assistance (consistent with the find-ings of Nakhooda, Fransen, Kuramochi et al., 2013). Contrib-utors such as Denmark and Japan sought to strengthenpartnerships with countries that were a priority for theirexisting aid programs. However, for both adaptation and

mitigation funding some divergence from the geographic dis-tribution of aid was notable.

The Copenhagen Accord calls for parties to prioritize fast-start adaptation funding toward “the most vulnerable devel-oping countries, such as the least developed countries, smallisland developing States and Africa” (UNFCCC, 2009, Para-graph 8). A number of participants reported that, relative totheir aid program, their climate finance gave higher priorityto low-income countries (most contributors), Africa (US)and Small Island Developing States (US and Australia). TheCopenhagen Accord does not single out high-priorityregions for mitigation finance. However, most contributorsfocused a larger share of their mitigation funding on rapidlygrowing middle-income or high-emitting countries (see alsoNakhooda, Fransen, Kuramochi et al., 2013), with the UKspecifically drawing on assessments of recipient countries’ mit-igation potential to inform allocations of mitigation finance.Similarly, the US and Australia allocated funds for reducingemissions from deforestation (REDD+) primarily to countrieswith large areas of forest cover at risk such as Indonesia. Moregenerally, however, US officials described allocation of fund-ing through the US aid agency as extremely decentralized,with country programs deciding which projects to fund andproject managers deciding whether to classify projects as cli-mate-related for international reporting purposes.

While a detailed quantitative comparison of allocation prac-tices in climate finance and aid is beyond the scope of this arti-cle, Table 2 (row v) shows that for most contributors, theproportion of climate finance flowing to Africa was lower thanthe proportion of their aid for Africa. This suggests that evenif countries may have prioritized Africa in their adaptationprograming, the high proportion of mitigation in overallfast-start finance tended to divert funding away from the poor-est countries. This finding is consistent with modeling con-ducted by others (Brown, Cantore, & te Velde, 2010;Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2007; Nakhooda, Fransen,Kuramochi et al., 2013).

More broadly, in reaching allocation decisions some con-tributors took into account factors that could be seen as facil-itating trust or leverage in the climate negotiations. Japanmade some loans conditional on host country agreement withspecific policy and greenhouse gas emissions reduction goals.In Switzerland, ministries differed as to the role of negotiatingfactors in allocation. Whereas the development and economicministries sought to focus funding on existing aid recipientcountries, the environment ministry preferred a more targetedallocation toward cooperative as well as vulnerable countries.In some countries (e.g., Denmark and Germany), the foreignaffairs ministry had some oversight role in assessing whetherfunding was in line with the country’s overall foreign policygoals.

(g) Financing modalities

The final issue we address relates to the means or “modali-ties” through which climate finance is implemented, including(i) the extent to which contributors apply internationallyagreed guidelines for aid when delivering climate finance;and (ii) whether the financial instruments employed in theirclimate finance portfolio differ from those used in their tradi-tional aid programs.

On the first aspect, participants broadly agreed that, sincetheir fast-start finance programs were integrated within aidbudgets and institutions, agencies sought to follow intergov-ernmental guidelines and standards applicable to aid (seee.g., OECD, 2008). A Swiss official noted that the current


application of aid effectiveness principles to climate finance isrelated to the dominant role of development agencies in imple-mentation of climate finance. On the second aspect, grantsrepresented around two-thirds of overall fast-start finance,with loans comprising the bulk of the remainder (Nakhooda,Fransen, Kuramochi et al., 2013). Participants confirmedexisting findings that climate finance has adopted similarfinancial instruments to general aid (Stadelmann et al.,2012). With the exceptions of Japan and the US, the propor-tion of grants for climate finance was considerably higher thanthe proportion of grants for aid (see Table 2, row vi).

