A Semiotic Perspective on Referential Models

of Video Game Temporality

Altuğ Işığan, PhD

Izmir University,

Film and Television Department,

İzmir, Turkey

isigan.altug@gmail.com

+90 530 179 62 01

Abstract: This paper deals with two major problems in contemporary game

studies: the lack of a notion of discourse, and the negative impact of

referential language models on the perception of games as semiotic system. It

can be said that the problems in these models are the by-product of an

attempt to separate games from narratives, and accordingly game studies

from semiotics.

In order to deal with these problems and to develop an alternative from

within semiotics, the first two chapters of the paper present a review of Espen

Aarseth’s account of Andersen's computer-based games typology, and Jesper

Juul's model of play time. The final chapter puts then forward an approach

of game temporality that is based on Seymour Chatman's model of narrative

fiction. This approach emphasizes the presence of a structure of four planes,

of which especially two, form of content and form of expression, play a

major role in the emergence of a mental image of chronology, and the

operations of discourse on this mental image in order to achieve a sense of

game temporality.

This paper shows that a better understanding of semiotics requires game

studies scholars to distinguish between reading line and discourse as two

different aspects of the expression plane. The paper lays bare that without

this distinction, the notion of discourse gets completely lost and a proper

analysis of game temporality becomes impossible.

On the other hand, this paper also clarifies that it is of major importance

to the field of game studies to improve its understanding of the term sign.

While game studies scholars continuously use this and other terms from the

arsenal of semiotics, they seem to use them without recognizing the

philosophy of language that lead to the development of this conceptual

arsenal, and they keep using them based on outdated referential models of

language. The paper concludes that game studies must reserve more space to

the teaching of semiotic models and not rely alone on resources that provide

unreliable critiques of these models.

Keywords: Discourse Time, Reading Line, Game Temporality, Story

Chronology, Sign, Semiotics, Narrative, Video Games

1 Introduction

The field of game studies stands in a stressful relationship with semiotics and narration

theory. This has its historical and institutional reasons, but they are the topic of another

paper. Instead I want to deal with the rather disastrous results of this tension in regard to

formulating an instrumental theory of temporality in video games. It is well known

among game scholars that some of the most influential publications on game studies in

the past two decades have been shaped by a desire to distance this field from semiotics

and narrative theory. It is for example emphasized in said publications that video games

and narratives are objects of entirely different natures [1] and that semiotics and

narrative theory are disciplines that are fruitless and desultory when applied to computer

games [2].

Not surprisingly then, we come across views on game temporality that label

commonly known discursive strategies in regard to game temporality as instances of

“broken time” [3], and hold that semiotics is only good for the study of traditional

media such as movies and books, since as chains of signifiers, these are linear and static

by definition, whereas games are non-linear and dynamic, with no preset chain of

signifiers whatsoever [4]. I believe that most semioticians would be alert in the face of

these confusing arguments and that they would wonder how it was possible to come to

these misleading conclusions in regard to semiotics and its concepts.

This paper aims to point out the shortcomings of the aforementioned confusing

arguments, and also wishes to contribute to overcome this confusion. Within this spirit,

it is particularly important to point out two common problems in the perception and use

of semiotics in the field of game studies, problems that also weaken the understanding

of meaningful play: first, the lack of an understanding of the term discourse; and

second, related to this, the prevalence of a referential model of language in this field,

despite the borrowed terminology from structuralist and post-structuralist language

theories.

In this paper I want to present both a critique of theories of game temporality in

the field of games studies and an outline of a theory of game temporality that finds its

roots in a (hopefully) proper use of semiotic and narrative concepts. With these

intentions in mind, I will first present a review of Aarseth’s account on Andersen's

computer-based signs typology. In this chapter my goal is to show that Anderson's

applied game semiotics maintains an essentialist view on the notion of the sign, and that

it fails to make use of the notion of discourse. Through this I want to point out that

Aarseth was wrong in generalizing the problems of this particular application as an

indicator that all semiotics is useless in the study of games. I will then continue with a

critique of Jesper Juul's two-level model of game temporality as being put forward in

his book Half Real. In this chapter, I will point out the larger, underlying problem to the

first one, that of the presence of a referential model of language, which seems to make it

impossible for game researchers to understand the notion of discourse, to a degree

where they openly reject it. I will then present the outline of a theory of game

temporality that is rooted in Seymour Chatman's [5] model of narrative fiction. Through

this outline, I want to put forward a view on game temporality that maintains both the

notion of discourse and the notion of the reading line, as they stand in relation to

chrono-logical structure of story.

