Diplomacy and Human Migration:

A History of U.S. Relations with Cuba during the Late Cold War

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy

in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Hideaki Kami

Graduate Program in History

The Ohio State University

2015

Dissertation Committee:

Professor Robert J. McMahon, Adviser

Professor Peter L. Hahn, Co-adviser

Professor Stephanie J. Smith

Copyright by

Hideaki Kami

2015

ii

Abstract

This dissertation analyzes U.S.-Cuban relations by focusing on the interaction of

diplomacy and human migration during the late Cold War years. It explores how the U.S.

government reformulated its Cuban policy in light of Fidel Castro’s institutionalization of

power while, at the same time, trying to build a new relationship with the Cuban-

American community as the latter forged a new, politically mobilized constituency within

U.S. society. Based on historical sources from the United States, Cuba, and other

countries, I argue that the triangular relations among Washington, Havana, and Miami

formidably reinforced the status quo. As hundreds of thousands of Cuban-Americans

participated in U.S. politics in the hope of toppling the Castro regime, the U.S.

government could no longer dismiss their concerns as completely alien to the national

interest. But while committing to “freedom” in Cuba in their public statements, U.S.

policy-makers in fact placed a higher priority on stability in the Caribbean Sea; they

collaborated with the Cuban government to prevent migration crises such as the 1980

Mariel boatlift, one of the largest and most traumatic in modern U.S. history. By

exploring the interactions of diplomacy and human migration, this dissertation not only

analyzes the contradictory nature of U.S. policy toward Cuba but also illuminates how

the making of U.S. foreign policy has changed due to the inflow of people from other

parts of the world.

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my father, Yuji Kami, who always supported my

endeavor.

iv

Acknowledgement

My academic journey toward completing a Ph.D. dissertation has received much

support and encouragement from countless persons and institutions. When I entered the

University of Tokyo, the Funou Foundation assisted my undergraduate study and several

overseas trips. When I continued at the University of Tokyo for its graduate program, the

Japan Society for the Promotion of Science supported me. For the first two years at The

Ohio State University, the Japan-United States Educational Commission granted me a

Fulbright Fellowship. Without their support, my quest for a Ph.D. degree would have

been an unfulfilled dream.

Generous grants from the Ohio State University’s Department of History,

Mershon Center, Center for Latin American Studies, and College of Arts and Sciences

played crucial roles in advancing my research. Outside support from the Society for

Historians of American Foreign Relations, the Gerald Ford Presidential Foundation, and

the George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, also provided

important support as well. A pre-doctoral research fellowship from the University of

Miami’s Cuban Heritage Collection gave me the opportunity to conduct intensive

research in Miami for three months. I was fortunate to receive a Presidential Fellowship

from the Graduate School of the Ohio State University, which enabled me to devote the

final year of my Ph.D. program to writing this dissertation.

v

In Tokyo, I was lucky to discover a topic that inspired my intellectual curiosity

and passion. My undergraduate adviser, Hitoshi Takahashi, sparked my interest in

migration and Cuban relations with the United States. Testuya Amino, Jun Ishibashi,

Hideo Kimura, Ayako Saito, Fumihiko Takemura, and Keiichi Tsunekawa also supported

my study of Latin America and understood my interest in North America. I am forever

thankful to Jun Furuya. Not only did he accept me as his advisee, but he also guided my

study, nurtured my intellectual development, and spent countless hours and days

consulting with this young scholar. His classes were intellectually stimulating and

instrumental to my growth, as were those of Yasuo Endo, Kenryu Hashikawa, Takeshi

Igarashi, Fumiaki Kubo, Fumiko Nishizaki, Masako Notoji, Takuya Sasaki, and Yujin

Yaguchi, who had superb knowledge of U.S. politics, culture, and history. Ryan Irwin,

Itsuki Kurashina, Sidney Pash, Sayuri Shimizu, and Paul Sracic gave me very helpful

advice during my transition to Ohio State.

My choice of Ohio State as the site for my graduate study proved fortuitous. Peter

Hahn, Robert McMahon, Mitch Lerner, and Jennifer Siegel have created an outstanding

diplomatic history program. Lilia Fernández, Steven Conn, Donna Guy, Stephanie Smith,

and David Stebenne introduced me to new themes in Latin American and U.S. history.

Philip Brown, Alice Conklin, Peter Hahn, and Stephanie Smith created an intellectual

environment in their writing seminars. I was delighted that Stephanie Smith agreed to

join my dissertation committee and believe her perspectives have added much to my

research. Jim Bach, Ashley Bowerman, Chris Burton, Katherine Eckstrand, Jane

Hathaway, Clay Howard, Robin Judd, Steve McCann, Rich Ugland, and Kristina Ward

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kept me out of administrative trouble. David Lincove always helped me find books,

journals, and databases at Ohio State University Libraries. I thank Peter Hahn for his

exacting standards, always pushing me to be a better scholar, and inspiring me with his

devotion to the field of diplomatic history. I am most indebted to Robert McMahon, who

encouraged me to study at Ohio State, served as my adviser, and provided heartfelt

backing during the various difficult points in graduate school.

I was also lucky to spend my time in Columbus with an exceptional group of

graduate students. Matthew Ambrose, Dani Anthony, Alexandra Castillo, Nicholas

Crane, Reyna Esquivel-King, Delia Fernández, Megan Hasting, Steven Higley, Patrick

Potyondy, Ryan Schultz, Spencer Tyce, Leticia Wiggins, and many other participants in

formal and informal writing seminars read my chapters, gave me suggestions, and helped

me improve my writing skills. Patrick provided breaks from my intellectual efforts by

inviting me to pick-up soccer games on Ohio State’s gorgeous field. Will Chou, my

friend, fellow historian, and language-exchange partner, contributed to this project in

countless ways. He always stepped forward to offer valuable assistance, discover

methods of collaboration, and make my life in the United States much easier.

A great number of academics, archivists, and staff members outside Ohio State

helped me produce this study. María Cristina García, Tanya Harmer, Yuko Ito, Yasuhiro

Koike, William LeoGrande, Alan McPherson, Louis A. Pérez, Kanako Yamaoka, and

two anonymous readers for the Journal of Cold War Studies, read part of this research in

one form or another, giving me inspirational comments, thoughtful criticisms, and

wonderful suggestions. I thank Isami Romero Hosino for inviting me to join his panels to

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present papers on various occasions. Yuki Oda, my senpai, always used his experience to

show the path forward for me. Takahito Moriyama let me stay at his place during my

research in Tallahassee, Florida. I also acknowledge my sincere gratitude to David

Engstrom, who generously provided me with his interview transcripts, as well as Myles

Frechette and Robert Gelbard, who shared with me accounts of their service for the

United States.

Numerous archivists and staff members extended timely and invaluable help to

me. In Miami, I was in the good hands of María R. Estorino, Gladys Gómez-Rossie,

Annie Sansone-Martínez, and Rosa Monzón-Alvarez of the University of Miami’s Cuban

Heritage Collection, as well as Christina Favretto, Beatrice Skokan, Cory Czajkowski,

and Yvette Yurubi of the University of Miami’s Special Collections. Koichi Tasa made

my stay in Miami more accommodating. I learned greatly about the history of Miami

Cubans from my meetings with Alfredo Durán, Francisco Hernández, and Marifeli Pérez-

Stable. Matthew Angles, archivist at the Cuban American National Foundation, not only

opened the door to the archive, but also assisted me in sifting through unprocessed

materials.

My research in Havana benefited tremendously from conversations with Carlos

Alzugaray, Jesús Arboleya, García Entenza. Néstor García Iturbe, Lázaro Mora, José

Luis Padrón, Ramón Sánchez-Parodi, José Viera, among others. Raynier Pellón

Azopardo at the Centro de Investigaciones de Política Internacional went out of his way

to process my academic visas. I enjoyed working with Eduardo Válido and Renier

González Hernández at the Archivo Central del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. My

viii

friendship and collaboration with Elier Ramírez Cañedo was a great pleasure, one which I

hope to continue in the future. Margarita Fonseca expanded my contacts in Havana with

her introductions. I will never forget my gratitude to Gloria León, who helped navigate

my study from the very beginning, and Piero Gleijeses, who put me in touch with her.

The archivists and staffs of the Archivo General de México, the Archivo Histórico

Genaro Estrada, the Library and Archive of Canada, and the National Archives of the

United Kingdom were all professional, friendly, and quick to help. Of special mention are

Brittany Paris at the Jimmy Carter Library, Shelly Williams at the Ronald Reagan

Library, and Zachary Roberts at the George H. W. Bush Library. They patiently

processed my mandatory review requests for thousands of U.S. records. Numerous

others, especially those in Florida-based archives, contributed to this study by offering

me their research assistance.

My family was my greatest source of support throughout this endeavor. I deeply

appreciate the understanding of my mother, Keiko, and my brother, Tomoaki, for my

pursuit of an academic career. It is regrettable that my late father, Yuji Kami, cannot see

this work, which is dedicated to him with all respect for what he had done for me.

Finally, Chen Zhang made my otherwise lonely life richer and more enjoyable. I am

grateful to her translation of a Russian memoir for this study, and am proud of her

forthcoming dissertation on Russian literature. Hopefully, we can be united in Tokyo

soon.

ix

Vita

2003................................................................Tsuru High, Yamanashi, Japan

2008................................................................B.A., The University of Tokyo

2010................................................................M.A., The University of Tokyo

2010-2011 …………………………………. Research Fellow (DC1), Japan Society for

the Promotion of Science

2011 to present ..............................................Graduate Teaching Associate, Department

of History, The Ohio State University

2015 to present …………………………….. Presidential Fellow, The Ohio State

University

Publications

“The Limits of Dialogue: Washington, Havana, and Miami, 1977-1980.” Journal of Cold

War Studies, forthcoming 2016.

“Ethnic Community, Party Politics, and the Cold War: The Political Ascendancy of

Miami Cubans, 1980-2000.” Japanese Journal of American Studies 23 (2012):

185-208.

“The Ebb and Flow of Cold War Tensions: The U.S. Government and Anti-Castro Exiles

from 1980 to 1992.” Pacific and American Studies 11 (March 2011): 51-71.

Fields of Study

Major Field: History

x

TABLE of CONTENTS

Abstract ............................................................................................................................... ii

Dedication .......................................................................................................................... iii

Acknowledgement ............................................................................................................. iv

Vita ..................................................................................................................................... ix

Abbreviations ..................................................................................................................... xi

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1

CHAPTER 1: Between Revolution and Counterrevolution ............................................. 21

CHAPTER 2: The Legacy of Violence ............................................................................ 64

CHAPTER 3: A Time for Dialogue? .............................................................................. 102

CHAPTER 4: The Crisis of 1980 ................................................................................... 165

CHAPTER 5: Superhero’s Dilemma .............................................................................. 215

CHAPTER 6: Reaching Equilibrium .............................................................................. 261

CHAPTER 7: Making Foreign Policy Domestic? .......................................................... 311

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 378

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 390

xi

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in the text.

AIPAC American Israel Public Affairs Committee

CANF Cuban American National Foundation

CDA Cuban “Democracy” Act of 1992, United States

CIA Central Intelligence Agency, United States

CORU Comando de Organizaciones Revolucionarias Unidas

CUINT Cuban Interests Section

DFS Dirección Federal de Seguridad, Mexico

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency, United States

FLNC Frente de Liberación Nacional de Cuba

FMLN Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, El Salvador

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service, United States

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States

NSC National Security Council, United States

NSPG National Security Planning Group, United States

OAS Organization of American States

PD Presidential Directive

POW Prisoners of War

PRM Presidential Review Memorandum, United States

RECE Representación Cubana del Exilio

RIG Restricted Interagency Group, United States

xii

SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

SCC Special Coordination Committee, United States

SNOWI Senior Naval Officer, West Indies, Great Britain

UNCHR United Nations Commission on Human Rights

USICA United States Information and Cultural Agency

USINT United States Interests Section

VOA Voice of America

1

INTRODUCTION

On December 17, 2014, Barack Obama and Raúl Castro turned a new page of

U.S.-Cuban relations by declaring the intention to normalize diplomatic relations. After

an 18-month-long secret negotiation over prisoner swaps, the announcement signaled the

beginning of the end of half a century of mutual hostility. Amid a flurry of posts, tweets,

and broadcasts on the global mass media, Cubans on the street waved the two nations’

flags in support of a historic change in bilateral relations. With the lifting of travel

restrictions finally in sight, many Americans expressed wishes to visit Cuba, where they

could enjoy cigars, mojitos, music, beaches, and a warm climate. The new policies

enjoyed solid public support, as indicated in polls taken after the announcement in both

countries. Whereas 63 percent of U.S. citizens favored normalization of diplomatic

relations with Cuba, 97 percent of Cubans agreed that normalization of relations was

good for their country.1

Public approval for the new policy did not necessarily deter the campaign against

the improvement of U.S.-Cuban relations. A leading opponent was Marco Rubio, a

senator from Florida of Cuban descent, who blasted Obama’s policy shift in an interview,

1 Pew Research Poll, “Most Support Stronger U.S. Ties with Cuba,” January 16, 2015,

http://www.people-press.org/files/2015/01/1-15-15-Cuba-release.pdf (accessed October 25, 2015); and

Washington Post (hereafter WP) (online), “Poll shows vast majority of Cubans welcome closer ties

with U.S.,” April 8, 2015. For an account of U.S.-Cuban negotiations prior to the announcement, see

William M. LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh, “Inside the Crazy Back-Channel Negotiations That

Revolutionized Our Relationship with Cuba,” Mother Jones, August 12, 2015,

http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/07/secret-negotiations-gross-hernandez-kerry-pope-

obama-castro-cuba (accessed August 13, 2015).

2

even prior to the announcement. “My own interest in Cuba has been always furthering

democracy and freedom,” he declared. “Nothing that the President will announce today is

going to further that goal.”2 Former Florida governor Jeb Bush, along with many other

hopefuls in the Republican Party for the 2016 presidential election, soon joined him. Both

Rubio and Bush had deep political roots in Miami, a major stronghold of anti-Castro

politics in the United States for the last three decades. For them, normalization of

relations would forego the U.S. commitment to “freedom” in Cuba, a neighboring

country just 90 miles away.3

Yet unlike in previous decades, such advocacy no longer proved effective. In his

January 2015 State of Union address, Obama described the previous U.S. policy as

outdated. “When what you’re doing doesn’t work for 50 years,” he said, “it’s time to try

something new.”4 With the backing of U.S. public opinion and the blessing of Latin

American governments, Obama moved forward. At the Seventh Summit of the Americas

in April, the U.S. president had the first substantial meeting with a Cuban president in

more than five decades. In May, he removed Cuba from the State Department’s list of

state sponsors of terrorism. The Republican-majority Congress ignored his request for the

lifting of the embargo on Cuba. Yet in the following summer, the two countries restored

2 Statement by Rubio, available at http://video.foxnews.com/v/3947931342001/sen-rubio-blasts-

white-houses-absurd-cuba-concessions/?playlist_id=2114913880001#sp=show-clips/daytime

(accessed September 1, 2015).

3 Pema Levy, “Rubio Leads Opposition to Obama’s Cuba Shift,” Newsweek (online), December 17,

2014; Sean Sullivan, “The Four Biggest Things Marco Rubio’s Cuba Moment Said about His Political

Future,” WP (online), December 18, 2015; and Sabrina Siddiqui, “Marco Rubio: I will absolutely roll

back Obama Cuba Policy,” Guardian (online), July 10, 2015.

4 Remarks by Obama, January 20, 2015, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-

office/2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-union-address-january-20-2015 (accessed September 1,

2015).

3

diplomatic relations, reopened the embassies in each capital, and agreed to discuss the

remaining outstanding matters, such as the embargo and human rights issues.

The unexpected ease with which the process of restoring diplomatic relations

occurred poses a question of why this did not take place much earlier. Obama’s White

House argued that decades of U.S. isolation of Cuba had failed. Such understanding,

however, was hardly new. After the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the U.S. government

sponsored counterrevolutionary forces, imposed an embargo, and resorted to other hostile

measures. As Fidel Castro nonetheless remained in power and contested U.S. foreign

policy, the notion of failure already had appeared by the 1970s. The end of the Cold War

did not change such an assessment but rather highlighted Washington’s unparalleled

inflexibility.5 Although the U.S. government expanded economic relations with China,

Vietnam, and other communist countries, it strengthened the embargo on Cuba and

forbade most travel to the island. Why did the United States treat Cuba so differently?

Trying to answer such questions, historians, political scientists, sociologists, and

migration scholars direct their attention to Miami Cubans. More than a million Cubans

moved to the United States, principally South Florida, in opposition to Fidel Castro and

his brother, Raúl. Despite comprising less than one percent of the U.S. population,

scholars claim, these anti-Castro Cuban Americans have wielded a disproportionate

5 On U.S. assessments of the embargo’s effectiveness, see for example, Appendix F “US and OAS

Sanctions against Cuba (1962-Present),” included in CIA Research Paper, “Economic Sanctions: A

Historical Analysis,” March 1989, in folder “Cuba (General) January-June 1990 [4],” NSC: William T.

Pryce Files, George H. W. Bush Library (hereafter GHWBL). The CIA concluded that the isolation in

fact benefited Castro by allowing him to solidify his rule over the island.

4

amount of political influence on the making of U.S. policy toward Cuba. They created a

powerful ethnic lobby in Washington, allied with influential politicians like Rubio and

Bush, and formed a solid voting bloc in Florida, a large and important state in U.S.

elections. Only recently, perhaps as a result of a generational shift, did Cuban Americans

show support for greater ties to their homeland, a goal that Obama pursued in his

“historical” move.6

In light of such arguments, this study explores the complex “triangular” dynamics

among Washington, Havana, and Miami. The main sources of the U.S.-Cuban dispute

have been ideological rivalries, disparities of power and resources, and fundamental

differences in attitude. Yet, because Cuban émigrés in South Florida intervened in

international politics at critical moments, relations between Washington and Havana also

intermingled with political dynamics of the Cuban-American community. Drawing on

international and multi-archival research, this study complicates traditional diplomatic

historical accounts that mainly focus on the two national capitals. It analyzes how the

U.S. government reformulated its Cuban policy in response to Fidel Castro’s

6 For example, see Stephen G. Rabe, “U.S. Relations with Latin America, 1961 to the Present: A

Historiographical Review,” in Robert D. Schulzinger, ed., A Companion to American Foreign

Relations (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), p. 395; and Soraya M. Castro Mariño, “Cuban-U.S.

Relations, 1989-2002: A View from Havana,” in H. Michael Erisman and John M. Kirk, eds.,

Redefining Cuban Foreign Policy: The Impact of the ‘‘Special Period’’ (Gainesville: University Press

of Florida, 2006), pp. 305-332. For works that underscore Miami Cubans’ political influence, see also,

Morris Morley and Chris McGillion, Unfinished Business: America and Cuba after the Cold War,

1989-2001 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Patrick J. Haney and Walt

Vanderbush, The Cuban Embargo: The Domestic Politics of an American Foreign Policy (Pittsburgh,

PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005); Melanie M. Ziegler, U.S.-Cuban Cooperation: Past,

Present, and Future (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007); Susan E. Eckstein, The Immigrant Divide: How Cuban Americans Changed the US and Their Homeland (New York:

Routledge, 2009); and Henriette M. Rytz, Ethnic Interest Groups in US Foreign Policy-Making: A Cuban-American Story of Success and Failure (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

5

institutionalization of power, while at the same time, trying to build a new relationship

with the Cuban-American community as the latter forged a new, politically mobilized

constituency within U.S. society.

In doing so, this study analyzes the migration-diplomacy interaction, a topic that

has not received adequate attention up to this day. The promotion and control of

migration had been one of the most important considerations for policymakers across the

boundaries of nation-states during the Cold War. Yet, as seen in the advocacy of Miami

Cubans, the migrants not only contested nation-states’ regulation of population flows, but

also actively pursued foreign policy agendas that did not necessarily match those of

policymakers in the capitals, especially in terms of priorities. To achieve their ends, the

Cuban émigrés took diverse political actions in the United States and beyond. Their

activities traverse otherwise separate themes across disciplinary and territorial boundaries,

as seen in this work’s analysis of migration crises, terrorism, ethnic lobbies, and party

politics.

It was the massive inflow of Cubans that prompted the transformation of Miami

into one of the most important U.S. cities with strong ties to Latin America. While

responding to the ebb and flow of Cold War tensions and the development of U.S. two-

party politics, the dynamics of Miami Cuban politics in turn had significant implications

for the broader realm of foreign relations. It is difficult to agree with those who claim that

migration defines the composition of the nation and therefore is the single most important

6

determinant in the making of foreign policy.7 Yet, by assessing the demographic change

in the “nation” and the mixture of U.S. and non-U.S. politics, this study traces the gradual

yet ongoing transformation of U.S. “national interests” and asserts that migration is

important to the fabric of international power relations. Diplomacy may outline migration,

but the international movement of people also helps to shape the contours of foreign

relations in the long run.

In exploring Washington-Havana-Miami relations, this study ties together the

three major emerging themes of the historical scholarship. First and foremost, any

analysis of U.S.-Cuban relations should examine Havana-Washington relations within the

international context, especially the global Cold War. The traditional Cold War

scholarship was overwhelmingly Eurocentric, paying exclusive attention to the United

States and the Soviet Union. Yet, in recent years historians have gone beyond the

traditional assumption of the Cold War as a superpower battle, moved the so-called Third

World to the center of their scholarship, and highlighted the global dimension of the

conflicts that incorporated uncountable smaller powers and non-state actors.8 In light of

such trends, scholars have reexamined and underscored Havana’s leading role in the Cold

War, especially in Latin America and Africa. It was Havana, rather than Moscow, that

7 Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds., Ethnicity: Theory and Experience (Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 23-24.

8 Robert J. McMahon, ed., The Cold War in the Third World (New York: Oxford University Press,

2013), pp. 3-4. For leading examples, see for example, Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,

2007); and Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

7

emerged as a principal foe of Washington at times.9

The Cold War aggravated, broadened, and prolonged U.S.-Cuban conflicts. Yet,

caution should be exercised not to reduce the source of U.S.-Cuban conflicts only to

differing ideologies and geostrategic interests. Cuba gained formal independence in 1902.

Yet as historian Louis A. Pérez, Jr. explains, almost all aspects of Cuban lives, ranging

from political economy to cultural representation, came under the overwhelming

influence of North American hegemony. The Revolution of 1959 marked a radical break

with this past, creating tensions between rising Cuban nationalism and the status quo

favored by traditional U.S. policy imperatives. This study affirms that not only

imbalances in power and resources, but also fundamental differences in attitudes between

revolutionary and hegemonic states, characterized the geographical and ideological

battles of the two nations facing each other across the Florida Straits.10

Nonetheless, precisely because of Miami’s importance in the making of U.S.

foreign policy, it is necessary to analyze the changing relations between Washington and

Miami. Despite frequent references to Cuban-American political influence, few have

primarily focused on the complex development of relationships between the U.S.

9 Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (Chapel Hill:

University of North Carolina Press, 2002); idem., Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria,

and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976-1991 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,

2013); and Tanya Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War (Chapel Hill: University

of North Carolina Press, 2011).

10 Louis A. Pérez, Jr., Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos (Chapel

Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008); idem., Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution, 4th ed.

(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Lars Schoultz, That Infernal Little Cuban Republic: The

United States and the Cuban Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009); and

Castro Mariño and Pruessen, eds., Fifty Years of Revolution.

8

government and the Cuban American community.11

In contrast, this study weighs the

impact of massive Cuba-to-U.S. migration on U.S. society and the shifting calculations of

U.S. national interests. It belongs to “New Diplomatic History,” which looks beyond

“what one clerk said to another,” a stereotypical image of the field in the eyes of non-

diplomatic historians. Practitioners of this approach reexamine the nation’s foreign policy

not only in the eyes of the elite circles of policymakers, but also through the stories of a

larger cross-section of society.12

As such, this project seeks to bring migration and ethnic history into the broader

narrative of international history. Rather than depicting immigrants’ incorporation into

U.S. society as a linear, progressive, and inevitable process, the recent migration history

scholarship emphasizes the ongoing influence, and mixture, of politics and culture in both

the United States and migrants’ countries of origin. By following this “transnational” (or

“global”) turn in migration history, this study taps into the rich fountain of knowledge on

migrants’ “foreign relations.”13

Still, unlike migration historians whose central focus

11

Based on media reports and published sources, most scholars highlight similarities of their interests

and worldviews. But too much emphasis on similarities obscures serious disagreements, which

frequently appear in unpublished records. See for example, Damián J. Fernández, “From Little

Havana to Washington, D.C.: Cuban-Americans and U.S. Foreign Policy,” in Mohammed E. Ahrari,

ed., Ethnic Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987); Morley and

McGillion, Unfinished Business; Haney and Vanderbush, Embargo; and Schoultz, Infernal. Although

their arguments are insightful, these studies explore few Miami Cuban sources.

12 Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, “Diplomatic History and the Meaning of Life: Toward a Global

American History,” Diplomatic History 21 (Fall 1997): 499-518.

13 For historiography of immigration history, Mae E. Ngai, “Immigration and Ethnic History,” in Eric

Foner and Lisa McGirr, eds., American History Now (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011),

pp. 358-375. For migration historians’ works that address transnationalism, see for example, Donna R.

Gabaccia, Foreign Relations: American Immigration in Global Perspective (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 2012); Adam McKeown, Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization

of Borders (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Thomas Lorrin, Puerto Rican Citizen: History and Political Identity in Twentieth Century New York City (Chicago: University of Chicago

9

remains on the nation-states’ control of human mobility and its impact on the lives of

migrants, this study places more emphasis on the impact of migration and migrant

activities on high-level international politics. More than how nation-states manipulated

migration and migrant communities as a tool of diplomacy, this work explores how

policymakers and leading figures in ethnic communities engaged in discussions,

negotiations, and power struggles over nation-states’ chief foreign policy goals.14

The plentiful literature on Cuban migration into the United States—often

conducted by scholars of Cuban origin—informed this inquiry. Earlier works of

historians, sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists explored why thousands

of Cubans came to the United States, how they settled into Miami and elsewhere, and

how they developed political and cultural attitudes in the United States.15

Later works

Press, 2010); Eiichiro Azuma, Between Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in Japanese America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); and Matthew Frye Jacobson, Special

Sorrows: The Diasporic Imagination of Irish, Polish, and Jewish Immigrants in the United States

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

14 Migration history receives scant attention in the field of diplomatic and international history.

According to Kristin Hoganson, this is because human mobility unsettles “the foundation of

traditional foreign relations history.” It decenters the decision-making from Washington and

disaggregates the nation, “the basic unit of international relations history.” Hoganson, “Hop off the

Bandwagon! It’s a Mass Movement, Not a Parade,” Journal of American History 95 (March 2009): p.

1089. A few exceptions would include Jason C. Parker, Brother’s Keeper: The United States, Race,

and Empire in the British Caribbean, 1937-1962 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Paul A.

Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States and the Philippines (Chapel Hill:

University of North Carolina Press, 2006); and Alexander DeConde, Ethnicity, Race, and American

Foreign Policy: A History (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992). For a work by an

international relations scholar who analyzes migration as a tool of diplomacy, see Kelly M. Greenhill,

Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY:

Cornell University Press, 2010).

15 Among the earliest works on Cubans in the United States are Richard R. Fagen, Richard A. Brody,

and Thomas J. O’Leary, Cubans in Exile: Disaffection and the Revolution (Stanford, CA: Stanford

University Press, 1968); Thomas D. Boswell and James R. Curtis, The Cuban-American Experience: Culture, Images, and Perspectives (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983); Felix Masud-Piloto,

With Open Arms: Cuban Migration to the United States (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1988);

idem., From Welcomed Exiles to Illegal Immigrants: Cuban Migration to the U.S., 1959-1995

10

evaluated the consequences of Cuban migration, such as the development of multiracial

conflict and collaboration with African-Americans and “Anglos” (non-Hispanic whites),

for the Sunshine State.16

María Cristina García and other historians analyze how diverse

groups of Miami Cubans formed distinctive identities, reacted to changing geopolitics,

and engaged in numerous noteworthy political activities.17

This work extends this

discussion to scrutinize how Miami Cuban politics figured in Washington’s policymaking

toward Havana.

If Washington’s relationship with Miami was complex, so was Havana’s

relationship with Miami. Traditionally, scholarship on the Cold War in Latin America

focused on U.S. interventions and their devastating consequences for the region. As a

result, the literature on inter-American relations has tended to exaggerate the centrality of

(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996); and James Olson and Judith Olson, Cuban American:

From Trauma to Triumph (New York: Twayne, 1995).

16 Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick, City on the Edge: The Transformation of Miami (Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1993). Also, Sheila L. Croucher, Imagining Miami: Ethnic Politics in a Postmodern World (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1997); Guillermo J. Grenier and

Lisandro Pérez, The Legacy of Exile: Cubans in the Unites States (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2003);

and Alex Stepick et al., This Land Is Our Land: Immigrant and Power in Miami (Berkeley: University

of California Press, 2003).

17 María Cristina García, Havana USA: Cuban Exiles and Cuban Americans in South Florida, 1959-

1994 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). See also, María de los Angeles Torres, In the

Land of Mirrors: Cuban Exile Politics in the Unites States (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,

1999); Gerald E. Poyo, Cuban Catholics in the United States, 1960-1980: Exile and Integration

(Nortre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007); Silvia Pedraza, Political Disaffection in

Cuba’s Revolution and Exodus (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Eckstein, Immigrant

Divide; and Julio Capó, Jr., “It’s Not Queer to be Gay: Miami and the Emergence of the Gay Rights

Movement, 1945-1995” (Ph.D. diss., Florida International University, 2011). For Cuban Americans in

other regions, see for example, Yolando Prieto, The Cubans of Union City: Immigrants and Exiles in a New Jersey Community (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2009).

11

the United States.18

Yet, newly emerging scholarship reassesses Latin American agency,

reevaluates their experiences of the Cold War “from within,” and explores the dynamics

of “revolution and counterrevolution” as a central theme of its analysis. Revolutionaries

were those who aspired to abolish the legacy of feudalism in favor of collective,

egalitarian notions of social democracy. Counterrevolutionaries were those who defended

the status quo. As revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries fought for contrary visions

of power and resorted to violence, Latin America’s Cold War became far from “cold.”19

It is both appealing and challenging to adopt this revolutionary-versus-

counterrevolutionary framework for the analysis of Cuba. It is appealing because as in

other revolutions in Latin America, the Cuban Revolution initiated the revolutionary

process aiming for a radical break with the past and generated counterrevolutionary

forces seeking to resist, mitigate, and subvert its impact. At the same time, it is also

challenging since the emigration of counterrevolutionaries to the United States extended

a Cuban “civil war” both spatially and chronologically. Because Cuban counterrevolution

merged into U.S. politics, the analysis of the Cuban case requires better understanding of

the political system in North America, as well as Latin America. As the Cuban

18

On the criticisms, see Max Paul Friedman, “Retiring the Puppets, Bringing Latin America Back In:

Recent Scholarship on United States-Latin American Relations,” Diplomatic History 27 (November

2003): 621-636.

19 For recent scholarship, see for example, Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser, eds., In From the

Cold: Latin America’s New Encounter with the Cold War (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,

2008), pp. 3-46; and Greg Grandin and Gilbert M. Joseph, eds., A Century of Revolution: Insurgent

and Counterinsurgent Violence during Latin America’s Long Cold War (Durham, NC: Duke

University Press, 2010). For a debate over U.S. roles in this binary battle, see Hal Brands, Latin America’s Cold War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010); and Stephen G. Rabe, The

Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America (New York: Oxford University

Press, 2012).

12

revolutionary-counterrevolutionary dynamic persisted beyond anyone’s design, it also

requires a long-term assessment.20

To be sure, compared to the Korean and Vietnamese counterparts, this Cuban

struggle hardly turned bloody except for a few occasions. But it bears emphasizing that

both victorious revolutionaries and defeated counterrevolutionaries continued to engage

in “the politics of passion,” politics construed as a moral imperative for absolute ends. In

this fierce zero-sum battle, opponents were more than adversaries; they were enemies,

traitors, evil, and inhuman.21

When Cuban counterrevolutionaries called themselves

“exiles,” attacked Fidel Castro as “dictator,” and spoke of the “liberation” of the

homeland, they still operated on this cultural code. Despite years of life in the United

States, their leadership identified their role as “The Opposition,” a single legitimate

alternative to revolutionary Cuba. Not all opponents of the Cuban government were

counterrevolutionaries. Neither were all critiques of counterrevolutionary forces

revolutionary. Yet, much of Miami’s behavior as a rival power against Havana originated

from the revolutionary-counterrevolutionary dynamic that first appeared in the wake of

the Cuban Revolution.

Along with Miami’s attitudes toward Havana, the story of Cuban migration into

the United States requires careful analysis of Havana’s policy toward Miami. The topic is

still sensitive but not as prohibitive as it had been before. As shown in Jesús Arboleya’s

20

Nicaraguan and Chilean battles during the Cold War would be similar to the Cuban case, even

though these two did not last as long. For the Cuban Revolution, see Pérez, Reform and Revolution.

For the Cuban counterrevolution, see Jesús Arboleya, The Cuban Counterrevolution, trans. Rafael

Betancourt (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000). It was originally

published as La contrarrevolución cubana in Havana in 1997.

21 Damián J. Fernández, Cuba and the Politics of Passion (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000).

13

award-winning book, Cuba y los cubanoamericanos (Cuba and Cuban Americans), the

Cuban government originally looked to emigration as “betrayal” of the nation, calling all

emigrants counterrevolutionary “gusanos” (worms). The revolutionary government

confiscated all properties and rights of all Cubans who had indefinitely left the island,

prohibited their return except for strictly humanitarian cases, and condemned contact with

families or friends in the United States as signs of disloyalty. Havana eventually stopped

viewing emigration in such black-and-white terms.22

Yet, the development was hardly

unidirectional or predictable. Indeed, this research indicates that the story of Havana’s

policy toward Miami closely relates to Washington’s interactions with Havana and

Miami.

For a long time, scholarship on U.S.-Cuban relations focused on conflicts and

hostilities. Most recently, however, Cuban and U.S. scholars have started to re-examine

Washington and Havana’s ill-fated attempts at dialogue. Elier Ramírez Cañedo and

Esteban Morales chronicle U.S.-Cuban efforts to normalize diplomatic relations during

the 1970s, although they conclude that U.S. officials regarded dialogue not as the

objective, but as a tool to control Cuba’s foreign policy. William M. LeoGrande and

22

Jesús Arboleya, Cuba y los cubanoamericanos: El fenómeno migratorio cubano (Havana: Fondo

Editorial Casa de las Américas, 2013), esp. chap. 4. Some other works also illuminate part of

Havana’s attitudes toward Miami. See for example, Arboleya, Havana-Miami: The U.S.-Cuba

Migration Conflict, trans. Mary Todd (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1996); idem., Cuban

Counterrevolution; idem., La ultraderecha cubano-americana de Miami (Havana: Editorial de

Ciencias Sociales, 2000); Jacinto Valdés-Dapena Vivanco, Pirates en el éter: la guerra radial contra

Cuba. 1959-1999 (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2006); and Hedelberto López Blanch, La

emigración cubana en Estados Unidos: descorriendo mamparas (Havana: Editorial SI-MAR S.A.,

1998). For a view on migration by Cuban scholars, see also, Antonio Aja Díaz, Al cruzar las fronteras

(Havana: Molinos Trade S.A., 2009); and José Buajasán Marrawi and José Luis Méndez, La República de Miami (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2003).

14

Peter Kornbluh, while extending this discussion to cover the entire period since 1959,

also place the major part of the blame on Washington’s inability to react positively to

Havana’s numerous attempts at dialogue. Unlike other traditional accounts that highlight

ideological antipathy, racial prejudices, and cultural traits, their stories of dialogue

address some elements of contingency.23

Where this study differs from theirs is its aim to go beyond the traditional

framework of diplomacy and analyze how human migration acted as a critical element of

international politics. Rather than treating Havana-Washington relations as separate from

Washington-Miami and Miami-Havana interactions, this study intends to tie them

together and show how international history, U.S. history, and Latin American history

may overlap. To this end, I follow the lead of migration historians in utilizing rich Miami

Cuban sources, including letters, personal notes, diaries, interview transcripts, memoirs,

and manuscripts, as well as Miami newspapers, journals, magazines, and newsletters. At

the same time, I reassess U.S. government documents, such as policy discussion papers,

directives, meeting files, cables, and intelligence reports, which diplomatic historians

commonly utilize. Most of them were classified until very recently, especially those in

the Carter, Reagan and Bush years.

23

Elier Ramírez Cañedo and Esteban Morales Domínguez, De la confrontación a los intentos de “normalización”: La política de los Estados Unidos hacia Cuba (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias

Sociales, 2011); ibid., 2da edición ampliada (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2014); and

William M. LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh, Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations between Washington and Havana (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,

2014). For other insightful analyses of Cuban foreign policy, see for example, Carlos Alzugaray,

“Cuban Revolutionary Diplomacy 1959-2009,” in B. J. C. McKercher, ed., Routledge Handbook of Diplomacy and Statecraft (New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 169-180; and Jorge I. Domínguez, To

Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba’s Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

Press, 1989).

15

Access to these historical sources helps to reevaluate the intimate relationship

between domestic politics and foreign policy making. Although political scientists, unlike

historians of U.S. foreign relations, pay attention to ethnic lobbies and U.S. foreign policy,

they are too eager to engage in a normative debate over whether ethnic groups make

healthy contributions to U.S. foreign policy.24

It is necessary for diplomatic historians to

utilize their expertise. A careful analysis of previously untapped historical records has

much to offer. It helps not only to better explain the objectives and capabilities of ethnic

lobbies, but also to illuminate Washington’s struggle to create a unified foreign policy in

light of the nation’s demographic changes. Such an assessment is indispensable to

critically reexamine the construction of “national interests”—something too often

unexamined in studies of U.S. foreign policy.25

In addition to U.S. government and nongovernment sources, this study draws on

an analysis of Cuban foreign ministry records in Havana, as well as the internal records

24

For the controversy, see esp. Yossi Shain, “Multicultural Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy 95, no.

100 (1995): 69-87; and Samuel Huntington, “The Erosion of American National Interests,” Foreign

Affairs 76, no. 5 (1997): 28-49. For the most recent one, see John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M.

Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007). For

works by political scientists on ethnic groups and U.S. foreign policy, see for example, Louis L.

Gerson, The Hyphenate in Recent American Politics and Diplomacy (Lawrence: University of Kansas

Press, 1964); Tony Smith, Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of

American Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Thomas Ambrosio, ed.,

Ethnic Identity Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002); and David M. Paul and

Rachel A. Paul, Ethnic Lobbies and U.S. Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009). For

Latinos, see for example, Rodolfo O. de la Garza and Harry P. Pachon, eds., Latinos and U.S. Foreign Policy: Representing the “Homeland”? (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).

25 For a model of such a historical assessment, see Peter L. Hahn, Caught in the Middle East: U.S.

Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945–1961 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,

2004). For domestic politics and U.S. foreign policy, see for example, Campbell Craig and Fredrik

Logevall, America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,

2009); Andrew L. Johns, Vietnam’s Second Front: The Domestic Politics, the Repubilcan Party, and the War (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2010); and Melvin Small, Democracy and

Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789-1994 (Baltimore, MD:

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

16

of the Cuban American National Foundation, once the most powerful anti-Castro

organization in Miami. This greater access to primary Cuban sources is crucical for an

assessment of divergent interpretations of historical events in Washington, Havana, and

Miami.26

Third-country perspectives, such as those of Britain, Canada, and Mexico,

which have maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba despite U.S. protests, often prove

useful. Due to an Anglo-American “special relationship,” British records are revealing

about Washington’s policymaking. As Canadian and Mexican diplomats enjoyed greater

access to Cuban leadership, their records provide insight into otherwise unattainable

Cuban thinking of the United States. Equally helpful are Soviet sources. Although many

Russian documents remain classified, some declassified sources and memoirs of Soviet

policy elites are quite informative.27

This study consists of seven chapters. The first chapter provides a historical

context for diplomacy and human migration in U.S.-Cuban relations. The Cuban

Revolution not only signaled the beginning of a new revolutionary regime, but also

engendered the rise of counterrevolution and its alliance with the U.S. government. As

26

The Cuban foreign ministry has recently opened its archive to researchers, although the nature of

one’s topic may determine the availability of the records. The Cuban American National Foundation

has allowed the only two writers to use its sources. Nestor Suárez Feliú, El Rescate de una Nación

(Miami, FL: Fundación Nacional Cubano Americana, 1997); and Álvaro Vargas Llosa, El exilio

indomable: historia de la disidencia cubana en el destierro (Madrid: Espasa, 1998). These authors

cited few U.S. and Cuban government records to corroborate their stories.

27 On Cuban relations with Mexico, Renata Keller, Mexico’s Cold War: Cuba, the United States, and

the Legacy of the Mexican Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). On Canada,

see John M. Kirk and Peter McKenna, Canada-Cuba Relations: The Other Good Neighbor Policy

(Tallahassee: University Press of Florida, 1997). On Britain, see Christopher Hull, British Diplomacy and US Hegemony in Cuba, 1898-1964 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

17

Washington sponsored massive Cuban migration into the United States, these

developments divided the Cuban population across the Florida Straits and created a

sizable Cuban community in Miami. The second chapter focuses on Miami extremists,

who unleashed indiscriminate violence across the Caribbean, Latin America, and North

America. Originally trained by the CIA, they acted independently of Washington and

provoked a series of terrorist incidents that had a significant impact on international

politics. Despite the scale of tragedies, however, Miami terrorists ultimately failed to

undercut U.S.-Cuban détente.

Chapter Three charts the shifting triangular relations among Washington, Havana,

and Miami in the late 1970s. When Jimmy Carter aggressively cracked down on Miami-

originated terrorism, Fidel Castro contemplated his major gesture toward the United

States. After opening dialogue with the Cuban community abroad, the Cuban government

released 3,600 prisoners from Cuban jails and allowed over 100,000 Cuban émigrés to

visit the island for family reunification. In light of rising Cold War tensions, however,

these results led to the Mariel boatlift of 1980, one of the most controversial migration

crises in the Caribbean. Chapter Four traces the course of this crisis, in which

Washington and Havana engaged in a six-month-long diplomatic battle for the control of

migration. Unable to prevent massive Cuban migration and its volatile impact on U.S.

society, Carter eventually yielded to Castro.

The next two chapters examine the rise of a Cuban-American lobby and the

Republican Party’s outreach to Miami Cubans. Despite his manifested hostilities against

Castro, Ronald Reagan came to terms with the existence of the Cuban government in

18

Havana and probed cooperation on migration issues. Yet by committing to the promotion

of “freedom” in front of increasingly politically powerful Miami Cubans, Reagan not

only made U.S. cooperation with Cuba more difficult, but also rendered normalization of

diplomatic relations almost impossible. Chapter Seven extends the discussion to the end

of the Cold War. Like his predecessor, George Bush considered Havana’s change of

internal structure as the main precondition for an improvement in U.S.-Cuban relations.

Yet, whereas counterrevolutionary Cubans in Miami aimed for the immediate end of the

Castro regime, Washington waited for a sign of change on the island and kept contact

with Havana over migration issues.

In the conclusion, I argue that U.S.-Cuban relations reached equilibrium of

“hostile coexistence” by the end of the Cold War. As a precondition for talks about

normalization of relations, Washington demanded that Havana radically transform its

domestic politics in addition to its foreign policy—more in response to the rise of Cuban

American political power than to the decline of Cold War tensions. Yet despite the shared

ideological hostility to the Castro regime, Washington differed from Miami in accepting

the existence of a revolutionary regime in Cuba. Despite the limits imposed by political

necessities, Washington pursued talks with Havana to make U.S.-Cuban relations more

controllable and prevent another migration crisis near its border. As such, migration

played a fundamental role in creating this deadlock by promoting the ideological split of

the Cuban population.

19

What follows is a history of human migration and its impact on U.S. foreign

relations. The project does not argue that power and ideology do not matter, nor does it

claim that migration plays the primary role in defining U.S.-Cuban relations. Quite the

opposite, it shows that these elements were complementary to each other, consisting of

complex and reinforcing forces across the Florida Straits. Out of necessity, reference to

two major U.S.-Cuban geopolitical battles—Southern Africa and Central America—are

kept to minimum. U.S.-Cuban disagreements over the international economic system, the

transformation of race, gender, and political culture in Revolutionary Cuba, and the

trajectory of U.S. politics and society after World War II also remain on the periphery of

this study. For readers interested in these subjects, they are and will be the subjects of

other works, including ones this author wishes to write in the future.

By bringing migration into diplomacy, my interest here is to look for the missing

piece in the existing story. The question of how Cuban migration acted as an important

element of international politics remains underexplored due to gaps in three fields of U.S.

history, Latin American history, and diplomatic and international history. My study

intends to overcome this problem by presenting a new narrative based on mulatiarchival

sources and interdisciplinary approaches. Such a study is necessary not only for better

understanding of U.S.-Cuban relations, but also in light of massive migration from Latin

America, which has been transforming U.S. society. People coming from Latin America

carried historical baggage, and continued to interact with their homeland. How do such

evolving phenomena enrich or complicate the story of foreign relations? In what ways do

migrant activities pose new challenges and opportunities to the nation-states in our age?

20

In dealing with these questions, the picture of U.S. relations with Latin America may

appear even messier than previously acknowledged. The blending of North and Latin

American peoples and cultures not only took place between the two continents but also

within the United States. In other words, U.S. behavior in the world might have become

even more complex as the growing number of people moved into the United States.

