Abstract

The Korean War, also referred to as the ‘Forgotten War’ has

been largely elapsed by the historiography of the 20th Century,

with many historians instead focusing their works on conflicts

such as the Second World War or the conflict in Vietnam. The

last twenty five years have however seen an increase in

volumes published on the Korean War, in light of various

anniversaries. However little have focused solely on the War

in the air. It is the aim of this dissertation to fill this

gap in the historiography and by doing so argue that the war

in the air was vital to American strategy during the conflict.

This had been achieved by focusing on primary source

documentation published by the United States during the

conflict. These documents include memorandums, minutes from

conferences, and United States National Intelligence

estimates. These sources have then been analysed qualitatively

and combined with secondary source literature to formulate the

overarching argument of this dissertation. The result is a

dissertation which is able to mark a new field of study

relating to the Korean War and provoke a debate between

historians promoting research from not only American sources

but sources from Russian, North Korean and Chinese archives to

further bolster the research conducted by this dissertation

and promote further volumes that are able to focus primarily

on non-allied sources.

Introduction

This dissertation will focus analytically on the Korean War.

It will suggest that once air superiority was established by

US forces in 1950 this was key in allowing the US to conduct

air operations, for example destroying North Korean airfields

in order to maintain air superiority. While the American

forces were able to establish air superiority with great ease

and success, US bombing of the Korean peninsula was

ineffective and failed to break the communist will to fight.

The following questions will be answered in order to

coherently analyse the primary material: How was American air

superiority established? How successful was American air

superiority during the war? What role did US bombing have

during the conflict? How effective was it? What was the

impact this had on the war? By answering these questions have

been answered this dissertation will provide an analysis of

the air war above the skies of Korea.

There are two main schools of historiography that divide

historians of the Korean War. Firstly the Traditional/Orthodox

view held by David Rees endorses the idea that the war was the

fault of the North Korean aggressors.1 This was the first major

publication on the subject and still holds weight in

historical circles. Rees was researching at a time when the

Soviet and Chinese archives were secured and inaccessible to

historians. The field has grown substantially since the

publication of Rees’ book with a plethora of academic material

appearing in the late 1980s and 1990s. Rees’ book focuses on

Korea as a “limited war.” He maintains this focus because at

the time of its writing the fear of nuclear annihilation faced

1For more information see; David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (Maryland: St. Martin’s Press Inc., 1964).

the world until the collapse of the USSR in 1991.2 However some

of the work Rees conducted still holds true today, and most of

the work conducted in this field since has some links back to

Rees’ work. Bruce Cumings’ work changed the historiography in

the 1980s and 1990s, and led to the emergence of the

Revisionist school of thought whereby he suggested that the

Korean conflict was a localised civil war which drew the

attention of superpowers who consequently became involved.3

During the 1990s Revisionism led to the development of another

hypothesis that key American Officials including the Secretary

of State, Dean Acheson, either knew that an attack was coming

and did nothing to deter it because they needed a crisis

abroad to implement their plans for rearmament at home, and/or

for the same reason they tried to provoke it.4

2 William Stueck, "The Korean War As History:David Rees' Korea: The LimitedWar In Retrospect." Cold War International History Conference. 1998. http://www.archives.gov/research/foreign-policy/cold-war/conference/stueck.html Accessed 22/1/2014.3 For more information see; Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990); For Revisionist works see Bruce Cumings, The Korean War: A History (US: Random HouseInc., 2010); and Gabriel Kolko, and Joyce Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World andUS Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (Michigan: Harper & Row, 1972). 4 Stueck, " David Rees' Korea." http://www.archives.gov/research/foreign-policy/cold-war/conference/stueck.html Accessed 22/1/2014.

With regards to methodology, this dissertation focuses solely

on primary source material from Foreign Relations documents

belonging to the United States.5 Most comprise documents,

telegrams, memorandums and official documents all of which

have all been used in this dissertation. For the most part it

is a comprehensive collection of primary source material.

However there are some limitations with this material which

must be addressed. Firstly most of the documents are focused

from or toward the US government so using these sources

provides a very Americo-centric view of the period. Memoranda

appear amongst some of the documents cited, however these have

several limitations which affect their reliability as sources.

They are published documents but are not always written by

people who were there at the time of specific events. Secondly

they have often been through many drafts and therefore can be

subject to frequent change and alteration. This has a negative

effect on their reliability as only the final draft is

published. Another limitation with this is that some documents

have been edited after publication, again suggesting the

original document has been altered in some way. National

Intelligence estimates also feature in the catalogue prompting5 Hereafter FRUS.

questions as to whether the statistics are accurate during a

time when available intelligence was low.

The topic is relevant to study today because the Korean War

has been described as the ‘forgotten war’ by historians,

probably because it has been overshadowed by the Second World

War and the conflict in Vietnam. It is only within the past

thirty years that more books have become available. This is

mainly due to archival resources becoming more readily

available, but also partly down to interest generated for its

fiftieth and sixtieth anniversaries. This topic is worth

studying because it was the first major confrontation of the

Cold War and has since had a profound impact on Western and

Communist policy in subsequent years, notably in Vietnam. Even

with the publication of large amounts of literature on the

Korean War in recent years, little has focused solely on the

war in the air. Therefore this dissertation will contribute to

the historiography of the Korean War, but with a specific

focus on the war in the air, something strangely untouched by

historiography and many historians. The purpose of this

dissertation is to create a new point of focus regarding the

Korean War and hopefully open up a debate between military

historians, promoting more academic research to be conducted

with the sole purpose of highlighting the effectiveness of

America’s role in the war. Although this dissertation provides

an in-depth analysis of the air war in Korea, to provide a

full study using not only American sources but also Russian

and Korean sources a much more comprehensive volume would need

to be produced.

Chapter One – The Importance of Air Superiority over the

Korean Skies

The purpose of this chapter is to suggest that for US

strategic planners establishing air superiority over the

Korean peninsula was of paramount importance. The poor

condition of the South Korean air force led to North Korean

domination over the Korean skies. However the United States

Air Force was able to achieve air superiority quickly over the

peninsular until Soviet supplied MiGs entered the conflict.6

The superior MiG managed to help Communist forces establish

superiority over part of the Korean peninsula and created a

situation where air superiority was then contested for the

remainder of the war, but still firmly in the hands of the US.