Participants reported some inter-agency differences on thechoice of financing instruments. For instance, Australia’s aidagency has traditionally focused overwhelmingly on grant-based funding, but one participant from the climate changeministry considered that the latter had a stronger appetitefor non-traditional investments, including non-concessionalprivate funding, even though the risk profile for such invest-ments could be greater. In Switzerland, the developmentagency appeared to show stronger support than other agenciesfor direct access to funding by recipient countries.

6. DISCUSSION

(a) Overview

In this sub-section we begin by summarizing major areas ofagreement and disagreement from the findings above. In Sec-tion 6(b) we assess agencies’ positions on key issues against thecorresponding hypotheses about ministries’ missions set out inSection 3(c). In doing so, we summarize outcomes emergingfrom areas of disagreement and compare them with outcomeson related areas of aid. Then in Section 6(c) we discuss theextent to which those outcomes reflect the influence of inter-agency configurations and power dynamics hypothesized inSection 3(d).

At a very broad level our results on the seven themes con-firm the findings of other research (e.g., Stadelmann et al.,2012; Ciplet et al., 2012) that there is significant variationamong contributors on major policy issues relating to climatefinance. Our analysis found that inter-agency differences havebeen salient regarding some but not all themes. Themes char-acterized by the greatest degree of inter-agency disagreementhave been (d) the balance between climate change adaptationand mitigation; and (f) which recipient countries should be tar-geted. A moderate degree of disagreement arose in relation to:(c) how “new and additional” finance should be understood.Areas commanding the greatest level of agreement were (b)effort-sharing; (e) the balance between multilateral and bilat-eral channels; and (g) financing and access modalities.

Disagreements were generally more significant at the begin-ning of the fast-start period. One possible reason for this isthat development ministries with pre-existing responsibilitiesfor climate-related aid feared they would be sidelined byinstitutions with little understanding of and appreciation forpoverty reduction and development. Over time, a number ofthese disagreements have subsided as cooperation has becomemore institutionalized, for instance through splitting responsi-bilities for adaptation and mitigation funding.

(b) Characterizing agencies’ positions

Our findings that the mitigation-adaptation balance andchoice of recipient countries represented the most intense areasof disagreement are consistent with our hypotheses that while

both development and environment ministries play the role of“advocates” of climate finance spending (hypothesis (i)), theirmissions lead them to advocate different spending priorities.Development ministries tended to prefer greater spending onadaptation activities more akin to their development missions(hypothesis (ii)), whereas environment ministries preferredspending on mitigation aimed at achieving national interestsin environmental protection (hypothesis (iii)). Different viewsabout the priority of each objective were mirrored in disagree-ments about geographic prioritization, with development min-istries generally showing a preference for targeting existing aidrecipients and the most vulnerable countries, while environ-ment ministries often factored in the potential for decisionsabout allocation to influence trust and leverage in negotiationsand to secure large-scale impacts from investing in energy effi-ciency and renewable energy.

Our finding regarding a lower level of disagreement on theissue of additionality seems at first inconsistent with this char-acterization of development ministries’ missions. If we expectdevelopment ministries to be vigilant advocates of their exist-ing development missions, we may expect them to expressstronger concerns about aid diversion than other ministries.But while this occurred in some countries, cross-countryvariation on additionality was greater than inter-agency dis-agreement. One possible reason for agreement within mostcountries is that development ministries saw the scale-up ofclimate finance simultaneously as an opportunity (to consoli-date their involvement in an area with a rising political profile)and a threat (that environment ministries would gain controlover spending diverted from the overall aid budget). Accord-ingly, development ministries may have considered it prudentto realign their own priorities to better accommodate climatefinance. Development ministries may also have recognizedthat they would have little chance of using climate finance asa lever for increasing the overall aid budget given the difficultfiscal situation that many countries faced during the fast-startperiod.

These findings point to a broader difference between theviews of development and environment ministries on the rela-tionship between climate finance and aid. Owing to their pre-existing involvement in delivering climate finance (and in somecases their views on the conceptual relationship between adap-tation and development), many development ministries sawclimate finance fundamentally as a kind of aid, but one thatwas re-branded and attracted the interest of other ministriesas its political salience grew. According to the missionespoused by most environment ministries, the objectives of cli-mate finance are fundamentally different from those of devel-opment aid, leading to a perception among some environmentministries that development ministries were encroaching ontheir turf.