21

CHAPTER 1: Between Revolution and Counterrevolution

Origins of the Triangular Relations among Washington, Havana, and Miami

The Cuban Revolution marked a critical juncture both in terms of Cuban

discussion on the nation’s future and Cuban relations with the United States. The

revolutionary programs entailed the emergence of counterrevolutionary forces and

encountered disapproval from U.S. policy elites. Whereas counterrevolutionaries and

Washington forged an anticommunist alliance, revolutionaries in Havana

counterbalanced this by inviting Soviet power into the Western Hemisphere. U.S.-Cuban

mutual antagonism endured for decades. Washington imposed an economic embargo,

mounted diplomatic campaigns to isolate the island, and orchestrated subversive

activities inside Cuba. Havana mobilized the masses, pursued guerilla movements

elsewhere, and resisted numerous surprise attacks organized by Washington and

counterrevolutionary militants.

The late 1960s and early 1970s saw signs of change. The fervor of

anticommunism in the United States declined after the end of the Vietnam War. U.S.

policy elites realized that their association with Cuban counterrevolutionaries was not as

effective in toppling the Castro regime as they had imagined. As the pace of Cuban

integration into the socialist bloc quickened, the revolutionary regime under the

leadership of Fidel Castro grew powerful and stable. Che Guevara’s death in Bolivia,

22

Castro’s endorsement of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the failure of Cuba’s

Ten-Million-Ton Sugar Harvest campaign in 1969-1970 assisted this trend. The start of

Cold War détente, Latin American defiance of U.S. power, and other global and regional

developments also appeared to demand a new U.S. policy toward Cuba.

Still, it was unclear how Washington and Havana could come to terms with the

tumultuous past of U.S.-Cuban relations. The following is a brief narrative of U.S.

relations with Cuba from 1959 to 1974. Instead of seeking to cover all features of

bilateral relations, this chapter provides the necessary background for the following ones

by illuminating several key themes like Cold War geopolitics, U.S. clashes with the

Cuban Revolution, and revolution-counterrevolution dynamics across the U.S.-Cuban

border. While drawing primarily on secondary sources, it pays special attention to the

massive inflow of Cubans into the United States, its ramifications for Cuban politics, and

its implications for U.S. foreign policy. This chapter shows that U.S.-Cuban relations

developed hand-in-hand with the revolutionary-counterrevolutionary dynamics that

developed first within Cuba and later across the Florida Straits.

Background for the Revolution

Cuba’s nation-building stagnated under the Spanish imperial rule for centuries.

Although the sugar economy produced prosperity on the island, it also harbored slavery,

racial discrimination, and social inequality. By dividing Cuban society by class, color,

and geographical sections, Cuba’s economic and social structure posed a crucial obstacle

to the early rise of the independence movement. Whereas many Latin American countries

23

achieved self-determination in the 1820s, Cuba’s war of independence belatedly came in

1868 and lasted intermittently for over thirty years. Despite much devastation and human

sacrifice, independence itself was a crushing disappointment for Cuban nationalists. The

United States accused Spain of sinking the Maine, intervened in the war, and occupied

the island. As a small nation with limited power, the subsequent political and economic

dependency on the United States inhibited Cuba’s exercise of national sovereignty.28

Cuba’s economic and political stability seemed crucial for U.S. commerce and

security. Since the age of Thomas Jefferson, Cuba was an important point of the vital

U.S. sea lanes. As such, North Americans imagined that the geographical proximity of

Cuba was a proof of manifest destiny to assert their prominence on the island. After the

War of 1898, the United States conquered Cuba, as well as the Philippines, Puerto Rico,

and Guam. Although Cuba gained nominal independence in 1902, Uncle Sam held a

naval base at Guantánamo in southeast Cuba, invoked the Platt Amendment to intervene

in Cuba’s internal affairs, and employed racialized and gendered rhetoric to justify his

dominance. In the early years of the Cold War, the United States acted as a “hegemonic

power” in the Western Hemisphere and aligned with the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista

as a member of the anticommunist “Free World.”29

Power imbalances combined with the geographic proximity to make almost all

aspects of Cuban life become increasingly dependent on U.S. economy and culture. On

28

Pérez, Reform and Revolution, chaps. 1-7; and ibid., The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba

in History and Historiography (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998).

29 Pérez, Cuba in the American Imagination; Thomas G. Paterson, Contesting Castro: The United

States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); and

Schoultz, Infernal, chaps. 1-3.

24

the eve of the revolution, the United States absorbed half of Cuba’s sugar exports and

about two-thirds of all island exports. U.S. companies owned about 40 percent of the

Cuban sugar lands, 80 percent of the utilities, and almost all cattle ranches, railways, and

petroleum industries. The omnipresence of U.S. interests benefited some Cubans,

especially those who worked for U.S. companies, studied abroad, travelled to Miami for

shopping and vacations, and adopted aspects of the American way of life. Yet,

Americanization of the island was not immune from criticisms as social discontent grew.

Gaps in living standards between the rich and poor, elites and masses, whites and

nonwhites, as well as those in cities and the countryside, increased. Of all, rural workers,

peasants, and Afro Cubans suffered poverty, insecurity, and neglect. They saw little hope

of improving their living.30

Cuba’s traditional political system was incapable of dealing with growing popular

discontent that originated in the skewed social structure. Pre-revolutionary Cuba

undertook political reforms to little avail. After the Great Depression, the 1933 revolution

took place but sustained only for a brief moment. Reformist elements enacted the 1940

Constitution that promised universal suffrage, free elections, civil liberties, and workers’

rights. Yet, Cuban politics ultimately succumbed to massive corruption. The depth and

breadth of national cynicism with politics was so great that the general public did not

react to the 1952 coup by Batista, who voided the scheduled elections. Almost all

30

Paterson, Contesting Castro, pp. 39-45. On U.S. influence on Cuban identity and culture, see Louis

A. Pérez, Jr., On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality and Culture (New York: Ecco, Harper

Collins, 1999), esp. chap. 6. For prerevolutionary Cuba’s economic performance, see Carmelo Mesa-

Lago, The Economy of Socialist Cuba: A Two-Decade Appraisal (Albuquerque: University of New

Mexico Press, 1981), pp. 7-10.

25

national institutions of political order were in disgrace. Political parties served few other

than professional politicians. Newspapers undermined their credibility by accepting

subsidies from the dictator. As such, the middle-class had no viable political institutions

to defend its interests collectively.31

What Cuba needed was a radical change, according to Fidel Castro, young

revolutionary nationalist. Born in 1926 as a son of a wealthy Spanish-born landowner in

the eastern province Oriente, Castro received education at a Jesuit school, earned a law

degree at the University of Havana, and immersed himself in student politics. He joined

the Orthodox Party, a wing of Cuban nationalists calling for social justice, removal of

corruption, and economic independence from the United States. On July 26, 1953, in

response to the coup by Batista, Fidel Castro and his brother Raúl assaulted the Moncada

military barracks in Santiago de Cuba. Released from jail in a 1955 amnesty, the brothers

left for Mexico, where they united with Ernesto “Che” Guevara and received military

training. In December 1956, they returned to the island in the yacht Granma. On his

landing, Fidel Castro launched a guerrilla war against Batista and became the most

powerful Cuban leader in the wake of the Revolution.32

31

Pérez, Reform and Revolution, pp. 210-236, 252-56.

32 For biographies of Fidel Castro, see for example, Fidel Castro and Ignacio Ramonet, My Life, trans.

Andrew Hurley (London: Allen Lane, 2007); Leycester Coltman, The Real Fidel Castro (New Haven,

CT: Yale University Press, 2003); and Tad Szulc, Fidel: A Critical Portrait (New York: William

Morrow, 1986). Szulc famously claims that Castro was a communist and intended to make the

revolution socialist from the very beginning. But this observation is dubious. See Samuel Farber, The Origins of the Cuban Revolution Reconsidered (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,

2006), pp. 61-63. For the revolutionary war, see for example, Julia A. Sweig, Cuban Revolution: Fidel Castro and the Urban Underground (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).

26

Revolution, Counterrevolution, and U.S. Charge of Communism

The Cuban Revolution indicted “the accumulated ills of Cuban society” and

declared “a substantive and symbolic break with past politics.” Fidel Castro rallied the

masses, made speeches, and presented his vision of power and social justice by appealing

directly to the masses. As his revolutionary rhetoric in turn stimulated pressure for

immediate, deep, sweeping change, he promoted far-reaching social reforms at a speed

and scope that overwhelmed the existing legal structures. In the first nine months, the

government enacted 1,500 decrees, laws, and edicts to increase wages, reform education,

abolish racial segregation in public spaces, provide health care and unemployment relief,

and reduce rents and utility fees. Most important was the Agrarian Reform of May 1959,

which invited vigorous U.S. opposition.33

Castro was enormously popular and successful in ensuring the longevity of the

revolution. Rural workers, peasants, and the unemployed enthusiastically embraced the

revolutionary leader who promptly implemented life-saving measures, forcefully

mobilized the nation for the literacy campaign, and aggressively worked for the

improvement of their health and nutrition. As principal beneficiariaries, Afro Cubans

became earnest supporters of the new regime that dismantled much of the old structure of

segregation and discrimination, especially in the public sphere. Since the traditional

political order was in disrepute, the vast majority of middle-class white Cubans also

rallied to Castro, who attacked the prerevolutionary past, called for national unity, and

33

The government nationalized land exceeding 1,000 acres with the exception of land used for the

production of sugar, rice, and livestock, whose maximum limits were set at 3,333 acres. Pérez, Reform and Revolution, pp. 238-243.

27

demanded individual sacrifices to the revolution. He was particularly effective in

arousing Cuban nationalism and converting it into people’s support for the revolution. As

he became the face of the revolution, Fidelismo became a secular state religion.

Numerous Cuban women and men became uncritical true believers, even though they

might not have automatically embraced all revolutionary measures with an equal degree

of enthusiasm.34

The Agrarian Reform had an impact on U.S. thinking of Cuba. Mindful of the

overwhelming popularity of the revolution, Washington initially took a wait-and-see

approach toward Cuba. Indeed, Vice President Richard Nixon received Castro, who made

a good-will tour in the United States in April 1959. Underneath the cautious U.S.

approach was confidence in the value of their traditional ties. U.S. policy elites hoped

that pro-U.S. moderate wings of the revolutionary regime would ultimately nudge Castro

away from radicalism. Yet, such thinking became increasingly untenable after the

Agrarian Reform. The compensations instituted by the government antagonized U.S.

investors and invoked the specter of communism. In the early summer of 1959, the

Dwight Eisenhower administration began considering a policy of regime change, while

closely following internal developments in Cuba.35

34

Ibid., p. 239, 242-43; and Lillian Guerra, Visions of Power in Cuba: Revolution, Redemption, and

Resistance, 1959–1971 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), esp. chap. 4. For Afro

Cubans, see also, Alejandro de la Fuente, A Nation for All: Race, Inequality, and Politics in Twentieth Century Cuba (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

35 Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 88-100; and LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, pp. 23-24. The Cuban

government offered compensation but only the amount equal to the assessed tax value as of October

1958, which was about 20 percent of market value. They would pay not in cash but in twenty-year

government bonds with an annual interest of 4.5 percent. This manner did not meet Washington’s

28

Under such circumstances, revolutionary-counterrevolutionary dynamics had

profound implications for U.S. policy toward Cuba. As in other social revolutions in

Latin America, the first to rise in opposition included politicians, government officials,

and military officers with ties to the old regime, as well as property owners, large and

small, whose interests, ideologies, and ways of life were threatened. They left the island,

organized counterrevolutionary forces, and mounted a campaign against what they

perceived as a “communist conspiracy.” Some embezzled public funds. Others allied

with Rafael Trujillo, the dictator of the Dominican Republic. In early August 1959, these

elements made the first major attempt to overthrow the revolutionary government by

military means.36

Joining them were anticommunist moderates who had participated in the

revolution but lost political struggles afterwards. The summary execution of war

criminals frightened them, as they saw a flagrant disregard for due process. As Castro

posted communists in key government positions and relied on radicals like Raúl and Che

Guevara to implement the Agrarian Reform, pro-U.S. anticommunists resigned and

departed for the United States. In testimonies before the U.S. Congress and media, these

former revolutionaries denounced what they considered the “communist takeover” of the

Revolution.37

For Castro, such accusation of communism was a sinister attempt to invite

standard for “prompt (within six months), adequate (full market value), and effective (in convertible

currency)” compensation. Schoultz, Infernal, p. 99.

36 Arboleya, Cuban Counterrevolution, pp. 40-51; and Fabían Escalante, The Secret War: CIA Covert

Operations against Cuba 1959-1962, trans. Maxine Shaw (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1995), chap. 2.

See also, Rafael Díaz-Balart, Cuba: Intrahistoria. Una lucha sin tregua (Miami, FL: Ediciones

Universal, 2006), pp. 99-109.

37 Pérez, Reform and Revolution, p. 240, 246; and Guerra, Visions of Power, pp. 77-84.

29

counterrevolution. There was the Guatemalan precedent; only five years earlier,

Washington had exploited communist influence to justify its use of

counterrevolutionaries in toppling the revolutionary regime.38

A major U.S.-Cuban showdown arrived in the fall of 1959. A series of air attacks

by Florida-based counterrevolutionaries coincided with the resignation of Huber Matos,

chief of the command for Camagüey, one of Cuba’s central provinces. Convinced that the

U.S. government was deliberately promoting counterrevolution by manipulating

anticommunist forces, Castro delivered his harshest speech against the United States,

imprisoned Matos on the charge of treason, and announced a series of measures curtailing

civil liberties in the name of national security.39

The vast majority of Cuban women and

men supported these measures and remained faithful to Castro. As historian Louis A.

Pérez, Jr. notes, the increase of organized attacks from opponents in the United States had

“far-reaching consequences,” making defense of the nation “indistinguishable” from

defense of the revolution.40

These developments effectively drew a line in the sand, forcing Havana and

Washington to harden their positions. U.S. officials not only opposed the Agrarian

38

Guerra, Visions of Power, pp. 63-67. On the Guatemalan counterrevolution, see Richard H.

Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin: University of Texas

Press, 1982); and Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991).

39 These measures included the end of judicial independence, decrees expanding the definition of

counterrevolution, and the application of capital punishment of traitors. Fidel also reopened the

Revolutionary Tribunals, eliminated the category of political prisoners (in preference for “common

delinquents”), and deterred future rebels from calling a strike or informal work slow-down. Schoultz,

Infernal, pp. 103-4; and Guerra, Visions of Power, pp. 84-87, 91-92.

40 Pérez, Reform and Revolution, p. 246. The administration launched a concerted effort to halt the

flights only after February 18, 1960, when an incident involving a U.S. citizen took place. The attacks

nonetheless continued. Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 111-12.

30

Reform, but also felt uneasy about Castro’s leadership style, revolutionary rhetoric, and

frequent criticisms of the U.S. government, which often appeared in response to verbal

U.S. interferences in Cuban affairs.41

They also noticed that the moderate force that they

counted on was losing its internal battle against radicals. In the absence of signs of

moderation of the revolution, few could defend the continuation of the wait-and-see

policy. Then came the above-mentioned speech by Castro, which Washington considered

hopelessly anti-American, if not outright pro-communist. On November 5, Eisenhower

decided to probe “a step-by-step development of coherent opposition” in Cuba, which

later evolved into covert actions in support of counterrevolution, including assassination

plots against Castro.42

In March 1960, whereas Castro accused the United States of

exploding the French vessel La Coubre in Havana and killing more than one hundred

people, Eisenhower formally activated a plan by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

to sponsor a counterrevolutionary invasion of the island.43

Thereafter, U.S.-Cuban tensions quickly escalated and merged with the broader

current of the Cold War, as well as the 1960 U.S. election. Despite initial misgivings,

Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev developed strong personal affinity toward the island

and offered economic and military assistance to Castro.44

In May 1960, in response to the

41

Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 87-92, 112-14.

42 Ibid., pp. 104-5, 116. For the Eisenhower administration’s early consideration of assassination plots,

see Howard Jones, The Bay of Pigs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 13, 18-19, 21. See

also, Escalante, Secret War, pp. 42, 50.

43 The charge remains unproven of whether the CIA was behind this incident. Jones, Bay of Pigs, p. 17.

The number of sabotages increased from 34 in September to 35 in October, 80 in November, and

lowered to 57 in December. Escalante, Secret War, pp. 62-63.

44 The Soviet leadership apparently drew a similar conclusion that the fall of 1959 was a major turning

point in U.S.-Cuban relations. For Moscow, Fidel’s decision to assign Raúl to be a new minister of the

31

increase of supply of Soviet oil to Cuba, the U.S. government instructed three U.S. oil

companies in Cuba not to refine Soviet petroleum. When Havana confiscated these

businesses, Washington eliminated Cuba’s sugar import quota. The deepening ties

between Moscow and Havana not only inspired further counterrevolutionary attacks on

the island, but also encouraged two presidential candidates, John F. Kennedy and Richard

Nixon, to wage a political battle over who could be tougher on communism. As Kennedy

blamed the vice president for “the loss of Cuba,” Nixon pleaded with Eisenhower to

impose an economic embargo on the island. When Eisenhower complied, Castro

nationalized all remaining U.S. properties, as well as non-agricultural properties owned

by Cubans. On January 3, 1961, the United States terminated diplomatic relations with

Cuba.45

U.S. Alliance with Cuban Counterrevolution, 1961-1962

U.S.-Cuban confrontation was not only important in Cuba, but also in the rest of

the Western Hemisphere. As U.S. leaders feared, the Cuban Revolution inspired left-

wing revolutionaries across Latin America. The spread of news of Cuba’s open defiance

of traditional U.S. hegemony energized pro-Cuban forces to contest local oligarchies

allied with the U.S. government. Washington, determined to preempt the emergence of

“another Cuba,” sought to undermine Cuba’s popular appeal through public relations

Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces in October 1959 was a further proof of Cuba’s direction

toward communism. Alexander Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964 (New York: Norton, 1997), pp. 22-31.

45 Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 117-139. Thereafter, the Swiss embassy in Havana and the Czech embassy in

Washington represented U.S. and Cuban interests in each other’s country respectively.

32

campaigns. The U.S. government also developed the Alliance for Progress to create,

promote, and showcase a non-Cuban model for economic development and political

democratization. As Castro accelerated the radicalization of the revolution, U.S. resolve

to attack every dimension of the revolutionary society grew only stronger.46

Cuba’s political radicalization also accelerated the ideological split of the Cuban

population. The radicalization made those Cubans who ideologically and economically

depended on traditional U.S. interests increasingly vulnerable, pushing them out of the

country. They hoped that their leave would be temporary, although their flight itself

served to consolidate revolutionary rule on the island.47

For the Cuban government, their

emigration not only helped to eliminate internal opposition, but also to purify the

revolutionary society. Havana viewed emigration as “betrayal” of the nation, calling all

emigrants “gusanos” (worms), harassed them on their departure, and confiscated their

citizenship, rights, and properties. The mere indication of a desire to leave led to the

expulsion from workplaces and the loss of access to university education. Only in the late

1970s did the Cuban government start to reevaluate its relations with emigrants and stop

describing emigration in stark black-and-white terms.48

For the U.S. government, these Cuban emigrants were the enemies of the enemy,

whose symbolic importance was tremendous. Although Havana claimed that most of

them left the island “voluntarily” without “political persecution,” Washington called all

46

Rabe, Killing Zone, chaps. 4-5; and Brands, Latin America’s, chaps. 1-2. For the Alliance for

Progress, see Jeffrey F. Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America (New York: Routledge, 2007).

47 Pérez, Reform and Revolution, pp. 252-56; and García, Havana USA, pp. 13-14.

48 Arboleya, Cuba y los cubanoamericanos, pp. 229-230.

33

Cuban emigrants “exiles” and “refugees” to highlight their plight and discredit the

revolution in the eyes of Latin Americans.49

Because many of the emigrants were

professionals and middle-class, Washington also expected that the emigration would

deprive the revolutionary regime of human resources. Cuban emigration was a critical

component of CIA operations. By 1961, the political spectrum of the anti-Castro

movement ranged from rightwing supporters of the Batista regime, anticommunist

Catholic groups, members of the old political parties, to former leftist revolutionaries.

Despite their disagreements and infighting, the CIA established an umbrella group, which

would supposedly become a provisional government for post-Castro Cuba.50

The U.S.

alliance with Cuban counterrevolution led to the creation of Brigade 2506, approximately

1,500 men, trained for an invasion.

U.S.-Cuban tensions reached a peak on April 17, 1961, as John F. Kennedy

unleashed these counterrevolutionary warriors. Inherited from his predecessor, the plan

was flawed in many ways. The brigade lacked training, resources, and personnel. Trying

to camouflage U.S. involvement, the U.S. president made fatal decisions, such as the

relocation of the landing site, the substantial reduction of pre-invasion air strikes, and the

imposition of strict limitations on U.S. air cover for the invading brigade. No less

fundamental was the miscalculation that millions of Cubans would welcome the invaders.

Although he might not have known exactly when and from where the attack would come,

Castro anticipated the invasion, suppressed internal opposition, and captured principal

49

Masud-Piloto, From Welcomed Exiles, pp. 1-6; and Arboleya, Cuba y los cubanoamericanos, p. 28.

50 The group was called the Frente Revolucionario Democrático and replaced in March 1961 by the

Consejo Revolucionario Cubano. García, Havana USA, pp. 123-26; and Arboleya, Counterrevolution,

chap. 2.

34

underground leaders, whom the CIA deemed as necessary to cause the corresponding

insurrection. Castro’s decisive victory in the Bay of Pigs consolidated his power,

cemented Cuba’s integration into the socialist bloc, and demoralized his foes on the

island.51

Driven by a zeal for revenge, Kennedy implemented a policy of maximum

hostility toward Cuba, anything short of a direct invasion. His measures included military

maneuvers near Cuban waters, a total economic embargo of the island, a diplomatic

offensive including the expulsion of Cuba from the Organization of American States

(OAS), and the exercise of pressure on U.S. allies in Asia, Latin America, and Western

Europe to terminate diplomatic and commercial relations with Cuba. The U.S.

government launched Operation Mongoose, a comprehensive destabilization plan to

incite an open revolt, which would supposedly set the stage for a costless U.S. invasion.

The CIA’s Miami headquarters employed hundreds of U.S. officers and thousands of

Cuban agents, recruited Mafias for assassination of Cuban leaders, and devoted millions

of dollars to sabotage, raids, clandestine radios, and assistance to remaining

counterrevolutionary groups on the island.52

The outright interferences in Cuban affairs ultimately propelled the United States

to face the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Traditionally, scholars have argued that the Soviet

Union deployed nuclear missiles to Cuba principally because of its desire to redress the

51

Just prior to the invasion, Fidel declared the Cuban Revolution as “socialist,” sending a

symbolically important message to the world. On the invasion, see Jones, Bay of Pigs. For Cuba’s

moves, see also Escalante, Secret War, pp. 78-83.

52 Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 171-183. According to Fabían Escalante, a Cuban intelligence officer, a total

of 5,780 counterrevolutionary actions took place from January to August 1962. 718 were economic

sabotages. Escalante, Secret War, p. 116.

35

strategic balance against the United States.53

Yet, recent scholarship has emphasized

Nikita Khrushchev’s deep sympathy for the Cuban Revolution and his strong desire to

defend the island as a symbolically important ally in the Third World. Although Moscow

backpedaled at the last moment of the crisis and agreed to withdraw the missiles from the

island, it achieved an otherwise unattainable goal: Washington pledged that it would not

invade Cuba. As some argue, the origins of the missile crisis lay in “the story of the

Cuban Revolution, Fidel Castro’s personality, and his embrace of the Soviet Union.”54

Still, the missile crisis was a psychological trauma for Cubans both in Havana and

Miami. Once the crisis reached a climax, Washington and Moscow termed the crisis as a

nuclear security issue between the two superpowers, rendering Cuba as an essentially

irrelevant player. To Havana’s frustration, the Soviet Union neither consulted the Cubans

prior to the end of the crisis nor addressed any of the five points they saw as essential for

its resolution: the lifting of the embargo, the termination of subversion, the end of

counterrevolutionary attacks, the cessation of violation of Cuban air and naval space, and

the return of Guantánamo. Castro drew a lesson that he could not trust either superpower.

His foreign policy radicalized, seeking allies to reduce their vulnerability in the East-

West context.55

Miami Cubans also disliked the superpower bargaining. Once its

53

See for example, Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban

Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999).

54 Khrushchev also was conscious of Mao Zedong’s China and its challenge to his prestige as the

principal leader of the communist camp. Before the final resolution, he secured the removal of the

U.S. nuclear missile from Turkey. Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble,” p. x. See also,

Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War (New York: Knopf, 2008).

55 James G. Blight and Philip Brenner, Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba’s Struggle with the

Superpowers after the Missile Crisis (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), esp. chap. 1.

36

existence was known, anti-Castro groups denounced Kennedy’s non-invasion pledge as a

plot against freedom in Cuba. They repeatedly urged the U.S. presidents to abrogate it.56

A Tactical Change: Regime Change through Ideological Penetration

Although the missile crisis marked a watershed in the Cold War, prompting the

two superpowers to seek ways of peaceful coexistence, it did not dissipate U.S.-Cuban

hostilities. As Castro refused on-site inspection of the Soviet withdrawal of missiles,

Kennedy downplayed the importance of his non-invasion pledge. Two months after the

crisis in Miami, Kennedy welcomed Bay of Pigs veterans released from Cuban prisons.

With a Brigade 2506 flag in hand, he declared, “I can assure you that this flag will be

returned to this brigade in a free Havana.”57

The U.S. president reactivated the secret war

against Cuba, funded selected groups of Cuban counterrevolutionaries, and encouraged

these “autonomous groups” to attack Cuba from outside the U.S. territory.58

Although

Kennedy also explored the possibility of dialogue with Castro through back-channel

communications, he was assassinated before any official discussions were scheduled.59

56

See for example, Mauel Antonio de Varona, Jorge Mas Canosa, and Andrés Vargas Gómez to

Ronald Reagan, November 12, 1985, ID #351318, FO006-09, White House Office of Records

Management: Subject Files (hereafter WHORM), Ronald Reagan Library (hereafter RRL); and Cuban

American National Foundation, Towards a New U.S.-Cuba Policy (Washington, DC: CANF, 1988).

57 Joan Didion, Miami (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), pp. 97-98.

58 Paper Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency for the Standing Group of the National Security

Council, June 8, 1963, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS) 1961-1963, Vol. XI:

Doc no. 346.

59 The question of what might have been remains within the realm of speculation. Schoultz, Infernal,

p. 211. For the details of this story, see LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, pp. 60-80.

37

Lyndon Johnson, the next U.S. president, was never as enthusiastic about Cuba as

Kennedy. Johnson inherited a series of anti-Cuban policies and intensified diplomatic

offensives against U.S. allies trading with the island.60

In response to the December 1963

discovery of a cache of Cuban arms in Venezuela, the U.S. government successfully

pressed all OAS member nations except Mexico to suspend all bilateral diplomatic and

consular relations, trade, and sea transportation with Cuba.61

In Castro’s view, this

maneuver was “a shameless call to counterrevolution,” proposed by “imperialists” and

supported by “all right-wing military dictatorships.” On July 26, 1964, Cuba issued the

Declaration of Santiago affirming the right to assist the revolutionary movements in “all

those countries” that interfered in Cuba’s internal affairs.62

Unlike Kennedy, however, Johnson gradually reduced the U.S. commitment to

Cuban counterrevolution. In its efforts to topple the Castro regime, Washington had

provided select counterrevolutionary groups with funds, arms, and equipment. These

groups supposedly operated outside the United States so that the U.S. government could

publicly deny any association with them “no matter how loud or even how accurate may

be the reports of U.S. complicity.”63

Such perfect separation was impossible to maintain

in practice. In September 1964, one group mistakenly attacked the Sierra Arranzazu, a

Spanish freighter, killing three and injuring eight. The incident set off a diplomatic

60

Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 229-236.

61 Ibid., pp. 226-29.

62 Fidel Castro, Declaration of Santiago, July 26, 1964 (Toronto: Fair Play for Cuba Committee,

1964), pp. 14-15, 23, 31-32, 36-37.

63 Paper Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency for the Standing Group of the National Security

Council, June 8, 1963, FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. XI: Doc no. 346.

38

scandal. Cuba and Spain were furious. Nicaragua and Costa Rica, which had provided

bases for the group, grew nervous. The Soviet Union complained. As the operations had

achieved nothing but international embarrassment, the U.S. government terminated the

program sometime in 1965.64

Havana did not fail to notice the decline of these U.S.-led counterrevolutionary

offensives, according to a heretofore secret paper on subversive aggression by a Cuban

intelligence officer. Based on reports from the Ministry of the Interior’s Dirección

General de Inteligencia (General Director of Intelligence) and Dirección General de

Contrainteligencia (General Director of Counterintelligence), the author indicates that the

CIA not only assisted in military attacks against the island from the sea, but also created

an intelligence network within the nation. It engaged in subversive activities against

civilian and non-civilian targets, supplied equipment and materials to

counterrevolutionary rebels, and established illegal channels of entrance and departure

near the Cuban coast. A major part of the credit for the termination of these operations

goes to revolutionary vigilance, as the CIA did not trust the counterrevolutionary groups

out of fear that they might have been infiltrated by Cuban counterintelligence.65

But Cuba still had no peace of mind. According to the author, the Johnson

administration not only maintained its policy of isolating Cuba, but also resorted to

64

Don Bohning, The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations against Cuba, 1959-1965

(Washington, DC: Potomac, 2005), chap. 13. The total cost of U.S.-led operation in Cuba for the year

1963 was about $21-22 million.

65 “IV. Las actividades subversivas después de la crisis de octubre,” n.d. (ca. 1973), Caja “Bilateral

27,” Archivo Central del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba (hereafter MINREX). The

document consisted of five chapters. The author cites numerous intelligence reports to analyze the

trajectory of subversive activities against the Cuban Revolution from 1959 to 1973.

39

“ideological diversionism.” Originally coined by Raúl Castro, the term referred to the

promulgation by enemies of the revolution of ideas and thought that did not conform to

the official line of revolutionary socialism.66

To prove this point, the author refers to

Johnson’s speech in April 1964. “The effectiveness of our policy is more than a matter of

trade statistics,” the U.S. president said. “It has increased awareness of difference and

danger, it has revealed the brutal nature of the Cuban regime, it has lessened

opportunities for subversion, it has reduced the number of Castro’s followers, and it has

drained the resources of our adversaries who are spending more than $1 million a day.”67

Cuba apparently took Johnson’s self-evaluation seriously. Even though the

prospect of U.S. military invasion and CIA-led paramilitary actions declined, they

believed that the U.S. government was working for regime change. According to the

paper, Washington’s new aims were to “destroy the Cuban Revolution from inside”

through attempts at “ideological penetration.” With powerful media and communication

tools in hand, enemies of the revolution could exploit any show of ideological weakness.

In their view, Washington was using intellectuals as tools to “diffuse bourgeois ideas

among the youth” and impede “the revolutionary process.” The growth of “anti-socials”

would in turn make Cuban society more vulnerable to the “influence of these activities of

the enemy.” Weakened solidarity at home would therefore jeopardize national security.68

66

For discussion on “ideological diversionism,” see Guerra, Visions of Power, pp. 228-29

67 “V. La esperanza en los cambios internos,” n.d. (ca. 1973), Caja “Bilateral 27,” MINREX. See also,

Speech by Johnson, April 20, 1964, American Presidency Project (hereafter APP).

68 Ibid. The paper specifically mentioned the existence of Radio Swan, a CIA-led clandestine radio

broadcast.

40

Increasing vigilance and narrowing acceptance of ideological pluralism in this period

appear to be another by-product of Cuban confrontation with the United States.

Embargo, Migration, and Contradiction in U.S. Policy toward Cuba, 1962-1965

The U.S. embargo and other hostile acts proved ineffective in preventing Cuba

from expanding its activities abroad. Africa particularly appealed to Havana because it

not only held deep historical ties to the island, but also attracted relatively little attention

from Washington. Starting from January 1962, Cuba intervened in Algeria, Zaire, Congo,

Guinea-Bissau, and Angola to assist independent movements in those areas.69

Cuba also

hosted the first Tri-continental Conference and founded the Organization for the

Solidarity of the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America in 1966, as well as the

Organization of Latin American Solidarity a year later. As Che Guevara called for “two,

three, or many Vietnams,” Castro excoriated orthodox communist parties following

Moscow’s orders in Latin America. Soviet relations with Cuba cooled under the

leadership of Leonid Brezhnev, who generally favored gradual change in Latin America

and a relaxation of tensions with the United States.70

Perhaps the U.S. policy of isolation was more efficient in mounting social

discontent in Cuba than deterring Cuba’s behavior abroad. For Cuba, the loss of the

United States as a natural trading partner meant a reduction in foreign currency earnings,

69

Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions.

70 Yuri Pavlov, The Soviet-Cuban Alliance, 1959-1991 (New Brunswick, NY: Transaction, 1993), pp.

86-88; Mervyn J. Bain, Soviet-Cuban Relations, 1985 to 1991: Changing Perceptions in Moscow and

Havana. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2007), pp. 21-26; and H. Michael Erisman, Cuba’s Foreign Relations in a Post-Soviet World (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000), pp. 68-73.

41

a decline in consumer goods purchasing power, and substantial changes in lifestyle. Yet

aside from the embargo, government’s mismanagement in the early 1960s might have

been another reason for the economic downturn. In an overly ambitious move to

overcome Cuba’s dependence on sugar, the Cuban leadership liquidated the capitalist

system, placed a greater emphasis on industrialization, and replaced market mechanisms

with central planning. But this process of state collectivization was too broad and too

rapid for the government to control the delicate relations between demand and supply.

The island experienced one of the worst recessions in 1962-1963. After 1965, the

government forged a new strategy that underscored sugar production once again.71

It also bears emphasizing that the political impact of the U.S. embargo was

cushioned by U.S. migration policy. Of particular importance is the 1965 Camarioca

Crisis, which led to the opening of special flights between Varadero and Miami. After the

missile crisis the U.S. government had suspended all Cuba-to-U.S. flights, forcing

thousands of Cubans to enter the United States either via a third country, by boat, or

through the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo. The Cuban government had no interest in

keeping those who grew dissatisfied with the revolutionary regime, since it would

contradict the socialist principle of building society on a voluntary basis. Nevertheless,

Havana still protested Washington’s acceptance of these illegally-departed Cubans,

including those who resorted to criminal acts such as boat hijacking. On September 28,

71

Mesa-Lago, Economy, pp. 1-18; and Pérez, Reform and Revolution, pp. 257-265. For a more critical

evaluation, see Guerra, Visions of Power, pp. 172-181.

42

1965, Castro denounced Washington’s practices, opened the port of Camarioca, and

announced that Cubans with relatives in the United States could leave the island.72

In response, Johnson developed an orderly departure plan and sought negotiations

with the Cuban government. In early November, the two countries agreed to sign a

memorandum of understanding in order to facilitate Cuba-to-U.S. migration on a basis of

family reunification. The two governments exchanged a list of names of Cubans eligible

for migration and operated an airlift between Varadero and Miami of two flights a day,

five days a week. In the period from December 1965 to April 1973, a total of 260,561

Cubans arrived in the United States through this program, popularly dubbed “freedom

flights” in the United States, as if all these Cubans came to the United States for political

reasons.73

In fact, compared to the earlier one, this second-wave migration included more

blue-collar, service, and agricultural workers, who faced no imminent threat of

persecution but left the island in search of economically better lives. For its part, the

Cuban government continued to treat emigrants as traitors of the nation, even though

such emigration acted as a safety valve for social discontent principally resulting from

economic stagnation. Intertwined with the ongoing Cold War, Cuban migration into the

United States remained highly politicized.74

72

Arboleya, Cuba y cubanoamericanos, pp. 227-28.

73 LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, pp. 103-7; and Masud-Piloto, From Welcomed Exiles, pp.

64-68.

74 Pedraza, Political Disaffection, esp. chap. 1. The Cuban government also exercised control over the

process by forbidding the emigration of men of ages from 15 to 26 (required for military service),

certain technicians, and political prisoners.

43

The migration crisis also confirmed the contradictory nature of U.S. policy toward

Cuba. The United States kept the embargo on Cuba in the hope of increasing

dissatisfaction among the Cuban people and thereby pressuring the Cuban regime to

change its behavior. But U.S. migration policy defied this logic by helping the

revolutionary regime remove the discontented from the island.75

Even the above-

mentioned paper by a Cuban intelligence officer acknowledges that Cuba-to-U.S.

emigration in the 1960s and early 1970s “reduced considerably” the base of support for

the CIA and counterrevolution.76

In a sense, Washington inadvertently became a strange

bedfellow of Havana in bringing counterrevolutionary forces to Miami and cementing

revolutionary power in Cuba.

Miami, Community Formation, and Participation in U.S. Politics

The massive inflow of Cubans promoted the transformation of late twentieth

century Miami. In 1959, Miami was a segmented society that consisted of a large number

of retired Jews, African Americans segregated in ghettos, and northern and southern

white migrants drawn to South Florida’s opportunities. For others, it was a shabby local

city for spending winter. Since the Cuban Revolution, thousands of Cubans reached

ashore, received residency, and brought in money, skills, talents, ideas, language abilities,

and cultural traits. As the size of the Cuban community grew, Miami attracted more

Latinos, expanded its ties to Latin America, and became the “City on the Edge,” which

75

Louis A. Pérez Jr., “The Personal is Political: Animus and Malice in the U.S. Policy toward Cuba,

1959-2009,” in Castro Mariño and Pruessen, eds., Fifty Years of Revolution, pp. 137-166.

76 “IV. Las actividades subversivas después de la crisis de octubre.”

44

appeared to be a precursor for many other U.S. cities.77

As their economic success

sustained anti-Castro politics, the transformation of Miami also had political implications

for U.S. relations with Cuba.

For all the Cuban expatriates, the survival of the revolution meant that they could

not return to their homeland as most of them had expected. As their wait rolled from

years to decades, many of these Cubans found it necessary to concentrate on new lives in

the United States. Many resided in South Florida, particularly the Miami metropolitan

area (Dade County), where the Cuban population underwent a 30-fold increase from

fewer than 20,000 just prior to the revolution to nearly 600,000 Cubans by the early

1980s.78

Here, they managed to preserve, express, and assert a strong sense of cubanidad

(Cubanness), an identity that remains both political and cultural. While calling

themselves “exiles” rather than “immigrants,” they developed a dual identity as both

Cubans and Americans. As historian María Cristina García explains, “Miami had become

Havana USA: the border town between Cuba and the United States.”79

By 1980, due to the successive waves of migration, approximately 800,000

persons of Cuban origin lived in the United States.80

The Cuban community in the United

States was diverse, although less so than in their homeland. Compared with the first wave

that occurred right after the revolution, the 1965-1973 air flights included less of top-

77

Portes and Stepick, City on the Edge. By Miami, scholars generally refer to metropolitan Miami

(Dade County).

78 Boswell and Curtis, Cuban-American Experience, p. 71.

79 García, Havana USA, p. 118.

80 For demographical data on persons of Cuban origin, see Lisandro Pérez, “The Cuban Population of

the United States: The Results of the 1980 U.S. Census of Population,” Cuban Studies 15, no. 2

(Summer 1985): 1-18. The number does not include those who arrived in the Mariel boatlift of 1980.

45

echelon of prerevolutionary Cuba and more of blue-collar workers and former small

business owners. As men of military age had to stay, the recent wave included more

women and the elderly. There also were substantial numbers of Cubans of Chinese and

Jewish heritage. Blacks, youths, and farmers remained underrepresented among the

overseas community because they tended to support the revolutionary government and its

programs. In the case of Afro-Cubans, U.S. immigration policy since 1965 gave

preference to those with relatives already in the United States, thus favoring the whites

who came first to the United States.81

Unlike many other Latin American migrants, Cubans enjoyed generous assistance

for their resettlement into the United States. From 1961 to 1973, federal assistance

programs expended roughly $957 million to provide Cuban newcomers with meals,

residences, job training, and other necessities. Furthermore, all Cubans enjoyed special

legal status after November 1966, when the U.S. Congress enacted the Cuban Adjustment

Act. This special legislation allowed Cubans to apply for permanent residency only a year

and a day after arriving in the United States.82

It is also important to note that residents in

South Florida generally opposed the increase of Cubans in their areas because they

worried about its impact on their jobs, taxes, housing, schools, and language. By 1974,

81

García, Havana USA, pp. 43-44; and Eckstein, Immigrant Divide, pp. 14-20. For Afro-Cubans in

Cuba, see de la Fuente, A Nation for All.

82 García, Havana USA, pp. 20-23, 26-28, 44-45; and Silvia Pedraza-Bailey, Political and Economic

Migrants in America: Cubans and Mexicans (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), p. 41.

46

because of strong local antagonism, the federal program resettled 299,326 of the 461,373

Cubans who had gone through registration.83

Thousands of Cubans nonetheless resided in “Little Havana,” the area located

west of downtown Miami.84

Here, Cubans established hometown associations, engaged

in the arts, opened private educational institutions to teach their children about Cuban

history, and published hundreds of Spanish-language newspapers, tabloids, newsletters,

journals, and magazines. They renamed parks, monuments, streets, and businesses after

heroes of Cuba’s war of independence such as Jose Martí. Many traditional cuisines,

cultural festivals, and social rituals also persisted in the new environment. Seeking

spiritual support, thousands of Cubans kept their style of Catholic faith through devotion

to the statue of La Virgen de la Caridad del Cobre (Our Lady of Charity).85

Many of

those who initially settled elsewhere also returned to Miami, looking for jobs, friends,

neighbors, and a warm climate.86

Geographical concentration and a strong sense of cultural ties also nurtured an

“ethnic enclave.”87

Miami Cubans benefited from individual capabilities, social networks,

83

Residents complained of preferential treatment of newcomers, worried about the decline of property

values and the quality of education for non-Spanish speaking students, and alleged that Cubans

disregarded American laws, especially traffic regulations. Masud-Piloto, From Welcomed Exiles, pp.

62-64; García, Havana USA, pp. 20, 28-30, 40-41; and Croucher, Imagining Miami, chap. 4.

84 Raymond Mohl, “Miami: The Ethnic Cauldron,” in Richard M. Bernard and Bradley R. Rice, eds.,

Sunbelt Cities: Politics and Growth since World War II (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983), p.

71.

85 A smaller number of Cubans, less than 10 percent, practiced Protestant faiths or Santería (a

syncretic Afro-Cuban faith). Boswell and Curtis, Cuban-American Experience, chaps. 7-9; and García,

Havana USA, pp. 86-99, 171-198.

86 By 1990, over half of Cuban population in the United States lived in the Miami area.

87 Alejandro Portes and Robert L. Bach, Latin Journey: Cuban and Mexican Immigrants in the Unites

States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 203.

47

and a variety of federal assistance and resources to create thousands of ethnic companies

that provided capital, employment, and job training for those who arrived later.88

As a

group, Cuban Americans in the late 1970s tended to receive higher education, hold

better-paying jobs, and gain higher incomes than other Latinos, although they were

behind non-Hispanic whites.89

Furthermore, Cuban-born entrepreneurs energized the

local economy of South Florida by taking advantage of Miami’s location as a crossroads

between North and Latin America, as well as easy access to cheap labor and abundant

capital. They transformed Miami into “the Capital of Latin America,” a center for trade,

finance, and aerial transportation in the Western Hemisphere.90

Although anticommunist Cubans took pride in their economic prosperity and

believed that their success was vindication of their work, all stories of communities are

not necessarily positive. Due to language barriers, licensing requirements, and a lack of

demand for their skills, middle-class Cubans experienced an abrupt economic downturn

when they moved to the United States. Many suffered from poverty, especially the

elderly. Some elements participated in organized crime, in particular drug-trafficking.91

More notorious was the community’s intolerance of dissent. Cuban newspapers, tabloids,

and radio programs incessantly denounced the adversarial regime in their homeland. For

88

Mohl, “Miami,” p. 78.

89 For example, in 1979, Cuban-American median family income was $17,538 while non-Cuban

Latino and non-Hispanic median family earned $14,569 and $19,965 respectively. Cuban-American

unemployment rate (5 percent) was lower than non-Cuban and even non-Hispanic counterparts (8.9

percent and 6.5 percent respectively). 12 percent of the Cuban Americans received four-year or more

college education. This figure was higher than the one of all Latinos (6.7 percent) and closer to the one

of non-Latinos (16.9 percent). Boswell and Curtis, Cuban-American Experience, pp. 104, 107.

90 Barry B. Levine, “Miami: The Capital of Latin America,” Wilson Quarterly 9, no. 5 (1985): 47-69.

91 García, Havana USA, p. 143; and Arboleya, Cuba y cubanoamericanos, pp. 118-19.

48

them, opposition to Castro was not a political opinion as much as a moral issue—“the

Cause”—that no member of the community could question. To describe this atmosphere,

sociologists Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick chose an apt phrase, “moral

community.”92

As their stay prolonged, many Cubans became naturalized U.S. citizens and

participated in U.S. politics. By 1980, 55 percent of the eligible Cubans in Dade County

were U.S. citizens, compared to 25 percent in 1970.93

Professionals created the Latin

American Chamber of Commerce, the Cuban American Medical Associations, and

numerous other organizations to advance their interests. Civic organizations, such as the

Cuban National Planning Council, the National Association of Cuban American Women,

and the National Coalition of Cuban Americans emerged to address community issues,

such as employment, health care, gender equality, and language discrimination. A

number of individuals started to run for local government posts. In 1973, two Bay of Pigs

veterans, Manolo Reboso and Alfredo Durán, respectively became the first Cuban-born

commissioner of the city of Miami and the first member of the Dade County school board.