Communist pilots often retreated to Manchuria, frustrating

6 Hereafter USAF

their American counterparts by retreating into so called

‘political sanctuaries’ where American pilots were forbidden

to enter.

The American defensive perimeter in South East Asia, and the

evacuation of American nationals from the Korean peninsula.

Korea was located outside the American defensive perimeter in

South East Asia. However once the North Korean troops crossed

the border into the South, President Truman abruptly reversed

this meticulously considered policy and placed Korea firmly

inside the American defensive perimeter in the Far East, and

committed US forces to the defence of Korea.7 Days before the

North Korean capture of Seoul, it was decided that American

women and children who were living in Korea would be evacuated

to Japan, and the American Air Force stationed in Japan would

provide air cover over Seoul to provide a safe evacuation. It

was agreed with the Korean government that American women and

children would be evacuated but men of the American mission

would remain in South Korea. It was also agreed that the USAF

7 Kathryn Weathersby, “Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War 1945-1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives,” Cold War International History Project 8 (1993): 5.

would be authorised to knock out North Korean tanks or

fighters interfering with the evacuation. 8 This was a very

risky policy for the US government to follow as they had not

yet entered the conflict and risked inflammation which could

have proved disastrous if American pilots engaged North Korean

fighters. When the Korean People’s Army thrust across the 38th

parallel into South Korea, it was supported by a small air

force comprising of a fighter regiment backed by a training

regiment, both of which had been trained and equipped by the

Soviet Union.9 In comparison the South Koreans only had a small

force comprising of around a dozen American supplied training

and liaison aircraft. The USAF unit closest to Seoul was

stationed in Japan and was given the task of providing air

cover for the evacuation. This unit was the US 5th Air Force,

which consisted of three jet fighter wings and it was able to

successfully control the skies above Seoul and evacuate

American nationals from Inchon and Seoul.10 American policy in

the Far East failed to provide an adequate defence from the

invading North Korean force. Because Korea was outside the8 FRUS, 1950. Korea, Volume VII, The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State, Seoul June 26, 1950, 143; Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup), June 25, 1950, 157-158. 9 Hereafter KPA; David Rees, “The Air and Sea War,” in The Korean War: History and Tactics, David Rees (ed.) (London: Orbis Publishing), 1984. 104. 10 Ibid.

American defensive perimeter the closest aircraft available at

the time of the invasion were in Japan, creating a logistical

nightmare for aircraft teams who were forced to fly from the

Japanese mainland to help support the evacuation of American

nationals.

The North Korean advance and the capture of Seoul

Once the KPA had crossed into South Korea it was only a meagre

three days before they had captured the South Korean capital

of Seoul. The situation was bleak; the South Korean Air Force

was too weak to repel the invading North Koreans, and with the

US 5th Air Force stationed in Japan supporting an evacuation,

the North Korean Air Force controlled the skies. North Korean

forces conducted attacks on air bases in the South, even

destroying one which was located near Seoul, promoting Muccio

to write that “it seems logical to conclude the North Koreans

intend to make full use of their air force to establish

complete air superiority above Korea”.11 North Korean strategic

11 FRUS, 1950. Korea, Volume VII, The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State, Seoul June 2, 1950, 133.

commanders and their American counterparts valued air

superiority as an imperative aspect of grand strategy. This

surprise attack caught the airfields off guard and although it

only caused minimum damage, it was a rude awakening for the

Allies and alerted them to the danger of the North Korean Air

Force. It promoted the necessity for US strategists to

establish air superiority over Korea if they were to destroy

the communist forces. At first it appeared that the Republic

of Korea Armed Forces might hold onto the frontier, however

the news turned progressively worse as the day drew to a close

and the North Korean forces pushed towards the South Korean

capital.12 In Seoul Syngman Rhee, the president of South Korea,

was desperately worried about the situation which was

unfolding. He contacted the American ambassador with his

concerns about the North Korean superiority in tanks and air

force, and called on the American government to supply South

Korea with F-51 Mustangs that could be used to engage the

North Korean force with rocket attacks and delay the advance

towards Seoul. By the time of the invasion and the capture of

Seoul, the North Korean Air Force contained around 150 combat

12 Hereafter ROKAF; Crimson Sky: The Air Battle for Korea (Virginia: Brassey’s, 1999),2.

aircraft, 1,500 men and was equipped with a motley collection

of Yakovlev Yak-s, Yak-7bs, Yak-3s, and a few Yak-9s.13 In

addition to this, the newly formed North Korean Air Force,

which had only been establish a few years earlier, also

contained a ground-attack regiment containing Ilyushin I1-10s,

the latest version of the Second World War Russian ground-

attack plane the I1-2 Sturmovik. Once the North Korean forces

had established air superiority, this made the job for

American forces much harder. Without air superiority it would

be impossible to land any troops on the Korean peninsula, not

to mention almost impossible to put fighters into the skies

without safe airfields away from the conflict. The North

Korean Air Force quickly subjugated the feeble South Korean

Air Force and was able to gain control of the skies within the

first few weeks of the war. The North Korean air force had

better equipment and a significant numerical advantage over

the South Koreans whose planes were in short supply. This

resulted in complete North Korean hegemony of the skies for

the first few weeks of the war.

13 FRUS, 1950. Korea, Volume VII, Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency, Current Capabilities of the North Korean Regime, 19 June, 1950, 119; John Bruning, Crimson Sky: The Air Battle for Korea, 1.

The introduction of the American air force into the Korean

Conflict and the establishment of air superiority

Once the USAF entered the conflict, the tide changed

dramatically for the NKPA. The USAF was able to establish air

superiority over Korea with relative ease through the resolve

and superior training of its pilots, resulting in a dramatic

weakening in the North Korean position. Hastings argues that

the Yak piston-engine fighters of the North Korean Air Force

were cleared from the skies within a matter of weeks, and that

the USAF Mustangs played a critical role in doing this.14 Rees

argues that North Korean Air Force attacks on strategic air

bases in South Korea forced the American forces to attack

North Korean air bases north of the 38th parallel; the first of

these attacks destroyed some twenty five grounded aircraft at

Pyongyang and shot down the only fighter which attempted to

intercept.15 Action against North Korean air bases continued

throughout July 1950 and by the end of the month the North

Korea air presence had been reduced significantly to the point

that is was virtually destroyed, resulting in allied air

superiority. The acquisition of the skies from the North14 Max Hastings, The Korean War, revised edition (Oxford: Pan Macmillan, 2010)368.15 David Rees, The Air and Sea War, 106.