Our findings on finance ministries suggest that it would besimplistic to characterize them in this context solely as guard-ians of short-term spending (hypothesis (iv)). Most financeministries supported some expenditure on climate financewhile emphasizing (like environment ministries) the impor-tance of mitigation funding. This finding is consistent withresearch indicating that while finance ministries’ interest inminimizing short-term spending has traditionally been domi-nant, their role as cautious advocates of mitigation financinghas become increasingly prominent, particularly since majorpolicy analyses such as the Stern Review provided more solideconomic credentials to the case for early action on climatechange (Skovgaard, 2012). The fact that ministries generallyagreed to draw fast-start finance from existing aidcommitments sidestepped the need for new short-term fiscal


commitments that finance ministries may have otherwise beeninclined to challenge.

(c) The influence of inter-agency dynamics on contributors’practices: preliminary observations

While a comprehensive explanation of policy outcomes onclimate finance is beyond the scope of this article, two strandsof evidence presented in the article can help to begin building apicture of the relative influence of inter-agency dynamics onpolicy outcomes: (i) comparison between agencies’ positionsand contributors’ actual practices on climate finance; and (ii)comparison between practices in key aspects of climate financeand aid.

First, on areas of policy disagreement such as the mitiga-tion-adaptation balance and choice of recipient countries,our results suggest that in most cases no single ministry consis-tently prevailed, and that outcomes generally diverged some-what from aid ministries’ preferences. Nor could weconclude that aid programs with ministerial or cabinet levelrepresentation were consistently more successful in ensuringtheir preferences were reflected in decision-making. In thisregard, Australia’s focus on adaptation in the Asia–Pacificregion represents a notable case where disagreement over thesetwo areas was minimal and where practices arguably reflectedthe aid agency’s priorities most closely, despite the agency nothaving its own minister at the time. However, in this case astrong emphasis on adaptation in the Pacific was consistentwith the Australian government’s national interest givenstrong public sensitivity to the threat of sea level rise, as wellas its focus on building relationships with Pacific countriesin the climate negotiations (Australia, 2009). Thus, rather thanan individual ministry prevailing in this case, it is more likelythat different ministries’ interests aligned with one another.

What of the other areas on which ministries generallyagreed? Choices about funding channels and financing instru-ments, while not devoid of political ramifications for climatenegotiations, are more closely tied to questions of implementa-tion than the other policy issues discussed above. A likelyexplanation for the low level of disagreement is that these deci-sions were largely delegated to implementing agencies (typi-cally development agencies) on the basis of their technicalexpertise (consistent with hypothesis (vi) and Kaarbo(1998)’s findings outlined above). In some cases, however,the decision to split mitigation and adaptation responsibilitiesbetween agencies suggests that development expertise alonewas an insufficient reason for development agencies to retainresponsibilities for implementing mitigation activities.

Turning to the second strand of evidence, the quantitativeindicators in Table 2 suggest that outcomes on climate financediverge from those on aid across most themes (notably effort-sharing, recipient countries, multilateral channels and finan-cial instruments). However, two patterns are noticeable. First,for several indicators the average divergence between climatefinance and aid was consistently in the same direction. Thus,for example, in all countries except Japan the share of fast-start finance through multilateral channels was considerablyhigher than overall aid through multilateral channels. Thereverse was true for the share of funding to Africa, where inall countries the share of fast-start finance to Africa was lowerthan the corresponding share of aid. Second, variationsbetween individual countries tended to follow a similar patternfor both climate finance and aid. Thus those countries with ahigh (low) proportion of grant-based aid funding tended tohave (with the exception of the US) a high (low) proportionof grant-based fast-start finance. A similar pattern across most

countries was discernible for funding to Africa and throughmultilaterals.