Party politics also followed this increased political participation, as the

Republican and Democratic Party competed for the hearts and minds of Cuban

Americans. Florida was one of the strongholds for conservative Southern Democrats,

who dominated posts at local and state levels and provided winning chances to promising

candidates. Since the mid-1960s, the Florida Republican Party directed its efforts toward

92

See, their City on the Edge, p. 107.

93 García, Havana USA, p. 113.

49

influential campaigners of Cuban origin, such as Edgardo Buttari and Manuel Giberga,

close associates of Nixon. These activists drove Cuban American voters to their camp by

sending a message that the Democratic Party was responsible for the Bay of Pigs fiasco

because Kennedy was a Democrat.94

The trend alarmed the Florida Democratic Party,

whose counteroffensive in the late 1970s addressed socioeconomic issues, took

advantage of infighting among Cuban American Republicans, and selected Alfredo

Durán to be the first Hispanic chair of the party.95

By the early 1980s, party affiliation

was almost even among Cuban Americans.

Homeland Politics Continued

For some, however, Cuba remained the sole focus of their lives. In the eyes of

U.S. officials after the missile crisis, Cuban paramilitary groups in Florida, such as Alpha

66, were embarrassments rather than assets, as they attacked the ships of the Soviet

Union as well as Britain, Japan, Spain, and other U.S. allies trading with Cuba. Following

the change of interests, Washington belatedly enforced U.S. laws such as the Neutrality

Act of 1917 (18 U.S.C. 960), which prohibited persons in the United States from

financing, organizing, or carrying out hostile expeditions against foreign powers with

which the United States was at peace.96

To evade U.S. law enforcement, the groups

94

Bernardo Benes to Dante Fascell, May 8, 1972, in folder “Groups-Cubans, Campaign ‘72,” box

1838, Dante B. Fascell Papers, University of Miami’s Special Collections (hereafter UM-SC).

95 Miami News, June 14, 1976, p. 5A; and New York Times (hereafter NYT), July 4, 1976, p. 19.

96 The federal government also enforced the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778) section 38,

which prohibited the unlicensed exportation of certain defense articles and services. Training with

automatic weapons was also a federal crime. On U.S. dealings with invasion plans, see the next

chapter.

50

stored explosives in a third country, typically the Bahamas, and picked them up just

before launching the raids. Yet, as Cuban intelligence agents already penetrated into the

groups, the raids almost always ended in dismal failure.97

The more desperate and radical they became, the more drastic their tactics grew.

Disillusioned with perceived U.S. betrayals of their cause, dozens of anti-Castro groups

acted independently of the CIA to launch the “War along the Roads of the World” (La

Guerra por los Caminos del Mundo). Instead of commando raids and guerilla campaigns,

they favored spectacular terrorism against Cuban diplomats, Cuban governmental

buildings, as well as other “unfriendly” targets in third countries.98

Most notorious were

groups led by Orlando Bosch, a pediatrician and former CIA agent. According to the U.S.

Justice Department, Bosch engaged in “more than thirty acts of sabotage and violence”

between 1961 and 1968, including the bombing of the British vessel Gramwood in Key

West, the Japanese vessel Asaka Maru in Tampa, and the Japanese vessel Mikagesan

Maru in Galveston, Texas. In September 1968, Bosch fired a bazooka at the Polish vessel

Polanica, anchored in the port of Miami.99

97

I Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba, Informe Central: Presentados por el compañero Fidel

Castro Ruz Primer Secretario del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba (Havana: Comité

Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba, 1975), chap. 8, esp. p. 199.

98 John Dinges and Saul Landau, Assassination on Embassy Row (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980),

pp. 145-47.

99 U.S. Justice Department, Office of the Associate Attorney General, “In the Matters of Orlando

Bosch-Avila,” June 23, 1989, in folder “Cuban Americans-Florida/ Orlando Bosch,” White House

Office of Public Liaison: James Schaefer Files, GHWBL. See also, Orlando Bosch, Los años que he vivido (Miami, FL: New Press, 2010), see esp. pp. 122-28.

51

Bosch himself claimed that they were not “terrorists” but “freedom fighters”

using terror as the only means available to them.100

This argument resonated with many

émigrés, who praised them as heroes, offered funding for the cause, and volunteered for

their legal defense.101

Yet regardless of their claims and popularity, the U.S. government

considered them “terrorists” and shared information with other countries to stop them. In

May 1967, for example, Mexico’s intelligence agency Dirección Federal de Seguridad

(DFS) received the FBI information on Bosch, who attempted to bomb a British ship

carrying cereals to Cuba from a port of Tampico, Tamaulipas.102

Ominously, in June

1968, a DFS informant reported that Bosch was changing its targets from ships to

airplanes, mobilizing his agents in Mexico, the Bahamas, the United States, and

elsewhere.103

In November 1968, U.S. authorities imprisoned Bosch for his firing on the

Polanica, although he violated parole six years later to become a fugitive. His name came

back to newspapers in October 1976, when the worst pre-9/11 aviation terrorist incident

occurred near Barbados.

From the opposite end of the political spectrum emerged the leftist movement.

Influenced by the Civil Rights movement, feminism, and the antiwar movement in the

United States, a group of radical academics and students started to reevaluate their culture

100

Bosch, Reflexiones (n.d., 2006?), pp. 39-40.

101 García, Havana USA, pp. 143-44.

102 U.S. authorities foiled the plot by arresting Bosch’s agents. Mexico later located the explosives

within its territory. DFS, “Explosivos Localizados en el Estado de Tamulipas,” May 4, 1967, Versiones

Públicas (hereafter VP), Fondo Dirección Federal de Seguridad (hereafter DFS), Archivo General de

la Nación de México (hereafter AGN).

103 DFS’s report on Bosch, 20 de junio de 1968, VP, DFS, AGN. DFS’s informant also reported that

Bosch was talking about the bombing plot at the Olympics in Mexico. DFS’s report on MIRR,

September 21, 1968, VP, DFS, AGN.

52

and identity, as well as their relations with the homeland. At the forefront was Lourdes

Casal, a dark-skinned sociologist, who travelled back to the island on a regular basis after

1973 and started a magazine, Areíto, in April 1974. In favor of U.S.-Cuban normalization

of relations, the magazine reported on the accomplishments of the revolution, in stark

contrast to the expatriate community’s problems with discrimination, inequality, and

social alienation.104

Areíto provoked negative responses from the community and came

under bombing threats. Yet, in addition to its defense of ideological plurality, this

movement later formed the Brigada Antonio Maceo, whose trip would invoke notable

repercussions in Cuba and the United States.

It also bears emphasizing that many ordinary Cuban emigrants held contradictory

feelings about U.S. relations with Cuba. According to a Miami Herald poll of Miami

Cubans in December 1975, more than 53 percent of the respondents staunchly opposed

U.S.-Cuban normalization. Yet the same poll also revealed that despite public anti-Castro

discourse, 49.5 percent expressed their desire to visit the island, perhaps to meet their

families.105

What was noteworthy about this poll was that it was taken only two months

after the controversy stirred by Fernando De Baca, special assistant to Gerald Ford for

Hispanic Affairs. Because De Baca commented that Cuban émigrés publicly opposed

normalization yet privately wished to visit the island, numerous angry community leaders

called him “irresponsible,” “insulting,” and “treacherous.”106

The poll not only verified

104

Editorial, Areíto 1, no. 1 (April 1974), p. 1; and Editorial, Areíto 1, no. 4 (January-March 1975), p.

52.

105 Quoted in García, Havana USA, pp. 138-39.

106 Miami Herald (hereafter MH), September 3, 1975, pp. 1A and 2A. For letters of protest from angry

Cubans, see those in folder “U.S.-Cuban Relations (1)” and folder “U.S.-Cuban Relations—

53

Baca’s statement, but also exposed the complex nature of Cuban politics in Miami. This

complexity would provide an important background for U.S. policy toward Cuba during

the later years.

Nixon, Détente, and Cuban-Soviet Relations

Richard Nixon was not a pragmatist in terms of his views on Cuba. In the early

1970s, the U.S. president promoted détente with China and the Soviet Union, the two

biggest communist powers in the world. These moves reflected a substantial decline in

anticommunist zeal in Washington, coincided with the emergence of realpolitik at the

center of U.S. policy design, and stirred expectations that Nixon might suggest

normalization of relations with Cuba. Yet, Nixon did not move in that direction, probably

due to his deep-seated personal animosity toward Castro as well as his close friendship

with Charles “Bebe” Rebozo, an anti-Castro Cuban émigré in Miami. When his chief

foreign policy adviser Henry Kissinger brought up the idea of reviewing U.S. policy

toward Cuba, Nixon hesitated, halted the process, and later opposed it completely. “I’m

not changing the policy towards Castro,” Nixon declared to Kissinger in December 1971,

“as long as I’m alive.”107

Correspondence,” both in box 5, Office of Public Liaison (hereafter OPL): Fernando De Baca Files,

Gerald Ford Library (hereafter GFL).

107 LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, pp. 120-23. According to Kissinger, Cuba was a

“neuralgic problem” for Nixon. The U.S. president also hated to appear “weak” before “his old friend

(Rebozo).” Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), pp. 633-34, 641. For détente,

see for example, Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).

54

Throughout his first term Nixon largely ignored Cuba, focusing on more pressing

issues such as the ongoing conflicts in Southeast Asia. Major exceptions were U.S.-

Soviet talks over the Soviet deployment of submarines in Cienfuegos, Cuba, and the

increase of hijackings of U.S. airplanes to the island. From May to October 1970, the U.S.

government worried that the new deployment of submarines would violate the Kennedy-

Khrushchev understanding and change the military balance in favor of the USSR. The

two superpowers eventually resolved this incident—without Cuba’s participation—by

confirming the agreement.108

On the hijacking issue, however, the United States had to

deal directly with Havana for cooperation. In February 1973, the U.S. and Cuban

governments concluded a “memorandum of understanding,” a five-year pact committing

themselves to punish hijackers or return them. But the agreement did not signal a new

beginning of U.S. relations with Cuba.109

Nixon’s stubbornness was particularly striking in light of Havana’s changing

foreign policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As existing scholarship points out,

Havana’s revolutionary strategy faced a fatal blow in October 1967, when its principal

practitioner, Che Guevara, was killed in Bolivia. While its guerilla operations

encountered further setbacks, Havana also faced increased pressure from Moscow, which

demanded a radical change in Cuba’s foreign policy for the sake of its pursuit of peaceful

coexistence with the United States. According to James G. Blight and Philip Brenner, the

relationship reached “near a breaking point,” when Moscow scaled back deliveries of oil

108

The Soviets withdrew a submarine from Cuba. Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 251-55. See also the next

chapter.

109 Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 255-260; and LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, pp. 123-26.

55

to the island and Havana purged a pro-Soviet faction from the Communist Party of Cuba.

Still, Cuban-Soviet relations improved incrementally after August 1968, when Castro

endorsed the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.110

Equally important was the unfavorable result of Cuba’s Ten-Million-Ton Sugar

Harvest campaign (La Zafra de los Diez Milliones). Embracing the concept of a “new

man” (hombre nuevo) and rejecting material incentives for labor, Castro proclaimed that

an underdeveloped country could make a gigantic leap forward toward communism,

skipping the transitional stage of capitalism. If selfless revolutionaries sacrificed personal

liberty for collective goods, he claimed, their limitless labor would produce ten million

tons of sugar, bring in massive foreign hard currency, and make possible Cuba’s

economic take-off.111

Despite these promises, however, the campaign proved overly

ambitious.112

Because Castro had served as the face of this crusade and directed all

available resources to this effort, the May 1970 announcement of its failure not only

reflected a massive economic disaster, but also exerted a tremendous political toll on

Castro. The Cuban leader admitted that he had committed “errors of idealism.”113

As the projected shortcut to communism closed, Havana undertook massive

reforms—Sovietization—on its own initiative. Following the Soviet economic model, the

110

Blight and Brenner, Sad and Luminous Days; and Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, pp. 90-92.

111 The concept of a new man was originally conceived by Che Guevara. Mesa-Lago, Economy, pp.

18-24; and Pérez, Reform and Revolution, p. 259-260.

112 Reasons for the failure may include: chaotic economic planning, inefficient management, further

emigration of professionals and technicians, and the decline of labor productivity through the total

elimination of material incentives for labor. Pérez, Reform and Revolution, pp. 261-63.

113 I Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba, Informe Central, p. 104. For a critical analysis of the

campaign, see Guerra, Visions of Power, pp. 290-304.

56

Cuban government adjusted wages according to quality and quantity of production and

replaced ideologically fervent, yet incompetent revolutionaries with economic managers

who had little enthusiasm for socialism.114

Parallel to these steps was the

institutionalization of the political system. Castro restored mass organizations, augmented

the membership of the Communist Party, and created a new political structure, Poder

Popular (People’s Power). He delegated administrative power to mass organizations and

the state, which consisted of a Council of Ministers, a National Assembly, fourteen

provincial assemblies, and 169 municipal assemblies. These reforms culminated in the

First Congress of the Communist Party in 1975, as well as the first elections under

Cuba’s new constitution in 1976, which a specialist described as “very similar to the

Soviet one.”115

Cuba’s Sovietization had critical implications for its foreign relations since it

cemented Havana’s ties to Moscow. The Caribbean adoption of the Soviet model not

only satisfied Soviet ideological needs, but also cushioned their allegations of Cuba’s

misuse of resources. In 1972, the Soviet Union supported Cuba’s participation in the

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and made a special trade arrangement with the

island. Moscow postponed debt payment schedules, extended new lines of credit, and

increased the price it paid for Cuban exports.116

In foreign policy, Castro publicly

114

Mesa-Lago, Economy, p. 29. According to Fidel, “revolutionaries also have an obligation to be a

realist” by acting with better knowledge of history, political sciences, and universal experiences. I

Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba, Informe Central, pp. 102-3. In September 1970, Havana

enacted the Ley contra la vagancia (The Law against Laziness) and criminalized refusal to work.

115 Pérez, Reform and Revolution, pp. 265-68. For a quote, see Bain, Soviet-Cuban Relations, pp. 27-

28.

116 Pérez, Reform and Revolution, pp. 268-271; and Bain, Soviet-Cuban Relations, pp. 26-32.

57

endorsed détente and peaceful coexistence in a communique issued during Leonid

Brezhnev’s 1974 visit to Cuba. This endorsement did not necessarily mean the end of

Cuba’s autonomy. While rationalizing its policy within the overall framework of Soviet

global strategy, Havana continued to advance an essentially independent agenda in the

Third World.117

Sovietization brought economic prosperity to Cuba and expanded its trade with

non-socialist countries. Historically high sugar prices assisted this trend. Sugar prices

rose from 3.75 cents per pound in 1970 to 29.96 per pound in 1974, generating massive

hard currency and reversing Cuba’s trade deficits to a small surplus in 1974—the first in

fifteen years. The island purchased Western technology, capital equipment, and consumer

goods from Canada, Japan, and Western Europe.118

Cuba’s Vice President Carlos Rafael

Rodríguez toured capitals in these countries and signed new agreements on trade, finance,

and technological cooperation. These arrangements fitted well within Havana’s strategy

of breaking the economic blockade. Canada, Argentina, Mexico, and Cuba’s other

trading partners vehemently opposed the jurisdiction of U.S. laws that prohibited trading

with Cuba through subsidiaries of U.S. companies in their territories.119

117

British Foreign Ministry Joint Memorandum, “CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev’s Visit to

Cuba,” n.d., Records of the Foreign Office and Commonwealth Office (hereafter FCO) 7/2650, Public

Records Office, National Archives of the United Kingdom (hereafter PRO); Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, pp. 95-102; and Tayna Harmer, “Two, Three, Many Revolutions? Cuba and the Prospects for

Revolutionary Change in Latin America, 1967-1975,” Journal of Latin American Studies 45, no. 1

(February 2013): 61-89.

118 For the change of sugar prices, see Table 19 in Mesa-Lago, Economy, p. 89.

119 Canadian exports to Cuba rose from $58 million in 1972 to $217 million by 1975. Japan’s exports

to the island also increased from $51 million in 1972 to $438 million by 1975, making the nation the

largest non-communist trading partner. Quoted in Pastor to Brzezinski and Aaron, January 16, 1979, p.

4, NLC-24-79-8-3-9, Records retrieved through the RAC system (hereafter RAC), Jimmy Carter

Library (hereafter JCL). For a basic summary of Cuba’s relations with Canada and Britain, see for

58

Growing reliance on the Soviet Union and continued dependency on sugar export

were not a panacea for Cuba’s structural economic problems despite these gains. As non-

Cuban observers frequently noted, Cuba in the mid-1970s exuded confidence in the

maturity of the revolution. With Soviet economic assistance, Cuba played a larger role

abroad, achieved some degree of industrial development, and made further advances in

social welfare for the population, particularly in education, nutrition, health care, sports,

and culture. These developments led not only Cuban citizens but also foreign observers to

express somewhat optimistic views of the nation’s future.120

However, the adoption of the

Soviet model also had a negative impact. It ultimately deprived Cuba of new ideas,

creative thinking, and institutional flexibility.121

In the late 1970s, as the price of sugar on

the world market plummeted, stagnation set in, disrupting Cuba’s trade with non-socialist

countries. This loss of economic vitality would have important ramifications for Cuba’s

view of the United States.

U.S.-Cuban Relations in Latin American Context

When the U.S. government signaled its distance from Cuban counterrevolution, it

example, “Canada/Cuba Relations and U.S./Cuba Relations,” October 6, 1975, vol. 10851, file 20-

Cuba-1-3-USA, part 4, Record Group 25: Department of External Affairs (hereafter RG25), Library

and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC); and Hugh Carless (Latin American Department) to J. E.

Jackson, January 13, 1976, FCO 7/3125, PRO.

120 Pérez, Reform and Revolution, pp. 272-285. For foreign observers’ views of Cuba in the mid-

1970s, see for example, Informe político, attached to Mexican embassy in Havana to Mexico City,

April 15, 1974, Leg. III-3256-2, Archivo Histórico Genaro Estrada, Secretaría de Relaciones

Exteriores (hereafter AHGE); and Comments by Fingland (British ambassador in Havana), in

Memcon (Fingland, Shlaudeman), August 14, 1974, pp. 2-3, FCO 7/2650, PRO. For a critical view,

see Guerra, Visions of Power.

121 Arboleya, Cuba y cubanoamericanos, pp. 236-41.

59

also emphasized that such attitudes would not represent any change in U.S. policy toward

Cuba.122

But developments in Latin America during the late 1960s and early 1970s

severely undermined this resolve. A series of global events, such as Washington’s fiasco

in Vietnam, détente and breakdown of bipolarity, the collapse of Bretton Woods, and oil

shocks of 1973-1974 raised doubts of U.S. prominence of power. Buoyed by economic

growth, rising nationalism, and subscription to “dependency” theory, several Latin

American countries vigorously contested U.S. hegemony at international forums. As the

perception of the Cuban military threat declined, these non-communist nations expressed

sympathy for the Cuban Revolution, defied U.S. diplomatic design, and worked to lift the

1964 OAS sanctions on the island.123

Castro readily responded to this change in regional dynamics. Cuba’s major focus

shifted from assistance in Guevara-type guerilla movements to selective acceptance of

peaceful coexistence with non-communist countries. Cuba also took a cautious approach

in Chile, a major Cold War battleground in the early 1970s. Castro not only collaborated

with orthodox Soviet-line communist parties but also formed an intimate personal

relationship with Chilean leader Salvador Allende, notwithstanding their ideological

disagreement over the path toward socialism. Havana remained calm even after the

United States and Brazil played roles in subverting the Chilean Revolution. Instead of

122

Washington to all U.S. embassies in Central America and the Caribbean, February 16, 1972, in

folder “POL 33-6 Cuba/ Plataforma 1,” box 2221, Subject Numerical Files, 1970-1973, Record Group

59: Department of State Records (hereafter RG59), National Archives and Records Administration

(hereafter NARA). See also the next chapter.

123 Brands, Latin America’s, chap. 5. By 1975, Cuba reestablished diplomatic relations with Chile,

Peru, Argentina, Panama, Venezuela, and Colombia. Cuba also established diplomatic relations with

four of former British colonies—Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.

60

reacting violently, Havana drew a conclusion from this experience that the revolutionary

moment was nonexistent in Latin America. The Cuban government thus would need to

wait for better times ahead.124

As Cuba signaled its readiness to normalize relations with the United States,

expectations for a change in U.S. policy grew greater. In January 1974, when the Cuban

ambassador to Mexico implied that the only precondition for the opening of talks with the

United States was the lifting of the embargo, dozens of U.S. newspapers gave wide

coverage to this comment and issued editorials in favor of talks.125

In the U.S. Congress,

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed a resolution to demand the end of the

embargo and dispatched Pat M. Holt, its executive director, to Cuba for a fact-finding

mission.126

But more critical than this gradual erosion of the Cold War policy consensus

was Kissinger’s concern about U.S. standing in Latin America, where the second-term

Nixon administration had inaugurated a policy of “a new dialogue.”127

Between two

rounds of foreign minister-level-meetings in Mexico City in February and Washington in

April, he had received enormous pressure from his Latin American counterparts who

124

Harmer, Allende’s Chile.

125 British embassy in Washington to London, February 12, 1974, FCO 7/2650, PRO. British embassy

in Washington to H. M. Carless, May 7, 1974, FCO 7/2650, PRO. See also, NYT, April 24, 1974, p. 8.

126 On return, Holt released an eleven-page report on his visit to recommend that the United States

improve relations with Cuba. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Cuba: a Staff Report,

93rd Cong., 2nd sess., August 2, 1974.

127 This new policy initiative aimed for the expansion of trade, economic cooperation, and

technological innovations, as well as the multilateral resolution of outstanding political issues such as

the return of the Panama Canal. The Nixon and Ford administrations took the initiative of their own,

although their enthusiasm waned substantially later on and their rhetoric did not accompany practices.

National Security Decision Memorandum 257, June 10, 1974, available at

http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdm-nixon/nsdm_257.pdf (accessed February 26, 2015). For U.S.

views, see Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999), chaps. 23-24.

61

sought to involve Cuba in this new framework.128

Kissinger intensely disliked how smaller Latin American countries put him on the

defensive even as he sought greater dialogue with them. In July 1974, when Kissinger

and his staff discussed U.S. responses to Argentina’s continued advocacy for Cuba’s

participation in the foreign ministers’ meeting, Kissinger noted, “I don’t mind changing

our policy but I do mind being pushed.” U.S. policy was the domain of the United States,

not others. “If anybody gets credit for getting [Castro] there,” he continued, “it’s going to

be us. (Laughter.) I’m serious.” If the United States changed its policy, “let’s do it as our

own policy…I’m open-minded on Cuba, but we’ll do it at our own speed.” It was such

calculation of U.S. interests in light of changing global and regional dynamics that drew

Kissinger to the idea of exploring normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations.129

As the

Watergate scandal forced Nixon out of his presidency, Kissinger was ready to pursue

confidential talks with Castro.

Conclusion

The Cuban Revolution not only broke past relations with the United States, but

also marked the beginning of counterrevolution and deepening divisions of opinions

128

For example, Mexico’s Foreign Minister Emilio O. Rabasa asked Kissinger to invite Cubans to the

next foreign ministers’ meeting, saying that “every time we speak about this thing Cuba, Castro, or

somebody comes out and says we were instruments of the United States…And that hurts my national

pride.” Telcon (Rabasa, Kissinger), March 13, 1974, Digital National Security Archive (hereafter

DNSA). Kissinger and his aides discussed how to drive the Cuban issue away from the U.S. press

coverage of the meeting. “If these meetings get identified with Cuba,” Kissinger said, “they are dead.”

Secretary’s Staff Conference Minutes, April 10, 1974, esp. pp. 1-13, DNSA. See also, Kissinger, Years

of Renewal, chap. 23, esp. pp. 727-28.

129 State Department Staff Meeting Minutes, July 16, 1974, esp. 17-23, DNSA.

62

among the Cuban population. Much like the experience of the Cold War in Latin

America, Cuba’s radical changes yielded conflict between revolutionaries and

counterrevolutionaries. In the case of Cuba, however, this revolutionary-

counterrevolutionary dynamic migrated across the borders of nation-states, as opposition

to the revolution expanded from the island itself, became entrenched in the United States,

and continued political and military activities. Emigration made Cuba a rare exception to

the ultra-violent cycle of revolution and counterrevolution in Latin America. Yet along

with local and global developments, it also would help to prolong the Cuban strife.

By the mid-1970s, new momentum for a U.S.-Cuban rapprochement had

appeared to emerge. The United States halted its program of sponsoring Cuban

counterrevolutionary groups, whereas the revolutionary government remained firmly in

power, aligned with the Soviet Union, and increased its support among Latin American

countries. Yet, Washington and Havana pursued differing global interests. Although

Washington sought détente with communist countries such as China and the Soviet

Union, it did not intend to cede leadership over any part of the world to them. Havana

revised its approach to revolutionary movements in the Third World, but it did not

completely give up its devotion to the cause of national liberation. Until the very end of

the Cold War, the foreign policy interests of Washington and Havana clashed as part of

the Cold War in the Third World.

Due to its heavy geographical concentration, extraordinary economic growth, and

strong sense of political and cultural identity, the Miami Cuban community was destined

to play a critical role in U.S. relations with Cuba. Many opposed the Cuban government,

63

even as they felt betrayed by the U.S. government. Washington had provided refuge and

sponsored their movement, but it also had abandoned their cause during the Bay of Pigs,

the Cuban missile crisis, and Operation Mongoose. For them, any moderation of U.S.

hostility toward revolutionary Cuba was tantamount to an assault against their personal

pride. Some Miami Cubans appeared convinced that they should do everything possible,

including the indiscriminate use of violence, to continue their fight. As a result, this

legacy of violence endured far beyond U.S. policymakers’ original design.

64

CHAPTER 2: The Legacy of Violence

Realpolitik, Détente, and Counterrevolutionary Terrorism in the Caribbean, 1970-1976

In his speech almost fifteen years after the Bay of Pigs, José Miró Cardona called

the United States a “guardian of Castro.” As one of the most prominent Cuban opposition

leaders abroad, Miró Cardona would have become the provisional President of Cuba after

the U.S.-sponsored invasion. But he now charged the U.S. government with having

abandoned Cuban counterrevolutionaries in the middle of their fighting, pledged no-

invasion of his homeland during the Cuban missile crisis, and failed to isolate Cuban

communism from the rest of the world. To make matters worse, he added, the U.S. and

British governments defended Castro by preventing Cuban “patriots” from raiding

against the island. “If we are alone, absolutely alone…there is only one route left to

follow,” he proclaimed, “Violence? Yes, violence. We are obliged to do so.”130

Miró Cardona died in August 1974, but his advocacy for violence endured as an

ominous guidance for Miami Cubans. A series of sensational and embarrassing reports of

counterrevolutionary raids in 1970 prompted the U.S. government to change its attitudes

toward anti-Castro militants and intensify its efforts to curve their activities. For the time

being, however, the crackdown had the effect of radicalizing anti-Castro militants.

During the three years from 1974 to 1976 alone, they caused 202 incidents that affected

130

José Miró Cardona, Exaltación de José Martí (San Juan, Puerto Rico: Editora Horizontes de

América, 1974).

65

twenty-three countries—with 113 taking place inside the United States.131

Some

reportedly looked to the speech by Miró Cardona as an endorsement of their acts.132

This

development culminated in the October 6, 1976, bombing of a Cubana airliner near

Barbados, killing all seventy-three passengers and crew aboard. The Crime of Barbados

became the worst pre-9/11 aviation terrorist incident in the Western Hemisphere.

Previous studies have not examined the surge of anti-Castro terrorist incidents as

a critical component of U.S. relations with Cuba and the broader Caribbean. With its

focus on Washington’s relations with Havana, U.S. scholarship has not detailed shifting

U.S. relations with the military movement in Miami from 1970 to 1976 as a whole.133

Cuban scholarship has paid closer attention to the counterrevolutionary military

movement. Yet, a shortage of documentation developed somewhat dubious

interpretations of the phenomena, leading some to accuse the United States of

masterminding almost all incidents, including the October 1976 bombing.134

The existing

literature on the Cuban American community examines the surrounding political

131

José Luis Méndez Méndez, Los años del terror (1974-1976) (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias

Sociales, 2006), p. 2. For another attempt to calculate the number, see Carlos A. Forment, “Political

Practice and the Rise of an Ethnic Enclave: The Cuban American Case, 1959-1979,” Theory and

Society 18 (1989): 47-81.

132 Hilda Inclán, “Cardona Inspires Acción Cubana,” Miami News, March 22, 1974, in U.S. Senate,

Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act

and Other Internal Security Laws, Terroristic Activity: Terrorism in the Miami Area, 94th Cong., 2nd

sess., May 6, 1976.

133 Schoultz, Infernal; and LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel. Until today the 1976 incident itself

has attracted relatively little attention in the United States.

134 Carlos Rivero Collado, Los sobrinos del Tío Sam (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1976);

Méndez Méndez, Los años del terror; and Nicanor León Cotayo, Crimen en Barbados, 5ta ed.

(Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2006). For a more nuanced description, see Carlos Alzugaray

and Anthony C. E. Quainton, “Cuba-U.S. Relations: Terrorism Dimension,” Pensamiento Propio 34

(July-December 2011): 71-84.

66

atmosphere, motives of individual groups and leaders, and the community’s responses to

the wave of terrorism. The geographical scope of their analysis nonetheless remains

limited, making it difficult to treat the movement as a critical issue of international

security beyond the United States.135

Based on diplomatic and security intelligence sources in the United States and

elsewhere, this chapter moves its focus from Washington-Havana relations to the

important issue of how the U.S. government confronted the legacy of its commitment to

Cuban counterrevolution in Miami after it had given up overthrowing the Cuban

government through military means. By the mid-1970s, the U.S. government found it

almost inevitable to coexist with revolutionary Cuba, worked to curtail Miami Cuban

commando raids, and contemplated normalization of relations with the Caribbean island.

Yet, the U.S. government’s turnaround in Cuban policy also invited defiance by Miami

Cubans. U.S. dealings with Miami militants in turn proved far from satisfactory for

Cuban and international observers, especially after the surge of terror by anti-Castro

militants opposing U.S.-Cuban détente.136

This chapter argues that U.S.-Cuban normalization of relations required more than

the termination of U.S. sponsorship of counterrevolutionary groups. When Secretary of

State Henry Kissinger contemplated a major change in U.S. policy toward Cuba, he gave

little attention to thousands of Miami Cubans. Yet, once the militant groups escalated

135

García, Havana USA; Torres, Mirrors; and Prieto, Union City, pp. 120-25.

136 Scholars disagree over the definition of terrorism. Here, I broadly define terrorism as an act of

threat of violence designed to achieve a political objective. For a scholarly discussion, see Peter L.

Hahn, “Terrorism,” in Akira Iriye and Pierre-Yves Saunier, eds., The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

67

their “war,” the chain of terrorist incidents provoked a crisis of confidence among many

Caribbean countries that suspected the arrival of another secret U.S. machination against

revolutionary Cuba. Due to the past association with Cuban counterrevolution,

Washington’s denial of any U.S. responsibility for these acts proved difficult to accept.

Rather than ignoring its history, the U.S. government would have needed to confront the

legacy of violence—directly—not only to prevent the tragic events, but also to give

credibility to its claim of innocence.

The Meaning of “Terrorism”—A View from Havana

Reading of the Cuban records on terrorism is an emotionally difficult task for

historians unless they favor the indiscriminate use of violence. In a box named

“Terrorismo Chronología” (Chronology of Terrorism) at the Cuban foreign ministry

archive, there is a fifty-three-page list of bombings, killings, and attacks against the

Cuban people from 1959 to 2001. In 1959, there occurred 26 terrorist incidents and

attempts, killing 4 and injuring 54. In 1960, the list had 122 items, in which 124 were

dead, many missing, and 286 injured. In 1961, 246 died and 410 got injured. These

numbers turned downward after 1963. The number of victims decreased from 52 in 1963

to 18 in 1964, and to 2 in 1965. The annual number of casualties thereafter fluctuated

between 0 and 13—until 1976, the year when the Crime of Barbados took many

invaluable lives.137

137

This list has English, Spanish, and French versions. I use the English one for analysis. “Detailed

Chronological List of Terrorist Acts and Actions Committed against Cuba from 1959 to the Present

(English),” 2001, Caja “Terrorismo Chronología 1959-1999,” MINREX.

68

The number of the list may be open to question, as the Cuban government could

not identify individuals who conducted these terrorist incidents in many cases. The

Cuban government obviously used an expansive definition of “terrorism,” as it counted

the Bay of Pigs, a combat against counterrevolutionary forces, as such. But even those

who are skeptical of the entire claim by the revolutionary government may find the

following entries disturbing.

December 26, 1960. An explosive device blows up in the cafeteria of the Flogar

department store in Havana, wounding ffiteen people, including numerous minors.

November 25, 1961. Peasant Ricardo Díaz Rodríguez is murdered by a terrorist

gang in front of his wife and three small children in Trinidad, Sancti Spíritus.

July 2, 1962. Three peasants, one of whom was a woman, are murdered. A ten-year-

old girl and her mother were beaten as well, but they managed to escape while

being shot at.

July 21, 1963. A peasant in Jatibonico, Sancti Spíritus, is shot to death after his eyes

are gouged out.

November 13, 1965. A woman is wounded when a boat armed with 30 and 50 mm

machine guns opens fire on the coastline of the Havana neighborhood of Miramar.

69

The extensive nature of the list suggests that they are only small portion of the Cuban

experiences. As its entries continued until 2001, the list indicates that a series of

aggressions and attempts, often directed against civilians, continued far beyond the mid-

1960s, when the CIA stopped funding counterrevolutionary groups.138

The operations certainly antagonized Castro and millions of Cubans. If one thinks

that the Cuban leader allowed these terrorists to attack the island to direct the public

anger against Yankee imperialism, such reasoning is utterly wrong. His show of anger

appears in numerous historical records. In a secret speech before his comrades, for

example, Castro called the raid “a flagrant, public, extremely irritating activity,” whose

“moral damage” was “far greater” than the damage it actually caused. What the Cuban

leader resented most was not really about the raids themselves but about the lack of U.S.

actions deterring them, thereby allowing his enemies to act “with impunity.”139

Because

there was no public acknowledgement regarding the beginning and end of U.S. covert

operations, Havana perceived almost all attacks as a part of one plan directed or

condoned by Washington. For instance, a report from a Cuban intelligence officer claims

that Nixon sponsored a counterrevolutionary “invasion” plan in 1970 to “distract

economic efforts, human and military resources for the defense.”140

138

Ibid. Some individuals remain on payrolls but mainly for compensation for their earlier service.

139 Quoted in Blight and Brenner, Sad and Luminous, p. 66.

140 The author of this report refers to the Torriente Plan, which appears in the following sections. “IV.

La esperanza en los cambios internos,” n.d. (ca. 1973), pp. 8-9, in Caja “Bilateral 27,” MINREX. See

also, Blight and Brenner, Sad and Luminous, pp. 17, 161. For comments on this issue by Cuba’s

Interior Ministry Sergio del Valle, see British embassy in Havana to London, August 12, 1970, FCO

44/372, PRO.

70

The Year of Invasion?

In April 1969, the U.S. State Department studied the feasibility of using Miami

Cubans for covert actions. The review offered nothing surprising. It confirmed the

inconvenient reality that over four hundred operations during the years from 1961 to

1967 were counterproductive. They not only “consolidated internal support of Castro”

but also increased “international sympathy for the Cuban regime.” Few Cubans inside the

island would take up arms against Castro. The Cuban government became an “extremely

formidable target” for paramilitary operations from abroad because it not only established

an “almost hermetic” internal security system, but also enjoyed “solid support” from “key

power groups—military, youth and peasants.” Anti-Castro activists and militants already

had left for the United States. “Unfortunately,” however, these counterrevolutionary

elements abroad “suffered from the same decline in operational effectiveness” that

“typically affects exile movements with the passage of time.”141

Militant groups simply did not disappear. A CIA report noted that their

commando raids hardly mobilized internal revolts in Cuba, since their potential

supporters either had left Cuba or prepared to leave.142

But many Miami Cubans thought

differently. For some, Havana’s 1970 failure of the Ten-Million-Ton Sugar Harvest

campaign presented an ideal opportunity for an “invasion.” The State Department was

aware that the three groups were particularly active. The Representación Cubana del

141

Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee, April 26, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-10: Doc.

no. 200. For U.S. views, see also Memcon (Campora, Funseth), April 9, 1970, in folder “POL 33-6

Cuba/ Plataforma 1,” box 2221, Subject Numerical Files, 1970-1973, RG59, NARA.

142 CIA Intelligence Report, April 1970, CIA Records Search Tool (hereafter CREST), NARA.

71

Exilio (RECE) was trying to enlist the support of the Panamanian government to set up a

camp for clandestine operations in Cuba.143

Its rationale was to get around the Neutrality

Act of 1917, which prohibited persons in the United States from knowingly financing,

organizing, or carrying out hostile expeditions against foreign powers with which the

United States was at peace.

Another group led by José Elias de la Torriente, a naturalized U.S. citizen of

Cuban origin, promoted the so-called Torriente Plan, a pledge of a military invasion of

Cuba by the end of the year 1970. In his conversation with Matthew D. Smith Jr., the U.S.

State Department’s point man in Miami, Torriente was confident. He assured that even a

military confrontation would be unnecessary since Castro was weak. “The Castro regime,

including the military,” he said, “is riddled with anti-Castro patriots who await the proper

opportunity to finish the regime once and for all.” The exile military was merely a

catalyst to instigate a radical change. When Smith said something to the contrary,

Torriente insisted that U.S. intelligence was as mistaken about Cuba as in the wake of the

1961 Bay of Pigs invasion—this time by underestimating popular dissatisfaction. In his

view, “90 percent” of the Cubans” were waiting for their return.144

Torriente kept

preparing for military expeditions and toured Latin America for support, notwithstanding

143

U.S. embassy in Panama to Washington, January 22, 1970, in folder “POL 33-6 Cuba/ Plataforma

1,” box 2221, Subject Numerical Files, 1970-1973, RG59, NARA.

144 Memcon (Torriente, Smith), “PLAN TORRIENTE,” April 1, 1970, in folder “POL 33-6 Cuba/

Plataforma 1,” box 2221, Subject Numerical Files, 1970-1973, RG59, NARA. Smith’s official title is

U.S. State Department’s Director of Miami Office of the Coordination of Cuban Affairs. He was in

constant touch with Miami Cuban leaders and monitored their activities.

72

repeated U.S. declarations of enforcing neutrality laws.145

The United States, Britain, and Alpha 66

Even more reckless than Torriente was Alpha 66, the third group that pursued an

invasion plan. In April 1970, the group in fact landed its men near Baracoa, an eastern

city of Cuba, and killed five soldiers. Castro arrested them and accused the United States

of “organizing troops of mercenaries.”146

As the news spread across the world, Henry

Kissinger’s aide Viron P. Vaky called for action against the anti-Castro group. “Present

activity is a technical violation of U.S. law [of neutrality] and of international law,” wrote

Vaky. If condoned, Castro might take it as a “deliberate” Washington effort to “increase

pressure” on Havana.147

In another memo to Kissinger, Vaky argued that the raids could

“provoke a Cuban retaliation action which in my judgment we neither want nor are we

prepared for.” But it was Richard Nixon who vetoed Vaky’s recommendation. On the

margin of the memo Kissinger wrote: “No formal action. [I] have discussed [this matter]

with Pres. [Nixon].” Washington virtually let loose the raiders by taking no actions.148

145

Office of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State to the Assistant Secretary for Inter-

American Affairs, August 14, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-10: Doc. no. 223.

146 Speech by Fidel Castro, April 19, 1970, Discursos e intervenciones del Comandante en Jefé Fidel

Castro Ruz (hereafter Discursos). For an insider story of Alpha 66, see Miguel L. Talleda, Alpha 66 y

su histórica tarea (Miami, FL: Ediciones Universal, 1995), chaps. 10-11.

147 Vaky to Kissinger, April 28, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-10: Doc. no. 216. For its media

coverage, see NYT, April 20, 1970, p. 1.

148 Vaky to Kissinger, April 30, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-10: Doc. no. 217. See its footnote for

the response by Kissinger. Scholars have suspected that Nixon sought to unleash raids against Cuba in

later years. Schoultz, Infernal, p. 248; and LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, p. 120. This

record shows that the U.S. president actually did so in April 1970.

73

It was only a week after this decision that Alpha 66 caused another sensational

incident. This time the group blew up two Cuban fishing boats, kidnapped eleven crew

members at a Bahamian islet, and demanded the release of their members from Cuban

jails. Although Alpha 66 eventually released the hostages, Cuba’s reactions were volatile.

Tens of thousands of Cubans demonstrated in front of the Swiss embassy in Havana,

which represented U.S. interests in Cuba in the absence of U.S.-Cuban diplomatic

relations. In a major speech on May 20, 1970, Castro kept attacking Switzerland since its

foreign minister implied that Havana dramatized the issue to deflect attention from the

failure of the Ten-Million-Ton Sugar Harvest campaign. Castro attributed the source of

this thesis to the CIA. He claimed that the “dirty methods of intrigue” were nonsense,

immoral, and stupid enough “to expect that this country will…accept the right of

kidnapping the fishermen” by its foes abroad.149

The rising tensions across the Florida Straits inadvertently gave a spotlight to

London, as Castro verbally attacked the British governor of the Bahamas. The British

Empire held thousands of Caribbean islands and assumed responsibility for their external

defense and internal security. But along with financial difficulties, the geographical

reality that around seven hundred Bahamian islands scattered over fifty thousand square

miles of the Atlantic made the implementation of this mission almost impossible.150

149

Speech by Fidel Castro, May 20, 1970, Castro Speech Data Base, Latin American Network

Information Center (hereafter LANIC). The tendency to view Cuba’s reaction to the kidnapping as a

deliberate propaganda effort remains strong. For the latest version, see Lillian Guerra’s award-winning

book, Visions of Power, pp. 308-15. Guerra claims that Fidel “tried to distract the public by

spotlighting” this event.

150 The Bahamian Patrol was only one of many responsibilities that the British Defense Ministry

assumed in the Caribbean. The ministry had to deal with disaster relief, perform military exercises,

promote naval sales, undertake periodic military training, and prepare for the Falkland Islands in case

74

Nevertheless, Castro called the governor “a liar” and denouced him for having allowed

Alpha 66 to use the British colonies as launching pads for the raids. He also threatened to

take unilateral measures against the “mercenaries” next time they entered the Bahamas.151

“If we get into a slashing match the Cubans will always win,” quibbled Richard Sykes,

the British ambassador in Havana, “if only because they are prepared to resort to grosser

terms than Her Majesty’s Government would countenance.”152

Despite such misgivings, however, Britain showed a degree of understanding for

Cuba’s plight. Recalling that Castro repeatedly cursed the CIA in his presence, Sykes

came to a conviction that the Cuban leader was “genuinely” angry about the raids. In his

view, moreover, the U.S. denial of responsibility was “a Bronx cheer.” Even though he

was aware of political sensitivity and legal limits, the ambassador found it difficult to

believe that the Americans were unable to control the raiders. The ambassador requested

urgent actions in London. “Isn’t there a danger that Alpha 66, realizing how simple it is

to interfere with the Cuban fishing fleet, may try to repeat the operation?” he asked. “If

so, the next time might be all too soon. I hope we can put this strongly to the

of emergency. They also had to protect significant U.S. interests in some of the British Caribbean.

Chief of Staff Committee, Defense Operational Planning Staff, “British Capability to Meet

Commitments in the Caribbean Area,” August 1970, Records of the Ministry of Defence (hereafter

DEFE) 11/886, PRO. This information was for British Eyes Only.

151 Cuba had no interest in the cays, but “if they cannot take care of, we make an offer with pleasure to

take care of the cays, at least in front of the mercenaries.” Speech by Fidel Castro, May 19, 1970,

Discursos. On this point, see also Communique by Fidel Castro (published in Granma, May 13,

1970), FCO 7/1603, PRO.

152 British embassy in Havana to London, May 20, 1970, FCO 7/1603, PRO.

75

Americans.”153

Even the insulted governor in the Bahamas urged London to reinforce

British forces and the Bahamas police.154

London did what it could do to persuade Havana that it was serious about the

raids. Despite repeated requests, the increase of border patrols turned out to be financially

infeasible.155

Yet, the governor of the Bahamas consulted with the Bahamian Prime

Minister to pass an amendment to the penal code, specifically designed to deter the use of

the Bahama territory for international aggressions.156

British diplomats conveyed their

concerns to their American counterparts, listened to what they had to say, and reminded

them that “similar incidents would embarrass all.”157

In early August, London sent

Commodore David Roome, the Senior Naval Officer, West Indies (SNOWI), to Havana.

This unprecedented gesture toward Cuba aimed to remove “any Cuban misapprehensions

as to our determination to patrol the Bahamas.”158

The visit was “worthwhile,” the

ambassador reported. Although the raids continued, Havana rarely attacked Britain

153

British embassy in Havana to Hayman, May 20, 1970, FCO 7/1603, PRO.

154 Governor of the Bahamas to London, May 29, 1970, FCO 44/372, PRO. See the attached paper,

“Possibility of Increased Measures to Deter Cuban Encroachment in the Bahamas,” May 20, 1970.

155 The frequency of patrol flights actually dropped since October. SNOWI to British Defense

Ministry, August 7, 1970; Governor of the Bahamas to London, August 9, 1970; Governor of the

Bahamas to London, September 24, 1970; A. B. Urwick to A. G. Rucker, October 5, 1970; British

Defense Ministry to SNOWI, October 8, 1970; London to the Governor of the Bahamas, October 16,

1970, all in FCO 44/372, PRO; and Governor of the Bahamas to London, November 25, 1970, FCO

44/373, PRO.