2 Essentialist Sign Theory: The Lack of a Notion of Discourse

One of the most important shortcomings of game studies hitherto is its inability

to put forward the question whether its use of the term sign is in accord with its well-

established definition in semiotics. This is very important, because leaving this question

unanswered also invites problems in the use (or avoidance) of terms developed by

narrative theory. In this chapter, I will try to answer this question by having a closer

look at Aarseth’s account of Andersen's computer-based signs typology. I will then ask

whether Aarseth's critique of Andersen's typology has a better understanding of the term

sign, and whether his dismissal of semiotics based on Andersen's applied game

semiotics, is justified.

In his influential publication Cybertext, Espen Aarseth puts forward a detailed

critique of Andersen's pioneering study in applied game semiotics [6]. After his review,

Aarseth reveals that he is not satisfied with Andersen's typology, and makes the

following statement: “The lesson learned from the experience with one semiology can

be generalized and so construed as arguments against the sufficiency of semiotic

approaches” [7]. In other words, he concludes that semiotics is not suitable to study

games.

It is clear that this generalization in itself is wrong: In a similar manner it could

be said that the experience with one type of game studies is ground enough to refute

game studies as a whole. This is a path that no one wants to walk down. More

important, however, is whether Andersen's use of semiotic concepts is in accord with

basic principles in semiotics, and whether Aarseth’ dismissal of semiotics as a whole is

justified.

Andersen applies his semiotic analysis to the game Dark Castle [8]. He starts his

analysis by providing a list of the signs in the game: Hero, Bag of Bricks, obstacles and

opponents such as Rats, Bats and Droids, and a Dungeon. He then continues to define a

number of features which he later on uses as measures in developing his typology of

computer-based signs.

Permanence – the ability of a sign to be recognized throughout its existence

Transience – the ability to change parts or part of the sign's appearance

Handling – the user's ability to control the sign by direct signals, e.g. joystick

movements

Action – the sign’s ability to cause changes without the necessary participation

of another sign

This small portion of his approach reveals that Andersen made a number of

categorical mistakes in his attempt to develop a typology of “game-produced signs”.

First, he should have resorted to the broader categories of narrative theory, such as

events and actants if he wished to classify “signs” like hero or bag of bricks. By

defining these game elements as stand-alone signs, he fails to recognize that what he

aims to analyze are actually chains of signifiers. By resorting to the term sign instead of

the notion of chain of signifiers, he renders the presence of discourse invisible.

Second, he seems to make the mistake that is known in semiotics as “falling for the

signifier”, that is, he thinks that the image (signifier) naturally leads to the mental

concept (signified): A hero is a hero, and a bag of bricks is a bag of bricks. Or as

Eskelinen [9] said a decade later: “A ball is a ball is a ball”. Here the problem is

essentialism: the way Andersen defines the features of computer-based signs assumes

that there is an essential connection between a sign and its meaning. Hence, he violates

a basic notion of the sign as defined in semiotics: that a sign is the connotative sum of a

signifier and a signified, and that the relationship between the two, that is, meaning, is

arbitrary and in no way guaranteed to remain permanent. In other words: a sign does not

have an essence (fixed meaning) of whose permanence or transience one can speak.

What Andersen perceives as the permanence of the sign, that is, the existence of a stand-

alone sign whose essence persists despite the sign undergoing transformations in shape

and form, should have been conceptualized as a chain of various signifiers whose

articulation and repetitive use foster the perception of broader narrative categories such

as events and actants. Seen from this angle, “the ability to control the sign”, e.g.

handling, is actually the user's ability to manipulate this very chain of signifiers in order

to modify said events and actants. In short: where Andersen sees one sign, there is a

chain of many.

Andersen's list of features does not only violate basic principles of semiotics, but his

approach also deteriorates into an essentialist view on meaning and signs. He fails to

maintain his initial intention: to deal with discourse. His flawed notion of the sign also

causes a failure in seeking the aid of narrative theory. Plagued by essentialism and the

absence of a notion of discourse, Andersen's typology can hardly be recognized as a

valid example of semiotics, despite the semiotic terminology that he uses.