Korean Air Force allowed a much greater number of aircraft to

be deployed for interdiction missions because only a small

number of planes were needed to contain what was left of the

much depleted North Korean Air Force.16 During the early stages

of the war and once the North Korean Air Force had been

destroyed, the USAF played a critical role in providing South

Korean forces with air support and cover so they could

effectively engage the North Korean Army. Muccio argues that

”American airstrikes had a great moral boosting effect, [and]

forthcoming strikes demoralised the enemy and allowed South

Korean forces to reform on the South bank of the Han river.”17

American air superiority during the early stages of the war

allowed South Korean forces to regroup after the unprovoked

North Korean attack. It also gave them a significant advantage

by protecting their positions from North Korean forces,

ensuring they could not be attacked from the air, while also

demoralising the North Korean troops fighting south of the

border. The US ambassador at large, Jessup, advocated the use

16 Refers to the activity of disrupting, delaying or destroying enemy forcesen route to a battle zone, can be strategic or tactical; This is in stark contrast to the Second World War where the Axis Luftwaffe was still a forceto be reckoned with until late in 1944, until it was destroyed by allied raids.17 FRUS, 1950. Korea, Volume VII, The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State, Seoul, June 29, 1950, 211.

of the USAF in Korea for the use of supporting South Korean

troops. He suggested they should be used against North Korean

tank formations and even if they were unable to spot or

destroy any tanks, the presence of American air superiority

would have a positive effect on the moral of South Korean

troops on the ground.18

The Japanese mainland was identified as part of the American

zone of defensive responsibility in South east Asia, the US

5th air force became stationed in Japan and protected the air

defence of the area until military support became readily

available. American jets were forced to make sorties from

Japan due to the extremely poor condition of the South Korean

airfields.19 There were obviously logistical challenges faced

when using aircraft based in Japan; the distance and fuel

shortages that came with this were a persistent problem for

American pilots. The most obvious solution to this problem

would be to use airfields in South Korea, however these had

been built by the Japanese during the Second World War and

18 Ibid., Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup), June 25, 1950. 158.19 In military aviation a sortie is a combat mission made by an individual aircraft.

were unfit for US jet planes to use until they had been

completely resurfaced.20 The Japanese airfields in South Korea

were paved with gravel and when jet planes attempted to take

off from surfaces paved with gravel, small rocks were drawn

into the jet intakes causing severe damage to the internal

mechanisms of the aircraft. To combat this and still maintain

air superiority the F-51 Mustang was reintroduced into the

combat theatre. The planes piston engines make it suitable for

landing on the South Korean airfields while its range and

payload still allowed it to operate effectively during close

air support missions.21 The mountainous regions of the Korean

peninsula created a nightmare for the Aviation Engineer teams

tasked with the construction of airfields. These teams were

forced to lay their strips in the valley bottoms, most of

which had been muddy rice fields.22 The use of Second World War

techniques like laying pierced steel planking (PSP) was

adequate for the use of piston-engine fighters such as the F-

51 Mustang or transports such as the C-46 Commando. However

20 David Rees, The Air and Sea War, 107.21 Retired from active service in 1984 the F-51 Mustang was an American longrange single seat fighter, and bomber which earned its name during the Second World War, in the later stages of the Conflict it was one of the planes vital in helping the allies to achieve air superiority over Europe in 1944; David Rees, The Air and Sea War, 107.22 Brian Catchpole, The Korean War 1950-1953, second edition (London: Constable &Robinson Ltd, 2010) 240.

jet blasts from jet engines caused rapid deterioration in the

PSP.23 The construction effort needed to make these ex-Japanese

airfields serviceable was massive. Large amounts of human

resources were needed from Aviation Engineers and also from

indigenous civilian labour.24 This highlights failings within

the army because it meant that jets could not fly from Korean

bases until June 1951, and few air commanders understood the

tremendous effort required to make an airfield operable. This

is a substantial amount of time in a theatre of war, and

although American engineers were unable to build suitable air

fields in South Korea for a year, the American navy was able

to provide logistical support in the form of aircraft carriers

that were stationed off the Korean coast. Yet when airfields

became operable in South Korea by mid-1951 much of the

technical support and maintenance was still in Japan, creating

problems with aircraft readiness and further highlighting

problems with the army chain of command and inconsistency

between different sections of the US military. The airfields

built by the Japanese occupiers during the Second World War

were left unfit for American jets planes and this led to

23 Catchpole, The Korean War, 240.24 Jon. A. Wheeler, “An Historical Analysis of the Development of Red Horse,” (Thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, 1987) 20.

several logistical challenges. Firstly it meant that

propeller-engine planes had to be introduced into the Korean

conflict and flown from Korean airbases. Secondly all American

jets fighting until June 1951 had to take off from the

Japanese mainland. Finally, new airfields had to be built in

South Korea which were capable of supporting jet aircraft.

The dysfunctional relationship between military sections led

to failings in USAFs ability to be effective. By late June and

July 1950 the situation in Korea had become critical. North

Korean forces were pushing back the South Koreans all along

the frontier, American air strikes were finding their targets

but failing to halt the North Korean advance and

miscommunication/ no communication between the Army and Air

Force was leading to ineffective raids. In a telegram on July

9th MacArthur said to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that “the

situation in Korea is critical. We are endeavouring by all

means now to build up the force necessary to hold the enemy,

but to date our efforts … have been ineffective.”25 In a

separate document Acheson concurs with MacArthur, writing “an

25 FRUS, 1950. Korea, Volume VII, The Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Tokyo, July 9, 1950, 336

enemy force of undetermined size [is] moving South on west

coast plain and advance elements [are] reported 60 miles

southwest of Taejon. No friendly forces in this sector. Enemy

growing more sensitive [to] US air attacks, now reluctant to

enter action in daylight and taking steps to conserve

dwindling transport by elaborate camouflage.”26 This suggests

that during the early stages of the war the situation had

become critical for the safety of the South Korean nation, and

secondly that while US air strikes were successful in

eliminating the North Korean aggressors during the day, the

North Korean army simply switched to night time operations to

negate the effectiveness of US strikes. By camouflaging

transports North Korean forces were also able to preserve

their vehicles, eliminating the effectiveness of US air

superiority and allowing them to progress southwards deeper

into Korea. Further telegrams also suggest that US policy

makers were doubtful as to whether US airstrikes could hold

back the advancing forces suggesting that if “the situation is

critical and even with air support… it is highly doubtful

26 Ibid., The Secretary of State (Acheson) to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices, Washington, July 21, 1950, 441.