156 Governor of the Bahamas to London, October 16, 1970; Governor of the Bahamas to London,

October 22, 1970; Governor of the Bahamas to Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth

Affairs, October 26, 1970, all in FCO 44/373, PRO.

157 Sykes himself visited Washington and talked with State Department and CIA officials. British

embassy in Havana to London, June 16, 1970, FCO 44/372, PRO.

158 British embassy in Havana to London, May 14, 1970; British embassy in Havana to Hayman

(Telegram 226), May 26, 1970; C. D. Wiggin (American Department) to Hankey and Renwick, June

2, 1970; London to British embassy in Havana, June 3, 1970; London to British embassy in Havana,

June 8, 1970, all in FCO 7/1603, PRO.

76

thereafter.159

Opposing the Invasion Plans

The United States did not make any gesture toward Cuba, even though it hardened

its stance against the counterrevolutionary raids. After the May 1970 kidnapping,

Washington determined these expeditions by Cuban emigres were “counterproductive,”

simply providing Castro with propaganda opportunities. Washington also considered

their activities as embarrassing, troublesome for friendly nations like Britain, and harmful

to their “credibility as a nation of laws.”160

Based on this judgment, the State Department

reiterated to representatives of various Miami Cuban organizations that the U.S.

government would enforce its laws. “If there is sufficient evidence of activity based in

the United States for any such military expedition,” it stated, “then the fact that a third

country might be used as a staging area would not preclude the United States from

proceeding to enforce its laws.”161

The FBI targeted Alpha 66 for serious investigation.

According to an insider-story of Alpha 66, the group finally encountered “fierce

prosecution” by U.S. authorities.162

159

Cuba apparently welcomed this unprecedented gesture, as both Interior and Foreign Ministers

received the SNOWI. British embassy in Havana to London, August 5, 1970; and British embassy in

Havana to London, August 12, 1970, both in FCO 44/372, PRO. The SNOWI also found the visit

“most friendly.” SNOWI to Defense Ministry in London, August 18, 1970, DEFE 11/886, PRO.

160 Paper Prepared in the Department of State, “Current U.S. Policy toward Cuban Exile Groups in the

US who Undertake Actions against Cuba,” July 13, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XII: Doc. no.

240.

161 “Taking Points Paper for discussions with Cuban exiles and selected members of the press in

Miami,” May 13-15, 1970, in folder “POL 30-2 Cuba,” box 2221, Subject Numerical Files, 1970-

1973, RG59, NARA. See also, Talleda, Alpha 66, pp. 97-99; and NYT, May 27, 1970, p. 29.

162 This quote is from Talleda, Alpha 66, p. 101.

77

The perceived turnaround in U.S. attitudes angered anti-Castro activists in Miami.

For Jorge Mas Canosa, “military leader” of RECE, the decision represented “a historical

contradiction.” After Smith briefed him of Washington’s intent of enforcing neutrality

laws, Mas Canosa pointed out that the U.S. government “obviously” had broken the same

laws by sponsoring the Bay of Pigs invasion. “Now you tell me that the United States

will not permit any similar expeditions to be mounted on U.S. soil even without U.S. aid

and assistance,” he said. “Why [do you make] this change of policy? Has the U.S.

government decided to abandon Cuba to communism?” Mas Canosa warned that the

policy would not only alienate the Cuban community but also generate more defiance and

disturbances. Although he agreed to convey the message to RECE members, he pledged

that it could not give up the hope of overthrowing the Castro regime.163

Torriente reacted somewhat differently. At first, his group pretended that there

was no conflict of interests with the U.S. government. In August 1970, when he met with

Smith, Torriente boasted that Castro would face public apathy, absenteeism, and disorder

within a couple of months and that he would exploit this situation by using infiltration,

sabotage, and military actions against Soviet installations and ships. But when Smith

repeated the U.S. intention of enforcing neutrality laws, he suddenly realized that the U.S.

government would block his plan. With tears in his eyes, Torriente denounced the U.S.

policy as “mistaken.” The stated policy, he claimed, was not valid since it did not

interpret the U.S. laws correctly. Neither was it applicable to their action in a third

country. If the United States nonetheless tried to prevent their war against Castro, he said,

163

Memcon (Smith, Mas Canosa), May 19, 1970, in folder “POL 30-2 Cuba,” box 2221, Subject

Numerical Files, 1970-1973, RG59, NARA.

78

“We will have no option but to resist such interference with force if necessary.” He

swore, “We will fight Castro whether you are with us or against us.”164

The invasion

never materialized, however.

Unknown to Torriente, there was another reason why Washington maintained its

opposition to the invasion. In August 1970, Washington received a Soviet note of protest

urging it to “strictly adhere” to the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding.165

According to Kissinger’s memoir, Moscow used this exchange to cover the deployment

of submarines to Cienfuegos, Cuba, which later caused a superpower diplomatic

showdown.166

Yet declassified U.S. records also suggest that by persistently raising

concerns about the invasion plans in Miami, Moscow effectively persuaded Washington

to expand the understanding to include U.S. curtailment of counterrevolutionary

forces.167

A month after the Soviet note, Kissinger approved a cable to inform Guatemala,

Nicaragua, and Costa Rica that Washington did neither support nor encourage the

invasion plan by Torriente. This initiative partly aimed to reassure the Soviets of “our

intention to abide by the 1962 understanding on Cuba.”168

164

Memcon (Torriente, Smith), August 31, 1970, in folder “POL 33-6 Cuba/ Plataforma 1,” box 2221,

Subject Numerical Files, 1970-1973, RG59, NARA.

165 A Soviet note, attached to Memcon (Kissinger, Vorontsov), August 4, 1970, DNSA.

166 Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 632-33.

167 Moscow repeated their interpretation of the 1962 understanding to that effect. See Memcon

(Kissinger, Dobrynin), October 6, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XII: Doc. no. 224; and Memcon

(Kissinger, Dobrynin), October 23, 1970, pp. 3-4, DNSA.

168 Arnold Nachmanoff (National Security Council Staff) to Kissinger, November 25, 1970, FRUS,

1969-1976, Vol. XII: Doc. no. 233. The telegram was sent on December 21. When the Carter

administration reviewed anti-Castro terrorism, it acknowledged that the issue had two aspects—U.S.

inability to control the terrorists and the “linkage of a U.S. non-aggression pledge to Soviet-Cuban

military ties.” It is obvious that the latter concerned the 1962 understanding. Paper, Presidential

79

In the November 1972 study of anti-Castro paramilitary operations, the CIA

confirmed that the U.S. “current policy” was “to interdict exile groups who attempt to

mount paramilitary operations against Cuba from U.S. territory.”169

As such, in February

1973, when Washington reached a five-year agreement with Havana on the prevention of

hijackings, it allowed Havana to include an article requiring the United States to

prosecute those who conspired, prepared, and executed “acts of violence or depredation

against aircraft or vessels.”170

Yet, the agreement did not solve the issue as Cuba

repeatedly denounced U.S. non-compliance with it. For instance, in April 1976, when a

Cuban militant group sank two Cuban fishing boats, killing one crewmember, an angry

Castro warned that Havana would cancel the agreement unless Washington prevented

similar aggressions.171

The U.S. capability of restraining Miami militants became even

more dubious in light of a surge of terrorism that occurred in response to Kissinger’s

attempt at dialogue with Cuba.

Henry Kissinger’s Realpolitik—U.S. Détente with Cuba

On March 1, 1975, Kissinger made a major speech on U.S. relations with Latin

America in Houston, Texas. Having outlined his aspiration to engage in “new dialogue”

Review Memorandum/ NSC-17, attached to Habib to Vance, March 7, 1977, in folder “3/1-3/15/77,”

box 2, Anthony Lake Papers, RG59, NARA.

169 Paper Prepared in the CIA, n.d., FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XII: Doc. no. 266.

170 Text of the agreement, in folder “Cuba-Hijacking,” box 2, National Security Adviser (hereafter

NSA): NSC-Latin American Affairs Staff Files (hereafter NSC-LAASF), GFL.

171 Speech by Fidel Castro, April 19, 1976, Discursos. The Cuban government also charged the U.S.

government with its inability to prosecute Cuban hijackers who forcefully seized vessels to arrive in

U.S. shores. See for example, MINREX to Swiss embassy in Havana, August 25, 1973; and MINREX

to Swiss embassy in Havana, August 2, 1976, both in MINREX.

80

with Latin America, the secretary of state suggested that the United States should work

together with its southern neighbors on three major issues—the Panama Canal, Cuba, and

economic relations. On Cuba, Kissinger commented that the communist neighbor no

longer posed a threat to Latin America, leading the OAS countries to review the 1964

sanctions against trade and diplomatic contact with the island. If the OAS lifted the

sanctions, he stated, “the United States will consider changes in its bilateral relations with

Cuba…We see no virtue in perpetual antagonism between the United States and

Cuba.”172

The speech provoked massive protests from Cold War warriors, including

numerous anti-Castro activists in Miami. Ominously enough, the FBI received

information indicating that the latters’ reaction would be “violent.”173

As Cuban and U.S. scholars have written, Kissinger already had initiated his talks

with Castro over six months before this speech. In June 1974, Kissinger sent an unsigned

note to Castro, leading to the opening of U.S.-Cuban secret talks exploring normalization

of relations. In January 1975, the first preliminary talks took place at La Guardia airport

in New York, where Kissinger’s personal aide, Lawrence Eagleburger, met Ramón

Sánchez-Parodi, Cuba’s special envoy, and Néstor García Iturbe, first secretary of the

Cuban mission to the United Nations. In July, four months after Kissinger’s speech, the

U.S. assistant secretary of state William P. Rogers joined them to hold another meeting to

discuss numerous bilateral issues such as the U.S. embargo, compensation of nationalized

172

Speech by Kissinger, Department of State Bulletin (hereafter DOSB), March 24, 1975, pp. 361-69.

173 For FBI’s information, see Information note for Kissinger, March 4, 1975, in folder “3/4/1975,”

box 5, National Security Adviser (hereafter NSA): White House Situation Room (hereafter WHSR):

Presidential Daily Briefings Files, GFL. On letters by Miami Cubans, see Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 263-

65.

81

U.S. properties, the release of prisoners, emigration and family visits, and foreign

policies. Then, following the OAS decision to end the 1964 collective sanctions against

Cuba in San José, Costa Rica, Washington exempted subsidiaries of U.S. companies

abroad from the U.S. embargo against trading with Cuba.174

In hindsight, Kissinger’s attempt at dialogue was doomed to fail. Unlike

counterrevolutionary activists, Kissinger had no interest in the internal affairs of Cuba.

As he explained in his memoir, his offer to Castro was essentially “noninterference by the

United States in Cuba’s domestic arrangements” in return for Cuba’s change in foreign

policy, including its end of an alliance with the Soviet Union and Third World

revolutionaries.175

But these conditions were far from acceptable to the Cuban leader,

who had little intention of changing its external policy merely in exchange for U.S.-

Cuban détente. In his eyes, Washington was too arrogant and presumptuous in trying to

dictate Cuba’s foreign policy, when Cuba did not demand any change in U.S. foreign

policy elsewhere. Cuba did not demand the end of U.S. alliances with any nations nor ask

for the removal of U.S. troops from any part of the world.176

Moreover, as Washington maintained and used the embargo as the most important

U.S. leverage to extract foreign policy concessions from Cuba, Havana saw Kissinger’s

174

Ramírez Cañedo and Morales, De la confrontación, chap. 3; ídem., De la confrontación, 2da

edición ampliada, chap. 3; and LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, pp. 126-143. Also

informative is Néstor García Iturbe, Diplomacia sin sombra (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales,

2007). For details on third-country subsidiary issues, see Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 271-74.

175 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, pp. 770, 787. See also, Memcon, July 9, 1975, in Pastor to Brzezinski,

March 7, 1977, in folder “Cuba 2/78-4/78,” box 10, Geographical Files (hereafter GF), Zbigniew

Brzezinski Collection (hereafter ZBC), JCL.

176 Ramírez Cañedo and Morales, De la confrontación, p. 76; and LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back

Channel, p. 151.

82

realpolitik as immoral and insensitive to its claim to national sovereignty. Using the

embargo as a diplomatic tool was to demand a concession with a dagger in the neck, as

the Cuban leader often claimed. In conversations with U.S. negotiators, his

representatives demanded that the United States unconditionally “relaxed” the economic

blockade—at least partially on food and medicines—before the start of any formal

bilateral negotiations. The U.S. refusal to consider this request then antagonized the

revolutionary government and virtually stalled progress in the talks.177

One may also note

that Cuba in the mid-1970s was not impatient at all. Its economy benefited from the

historically high sugar prices and seemed to “keep growing” without opening trade with

the United States.178

U.S.-Cuban clashes of foreign policy interests were almost inevitable. Having

entered into an open debate over Puerto Rico, the two countries disputed most

vehemently over Cuba’s roles in Angola since November 1975. In response to South

African aggression against the Angolan government in Luanda, Cuba sent a large

expeditionary force numbering over 30,000 to its assistance without consulting

Moscow.179

This development in Africa greatly disturbed Ford and Kissinger, who

looked to Cuba, rather than apartheid South Africa, as a major destabilizing force in the

region. As U.S. officials worried about the possibility that the Cubans would spread the

177

For Cuba’s views, see Eagleburger to Kissinger, “Meeting in New York with Cuban

Representatives,” January 11, 1975, in Pastor to Brzezinski, March 7, 1977, in folder “Cuba 2/78-

4/78,” box 10, GF, ZBC, JCL.

178 Fidel instructed the Cuban delegation to emphasize this point. “Chronología de hechos referidos a

los acercamientos de EE. UU. a Cuba con el pronóstico de mejorar las relaciones bilaterales y las

repuestas de Cuba (junio de 1974-febrero de 1977),” pp. 7-8, cited in Ramírez Cañedo and Morales,

De la confrontación, 2da edición ampliada, pp. 95-96.

179 For details of Cuba’s intervention in Angola, see Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions.

83

war beyond Angola, Kissinger even considered contingency plans for a naval blockade

and military action against Cuba.180

Working with Venezuela, the U.S. secretary of state

also coordinated diplomatic pressure on the Caribbean countries, especially Guyana, to

stop Cuban forces from using their territory as transit sites to Africa.181

Furthermore, as the 1976 presidential election approached, Gerald Ford shifted

attention from Havana to Miami.182

Unlike Nixon, Ford generally disregarded strong

anti-Castro sentiment in Miami before undertaking a new initiative in Cuba. He neither

targeted Miami Cubans in his incipient Hispanic outreach strategy nor intervened in the

old bitter infighting between the two camps of Cuban American Republicans.183

Yet, as

his rival Ronald Reagan campaigned intensively in Florida, the U.S. president realized

that their votes grew increasingly more important for winning this crucial state. Trying to

justify his previous policy, Ford asked Castro to consider family reunification as an

important gesture toward the United States.184

Yet, when Havana made only a minor

concession allowing a small number of Cuban Americans to visit the island, Ford made a

180

LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, pp. 148-150.

181 U.S. embassy in Georgetown to Washington, December 24, 1975; Kissinger to U.S. embassy in

Georgetown, December 24, 1975; U.S. embassy in Georgetown to Kissinger, December 24, 1975;

U.S. embassy in Georgetown to Kissinger, December 27, 1975; U.S. embassy in Georgetown to

Kissinger, December 31, 1975; and Kissinger to U.S. embassy in Georgetown, February 16, 1976, all

in Central Foreign Policy Files, Record Group 59, Access to Archival Databases at the National

Archives (hereafter DOS-CFP). For Venezuela, see U.S. embassy in Caracas to Kissinger, January 2,

1976, DOS-CFP.

182 Latinos, mostly of Cuban origin, made up about 15 percent of registered voters of the most

populous Dade County. For the first time the ballots in Dade County were printed in Spanish as well

as English. NYT, March 10, 1976, pp. 1, 19.

183 See for example, NYT, May 28, 1976, p. 53; and Lilian M. Giberga to Ford, April 6, 1976, in folder

“Cuba Policy (3),” box 3, OPL: Thomas Aranda Files, GFL.

184 “U.S. Policy towards Cuba,” n.d., in folder “Cuba,” box 6, Staff Secretary’s Office: Presidential

Handwritten Files, GFL.

84

major speech in Miami, attacking Cuban policy in Angola and calling the Cuban leader

“an international outlaw.”185

Almost everyone knew that the U.S. president was courting

Miami Cuban votes.186

Ford failed to gain the majority of their votes, although he

managed to win the Republican primary in Florida.

Terrorism Made in U.S.A.

Following the break of Cuba’s isolation in the Western Hemisphere, the Ford

administration encountered more than electoral backlash in Miami. As María Cristina

García notes, many émigrés believed that normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations was “an

endorsement of Castro-communism.”187

In order to prevent a U.S.-Cuban rapprochement,

a few conspired for military raids against Cuba, even though it was even more difficult to

get around the increased U.S. surveillance since May 1970. Many sent letters of protest,

marched in the street, and passed a resolution against U.S.-Cuban détente, yet they hardly

reached the president’s desk.188

There also were activists like RECE’s leader Jorge Mas

Canosa, who proposed that their followers “look for friends and allies” in the United

States, instead of continuing military raids. His organization courted seventeen U.S.

185

Speech by Ford, February 28, 1976, APP. Cuba allowed approximately 60 persons per week to

return to the island for a ten-day visit on strictly humanitarian bases. García Iturbe, Diplomacia sin sombra, p. 75.

186 For Cuba’s views, García Iturbe, Diplomacia sin sombra, pp. 69-71; and Speech by Fidel Castro,

April 19, 1976, Discursos. For British views, British embassy in Washington to London, March 8,

1976, FCO 7/3124, PRO. In their talks with British counterparts, U.S. officials admitted the existence

of electoral concerns.

187 García, Havana USA, p. 139.

188 See for example, José Manuel Casanova to Ford, March 17, 1975, in folder “Cuba-Congressional

(1),” box 2, NSA: NSC-LAASF, GFL; and Casanova to Ford, March 17, 1975, in folder “U.S.-Cuban

Relations—Correspondence,” box 5, OPL: Fernando De Baca Files, GFL.

85

senators like Richard Stone and Jesse Helms to form the “Americans for a Free Cuba,” an

anti-Castro caucus in the U.S. Congress.189

But it would take half a decade until their

lobbying in Washington achieved more than symbolic acts.

Not all Miami Cubans rejected dialogue. Some expressed hopes that Ford

addressed humanitarian issues such as the release of Cuban prisoners and family

reunification.190

Many more ordinary Cuban émigrés sought information about how

changes in diplomatic relations would affect their lives. Thousands of letters asking for

consular service flooded into the Czech embassy in Washington, which represented

Cuban interests in the United States in the absence of U.S.-Cuban diplomatic relations.

Topics of inquiries ranged from the benefit of seeking a Cuban passport, customs

regulations in Cuba, the possibility of exchanging foreign currencies for pesos, and flight

schedules from Mexico, Jamaica, and Barbados to Havana.191

The nature of these

questions reveals that a substantial number of émigrés anticipated an opportunity to visit

their families in Cuba, whom they had not met since they had left the island.

Yet, of all variances in Miami’s reactions to Kissinger’s realpolitik, none was

more striking than the startling increase of terrorist acts. By denouncing what they saw as

capricious U.S. attitudes, extremist groups resorted to indiscriminate violence—terror—

as a political tool to pursue what they claimed as a “revolutionary” cause. Anti-Castro

189

RECE, December 1974, pp. 6-8; RECE, November, 1975, pp. 6-7; and Diarios Las Américas,

November 15, 1975, p .1.

190 See for example, Memcon, “Cuban Exiles,” February 26, 1975; and Memcon, “Exile Attitudes on

U.S.-Cuban Relations,” April 14, 1975, both in folder “U.S.-Cuban Relations (2),” box 5, OPL:

Fernando De Baca Files, GFL.

191 Rudolf Hromádka to Lourdes Urrutia Rodríguez (chief of the Office of Minister, MINREX),

March 10, 1975, Caja “Migratorios 4,” MINREX.

86

terrorism had appeared since the early 1960s, and broadened the scope of its activities

trailing the expansion of Cuba’s diplomatic and commercial relations. Between March

1972 and August 1976, the Frente de Liberación Nacional de Cuba (FLNC) engaged in

more than 39 terrorist acts in the United States, Mexico, Costa Rica, Colombia, and other

nations.192

The group considered Cuban diplomatic representatives and “all forms of

commercial and technical exchange with the Castro regime” as “military objectives.”193

The FLNC celebrated an “internationalized anticommunist fight,” speaking of “glory”

and “passion for liberty.”194

There were many more such organizations. Acción Cubana was led by Orland

Bosch, a long-time practitioner of violence as a justifiable means to achieve political ends.

“The fight for Cuba’s liberty obliged us to marry with actions and violence,” he claimed.

Referring to the Cuban government’s “tyranny” and the U.S. government’s “betrayal,”

Bosch called violence “the only path” toward Cuba’s liberty.195

Once imprisoned in the

United States, Bosch violated parole in 1972, leaving the United States without

authorization. Having turned himself into an international fugitive, he established the

Acción Cubana, which took credit for numerous terrorist acts in Mexico, Panama,

192

Miami to FBI Director, August 25, 1976, in Miscellaneous Box 2A, HSCA Subject Files: Orlando

Bosch Avila, JFK Assassination Records Collection (hereafter JFK), NARA.

193 FLNC, Mensaje, June 21, 1974, in folder “FLNC,” box 1, Antonio Arias Collection, University of

Miami Libraries’ Cuban Heritage Collection (hereafter UM-CHC). The message was sent to a local

Miami radio station.

194 FLNC, Mensaje al Pueblo Cubano, December 1974, with its attachment, in folder “FLNC,” box 1,

Antonio Arias Collection, UM-CHC.

195 Bosch, “Terrorism cubano,” January 1977, folder “Orlando Bosch,” box 1, Antonio Arias

Collection, UM-CHC. For a Cuban scholar’s account, see Méndez Méndez, Los años del terror, pp.

88-89.

87

Venezuela, and France, among others.196

There also emerged Omega 7, which not only

engaged in terrorist acts in the United States, but also became involved in drug-

trafficking.197

Some organizations like the Movimiento Nacionalista Cubano enjoyed

intimate connections with the Chilean military dictatorship, with which it agreed to

terrorize their common enemies. The pact resulted in the 1976 assassination of Orlando

Letelier, a former Chilean ambassador to the United States, in Washington, D.C.198

The growth of international anticommunist terrorism was a headache for law

enforcement authorities in targeted countries like Mexico, a leading voice for Cuba’s

reengagement in inter-American affairs. Luis de la Barrera Moreno, director of Mexico’s

intelligence agency DFS, noted that FLNC agents were infiltrating from South Florida. In

response, he recommended that Mexican officials verify if U.S. passport-holders with

Latina/o surnames were of Cuban origin, undertake complete inspection of their personal

belongings, and search for documents that might be used as “letter bombs.”199

Within a

month, however, FLNC bombed the Cuban consulate in Mérida, Yucatán.200

In

November 1974 alone, thirteen bombs exploded in three cities. Two months later, the

196

Acción Cubana, Communique, December 1974, in folder “Acción Cubana,” box 1, Antonio Arias

Collection, UM-CHC.

197 Cuba Update 5, no. 5 (Fall 1984), pp. 4, 6.

198 Dinges and Landau, Assassination, pp. 149, 265; and Ariel C. Armony, Argentina, the United

States, and the Anti-Communist Crusade in Central America, 1977-1984 (Athens: Ohio University

Center for International Studies, 1997), pp. 26-29.

199 De la Barrera Moreno, “FLNC,” April 15, 1974, expediente 76-3-74, legajo 6, hoja 3-5, DFS,

AGN.

200 FLNC, Comunicado #10, May 14, 1974, in folder “FLNC,” box 1, Antonio Arias Collection, UM-

CHC.

88

bombings killed five people and injured twenty-seven in three Mexican cities.201

“Loose” System of Counterterrorism

Terrorism also posed an acute problem for U.S. authorities, as some militants

used violence against each other. In Miami alone, four homicides and at least fifty-five

bomb explosions took place from late 1974 to May 1976.202

José Elias de la Torriente,

whose plan for an invasion of Cuba did not materialize, was assassinated in April 1974.

Some other political figures encountered similar fates, and the names of more individuals,

including RECE’s Mas Canosa, appeared on a black list circulated in Miami.203

In April

1976, when Emilio Milián, one of the most popular Cuban American radio personalities,

voiced against terrorism, he also was bombed and lost both legs. A month later the FBI

and Miami police arrested Antonio de la Cova and two others for their attempts to place a

bomb at a pornography store. The FBI also indicted Roland Otero for eight bombings,

including the one of the proper FBI office in Miami. Yet, the overwhelming majority of

cases remained unresolved.204

The cases of bombings, threats, and assassinations were so abundant that the U.S.

Senate Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing on “Terrorism in the Miami Area.”

201

Jane Franklin, Cuba and the United States: A Chronological History (Melbourne: Ocean Press,

1997), pp. 111, 113. DFS’s reports on the FLNC and AC are abundant. See for example, Report on the

bombing attempts at the Cuban embassy, January 25, 1974, Versiones Públicas (VP); De la Barreda

Moreno, November 25, 1975, expediente 76-3-75, legajo 6, hoja 58-63; Report on a bombing,

November 28, 1975, expediente 76-3-75, legajo 6, hoja 225-6; and Report on AC, December 26, 1975,

VP, all in DFS, AGN.

202 U.S. Senate, Terroristic Activity, pp. 612-13.

203 DLA, February 25, 1975, p. 2B.

204 MH, September 7, 1976, pp. 1B, 8B.

89

According to Thomas Lyons and Raul J. Díaz from the Dade County public safety

department, Miami terrorists were well-organized, determined, and enjoyed foreign

connections. Yet, along with the easy accessibility of explosives in the area, the officials

also pointed out the lack of coordination among law enforcement authorities. Whereas

the FBI remained “sorely understaffed” in Miami, they claimed, the CIA refused to

provide them with necessary information.205

Their testimony was contradictory to the

view of the Justice Department expressed to Dante Fascell, a Miami congressman who

requested an explanation. Referring to a few cases, Attorney General Clarence M. Kelley

stressed “excellent cooperation” among local, state, and federal agencies. Yet, the same

letter confirmed that the FBI did not investigate the case of Emilio Milián since the

jurisdiction over the bombing belonged to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms,

instead of the FBI.206

The State Department later concurred with the assessment by the Dade County

officials. In July 1977, Anthony Lake, head of the State Department’s policy planning

staff, reviewed this issue and concluded that the U.S. counterterrorism system was “loose.”

The main office in charge of counterterrorism considered anything other than

international terrorism as matters of domestic law enforcement. Within the Justice

Department, moreover, operations were divided among sections dealing with gun control,

foreign agent registration, customs, and other matters. The FBI tracked individual groups

and persons, but it lacked both personnel and clear legal authority for preventing their

205

U.S. Senate, Terroristic Activity, pp. 612-14, 632.

206 Kelly to Fascell, May 18, 1976, in folder “Justice-Cuban Terrorism Correspondence, 1976-77,” box

2292, Dante Fascell Papers, UM-SC.

90

criminal acts. Although the United States ratified an international convention on sabotage

of aircraft, the U.S. Congress had not yet passed necessary legislation for implementing

it.207

Since May 1970, the U.S. government affirmed its intention of enforcing laws

against any violent attacks against Cuba.208

Yet, lacking institutional setups, these

admonitions lacked credibility in the eyes of anti-Castro terrorists.

Under U.S. Watching-and-Monitoring

Washington’s inability to control violence greatly disturbed Castro. On June 6,

1976, after a bomb killed two officials of the Cuban embassy in Lisbon and another bomb

exploded outside the Cuban Mission to the United Nations, the Cuban leader could no

longer repress his indignation. “No one will be frightened. No one will shirk his duty. No

one will withdraw from his functions,” he said before making startling comments. “Of

course, we have not responded with terrorism. [Yet] if the Cuban state were to carry out

terrorist acts and respond with terrorism to the terrorists, we believe we would be

efficient terrorists…If we decide to carry out terrorism, it is a sure thing we would be

efficient.” Realizing that he might have gone too far, Castro soon stepped back. “We

simply say that we have not applied it and do not propose to implement it in the

207

Lake to Warren Christopher, July 7, 1977, in folder “7/1-15, 1977,” box 2, Records of Anthony

Lake, 1977-1981, RG59, NARA.

208 Kissinger to U.S. embassy in Nassau, March 13, 1974, DOS-CFP. U.S. officials also conveyed the

message directly to Miami organizations. See for example, Memcon, “Cuban Exile Activities,” April

29, 1975, in folder “U.S.-Cuban Relations (2),” box 5, OPL: Fernando De Baca Files, GFL; and a

draft reply (to Juan E. Pérez Franco to Ford, February 28, 1976), March 25, 1976, in folder “Cuba-

Political, Military (3),” box 2, NSA: NSC-LAASF, GFL.

91

immediate future…May the governments where these criminals carry out these actions

take appropriate measure to avoid them.”209

In Havana’s view, the United States was responsible for all terrorist incidents

because it had historical ties with counterrevolution. Castro conceded that the CIA might

not direct—or even control—terrorists against Cuba. Nevertheless, he stressed that the

agency “taught them how to handle explosives.”210

Moreover, Washington never

provided to Havana information it had gained about violent conspiracies against the

island. Just five days after this speech, five anti-Castro groups including FLNC, Acción

Cubana, and Movimiento Nacionalista Cubano formed a new umbrella group, the

Comando de Organizaciones Revolucionarias Unidas (CORU), in the Dominican

Republic. Presided over by Bosch, they discussed plans to kidnap Cuban diplomats,

launch attacks against airlines, and create front groups for actions taken inside the United

States. Reports of their activities reached the White House Situation Room. The State

Department handed information to several Caribbean countries, but not Cuba.211

Under U.S. watching-and-monitoring, groups under the CORU unleashed

monstrous terror against their targets. In July, a bomb exploded in the wagons of a Cuban

209

Speech by Fidel Castro, June 6, 1976, LANIC. The Canadian ambassador in Havana thought that

Castro uttered these words not as a serious warning but as an inadvertent expression of his emotional

uproar. Later Carlos Rafael Rodríguez assured him that such was the case. Canadian embassy in

Havana to Ottawa, June 16, 1976, vol. 12524, file 20-Cuba-1-4, part 8; and Canadian embassy in

Havana to Ottawa, June 28, 1976, vol. 10851, file 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 4, both in RG25, LAC.

210 Speech by Fidel Castro, June 6, 1976.

211 Evening Report, July 22, 1976, in folder “July 22, 1976,” box 1, NSA-WHSR: Evening Reports

from the NSC Staff Files, GFL; and Robinson to U.S. embassy in Georgetown, September 17, 1976,

DOS-CFP; and U.S. embassy in Port of Spain to U.S. embassy in Georgetown, September 8, 1976,

DOS-CFP. See also, CIA, Weekly Situation Report on International Terrorism, September 7, 1976, pp.

6-7, CREST, NARA.

92

airliner’s airplane at a Jamaican airport a few minutes before the departure. Days later

another bomb blasted the office of British West Indian Airways in Barbados. Mexican

authorities could not prevent the killing of a Cuban consul’s bodyguard in Mérida,

Yucatán, although they managed to arrest two CORU agents for the attempt to kidnap a

Cuban consul and also foiled a plot to bomb the Cuban embassy in Mexico City.212

In

August, CORU kidnapped two Cuban employees of the Cuban embassy in Argentina,

bombed the Cubana Airlines office in Panama, as well as the Guyanese consular office in

Trinidad and Tobago. The last bomb was particularly upsetting for Guyanese leaders,

who not only worried about the act but also received information of assassination plots

against them. To assuage their suspicions, Washington sent Joe Leo, a U.S. legal attaché

in Caracas, reiterating that U.S. policy had nothing to do with an upsurge of terrorist

incidents all over the world.213

In September, the CORU retaliated against Mexico’s

imprisonment of the agents by bombing the Mexican embassy in Guatemala City.

The Crime of Barbados and its Impact on Foreign Relations

Among all CORU-related incidents, none was more notorious than the bombing

of Cubana Flight 455 near Barbados on October 6, 1976. Nine minutes after departure a

bomb exploded on the airplane, killing all seventy-three people aboard. Victims included

212

If they had succeeded in kidnapping the Cuban consul, they would have killed him immediately,

buried his body, and demanded that the Mexican government persuade the Cuban government to

release Huber Matos and Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo, two well-known anti-Castro prisoners. DFS’s report

on Gaspar Jiménez (arrested and interrogated by DFS), July 24, 1976, VP, DFS, AGN. See also, DFS’s

report, “Estado de Yucatan,” July 23, 1976, expediente 76-3-76, legajo 7, hoja 1-4, and also, July 24,

1976, expediente 76-3-76, legajo 4, hoja 14, both in DFS, AGN.

213 U.S. embassy in Georgetown to Kissinger, September 7, 1976; and U.S. embassy in Georgetown to

Kissinger, September 10, 1976, both in DOS-CFP.

93

fifty-seven Cubans, including all the members of the Cuban national fencing team, eleven

Guyanese, and five North Koreans. News of the bombing caused a flood of informants’

reports on the involvement of the CORU throughout the Caribbean and the United

States.214

Trinidad and Tobago authorities arrested Freddy Lugo and Hernán Ricardo,

executors of the plan. Venezuelan counterparts caught Orlando Bosch, chief of the

CORU, as well as Luis Posada Carriles, another Cuban-born militant. Posada Carriles

previously served as a CIA agent and took a job at the Venezuelan intelligence agency.215

The incident infuriated Castro and a million Cubans who attended a national

memorial service for the victims on October 15. The sudden loss of youthful—and

innocent—lives caused an intolerable pain across the island. In a speech, Castro

presented a list of suspicious moves by Washington, remarked on the historical

associations between Cuban counterrevolutionaries and U.S. officials, and cast the CIA

as responsible for “terrorist actions that culminated into the unbelievably barbarian

destruction of an entire Cuban civil airplane.” Therefore, he added, the U.S. government

violated the spirit of the 1973 anti-hijacking agreement and forced him to suspend it. The

agreement would expire six months later unless the United States took measures to

terminate terrorist campaign against the island, said the Cuban leader.216

214

See for example, J. G. Deegan to R. J. Gallagher, October 12, 1976, in folder “Serial 71-99,” box 1,

HSCA Subject Files: Orlando Bosch Avila, JFK, NARA.

215 For Posada Carriles, see his memoir, Los caminos del guerrero (n.p., 1994). It remains unclear to

what extent Venezuelan officials, especially Cuban-born officers in the intelligence agency, were

involved in this incident.

216 Castro’s speech in Granma, October 15, 1976, pp. 1-3. For a Cuban view, see León Cotayo,

Crimen en Barbados.

94

Castro’s charge was nothing but anti-American propaganda, according to Henry

Kissinger. On the same day, the U.S. secretary of state called Castro’s charge of U.S.

involvement “totally false,” declaring that the U.S. government had “nothing to do with

the explosion.”217

In private conversation, Kissinger worried about the potential damage

done by the incident. Three days before the speech by Castro, Kissinger already

overruled his aide’s suggestion of sending a diplomatic note to Havana explaining the

U.S. position on this incident. He feared that it would merely provide fodder for what he

saw as Cuban propaganda.218

According to an information note from the White House

Situation Room, Castro needed “something dramatic to shift attention away from Cuba’s

economic difficulties…just as he did during difficult economic times in May 1970.”

Moreover, the Cuban leader would “probably also try to use the current incident to drive

a wedge between the U.S. and the countries of the Caribbean.”219

As if such were his

concerns, Kissinger was reluctant to take part in the joint investigation into the terrorist

incident by Caribbean countries. “Why do we have to get so involved in the

investigation?” Kissinger said to his aides. “That makes us look guilty, to begin with.”220

Kissinger’s attempts to minimize U.S. responses to the Crime of Barbados

backfired in the Caribbean. A day after the incident, Guyanese Prime Minister Forbes

217

Kissinger’s News Conference, October 15, in DOSB, November 8, 1976.

218 “I don’t see any sense in a note to Castro,” Kissinger responded. “This way all he has to do is start

a campaign.” Transcript of Kissinger’s Staff Meeting, October 12, 1976, pp. 33-34, in folder “October

12, 1976,” box 11, Record of Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s Staff Meetings,

RG59, NARA.

219 Situation Room for Scowcroft, October 14, 1976, in folder “10/14/1976,” box 10, NSA: WHSR:

Noon and Evening Notes Files, GFL.

220 Transcript of Kissinger’s Staff Meeting, October 18, 1976, pp. 23-24, in folder “October 18, 1976,”

box 11, Record of Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, RG59, NARA.

95

Burnham called the U.S. ambassador in Guyana, appealing to the United States to stop its

“allies.”221

When little was done, Burnham publicly questioned U.S. indifference toward

counterrevolutionary activities in his speech at the memorial service for the victims.222

As

the theme of U.S.-led destabilization spread across the Caribbean, the U.S. embassy in

Trinidad and Tobago lamented the U.S. failure to defuse “residual suspicions” regarding

Washington’s “relatively benign and protective eye toward anti-Castro terrorists.”

Caribbean anxiety was “fueled by the relatively low key U.S. government’s response to

the aircraft sabotage,” its cable stated, “when that reaction was compared with the usually

instant American reaction to terrorist acts where innocent lives are lost.”223

In Kissinger’s mind, however, it was Castro who caused this regional crisis of

confidence in the United States as a lawful country. “The real question is how much faith

and credit responsible people in the area are going to put in Cuban propaganda,” said a

cable sent by Kissinger to the U.S. ambassador in Venezuela, where President Carlos

Andrés Pérez worried about allegedly secret U.S. intentions regarding terrorism.224

Kissinger eventually dispatched a joint briefing team of State Department-FBI officials to

221

U.S. embassy in Georgetown to Washington, October 7, 1976, in folder “Serial 1-21,” box 1,

HSCA Subject Files: Orlando Bosch Avila, JFK, NARA.

222 Speech by Burnham, cited in U.S. embassy in Georgetown to Washington, October 18, 1976, DOS-

CFP.

223 U.S. embassy in Port of Spain to Washington, October 20, 1976, in folder “Serial 196,” box 1A,

HSCA Subject Files: Orlando Bosch Avila, JFK, NARA. Tom Adams, Prime Minister of Barbados,

also brought up a U.S. conspiracy against his government in his talks with Ricardo Alarcón, Cuban

ambassador to the United Nations. Alarcón to Fidel Castro, “Informe del compañero Ricardo Alarcón

sobre el viaje a Trinidad-Tobago y Barbados,” October 26, 1976, pp. 9-13, Caja “Crimen de

Barbados,” MINREX.

224 Kissinger to Vaky, October 28, 1976, in folder “Cuba-Cubana Airlines Crash,” box 2, NSA: NSC-

LAASF, GFL. For Carlos Andrés Pérez’s view, see U.S. embassy in Caracas to Washington, October

23, 1976, in folder “Cuba-Cubana Airlines Crash,” box 2, NSA: NSC-LAASF, GFL.

96

Venezuela, as well as several other Caribbean countries.225

In Barbados, the team claimed

that the U.S. government was not involved in the incident, that it took the issue of

terrorism seriously, and that it wanted to deepen international cooperation. Yet, “Castro

has attempted to turn public opinion in Caribbean against us by confusing events of early

1960s and present,” the U.S. visitors added. “Anti-Castro terrorists also exploit this

confusion for their own purpose.”226

It must have been a difficult task for Kissinger to demand that his Caribbean

neighbors simply forget the legacy of U.S. support for Cuban counterrevolution. As

shown earlier, it was Kissinger who, in response to international pressure, oversaw the

downscaling of the U.S. commitment to military raids against Cuba after May 1970. Yet,

the reputation of Kissinger was tainted in the region due to his involvement in the

overthrow of the Chilean government in September 1973. When anti-Castro warriors

radicalized and expanded their operations beyond U.S. territories, moreover, his reactions

to their activities were passive and conciliatory in the eyes of the neighboring countries.

The failure of U.S.-Cuban dialogue also played a role. Because these countries came

under intense U.S. pressure for anti-Cuban collaboration, they apparently thought that the

incident was another U.S. countermeasure against Cuban intervention in Angola.227

In a

sense, even though the U.S. government was not directly responsible for the bombing, the

225

J. B. Adams to Held, November 1, 1976, in folder “Serial 128-154,” box 1, HSCA Subject Files:

Orlando Bosch Avila, JFK, NARA.

226 U.S. embassy in Bridgetown to Washington, December 4, 1976, DOS-CFP.

227 Particularly informative is the view offered by Guyanese Foreign Minister Frederick Wills after

Jimmy Carter took the presidency, cited in U.S. embassy in Georgetown to Washington, February 11,

1977, DOS-CFP.

97

lack of sensitivity to the past, as well as the lack of effective counterterrorism measures,

made the United States appear to be part of the larger problem.

Havana’s Renewed Signals

Yet, despite the horrendous aftermath and the exchange of acrimonious remarks,

scholars should not rush to the conclusion that terrorism successfully destroyed political

space for U.S.-Cuban dialogue. Previous studies typically introduce the October 6

bombing as an epilogue to Kissinger’s failure of dialogue with Cuba. But it bears

emphasizing that since the summer of 1976 Cuba actually grew more interested to reopen

U.S.-Cuban dialogue after the November U.S. presidential election. Having pushed out

the invading forces from South Africa, Cuba focused on military training and civilian

assistance, started to withdraw the troops from Angola, and conveyed its oral message to

Kissinger through Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme that it had “no desire to spread

throughout Africa.”228

While these measures pointed at the potential removal of a critical

foreign policy disagreement, an abrupt drop in the world-market sugar price deprived the

island of much foreign hard currency and caused a massive economic recession in Cuba

since 1976. The recession was so severe that the government added coffee to rationing,

halted trade with non-socialist countries, and suspended the announcement of Cuba’s first

Five-Year plan for 1976-1980.229

228

Memcon (Olof Palme, Kissinger), May 24, 1976, DNSA. See also, Gleijeses, Visions, pp. 34-35

229 Speech by Fidel Castro, September 28, 1976, Discursos; and U.S. embassy in San José to

Washington, October 8, 1976, DOS-CFP. See also, British embassy in Havana to London, January 26,

1977, FCO 7/3333, PRO; and O.G.S. memorandum for the Minister, “Cuba’s Economic Situation,”

October 22, 1976, vol. 12524, file 20-Cuba-1-4, part 8, RG25, LAC.

98

In light of these developments, Havana renewed signals of interest in U.S.-Cuban

détente. In June 1976, in his talks with the Canadian ambassador in Havana, Carlos

Rafael Rodríguez conceded that the opening of trade with the United States would not

only help Cuba to achieve industrial development and economic independence, but also

allow the island to expand Cuba’s relations with the rest of Latin American and Western

countries. Cuba would not sacrifice its relations with the socialist bloc, but neither would

it reject U.S. overtures for better relations. Referring to his knowledge of the complex

nature of the embargo, he also commented that the executive office could exempt food

and medicines from the embargo, leaving the rest to an approval of the U.S. Congress.230

Since his comment implied that Havana would look to the partial lifting of the embargo

as a major U.S. gesture, the Canadians asked Rodríguez if they could pass his words to

Kissinger. After consulting with Castro, Rodríguez raised no objection.231

Surprisingly, Cuba’s signals grew more frequent after the Crime of Barbados.

Castro’s funeral speech itself was intentionally made benign, according to a secret Cuban

message received by Washington in late October. Cuba viewed the absence of U.S.

official denouncements of the terrorist acts as evidence of official U.S. complicity and

suspended the agreement as the only avenue to express displeasure at the U.S. failure to

control counterrevolutionary terrorism. The message then addressed Cuba’s remaining

interest in normalization of relations with the United States, as well as the renewal of the

230

Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, June 28, 1976, vol. 10851, file 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 4,

RG25, LAC.

231 Director General of the Bureau of Western Hemisphere, June 30, 1976, vol. 10851; and Canadian

embassy in Havana to Ottawa, July 29, 1976, vol. 16019, both in file 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 4,

RG25, LAC. The Canadians told the British that they eventually decided not to act as an intermediary

for the time being. British embassy in Havana to London, June 30, 1976, FCO 7/3124, PRO.

99

anti-hijacking agreement, but only after the end of the terrorism and the declaration of

U.S. position on this issue.232

Within a few weeks, Havana sent similar messages through

diverse channels to suggest that combating terrorism would be the first real step that

Washington and Havana could take toward normalization of relations.233

The message

was identical in all these cases, leading Washington to believe that Havana was mounting

a well-organized campaign for an improvement of U.S.-Cuban relations.234

Finally, on

November 13, Kissinger took a small yet positive step. He sent a note to Havana to affirm

a U.S. position against terrorism. The U.S. secretary of state apparently cooled down a bit

just before he left his office.235

Conclusion

Cuban counterrevolution radicalized from 1970 to 1976. Independent of

Washington, militant groups like Alpha 66 frequently launched raids against the island

via a third country. Yet, their major public coup in May 1970 embarrassed the United

States and invited international pressure for preventive actions not only from Cuba, but

also from Britain and the Soviet Union. Despite Nixon’s sympathy for Miami Cubans,

232

Emphasis added. Cuba’s U.N. Mission delivered this message to Arnie Nachmanoff, former NSC

staffer. Information note for Scowcroft, October 28, 1976, in folder “10/28/1976,” box 18, NSA:

WHSR: Presidential Daily Briefings Files, GFL.