In seeking to explain the first pattern, divergences betweenclimate finance and aid on some themes—particularly on geo-graphic allocation, where we reported a relatively high level ofdisagreement—could be attributable to the role of other min-istries in attenuating the influence of development ministries.However, other factors could be at play as well. For despitemany donors having policies that apply uniformly across theiraid programs (e.g., untying of aid procurement from domesticsuppliers), key aid indicators differ considerably across indi-vidual sectors, even where development agencies have the leadrole in decision-making. Consider, for example, the high pro-portion of grants compared to loans for humanitarian assis-tance, or the geographic targeting of health funding to areaswith high prevalence of specific diseases. In these cases, sec-tor-specific divergences may be due largely to the nature ofthe development challenges in the sector rather than the rela-tive influence of other ministries vis-a-vis the aid ministrieswithin that sector.

In practice climate finance cuts across a range of sectors,particularly since aid agencies frequently integrate a substan-tial amount of adaptation funding into existing sectors suchas health, agriculture and infrastructure. Nevertheless it is pos-sible that the specific development challenges associated withclimate finance could prompt aid agencies to prefer practicesthat differ from the rest of their aid program. This explanationcould go some way toward reconciling divergences betweenthe quantitative data and the frequently expressed view amongparticipants that implementation of climate finance was clo-sely integrated with development agencies’ practices. It alsohelps to explain why hypothesis (viii) (similarity between con-tributors’ practices in implementing climate finance and aid)may be difficult to sustain even though hypothesis (vi) (aidagencies’ retention of control over implementation) largelyholds.

In relation to the second pattern, the consistency acrosscountries in their rankings on some indicators of both aidand climate finance (i.e., countries with a relatively high shareof multilateral funding in aid showing a relatively high sharethereof in fast-start finance, and vice versa) could be explainedeither by the influence of development agencies on climatefinance outcomes, or by the influence of factors common toboth climate finance and aid (e.g., overall economic conditions,the influence of domestic interest groups and so on). However,with the available evidence we cannot rule out either possibil-ity. Since this divergence occurred in countries with both moreand less tightly linked aid and foreign policy missions, we findlimited evidence to support hypothesis (vii) regarding the influ-ence of inter-agency dynamics on policy divergence.

7. CONCLUSIONS

In this article we have sought to address the importantknowledge gap regarding how contributor countries reachdecisions on climate finance, with a particular focus oninter-agency dynamics—particularly among development,environment and finance ministries—as a potentially influen-tial factor. In order to analyze the role of inter-agency dynam-ics, we interviewed key officials from seven countries about siximportant challenges that all developed countries face indeciding about how to allocate fast start finance: effort-shar-ing; new and additional finance; the balance between mitiga-tion and adaptation; multi- versus bilateral finance; targetingrecipient countries; and financing and access modalities.


On the basis of these interviews, we may conclude that min-istries were largely in agreement on effort-sharing, multi- ver-sus bilateral finance, financing and access modalities, and (to amoderate degree) understandings of new and additionalfinance. There were also significant issues on which ministriesdisagreed, namely the mitigation-adaptation balance and thechoice of recipient countries. Although we identified some dif-ferences among ministries regarding the concept of adaptationand its relationship to mitigation and development, in mostcases countries appeared to operate within roughly commonunderstandings of these concepts but held different viewsabout their relative priority in practice.

Regarding all challenges the variation between countriesremained more significant than the disagreement between min-istries. There was also considerable variation on how interac-tion between the different ministries was institutionalized inthe seven countries. In some countries, responsibilities weresplit between ministries, with the development ministry han-dling adaptation and the environment ministry handling miti-gation, whereas others have chosen more centralized modelswith one lead ministry, and some using a hybrid model withclose cooperation among relevant ministries.