whether sustained attempt to cross [the] river can be

thwarted.”27

One reason why US strikes were unsuccessful during the early

stages of the war is due to the constant ill-tempered debate

between ground tacticians and air commanders, both believing

they were necessary to victory and that victory could be

achieved without the other. Hastings suggests that this

affected the quantity and quality of air support which was

delivered, and became heightened by army jealously of Marine

organic air support, which the soldiers considered both more

dedicated and professional than that of the air force.28

Hastings argues that there was a lack of co-operation between

the air force and the army at all levels, ground forces became

frustrated by the difficulty of gaining air support when it

was needed and battalion commanders became irked by the

arbitrary arrival of fighter-bombers who would often radio

ironically, “I have twenty minutes on station. Use me or lose

me.”29 This led Hastings to suggest that air superiority and27Ibid., The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State, Suwon, June 29, 1950, 228.28 Hastings, The Korean War, 367.29 Ibid., 367-368; usually when air support finally did arrive they could only circle for a short amount of time before needing to return to Japan to

air support provided an instrumental role in keeping the army

in the fight. But commanders ultimately needed to work

together for bombing strikes to be the most successful.

However it is evident that communication and empathy between

different sections of the US military was lacking and

therefore led to ineffective raids. A lack of co-ordination

between different factions of the US military led to the

situation in Korea becoming critical. North Korean forces were

becoming wise to the American air tactics and employed tactics

of their own to reduce the American advantage in the air.

MiGs in the skies, the issue of safe sanctuaries and the

potential loss of American air superiority.

The first Soviet produced MiG aircraft appeared in the skies

above Korea in November 1950. The introduction of this plane

radically challenged the American perception that they would

have outright control of the skies throughout the war.30 Before

the introduction of MiG fighters, American aviation

authorities were arrogantly confident with their pilots and

rearm and refuel (pre-June 1951). 30 Robert Cowley, “The First Jet War,” in The Cold War: A Military History, ed. Robert Cowley (New York: American Historial Publications, Inc., 2005), 120.

service crews, stating “between untrained air and ground

forces an air umbrella is impossible without a lot of

training. I believe it just wouldn’t work with Chinese

Communist… and Russian air. We are the best.”31 American

strategists were over confident of American air power and

critical of Russian and Chinese forces. Yet within the first

six months of their introduction, there were a total of 445

MiGs operating in Korea from the political sanctuary of air

bases beyond the Yalu River. By 1953 this number had increased

drastically to 830.32 Disturbingly, Soviet and Chinese air

crews were introduced along with the MiGs in an attempt to

wrestle air superiority away from the US grip. Like the US,

Chinese and Soviet leaders used the skies above Korea as a

testing ground where their pilots would be able to train and

master this new form of air combat which had developed

drastically since the conflict in the European skies only a

decade previously. Hastings argues that during the first few

weeks after the MiGs arrival, the available American fighters

in the theatre, notably the F-80 Shooting Stars, were

disturbingly outclassed until the F-86 Sabre entered the

31 FRUS, 1950. Korea, Volume VII, Statements made at the Wake Island Conference, October 15, 1950, 954.32 Hastings, The Korean War, 372.

conflict. However they were chronically under supplied and

over stretched and so no more than 150 were ever deployed in

Korea against the much greater numbers of MiGs.33 The

superiority of the MiG compared to the Shooting Star led to

the first challenge on American air superiority since the

start of the war, and the experience and expertise of the

Russian and Chinese pilots in these aircraft proved to be a

handful for American F-80 pilots.

The surprise introduction of superior aircraft challenged the

already established American air superiority and would

continue to do so until the end of the conflict. This came as

a shock to the USAF who had gone unchallenged in the air for

several months and led to the communists “gaining air

superiority as far south as Sinanji on the Chongechon River.”

Daylight bombing raids became impossible and led to the

American forces diverting planes from interdiction missions

33 Ibid.; The F-80 Shooting Star was considerably outclassed by the Russian produced MiGs, the lighter MiGs could operate at higher altitudes and make tighter turns, making dog fights difficult even for veteran American pilots. The standard armament for an F-80 Shooting Star was 6 x .50 CalibreM2 Browning machine guns although with an impressive fire rate they had a short rage and therefore needed to be focused on the target in a concentrated and accurate burst. The Standard MiG-15 armament was two 23mm cannon and a 37mm cannon and although they were slow firing they were devastating if they connected with an aircraft.

over to this area to retrieve air superiority from the

communist forces who had gathered “a sufficient amount of MiGs

to provide [a] good air defence.”34 The Communists made

significant gains in 1951-1952 contesting American dominance

of the air, leading to American F-86 Sabre jets having to be

concentrated and redirected into missions that would maintain

accustomed air superiority achieved earlier in the war.35

According to a CIA report in the summer of 1952, “a de facto

air war exists over North Korea between the UN and the USSR.”36

This was something that would have seemed almost unthinkable

during the early stages of the War when superiority was

achieved so decisively and so quickly by the Unites States Air

Force. The introduction of the MiG challenged American

superiority over Korea and drastically outclassed their

American equivalent, leading to communist air superiority as

far south as Sinanji and along the Chongechan river, resulting

in superiority of the skies being contested for the remainder

of the war.

34 FRUS, 1951. China and Korea, Volume VII, National Intelligence Estimate, Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in Korea through Mid-1952, Washington, December 7, 1951, 1268.35 Richard H. Kohn and Joseph H. Harahan (eds), Air Superiority in World War II and Korea: An interview with Gen. James Ferguson, Gen. Robert M. Lee, Gen. William Momyer, and Lt. Gen.Elwood R. Quesada (Washington: Office of Air force History, 1983), 11. 36 Robert Cowley, “The First Jet War,” 120.