233 Kingston to Washington, October 27, 1976, DOS-CFP; CIA Report, November 3, 1976, in folder

“2 of 3,” box 2, HSCA Subject Files: Luis Posada Carriles, JFK; and Scowcroft to Ford, November

24, 1976, in folder “11/24/1976,” box 18, NSA: WHSR: Presidential Daily Briefings Files, GFL.

234 INR Afternoon Summary, November 23, 1976, p. 4, in folder “November 23, 1976,” box 3, NSA:

WHSR: Evening Reports from the NSC Staff Files, GFL.

235 Message from Swiss embassy in Cuba, “Hijacking Agreement,” November 15, 1976, in folder

“ Cuba-Hijacking,” box 2, NSA: NSC-LAASF, GFL. The State Department also authorized Cubana

airline’s regular flights to Canada over U.S. territory. MINREX to Swiss embassy in Havana,

November 29, 1976, Caja “Bilateral 18,” MINREX.

100

the U.S. government finally took this issue seriously, demoralized Alpha 66, and made

clear its opposition to other invasion plans. That satisfied few in Miami. As Mas Canosa

noticed, the U.S. government’s enforcement of its neutrality laws was a historical

contradiction. Like Torriente, many also confirmed that the interests of the U.S.

government and anti-Castro activists in Miami were never the same. Whereas détente and

coexistence with Cuba further disillusioned anti-Castro activists, extremists mounted a

campaign of terror across the United States, Latin America, and the Caribbean.

U.S. responses to this surge of terrorism were far from timely. As Kissinger

claimed, the United States was not directly responsible for the terrorist incidents across

the world, including the one of the Cubana airplane on October 6, 1976. But in the eyes

of Cuba and other Caribbean nations, the United States was a part of the problem due to

its past association with Orlando Bosch, Luis Posada Carriles, and more. Unlike Britain,

in May 1970, the United States denied any legitimate reasons for why Castro was angry

about terrorism, looking to him as an anti-American spokesman who either needed

attention away from domestic problems or intended to harm U.S. relations with other

countries. The calculated U.S. silence on the Crime of Barbados nonetheless exacerbated

the credibility problem of the United States as a lawful country. Given that the Church

Committee had just released a report on numerous U.S. covert operations in the region,

including CIA-led assassination plots against the Cuban leader, the United States

probably would have needed more than attacking Castro before claiming its innocence.236

236

See U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence

Activities, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Reports of the Select

101

Still, despite the scale of tragedy caused by the incidents, terrorists apparently

failed to achieve their major purpose of halting U.S.-Cuban détente. After all, the Crime

of Barbados was such a horrendous event that no one with a decent measure of humanity

would support the scheme behind it. Even in the immediate aftermath, the Cuban

government presented terrorism as a common enemy, against which Washington and

Havana worked together as the first step toward normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations.

When Jimmy Carter responded favorably to this suggestion, it paved the way for the most

notable moments of U.S.-Cuban dialogue during the Cold War. Castro contemplated his

first major gesture toward the United States—even though the U.S. embargo remained in

place.

Committee to Study Government Operations, 94th Cong., 1st sess., November 18, 1975. The report

based on this investigation was published in 1976.

102

CHAPTER 3: A Time for Dialogue?

Jimmy Carter, Fidel Castro, and the Triangular Dynamics around Migration

In June 1977, a CBS news program broadcast “The CIA’s Secret Army,” a special

documentary on the intertwined history of the U.S. government and Cuban émigrés. In

the wake of the 1959 Cuban Revolution, the U.S. government encouraged thousands of

Cuban émigrés to leave the island and trained hundreds of civilians for an invasion of

Cuba. Having abandoned these “freedom fighters” at the Bay of Pigs, the U.S.

government launched Operation Mongoose, “the secret war” against revolutionary Cuba,

using “the secret army” of Cuban counterrevolutionaries. By the time the U.S.

government ended the clandestine operations, hundreds of Cubans had lost their lives and

thousands more served time in Cuban jails. Many Miami Cubans nonetheless remained

adamant, as the documentary showed. Some even waged a “terrorist war” against

anybody calling for a U.S. rapprochement with Cuba.237

To the surprise of viewers of the documentary, however, the U.S.-Cuban dialogue

in the late 1970s had a transformative impact on the Cuban American community in

Miami. When Jimmy Carter initiated a rapprochement with Havana, Washington’s new

attitude strongly encouraged Havana to promote a dialogue with a group of Miami

Cubans. The subsequent talks among Washington, Havana, and Miami resulted in the

237

Transcript, CBS Reports with Bill Moyers, “The CIA’s Secret Army,” June 10, 1977, The United

States and Castro’s Cuba, 1950-1970: Paterson Collection (Microfilm).

103

release of thirty-six hundred political prisoners in Cuba and the visits of over 100,000

Cuban émigrés to their families in the homeland. A year later these consequences helped

to provoke the Mariel Crisis, one of the largest and the most traumatic migration crises in

modern U.S. history. Around 125,000 Cubans left for the United States.

This chapter and the next explore the complex interactions between diplomacy

and human migration at a critical period of U.S.-Cuban relations. For long Washington

manipulated Cuban migration as a part of its policy of hostility toward Havana. Yet,

when Washington sought to normalize diplomatic relations and disengaged itself from

the counterrevolutionary project, Miami Cubans referred to their collective history to

demand greater attention to their peculiar needs. Cuban migration also was a matter of

special concern for Havana. By claiming the principle of national sovereignty, the Cuban

government viewed all internal issues as nonnegotiable with Washington. But the Cuban

government considered Washington’s suggestion for an improvement of relations with

Cubans living abroad while reassessing Cuban policy toward the United States.

As a result, Washington, Havana, and Miami interacted more intensely than

previously acknowledged by scholars. U.S. diplomatic historians examine Carter’s ill-

fated attempt to achieve normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations, yet provide relatively

little information about developments in Miami and Havana.238

Migration historians

document the varying reactions of Cuban émigrés to U.S.-Cuban détente, as well as their

238

Schoultz, Infernal, chap. 10; and LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, chap. 5. Two Carter’s

officials also provide their insights into bilateral relations. Wayne S. Smith, The Closest of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic Account of US-Cuban Relations since 1957 (New York: Norton, 1987); and

Robert A. Pastor, “The Carter-Castro Years: A Unique Opportunity,” in Castro Mariño and Pruessen,

eds., Fifty Years of Revolution, pp. 237-260.

104

conflicting political activities ranging from terrorist threats to private diplomacy. Yet, an

analysis of declassified government records also reveals how the shifting ideas and

sentiment among Cuban Americans became one of the most controversial elements of

secret U.S.-Cuban negotiations.239

This chapter also seeks to incorporate the perspectives

of the Cuban government. Particularly important are the declassified records of U.S.-

Cuban meetings, the interview transcripts of key Cuban policymaker José Luis Padrón,

and the unpublished memoir and manuscripts of Bernardo Benes, who acted as an

intermediary between Carter and Castro.240

This chapter thus describes the complex triangular relationship among

Washington, Havana, and Miami as one of the fundamental themes of the U.S.-Cuban

dialogue of the late 1970s. As Washington was reevaluating its relations with Havana, it

also tried to reframe the roles of Miami Cubans by containing terrorism and addressing

human rights issues. Washington’s shifting attitude toward Miami in turn enabled Havana

to envision a new economic future for Cuba, one in which Miami Cubans would play an

important role. As other scholars note, U.S.-Cuban attempts at normalization of relations

239

For the best works on the Cuban American community, see García, Havana USA. For Cuban

perspectives, Arboleya, Cuban Counterrevolution; and idem., Cuba y los cubanoamericanos.

240 This chapter enriches from Cuban scholarship, especially Ramírez Cañedo and Morales, De la

confrontación and ibid., 2da edición ampliada. Ramírez Cañedo generously collaborated with me in

interviewing Padrón and shared with me his other interview transcripts. An unpublished memoir by

Benes, Mis conversaciones secretas con Fidel Castro, is found in folder “In his own words,” box 2,

Mirta Ojito Papers, UM-CHC. Robert Levine uses this source to write Benes’s semi-biography, Secret

Missions to Cuba, Secret Missions to Cuba: Fidel Castro, Bernardo Benes, and Cuban Miami (New

York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001). However, Levine focuses on Benes’s activities, rather than what

Benes heard from U.S. and Cuban officials. Further, Levine presents his work without referring to

outside sources to corroborate Benes’s version of the story, leading Padrón to claim that the book is

“full of impreciseness and lies.” Padrón, interview transcript, Havana, November 4, 2013, p. 8, in

author’s possession. Yet, when checked against other sources, this memoir contains some valuable

information on U.S.-Cuban relations.

105

deadlocked due to the Cold War in Africa, where East-West rivalry intermingled with

North-South conflicts.241

But it was also Washington and Havana’s subsequent

miscalculations and disagreements over the issues of Cuban migration—human ties

between Havana and Miami—that contributed to the breakdown of the dialogue.

Castro’s Messages through Bill Moyers

Throughout late 1976 and early 1977, Castro continued to send signals to

demonstrate his interest in improved U.S.-Cuban relations.242

Of particular importance

was the one he sent via CBS news correspondent Bill Moyers, who visited Cuba in early

February 1977. Here, Castro not only underscored his hope of normalizing diplomatic

relations with the United States, but also set forth Cuba’s positions on broader issues.

Terrorism was the first topic that Castro spoke about with Moyers. “Be against it. Don’t

let them do it with immunity.” Along with the U.S. economic blockade on Cuba, the

Cuban leader looked to U.S. sponsorship of counterrevolution as “undeclared acts of

war.” He urged the U.S. leader to put himself in his shoes. “Imagine if we had trained to

invade the United States, if we had tried to assassinate your president…if we had turned

loose a gang of thugs to try to bring down your government.”243

241

Schoultz, Infernal; LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel; Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies;

and Pastor, “Carter-Castro,” p. 257.

242 For Cuba’s signals from October to December 1976, see the previous chapter. See also, Stuart

Eizenstat to Carter, December 9, 1976, in folder “Confidential File, 11/76-1/77,” box 1, Office of the

Staff Secretary Records, JCL.

243 Handwritten notes, Bill Moyers’ conversations with Fidel Castro and Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, in

Vance to Carter, February 8, 1977, NLC-128-12-5-16-4, RAC, JCL.

106

Castro elaborated on other contentious issues between Washington and Havana.

The United States should lift the economic blockade on Cuba, which—Castro admitted—

“has done us [the Cubans] great damage.” On human rights issues Castro said the release

of Cuban prisoners convicted of political crimes “should not be the object of negotiations

but the result of negotiations.” Castro promised that he would not make the U.S. base in

Guantánamo a point of major importance, although it had been a source of great

provocation to Cuba. According to Moyers, the Cuban leader called Angola “our

Vietnam” as if Cuba had been reluctant to intervene in Southern Africa and eager to

withdraw its troops if possible. On revolution in Latin America, Castro made clear his

respect for the principle of coexistence as long as the other governments did the same. “I

do not want to be involved in the internal affairs of my neighbor,” he stated.244

Finally, on the Soviet Union, the Cuban leader expressed his preference for

trading with the United States because of the geographical proximity. Cuba would

continue to do business with Russians who provided the island with preferential trade

benefits. But he reportedly stated, “Once Kennedy agreed not to invade Cuba, we no

longer needed the Russians militarily. Once [counterrevolutionary] terrorism against

Cuba from American territory stops, we need them less.” What Cuba aimed to achieve

was a relaxation of tensions with the United States, relative autonomy from superpower

confrontation, and expansion of trade with all parties. “As far as the trade is concerned, it

would be much easier to do business with the Americans than the Russians…You are so

244

Handwritten notes, Moyers’ conversations with Fidel Castro.

107

close.” The Cuban leader ended the meeting with a positive tone. The United States and

Cuba had “many reasons to want good relations.”245

It remains unclear if Moyers’ handwritten note reflected what the Cuban leader

had actually stated. Moyers went to Cuba to create the above-mentioned CBS

documentary. His personal interest might have colored his report. It is difficult to believe

that Castro described Angola as “our Vietnam,” especially because the Cuban delegation

refused such comparison afterwards. Perhaps, Moyers, who worked as the Press

Secretary for the Johnson administration, was the one who drew this reference.

Regardless of possible misunderstandings, however, Cuban officials repeated that

Castro’s remarks to Moyers “officially” represented Cuban positions.246

Moyers’s report

also had a strong impact on Cyrus Vance, Jimmy Carter’s Secretary of State, who spent

hours debriefing Moyers. “We will carefully study what Bill has reported and be

submitting to you shortly a recommended timetable and scenario for opening discussions

with the Cuban government,” Vance wrote to Carter.247

Carter’s Approaches toward Havana

Prior to Castro’s meeting with Moyers, the Carter administration already had

explored the idea of normalization of diplomatic relations. At his confirmation hearings

in early January 1977, Secretary Vance made clear his intention of opening U.S.-Cuban

245

Ibid.

246 See for example, Vance to Carter, March 11, 1977, NLC-128-12-6-11-8, RAC, JCL; and Memcon

(Terence A. Todman, Torras), March 24, 1977, NLC-24-10-8-2-3, RAC, JCL.

247 Vance to Carter, February 8, 1977, NLC-128-12-5-16-4, RAC, JCL.

108

discussions despite the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. Vance’s State Department

led the suspension of SR-71 aerial reconnaissance overflights over Cuba and accepted a

Cuban proposal for opening talks on maritime boundaries and fishing rights.248

This

approach was in tune with Carter’s general philosophy that “nations cannot solve the

problems among them unless they communicate with one another.”249

Cuba was one of

the enemy countries with which Carter wanted to try dialogue in order to alleviate

international tensions. “If I get an equivalent response from these countries,” he noted in

his diary, “then I would be glad to meet them more than halfway.”250

As such, Carter ordered the State Department to devise the Presidential Review

Memorandum (PRM) 17 on U.S. policy toward Latin America, of which Cuba was part.

By contextualizing Cuban initiatives into Latin American policy, the administration drew

on a report of the private commission chaired by Sol Linowitz, former U.S. ambassador

to the OAS. The so-called Linowitz report advocated a new dialogue with Cuba, as well

as the return of the Panama Canal, to signal a new U.S. attitude toward southern

neighbors.251

But PRM17 also suggested that the State Department deal with Cuba as a

248

Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, pp. 101-2; and Harold H. Sunders and Todman to Vance, “SR-

71 Reconnaissance Flights over Cuba,” February 8, 1977, NLC-6-16-2-17-8, RAC, JCL. For Vance’s

views, see “Overview of Foreign Policy Issues and Positions,” in Vance to Jack Watson, October 24,

1976, in folder “Transition,” box 42, Plains Files (hereafter PF), JCL.

249 Quoted in Pastor to Brzezinski and Aaron, January 16, 1979, p. 4, NLC-24-79-8-3-9, RAC, JCL.

250 Carter, White House Diary (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), p. 27.

251 Commission on United States-Latin American Relations, The United States and Latin America:

Next Steps (New York: Center for Inter-American Relations, 1976). Its content on Cuba is similar to

those in State and Defense Option Paper, November 3, 1976, in folder “Transition,” boxes 41 and 42,

PF, JCL.

109

“special country” which could be “dealt separately and more quickly.”252

The unique

treatment of Cuba reflected Carter’s concern about Cuban involvement in Africa, which

required more than a single regional scope. In his late February 1977 talks with Canadian

Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, Carter referred to Castro’s meetings with U.S. visitors

(Moyers) and asked for Canadian views of “various indications that Cuba was reducing

its forces in Angola more rapidly.”253

Here entered Carter’s other chief foreign policy adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, the

son of a Polish diplomat. From the very beginning, Brzezinski was less enthusiastic than

Vance about a new approach toward Cuba. At a pivotal March 9, 1977, policy review

committee meeting on Cuba, all Carter’s chief advisers endorsed a step-by-step approach

toward normalization of diplomatic relations, in which the U.S. government would use

the lifting of the embargo as “a bargaining chip” to withdraw Cuba’s major concessions

in foreign policy and human rights. Yet, divergent views on the question of Africa

already emerged. Referring to Castro’s conversation with Moyers, Vance explained that

the Cubans wanted to withdraw from Africa even though they held “the theoretical

position that they have an inherent right to send troops overseas.” Brzezinski was

unimpressed. “I greet Castro’s blabbing to possibly naïve Americans with some

252

PRM17, available at http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/prmemorandums/prm17.pdf

(accessed October 22, 2015).

253 Memcon (Carter, Trudeau), February 22, 1977, pp. 25-26, NLC-23-16-4-5-0, RAC, JCL. Although

Carter referred to Castro’s meetings with various U.S. visitors, it is clear that he had the one with

Moyers in mind here. This handwritten record alone contains much information about Cuba’s views

on Africa.

110

skepticism.” Vance responded, “Yes, you may be right. But the only way to prove it is to

start talking.”254

Not all items provoked such a heated debate. In a discussion paper for the same

meeting, the State Department contended that greater U.S. communication with the island

would increase the U.S. presence and serve “the long-term objective of seeking to

diminish Soviet-Cuban ties.” Even a flow of U.S. tourists would help to achieve this goal

because it “will re-awaken the attraction among the Cuban people for American goods

and values, and deflect the population from the stern task of building socialism.”255

Throughout Carter’s presidency, this belief in the superiority of the American way of life

over Cuba’s hardly came into question. On March 19, shortly after he signed Presidential

Directive (PD) 6 to begin exploratory talks with Cuba, Carter announced the end of the

ban prohibiting U.S. citizens from travelling to Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, and North

Korea. Beneath the decision was the Carter administration’s desire to transform the

Cuban revolutionary regime through dialogue and engagement.

Washington Listens to Miami—Human Rights

In PD6, the Carter administration identified five major U.S. goals in Cuba. In

addition to the reduction of “Cuba’s foreign intervention” and “Cuban relationship

(political and military) with the Soviet Union,” the administration remained interested in

the old issue of “compensation for American expropriated property.” To these three,

254

Minutes of Policy Review Committee Meeting 15, “Cuba,” March 9, 1977, NLC-24-61-4-4-0,

RAC, JCL.

255 Paper, Presidential Review Memorandum/ NSC-17, pp. 9-10, attached to Habib to Vance, March 7,

1977, in folder “3/1-3/15/77,” box 2, Anthony Lake Papers, RG59, NARA.

111

Carter added two more—“combating terrorism” and “human rights.”256

These issues did

not come up randomly, but resulted from Carter’s resolve to clean up the legacy of

Washington’s association with Cuban counterrevolution. By April 1980, approximately

800,000 persons of Cuban origin lived in the United States, half of them concentrated in

Florida. As they integrated into the U.S. constituency, the U.S. government could no

longer dismiss their concerns completely as alien to U.S. national interests, even though

their political power was not as great as it would become a decade later.257

Recently declassified records reveal that Carter took great care to approach

Miami Cubans. As the previous chapters indicate, the community’s view polarized over

time. Whereas hardliners and militants kept calling for the overthrow of the Cuban

government, a small yet notable number of leftist youths and professionals advocated

dialogue with the Cuban government. Between these wings appeared the “moderates,”

who remained hostile to the government but grudgingly accepted dialogue as a way to

achieve important community interests, such as the release of political prisoners in Cuba

and the reunification of Cuban families. Yet, when Carter assumed the presidency, most

of these moderates remained silent for fear of being labeled communists, amid a flurry of

terrorist threats and political assassinations.258

256

PD6, March 15, 1977, available at

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd06.pdf (accessed February 15, 2012).

257 The transition paper urges the new administration to make “special efforts” to explain new policy

to Cuban American leaders. State and Defense Option Papers. For demographical data on persons of

Cuban origin, see Pérez, “The Cuban Population.”

258 For militants and hard-liners’ views, see articles and editorials that appeared in DLA, Patria, La

Nación, among others. For moderate and radical views, read Réplica and Areíto respectively. For

letters from Cuban Americans calling for family reunification, see also, Jorge Roblejo Lorie to Pastor,

May 26, 1977, and others in folder “Hispanic Issues: Cuban 3/77-8/77,” box 71, Records of the Office

112

Carter allied with these moderates by incorporating their thinking into the U.S.

agenda for discussion with Cuba. Alfredo Durán, chair of the Florida Democratic Party,

became an early supporter of Carter during the 1976 presidential election. While

endorsing liberal programs on domestic issues, Durán opposed negotiations with Castro

unless the latter withdrew his troops from Africa and released political prisoners from

jails.259

In response to the released Linowitz report, Durán reportedly said that U.S.-

Cuban normalization “would be a tremendous mistake at this point.” What he probably

meant was that normalization was possible if some conditions were met.260

For his part,

Carter visited Durán and his group during the campaign at the editorial office of Réplica,

a magazine that emerged to counter the far-right-wing newspaper Patria. The presidential

hopeful promised that he would consider Cuban American views if he was elected.261

It was Durán who advised Carter, Vance, and Brzezinski of Miami Cuban

opinions in February 1977. Durán explained that the Cuban American community would

be “divided” on the issue of normalization. For some, normalization was simply

unacceptable. For others, it would be “a means to reunite families.” Durán then urged

Carter to prioritize human rights issues, such as the release of prisoners, family

reunification, and visitation rights, over compensation for confiscated U.S. property. In

this way, he claimed, Washington could avoid creating the impression that normalization

of the Assistant for Public Liaison (hereafter OAPL), JCL. See also, García, Havana USA, pp. 48,

138-140; Torres, Mirrors, chap. 4, esp. pp. 92-94; and Arboleya, Counterrevolution, chap.5.

259 Réplica, September 8, 1976, p. S-2. Durán also worked with Bernardo Benes, Manolo Reboso,

Manolo Reyes, Max Resnik, editor of Réplica, and Maurice Ferré, Puerto Rican mayor of the city of

Miami.

260 Italics added. Miami News, December 21, 1976, p. 3A.

261 See, Réplica, February 4, 1976, p. 18; Réplica, July 28, 1976, p. 9.

113

was designed to benefit U.S. business. Carter apparently liked this advice.262

For the

following weeks the U.S. president reiterated the importance of human rights in his

public statements on Cuba, triggering Havana’s protest.263

In a message to Carter, Castro

complained that the U.S. government had no right to teach him on human rights given the

CIA plots to assassinate him. Castro nonetheless proposed private discussions, instead of

public lectures.264

Within such intricate Washington-Havana-Miami interactions, human rights

entered U.S.-Cuban talks. At the first meeting in New York on March 24, 1977, in which

the U.S. and Cuban delegation discussed fishery and maritime boundaries, Assistant

Secretary of State Terrence Todman introduced human rights issues as those “of the

greatest importance to the Cuban community in the United States.”265

At the end of the

second round of talks in Havana on April 24-27, Todman stepped further, indicating that

Washington would consider the lifting of the embargo on food and medicines in

exchange for important humanitarian gestures from Havana. In reply, Cuban foreign

minister Isidro Malmierca referred to the historical background, in which the U.S.

government promoted Cuban migration to harm the Cuban economy. Yet, despite such

262

Vance to Carter, February 5, 1977, NLC-128-12-5-14-6, RAC, JCL. See also, Memcon (Carter,

Durán), February 5, 1977, NLC-24-10-7-9-7, RAC, JCL.

263 Remarks by Carter, February 16, 1977, February 23, 1977, and May 20, 1977, all in APP. See also,

Carter, White House Diary, p. 62.

264 Rick Inderfurth to Brzezinski, March 1, 1977, NLC-24-10-8-4-1, RAC, JCL. Carter confirmed the

receipt of this message and agreed to favor private discussion. Memcon (Castro, McGovern), April 9,

1977, cited in Ramírez Cañedo and Morales, De la confrontación, 2da edición, pp. 171-72.

265 Memcon (Todman, Torras), March 24, 1977, p. 18.

114

misgivings, he promised that Havana would study individual cases.266

Even such

qualified comments startled the U.S. delegation. In a report to Vance, Todman expressed

his surprise that Malmierca seemed willing to discuss all issues, including political

prisoners.267

Washington Faces Miami—Terrorism

Along with human rights, terrorism also attracted much of Carter’s attention.

Urged by Durán and his group, Vance strongly demanded that Attorney General Griffin

Bell investigate this issue by himself. In the face of Bell’s reticence and complaints,

Vance kept arguing that the success of U.S.-Cuban détente required the containment of

terrorism. Carter’s ethics also allowed for little compromise with the inhumane nature of

terrorism. When Carter watched Bill Moyer’s CBS documentary, “The CIA’ Secret

Army,” he was “appalled at the idea that people could use U.S. territory as a base for

terrorist action.” The U.S. president promptly ordered CIA Director Stansfield Turner to

ensure that the agency would never authorize any of anti-Castro militants’ operations.

When Carter received a report on anti-Castro terrorism, he stressed to Vance, “We can

watch it, not yield to the threat.”268

After the Crime of Barbados in October 1976, the U.S. government no longer

could dismiss Miami terrorism as the business of someone else. Even the CIA identified

266

Memcon (Malmierca, Todman), April 27, 1977, pp. 3, 7, NLC-24-11-1-2-9, RAC, JCL.

267 Todman to Vance, May 2, 1977, NLC-24-11-1-1-0, RAC, JCL.

268 Minutes of PRM 15; Pastor to James Schecter, January 12, 1978, NLC-24-75-1-1-1, RAC, JCL;

and Handwritten note by Carter, in Vance to Carter, March 7, 1977, in folder “State Department

Evening Reports, 3/77,” box 37, PF, JCL.

115

anti-Castro terrorism as “among the most active and most disruptive terrorist groups” that

undermined U.S. interests.269

Yet, despite PD6, in which Carter ordered Bell to

investigate this problem, the Attorney General emphasized what the Justice Department

could not do, rather than what it could do. In a report to Brzezinski, he claimed that

federal agencies could prosecute anti-Castro militants only after they violated specific

U.S. laws. To direct non-criminal investigations otherwise would infringe the First

Amendment and lead to unfair targeting of the Cuban American community.270

In light of

these responses, Robert Pastor, the NSC’s specialist for Latin American affairs,

complained that the Justice Department was “not zealous as they could be.”271

On May

25, 1977, anti-Castro militants bombed an office of Mackey Airlines, the first U.S. carrier

that planned to resume flights to Cuba.272

Much like human rights, terrorism also emerged as a crucial topic of U.S.-Cuban

talks. At the above-mentioned March 1977 meeting, Todman asked Havana to renew the

anti-hijacking agreement. In response, Cuban Vice Foreign Minister Pelegrín Torras

reminded Todman of the Crime of Barbados. “These things are not easy for our people to

understand,” he said, “and our government must be responsive to them.”273

At the

Havana talks a month later, Todman again brought up the same issue by implying U.S.

269

CIA, “International Issues: Regional and Political Analysis,” February 16, 1977, pp. 18, 22,

CREST, NARA.

270 On the legal constraint on the FBI, see esp. Bell to Brzezinski, April 8, 1977, NLC-24-10-9-2-3,

RAC, JCL.

271 Pastor to Brzezinski and Aaron, “Justice Department’s Response to PD-6,” April 15, 1977, NLC-

24-69-6-6-8, RAC, JCL.

272 Brzezinski to Carter, July 20, 1977, in folder “Cuba, 5-10/77,” box 13, Records of the Office of the

National Security Advisor (hereafter RNSA), JCL.

273 Memcon (Todman, Torras), March 24, 1977, pp. 19-20, NLC-24-10-8-2-3, RAC, JCL.

116

willingness to make a public statement against terrorism. This gesture had little impact on

Malmierca, who demanded “more than words.” Todman claimed that the U.S.

government had cut its ties with anti-Castro terrorists. “Whatever may have occurred,” he

stressed, “these relationships no longer exist.” To underscore this point, Todman handed

a FBI report to Malmierca and remarked on a U.S. request for Cuba’s assistance for

investigations in the Orlando Letelier assassination, which involved anti-Castro

militants.274

The effectiveness of the U.S. control of terrorism was put to the test between

June and August, when the administration learned of a new threat. Carter immediately

mobilized federal agencies and provided the information to the governments of the

Bahamas—where the plotters supposedly stored fuel and arms—and Cuba. The response

foiled the plot, yet the administration took the issue so seriously that it created an

interagency task force to review the procedures for prevention. Vance argued that

“simply swapping information may not be sufficient in such volatile situations” and that

“thought should be given to expanding present procedures to allow the appropriate

agency to take the lead in following events and making recommendations.” Carter

supported Vance’s argument and wrote, “We need to move on this.” On the next day,

Carter asked Brzezinski, “What are we doing to control Cuban-U.S. terrorists?” In a

memorandum for Brzezinski’s answer to Carter, Pastor responded, “Not enough.”275

274

Memcon (Malmierca, Todman), April 27, 1977, pp. 2, 5, 7-8, NLC-24-11-1-2-9, RAC, JCL. For

the assassination, see the previous chapter.

275 Vance to Carter, July 13, 1977, NLC-7-18-5-4-6, RAC, JCL; Handwritten Memo, Carter to

Brzezinski, July 14, 1977; Brzezinski to Carter, July 20, 1977; and Pastor to Brzezinski, July 20, 1977,

all in folder “Cuba, 5-10/77,” box 13, RNSA, JCL.

117

Castro volunteered to assist Carter. In June 1977, he ordered Néstor García

Iturbe, first secretary of Cuban mission to the United Nations in New York, to provide

U.S. officials with an oral statement on terrorism. The statement detailed a plot against

Cuba, including such information on principal executioners, their whereabouts, weapons,

financial sources, and collaborators in Miami.276

In doing so, Havana admitted that it had

deeply infiltrated South Florida, yet made clear its disposition to expand counterterrorism

cooperation. Later in his message to the U.S. president, Castro promised that he would

continue to oppose terrorism even though the anti-hijacking agreement had expired. The

Cuban leader referred to a large number of Cuban-born residents trained by the CIA as “a

monster that has been created [by the U.S. government] and will be extremely difficult to

control.”277

In late October, two Cuban intelligence officers, José Luis Padrón and

Antonio de la Guardia, exchanged views on Miami terrorism with FBI representatives.278

These efforts started to bear fruit. On August 15, 1977, U.S. federal and local

agents seized three boats and automatic weapons that they claimed would be used for hit-

and-run raiding on Cuba. In November, the FBI reported that the number of terrorist

actions declined from 23 to 8 within the last twelve months despite an anticipated

increase following Carter’s announcement of a new policy toward Cuba. The FBI

claimed that it had conducted “aggressive and penetrating” criminal investigations into

276

Memcon, July 22, 1977, NLC-24-65-11-3-9, RAC, JCL. For Cuba’s side, see García Iturbe,

Diplomacia sin sombra, pp. 100-110.

277 Church to Carter, Vance, and Brzezinski, August 12, 1977, in folder “Cuba, 5-10/77,” box 13,

RNSA, JCL.

278 Cited in James B. Adams (associate director) to Aaron, April 13, 1978, NLC-17-61-1-7-8, RAC,

JCL.

118

past terrorism, taken “stringent measures” to deter future actions, and devoted additional

manpower and resources to maintain an “aggressive posture” against Cuban-émigré

terrorism.279

In a U.S.-Cuban talk about maritime cooperation in May 1978, a U.S.

delegation assured that the administration was doing everything possible to prevent any

escalation of terrorism in the Florida Straits.280

In the end, however, Carter’s campaign against terrorism might have been too

vigorous for many Miami Cubans to accept. Highly publicized efforts against terrorism

drew vocal criticism not only from hardliners like RECE leader Jorge Mas Canosa, but

also from Bernardo Benes, who later played a role in a U.S. dialogue with Cuba. Their

defition of “terrorism” was different. Unlike the U.S. and Cuban governments, they still

considered raiders who plotted to topple the Cuban government through military means

as “patriots,” rather than terrorists.281

As Maurice A. Ferrer, mayor of the city of Miami,

wrote to Carter, Washington’s anti-terrorism campaign created “utter confusion” in the

minds of thousands of these Cubans.282

Such developments worried Durán, who preferred

a gradual approach to “sensitize” the community to the goals of the U.S. government. In

late October, he led a group of Miami Cubans, including Mas Canosa, to convey Miami’s

279

FBI Director to Bell, November 29, 1977, NLC-24-11-4-5-4, RAC, JCL. Pastor to Brzezinski,

December 10, 1977, in folder “Cuba, 11/77 to 2/78,” box 13, RNSA, JCL. For a FBI’s self-evaluation,

see also Michael Kelly to Brzezinski, Christopher, Turner, December 2, 1977, in folder “Cuba 10-

12/77,” box 11, NSA: Staff Material-North/South (Pastor) Files, JCL.

280 The Cuban delegation complained that none of “counterrevolutionary terrorists” went to prisons.

The U.S. delegation did not refute this point but claim that it was the result of the division of power

between executive and judicial branches of the U.S. government, not the show of hostile intentions

against the revolutionary regime. “Resumen del informe sobre los resultados de las conversaciones

guardacostas-guardafronteras,” May 8-10, 1978, Caja “Agresiones 3,” MINREX.

281 See for example, DLA, August 5, 1977, pp. 1, 23; DLA, August 6, 1977, p. 1; DLA, August 7, 1977,

p. 1; and an editorial, August 7, 1977, DLA, p. 4.

282 Ferrer to Carter, August 8, 1977, in folder “Cubans,” box 2287, Dante Fascell Papers, UM-SC.

119

views to Brzezinski.283

After the meeting, Brzezinski reported to Carter that he had

“relieved their anxiety.”284

This was hardly true.

A Deadlock over Africa and the Embargo

Despite Carter’s important achievement on terrorism, the U.S.-Cuban dialogue

was losing its momentum because of the renewed Cold War in Africa. The bilateral talks

started in March 1977, and by August, the two countries agreed on fisheries and maritime

boundaries and reopened interest sections—“embassies in all but name”—in each other’s

capitals.285

They made other gestures. Whereas Washington halted SR-71 overflights and

lifted the ban on travel by U.S. citizens, Havana released ten U.S. prisoners and permitted

a number of visits of divided families. But the growing African conflicts complicated

matters. Havana stalled the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, its major ally, in

response to the increased regional tensions after the Shaba I affair. Angola pleaded with

Cuba to defend the nation against its hostile neighbors, Zaire and South Africa, both of

which allied with the United States.286

It was in this context that Brzezinski reframed the U.S. discussion on Cuba. By

then U.S. policy toward Cuba was essentially part of a U.S. dialogue with Latin America,

as advocated by the Linowitz report. Although the State Department expressed concern

283

Pastor to Brzezinski, October 26, 1977, NLC-24-11-4-2-8, RAC, JCL; and Pastor to Brzezinski,

October 7, 1977, NLC-24-19-7-20-5, RAC, JCL.

284 Brzezinski to Carter, October 28, 1977, NLC-1-4-2-58-1, RAC, JCL.

285 For the quote, Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, p. 114. Although the U.S. and Cuban interest

sections already existed in the Swiss and Czech embassies, U.S. and Cuban diplomats began to staff

them and reopened the offices in former embassy buildings in Havana and Washington.

286 For the best account of the Shaba I affair, see Gleijeses, Visions, pp. 39-44.

120

about Cuba’s role in Africa, it avoided linking this issue with bilateral matters.287

But at a

crucial August 3, 1977, meeting on Cuba, Brzezinski advocated the opposite. He stood

against the State Department’s proposal for the partial lifting of the embargo, which

aimed to draw Havana’s concessions on human rights. The national security adviser

conceded that human rights was important “because it is good in itself; because it is

important to the President; and also because it is of great importance to the Cuban

American community.” Yet, he insisted that the administration maintain the embargo

because it was “the only U.S. leverage” to restrain Cuba’s African policy, which he

identified as the single most important U.S. national interest regarding Cuba. Secretary of

Treasury Michael Blumenthal vehemently contested this far-reaching shift of policy

understanding. “Normalization is important not just because of Cuba’s activities in

Africa,” he exclaimed. Still, it was Brzezinski who won the debate. Carter himself was

deeply concerned about Cuba’s roles in Africa. In his talks with Tanzanian President

Julius Nyerere, Carter complained of the continued presence of Cuban troops in Africa,

which made it “impossible for us to normalize relations with Cuba.”288

This abrupt change in the U.S. policy orientation puzzled Havana. Cuban foreign

policy was a matter of national sovereignty, Castro believed. Cuba also was defending

the existing government in Angola from external aggression. Abandoning the Angolan

287

Talks with Deputy Assistant Secretary Luers, cited in Canadian embassy in Washington to Ottawa,

April 7, 1977, vol. 16019 file 20-Cuba-1-3-USA part 5, LAC.

288 Vance was absent from the meeting. Blumenthal was a member of the Linowitz commission.

Department of State’s Policy Paper, n.d., NLC-24-17-6-7-4, RAC, JCL; Minutes, Policy Review

Committee Meeting, August 3, 1977, NLC-15-8-1-10-5, JCL; and Brzezinski to Carter, August 18,

1977, Declassified Documents Reference System (hereafter DDRS). For Carter’s comment on Cuba’s

roles in Africa, see Memcon (Carter, Nyerere), August 4, 1977, NLC-133-42-3-20-2, RAC, JCL.

121

Revolution for the sake of an improvement of U.S.-Cuban relations was unthinkable, as

Castro reassured Angolan President Agostinho Neto.289

Furthermore, the Cuban leader

was essentially nationalist in nature, and did not want to create the perception that he was

opportunistic and susceptible to U.S. pressure.290

Castro refused the linkage between his

interests in Africa and U.S.-Cuban détente. Both publicly and privately, Castro repeated

that Cuban solidarity with its African allies was nonnegotiable.291

“Cuba is not China,”

he said at one point.292

But Carter continued to claim that Cuba should withdraw from Africa to make

progress on U.S.-Cuban normalization. When this suasion did not work, Carter tried to

mount international pressure on Cuba through negative public relations campaigns.293

In

November, in a statement for attribution to a “high-ranking Administration official,”

Brzezinski told U.S. reporters that there has been a recent military buildup by Cuba in

African countries that made normalization of relations with Cuba “impossible.” He cited

an increase of 4,000 to 6,000 Cuban troops in Angola since July, a figure that turned out

to be based on a change in CIA bookkeeping, not on an actual increase. Brzezinski’s

“marked indifference to the facts” irritated Cuban officials.294

Castro later called it

289

Memcon (Castro and Neto), March 23, 1977, Consejo de Estado (Cuba), Wilson Center Digital

Archive (hereafter WCDA).

290 Padrón, interview transcript, November 4, 2013, pp. 2-3.

291 For example, see interview with Castro for Afrique Asie, May 12, 1977, in Bohemia, May 20, 1977,

pp. 58-65.

292 Speech by Fidel Castro, January 1, 1979, Discursos.

293 Carter, White House Diary, p. 134.

294 Smith, Closest of Enemies, pp. 122-27; and Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, November 25,

1977, vol. 12614 file 20-Cuba-1-3, part 13, LAC.

122

“deliberate propaganda,” and “this was when the anti-climate in the United States

began.”295

A month later, Castro’s rhetoric flared up in a speech. “In the same manner

that in the past we fought against five presidents of the United States,” he declared, “we

will now fight against the sixth.” Cuba had already begun to send new troops to the Horn

of Africa, this time to defend Ethiopia from invading Somalian armies.296

U.S.-Cuban disputes over Africa reached a peak in May 1978, when Carter and

Castro engaged in verbal battles over the Shaba II affair. As soon as Castro received news

of the intrusion of Angola-based Katangan rebels into Zaire’s Shaba province, he

conveyed an assurance to Carter that Cuba was not involved. Despite the receipt of this

confidential message, however, Washington publicly condemned the Cuban presence in

Africa as the cause of the incident and denounced the Cuban leader as a liar. Castro shot

back, and went public to blame Brzezinski for misleading the U.S. president.297

Not

surprisingly, the exchange of these accusations did not help to foster U.S. public support

for the dialogue. By this time Carter became hostage of his rhetoric, as Wayne Smith

notes. The administration “talked so often and in such alarmist terms about the Cubans in

Africa…that various members of Congress began to demand that something be done.”

But “when none did, Carter was labeled a wimp.”298

The process of U.S.-Cuban

normalization appeared to stall.

295

Memcon (Castro, Turner, Pastor), December 3-4, 1978, DDRS.

296 Fidel Castro, 2nd Period of Sessions of the National Assembly of People’s Power: City of Havana

December 24, 1977, Year of Institutionalization (Havana: Political Publishers, 1978), p. 66. On the

Cuban intervention in the Horn of Africa, see Gleijeses, Visions, pp. 49-53.

297 For the best account of the Shaba II affair and U.S.-Cuban reactions, see Gleijeses, Visions, pp. 55-

60.

298 Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, p. 142.

123

Cuba’s Outreach Efforts in U.S. Society

The disagreements over Africa did not necessarily end the U.S.-Cuban dialogue,

however. Castro was not impatient. In his May 1977 interview with ABC reporter

Barbara Walters, the Cuban leader estimated that U.S.-Cuban normalization would

prolonge until Carter’s second term.299

For the time being he worked to generate

favorable audiences both in the United States and Cuba. The Cuban leader invited

journalists, business groups, and politicians to Havana, and talked with many of them

personally. The Cuban interests section (CUINT) in Washington was developing

relations with the Congress, business, the press, academics, and influential private

citizens. Castro also sought to prepare the Cuban public in anticipation of eventual U.S.-

Cuban normalization. “Imperial aggression strengthened revolutionary spirit in Cuba,” he

said in one of the speeches, “but the Cuban Revolution would not need imperialist

aggression to survive.”300

Monthly reports to Havana from Ramón Sánchez-Parodi, head of the CUINT in

Washington, contained considerable information on Cuba’s outreach to U.S. society.

Since its opening in August 1977, this Cuban outpost in the U.S. capital strove to provide

information, expand people-to-people communication, and overcome the negative

stereotype of the revolutionary regime. In the U.S. Congress, the CUINT could count on

the Congressional Black Caucus and liberal Democrats as natural allies because of their

299

Entrevista Concedida por el Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro a la Periodista Norteamericana Barbara Walters, 19 de Mayo de 1977 (Havana: Oficina de Publicaciones del Consejo de Estado,

1977).

300 Speech by Fidel Castro, September 28, 1977, in Bohemia, October 7, 1977, pp. 50-59.

124

sympathy for the Cuban fight against apartheid Southern Africa. The section also reached

out to conservative Republicans to see if they could visit the island and seek business

relations despite ideological differences. The CUINT was also active in non-political

fields. It hosted cultural events and music performances in various U.S. cities and kept in

touch with U.S. universities, which showed interest in organizing trips to Cuba.301

Expanding Cuba’s influence in the United States required much labor, especially

in light of what was perceived as an “anti-Cuban” campaign by Brzezinski. The CUINT

lamented that Washington’s show of hostility had a chilling effect on U.S. business

sectors since several local chambers of commerce cancelled their planned trips to Cuba.

Still, the section had some good news. It reported favorably on the Black Caucus’s

criticisms against Carter’s accusation of Castro over the Shaba II affair. Afro-business

sectors and a lobbying group TransAfrica, which advocated global justice for the African

world, remained eager to visit the island. The report also highlighted that the Cuban

National Ballet made a superb performance in Washington and impressed the audience.

“We consider that the presence of the Ballet in Washington has been very fortunate,”

Sánchez-Parodi wrote, “since it contributed to counterattack the current campaign against

our country.”302

A month later, the CUINT pleasantly noted that the Conference of Mayors

approved a resolution in favor of its visit to Cuba despite strong opposition from the

301

CUINT in Washington to Havana, Informe de apreciación sobre la política de Estados Unidos hacia

Cuba, June 6, 1978, Caja “Bilateral 22,” MINREX.

302 Ibid., see esp. pp. 10-16, 25.

125

mayor of Miami.303

Even as late as February 1979, the CUINT reported that U.S.

academic, media, and business sectors maintained interest in the island despite mounting

difficulties in government-to-government relations. The list of U.S. universities that kept

in touch with the CUINT included Johns Hopkins, Columbia, Harvard, MIT,

Georgetown, George Washington, Howard, UT Austin, Florida, North Carolina at Chapel

Hill, and U.C. Berkeley. The section also organized several cultural activities, such as

“Cuban Night” at the National Press Club in Washington, orchestra performances by

Aragón and Elena Burke in New York, and a tour by famous musicians Silvio Rodríguez

and Pablo Milanés around U.S. cities. According to Cuban diplomats in Washington, all

these activities contributed to “the increase of Cuban political influence in the United

States.”304

Castro’s Overtures: Fidel Castro’s “New Economic Policy”

Havana’s most far-reaching move on this front was its outreach to the Cuban

American community. Carter’s initial policy amplified expectation among Miami

moderates that U.S.-Cuban dialogue may result in the release of prisoners in Cuba and

reunification of Cuban families. Searching for their identity and cultural origins, radical

youths and professionals travelled to Cuba for three weeks, with the concurrence of the

Cuban government. Castro entertained the group of 55 Cuban émigrés, the Brigade

303

CUINT in Washington to Havana, Informe de apreciación sobre la política de Estados Unidos hacia

Cuba—del 6 al 30 de junio de 1978, Caja “Bilateral 22,” MINREX.

304 CUINT in Washington to Havana, Informe de apreciación sobre la política de Estados Unidos hacia

Cuba—del 5 de diciembre de 1978 al 12 de febrero de 1979, February 20, 1979, pp. 3-4, 10-11, Caja

“Bilateral 22,” MINREX.

126

Antonio Maceo, and allowed their documentary, 55 Hermanos, to be shown at Cuban

theaters, which drew record crowds. “Scenes of young exiles returning to their childhood

rooftop playgrounds and neighborhoods warmed the hearts of a public that until then had

been publicly encouraged to despise those who had left,” according to a participant of the

brigade. “Audiences left the theaters crying.”305

Behind the scenes Castro opened secret channels with Bernardo Benes, a Jewish

banker of Cuban origin in Miami. Benes did not hold an official title in the administration,

yet he belonged to Durán’s group and saw the dialogue with Castro as the only way to

solve human rights problems in Cuba. In August 1977, he encountered José Luis Padrón,

executive assistant to the Cuban Ministry of Interior’s first vice minister, by chance.