Aarseth, on the other hand, doesn't seem to recognize these shortcomings in

Andersen's semiotic approach. Instead he concludes that semiotics as a discipline is of

no use to games. Aarseth's misrecognition of Andersen's typology as a work that

represents semiotics properly may have its reasons, but it would be wrong to follow his

thought that semiotics in general is insufficient in the study of games.

3 Against Discourse Time: The Impact of Referential Language Models

While I have shown the problems that come with a lack of a notion of discourse,

it is even more interesting to see that in some influential publications in the field of

game studies the notion of discourse is openly rejected. This is especially the case in

Jesper Juul's widely acknowledged book Half Real. I will try to show now how his

dismissal of the notion of discourse time, apart from his intention to define an

ontological foundation that allows justifying a separation between games and narratives,

is a result of his reliance on a referential model of language.

Juul explains that his theory of game temporality is based on Pavel's notion of

dual structure in make-believe. Juul adapts this dual structure model to games in the

following way: in games, player actions are both real actions and actions that have a

meaning in the fictional world of the game. In other words, player actions have a real

meaning, and a fictional meaning.

From here he develops a two-level model of game temporality. One of these

levels is play time: the time in the real world that it takes the player to carry out his real

actions during play. The other level is fictional time, the time it takes the events in the

fictional world to happen. For example in some games, fifteen minutes of real play time

and real player actions may be the equivalent of events that take three days to happen in

the fictional time of the game world.

He uses the term projection to express the ratio of play time to fictional time,

and he seems to assign a certain privilege to the 1:1 ratio (or real-time gameplay), since

he believes that this is the most logical thing to happen in an interactive medium in

which the actions in “the now of the player” must be the principal measure of the

temporal structure of the events that take place in the fictional world of the game. He

goes so far as to put this as a major principle of game temporality: it is only natural for

game events to happen in their chronological order and in real time. He sees this as a

result of the interactive and player-dependent nature of the medium: for example

discourse time applications such as flashbacks would cause a time machine dilemma in

games, because if a player were allowed to play prior events, she would be given the

chance to destroy already established causal connections between events, and this would

destroy the temporal coherence of the fictional world as a whole. It is therefore most

natural that the order of events in play is chronological, and that there is a tendency to

prefer 1:1 projection between play time and fictional time.

As Juul expands on this notion, he not only renders discourse time into an

oddity, but at some point he also renders it completely obsolete: when he talks about

what he calls abstract games, he abandons discourse time and story time altogether.

Here he argues that “abstract” games (such as Tetris [10]) do not even contain a fictional

world, which means that they do not even have fictional time, let alone discourse time.

Abstract games have only play time.

His goal here seems to be to establish a notion of the “pure game”, a game that

solely rests on player actions in the now of the player, so as to be able to justify an

ontological difference between games and narratives. His reasoning here is that

narratives have discourse time because they are a recount of events past. If there are

games that do not have a discourse time, then we can say that games aren't narratives. In

this view, attempts to tell a story will introduce a discourse time level to games, which is

against the nature of games and destroys their purity. All that discourse time brings with

it are instances of incoherent or broken time.

As a result of this reasoning, forms of temporality that he sees in connection to

the presence of fictional worlds or narrative discourse are perceived to have destroying

impacts on the play time “principle” and on what he considers to be “reasonable” forms

of temporal structure. Along the chapter on game temporality, he points out the

“temporal incoherencies” that come with applications of discourse time. He points out

the severe damage on temporal structure in games that violate the 1:1 projection ratio:

games that can be speeded up and that create thereby confusion in regard to temporality,

or games that feature undesired disconnections of play time from fictional time through

the use of cut-scenes, loading screens and level transitions.

At some point he openly labels some projection types as instances of “broken

time” and wonders why reviews in game journals fail to address these: one such

example is his observation in regard to “broken time” in the game FIFA 2002 [11]: he

says that according to the game clock it takes David Beckham several minutes to run a

distance of 50 meters whereas in reality it would take him only a few seconds. Juul

arrives at a point where discourse time applications that are easily understood by players

of all ages, are regarded as unwanted incoherencies.