The introduction of Soviet aircraft into the Korean frontier

created a new problem for American policy makers to

circumnavigate, the issue of ‘political sanctuaries’. Soviet

and Chinese pilots were using air bases along the Manchurian

border as forward bases to launch their air attacks on

American air dominance. However orders forbid attacks on these

bases by American and UN pilots –although many did- for fear

of risking an exacerbation of the conflict and forcing full

scale war over the Korean peninsula. As the battle for

superiority over the skies was raging, communist pilots would

frequently disengage allied fighters and fly home towards

these forward bases, enticing allied pilots to follow them and

risk full scale war. The American command became increasingly

frustrated with these political sanctuaries arguing that many

American air men “complain that communist planes use Manchuria

as a sanctuary from which they operate and retreat to when

convenient. Furthermore the Manchurian side of the border

contains many anti-aircraft batteries which are employed

against UN aircraft”. The Communist authorities knew that the

UN could not provide a mandate and allow UN or American

servicemen the ability to attack these bases, and that

communist forces could use this to their advantage when

struggling to gain air superiority, disengaging allied

fighters and trying to entice them to follow them and into an

ambush of MiGs and anti-aircraft batteries. There was little

the US authorities could do when looking toward a solution to

the frustrating problem of political sanctuaries which the

Communist forces had managed to achieve. However primary

source evidence has suggested that if a massive air attack was

directed against UN air forces, then the US would retaliate

and strike Chinese bases in a crushing blow focused toward

Manchuria and in Chinese sovereign territory.37 This evidence

shows plans for American pilots being provided authority to

strike ‘neutral’ territory of another foreign power without a

mandate from the UN, and that the US were willing to risk the

certainty of full scale Chinese involvement and potentially a

world war in order to maintain air superiority above Korea.

The political sanctuaries to which communist pilots were able

to retreat frustrated American pilots. They were forbidden

from entering Chinese territory and therefore could not engage

37FRUS, 1951. China and Korea, Volume VII, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons), Washington, March 22, 1951, 307.

above China in order to allow the USAF to strike a decisive

blow and establish air superiority out right.

Chapter Two – The Use of USAF bombers, and the Effect that

they had on the Korean population, and the War.

The purpose of this chapter is to suggest that interdiction

missions conducted by US bombers were on the whole ineffective

in destroying the North Korean will to fight. Although they

were successful in devastating North Korean industry and

cities, they were ultimately ineffective as help became

available from the USSR and China. American bombers should

have been able to bomb targets on the Yalu River and in

Manchuria sooner resulting in the greatest effect possible.

However by the time the US did strike targets in these areas,

the communist anti-aircraft presence was too high and the US

suffered high numbers of casualties.

Interdiction bombing and Chinese methods of casualty reduction

US combat planes flew two distinct types of interdiction

missions that were to characterise and define the majority of

deep air support missions flown during the Korean War.38

Firstly the term strategic interdiction is used to refer to

operations that are carried out over a longer period of time

with the purpose of having an effect over the long-term.

Secondly tactical interdiction is used to quickly affect

events in a combat theatre or similar small localised area of

conflict.

Strategic interdiction bombing was used more widely during the

early to mid-stages of the war where interdiction bombing was

conducted on a large scale against targets in the North in

order to disrupt supply and communication. American policy

makers authorised the strategic interdiction bombing of

targets in Korea once the USAF had achieved air superiority

over the peninsula. General MacArthur authorised the strategic

interdiction bombing of targets in 1950 and allowed the USAF

“to extend [their] operations into Northern Korea against

38 Strategic and Tactical interdiction.

airbases, depots, tank farms, troop columns and other such

purely military targets.”39 Hastings argues that during the

first months of the war, thousands of interdiction missions

were flown by the USAF, and the majority were valueless

because of the inadequate targeting mechanisms that were

available to the American flight crews and their bombers.40

Hastings also argues that these raids proved to be ineffective

during the early stages of the war because American

strategists simply did not understand communist techniques.

Although they bombed all the main supply routes during the

‘winter retreat of 1950’ the communist forces were not on

these supply routes meaning American bombs were not finding

their intended communist targets pursuing the fleeing UN

forces.41 Chinese forces switched to moving large convoys of

supply by night, forcing US bombers to fly interdiction

missions at night thus making accurate targeting by US bombers

more difficult and on the whole ineffective. By 1951 US

bombers were inflicting heavier casualties by the constant

bombardment of rail facilities and bridges, while also greatly

39 FRUS, 1950. Korea, Volume VII, The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur), Washington, 29 June, 1950, 253.40 Hastings, The Korean War, 368.41 Ibid.; The winter retreat of 1950 refers to the retreat of UN forces fromNorth Korean after being surrounded by 67,000 communist forces.

reducing the operation field of activity of the communist

supply lines.42 These attacks proved to be highly successful in

limiting North Korean capabilities to wage war south of the

38th parallel by damaging supply routes, trains, and trucks

delivering logistical support to North Korean forces. This was

a vital part of the USAF strategy to direct bombing against

enemy reinforcements and supplies before they could re-group

or reach the battlefront.43 North Korean supply chains and

industry became heavily disrupted hampering the North Korean

war effort. However once Chinese and Soviet forces began to

resupply the KPA this negated the successes enjoyed by US

bombers and allied troops on the ground, as the KPA became

more heavily supplied with foreign aid. US National

Intelligence suggests that North Korean truck losses were

replaced with deliveries from the USSR.44 In 1952 American

military intelligence reports suggest that since the beginning

of the ceasefire negotiations in 1951 communist troop’s

strength had doubled and logistical support for North Korea

42 FRUS, 1951. China and Korea, Volume VII, National Intelligence Estimate, Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in Korea through Mid-1952, Washington, December 7, 1951, 1265.43 David Rees, The Air and Sea War, 107.44 FRUS, 1951. China and Korea, Volume VII, National Intelligence Estimate, Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in Korea through Mid-1952, Washington, December 7, 1951, 1265.

had substantially improved. Although US bombing had made

communication and supply difficult, Chinese forces, at great

cost due to lost hardware and equipment, had managed to

stockpile supplies for thirty five days of offensive

operations.45 As well as the problem of not being able to

successfully break North Korean supply lines, the USAF became

faced with another problem when MiGs were introduced to the

Korean theatre. The increasing numbers of MiGs present in

Korea was being brought to bear on American B-26s carrying out

interdiction bombing on rail and road communications. The

build-up of MiG aircraft created a problem for the US because

soon there would be enough MiGs to sufficiently destroy the B-

26 bombers and their fighters which were protecting them.46

Therefore the US 5th air force was tasked with focusing attacks

on North Korean airfields to keep them inoperable for MiG

fighters through daily bombing. Although North Korean

airfields remained inoperable for MiG fighters, there was

still a “request for increase in air strength in Korea [of]