Alberto Pons, a friend of Panamanian Vice President Ricardo de la Espriella, knew that

both Benes and Padrón happened to be in Panama and arranged their meeting in the hope

of better U.S.-Cuban relations. It was after this meeting that Benes decided to act as a

private intermediary between Washington and Havana, and recruited his friend, Charles

Dascal, to join him. In contrast to Brzezinski, Benes and Dascal were more interested in

the wellbeing of the prisoners than Cuban interventions in Africa.306

Of special importance was the first Havana meeting of Benes and Dascal with

Castro in February 1978. Here Castro expressed sympathy for their interest in the plight

of prisoners, and promised that he would examine the matter, as well as the issues of

305

Torres, Mirrors, p. 93. On the brigade, see an editorial, Areíto 4, nos. 3-4 (Spring 1978). For this

trip, see Roman de la Campa, “Itinirario de la Brigada Antonio Maceo,” and Miriam Muñiz, “Algunas

Cartas y Anotaciones,” both in Areíto 4, nos. 3-4 (Spring 1978), pp. 12-23.

306 Padrón, interview transcript, Havana, February 10, 2010, in author’s possession. Padrón finds

Levine’s version of the first encounter false.

127

family reunification. Castro then exhibited interest in opening clandestine channels of

communication with Carter. He repeated that Carter was a moral, decent person with

religious convictions, and emphasized that it was important to sit down with him before

his term ended. The meeting lasted for over seven hours and impressed not only the

visitors but also Cuban officials. “Unprecedent [sic]—180 degrees change of position

regarding Cuban Community abroad and U.S.,” Padrón dictated to Benes after the

meeting. “[I have] never heard him talk to strangers in such a candid and open way—

economic development, commercial and trade relations—tell Dr. Breszinsky [sic] this is

the Cuban NEP [New Economic Policy] of [Vladimir] Lenin.”307

According to Padrón, who became a special envoy of Fidel Castro thereafter, the

meeting was the first time when he and other Cuban officials heard of Castro’s new

vision for the Cuban economy. The timing was crucial. It was five years before the

Decree no. 82, issued in 1982, which approved foreign capital investment. “I think it was

extremely important,” Padrón says, that Castro was ready to adjust the Cuban economic

system in response to the changing relations with the United States, while considering

new scenarios and new interests. Benes and Dascal also played a critical role in giving

Castro a new perspective on the Cuban American community, which, according to

Padrón, “none of us [Cuban leaders] had.” Dascal spoke frankly to the Cuban leader,

“Fidel, you are betting for the losing chicken, the Soviet Union.” He explained how a

307

Memoir by Benes, pp. 12-19; Benes’ note, “First Meeting of Bernardo Benes with Fidel Castro in

Havana, Cuba,” in folder “Dialogue, n.d., 1977-1979,” box 2, Mirta Ojito Papers, UM-CHC. A partial

version of this meeting appears in Levine, Secret Missions, pp. 91-92. The NEP was a more capitalist-

oriented economic reform conducted by Vladimir Lenin since 1921. While holding state control of

large state industries, Lenin promoted privatization to promote production, trade, and economic

growth. Joseph Stalin abolished it in 1928.

128

Cuban émigré who had arrived with fifty pesos in the United States became one of the

richest men in twenty years.308

Out of his desire to tell a real story about Miami, Benes later produced a TV

documentary on the political, economic, and cultural accomplishments of the Cuban

community. This video astonished Castro. When an announcer introduced a Cuban

American shoe factory producing sixty thousand shoes a day, Castro jumped up and said,

“Benes, this is wrong. This should be sixty thousand a year.” Benes responded, “No,

Fidel. It is sixty thousand pairs of shoes a day, as the announcer says.” For a while,

Castro found it difficult to grapple with what he had watched. “This is a million of

Cubans who left for the north in a mess, for the country whose culture was different and

foreign, for the country that was discriminatory and capitalist. Look [at] what they have

done!”309

Some Cuban officials like Padrón appreciated Benes and Dascal’s roles because

of their concerns about Cuba’s economic future. “I was very critical of the economic

scheme that was predominant in Cuba at that moment,” recalls Padrón in an interview.

The Cuban economy was “almost carbon copy of the Soviet system,” and “I was

convinced that would not develop the country.” Padrón looked for new ideas and found

two sources of inspiration: the Jews and the Palestinians. Both of them benefited from

political and economic ties among their Diasporas. “So I said, well, we had a nation, we

had a state. Why could not we do the same?” Castro seemed to agree with him. The

308

Padrón, interview transcript, November 4, 2013, p. 8.

309 Memoir by Benes, pp. 42-44. Padrón frankly confirmed this story. Padrón, interview transcript,

November 4, 2013, pp. 2, 6. Similar story appears in Levine, Secret Missions, p. 99, although the

author does not mention some critical elements of this story.

129

Cuban leader appointed Padrón as Cuba’s Minister of Tourism, allowing him to set up a

new corporation, CIMEX, for which the government would work with foreign capital.310

Later, Castro himself told Benes that Cuba’s priority was to promote détente with the

West and establish “a new order of economic development.”311

As the phrase NEP implied, Castro did not abandon the final goal of building

socialism but viewed the new economy plan as a temporary measure to reconstruct the

Cuban economy. He indicated to Moyers, Benes, and Dascal that Cuba had no intention

of cutting its economic ties to the Soviet Union because they were beneficial for the

island.312

As indicated previously, neither did Castro have any idea of abandoning his

policy objective in Africa only to improve relations with the United States. However,

despite these qualifications, the revelation of Castro’s intentions prior to the opening of

secret meetings was important. By illustrating his strong desire to reenergize the Cuban

economy, it helps to understand why he showed a keen interest in resuming talks with the

United States, even though Carter maintained the embargo on the island.313

310

Padrón, interview transcript, November 4, 2013, p. 4. Padrón discussed the idea of mixed industry

with Benes and Dascal in Mexico City in late March. Memoir by Benes, pp. 99-103. Dascal viewed

Padrón as one of pragmatic and open-minded Cubans who wanted to change the course of Cuba’s

economic future. See Dascal to Brzezinski, n.d., in folder “Cuba, 2/78-4/78,” box 10, GF, ZBC, JCL.

311 Memoir by Benes, p. 116.

312 Memoir by Benes, pp. 113-4. See also, Memcon (Padrón, Newsom), July 5, 1978, p. 11, in folder

“Cuba, 5/78-8/78,” box 10, GF, ZBC, JCL.

313 The Cuban government also took some other measures to lower regulations on economic activities.

In July 1978, the government issued the Decree no. 14 to authorize part-time economic activities of

selling hand-made goods. The same decree also allowed individuals to provide personal services like

car repair and plumbing on a part-time basis. Jorge F. Pérez-López, Cuba’s Second Economy (New

Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1995), pp. 91-94.

130

Alpha Channel

Washington was ambivalent toward Benes and Dascal’s private diplomacy and

Castro’s interest in the opening of a secret U.S.-Cuban communication. After he received

Havana’s messages through Benes and Dascal, Brzezinski sent his deputy David Aaron

to the meeting with Padrón in New York on April 14, 1978.314

Unlike Benes and Dascal,

Brzezinski and Aaron had far less interest in human rights issues than Cuba’s roles in

Africa. “I will suggest to Padrón that the Cubans are being exploited by the Soviets in

Africa,” Aaron pledged to Brzezinski a day before the meeting.315

When Aaron actually

fulfilled his promise, Padrón gave him a frank response. “You’re not well informed,” he

said. “We believe that sometimes the United States underestimates the character, the

position, and the influence of Cuba in Africa.” The talks made clear the degree of

misperception, although they agreed to continue to talk.316

In contrast, Vance’s State Department paid more attention to human rights issues

and took more forthcoming attitudes toward the resumption of U.S.-Cuban talks.

According to William LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh, the Cubans found the New York

meeting so unsatisfactory that they asked Benes and Dascal to contact the State

Department. At their meeting with Vance, Benes and Dascal found him more amicable,

engaging, and interested in their account than Brzezinski. Whereas Brzezinski cut them

out of communication, Vance even assigned his top aide, Peter Tarnoff, as their contact

314

Brzezinski to Aaron, March 27, 1978, in folder “Cuba, 2/78-4/78,” box 10, GF, ZBC, JCL.

315 Aaron to Brzezinski, April 13, 1978, DDRS.

316 Memcon (Padrón, Aaron), April 14, 1978, in folder “Cuba 2/78-4/78,” box 10, GF, ZBC, JCL.

131

person.317

Appealing to human rights concerns, Vance then persuaded Carter to open

Alpha Channel, a top-secret channel with Havana. For the following months, U.S. and

Cuban delegations met in New York, Washington, Atlanta, Cuernavaca (Mexico), and

Havana.318

In New York on June 15 and Washington on July 6, U.S. and Cuban

representatives exchanged their views about Africa and human rights. The talks on the

latter went smoothly. In light of Castro’s talks with Benes and Dascal, Padrón stated,

Havana had already decided to release hundreds of prisoners and authorize their

departure with their families from Cuba. This new initiative would help to “improve the

climate between the U.S. Cuban community and Cuba” and also “create a propitious

climate in U.S. public opinion.”319

Vance’s State Department welcomed this move,

showing its willingness to accept these Cubans and process their visa applications.320

But

Brzezinski doubted Castro’s intentions, suspected Vance’s naiveté, and instructed the U.S.

delegation not to discuss “any bilateral issues.” In that way, Washington would not have

to reciprocate Havana’s concessions on human rights.321

317

LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, pp. 184-85; and Levine, Secret Missions, 97-99.

318 Virtually all memcons were declassified very recently. Partial stories appear in Levine’s Secret

Missions, Schoultz’s Infernal, Gleijeses’ Visions, and LeoGrande and Kornbluh’s Back Channel. Yet

none of them tells about the Atlanta meeting, the most important of all. Padrón claimed that the Soviet

Union knew nothing about this channel. Padrón, interview transcript, February 10, 2010, p. 9. On

Carter’s decision, see Tarnoff, interview transcript by David Engstrom, July 20, 1988, p. 4, in author’s

possession.

319 Statement by Padrón, in Memcon (Padrón, Newsom), June 15, 1978, pp. 4-6, DDRS.

320 Statement by Newsom, in Memcon (Padrón, Newsom), July 5, 1978, pp. 1-2.

321 Newsom, interview transcript by David Engstrom, July 17, 1987, p. 6, in author’s possession; and

Brzezinski to Carter, July 7, 1978, in folder “Cuba—Alpha Channel [6/78-10/78],” box 10, GF, ZBC,

JCL. On Brzezinski-Vance rivalry, see Gleijeses, Visions, pp. 120-22.

132

Then came the meeting in Atlanta on August 8, 1978. By then the Cuban

expectation about the prospect of better U.S.-Cuban relations had increased to one of its

highest points. Unlike the previous New York meeting with Aaron, Padrón found the

Washington meeting with Vance’s assistant David Newsom very satisfactory. “This is as

if a man who could not speak for twenty years,” he described to Benes, “suddenly started

to speak words like ‘dad,’ ‘mom,’ and ‘honey (nené).’”322

Their enthusiasm waned when

they found that Washington was discouraging fifteen countries from attending the Non-

Aligned Movement summit to be held in Havana. In his major July 26 speech Castro

unleashed a diatribe against U.S. imperialism, ridiculed Carter’s human rights policy, and

condemned U.S. support for Nicaragua, Chile, and other undemocratic regimes

conducting genocide and torture.323

Padrón admitted that the address was acrimonious,

but sent messages to Carter through Benes that Cuba looked to the Atlanta meeting as

“very important” and expected that Washington would reciprocate Havana’s

concessions.324

The Atlanta meeting completely disappointed the Cubans. In response to Castro’s

July 26 speech, the NSC’s Aaron opened the meeting by citing Carter’s comment, “Are

they [Cubans] really serious?” This question infuriated the Cuban delegation.325

Neither

were they pleased to hear again the U.S. position that Cuba should withdraw from Africa

322

Memoir by Benes, p. 122.

323 Castro also claimed that the United States repeatedly violated human rights principles by dropping

atomic bombs in Japan, by intervening militarily in Latin America, and by assassinating millions of

Vietnamese. Speech by Fidel Castro, July 26, 1978, Discursos.

324 Memoir by Benes, pp. 126-28; and Tarnoff to Vance, August 3, 1978, DDRS.

325 Levine, Secret Missions, pp. 101-4; and Memoir by Benes, p. 133.

133

and restrain criticism of the United States on such matters as Puerto Rico. Padrón

reiterated that foreign policy was nonnegotiable with the United States. The Cuban troops

came at the request of Angola. Unless the United States gave a security guarantee for

Angola from the external danger of South Africa, Angola would not ask the Cubans to

leave. The State Department’s Newsom called the meeting “disappointing,” but the U.S.

delegation made it even worse for the Cuban counterpart by cutting the meeting in half.

When Padrón requested that they talk about the blockade and Guantánamo on the Cuban

agenda, the U.S. delegation refused to comment. The discussion had entered a vicious

cycle. Padrón denounced this meeting as “one-sided.”326

In Havana, Benes saw Castro losing patience. Cuba already had released more

than 1,000 prisoners. Although Castro still wanted to bring the U.S. delegation to Havana

to expedite U.S.-Cuban talks, he also quipped that Carter did little to reciprocate his

gesture. “Everything has been unilateral,” the Cuban leader said. “We want to work

constructively. But if they fuck us, we shall fuck them twenty-four hours a day! We are

willing to talk about anything, but in an atmosphere of decorum. We will not stand to be

humiliated!” Castro repeatedly said, “Cuba will not deal with the United States with

concessions or conditions!”327

Benes thought that this misunderstanding drew from cultural differences between

the United States and Cuba. To the Cubans, Castro’s vitriolic attacks on the United States

in his public speeches simply reflected his trademark revolutionary zeal. To the

326

Memcon (Aaron, Newsom, Padrón, Arbesú), August 8, 1978, NLC-24-12-2-9-1, RAC, JCL.

327 Memoir by Benes, pp. 134-26, 141-42, 144. Benes met Castro a week after the Atlanta meeting.

134

Americans, these criticisms of Yankee imperialism during negotiation periods not only

increased the political cost of the dialogue but also meant a lack of sincerity on the part of

Cuba.328

However insightful this observation might have been, it is also undeniable that

Washington and Havana confronted a security dilemma in Southern Africa. As historian

Piero Gleijeses notes, Carter failed to restrain South Africa, which exacerbated the

regional tensions and threatened Angola. Even if Cuba was eager to reduce troops in

Angola, South African intransigence made this impossible.329

The U.S.-Cuban talks

became more complicated after Castro embarked on a dialogue with “the Cuban

community abroad.”

The Entangled Triangle: Havana, Miami, and Washington

On September 6, 1978, Castro surprised the world media by inviting Cuban

émigrés to the Diálogo, a dialogue for national reconciliation among Cubans at home and

abroad. The Diálogo planned to address not only the release of thousands of Cuban

prisoners convicted of political crimes, but also the reunification of Cuban families

separated across the Florida Straits for over twenty years. Havana’s decision was

transcendent. For years Castro and millions of Cubans had condemned Cuban Americans

as gusanos (worms) because they left the island at difficult times after the revolution. But

the Cuban leader now referred to them as members of the “Cuban community abroad”

and expressed his regret that he had used this insulting term. He argued that the past was

328

Levine, Secret Missions, pp. 103-4.

329 Gleijeses, Visions, p. 113. See also, Memcon (Aaron, Newsom, Padrón, Arbesú), November 1,

1978, in folder “Cuba—Alpha Channel [11/78],” box 10, GF, ZBC, JCL.

135

the past. “For the first time in almost twenty years,” he claimed, “we are willing to talk

with personalities of the Cuban community abroad.”330

Castro’s September 1978 press conference startled U.S. officials, even though

they had prior notice. Peter Tarnoff rushed to call Benes and asked why Castro created a

new situation. Tarnoff feared that Havana’s actions would force Washington to start to

discuss U.S.-Cuban issues in the public just before the November mid-term election.

Benes reminded him that the conference was merely symbolic. But soon Washington

concluded that Havana was using new pressure tactics to make the United States commit

to negotiations.331

Havana tried to reassure U.S. officials, sending a message that it “just wanted to

make the community more amicable, less hostile.”332

Indeed, from the start of U.S.-

Cuban talks, it was Carter who encouraged Castro to improve relations with Miami.

Then, why did Castro go public? According to Padrón’s recollection, the Cuban

government wanted to engage in the battle for the hearts and minds of Cubans abroad.

But not all Cuban leaders at home were convinced. Many Cubans could not forgive those

who had left. Much like Miami Cubans, Havana Cubans had many disagreements among

themselves. “These disagreements appeared discreetly and subtly, if not openly, in front

of Fidel,” Padrón recalls.333

Castro had to persuade Cubans both inside and outside Cuba.

Six weeks later, when the first group of forty-eight prisoners left Cuba, Castro stated,

330

Press conference by Fidel Castro, September 6, 1978, in Diálogo del gobierno cubano y personas

representativas de la comunidad cubana en el exterior (Havana: Editora Política, 1994), p. 12.

331 Memoir by Benes, pp. 144-46; and Tarnoff to Brzezinski, September 13, 1978, DDRS.

332 Memoir by Benes, pp. 155-57.

333 Padrón, interview transcript, November 4, 2013, p. 2.

136

“Please do not think that this was easy for us. For us this was also a brave gesture, since

we have had to explain to the [Cuban] people, who have spent twenty years fighting and

holding that way of thinking.” He added, “If they do not understand, this is a failure.”334

But after the Atlanta meeting the U.S. government found it difficult to believe that

Cuba was acting in good faith. Cuba also tried to move faster exactly when the United

States tried to slow down the pace of negotiations. The United States had a lot of other

foreign policy issues, such as Vietnam, China, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT),

and the Middle East. At the inter-agency meeting on August 22, 1978, NSC’s Aaron

reminded the participants that the U.S. president “wants to be careful not to overload the

circuits.” As the 1978 mid-term election was approaching, the NSC and State Department

decided to conduct a broader analysis of U.S.-Cuban relations and its domestic political

impact.335

Equally instructive is Washington’s reading of Miami reactions to the Diálogo.

Many Miami Cubans reacted enthusiastically to Castro’s invitation. Unaware of the

existing secret U.S.-Cuban talks, they thought that negotiations with Castro were the only

path to break a revolutionary-counterrevolutionary impasse, in which thousands of Cuban

prisoners stayed behind bars and tens of thousands of families remained separated across

the border.336

Yet, working with Castro was still unthinkable for many militants and

hardliners. “Talk with Castro…is politically absurd,” wrote Mas Canosa. He claimed that

334

Quoted in Ramírez Cañedo and Morales, De la confrontación, p. 171.

335 Memcon (Christopher, Aaron), esp. p. 3, August 23, 1978, NLC-15-60-2-2-5, RAC, JCL.

336 García, Havana USA, pp. 47-48; Torres, Mirrors, pp. 94-95; and WP, October 24, 1978, p. A13.

137

the release of prisoners had nothing to do with the Diálogo; it was a gesture to Carter. He

urged his readers not to succumb to “emotional impulse” and “fall into Castro’s ploy.”337

Despite this mixed feedback, Washington was rather impressed by the emerging

dynamic that mounted pressure on the seemingly inactive administration. Citing an

example of Jewish-Israeli relations, Tarnoff wrote to Brzezinski that the Cuban American

community might become a pressure group calling for new steps toward U.S.-Cuban

normalization. In line with this argument, Tarnoff hinted at a growing discrepancy

between the national interest and Cuban American interest in the foreseeable future:

The time may come when they will want to move ahead faster than will suit our

purpose…But even should they begin to get ahead of us, this should not prove a

serious problem. As a pressure group, the relatively small Cuban American

community has definite limits. We move ahead in opening the normalization

process despite their objections; we should be able to control its pace even should

they urge a faster one.338

The administration soon found the growing desires for a change in their lives among

thousands of Cubans and Cuban Americans uncontrollable.

337

DLA, September 14, 1978, in Jorge Mas Canosa, Jorge Mas Canosa en busca de una Cuba libre: Edición completa de sus discursos, entrevistas y declaraciones, 1962-1997 (Coral Gables, FL: North-

South Center Press, University of Miami, 2003), vol. 1, pp. 333-34.

338 Tarnoff to Brzezinski, September 13, 1978, DDRS.

138

Many Consequences of the Dialogue—The Release of Prisoners

In the end, Havana’s ill-timed gesture ironically reinforced suspicion rather than

good feeling in Washington. At the Cuernavaca meeting on October 28, 1978, the U.S.

and Cuban delegations again exchanged their views on Africa, but failed to break the

impasse. The Cubans stressed the release of prisoners and the effort to improve their

relations with the Cuban American community as proof of their seriousness regarding the

dialogue with the United States. Padrón reminded the U.S. delegation of its significance:

You have always told us that this [Cuban Americans’ attitude toward Cuba] was

a very important factor in allowing any U.S. administration to improve relations.

We concur with this and feel that a hostile Cuban community in the U.S. is

useful neither to the U.S. nor Cuba. We, therefore, determined that it was

prudent, appropriate and advisable for us to improve relations with the Cuban

community.

The U.S. delegation disappointed Padrón by sticking to the same point: it would consider

the lifting of the embargo only after Cuban troops left Africa. Prevalent among U.S.

officials was Brzezinski’s line that the presence of Cuban troops in Africa was far more

important than human rights in Cuba.339

Washington’s fixation on Cuba’s ties to the

Soviet Union was so great that it occasionally misread intelligence reports. In November

339

Memcon, November 1, 1978; and Aaron to Carter, October 30, 1978, in folder “Cuba—Alpha

Channel [6/78-10/78],” box 10, GF, ZBC, JCL. See also Pastor, “Carter-Castro,” p. 246.

139

1978, the U.S. government dramatized the Soviet upgrading of MiG-23s on the island

and resumed SR-71 surveillance flights over Havana.340

Still, it bears emphasizing that Washington and Havana continued to maintain

communications. In his report to Carter on foreign policy priorities for 1979, Secretary

Vance insisted that normalization of relations with traditional anti-U.S. countries remain

a U.S. goal to stabilize international system, expand U.S. influence in the world, and

counter the Soviet expansion of power. Carter still probably saw merits in such

arguments, although he wrote in the margin of the memorandum: “Status quo on

Cuba.”341

Neither did Castro foresee any immediate hope for progress in U.S.-Cuban

dialogue, but he too wanted to avoid any backsliding. In his message to Carter, the Cuban

leader conveyed his wishes to pursue links with the Cuban American community and

maintain U.S.-Cuban cooperation on issues of mutual interest, including the exchange of

information on terrorists. “[That’s] ok to me,” Carter responded.342

In the absence of Washington’s outright opposition, Havana continued to build its

links with Miami. The Cuban government initially allowed Benes to assemble a broad

range of people as community representatives, but when his recruitment did not go well

amid the flurry of bomb threats, it started to contact “all of those who [had] expressed a

willingness to participate in this dialogue.”343

In late November, the Committee of 75

340

For this controversy, see Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 328-330. Carter noted in his diary that the whole

incident “was being made out of a molehill.” Carter, White House Diary, p. 262.

341 Vance to Carter, n.d., in folder “State Department Evening Report, 1/79,” box 39, PF, JCL.

342 Vance to Carter, March 22, 1979, in folder “State Department Evening Report, 3/79,” box 39, PF,

JCL.

343 Memoir by Benes, p. 151; Miami News, November 6, 1978, p. 1A. Some rejected the offer, and

others made no response.

140

(simply because at a certain point it had seventy-five members) attended its first meeting

with Castro in Havana. At the end of this discussion Castro announced that he would free

3,600 prisoners from Cuban jails, permit these Cubans, as well as thousands more former

prisoners and their families, to leave the island, grant émigrés permission to visit their

families in Cuba, and promise further consideration of other matters of interest for the

community abroad. The announcement was “window-dressing.” Benes, Dascal, and

Castro had already worked out all the details.344

This time, Castro underscored Carter’s contribution to his decision, but Havana’s

move puzzled Washington. The number of former prisoners allowed to leave Cuba far

exceeded the number that the U.S. government could accept amid an economic

depression. The U.S. Justice Department was reluctant and slow in processing the entry

of Cuban prisoners, and upset both the Cuban government and the Committee of 75.345

In

the face of Cuban American pressure, Bell later agreed to accelerate the processing, but

the problems remained unresolved for over a year, until Carter personally intervened.346

For the time being, thousands of ex-prisoners had to endure stigmatization for their

involvement in the U.S.-led counterrevolutionary plots, and were incapable of securing

jobs. Concerned about their plight, Cuban émigrés—regardless of their stance on U.S.-

Cuban normalization—demanded that Carter take a “moral responsibility” in the name of

344

Acta Final, December 8, 1978, in Diálogo, pp. 112-17; and Levine, Secret Missions, p. 111.

345 Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, pp. 158-59.

346 Carter to Bell, August 10, 1979, Benjamin Civiletti to Carter, August 16, 1979; Pastor to

Brzezinski, August 17, 1979; and Brzezinski to Carter, August 17, 1979, all in folder “Cuba 7-8/79,”

box 14, RNSA, JCL.

141

“human rights.”347

By this time U.S. officials like Pastor interpreted Havana’s rapid

release of prisoners as deliberate attempts to embarrass Washington. “We have allowed

Castro,” he lamented, “to make a Carter victory seem like a Castro triumph and a Carter

failure.”348

The CIA reported that Havana’s true purpose was to “neutralize that group

[Cuban Americans] as an obstacle to normalization and, ideally, to encourage leaders of

the community to criticize U.S. policy toward Cuba.”349

The idea of this report must have come from the fact that Havana took similar

positions to Miami on the issue of emigration. In a speech before the Committee of 75,

Castro said that “the U.S. government had a moral obligation of receiving these prisoners,

who had families or friends, or who acted here under the influence of the U.S.

government.”350

He repeated the same view at the secret U.S.-Cuban talks on December

3-4, 1978, when he received Washington officials for the first time in Havana. Castro

took a very aggressive stance at this meeting. “We are not negotiating these things

[Cuban policies in Africa] to get you to lift the blockade,” he said. “You were the ones

who linked the two problems, not we.” On the U.S. embargo on medicine and food, “this

is in complete opposition to President Carter’s human right policy…History will bear

witness to your shame.” On return Pastor wrote to Carter, “As he [Castro] spoke…we

347

Benes and Durán to Phil Wise, September 21, 1979, DDRS; and Torres, Mirrors, p. 97.

348 Pastor to Brzezinski, May 4, 1979, DDRS.

349 CIA, “The Cuban Foreign Policy,” June 21, 1979, NLC-6-14-1-2-7, RAC, JCL.

350 Remark by Fidel Castro, November 22, 1978, in Diálogo, p. 103.

142

were viewing a man who had bottled up 20 years of rage and was releasing it in a

controlled but extremely impassioned manner.”351

This was true except for the last third of the conversation. Castro completely

changed his attitude once the talks shifted to the topic of prisoners. He used the words,

“por favor (please),” twice, to ask the U.S. government to take all Cubans who wanted to

go to the United States. His main concerns were about “ex-prisoners,” the Cubans who

had been set free prior to August 1, 1978, when the U.S. and Cuban governments reached

an agreement. Tarnoff explained that the U.S. government gave priority to the current

political prisoners and would accept up to 3,500 of them. The ex-prisoners had to apply

for immigration visas through normal channels and to wait until their turn came. Castro

urged them to reconsider their positions. “Here I am acting as their attorney… Some have

undergone social adaptation, and for others it was more difficult…If the United States

had not supported the counterrevolution, very few people would have gotten involved.”

The current number did not cover these ex-prisoners, “but we would ask you to please

take the others [ex-prisoners] into account.”352

When this plea did not work, Castro raised a question: “If they leave this country

illegally, will you take them?” As Tarnoff gave no clear answer, Castro then made a

warning. “So, you are going to be leaving us a lot of ex-prisoners. You’ll be saying it is

our fault. But I’d ask you to consider the illegal departure cases. For a while the U.S. was

welcoming them, encouraging them, but if you refuse to take them now, they will all try

351

Tarnoff and Pastor to Carter, “Our Trip to Cuba, December 2-4, 1978,” n.d., DDRS. Gleijeses’s

Visions covers the part of the conversation on Africa.

352 Memcon (Castro, Tarnoff, Pastor), December 3-4, 1978, pp. 32-33, DDRS.

143

to leave.”353

Castro clearly indicated that migration problems would be matters of

concern not only for Cuba, but also for the United States. This warning should have been

ominous for Washington. Indeed, many ex-prisoners reportedly spoke of leaving the

island in the same way as in the Camarioca boatlift of 1965, in which around 5,000

Cubans were brought by their families into the United States.354

Many Consequences of the Dialogue—Family Visits to Cuba

Starting from January 1979, the release of prisoners was no longer the only

consequence of the Diálogo that caused a problem for the Cuban government. Castro

allowed Cuban families abroad to visit the island to address their humanitarian needs and

isolate his enemies abroad. In the middle of envisioning a new economy, Havana no

doubt viewed their visits as a source of foreign currency and courted visitors to spend

money in Cuba. Vaguely aware of such a calculation, anti-Castro militants and hardliners

tried to discourage émigrés from traveling to Cuba. Still, many émigrés, especially those

who had left parents, siblings, and children, did not want to miss this chance to see them

for the first time in years. As historian María Cristina García puts it, “family now took

precedence over political ideologies.” Despite the increasingly hostile bilateral relations,

over 100,000 Cuban Americans enjoyed the visits to their families in Cuba as the benefits

of the Diálogo, allowing the Cuban government to earn $150 million.355

353

Ibid., pp. 36, 39.

354 MH, December 10, 1978, pp. 1A, 18A. On the Camarioca boatlift, see Chapter One.

355 García, Havana USA, pp. 51-54; Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, pp. 198-99; and Torres,

Mirrors, p. 97.

144

However, the result of this massive family reunification ultimately exceeded

Havana’s calculation for it stimulated discontent in Cuba. For those who had already lost

any affection for the Cuban government, the tales of the United States pointed at an

alternative way of life. A disgruntled young Cuban girl later wrote in her memoir:

Contrary to what I had been taught in school about the ways of capitalism, my

uncles explained that he had medical insurance, so medicines and visits to the

doctor were free or cost very little. If his children earned good grades or were

excellent athletes, their university education also would be free. No one told him

what to do, except his bosses. And if he didn’t like them, he could leave and work

elsewhere. He could travel outside the country easily, without having to alert

anybody of his intentions. The neighbors didn’t bother him—in fact, he didn’t

even know most of his neighbors—and he didn’t have to work for free on

Sundays for good of the neighborhood. He tended his own garden and made his

own repairs at home. He expected nothing from the community but also was not

obliged to do anything for anybody, except obey commonsense rules of civility

and the laws of the country.356

For these Cubans, their individualistic hope for self-realization came in great conflict

with the collective nature of revolutionary society. Numerous consumer goods that

returned Cubans brought for families, relatives, and friends also might have played a role.

356

Mirta Ojito, Finding Mañana: A Memoir of a Cuban Exodus (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), p.

62.

145

The Cuban economy had stagnated since 1976, which made it more difficult for the

Cuban government to provide the population with these items as incentives and rewards

for their labor. Castro instead believed in the strength of revolutionary consciousness and

austerity among Cubans, and millions of Cubans kept their belief in the revolution. But

the somewhat exaggerated demonstration of wealth by Cuban Americans made at least

thousands of Cubans impatient with their political and economic system. Along with

former prisoners and their families, they started to dream of living in the United States.357

As Cuban scholar Jesús Arboleya frankly notes, Cuban institutions and societies

were unprepared to control what he calls an “emotional clash” and its enormous

consequences.358

Contemporary non-Cuban observers reached the same conclusion. The

year 1979 was bad for the Cuban economy. The country faced a variety of problems

ranging from the lowering sugar prices, natural disasters, job absenteeism, and the arrival

of the baby boomers to the labor force. In a cable to Moscow the Soviet ambassador

noted that prior to the arrival of the visitors the Cuban leadership had intensified

ideological work for the people to prevent unnecessary confusion. Castro himself took

time to explain at the Seventh Plenum of the central committee of the Communist Party

in December 1978 and at a national conference of party leaders in February 1979.

Likewise, the Communist Party authorized its organizations at local and regional levels to

357

Torres, Mirrors, pp. 97-98; Ojito, Finding Mañana, pp. 55-56, 62; and José Luis Llovio-Menéndez,

Insider: My Hidden Life as a Revolutionary in Cuba, trans. Edith Grossman (Toronto: Bantam Books,

1988), pp. 355-56. Cuban newspapers like Granma exacerbated the problems by not reporting much

on who the visitors were. Even when it reported, the newspaper followed the previously endorsed line

of interpretation: Cubans in the United States were suffering from discrimination and unemployment

in racist and unjust capitalist country. See for example, Granma, October 5, 1978, p. 5.

358 Arboleya, Counterrevolution, pp. 172-73.

146

explain to the workers about a new policy toward the Cuban community abroad.359

According to a British report, Castro facilitated their work by videotaping his February

1979 speech, in which he spent four hours elaborating on the economic and humanitarian

benefits from the family visits for the nation as if he were pleading with people to

understand this transcendent decision.360

But by late 1979, Cuban leaders nonetheless had to admit that the government

was facing greater economic woes and social problems at home. Two days after the IX

Plenum of the Communist Party’s central committee in November, Cuba’s First Vice

President Raúl Castro made a major speech about Cuban economic difficulties. He

exhibited the new emergency plan that would prioritize the distribution of resources to

maintain people’s basic necessities, such as food. What impressed foreign observers was

his criticism of internal problems, rather than external problems such as the U.S.

blockade. Raúl Castro even said that the Cubans should not use the U.S. blockade as an

excuse to ignore their own inefficiency.361

At the same time, Cuba took various measures,

such as a shakeup of the leadership, increased neighboring vigilance, salary reforms, and

the opening of free peasant markets. Yet, according to the Canadian ambassador, Cuban

leaders’ rhetoric and actions had “little practical effect.”362

359

Soviet embassy in Havana, April 26, 1979, WCDA. See also, a report prepared by the Cuba section

of the Soviet Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, January 2, 1980, TsKhSD, f. 5, op.

77, d. 639, l. 1-9, WCDA. For Cuba’s economic woes, see also, Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 349-352.

360 British embassy in Havana to London, May 18, 1979, FCO 99/309, PRO. On its speech, see also,

State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, May 15, 1979, NLC-SAFE-17A-13-31-3-4,

RAC, JCL.

361 Speech by Raúl Castro, November 30, 1979, in Granma, December 1, 1979, pp. 2-3.

362 Canadian diplomats very closely followed these Cuban campaigns. See for example, Canadian

embassy in Havana to Ottawa, December 4, 1979, December 14, 1979, December 17, 1979, December

147

Many Consequences of the Dialogue—Miami Cubans

The impact of Diálogo was also palpable across the Florida Straits. In February

1979, the CUINT in Washington reported to Havana that the dialogue had a positive

impact on Cuba’s interests in the Untied States. It not only eliminated the

administration’s accusation of Cuba’s “supposed violation of human rights,” but also

amplified support for normalization of relations among Cubans living in the United

States. Despite some worrisome developments such as growing internal conflict within

the Committee of 75 and reports of a swindle by persons claiming to organize family

trips, the CUINT asserted that “Cuban emigration must continue to play an important role

as to Cuba’s political influence in the United States” as long as the community benefited

from the result of dialogue and recognized “the consolidation of the Revolution.”363

But things did not go smoothly. Encouraged by these “achievements,” radical

activists, academics, and those who supported U.S.-Cuban normalization formed a

lobbying group urging U.S. officials to lift the embargo. The group submitted an open

letter with ten-thousand signatures and surprised U.S. congressmen by underscoring the

size of pro-normalization voices in the Cuban-American community.364

For anti-Castro

militants, however, this was a betrayal of their cause. A group named El Condor publicly

20, 1979, January 23, 1980, and February 1, 1980, all in vol. 18508, file 20-Cuba-1-4, part 9, RG25,

LAC.

363 CUINT in Washington to Havana, Informe de apreciación sobre la política de Estados Unidos hacia

Cuba—del 5 de diciembre de 1978 al 12 de febrero de 1979.

364 Cuban American Committee for the Normalization of Relations with Cuba to Vance, May 16, 1979,

in folder “96th-1st-1979 International Relations, Cuba,” box 2480, Dante Fascell Papers, UM-SC. See

also, Areíto 5, no. 19-20 (1979), pp. 7-8.

148

called for “revolutionary justice” against Dascal and Benes.365

Omega 7 not only killed

two participants in the Diálogo in 1979, but also bombed the buildings of the Soviet and

Cuban missions to the United Nations in New York City. In September 1980, the FBI

failed to prevent Omega 7 from assassinating Félix García Rodríguez, a diplomat at the

Cuban U.N. mission, even though the agency regarded the group as “the most dangerous

terrorist organization” in the United States and placed the “highest priority” on arresting

its members.366

Between radicals and militants were ordinary Cuban Americans, who generally

hardened their anti-Castro feelings. Despite Havana’s efforts to attenuate such hostility,

their major achievements—the release of prisoners and family reunification—appeared to

have produced the opposite result at least in the short span. Once they arrived in Miami,

most former prisoners criticized the Cuban leaders who had imprisoned them. Many

U.S.-to-Cuba visitors felt “exploited” during their visits to the homeland because the

Cuban government had called them “tourists” and charged “outrageous prices” for

airfares and hotel accommodations.367

Despite government monitoring, reports of illicit

business taking advantage of family trips persisted. An official of the Ministry of the

Interior worried that such wrongdoing would give Cuban consulates a “purely

commercial image” among travelers.368

365

FBI in Miami to Director, November 21, 1978, and El Condor, Aclaración Necesaria, published in

La Nación, November 17, 1978, both in FBI, Freedom of Information Act.

366 NYT, March 3, 1980, p. A1; and Torres, Mirrors, pp. 98-102.

367 Torres, Mirrors, pp. 97, 112.

368 Justo Hernández de Medina Hurtado (MININT official) to Olga Miranda, November 17, 1980, in

Caja “Migratorios 7,” MINREX.

149

Furthermore, many visitors returned with tales of the “poor life” in Cuba and

renewed their desires to bring their families and friends to the United States. Unable to

comprehend or unwilling to accept Havana’s emphasis on social goods rather than

individual access to consumer items, many of the visitors were simply shocked with the

living standards of Cubans on the island. This experience strengthened their belief in the

superiority of the American way of life. What followed was a rumor of instability in

Cuba, rather than a perception of a strong consolidation of the revolutionary regime.

Anti-Castro groups like Abdala, Alpha 66 and Brigade 2506 grew energized. Abdala

even started to exploit family visits to send letters and activists to Cuba to mount

propaganda campaigns on the island.369

It was against this background that Castro declared a war against the decay of the

Cuban Revolution. In his December 1979 speech before the last session of Cuba’s

national assembly of Popular Power, the Cuban leader identified the attack against the

integrity of the revolutionary cadres as Cuba’s greatest national security threats. He

warned against counterrevolutionaries, who were taking advantage of these economic and

social difficulties and were “trying to sow discord, mistrust, and deviations among the

youth, the students, the people, and the intellectual sectors.” “Therefore,” Castro argued,

“the revolution must be firmly vigilant.” He announced that the government had begun

“the first roundup of criminals”—criminals in a broader sense—including “the bum, the

369

Llovio-Menéndez, Insider, pp. 354-55; Ojito, Finding Mañana, p. 168; WP, December 2, 1978, p.

A29; Aquiles Durán, “Delegación Abdala en La Habana distribuye volantes,” Abdala, December

1978, p. 1; and “Compatriota: Si Vas a Cuba...¡Sé Util!” Abdala, February-March 1979, pp. 1-3.

150

antisocial, the absentee, the shameless, and the unfulfilled.”370

Castro emphasized that the

enemies of the revolution lived inside Cubans themselves.

Back to Confrontation—Presidential Directive 52

All of these developments set the stage for the 1980 Mariel migration crisis, but

none was more important than Washington’s intensifying hostility toward Cuba. U.S.

officials grew too preoccupied with Cuban foreign policy to stay focused on the Florida

Straits. They continued to dismiss Castro’s gesture to the Cuban American community as

pressure tactics and overlooked a major externality of increased people-to-people

contacts, which drove larger numbers of Cubans to seek another life in the United States.

During the last two years of Carter’s presidency, the relations between

Washington and Havana went from bad to worse. The U.S. perception of Cuban threats

grew exponentially in the Caribbean and Central America. The United States traditionally

proclaimed its hegemony, repeated military interventions, and promoted U.S. economic

and security interests through its support for dictatorship. Yet by the late 1970s,

economic recessions, social discontent, population growth, and rising political repression

combined to escalate confrontation between traditional ultra-right oligarchies and

growing leftist militants. Whereas the oligarchies acquired U.S. assistance, unleashed

massive violence, and did everything possible to hold their power, the revolutionaries

became more determined, magnified their popular support, and looked to Cuba as a new

370

This speech circulated in the United States, and appeared in World Affairs, vol. 143, no.1 (Summer

1980), pp. 20-64. When Pastor mentioned the speech in one of the meetings, the Cubans did not deny

its content.

151

model of society.371

Two events held special importance for Washington. The

revolutionaries achieved victory in Grenada in March 1979 and Nicaragua in July 1979.

Certainly, the Carter administration did not take a simplistic view of looking to

Cuba as the main cause of the revolutions in Grenada and Nicaragua. Yet, as Cuba’s

influence grew, Washington recognized Havana as a major rival in the Cold War in

Africa, Latin America, and the rest of the Third World. In addition to revolutionary

movements in the Caribbean and Central America, Washington particularly dreaded

Havana’s leadership at the Sixth Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in

September 1979. Carter feared that Castro would exploit his presidency to drive the

movement to the socialist bloc. In early July, when Brzezinski reported on Moscow’s

promotion of Cuban leadership in the movement, Carter wrote, “Let we do just the

opposite by telling the truth about the Soviet puppet.” Brzezinski quickly ordered the

State Department, the CIA, and the U.S. Information and Cultural Agency (USICA) to

develop briefing materials, highlight Cuba’s “dependence” on the USSR, and discredit

Cuba’s nonaligned status.372

It was around this time that segments of the Carter administration developed new

thinking regarding Cuba. Previously, the administration assumed that Havana disagreed

with Washington mainly because it depended on Moscow to conduct foreign policy.373

However, the NSC’s Pastor started to claim that Cuba itself was a dangerous power

371

Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America, 2nd ed. rev. and

expanded (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993); and Rabe, Killing Zone, pp. 149-155.

372 Handwritten note on Brzezinski to Carter, July 12, 1979; Brzezinski to Vance, Turner, and John

Reinhardt, July 12, 1979, all in folder “Cuba 7-8/79,” box 14, RNSA, JCL.

373 See PD6.

152

“driven by revolutionary zeal, nationalistic purpose, and the personal glory of Fidel.”

Rather than reducing Cuban dependence on the USSR, he proposed, Carter should “make

Cuba appear very dependent on the Soviets.”374

Brzezinski took a similar view. “Whether

Cuba is acting as a Soviet surrogate, partner, or (in my view least likely) simply dragging

the USSR along” did not matter, he wrote to Carter. Cuba “served Soviet interests and

created far-reaching problems” by making Carter appear weak at home and abroad.375

Seeking to discredit Cuba’s nonaligned status, Brzezinski’s NSC repeated requests for

intelligence-gathering on the island, particularly its connection with the Soviet Union.376

The result was the Soviet brigade crisis, which was to some extent Brzezinski’s

self-fulfilling prophecy. Once again the administration misread the intelligence reports,

mishandled its “new finding,” and was overwhelmed by the turn of the events. Although

Washington claimed that the Soviet Union had just placed its brigade to Cuba with the

intention of increasing tensions in the Caribbean Sea, this new accusation proved baseless.

Because the administration nonetheless demanded Soviet concessions, it proved difficult

to stop the anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban campaigns it initiated. As Carter notes in his

memoir, it was “politically devastating to SALT,” the foundation of U.S.-Soviet détente.

Moscow even made a face-saving gesture by calling its troops a “training center,” instead

374

Pastor to Brzezinski, July 19,1979, NLC-12-19-3-17-7, RAC, JCL.

375 Brzezinski to Carter, July 27, 1979, in folder “Weekly Reports 102-120,” box 42, Subject Files,

ZBC, JCL.

376 Chronology, “Soviet Military Activities in Cuba and Intelligence Deficiencies relating to Cuba,”

n.d. (around August 29, 1979), NLC-23-53-3-2-3, JCL. The first order took place on March 6, 1979,

just a week before the Grenada Revolution. Brzezinski and his subordinates repeated such requests on

April 10, May 18, and July 12. For the last order, see Brzezinski to Vance, Turner, and John Reinhardt,

July 12, 1979.