There are several problems in Juul's argumentation that lead to such strange

conclusions. First of all, it is unacceptable to claim that there are game worlds that are

not at the same time fiction. All games put themselves forward as a fictional world with

unique events and actants, be it Tetris, Dark Castle or football. High levels of

abstraction in existents and settings, or the use of real humans and real settings does not

change this fictional aspect. As a natural extension to this, it follows that the content

plane of all game worlds must be narrated through direct or indirect statements. The

duality between story and discourse in games is therefore inevitable. In this context,

player actions must be regarded as statements that are part of the expression plane of

games, that is, they are part of the signifying chain of the ludic discourse.

As a natural result, actions in play time always take place as part of discourse

time. The 1:1 projection principle that is privileged in Juul's model does not prove the

absence of discourse time, but it rather indicates that sticking with the chronological

order of events is a common form of temporality in ludic discourse. But sticking with

the illusion of “real time” is only one out of the many possible applications of discourse

time. In other words, there is no play time that isn't at the same time discourse time.

More than that, recently published games such as Prince of Persia: The Sands of Time

[12], Braid [13] and Company of Myself [14] provide concrete examples that refute

Juul's argument of the time machine paradox. It would also not be wrong to say that

methods like save points, that is, earlier points in the story timeline to which players are

sent back when they fail at some point in a game, are quite common uses of the

flashback technique in the context of games.

Interestingly, Andersen, who fails to maintain a notion of discourse in his

computer-based signs typology, is quite aware of the fact that real time play must be

considered as discourse. He states:

“An interactive work is a work where a reader can physically change

the discourse in a way that is interpretable and produces meaning

within the discourse itself... the reader's interaction is an intregral part

of the sign production of the work”. [15]

But how does Juul fall this much apart from the notion of discourse time, to a

degree where he abandons it altogether with its twin story time?

The problem lies in his misinterpretation of Pavel's notion of dual structure in

make-believe. He interprets this model around a notion of referential language, which is

clearly against the semiotic perspective that Pavel maintains. Indeed, as early as in the

1950's both in the USA and in continental Europe we witness studies that capture this

dual structure as a dual discourse, more specifically, as a discourse on discourse, and

not as a duality between reality and fiction. For example Gregory Bateson [16] proposes

to see gameplay as meta-communication, and Roland Barthes [17] proposes to use the

term secondary languages for any form of “mythical” speech, a category that game must

be considered to be a part of.

In other words, what Juul takes as the “level of reality” is considered by

semioticians to be already subject to discourse: although we know that “reality” exists,

it has no fixed meaning that we could take as a referent. The meaning of reality is the

discourse that it is the subject of. The point of departure for analysis must be discourse

then, not reality, for all we know about reality is produced by discourse through which

we recognize it as an array of existents and rows of meaningful actions.

Juul fails to see that Pavel's dual structure model is actually a tripartite model in

which the “level of reality” is intentionally ignored for analytical purposes. Based on a

referential view, Juul re-introduces this level of reality back into the model, at the

expense of one of the crucial levels of discourse in Pavel's dual structure model. At the

point where Juul speaks of abstract games that have no discourse or story time, only

play time, Pavel's dual structure model is completely destroyed: The level of reality that

is ignored for analytical purposes in Pavel's models becomes the only level that is

recognized by Juul.

Juul arrives at a purely referential model of language here, and his ability to

recognize discourse is completely lost. Forms of discourse time become irrationalities

that are judged according to the “reality” of a “reasonable” notion of objective time. It is

clear that at this point Juul's model of game temporality loses both its credibility and its

instrumentality in assessing the richness of stylistic features enabled through

applications of ludic discourse.

4 A Semiotics-Based Approach to Video Game Temporality

So far I have focused on the problems that arise from a lack of a notion of

discourse and the problems that arise from the reliance on referential models of

language. At this point it must be clear to the reader that both problems cause game

studies to use semiotic terms in improper ways.

However, revealing these problems is not helpful at this point, and I wish to

approach the problem of game temporality from an improved semiotic position. My

goal is to give back to game studies the notion of discourse by distinguishing it from the

reading line. I will show how these two different aspects of the expression plane relate

to story existents and the chronological order of events, that is, the content plane. To

formulate the goal of this chapter in two short questions: What is the source of

temporality in narratives? How can we seize it by use of concepts from semiotics and

narrative theory? As a first step, let us have a closer look at Seymour Chatman’s model

of narrative fiction.