45 FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Communist Capabilities and probable Courses of Action in Korea, April 3, 1953, 867-868.46 FRUS, 1951. China and Korea, Volume VII, Memorandum by the Counselor (Bohlen to the Secretary of State, Washington, October 4, 1951, 992; the B-26 invader was a World War II-era light bomber and once of the first American aircraft to engage enemy forces in Korea, they flew interdiction missions over North Korea until increased anti-aircraft fire and the growing MiG presence forced themto fly at night.

additional B-26s and F-86s to counter the growing MiG

threat.”47 US bombing was effective at destroying North Korean

airfields but the amount of MiGs supplied by foreign powers

was becoming too much for the USAF. In 1951 General Vandemberg

indicated that “there [the USAF had] reached the point where

there [were] not enough targets left in Korea to keep the air

force busy.”48 This demonstrates that the damaged caused by the

USAF bombing campaign had been successful in eliminating North

Korean targets in the north but ultimately failed due to the

support gained from the Soviet Union and China. Inadequate

targeting facilities on US bombers led to many strategic

interdiction missions being useless. Secondly communist

techniques such as moving convoys by night and outsourcing

supplies from Russia and China meant that although American

bombing missions were successful in hampering North Korean

industrial capacity, this was simply replaced in the form of

aid from the USSR and China. Finally, the increased MiG

presence over Korea made bombing missions difficult for US

pilots who were increasingly under resourced. This did however

47 Ibid.48FRUS, 1951. China and Korea, Volume VII, Memorandum for the Record of a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting, Washington, February 13, 1951, 176.

mean that more aircraft were available to conduct tactical

interdiction missions.

From the advent of Chinese intervention in 1950, the B-29s,

which had successfully destroyed all strategic targets in

North Korea, were now used against tactical targets.49 This led

the USAF to conduct more tactical interdiction missions to

support ground troops in offensive and defensive rolls.

Tactical interdiction was authorised for use in Korea “to

avoid unnecessary casualties to [American] forces.”50 Although

planes were required to stay well away from the frontiers of

Manchuria and the Soviet Union, these raids were somewhat

effective. But during the first few weeks when targeting

intelligence was at a minimum, it became nigh on impossible to

accurately and effectively attack communist forces on the

move, and resulted in numerous friendly and civilian

casualties.51 Later in the war, as tactical interdiction became

more effective once again, communist forces learnt how to

counter the superior technological advantage that the US49 Rober A. Mann, The B-29 Superfortress: A comprehensive Registry of the Planes and their Missions (North Carolina, MacFarland & Company, Inc., 1997), 250. 50 FRUS, 1950. Korea, Volume VII, The Joint-Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur), Washington, 29 June, 1950, 253.51 Hastings, The Korean War, 368.

commanded. Trains were high priority targets to attack as they

were large targets and usually travelling in a straight line.

However the engineers on trains started to let off steam from

their engines to make them hard to see and strike. General

practice from a bomber performing a mission to attack convoys

was for the bombers to fly down the column ejecting bombs

every five hundred yards then swing around for another fly

past and machine gun the blazing ruins.52 However the Chinese

developed a strategy to switch truck lights off, and halt

convoy movement whenever they heard an American bomber

overhead, greatly reducing the effectiveness of these types of

interdiction missions. Rees argues that once communist forces

had pushed the Allied forces back down the 38th parallel and

the war stabilised, the B-29 Superfortress came into its own,

attacking supply and troop concentrations. Rees suggests that

during the first days of the communist advance from 1-5

January 1950 8,000 causalities were caused to communist

forces.53 These estimates are likely to be exaggerated and

therefore effect the credibility of this statement. Tactical

interdiction at a time when target intelligence was at a

52 Ibid., 370.53 David Rees, The Air and Sea War, 107.

minimum led to exceptionally high numbers of friendly

casualties. Communist forces became aware of US tactical

interdiction missions and developed methods which saved

convoys from American attacks.

The devastation caused to North Korean cities and the

targeting of civilians as a legitimate means of waging war.

The Second World War demonstrated a shift in military thinking

and an acceptance of using civilians as targets intended to

break the will of a nation to wage war. The experience of the

Korean War demonstrated that American moral scruples against

targeting civilians did not disappear with the bombing in

World War II, as some historians have argued.54 Five years

since devastating the industrial heartland of Germany,

American bombers were once again conducting devastating raids

on cities and industrial centres. Throughout the Korean War

American bomber command unleashed an extensive bombing

campaign over North Korean cities which would see devastation54 Sahr Conway-Lanz, “The Ethics of Bombing Civilians After World War II: The Persistence of Norms Against Targeting Civilians in the Korean War,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 12 (2014): 47; see Ronald Schaffer, Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); and Marilyn B. Young, “Bombing Civilians: An American Tradition,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 16, 2009.

of mainly civilian areas on a scale unprecedented since the

Second World War. Yet this campaign would fail to break

communist moral and largely failed. The experience of the

Second World War showed that strategic bombing and devastation

of cities was successful in killing large numbers of the

civilian population and affecting industrial capacity, but was

indecisive in securing victory. Gabriel Kolko agrees and

suggests that even with the immensely superior fire power that

the American air force commanded, they were able to destroy

property and countless civilian lives but were unable to

translate this into a military victory.55 The Americans began

bombing North Korean cities upon their arrival in the war.