153

of a “brigade.” But the damage was already done. The U.S. Senate stalled the ratification

process of the SALT II treaty.377

In the wake of the brigade crisis, Carter signed Presidential Directive (PD) 52 to

“contain Cuba as a source of violent revolutionary change.” PD52 marked a major

change of U.S. policy toward Cuba. Rather than normalizing relations with Cuba, the U.S.

government now pursued a series of hostile measures against the island, including

diplomatic offensives against Cuba, the resumption of the SR-71 reconnaissance

overflights, and planning for military operations around Guantánamo.378

Aiming for an

economic encirclement of the island, the U.S. government asked Britain, France, West

Germany, Japan, Spain, Italy, Belgium, and Canada to discourage additional private and

official financing for Cuba.379

Cuba should be vulnerable to such economic pressure,

Washington claimed, as Cuban external hard currency debt increased dramatically from

around $1.4 billion in 1976 to $2.5 billion in 1978.380

Yet, after probing each other’s

reactions, these countries dismissed this initiative as ineffective, difficult to enforce, and

merely harmful to their economic interests.381

377

Carter, White House Diary, p. 354; Gleijeses, Visions, pp. 126-133; and Vitaly Vorotnikov,

Gavana—Моskva: pamiatnye gody (Moscow: Fond imeni I. D. Sytina, 2001), pp. 69-83. See also,

David D. Newsom, The Soviet Brigade in Cuba: A Study in Political Diplomacy (Bloomington:

Indiana University Press, 1987).

378 PD52, October 4, 1979, in folder “Presidential Directive 41-63,” Vertical Files (hereafter VF), JCL.

For Cuba’s reaction, see Memcon (Parodi, Feinberg), October 19, 1979, NLC-24-14-7-8-4, RAC, JCL.

379 Vance to U.S. embassies in London, et, al., October 12, 1979, NLC-16-118-3-24-5, RAC, JCL.

380 Kempton B. Jenkins to Habib, et. al., July 27, 1979, NLC-24-13-5-20-4, RAC, JCL; and Lawrence

Theriot to Pastor, August 14, 1979, NLC-12-19-3-14-0, RAC, JCL.

381 Memo to the Prime Minister, “U.S.A. Demarche on Cuba,” November 8, 1979, vol. 16019 file 20-

Cuba-1-3-USA, part 5, RG25, LAC. The file contains information about the confidential exchange of

opinions among Canada, Japan, Britain, France, and West Germany. See also, Roderic Lyne to

154

Carter’s NSC often believed that the lack of outside support for U.S. policy

toward Cuba drew from the lack of information, rather than the weakness of their

assessment. Therefore, another pillar of PD52 was to intensify intelligence-gathering,

briefing for other countries, and public relations campaigns in order to “put the Cubans

on the defensive in the court of world opinion.”382

In particular, the NSC’s Pastor wanted

to address Cuba’s economic failures to undermine Cuba’s appeal in developing

countries.383

Prodded by him, Brzezinski requested an assessment of the Cuban economy,

and the CIA produced a report “The Cuban Economy: Model for Third World

Development.” The report not only highlighted the economic failure of the Cuban

Revolution, but also Cuba’s impressive achievement in important aspects of daily life

such as health, education, and employment. Yet, its main point was that impoverished

countries admired Cuba because they emphasized its social and political successes

without knowing its economic failures.384

Pastor called the report “excellent and

balanced.” At Pastor’s urging, Brzezinski complimented the agency for this study.385

East-West détente was over in December 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded

Afghanistan. Yet, these developments only reinforced the charted course of U.S. policy

Michael Alexander, “Credits for Cuba,” November 19, 1979; and Lyne to Alxander, December 14,

1979, both in Records of the Prime Minister’s Office 19/12, PRO.

382 U.S. officials referred to the classified part of PD52 in declassified reports. See for example, Daily

Report Item for Carter, drafted by Pastor, February 12, 1980, NLC-24-86-5-5-1, RAC, JCL; and

Turner to Brzezinski, February 28, 1980, NLC-132-22-10-9-0, RAC, JCL.

383 Pastor to Brzezinski, December 11, 1979, NLC-24-85-4-3-5, RAC, JCL.

384 CIA National Foreign Assessment Center, “The Cuban Economy: Model for Third World

Development,” February 15, 1980, NLC-17-39-10-7-3, RAC, JCL.

385 Pastor to Brzezinski, March 22, 1980, NLC-132-22-10-5-4, RAC, JCL; and Brzezinski to Turner,

March 28, 1980, NLC-15-9-1-10-4, RAC, JCL.

155

toward Cuba in PD52. In Washington’s imagination, Cuba became a major contender for

influence in the region not only because of what it did, but also because of what it was.

The simple existence of Cuban society as an alternative development model was the

source of dangerous radicalization in small, powerless, and impoverished countries. The

State Department prepared to expand people-to-people programs to increase the U.S.

presence in the Caribbean. The USICA increased positive publications on U.S. activities

to keep “Cuban adventurism” in check.386

With PD52 in hand, the Carter administration

grew more zealous in calling attention to Cuba’s economic problems to rectify the

supposedly distorted world opinion of Cuba. The scene of Cubans rushing out of their

country appeared to be ideal material for such global education.

Endgame—Prelude to Mariel

In late 1979, a number of Cuban ex-prisoners and other desperate people entered

foreign embassies in Havana or hijacked naval vessels to leave the island. These incidents

highly irritated the Cuban government. In late October, Cubans who hijacked a boat with

crew arrived in Miami, received a “heroes’ welcome,” and evaded imprisonment. Three

more hijackings ensued, each of which accompanied a Cuban protest. But U.S. federal

authorities arrested none of these hijackers.387

To emphasize the gravity of this matter

Castro publicly issued a warning to Washington on March 8, 1980. “We hope they [the

386

Tarnoff to Brzezinski, “U.S. Policy toward the Caribbean,” January 15, 1980, NLC-6-46-4-15-5,

RAC, JCL.

387 MH, October 25, 1979, p. 2C; MH, February 17, 1980, pp. 1A, 4A; Wayne Smith, Closest of

Enemies, pp. 200-204; and David W. Engstrom, Presidential Decision Making Adrift: The Carter Administration and the Mariel Boatlift (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), pp. 48-50.

156

United States] will adopt measures so they will not encourage the illegal departures from

the country,” he said, “because we might also have to take measures in this regard once.”

The Cuban leader hinted that Havana would stop restricting the flow of people as it did

during the 1965 Camarioca exodus.388

Despite these statements, however, the United

States took little action.

U.S. scholars have attributed U.S. inaction to bureaucratic inertia. Washington

was preoccupied with an economic recession, energy crises, Afghanistan, and the Iranian

hostage crisis that began in late 1979. Carter also paid attention to hijackings in Cuba, but

failed to mobilize authorities. Although the U.S. president urged the Justice and State

Departments to explore ways to restrict maritime hijackings, the Justice Department

claimed that obtaining a conviction was “questionable” in the Southern District of Florida,

where judges would likely favor the hijackers and their Cuban American supporters.

Carter nonetheless ordered his officials to examine possible measures, yet he had to wait

for reports for another four months.389

In this regard, the State Department’s Tarnoff

recalls, Havana should have understood the limit of U.S. presidential power. Carter and

his federal government could not simply return hijackers to Cuba since they all went to

juries in South Florida. All Carter could do was “not to endorse [their decision].” In short,

the U.S. system was unresponsive, but it was “not deliberate.”390

388

Speech by Fidel Castro, March 8, 1980, in Granma (Havana), March 10, 1980, pp. 1-4.

389 Vance to Carter, February 25, 1980, NLC-7-22-8-18-3, RAC, JCL; and Wayne Smith, Closest of

Enemies, pp. 204-6. See also, Handwritten note in Vance to Carter, March 5, 1980, NLC-128-15-3-3-

8, RAC, JCL.

390 Tarnoff, interview transcript by David Engstrom, p. 7.

157

But Cuba must have seen U.S. inaction from very different angles. The topic of

ex-prisoners and hijackers in fact came up at the U.S.-Cuban meetings in Havana on

January 16 and 17, 1980. Here again, as in the previous Havana talks in December 1978,

Tarnoff asked for Castro’s patience and explained that the U.S. government was

accepting half a million migrants, especially 200,000 Vietnamese, from around the world.

Castro was quick to point out that Washington kept receiving illegally arrived Cubans

without prosecuting their crimes. In view of perceived U.S.’s double standards, he posed

two options. “Either you take measures [to return them] or we should be free of any

obligation to control those who wish to leave illegally.” Tarnoff remarked that “you must

recognize the special situation that exists” and added, “It is not possible to forcibly return

these people to Cuba.” This comment angered Castro. “That’s an absurd situation,” he

exclaimed. “Some countries are criticized because they do not let people leave. [But] we

are willing to let anyone leave who wishes to.”391

Pastor replied with sarcasm,

“According to our figures,” he said, “we project that by the year 2000 there will be ten

million wishing to leave Cuba.”392

Pastor’s comment reflected his belief that the emigration problem was something

that Cuba should take care of—alone. After all, without realizing the fatal consequences

for U.S. border control, he had been looking for ways to exploit any indications of Cuba’s

weaknesses, including the movement of people. As early as August 1979, Pastor himself

391

Memcon (Castro, Tarnoff, Pastor), pp. 72-73, in folder “Cuba—Carter’s Trip, May 12-17, 2002

[2],” VF, JCL. Despite the peak of Cold War tensions after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter

sent State Department’s Tarnoff and the NSC’s Pastor to see if Castro criticized the invasion. Castro

refused to do so, yet presented his views on world politics for eleven hours.

392 Ibid.

158

suggested that the U.S. government seek ways to take advantage of Cuban American

visits to the island “as a much more potent force for influencing the Cuban people.” Then

after Carter’s signing of PD52, he advocated the use of U.S. films to “reinforce the

impressions left by the Cuban-Americans…that imperialism is not so bad, and that in the

last 20 years, Cuba has not only failed to keep up [with economic expectations]…but it

has fallen behind.”393

For his part, the U.S. lack of responsiveness to repeated Cuban appeals must have

led Castro to perceive more hostile intent on the U.S. side than the latter actually wanted

to convey. Cuba raised this issue repeatedly in its secret meetings with the United States

in October 1978, in December 1978, and again in January 1980. The result was

frustrating. Clearly in Castro’s mind, the emigration crisis was another U.S. provocation,

followed by the Soviet brigade crisis, as he explained to the Soviet ambassador in Cuba.

Castro apparently believed that the United States politicized and exploited humanitarian

issues to attack the Cuban society.394

Carter’s responses to the Peruvian embassy crisis exacerbated Castro’s inclination

to assume the worst of U.S. attitudes. On April 1, six Cuban asylum seekers crashed a

minibus through the gates of the Peruvian embassy in Havana, resulting in the death of a

Cuban guard. Infuriated, Castro withdrew police protection from the embassy and

announced that anyone wishing to leave Cuba could enter the embassy. The result was

more than he expected; within forty-eight hours over ten thousand Cubans entered the

393

Pastor to Brzezinski, October 12, 1979, NLC-24-84-6-2-5, RAC, JCL.

394 Vorotnikov, Gavana—Моskva, p. 117. The Cuban delegation presented this thesis to the U.S.

delegation months later. Memcon (Padrón, Tarnoff, etc.), June 17-18, 1980, DDRS.

159

embassy. “We, including Fidel,” recalls Padrón, “never expected that it would create the

phenomena of the Peruvian embassy.”395

In any case, the crisis caught global attention

and invoked emotional responses from Cubans both in Havana and Miami. Echoing the

front-page Granma editorial of April 7, which called these asylum seekers “lumpens” and

“anti-socials,” thousands of Cubans marched and shouted: “Go away, delinquents! Go

away, scums!” They soon started to throw stones and rotten food at the asylum seekers.

Across the sea these Cubans in the embassy became heroes, for whom Miami Cubans

started to collect money, food, and medicine. They demanded that Carter take all of them,

holding a placard like “Human Rights for 10,000.” The militants waved flags and chanted,

“War! War! War!”396

Carter refused their demands and strove to avoid turning the incident into a U.S.-

Cuban issue. Aware of widespread public opposition to rising immigration from abroad,

the U.S. Congress had enacted the 1980 Refugee Act, which required individuals to prove

a well-founded fear of persecution. Granting unconditional entry to Cubans would violate

the intent of the law. Such practice would also antagonize African Americans and liberals

since Carter refused refugee status for thousands of Haitians entering into the United

States. But more important might have been Washington’s fear of making a precedent for

future migration waves from Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central America.397

Carter

sought to deal with the Peruvian embassy crisis through a multilateral approach. At his

395

Padrón, interview transcript, November 4, 2013, p. 5.

396 Granma, April 8, 1980, pp. 1-2, April 9, 1980, pp. 2-4, and April 10, 1980, pp. 1-4; MH, April 8,

1980, pp. 1A, 8A; and MH, April 9, 1980, p. 20A.

397 Discussion Paper, Mini-PRC Meeting on Cuban-Peruvian Situation, April 8, 1980, DDRS; and

Engstrom, Adrift, pp. 138-39, 144-48.

160

urging, the United Nations and the International Red Cross stepped forward. Spain, Costa

Rica, Ecuador, Canada, Belgium, and Venezuela offered to take some hundreds of the

Cubans. Costa Rica agreed to serve as a processing point for their emigration.

But Carter could not resist the temptation of exploiting the crisis. In his remarks

on April 9, 1980, Carter emphasized “the real threat of Cuba” was not its military

capability but its claim to “a model to be emulated by people who are dissatisfied with

their own lot.” But according to the U.S. president, the Peruvian embassy crisis shattered

the myth of the Cuban society. “We see the hunger of many people on that island to

escape political deprivation of freedom and also economic diversity.” Those who entered

the embassy were “freedom-loving Cubans” who merited special concerns in a closed,

totalitarian society.398

The speech was a deliberate attempt to put Havana on the

defensive in the Cold War battle for the hearts and minds in the Third World.399

The next

day U.S. newspapers reported on a plan that the U.S. government would conduct

Operation Solid Shield, the largest military exercise in the Caribbean in four years,

starting from May 8.

Carter’s April 9 address was the last blow. That was enough for Havana to end the

dialogue with Washington. Indignant at the speech, Castro made up his mind to shoot

back at Carter. Whereas Granma started to depict an ugly caricature of the U.S. president

398

Carter, April 9, 1980, APP. See also, John E. Reinhardt to Brzezinski, April 25, 1980, in folder

“Broadcasting to Cuba,” box 90501, Carnes Lord Files, Ronald Reagan Library (hereafter RRL).

399 Pastor complained that the State Department did little to highlight “a failure of the Cuban model”

until Carter corrected it with his speech. Pastor to Brzezinski and Aaron, April 10, 1980, with Talking

Points, “Next Steps on U.S. Policy to Cubans in Peruvian Embassy,” NLC-24-87-6-4-9, RAC, JCL.

Pastor directed the USICA to intensify radio broadcasting of the embassy crisis and the speech. Pastor

to Brzezinski, April 15, 1980, NLC-24-55-1-15-8, RAC, JCL.

161

next to a Nazi military officer, Castro opened Mariel, a port 25 miles west of Havana, to

force down his hand. On April 19, the Cuban government announced that Cuban

Americans could come to Cuba to pick up their families and friends. Behind the scenes,

moreover, Havana had already arranged the first boatlift by contacting a few Miami

Cubans to “break the ice,” as Padrón recalls this pivotal moment.400

As the news of the

first boatlift spread, Cubans living in the United States rushed to Miami and Key West

looking for boats or persons who could go to Mariel on their behalf.401

Fearful of a flood of Cubans flowing into the United States, Washington held

interagency meetings. The U.S. objective was the avoidance of “the outcome, desired by

both Castro and the Cuban American community, though for different reasons, of having

this issue become a U.S.-Cuban issue.” The first thing that U.S. officials came up with

was to dissuade Miami Cubans from heading toward Cuba. Carter threatened to impose

fines against boat captains for each person they brought in, yet he could not stop these

determined people. The administration then set up a meeting with Miami Cubans and

decided to wait for its results.402

In Brzezinski’s eyes, the Cuban American community

grew “hysterical.” Yet, the national security adviser urged Carter to “open up a dialogue

with the community.” Even though he did not know how, “it is essential that we try to

400

Padrón, interview transcript, November 4, 2013, p. 5.

401 A caricature in Granma, April 10, 1980, p. 5. This and other versions of ugly Carter appeared

continuously for a while. For Cuba’s decision, see also, Vorotnikov, Gavana—Моskva, p. 119. For a

view of Miami, see Ojito, Finding Mañana, chap. 7.

402 Summary, Mini-Presidential Review Committee Meeting on Cuban Refugees, April 22, 1980,

NLC-17-40-7-7-5, RAC, JCL; and Victor Palmieri (U.S. coordinator of refugee affairs), interview

transcript by David Engstrom, p. 12, February 22, 1988, in author’s possession.

162

reach out to the community or risk encountering increasing defiance and

confrontation.”403

This last-minute initiative for a dialogue bore little fruit. At an April 26, 1980,

meeting with Miami Cubans, Acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher asked for

their cooperation. “We need your help,” his talking points went. “We urge you to use

your influence to hold back the sending of boats to Cuba.”404

The plea went to no avail.

Instead, it merely clashed with “the highly emotional feelings in south Florida about the

possibility of recovering grandmothers and cousins,” according to the State Department’s

Newsom. The meeting was “a disaster,” as half the invitees left the room in the middle.405

The administration misunderstood the dynamics of migration politics at this critical

moment. For those Miami Cubans rushing to Mariel, no issue was more important than

family reunification. “Once the boats were gone,” recalls Victor Palmieri, U.S.

coordinator for refugee affairs, “the game was over.”406

Conclusion

The late 1970s presented a rare opportunity for Americans, Cubans, and Cuban

émigrés in the United States to come to terms with the tumultuous past of U.S.-Cuban

relations. Carter wanted to normalize U.S.-Cuban relations to signal a new U.S. attitude

403

Brzezinski to Carter, April 25, 1980, NLC-41-14-11-8, RAC, JCL.

404 “Talking Points,” n.d., State Department records, ARA/CCA 86 D 90, box 7544, in the author’s

possession. The document was supposedly used for Christopher for the April 26 meeting. I am grateful

to Dr. David W. Engstrom for sending me this record.

405 David Newsom, interview transcript, FAOH; Watson, interview transcript by David Engstrom, pp.

21-22, March 7, 1988, in author’s possession.

406 Palmieri, interview transcript by David Engstrom, p. 9, February 22, 1988.

163

toward Latin America and stabilize global affairs through greater communication

throughout the world. Carter also expressed sympathy for human rights in Cuba. He

listened to the moderate wings of the Cuban American community and cracked down on

the militarists. A sense of justice and a willingness to take on moral responsibilities,

rather than sheer political necessity, drove his actions. As Brzezinski admitted, the issue

of human rights was important because it was good in itself, and important to Carter and

the Cuban American community.407

Washington’s new attitude greatly impressed Castro, who saw Carter as morally

principled and personally likable. Even though Carter did not lift the embargo as Castro

requested, Castro started to envision a new economic model, in which Miami Cubans

would play a significant role with their accumulated capital and skills. Havana’s decision

to release thousands of Cuban prisoners certainly reflected Castro’s aspiration to mend

fences with Carter without making concessions on Africa.408

But Castro also looked to

Miami, basing his foreign policy on something more than realpolitik. Havana’s

permission of Cuban American visits to Cuba, which had great implications for the

bilateral relations, came out of the combination of Havana’s need for capital, its

confidence in the maturity of the Cuban Revolution, and its willingness to cater to

Miami’s human needs.

407

See Brzezinski’s comment at the policy review committee meeting on August 3, 1977, cited above.

408 Gleijeses, Visions, p. 119.

164

As others note, U.S.-Cuban dialogue stalled over the Cold War in Africa, where

East-West rivalry intermingled with North-South conflicts.409

But it was also the

disagreements over Cuban migration—due to Washington’s shift in attitude toward

Havana-Miami relations—that endangered the spirit of U.S.-Cuban dialogue. Despite its

initial willingness to value Cuban American interests, Washington effectively backed out

when it embraced a narrower definition of national interest that linked U.S.-Cuban

dialogue with a change in Havana’s foreign policy. Notwithstanding its encouragement to

Havana to improve relations with Miami, Washington grew alarmed when Havana

unexpectedly quickened the pace of U.S.-Cuban reconciliation after September 1978.

When Havana and Miami’s rapid rapprochement stimulated a new momentum for a

change in the lives of ordinary people on both sides of the border, Washington ignored

Havana’s emigration agenda and seemed to implement policies whose legitimacy was

deeply contested at the grassroots level. By April 1980, Washington’s actions were far

from meeting Havana’s desire to be treated as equal, and far from meeting Miami’s

demand for special attention to their needs.

The growing discrepancy, conflicts, and contradictions between U.S. foreign

policy and Cuban and Cuban American politics culminated in a migration crisis that

Washington failed to anticipate, prevent, or control. It was such interaction between

diplomacy and human migration that shaped U.S.-Cuban relations at a critical moment in

history of both nations.

409

Schoultz, Infernal; Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies; and Pastor, “Carter-Castro,” p. 257.

165

CHAPTER 4: The Crisis of 1980

The United States, Cuba, and a Diplomatic Battle over Migration Control

“I feel half dead,” Angel Castillo cried. When she heard of the opening of Mariel,

she immediately thought of her families in Cuba—her brother, his wife, their two

children, and his wife’s mother. She knew that they wanted to leave the island. Five

months ago, when she visited them, her brother complained of economic and political

conditions, and desired to avoid sending his children to the military service. Regardless

of the U.S. government’s warnings, therefore, she borrowed some money from her

relatives, joined her neighbors to look for boats, and sailed to Mariel. Her endeavor

proved fruitless. Cuban authorities notified her group that they could not leave with more

than one-third of people they reclaimed. Unable to separate her family, she conceded her

spot to others. Yet despite this setback, she did not give up her hope. “To bring them

here, I will do whatever I will need to do.”410

Angel Castillo was one of thousands of Cubans in the United States who dreamed

of reunification of families for years. Each played a role in making the 1980 Mariel

boatlift one of the most traumatic migration crises in U.S. history. Within six months

after the opening of the Mariel port, thousands of boats left Miami, Key West, and other

U.S. ports. Unable to stop the flow, Jimmy Carter allowed 124,784 Cubans to arrive in

410

Oral history records, in folder “#594 6-6-80,” box 3, Diana Kirby Papers, UM-CHC. All names for

Cuban individuals from the records are pseudonyms.

166

South Florida. The boatlift exhausted federal, state, and local resources, and created a

massive furor among millions of Americans. The U.S. president called this migration

crisis “one of the most difficult human problems” he ever faced in the White House.411

In

the words of Carter’s chief of staff Jack Watson, the boatlift was “an avalanche of human

beings that was cascading across the Florida Straits in unbelievable numbers.”412

This chapter explores the Mariel boatlift as a case study of the interaction of

diplomacy and migration. The migration crisis had many origins, including Cuba’s

pursuit of the Diálogo of 1978. As the previous chapter shows, Havana’s attempts to

mend fences with Miami went awry and had a disturbing impact on the Cuban

population. Yet, the boatlift would not have occurred in the way it did without the

dramatic escalation of U.S.-Cuban tensions in 1979-1980. As revolutionaries in the

Caribbean and Central America allied with Havana, the U.S. government adopted PD 52

and intensified verbal attacks on the Cuban internal system. It was the loss of bilateral

cooperation over the movement of people that fundamentally defined the migration crisis.

Both Havana and Washington found it necessary to terminate the crisis at one point or

another, but engaged in a diplomatic battle over the terms to end it.

The migration crisis has attracted relatively scant attention from diplomatic

historians, who apparently left the work on this topic to be done by other scholars.413

Previous studies, especially those written by former U.S. officials, almost unanimously

411

Carter’s remarks, October 1, 1980, APP.

412 Jack Watson, interview transcript by David Engstrom, p. 6, in author’s possession.

413 For a concise description on the Mariel boatlift, Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 356-361; Gleijeses, Visions,

pp. 135-38; and LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, pp. 214-224.

167

conclude that Carter mishandled this migration crisis. According to these sources, Carter

should have moved more speedily, streamlined the decision-making process, and

conveyed clearer messages to his multiple audiences.414

Migration historians also add that

the economic recession, the sensational reports of Mariel Cubans, and the declining

public support for the arrival of new immigrants—even within the Cuban American

community—compounded Carter’s difficulties in handling the crisis.415

Of the available

research on this topic, the most comprehensive work is that by political scientist David

W. Engstrom, who added considerable nuance by showing how presidential decision-

making went adrift due to the institutional and bureaucratic mechanism. His masterful

work also touches on Carter’s efforts to end the crisis through diplomatic means.416

This chapter builds on these previous works by focusing more on how the United

States and Cuba exercised diplomacy over migration control. The Mariel boatlift was not

simply about the movement of Cubans leaving their homeland and creating problems in

the United States. It had a diplomatic aspect in the sense that U.S. and Cuban officials

pursued what they considered as the best interests of each nation while seeking to end the

crisis. Washington was not fully reactive, with no policy and no aim other than accepting

the people. Determined not to make an important foreign policy concession, Washington

upgraded propaganda attacks, examined military and diplomatic options, and assembled

414

For the works by former U.S. officials, see Ronald Copeland, “The Cuban Boatlift of 1980:

Strategies in Federal Crisis Management,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social

Science 467 (May 1983): 138-150; Alex Larzelere, The 1980 Cuban Boatlift: Castro’s Ploy—

America’s Dilemma (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988); and Mario Antonio

Rivera, Decision and Structure: U.S. Refugee Policy in the Mariel Crisis (Lanham, MD: University

Press of America, 1991).

415 See esp. García, Havana USA, chap. 2.

416 Engstrom, Adrift, see esp. pp. 114-121 for Carter’s diplomatic efforts.

168

international conferences by nudging U.S. allies like Britain. Havana took up this

challenge by mobilizing international and domestic support and insisting that the U.S.

government admit its wrongdoings and change its attitudes toward Cuba.

This chapter argues that the fundamental flaw of the U.S. approach was Carter’s

willingness to enter such a diplomatic battle with Fidel Castro, the only person who could

actually control the migration flow. Carter considered negotiations with Castro, but

refused to accept Castro’s demand that the two countries discuss broader bilateral issues.

Because such discussion would inevitably lead to a major reversal of U.S. policy toward

Cuba since PD52, it would have meant a major foreign policy defeat for the U.S.

president. Carter tried in vain to assemble international pressure against Cuba in the hope

of making it too embarrassing for Castro to continue the boatlift. His administration also

considered numerous measures and contingency plans in dealing with the crisis. But in

the end, the U.S. president himself—however belatedly—recognized the flaw of his

approaches. The migration crisis came to its conclusion when Carter chose to cut his

losses by accepting Castro’s terms of negotiations.

Miami Ignores Washington

As Havana unleashed the wave of Cuban migrants, Washington hastily assessed

how to prevent this new migration crisis—without much cooperation from Miami

Cubans. When hundreds of Cuban Americans were leaving for Mariel, Washington found

no legal authority to stop them on the high seas or prevent them from carrying Cubans

from Cuban waters. Washington probed for numerous options, including a naval

169

blockade of South Florida and the forceful transportation of Cubans to the U.S. base of

Guantánamo. But each idea appeared problematic from legal, political, and humanitarian

standpoints. The U.S. government also feared that coercive federal actions might drive

Miami Cubans to violent riots and amplify disorder. “I did understand…the powerful

human emotions that were at work there,” recalls Watson. Washington made a

compromise. It tried to discourage further boatlifts by threatening a fine of $1,000 for

each person brought from Cuba, while accepting Cubans once they landed in the United

States.417

Despite the disastrous April 26 meeting, the U.S. government kept making efforts

to open dialogue with Miami Cubans. “It was our belief, from very early on,” recalls

Eugene Eidenberg, Secretary to the Cabinet and Assistant to the President, “that a key

part of this whole episode in controlling [the boatlift] had to do with the Cuban-American

community.” Chosen by Carter as a point-man in Miami, Eidenberg sought to enlist the

community leaders’ help to dissuade their followers from joining the boatlift. Yet, his

efforts were “massively unsuccessful.” Working class Cuban Americans mortgaged their

homes, sold their cars, used their savings, or borrowed from friends and relatives to cover

the expenses of the journey. In retrospect, Eidenberg was not sure if the Cuban American

417

Summary, Mini-PRC Meeting on Cuban Refugees, April 22, 1980, NLC-17-40-7-7-5, RAC, JCL;

Brzezinski to Carter, April 25, 1980, NLC-41-14-11-8, RAC, JCL; Watson, interview transcript by

David Engstrom, pp. 23-24; Case Study Paper of Stuart Eizenstat, pp. 9-10, in folder “Stu. Eizenstat

(Mariel Case Study),” box 1, Mirta Ojito Papers, UM-CHC; Palmieri, interview transcript by David

Engstrom, p. 13; and Admiral John Costello (chief of operations in Coast Guard Headquarters),

interview transcript by Stuart Eizenstat, pp. 3, 18, in folder “Coast Guard,” box 1, Mirta Ojito Papers,

UM-CHC. For the lack of legal authority, see Engstrom, Adrift, pp. 83-84; and Larzelere, Boatlift, pp.

238-244.

170

leadership was able to exercise its influence in any way since “the emotional level was

running so high.”418

Miami defiance was nothing but outright. Eidenberg claims that he encountered

“a script for a Frank Capra movie” in Little Havana. “We are among the most patriotic of

Americans. We would do nothing to hurt our country, our adopted country, the country

which has given us new lives.” But they also said, “You can’t ask us not to take the

opportunity to get our uncles and relatives.”419

José Pérez, captain of a vessel heading

toward Cuba, accepted an interview for the New York Times without seeking anonymity.

“I want to see them arrest me for going to get my parents. I want to see them arrest me

and keep me from feeding my children.”420

According to María Cruz, a Miami Cuban

who called her congressional representative’s office, Cuban Americans might violate

U.S. laws but remained good U.S. citizens. The reason was simple. It was because they

were assisting people in “fleeing from communism.”421

Such genuine, yet self-righteous

belief was difficult to change overnight.

A New Form of “Warfare” with Castro

Unable to control Miami Cubans, Washington looked at the opposite end of the

equation. Should the administration dramatize the issue in front of world opinion,

418

Eidenberg, interview transcript by David Engstrom, pp. 4-12, June 17, 1988, in author’s

possession. See also, Renfrew, interview transcript by David Engstrom, June 17, 1988, pp. 2, 9, in

author’s possession.

419 Eidenberg, interview transcript by David Engstrom, June 17, 1988, p. 14.

420 NYT, April 25, 1980, pp. A1 and A10.

421 Call memo, BB to file, April 29, 1980, in folder “Pending-State Correspondence, 1980,” box 2394,

Dante Fascell Papers, UM-SC. See also, MH, April 24, 1980, pp. 1A, 23A.

171

Washington calculated, Havana would find it too embarrassing to keep the port open for

emigrants. On April 27, 1980, Vice President Walter Mondale made a statement to

underscore the crisis as the best “proof of the failure of Castro’s revolution.” The exodus

was “a callous, cynical effort by Castro,” said Mondale, to play on “extraordinarily

dangerous and unlawful boat trips.”422

To assist public relations campaigns against Cuba,

the Voice of America (VOA) worked with the CIA, carried a lead news analysis, and

gave “as much coverage as they have given to any other issue including [the Soviet

invasion in] Afghanistan.”423

To preempt Cuba’s counter-propaganda, Washington cancelled Operation Solid

Shield, a massive military maneuver in the Caribbean. As part of the increased U.S.

military activities in the Caribbean, directed by PD52, the operation involved the landing

of 3,400 Marines at the U.S. base in Guantánamo. Yet, the announcement of the exercise

disturbed not only Castro, who accused the United States of posing a military threat

against Cuba, but also other pro-U.S. governments in Latin America, which worried

about the perceived U.S. resolve to escalate tensions. In his letter to Carter, for example,

Costa Rican President Rodrigo Carazo expressed concern about the exercise, which he

claimed would embolden Castro to mount further anti-U.S. “propaganda.”424

As a result,

Carter abandoned the exercise, diverted U.S. vessels to rescue ships in distress on the

422

Statement by Mondale, April 27, 1980, in DOSB 80 (June 1980), p. 68. For the rationale, see

Brzezinski to Carter, April 27, 1980, NLC-133-218-4-37-8, RAC, JCL; and Brzezinski and Watson to

Mondale, et. al., April 28, 1980, NLC-24-88-1-10-6, RAC, JCL.

423 Reinhardt to Brzezinski, April 25, 1980, in folder “Broadcasting to Cuba,” Carnes Lord Files, RRL.

424 Carazo to Carter, April 23, 1980, NLC-24-10-6-1-6, RAC, JCL.

172

Florida Straits, and presented this policy change as a humanitarian gesture.425

The

violations of Cuba’s aerial space by U.S. espionage aircraft instead became more

frequent.426

Furthermore, Carter sought to shore up international support for the U.S. position

by bringing the case to international forums. Washington calculated that multilateral

approaches would not only alleviate the U.S. burden of accepting Cubans, but also help

to reinforce public relations campaigns against Cuba. In his reply to the above-mentioned

letter from Carazo, Carter urged him to convoke an international conference on Cuba to

“bring pressure on Castro” to stop his “inhuman actions.” According to an instruction

given to the U.S. ambassador in San José, the conference would “try to re-internationalize

this crisis in order to put credible pressure on Castro” to restore migration normalcy

surrounding the island.427

On May 8-9, 1980, at Carter’s urging, the San José conference

of twenty-two countries and seven international organizations took place. The United

States formed a tripartite commission with Costa Rica and Britain to demand Cuba’s

unconditional closure of the crisis.

The leading advocate of these diplomatic approaches was Zbigniew Brzezinski’s

NSC. Although the day-to-day management of the boatlift was transferred to Carter’s

crisis coordinator Jack Watson, Brzezinski continued to contemplate ways to terminate

425

Brzezinski to Carter, April 28, 1980, NLC-7-41-5-5-9, RAC, JCL; Brzezinski to Carter, April 29,

1980, NLC-24-57-6-2-5, RAC, JCL: and Clift to Mondale, April 30, 1980, NLC-133-203-4-16-7,

RAC, JCL.

426 Estado comparativo de las violaciones del espacio aereo de Cuba en 1980 y 1981, MINREX. Cuba

counted the total number of U.S. violations of Cuba’s aerial space from May to October 1980 was 71.

This was even more numerous than 1981, when Reagan assumed the presidency.

427 Christopher to the U.S. embassy in San José, May 1, 1980, NLC-16-105-5-3-0, RAC, JCL. The

cable cited Carter’s letter to Carazo.

173

the crisis on U.S. terms. Eager to enter a diplomatic confrontation with Havana, the NSC

focused on the best part of the exodus: the Cuban Revolution was in trouble. Such was

the case even after Carter experienced a major difficulty in curtailing Cuban migration.

For instance, Brzezinski’s deputy David Aaron wrote to Carter that Castro “can no more

control his population than we can control the Cuban American community.” As the

Cuban leader was under pressure, Aaron claimed, he was “trying to get us to scream

first.”428

Eidenberg recalls a startling statement by Brzezinski at one meeting. “You don’t

understand, [but] we got to deal with this as a new form of warfare. They are throwing

people at us as if they were bullets.”429

Carter backed Brzezinski, when he endorsed the NSC’s recommendation to

“orchestrate a world-wide campaign pointing out Cuba/ Castro’s responsibility” for the

Mariel crisis.430

The VOA programming emphasized that the mass exodus was “an

international not just a U.S. concern” and that Cuba, not the United States, was the one

“seeking a confrontation…to mask massive internal problems.”431

By late May, when

Carter renewed his order of providing “maximum publicity of the Cuban refugee issues

through VOA,” Brzezinski had much to write in a progress report. In addition to building

four 50-kw transmitters in Antigua and Grand Turk for broadcasting VOA programming

428

Aaron to Carter, “NSC Weekly Report 140,” May 9, 1980, DDRS. It may be worthwhile to note

that the infamous NSC-State Department infighting ended in the resignation of Cyrus Vance, a head of

the State Department. The new Secretary of State, Edmund Muskie, took office on May 8 but needed

some time to learn on the job.

429 Eidenberg, interview transcript by David Engstrom, June 17, 1988, p. 24.

430 Handwritten note by Carter, in Les Deneno to Donald Holm, May 27, 1980, NLC-15-9-2-5-9,

RAC, JCL.

431 Reinhardt to Brzezinski, May 16, 1980, in folder “5/1/80-6/30/80,” FG 298-1, White House Central

Files, JCL.

174

in the English Caribbean for four to five hours, the USICA also prepared a full-length

film on the boatlift in multiple languages, undertook a study on “listening habits” of

peoples in Cuba and the Eastern Caribbean, and expanded “very rapidly” its leadership

grants and speaker’s programs to the Caribbean area.432

Still, despite the intensity of

these diplomatic/ propaganda efforts, they fell far short of bringing Castro to his knees.

Castro’s Hardened Defiance

Although the Peruvian embassy crisis certainly took Castro by surprise, he

quickly reshaped the unfavorable series of events to his advantage. A Granma editorial

on April 14 called for three massive demonstrations on April 19, May 1, and the day of

the U.S. maneuvers at Guantánamo to “express their outrage and revulsion against the

Yankee provocations and threats.”433

On May 1, despite Washington’s cancellation of the

exercise, one million Cubans attended the mass demonstration in Havana. Castro charged

the United States with masterminding all the crises and affirmed the sacred virtue of the

revolution. “No society in the entire hemisphere has a healthier moral atmosphere than

ours,” he proclaimed. “No society has higher moral values than those our society has

achieved in the twenty-one years of the Revolution.”434

The famous incident of the

432

Brzezinski to Carter, “NSC Weekly Report 143,” May 30, 1980, NLC-128-10-3-2-4, RAC, JCL.

For Carter’s order, see Brzezinski to USICA Director, May 30, 1980, NLC-15-9-2-5-9, RAC, JCL.

433 Editorial, Granma, April 14, 1980, p. 1.

434 Speech by Fidel Castro, in A Battle for Our Dignity and Sovereignty (Cuba: n.d., 1980?), p. 87. For

Cuban public support, see Granma, May 1, 1980, pp. 1-3, and May 2, 1980, pp. 1-8.

175

USINT in Havana occurred the day after. Around 400 Cuban asylum seekers flooded into

the section, chased after by angry neighboring organizations.435

Castro incessantly attacked those who were leaving the island. Granma called all

Mariel Cubans “antisocial,” or someone who lacked “national sentiment and attachment

to the homeland.”436

The appeal to national sentiment in turn sanctioned the act of

repudiation (group punishment). “Enraged mobs prowled the neighborhoods of Havana

day and night, armed with sticks, rotten eggs, and tomatoes,” as Mirta Ojito recalls in her

memoir.437

These elements forced Cubans leaving for the United States to confess their

illegal or antisocial behaviors. The USINT in Havana received the following report.

“They [emigrants] would be pelted with eggs, made to wear signs saying ‘I am a worm,’

and sometimes forced to run a gauntlet of jeering neighbors. In many cases, they were

beaten up, and in at least one or two cases they were beaten to death.”438

The scene was

disgusting for many revolutionary Cubans who refused to join the act.439

The Cuban government further delegitimized the whole exodus by placing its

“undesirables” on the boats coming to Mariel. According to Cuba’s law of dangerousness

of 1979, Cuban authorities had incarcerated those who engaged in antisocial behaviors,

435

U.S. and Cuban scholars disagree on what actually happened. U.S. scholars argue that the Cuban

government suddenly directed violence against men and women waiting for their visas in front of the

USINT in Havana. They escaped the violence by entering into the building. See Wayne Smith, Closest

of Enemies, pp. 217-231; and Schultz, Infernal, pp. 356-57. In contrast, Cuban scholars view the story

as a part of U.S. propaganda instigated by USINT chief Wayne Smith to embarrass Cuba in front of

world media. See Ramírez Cañedo and Morales, De la confrontación, pp. 231-32.

436 Granma, April 27, 1980, p. 1.

437 Ojito, Finding Mañana, pp. 170-74.

438 Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, pp. 212-13. See also, García, Havana USA, pp. 63-64.

439 Arboleya, Cuba y cubanoamericanos, p. 52.

176

such as thefts, alcoholism, gambling, drug addiction, homosexuality, prostitution,

“extravagant behavior,” vagrancy, religious practices of Jehovah’s Witnesses, and

dealing on the black market. Given their bleak prospect of life in revolutionary Cuba,

these anti-revolutionary “delinquents” would have seized the first chance to leave for the

United States. Included in this group were “common criminals,” those who had

committed robbery, assaults, and other non-felonies. Based on the study of Cuban

scholars, Jorge Domínguez estimated that about eight thousand common criminals joined

the boatlift.440

Reports of criminals appeared in U.S. newspapers, accompanied by people

with mental disorders, prostitutes, unaccompanied minors, and spies.

When Washington used acrimonious words in making a protest, Havana lined up

even harsher sentences in reply. In a five-paragraph note, the State Department charged

Havana with sending “hardened criminals,” calling this practice unacceptable for “any

civilized society.”441

The Cuban foreign ministry prepared thirty-five paragraphs to reject

this accusation. The government “never” authorized the departure of “persons imprisoned

for violent crimes involving bloodshed.” Even if those with such criminal backgrounds

had joined the boatlift, they had already finished their sentences and thus had “the same

right” to move. The government violated no international laws. Cubans were free to

emigrate. Their poverty was created by “unequal and unjust development,” for which the

U.S. history of exploitation was responsible. After overviewing the record of U.S.

440

Jorge I. Domínguez, “Cooperating with the Enemy? U.S. Immigration Policies toward Cuba,” in

Christopher Mitchell, ed., Western Hemisphere Immigration and United States Foreign Policy

(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), p. 57. See also, Rafael Hernández and

Redi Gomis, “Retrato del Mariel: el ángulo socioeconómico,” Cuadernos de Nuestra América 3, no. 5

(January-June 1986): pp. 124-151.

441 U.S. State Department to CUINT in Washington, June 7, 1980, Caja “Migratorios 7,” MINREX.

177

toleration of crimes, terrorism, and illegal departures, the note rhetorically asked, “From

what moral perspectives can the United States speak of criminals?”442

No Diplomatic Opening

Confronted with Havana’s hardened defiance, Carter found it impossible to

continue the present policy. By May 14, 1980, the number of Cuban arrivals reached

37,085 and showed no signs of relief for the White House. As federal, state, and local

officials were confused, panicked, and exhausted their resources, U.S. public opinion

polls turned overwhelmingly against the admission of new Cubans. The notable presence

of “undesirables” made the entire group of Mariel Cubans less welcome.443

The boatlift

became an “administrative and logistical nightmare.”444

Carter’s famous “open-arms” speech on May 5, 1980, exacerbated the problem.

“We’ll continue to provide an open heart and open arms,” he declared, “to refugees

seeking freedom from Communist domination and from economic deprivation, brought

about primarily by Fidel Castro and his government.”445

In private, Carter quipped that

442

MINREX note to USINT in Havana, June 11, 1980, in Caja “Migratorios 7,” MINREX. See also,

Speech by Castro, June 14, 1980, LANIC.

443 Watson to Carter, May 2, 1980, in folder “Cuban Refugees,” box 178, Domestic Policy Staff Files

(hereafter DPS): Eizenstat, JCL. For confusion, see Copeland, “Cuban Boatlift”; Engstrom, Adrift, pp.

69-72; and Larzelere, Boatlift, pp. 238-244. For the public opinion, see Gallup Poll, May 16-19, 1980,

in George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1980 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources,

1981), pp. 120-22; and Newsweek, May 26, 1980, p. 25.

444 A quote from Watson, interview transcript by David Engstrom, p. 12.

445 Speech by Carter, May 5, 1980, APP.

178

the U.S. press exaggerated the “open-arms” part of this speech.446

But aside from the

rhetoric, the speech itself well represented the basic tenet of the policy at that time.

Instead of refusing Cubans, Carter was following the strategy of trying to force Castro to

stop the boatlift by attacking the Cuban model and by mounting pressure on Castro. What

Carter did not notice was that this approach simply had been backfiring. Unable to stop

the boatlift, a combination of Carter’s humanitarian “open-arms” and public

condemnation of Cuba simply appeared naive in the eyes of many Americans.447

Desperate to change the game, Carter made another address on May 14 for his

three core audiences: the U.S. public, Miami, and Havana. For the U.S. public, Carter

clarified his intention of enforcing stricter laws against participants in the boatlift.

Following his order the Coast Guard warned all vessels against going to Cuba, utilized

aerial surveillance, and established a naval “blockade” to intercept boats traveling to

Cuba. Ashore, the INS and Customs issued intent-to-fine notices, seized private boats

carrying Cubans, and kept them in custody, subject to forfeiture. Being aware that law

enforcement alone would not work, Carter also tried to reassure Miami Cubans by

promising an orderly departure program as an alternative to the boatlift. Carter urged

them to register those whom they wanted to bring into the United States at newly opening

family registration centers. Finally, to make this arrangement possible, Carter demanded

446

Case Study Paper of Eizenstat, p. 15. Jack Watson reinforces this point. “If you read the President’s

words in response to that question carefully, he really wasn’t off the mark.” Watson, interview

transcript by David Engstrom, p. 10.

447 On the next day, when Carter received the situation report on the Mariel boatlift, he dictated,

“Organize a concerted PR campaign [against Cuba].” Christopher to Carter, May 6, 1980, NLC-7-23-

3-4-2, RAC, JCL.

179

that Castro agree to begin an airlift or sealift for “qualified” Cubans and accept over 400

“hardened criminals” whom Carter found among the newcomers.448

The new policy produced mixed results. Stricter law enforcement and opening

family centers achieved a significant drop in the number of vessels heading toward Cuba.