Our findings are largely consistent with the theoreticalframework and hypotheses outlined above, but with someimportant qualifications and amplifications. First, while bothdevelopment and environment agencies have played the roleof spending “advocates”, their different missions gave rise todisagreements about spending priorities. Meanwhile, financeministries were not solely “guardians” of short-term spendingbut were supportive of national interest-oriented mitigationfinance. Second, our results are consistent with the expectationthat minority development agencies were in most cases able toretain significant decision-making influence over implementa-tion decisions, but that their influence over broader policydecisions was much more mixed.

Given the focus of this study on national decision-makingover the fast-start period, any broad implications of our find-ings for global climate negotiations or future national deci-sion-making must inevitably remain tentative. Nevertheless,we note three preliminary observations on these aspects. First,our analysis suggests that the diversity of views about climatefinance evident in the climate negotiations is not reducible todifferences between developed and developing countries, butalso extends to differences within the governments of devel-oped countries. Development ministries’ views appear closerto those of developing countries on some issues (such as theadaptation-mitigation balance and geographic allocation)but remain at arm’s length on others (such as interpretationsof additionality and financing modalities). The fact that dis-agreements occurred at domestic as well as international lev-els—and potentially reinforced one another—may in turnhave contributed to the ambiguity and fragmentation in theoverall financing architecture that we observed above.

A second, related observation follows from our finding thateven though current climate finance may be counted as aid for

ODA reporting purposes, it differs in practice from traditionalaid in a number of important respects. This suggests on theone hand that contributors could address some concernsraised by developing countries about the distinct nature of cli-mate finance even without needing to enact a clinical institu-tional separation of climate finance from aid. On the otherhand, assuming that other ministries will remain involved inclimate finance policy (whether or not climate finance contin-ues to be classed as aid), institutional separation may not nec-essarily shift contributors’ climate finance practices moreclosely toward developing countries’ preferences. A substan-tial shift in this regard may only become more likely if greatercontrol over decision-making is vested in multilateral organi-zations such as the Green Climate Fund whose representationof developed and developing countries’ interests is more bal-anced.

Third, the ability to draw fast-start finance from aid budgetsappears to have enabled ministries to circumvent—if only tem-porarily—potentially divisive inter-agency and externaldebates about redirecting or increasing domestic expenditurein order to meet growing commitments. In the case of theUS, bilateral funding delivered through the developmentagency’s budget was less conspicuous to Congressional staffershostile to climate funding than large budgetary appropriationsfor multilateral funds. However, given that (as noted above)fulfilling longer term finance commitments will require har-nessing a broader range of funding sources, it is plausible toexpect that this task may exacerbate inter-agency tensionsand trigger wider public debate in the coming years.

Further research is needed to answer some of the outstand-ing questions that our analysis raises. The first—and arguablymost important—group of questions concerns explaining therelationship between cross-country variation and intra-gov-ernmental dynamics. Further quantitative and qualitativeanalysis encompassing a greater number of countries, aspectsof climate finance practice and explanatory factors (includingalternative domestic and cross-country influences) could helpto estimate the influence that different ministries may haveover the themes covered in our analysis. In addition, longitu-dinal analysis may enable more in-depth analysis of whetherand how the roles of different ministries have changed overtime. As noted above, preliminary evidence suggests thatinvolvement of other ministries has increased particularlysince the mid-2000s, as climate policy became a higher priorityfor governments and took on broader economic and fiscalimplications (Skovgaard, 2012). Second, building on scholar-ship in international relations on domestic-internationaldynamics (e.g., Downie, 2013; Putnam, 1988), research couldexplore the influence of intra-governmental interactions onthe parameters and outputs of international negotiations onclimate finance. Finally, further analysis could compare theeffectiveness of different inter-agency configurations in deliver-ing on national and internationally agreed objectives, includ-ing their ultimate impacts in strengthening developingcountries’ capacity to address climate change.

NOTES

1. In this article we use the terms ODA, “aid” and “developmentassistance” interchangeably.

2. We use the term “practices” to cover contributors’ approaches to bothpolicy and implementation.

3. We also drew on two interviews conducted for related research in late2010.


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