Mathew Ridgway an American general in 1951 authorised “an all-

out strike against Pyongyang” aimed at destroying military

targets, marshalling yards, motor vehicle repair shops,

concealed aircraft parks and communication facilities.56 Kolko

argues that the civilian life was gravely affected by the US

bombing campaign, cities were devastated and the destruction

of ninety percent of Korea’s power capacity at a time when the

55 Gabriel Kolko, Century of War: Politics, Conflicts, and Society Since 1914 (New York: The New Press, 1994), 404.56 FRUS, 1951. China and Korea, Volume VII, The Commander in Chief Far East Ridgway to the joint chiefs of staff, Tokyo, 21 July 1951, 718.

war had already ruined social and health infrastructure

created typhus and small pox epidemics.57 Strategic bombing was

inherent within American strategy during the Korean War. At

armistice negotiations in 1952 the Chinese asked the US to

stop strategic bombing and remove the USAF from Korea so that

a prisoner exchange could be negotiated. However General

Collins is reported to state privately that “if we announce an

armistice unilaterally we would have to stop bombing. This is

impossible.” This suggests how important and effective US

military leaders believed the bombing campaign to be in

Korea.58 Once the American bombers started targeting the North

Korean ability to wage war, the KPA simply continued to

manufacture weapons and other paraphernalia of war by

dispersing their industries underground, making them immune to

conventional bomb attacks.59 American raids on North Korea’s

cities failed to break communist resilience and resulted in

the loss of thousands of civilian lives. The US strategic

bombing campaign greatly added to the communists’ difficulties

in sustaining war, but the communist ability to introduce

57 Kolko, Century of War, 406.58 FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State Joint Staff meeting, Washington, May 21, 1952, 217.59 Catchpole, The Korean War, 242.

counter measures, above all putting key installations

underground, negated the effects of the air-dropped

conventional bomb.60

Korea was a primitive society and therefore the USAF found it

difficult to identify many targets of strategic or military

value. Once the targets of military value had been eliminated

there was little for USAF to attack. Conway-Lanz argues that

American leaders claimed that US air power was being used in a

discriminate manner and was avoiding harm to civilians, as

they had asserted even at the height of bombing in the Second

World War.61 The elasticity of the definition of ‘military

target’ helped make these claims of discrimination more

plausible.62 The new bombing capabilities contributed to

stretching the definition of military targets as they targeted

new areas of civilian societies, such as transportation

networks, arms factories, and their workers. American military

planners stretched their definition of military targets to

include almost everything so they could indiscriminately bomb

60 Hastings, The Korean War, 393.61 Sahr Conway-Lanz, “The Ethics of Bombing Civilians After World War II,” 47.62 Ibid.

civilian populations in the hope they could break the resolve

of the North Koreans.63 The primacy of North Korean society

enabled the US to destroy military and strategic targets

quickly, and once these had been destroyed and there was

nothing left to target, the US expanded their definition of

military targets to include almost everything.

The USAF goes beyond the Yalu striking targets close to the

border

The bombing of the Yalu River dam and subsequent air strikes

in China was a contentious issue that had to be handled with

great care for American policy makers who were tasked with

formulating bombing strategy. During 1950 policy makers stated

that “there would be no bombing during this period of the Yalu

River dam or its power plants… and that the dam could be used

as a bargaining point in case it came to pass with the Chinese

Communists.”64 The dam is situated on the Yalu River, built by63 Ibid.64FRUS, 1950. Korea, Volume VII, Memorandum by the Deputy of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Perkins) to the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb), Washington, October 9, 1950,

the Japanese during the Second World War and supplies hydro-

electric power to North Korea and China. The dam was avoided

by American bombers during the early stages of the war and a

‘ban on strategic bombing’ was passed to avoid American

bombers crossing the Yalu or bombing too close to Chinese

territory. If it was destroyed, a large proportion of North

Korea and part of Manchuria would be left without power and

therefore cause unnecessary civilian suffering. American

officials protected the ban on strategic bombing too close to

the Yalu by arguing that “strikes against Manchuria meant

nothing more than hostilities with China, it would be

practically impossible to disengage from such a war, and while

we [are] slowly sinking in the quagmire of the vast waste over

which no victory would be anything but pyrrhic.”65 However in

1951 American strategy had changed and plans were drawn to

attack the Yalu River dam. American bombers were “authorized

to bomb strategic targets… in Manchuria for the purpose of

eventually bringing the war in Korea to a conclusion.66

Although strikes were not conducted against the Yalu River dam

917.65Ibid., Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk), Washington, November 7, 1950, 1091-1092.66 FRUS, 1951. China and Korea, Volume VII, The United States Deputy Representative atthe United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State, New York, March 20, 1951, 252.

until 1952, the lifting of the ban on strategic bombing on

this region is an important event which legitimises the

striking of a ‘neutral’ state. It is important because in

previous years pilots were restricted from flying near, or

bombing near the border –within twelve miles- but now US war

planes were authorised to strike targets in Chinese territory,

risking retaliation from the Chinese or indeed Soviet Union.

Once the Korean sources of hydro-electric power had been

destroyed, US fighter bombers then focused on destroying

irrigation dams and North Korean food supplies. American

policy makers argued that if the harvest could be interrupted

it would cause food shortages among both the civilian and

military population. An added bonus would be the creation of

flash floods that would inundate military sites and erode the

foundations of bridges and railroad embankments.67 By the end

of 1952 the USAF’s planners began to study the main

concentration of irrigation dams in North Korea. They reported

two ideal times for interrupting the rice harvest; in May 1953

when the young plants had weak root systems and would be swept

away by water; and in August 1953 when a flood would cover and

67 Catchpole, The Korean War, 247.

kill the rice plants.68 Planners decided to ignore advice to

strike all the dams simultaneously to avoid the Communists

catching onto what the USAF was doing and draining the dams to

avoid flooding. However the operation was carried out over a

month long period and as a result of this only fifty percent

of the dams were destroyed.69 American policy was weak when

confronted with the Chinese threat and the necessity to

destroy power and food sources to the North Korean war effort,

and although in the later stages of the war these dams were

destroyed, the war was coming to a conclusion. The destruction

of power supplies and food shortages could have hurried the

North Koreans to the negotiating table and see that they

brought a speedy conclusion to the war, however had these

attacks been conducted earlier the war may have been concluded

even sooner.

Communist anti-aircraft presence as a means of defending

against bombing

As the communists began to build up their anti-aircraft

presence along the Yalu River it became much harder for68 Ibid.69 Ibid.