According to Chatman, a discourse consists of two related planes: The expression

plane and the content plane. The former is the plane of signifiers, the latter the plane of

signifieds. Chatman divides each of these planes into further two planes: Both

expression and content plane have a substance and a form [18]. Through this, we yield

the four planes that a narrative is made of. I will demonstrate briefly how these planes

also apply to games by applying them to the game Rock-Paper-Scissors [19].

Substance of Expression – The material substance of signs. In Rock-Paper-

Scissors these are the player's hands.

Form of Expression – The range of shapes that are recognized as valid signifiers

within the system. In Rock-Paper-Scissor these are the shapes |rock|, |paper| and

|scissors| that a player would form by using her hands.

Substance of Content – The catalogue of positive meanings that contains the

array of existents in the fictional world of the game. In Rock-Paper-Scissors this

catalogue contains the semes “rock”, “paper” and “scissors”.

Form of Content – the formal or logical structure that consists of an arrangement

of data locations and operators that relates a set of existents so as to utilize them

as the objects of functions that produce readable values. In Rock-Paper-Scissors

this is the triangular logical expression that holds up the intransitive

relationships between the existents “rock”, “paper” and “scissors.

Fig. 1 The Four Narrative Planes in the game Rock Paper Scissors

When two players start to play, their actions mobilize all four planes at once:

They use their hands (substance of expression) to form one of the recognized signifiers

|rock|, |paper| or |scissors| (form of expression). The signifiers that are put forward by

the players do not only call the associated signifieds “rock”, “paper” and “scissors”

(substance of content), but they also put into motion the logical expression that holds up

the relationships between these (the form of content). As a result of the mobilization of

all four planes at once, a productive articulation takes place and generates a chain of

signifiers that convey a readable meaning: “Rock versus paper. Paper wins.”

Based on this classification of planes, we understand that at the level of the

expression plane we should not confuse the linearity of the reading line (the substance

of expression) with the temporal order held up via discourse (the form of expression),

The inevitable linearity of the former, does not automatically mean that the latter has to

be linear too. The linear reading line may still translate into a discourse that presents a

non-linear arrangement of story events. This is for example the case in the film

Memento [20], where the chain of signifiers, albeit flowing in a linear fashion, narrates

the story events in complete reverse order when the said chain of signifiers is

recognized as discourse.

We can conclude from this that the chronological order that is preferred in some

the discourse of some games is neither rooted in the inevitable linearity of the reading

line, nor in the inevitably chronological order of story. It is an application of discourse

that is constructed so as to present the chrono-logical order as it is. We could say that

this is a discourse whose essential manipulation on the chronological order is to prefer

to not changing it at all. This is the case with games that follow the so-called “1:1

projection ratio”.

One aspect that shapes game temporality is then the form of expression

(discourse), and not the substance of expression (the reading line). When Aarseth speaks

of traditional media as being of a linear nature, he takes the linearity of the reading line

as the basis, which is clearly the wrong thing to do. Through this, he completely fails to

recognize the duality of the expression plane, dismisses the notion of discourse, and

therefore ignores its primary role in the shaping of temporal structure. To him it must

look like a narrative consists only of the reading line, whereas he should recognize in

this the presence of a discourse that prefers a linear narration of events. Through this

misrecognition, he blames formats that can present non-linear discourses, such as books

and movies, as linear by nature, and only recognizes in the computer game an

essentially non-linear medium. But since he ignores the presence of discourse, he also

dismisses to capture this non-linearity in terms of discourse time.

Again based on the classification above, we understand that the chrono-logical

order of story must be rooted in the form of content, rather than in the substance of

content. As I have already mentioned, the content plane consists of two layers: For one,

the substance of content, that is, the catalogue of positive meanings that make for the

existents in the story: characters, objects, settings. Second, the form of content, that is,

the logical structure held up via algorithms (or sets of logical operators) that allow these

existents to be exchanged and compared so as to create values that can be read as the

story events: actions and happenings; kernels and satellites. Our mental image in regard

to the chronological order of the events in the game world depends on this logical

structure: the form of content is the source of a causal chain that inevitably brings with

it an abstract or fictional notion of a unique timeline or events.