American bombers and their fighter escorts to safely and

accurately destroy targets. As the anti-air presence

increased, the dangers about attacking targets on the Yalu

River increased because of anti-aircraft fire from the bank of

the river. With American pilots forbidden to cross, any

attacks from enemy fighters created an irresistible temptation

for American pilots to cross into Manchurian air space.70 The

build-up along the Yalu River caused serious problems for the

US as reported in 1953. “The Communist Air Force in China has

[the] capability of seriously challenging [US] daylight air

operations… in recent months build-up [and] the enemy’s

employment of field and AA artillery” were drastically

increased creating serious issues for US bombers.71 Estimations

of Chinese aircraft radically increased to around 1,000

fighters by 1953 since 1951, making it much harder for US

bombers to successfully strike and destroy targets.72 With

anti-air and fighters increasing drastically over the years,

US bombers and their fighter escorts were exposed to the enemy

on more occasions. Enemy fighters who enjoyed privileged

70 FRUS, 1951. China and Korea, Volume VII, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant), Washington, September 12, 1951, 906.71 FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in Korea, Washington, April 3, 1953, 865-867.72 Ibid, 868.

sanctuary would incite bombers to follow them into Manchuria

where AA batteries had been building up leaving American

bombers highly exposed and potentially resulting in the loss

of American air superiority if high numbers of casualties

occurred.73 Hastings argues that constantly improving communist

anti-air defences emphasised the enteral conundrum; to bomb

low meant sustaining unacceptably high causalities while to

bomb high meant a fatal loss of accuracy.74 By the end of the

war the communists had a suitable and effective AA defence

system which caused a large number of American causalities

compared to earlier in the conflict when this defence system

barely existed and was therefore ineffective. Should American

bombers have attacked Manchuria in the opening years of the

war they would have had a much more profound effect as the

communist defence was not as fortified.

73 FRUS, 1951. China and Korea, Volume VII, Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of North-eastern Affairs (McClurkin) to the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far EasternAffairs (Merchant), Washington, September 10, 1951, 921.74 Hastings, The Korean War, 390.

Conclusion

The first conclusion that can be drawn from this dissertation

is that American air superiority was of paramount importance

to US strategic planners and therefore played a key role in

determining the outcome of the war. The US failed prior to the

war in extending the American defensive perimeter in South

East Asia to include Korea, and also failed to provide

adequate aircraft to the South Korean government as promised.

This led to the almost total annihilation of the South Korean

air force. Once American aircraft entered the conflict they

were able to establish air dominance quickly and effectively.

Although the North Korean Air Force was superior to the South

Korean Air Force in 1950 it could not hold supremacy over the

experienced US pilots and superior planes. Any air operations

that were to be conducted by Allied forces during the war

could only be conducted if air superiority was under allied

control. For example the landings at Inchon (1950) would not

have been possible without air superiority providing cover for

advancing troops and destroying the small amounts of air power

that the communists could muster.75 Air superiority was

imperative and proved to be highly successful in destroying

North Korean airfields and continuing to bombard them

throughout the war leaving the vast majority of North Korean

air fields inoperable throughout the War.76 However after

having established air superiority within the first few weeks

of the war, once the Soviet supplied MiG entered the conflict

in late 1950 American air superiority was challenged but not

defeated. The superiority of the MiGs in combat surprised

American officials who believed that Soviet and Chinese planes

75 Inchon landings were a surprise amphibious assault conducted by the allied forces toward the undefended city of Inchon, which allowed allied forces to gain a foothold in North Korean territory; for more information see Russel H. S. Stolfi, “A Critique of Pure Success: Inchon Revisited, Revised and Contrasted,” The Journal of Military History, 68 (2004): 505-525; and Joseph H. Alexander, and Merrill L Bartlett, Sea Soldiers in the Cold War: Amphibious warfare, 1945-1991 (Maryland: United States Naval institute, 1995), 26-45.76 FRUS, 1951. China and Korea, Volume VII, Memorandum by the Counselor (Bohlen to the Secretary of State, Washington, October 4, 1951, 992.

were inferior because as suggested at the Wake Island

Conference “We [America] are the best.”77 The superiority of

the MiGs compared to its early counter parts such as the

Shooting Star led to this challenge in American air

superiority. However despite the introduction of the MiG into

the Korean theatre of war, and the chronic shortage of

warplanes that faced American forces the USAF was able to

maintain superiority over the Korean peninsula throughout the

war thus enabling American bombers to conduct their missions.

However the issue of political sanctuary that the communist

air forces enjoyed and the increasing presence of MiG fighters

meant that even if the USAF wanted air superiority over

Manchuria they would have been unlikely to achieve it.

The second conclusion that can be made from this dissertation

is that American air superiority was successful in

establishing superiority over the Korean peninsula for US

bombers to conduct operations against targets in North Korea

and later Manchuria. These attacks were on the whole

unsuccessful in breaking North Korean resolve to fight through

77 FRUS, 1950. Korea, Volume VII, Substance of Statements Made as Wake Island Conference, October 15, 1950, 954.

co-ordinated attacks on northern cities. While bombing

missions did devastate Northern cities, industrial centres and

supply routes supplies and industrial products were outsourced

and delivered by China and Russia. Inadequate targeting

facilities on US bombers led to many strategic interdiction

missions being useless. Communist techniques such as moving

convoys by night, and outsourcing supplies from the Soviet

Union and China meant once North Korean infrastructure had

been destroyed US bombing sorties became ineffective, as the

loss of North Korean industry was replaced by that of the USSR

and China. Tactical interdiction missions at a time when

target intelligence was at a minimum led to exceptionally high

numbers of friendly casualties, and refugees fleeing the

conflict.78 Communist forces became aware of US tactical

interdiction missions and developed methods which preserved

them from US bombs. American raids on North Korean cities

created an unfathomable amount of civilian deaths, yet failed

to break communist resilience. The North Korean General Nam II

points out that indiscriminate and inhuman bombing, and

bombardment of innocent inhabitants violated international

law, and the American belief that this was sufficient to78 Hastings, The Korean War, 368.

decide the outcome of the war was wrong.79 Carpet bombing of

North Korean cities created devastation on a scale

unprecedented since the Second World War but failed to break

the North Korean resolve to fight. The expansion of the term

‘military target’ legitimised this but failed to cripple the

North Korean determination to fight and although may have

helped bring the communists to the negotiating table, failed

to prove decisive. American policy in 1950-1951 was weak

towards China. When they did eventually strike targets in

Manchuria and on the Yalu River “it had practically no

effect.”80 However once the US did attack targets such as

irrigation dams, it caused widespread flooding, famine, and

disease. Therefore these attacks should have been authorised

sooner in order for the bombing campaign to have the greatest

affect possible, while also demonstrating a tough US policy

towards China.

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policy/cold-war/conference/stueck.html Accessed 22/1/2014.