It is now easier to understand the role of the relation between the form of

expression and the form of content in the creation of various temporal modes in games:

A specific spatial arrangement of signifiers (the physical reading line), which is

recognized as a compositional order (discourse) by the player, signifies to her both

aspects of story: the array of existents, and the chronological order of events. The

discourse may omit, delay, shuffle, repeat, or superimpose parts of the chronology and

thereby alter the ways in which we build our mental image of temporality of the

fictional world, or it may leave the chronology as it is, as it is the example in games that

go for a “1:1 projection ratio”.

It is hence the unique relation between discourse (form of expression) and events

(form of content) that shape temporality in linear, non-linear or mixed forms. This

relationship can produce a great variety of modes of temporality. In the light of the

possible relationships between story and discourse time, it should be preferred to see

different modes of temporality as style issues rather than as examples of “broken time”.

5 Summary and Conclusion

In this paper I took a closer look at two major problems in contemporary game

studies: the lack of a notion of discourse and the impact of referential language models

on game-related theories. By pointing out the shortcoming in Andersen's applied game

semiotics, Espen Aarseth's critique of semiotics, and Jesper Juul's model of game

temporality, I tried to show both the wrong assumptions in regard to semiotics, and the

problems that game studies starts to face when it tries to go without the help of

semiotics. As an alternative, I put forward an approach to game temporality that is based

on Seymour Chatman's model of narrative fiction. In this approach I emphasized a

structure of four planes, of which especially two, form of content and form of

expression play a major role in the production of various modes of game temporality.

My review has shown that it is crucial to game studies to distinguish between the

reading line and discourse as two different aspects of the expression plane. I have

shown the troubles that arose in Andersen's and Aarseth's work as a result of not

recognizing this difference.

On the other hand, it also seems to be of major importance that the field of game

studies improves its understanding of the notion of the sign. Game studies scholars

continuously seem to fall victim to referential perceptions of language, which causes

them to assign substance to what has become form, and to see only a single sign where

they must see a chain of signifiers. As my analysis on Juul's model of temporality has

shown, loyalty to referential language models can go so far as to abandon the notions of

discourse and story altogether. I have pointed out the fatalities that taking this course

brings with it.

I believe that game studies needs to revitalize its relationship with semiotics and

narrative theory. While many game scholars today believe that the narratology-ludology

debate is over, we see that one of its major results is the poor use of semiotic concepts.

Although scholars often use concepts such as sign, signifier, signified etc., they seem to

have failed that these concept stem from a philosophy of language that distances itself

from referential language models.

I believe that in the future, game studies programs must reserve more space for

the teaching of semiotic and narrative models and not restrict themselves to resources

that write these models off around a great number of unreliable assumptions. I believe

that the field of semiotics is and has been always ready to the study of games. It is now

the time that the field of game studies gets itself ready for better semiotics.

References:

[1] Jesper Juul: Half Real: Video Games Between Real Rules and Fictional Worlds. Cambridge: MIT Press (2004)

[2] Espen Aarseth: Cypertext: Perspectives on Ergodic Literature. Cambridge: MIT Press (1997)

[3] Jesper Juul, ibid

[4] Espen Aarseth, ibid

[5] Seymour Chatman: Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film. Ithaca, Cornell University Press

(1978).

[6] Espen Aarseth, ibid

[7] Espen Aarseth, ibid

[8] Dark Castle (Computer Game). Three Sixty Pacific (1987)

[9] Markku Eskelinen: The Gaming Situation. Game Studies Vol.1 (1) (2001).

http://www.gamestudies.org/0101/eskelinen/

[10] Tetris (Computer Game). Spectrum Holobyte (1987)

[11] FIFA 2002 (Computer Game). Electronic Arts (2001)

[12] Prince of Persia: Sands of Time (Computer Game). Ubisoft (2003)

[13] Braid (Computer Game). Number None (2008)

[14] Company of Myself (Computer Game). Games Free (2009)

[15] Espen Aarseth, ibid

[16] Gregory Bateson: A Theory of Play and Fantasy. In J. Harris, & R. Park (Eds.), Play, Games and Sports in

Cultural Context (pp. 313-326). Champaign: Human Kinetics Publishers (1983)

[17] Roland Barthes: Mythologies. New York: Noonday Press (1991)

[18] Seymour Chatman, ibid

[19] Rock Paper Scissors (Game): Anonymous

[20] Memento (Feature Film): Christopher Nolan (2000)