Miami Cubans became more cooperative, partly because Carter made crystal clear his

intention of restricting the flow. Many also began feeling that Castro was using their

desire for family reunification to his advantage. But the boaters already in Mariel had

little incentive to leave without their relatives, and were willing to pay fines. Trying to go

around the naval blockade in South Florida, some vessels departed for Mariel from

Puerto Rico and Jamaica. The number of southward vessels plummeted, yet continued.449

Havana had even less motive for listening to Carter. A few days later Cuba

mobilized the third and largest mass demonstration, and over five million people joined

marches in several cities.450

At Mariel, Cuban authorities apparently took forceful law

enforcement measures. They reportedly prohibited boat captains from leaving Cuba

without taking passengers, threatened to fine the captains, and insinuated retaliation

against their waiting families. With fewer boats available, Cuban authorities also put too

many passengers on each boat—too many for some vessels to survive the voyage back to

448

Speech by Carter, May 14, 1980, APP. For discussion, Eizenstat, Watson, and Brzezinski to Carter,

May 13, 1980, in folder “Refugees—Cuban and Haitian [5],” box 22, DPS: Civil Rights and Justice-

White, JCL. For law enforcement, see Larzelere, Boatlift, chap. 16.

449 Case Study Paper of Eizenstat, pp. 17-18; Engstrom, Adrift, pp. 110-2; Eidenberg, interview

transcript by David Engstrom, March 22, 1991, pp. 18-19, in author’s possession; García, Havana

USA, p. 68; and Cuban Refugee Task Force, SITREP 25, May 30, 1980, in folder “Pending—State

Cubans Work File, April-June, 1980,” box 2394, Dante Fascell Papers, UM-SC. For mixed Cuban

American reactions to Carter’s policy, see for example, editorial, Patria, May 16, 1980, p. 2.

450 Granma, May 15-18, 1980, all pages.

180

the United States. Because of overloading problems and the likelihood of ship wreckages,

the Coast Guard and Navy had to focus on rescue-and-search missions, rather than law

enforcement on northbound vessels.451

More important was Havana’s rejection of Carter’s scheme for an orderly

departure program, a central component of the new U.S. policy. A Granma editorial on

May 19 called the proposition “partial solutions,” and made a proposal of its own—U.S.-

Cuban talks on all issues of bilateral relations, of which migration control was only part.

The editorial claimed that the U.S. government was the one that started to use migration

as a political weapon. Carter stalled the emigration of ex-prisoners, encouraged them to

leave illegally, and created negative publicity against the Cuban system. Therefore, the

editorial stated, the two countries had to talk about the fundamental cause of the

emigration crisis—U.S. hostilities—and to cover such issues as the U.S. economic

blockade against Cuba, U.S. support for counterrevolutionaries, and the return of the

Guantánamo base to Cuba. This was Cuba’s position, as Raúl Castro explained to the

Soviet ambassador in Havana. “Cuba is ready to [have] a serious conversation with

Americans about our [migration] problem,” he said. “But we intend to hold the

conversation around the whole complex of questions.”452

451

MH, May 16, 1980, pp. 1A, 22A; García, Havana USA, p. 68; and Larzelere, Boatlift, p. 159. The

problem of these stories was their reliance on the testimonies of Mariel Cubans themselves. Wayne

Smith tried in vain to see if the reports of forced loading were true. Yet, the Cubans did not approve

his request for access to the Americans in the Mariel harbor. Pastor to Brzezinski and Aaron, June 5,

1980, NLC-24-88-5-10-2, RAC, JCL. On the Coast Guard priority, see Watson, interview transcript by

Engstrom, p. 16.

452 Granma, May 19, 1980, p. 1; and Vorotnikov, Gavana—Моskva, pp. 122-3.

181

Carter’s Failed “Multilateral” Approaches

Havana’s counterproposal was unacceptable to Carter. According to a summary

paper prepared by the State Department two months later, Havana since the beginning of

the migration crisis had made clear its willingness to enter into talks with Washington,

“but only if the whole range of bilateral issues important to Cuba can be discussed.” 453

Yet, the U.S. government had avoided discussing bilateral issues of the major

importance, such as the embargo, to “indicate our displeasure with Cuba’s aggressive

foreign policy.” Therefore, the paper continued, opening of U.S.-Cuban talks on Cuban

terms meant not only reversing a rationale of U.S. policy toward Cuba, but also “giving

in to Castro’s pressure tactics” of employing migration as a foreign policy tool.454

In

other words, accepting Cuban terms for opening talks would have meant a major foreign

policy defeat for Carter, as well as Brzezinski, who had argued since August 1977 that

Carter should not consider the lifting of the embargo—full and partial—unless Castro

changed his foreign policy.455

As Carter’s reelection approached, the national security

453

State Department Options Paper, “Negotiating with Cuba,” July 31, 1980, p. 3, in folder “Cuba-

Refugees, 7/22-31/80,” box 18, NSA: Staff Material-North/South (Pastor), JCL. Since late April 1980,

Carter secretly probed Castro’s willingness to discuss the migration crisis—through the USINT in

Havana and Panama—without discussing larger bilateral issues, although it received no positive

response. Christopher to Carter, May 1, 1980, NLC-7-23-3-2-4, RAC, JCL; Situation Room Checklist,

May 14, 1980, NLC-133-218-5-18-8, RAC, JCL; and Brzezinski to Carter, May 7, 1980, NLC-SAFE

17 E-27-6-8-8, RAC, JCL. Havana spent three weeks to answer the proposal, according to a U.S.

document. Christopher to Carter, June 13, 1980, NLC-7-23-4-15-9, RAC, JCL.

454 Ibid.

455 See the previous chapter for my discussion on the August 1977 meeting among U.S. officials.

182

adviser also appealed to Carter’s concerns about domestic politics. Brzezinski insisted

that Carter maintain a hard stance on Cuba and deal with the boatlift accordingly.456

For the time being at least, Carter also hoped that his strategy of internationalizing

the crisis would turn the unfavorable tide somehow. As explained earlier, bringing the

migration case to international forums was a critical piece of Carter’s diplomatic

offensive against Cuba. Yet, despite hectic behind-the-scenes moves by U.S. diplomats,

the administration failed to elicit enthusiastic international support. For example,

although twelve countries at the May 8-9 San José conference pledged to accept hundreds

of Cubans, the combined number was far from meeting the demand. Of the participants,

only Britain and Costa Rica joined the United States to form a commission urging Cuba

to open discussions on an orderly departure program along the lines of Carter’s May 14

address.457

The Cuban government rejected their notes, calling them “wholly

improper.”458

After Cuba refused their demand once again, the group convened another

San José conference on June 27-28 to underscore Cuba’s inhumane treatment of

emigrants.459

456

Brzezinski to Carter, NSC Weekly Report 149, August 7, 1980, DDRS. See also later sections. For

Carter’s reluctance to talk with Castro in an election year, see also, Engstrom, Adrift, pp. 117-19.

457 British embassy in San José to London (Telegrams 106, 107, 108), May 9, 1980, FCO 99/501,

PRO. See also, Costa Rican ambassador in Britain to Payne, May 12, 1980, FCO 99/502. PRO.

458 British embassy in Havana to London, May 22, 1980, and May 24, 1980, FCO 99/502, PRO.

459 Editorial, Granma, May 10, 1980. The Cuban foreign ministry later sent a copy of this editorial to

London as a Cuba’s formal position on the tripartite proposal. Cuban Embassy in London, May 13,

1980, FCO 99/502. PRO. See also, Engstrom, Adrift, pp. 117-19.

183

Cuba denounced these endeavors as “American-manipulated propaganda” and

warned non-U.S. countries against participation in the “hostile act” against Cuba.460

In

essence, Havana’s perception was correct. It was “multilateral” only in appearance, as the

British records reveal. British action was driven as much by a shared Cold War goal of

discrediting the Cuban model in the Third World, as by perceived obligation to the

Anglo-American “special relationship.”461

But even these U.S.-friendly diplomats in

London found the Americans too reckless and too eager to use the multilateral approach

for “domestic consumption.”462

To increase the chance of success of their maneuver, the

British proposed that the tripartite group take time to expand its membership and refrain

from seeking publicity for its actions. The Americans cast aside these premonitions and

claimed that they had to take action immediately and publicly since Carter already

referred to international efforts in his speeches. These U.S. responses puzzled the British,

who wondered if Washington truly wanted to pressure Havana to sit at negotiating tables,

rather than just making Carter look better.463

The British also felt that their presence was merely a cover for the “unilateral”

nature of the tripartite approach. Without the British presence, this mechanism lacked any

international credibility, as Costa Rica was vulnerable to Cuba’s accusation of its being

“in the U.S. pocket.”464

But if the membership of the tripartite group expanded, it would

460

See for example, British embassy in Havana to London, May 9, 1980, FCO 99/501, PRO.

461 Carrington to British embassy in Vienna, May 15, 1980, FCO 99/502, PRO.

462 Carrington to British embassy in Washington, May 15, 1980, FCO 99/502, PRO.

463 Memcon (Loy, Ridley, Aguilar, et. al.), May 18, 1980, FCO 99/503, PRO.

464 British embassy in Washington to London, June 23, 1980, FCO 99/504, PRO.

184

be too unwieldy for the United States to control and serve Carter’s political interests.465

In this case, the prestige and good intentions of London were too convenient for

Washington to ignore. Although the British nonetheless went along with the Americans,

the whole effort appeared “unrealistic” in their eyes.466

By the time Washington called for

the second San José conference, the British had lost all hope. “It seems likely,” they

lamented, “that this proposal stems from continuing domestic political pressure for

visible action by the administration.”467

Mariel Cubans: Profiles, Motives, and Strategies

Whereas Carter hesitated to open talks directly with Castro, the flow of Cuban

migration continued in the spring and summer of 1980. By early June, the number of

Mariel Cubans arriving in the United States reached one hundred thousand. Resettling

these unwelcome strangers became another source of problems for the U.S. president.

The profiles of Mariel Cubans complicated U.S. resettlement efforts. U.S.

governmental sources indicated that many Mariel Cubans were young, urban males who

held some menial job experiences. About 70 percent of the Cubans were male, and more

than half were under the age of thirty. Most of them had not completed high-school-level

education, and few received college degrees or professional training. Notably, about

twenty-four thousand Mariel Cubans claimed to having served in Cuban prisons. Some

465

See esp. Memcon (Loy, Ridley, Aguilar), May 18, 1980, FCO 99/503, PRO.

466 Carrington to British embassy in Washington, May 28, 1980, FCO 99/503, PRO; and A. J. Payne to

Maitland, May 28, 1980, FCO 99/503, PRO.

467 British embassy in Washington to London, June 17, 1980, FCO 99/503, PRO. In late June 1980,

the British decided to distance itself from the tripartite scheme.

185

participated in robbery, theft, possession of explosives, and other non-felonies under U.S.

immigration laws. Others did something that North Americans did not consider as

punishable “crimes,” including the refusal to work, the rejection of joining the

Communist Party, the failure to serve the army, traffic violations, loitering, gambling, and

petty thefts.468

These data might be potentially biased since they were entirely based on self-

confession made by Mariel Cubans, who might seek to dramatize their defiance to Cuban

authorities to earn U.S. sympathy. Nevertheless, the U.S. intelligence community largely

accepted their claims, called these Cubans “revolutionary dropouts,” and emphasized the

lack of economic and political prospects in Cuba, rather than family reunification, as the

principal cause of the boatlift. Of particular importance was the size of the Cuban youth

included in the boatlift. U.S. officials reasoned that the Cuban youth had no memory of

the pre-revolutionary era, took socioeconomic achievements in the first decades of the

revolution for granted, and therefore, became frustrated with the economic system once a

depression occurred. The 1979 visit of Cuban Americans to the island apparently

exacerbated their disillusion.469

468

Robert L. Bowen, ed., Report of the Cuban-Haitian Task Force (hereafter CHTF), November 1,

1980, in folder “CHTF Documents—A Report of the CHTF,” pp. 55, 70, box 24, Cuban Refugee

Center Records, UM-CHC; and CHTF Data Book, p. 75, in folder “Briefing Materials, Senate

Appropriations 3/16/81 [1],” box 11, Records of the Cuban-Haitian Task Force, JCL. U.S. and Cuban

scholars disagree on the degree of Mariel Cubans’ labor participation in the Cuban economy prior to

their departure. See Robert L. Bach, Jennifer B. Bach, and Timothy Triplett, “The Flotilla “Entratns”:

Latest and Most Controversial,” Cuban Studies/ Estudios Cubanos 11, no. 2-12, no. 1 (January 1981-

January 1982): pp. 29-48; and Hernández and Gomis, “Retrato del Mariel.”

469 CIA Special Analyses, “Cuba: Profile of the Refugees,” July 7, 1980, in folder “Cuba: Refugees,

7/6-21/80,” NSA: Staff Material North-South (Pastor), JCL; and U.S. State Department Paper, “Cuba:

Sociological Profile of the Refugees,” June 3, 1980, in folder “Statistics,” box 1, Mirta Ojito Papers,

186

Such a strong emphasis on Cuba’s difficulties tended to cloud many other aspects

of the boatlift. The U.S. data also suggested that more than half of the Mariel Cubans had

relatives in the United States. Of these, about 30 percent had immediate family such as

parents or spouses; around 40 percent had other blood relatives; and 25 percent had non-

blood relatives.470

For these Cubans, the principal motive for migration might have been

their desire to reunite with family members separated for a long time.

Race, ethnicity, gender, and sexuality also informed each individual’s decision to

leave for the United States. Contrary to the prior waves of Cuban migration, a sizable

proportion of the newcomers—at least 20 percent—were nonwhites. Many Afro Cubans

became enthusiastic supporters of the revolution, which promoted open access to public

facilities and beaches, as well as employment, education, and health care. But those who

came to the United States did not hesitate to say that racial prejudices persisted in Cuba

and inhibited their socioeconomic success. Comparatively, Cuban women were more

enthusiastic than men because the revolution enlarged educational and career

opportunities. Some women stayed, even though their husbands left Cuba to avoid

military services and other obligations. Homosexuality was a crime, subject to fines and

imprisonment in Cuba. The estimated number of gays among Mariel Cubans was around

one thousand, but probably more.471

UM-CHC. Both of them rely on a large sample of over 30,000 Mariel Cubans processed by U.S.

authorities. For Cuba’s economic woes and the impact of family visits, see the previous chapter.

470 For data on Mariel Cubans’ family ties, see CHTF Data Book, p. 75.

471 In his 1971 speech, Fidel Castro defined homosexuality as “social pathology” and moved to make

it illegal, Pedraza, Political Disaffection, p. 158. See also, Julio Capó, Jr., “Queering Mariel:

Mediating Cold War Foreign Policy and U.S. Citizenship among Cuba’s Homosexual Exile

187

Contemporary oral history records reveal that the motives of Mariel Cubans were

even more complex. As in the case of many other migrants, individual decision was part

of family strategies. An Afro-Cuban middle-class couple, Olga and Jorge Lezcano, lived

in Havana. Despite their hatred of the government, they could not leave the island since

they had no relatives in the United States. For them, the Peruvian embassy crisis was the

first chance they seized to leave the country. Before their departures they left Jorge’s old

mother to his brother remaining in Cuba. Jumping into the embassy amid a full-scale

protest was too dangerous for the elderly.472

Some families were more fortunate than others. Eight members of the Casanova

family had no issues with the government. But their youngest son, Miguel, wanted to go

to the United States, and his desire to leave Cuba grew stronger after his godmother in

New York came back for a visit with souvenirs and stories of her life. The families

eventually found a way out. When Miguel lied that he had committed a crime of playing

bolita (lottery), Cuban authorities gave passports to all family members without bothering

to verify his confession of guilt. Without further troubles the entire family arrived in the

United States in August 1980.473

The case of María Rodríguez and her husband was more

burdensome. Trying to have a quiet and private life away from neighboring community

activities, the couple tried to leave Cuba with their two sons. But when they waited in line

Community, 1978-1994,” Journal of American Ethnic History 29, no. 4 (Summer 2010): pp. 78-106.

For the proportion of nonwhites, see CHTF Data Book, p. 58. For race, gender and sexuality, see esp.

Pedraza, Political Disaffection, chap. 6.

472 Oral history records, in folder “#195 12-19-80,” box 5, Diana Kirby Papers, UM-CHC.

473 Oral history records, in folder “#823 1-5-81,” box 7, Diana Kirby Papers, UM-CHC.

188

in El Mosquito, an emigration center near Mariel, Cuban officials stopped their sons

because they were close to the military age. On arrival, the couple started to work to

reclaim their remaining families, her mother and two sons left in Cuba.474

Many families wanted to live together. Other families decided to send one of the

members to the United States in hopes that he or she would bring the other members to

the United States in the future. Bryan Walsh, archdiocese of Miami, noticed that most of

the young men came alone simply because they did not want to risk exposing their wives,

children, and elderly to the dangerous voyage. Many teenage boys also did the same so

that they could reclaim the rest of their families later.475

Miguel of the Casanova family

might have done so if he could not cheat Cuban authorities. There also were some

extraordinary examples. Louisa Mendoza Hernández, an eighty-three-year-old widow,

initially refused to go along with her three sons and a daughter. She had only two teeth,

was unable to walk by herself, and thought that she could not survive the voyage. “I’ll

never make the trip. You go ahead and leave. You have more life.” But her son insisted,

“You’ll have to kill me first.” So she came. The reason why she came to the United

States was her decision to follow her siblings.476

474

Oral history records, in folder “#289 10-28-80,” box 5, Diana Kirby Papers, UM-CHC. The

military age was sixteen to twenty-seven, only for men.

475 U.S. Senate, Committee on Judiciary, Caribbean Refugee Crisis: Cubans and Haitians, 96th

Cong., 2nd sess., May 12, 1980, p. 14.

476 MH, May 18, 1980, p. 23A.

189

A Quagmire of Confusion

Carter struggled to resettle thousands of these Cubans into U.S. communities, and

tried to accommodate their needs and concerns as quickly as possible. Carter assigned

Jack Watson to lead this resettlement effort. Thomas R. Casey of the Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA) took charge of onsite coordination of all federal

government activities, including those of the Departments of State, Defense, Justice,

Treasury, Transportation, and Health and Human Services. The FEMA opened

processing centers in Key West, where INS officials conducted initial screening and

inspection. If aliens had close family ties, then they were sent to Miami processing

centers, such as Miami’s Tamiami Park and the Opa-Locka barracks, to go through

further identification, security clearances, and medical checks. They received a parole for

stay and an employment authorization before moving to new places to live.

Mariel Cubans with no family ties or who had criminal backgrounds were airlifted

from Key West to one of the four processing centers outside Miami. These were: Eglin

Air Force Base in Northwest Florida; Fort Chaffee, Arkansas; Fort Indiantown Gap,

Pennsylvania; and Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. The processing at the camps took longer than

in Miami since the security clearance procedure was more intensive. Also, the federal

government used voluntary agencies, such as United States Catholic Conference, to

match entrants with sponsors throughout the United States. Only when the inmates found

sponsors could they receive an I-94, as well as a small amount of money and a flight

ticket to leave the camps. Those whom the INS suspected of having committed serious

190

nonpolitical crimes went to the Atlanta Penitentiary. They had to wait there for

exclusionary hearings.

Various factors delayed the resettlement process. Voluntary agencies had

difficulty finding sponsors and jobs since U.S. society was suffering an economic

recession. The relationship between the FEMA and voluntary agencies was far from

harmonious. FEMA’s Casey snapped when voluntary agencies protested that he had

made a decision without an in-advance notice.477

The failure to establish a structure of

command and communications resulted in a bureaucratic mess. The situation was so

chaotic that Casey angrily complained at an interagency meeting that his private phone

received calls from Cuban Americans looking for their families.478

The profile of Mariel

Cubans who went to the camps was another unfavorable factor. They were more likely to

be nonwhite, male, single, and more difficult to find sponsors than Miami arrivals.479

The

U.S. press sensationalized the existence of criminals, people with mental disorders,

homosexuals, prostitutes, and unaccompanied juvenile delinquents. The last group posed

a difficult legal problem of custody.480

The worst of all was the Fort Chaffee riot of June 3, 1980, which engulfed U.S.

news reports. Angry at processing delays and chaotic camp management, two hundred

477

AC to Fascell, May 9, 1980, in folder “Pending-State Cubans Work File, April-June, 1980,” box

2394, Dante Fascell Papers, UM-SC. Congressman Fascell received reports from his staff attending

numerous FEMA meetings. For FEMA’s problematic relations with voluntary agencies, see Rivera,

Decision and Structure, pp. 179-180.

478 AC to Fascell, May 22, 1980, in folder “Refugee and FEMA,” box 2408, Dante Fascell Papers,

UM-SC.

479 Bach, Bach, and Triplett, “Entrants,” p. 46.

480 For minors, see José Szapocznik, Raquel E. Cohen, and Roberto E. Hernandez, eds., Coping with

Adolescent Refugees: The Mariel Boatlift (New York: Praeger, 1985).

191

Cubans rioted, stormed out in protest, and caused a panic in the state of Arkansas. As

three-to-four hundred local armed citizens gathered and threatened to attack the Cubans,

Governor Bill Clinton feared “a bloodbath that would make the Little Rock Central High

crisis look like a Sunday afternoon picnic.”481

The scene of Clinton’s state troopers and

federal marshals turning the rioters back with tear gas appeared in the U.S. media for

days and weeks. The press also took this opportunity to highlight the criminal

environment in the camps, including gang violence, prostitution rings, rape and stabbing,

liquor stills and contraband, and homemade firearms. It often failed to note, however, that

those who joined such activities were small minorities.482

The riot dismayed even the

Miami Cuban media. A reporter for Réplica dismissed the rioters as delinquents who did

not merit “the title of political refugees.”483

The pace of resettlement slowed down. Poll after poll indicated that increasingly

more U.S. citizens experienced frustration with the ongoing migration disorder. A Gallup

poll of May 16-19, 1980, showed that 57 percent of the respondents opposed Cuban

migration into the United States. Yet, the disapproval rate for U.S. acceptance of Cuban

migrants increased to as high as 73 percent, according to a Harris poll two months later.

Another Harris survey on August 26, 1980, also noted that 81 percent were critical of

481

Bill Clinton, My Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), p. 276.

482 Gastón A. Fernández, The Mariel Exodus Twenty Years Later: A Study on the Politics of Stigma

and a Research Bibliography (Miami, FL: Ediciones Universal, 2002), pp. 48, 65-66; and García,

Havana USA, p. 70.

483 See an article in Réplica, June 11, 1980. Hardliners also agreed on this. See for example, Jorge Mas

Canosa, RECE, Mensage, June 1980, in Jorge Mas Canosa, vol. I, pp. 359-360. For a more detailed

analysis, see García, Havana USA, pp. 68-74.

192

Carter’s handling of the crisis.484

Members of the U.S. Congress claimed that they

received letters and phone calls from constituents displeased with Carter’s handling of the

boatlift. They demanded that Carter waste no time before doing something.485

After the

riot, not only terminating the boatlift but also returning Cuban “undesirables”—felons,

rioters, and those whom the U.S. government considered excludable under immigration

laws—became a top priority for Carter. The U.S. president demanded a report on how he

could “deport Cuban criminals and other unacceptable characters.”486

It was around this time that Carter officials made a decision about the status of

Mariel Cubans. As mentioned earlier, the U.S. government had traditionally accepted all

Cubans as “refugees” and rejected Haitians as economic migrants. In the face of public

criticisms of such double standards, however, Carter wanted to treat them on equal terms

without stimulating further immigration.487

As a result, the U.S. government created a

new legal category of “Cuban-Haitian entrant” as a “one-time only measure.” The status

was temporary, awaiting the passing of special legislation in the Congress. For the time

being, “entrants” could stay in the United States, eligible for the Aid to Families with

Dependent Children, Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income, food stamps, vocational

484

All poll data cited here are found in folder “Attitudes on Immigration Prepared by Reagan-Bush

’84 (July 26, 1984),” OA11586, Michael Deaver Files, RRL.

485 They differed on what exactly Carter should do. Frank Moore, Bob Schule, and Terry Straub to

Carter, “Congressional Consultation on the Cuban-Haitian Situation,” June 6, 1980, in folder “Cuban

Refugees,” box 178, DPS: Eizenstat, JCL. See also, Carter to Muskie, June 4, 1980, NLC-7-23-4-7-8,

RAC, JCL.

486 Carter, White House Diary, p. 434.

487 See the previous chapter. For details, see Engstrom, Adrift, pp. 142-160.

193

and English training, and other resettlement and social services.488

This decision was

symbolically important, as Jorge Domínguez notes. To refuse Mariel Cubans the

“refugees” status represented “the breakdown of earlier ideological consensus.” Cuban

migration was no longer welcomed merely to emphasize the benevolence of the U.S.

system and the bankruptcy of Cuba’s.489

Another Failed Diplomacy

As Washington’s handling of the crisis went into a quagmire of confusion,

bureaucratic mess, and declining public support, Havana was declaring its “victory.”

According to the Soviet ambassador in Cuba, Fidel Castro was triumphant in their

conversation on June 6, 1980. “About 118,000 people left the country, in which eighty

percent are criminals or potentially dangerous people and people living on the fringes of

society,” he remarked to the ambassador. “We won a two-month-long fight around the

events in the Peruvian embassy. This action improves the condition in the country.”

Castro also favorably mentioned a U.S. proposal for a confidential bilateral talk. “We

understand that the problems of ‘economic blockade’ and the base in Guantánamo will

not be solved quickly. But important is the fact itself that the United States displayed

preparedness to hold the talks.”490

488

Palmieri’s statement and White House Fact Sheet, June 20, 1980, DOSB (August 1980), pp. 79-82.

Since 1984, the U.S. government allowed these “entrants” to readjut their status. See Chapter Six.

489 Domínguez, “Cooperating with the Enemy?” p. 47.

490 Vorotnikov, Gavana—Моskva, pp. 123-24. On a U.S. proposal, see Muskie to Carter, May 24,

1980, in folder “State Department Evening Report, 5/80,” box 40, PF, JCL.

194

To Castro’s disappointment, however, the subsequent U.S.-Cuban talks in Havana

made clear that Carter was not yet ready to concede. After spending three weeks to

respond, the Cuban government accepted a U.S. proposal for talks to see what

Washington had to say. On June 17, 1980, Carter’s representatives, the State

Department’s Peter Tarnoff and the NSC’s Robert Pastor, met with José Luis Padrón and

other Cuban representatives. Here, Tarnoff and Pastor expressed a U.S. desire to improve

relations with Cuba. Still, they said, the resumption of dialogue was possible only after

Cuba agreed on an orderly departure program for Cubans, took back Cuban

“undesirables,” and allowed the Cubans who remained in the USINT building to depart

for the United States. The proposal was far from satisfactory for Cuban representatives.

“No progress was possible,” Padrón exclaimed, unless Washington first showed its

willingness to discuss all parts of U.S. policy toward Cuba, such as the economic

blockade of the island. The talks went in circles and reached “a dead-end.” 491

In his memoir, Wayne Smith, chief of the USINT in Havana, attributed the failure

of the talks to Brzezinski’s NSC. Contrary to the State Department, he wrote, the NSC

did not comprehend that accepting Castro’s terms was necessary to open negotiations and

stop the boatlift.492

But there was more to think about this failure, since Havana and

Washington held contrasting views on the causes of the migration crisis. Following the

Granma editorial of May 19, the Cuban delegation argued that the fundamental cause of

the crisis was U.S. hostility, and the fundamental solution was a major reversal of U.S.

491

Memcon (Padrón, Tarnoff), June 17-18, 1980, DDRS; and Tarnoff and Pastor to Carter, June 18,

1980, DDRS. U.S. officials apparently did not notify London of the June 1980 U.S.-Cuban talks.

492 Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, p. 216.

195

policy toward Cuba. The U.S. delegation rejected this explanation and portrayed Cuba’s

lack of economic growth and political freedom as the major sources of the crisis. By

blaming everything on the United States, they argued, the Cubans conveniently neglected

their own problems, including the devastating impact of the 1979 Cuban American visits

on Cuban society. U.S. denial of responsibilities for the outbreak of the crisis in turn

antagonized the Cubans. In the end, the U.S. and Cuban diplomats accused each other of

creating the migration crisis while downplaying their share of the blame.493

The importance of NSC-State Department’s differences paled in comparison to

Cuban defiance. Both the NSC’s Pastor and the State Department’s Tarnoff questioned

the rationale for using the embargo to change Cuban foreign policy. But they also

remained cautious about the lifting of the embargo, since it would harm U.S. “credibility”

in the world. The unilateral lifting of the embargo, especially when Cuba did not change

its foreign policy, would send a wrong message that the United States had “no staying

power.” Castro “wouldn’t even see me on that occasion, Tarnoff recalled, “because he

was insisting that I apologize, not personally, but on behalf of the President for having

been a party to stimulating this.” The Cuban leader “did not deny that he was responsible

for what was going on but he really put it on the back of the American president.” In both

the NSC and State Department’s views, what was at stake was national pride and

international credibility.494

493

Memcon, June 17-18, 1980.

494 Tarnoff, interview transcript by David Engstrom, p. 16. Tarnoff stated that Wayne Smith’s opinion

had not always represented the view of the State Department.

196

A Contingency Plan

Unable to stop the boatlift, the United States came very close to a war with Cuba

over migration control. In late June 1980, the U.S. Coast Guard conveyed alarming news

to Carter about the Blue Fire, anchored in a Mariel port. Seeking to bring in as many as

two thousand Cubans to the United States, forty Cuban Americans commissioned this

large “stateless” freighter, over which the United States had no jurisdiction. U.S. officials

convened an interagency meeting on an emergency basis to discuss ways to disable the

vessel, turn it around, and escort it back into Cuban waters. Yet, they noticed that such an

operation could result in “a serious military confrontation or clash” with Cuba.495

After

studying military options “in greatest detail,” Carter’s top officials at the Special

Coordination Committee (SCC) recommended that Muskie send a note of protest to

Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodríguez.496

Should Cuba ignore a U.S. message,

the United States would send a warning that it would take “physical action” to stop “a

new wave of immigration on stateless vessels.”497

Carter’s top officials also proposed that Carter consider a drastic military action if

the Blue Fire arrived in the United States anyway. To prevent any more large stateless

vessels from carrying Cubans, the U.S. president would send U.S. vessels to enter Cuban

waters and impose a “blockade” on the Mariel Harbor. Alternatively, the U.S. ships

would simply stay outside Cuban waters, seize vessels departing Mariel—through the use

495

Brzezinski to Carter, “Halting More Cuban Refugees,” June 30, 1980, NLC-133-219-1-35-2, RAC,

JCL.

496 SCC Summary of Conclusions, July 1, 1980, NLC-17-22-4-4-1, RAC, JCL.

497 Brzezinski to Carter, “Cuba—Refugee Ship,” July 3, 1980, NLC-133-219-2-6-3, RAC, JCL.

197

of lethal force if necessary—and escort them to shallow water offshore one half mile

from the east of Havana. Both options involved the deployment of “sizable” U.S. forces

to prepare for a dangerous conflict with Cuban authorities. Whereas the U.S. Navy and

Coast Guard favored the first plan, the Pentagon was preparing the second one.498

This

was the moment when the U.S. government “came closest to implanting the military

action option,” recalled Pastor. “The NSC actually sent the military options up to the

President for his approval.”499

The U.S. government did not have to implement this military contingency plan

because the Cuban government agreed to prohibit the Blue Fire from loading any

Cubans. On receipt of Muskie’s note, the Cuban government chose not to exacerbate

U.S.-Cuban tensions despite its misgiving about the ongoing SR-71 overflights, which

resulted in material damage in Havana area and greatly irritated Cuban leaders.500

As

often mentioned, Cuba’s responsiveness might have originated from Castro’s growing

concern about the 1980 U.S. presidential election. “I remember that during some of our

conversations with Fidel,” Padrón recalled, “we commented that Mariel was fatal to the

Democrats and those who came after were worse.” Castro obviously preferred Carter to

his campaign rival, Ronald Reagan.501

498

Ibid.

499 Pastor, interview, cited in Larzelere, Boatlift, p. 270.

500 Wayne Smith to Muskie, July 3, 1980, DDRS. See also, Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, pp. 232-

33. The CIA found no evidence that the Cubans knew that the U.S. navy vessels had moved up to the

twenty-four parallel and were considering the use of force. Pastor concluded that Muskie’s message to

Rodríguez, rather than the U.S. show of force, was the key to the resolution of this affair. Pastor to

Brzezinski and Aaron, August 6, 1980, in folder “Cuba 1980-7 to 8,” box 15, RNSA Country Files,

JCL.

501 Padrón, interview transcript, November 14, 2013, p. 5.

198

As if such were the case, Castro publicly expressed his worries about Reagan’s

Republican Party. Issued on July 15, 1980, the party’s platform identified Cuba as the

source of the growing conflicts in Central America and reiterated the party’s willingness

to contest the “takeover” of the region by Marxist-Leninists.502

In response, Castro made

two major speeches on July 19 and July 26. In the first speech, Castro presented the

choice of Carter and Reagan as one of peace and war. He welcomed Carter’s decision to

send economic aid to Nicaragua while denouncing the platform as “a terrible platform

posing a threat to peace.” In the second speech, Castro’s attack on the platform became

more scathing by calling it “the most dangerous and reactionary.” His warning against its

consequences of Reagan’s victory was almost apocalyptic. “If the platform is fulfilled,”

he predicted, “there will be war between the United States and the Latin American

peoples.”503

The Cuban government began to take positive measures for Carter. It

allowed the first group of eighty-three individuals in the USINT to prepare for their

departure for the United States within two weeks after the second speech.

Carter Geared toward Diplomacy

Without access to historical records, most scholars attribute the end of the Mariel

boatlift to Castro’s concern about Reagan’s electoral victory alone. According to them,

Havana ended the boatlift because Castro realized that the cost of the continued chaos

502

Republican Party Platform of 1980, July 15, 1980, APP.

503 Castro’s speech, July 19, 1980, and July 26, 1980, both in LANIC.

199

would be far greater than its benefits by lowering Carter’s chance of reelection.504

This explanation is only partially true, as Castro’s decision also reflected his

recognition of Carter’s substantial change of attitude. For instance, the U.S. president

took measures against Cuba-to-U.S. hijackings to address Cuba’s expressed concerns

prior to the boatlift. In June 1980, four months after Carter’s initial request, the Justice

Department finally submitted a report in favor of new measures against hijackers.505

Then

on July 12, 1980, three days after the arrival of a hijacked Cuban vessel in Key West,

Carter took an opportunity to implement the recommendations. He not only approved the

public announcement condemning the forceful hijacking as a means of escaping Cuba,

but also authorized a “thorough investigation” in each future case while collaborating

with the Cuban government. On the latter, Washington asked Havana to cooperate on the

return of vessels, as well as the prosecution of hijackers in a Miami court.506

As the continued hawkish approaches failed to end the boatlift, the voice for

negotiations with Castro also grew within the administration. In late July, Muskie’s State

Department prepared a paper, “Negotiating with Castro,” for an inter-agency meeting of

Carter’s top advisers. This paper was noteworthy on many points. First, it conceded that a

series of hostile words and actions by the U.S. government in 1979-1980—i.e. the Soviet

brigade crisis and Operation Solid Shield—“no doubt” made Castro worry about “what

504

Schoultz, Infernal, p. 361; Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, p. 234; and LeoGrande and

Kornbluh, Back Channel to Cuba, pp. 222-23.

505 Benjamin R. Civiletti to Carter, “Hijacking of Cuban Vessels,” June 9, 1980, DDRS; and

Christopher to Carter, “Hijacking of Cuban Vessels,” June 26, 1980, DDRS.

506 Christopher to the USINT in Havana, July 12, 1980, NLC-24-18-6-1-8, RAC, JCL. For a Carter’s

decision, see also, Brzezinski to Muskie and Civiletti, July 15, 1980, NLC-24-18-6-4-5, RAC, JCL.

200

he perceives as a dangerous trend” in the United States and the prospect of U.S.-Cuban

“military confrontation.” Second, the paper noted that Castro expressed his willingness to

open talks on the migration crisis within the larger framework of bilateral issues, although

the United States avoided taking this offer. According to this paper, Washington feared

that such negotiations would inevitably lead to discussion of the embargo, which they

wanted to keep as an instrument to change Cuba’s foreign policy. Third, the paper

concluded that the opening of direct U.S.-Cuban talks was a viable means to stop the

boatlift and prevent a future one. In this regard, the paper admitted that U.S. diplomatic

efforts to mount pressure on Castro on the international stage “provide no insurance

against a repetition of the massive exodus.” Based on these understandings, the State

Department proposed three schemes for U.S.-Cuban negotiations. One of them was

“quiet, comprehensive diplomacy,” in which the United States expressed a willingness to

revise the embargo in exchange for Cuba’s termination of boatlift and acceptance of

criminals. The paper noted that such negotiations would be “largely on Castro’s terms,

not ours.”507

Despite the shared concern about the restoration of migration control,

Brzezinski’s NSC opposed this proposal. Chaired by the national security adviser, an

inter-agency meeting on August 7, 1980, concluded that negotiation strategies “do not

offer anything useful.” Instead of diplomacy, Brzezinski promised that the NSC would

continue to explore other plans, especially the forceful return of the “criminals and

507

State Department Options Paper, “Negotiating with Cuba.”

201

undesirables.”508

It turned out that Brzezinski was the one who preferred military

operations to negotiations. In a separate paper the same day, he argued that foreign policy

was “the greatest opportunity for the exercise of Presidential leadership, in a manner that

could significantly influence the outcome of the elections.” In his views, leadership

exercise still meant taking hostile measures against Cuba, however impractical it might

have been to solve migration problems. Brzezinski claimed that the military operation of

returning the Cubans “might be an appropriately dramatic step, designed to signal Castro

that there are limits beyond which the U.S. cannot be pushed.”509

Yet, there was no effective ways to end migration problems except negotiations

with Castro. The number of arrivals went down to 280 in the week of August 4, but

started to increase to 709 in the week of August 11, to 1,203 in the week of August 18,

and to 1,267 in the week of August 25.510

Hundreds of frustrated Mariel Cubans kept

rioting. Whereas the August 5 riot at Fort Indiantown injured sixteen Americans and

forty-two Cubans, the August 14 riot at Fort McCoy became “a full-scale, four-alarm,

highly dangerous” one.511

The unending boatlift created another problem. A dozen

disgruntled Mariel Cubans started to seize an airplane through the use of faked or real

Molotov cocktails to return to Cuba. They hijacked nine U.S. aircraft beginning on

August 10. As the resolution of the boatlift became more urgent, top U.S. officials again

508

Summary of Conclusions, August 7, 1980, NLC-126-22-12-1-3, RAC, JCL.

509 Brzezinski to Carter, NSC Weekly Report 149, August 7, 1980, DDRS; and Engstrom, Adrift. See

also, Aaron to Brzezinski, August 4, 1980, NLC-133-219-3-2-6, RAC, JCL.

510 Bowen, ed., Report of the CHTF, p. 90.

511 On the latter, at least sixty-five inmates were stabbed. Two federal marshals, one FBI agent, and a

military policeman were injured. NYT, August 7, 1980, p. A26; and Nick Nichols (former officer of

CHTF), “Castro’s Revenge,” Washington Monthly 14 (1982): pp. 38-42.

202

gathered at the SCC meeting on August 20. To Brzezinski’s irritation, they found the

forced return of criminals infeasible.512

“The only thing we could think of,” recalled a

U.S. official with a sense of shame, was to load “undesirables” on several large old boats,

which “would be sailed back to Cuba and sunk close to shore.” This was “not the sort of

think a country like the U.S. does.”513

As the military operation disappeared from the agenda and internationalizing

approaches offered no hopes of terminating the crisis, the SCC meeting reconsidered

diplomacy. This idea also attracted Carter’s attention. “We need to discuss this [option]

in more depth,” the U.S. president directed to Brzezinski.514

Six days later Carter

expressed his concern about the increase of Mariel Cubans. “Refugee flow from Cuba is

increasing,” he wrote to Brzezinski and Jack Watson. “Step up confiscation of boats and

other steps. Prepare private high-level mission to Castro.”515

In a report to Carter the next

day, a reluctant Brzezinski cited the failure of the June 1980 conversation and discounted

the State Department’s ideas as unlikely to succeed.516

Yet, in light of Carter’s expressed

interest in negotiations and Muskie’s advocacy for diplomacy, the SCC meeting chaired

by Brzezinski on August 28, 1980, concluded that the idea was “worth discussing.” The

512

Brzezinski to Carter, “Cuban Refugees” (with Summary of Conclusions), August 21, 1980, NLC-

128-12-3-2-2, RAC, JCL. The State Department drafted a letter to Rodríguez according to this line.

Drafted Letter from Muskie to Rodríguez, n.d. (ca. July 31, 1980), in folder “Cuba-Refugees, 7/22-

31/80,” box 18, NSA: Staff Material-North/South (Pastor), JCL.

513 John Bushnell (deputy assistant secretary of state), interview transcript, p. 332, FAOH.

514 Handwritten note by Carter, in Brzezinski to Carter, “Cuban Refugees” (with Summary of

Conclusions), August 21, 1980, NLC-128-12-3-2-2, RAC, JCL.

515 Carter to Brzezinski and Watson, August 26, 1980, in folder “Cuba 1980-7 to 8,” box 15, RNSA

Country Files, JCL.

516 Brzezinski to Carter, August 27, 1980, in folder “Cuba 1980-7 to 8,” box 15, RNSA Country Files,

JCL.

203

national security adviser remained cautious. He emphasized the necessity of choosing an

unofficial person as an emissary and thus denying Castro “the opportunity to embarrass

us politically.”517

Carter’s Private Emissary to Havana

Carter selected Paul Austin, Coca-Cola board chair and his close friend in Atlanta,

as a special emissary to Havana. The State Department prepared the talking points for

Austin, whom Carter entrusted to propose a two-stage negotiating process. The first

phase concerned the immediate end of the migration crisis. If Cuba agreed to end the

crisis, then the two countries would discuss by the first quarter of 1981 the reinstitution of

a hijacking agreement, the start of bilateral air service, the removal of a list of rare

medicines from the target of the U.S. embargo against the island, and the conversation

with the Cubans about all aspects of problems in U.S.-Cuban relations. Unlike the

previous one, the new proposal contained an in-advance promise of talks on all bilateral

issues, a major concession on the U.S. part to Cuba’s demand for full respect of its

grievances.518

But Austin went even further in his talks with Castro on September 3, 1980. He

told the Cuban leader that Carter wanted to hold “the face-to-face summit meeting before

Christmas.” The two leaders should meet alone without aides to “discuss frankly” the

U.S.-Cuban problems and set the agenda for further negotiations. Then, the following

517

SCC Summary of Conclusion, August 28, 1980, NLC-24-18-8-7-1, RAC, JCL.

518 Taking Points for Emissary to Use in Cuba, n.d., NLC-128-1-18-7-2, RAC, JCL.

204

January, a small group of U.S. and Cuban officials would start negotiations, at the first of

which Carter and Castro might be present. Only after presenting such a dramatic proposal

did Austin stress the importance of Cuba’s restraint on its foreign policy during the

election year. Austin asked Castro to do three things. Castro should stop the migration

crisis from Cuba, wane his criticism of U.S. policy in the Third World, and stop

“intemperate public attacks” against the United States. In return, Carter would prepare to

lift the embargo against Cuba on all types of medicines by the end of the year. Austin also

added that Carter would appreciate it if Cuba took back Mariel “undesirables” and

worked to restate the anti-hijacking agreement. Finally, Austin asked Castro to keep this

message secret.519

Castro’s reaction was enthusiastic, according to Austin. When Peter Tarnoff

visited him several days later, Austin claimed that Castro had received “Carter’s

message” with “pleasure and gratitude,” and “agreed completely” with the proposal.

Referring to his July speeches, Austin’s story went, the Cuban leader had stressed that

Reagan’s victory would pose a menace to world peace and displayed strong feelings

against the Republican Party platform concerning non-aligned countries. Cuba

understood the intricacies of a U.S. election year, and would cooperate with the Carter

administration on several issues, including the punishment of hijackers. Castro also had

noted that Cuba already worked to solve the remaining USINT problem. As a new

gesture he would also release around thirty U.S. citizens in Cuban jails charged with

drug-trafficking, common crimes, and counterrevolutionary activities. On the issues of

519

Memo for the record by Tarnoff, “Account of Mr. Paul Austin’s Conversation with Cuban President

Fidel Castro,” September 8, 1980, NLC-128-1-18-7-2, RAC, JCL.

205

stopping the Mariel crisis and of taking back Cuban “undesirables,” Austin stated, Castro

would consider them as the first issues of the talks. The Cuban leader had repeated that

“he set great store in the Austin visit, and the message received from the President.”520

Some might dispute the validity of this account. According to U.S. scholars

William LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh, Austin showed early symptoms of Alzheimer’s

disease and was incapable of conveying messages.521

Yet, based on their analysis of the

Cuban memorandum of conversation, Cuban historians Elier Ramírez Cañedo and

Esteban Morales Domínguez not only confirm his story, but also conclude that Austin’s

mission was important for the conclusion of the boatlift. In addition to Austin’s

unauthorized proposal and Castro’s insinuation of his counterproposal, the Cuban record

shows that Castro indicated his appreciation of the visit. “I want to tell you that I had

been thinking of this before your visit,” he said to Austin. “But when I received the

message I was further convinced of the convenience of making this gesture.”522

The next

day Castro approved a U.S. request for consular access to U.S. prisoners in Cuba.523

In a

message to Mexican President José López Portillo, the Cuban leader also expressed his

desire to help to reelect Carter.524

520

Ibid.

521 LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, pp. 177-78. The authors claim that Austin already

demonstrated his incapacity during his February 1978 visit to Cuba. Yet, there is no evidence that

Austin brought up his idea of a Carter-Castro meeting at that time. It is also perplexing to believe that

Carter again sent Austin to Havana if he had known Austin’s mental problems.

522 Ramírez Cañedo and Morales, De la confrontación, 2da edición, pp. 360-63.

523 Muskie to Carter, September 4, 1980, NLC-7-23-7-5-7, RAC, JCL.

524 José López Portillo, Mis tiempos: Biografía y testimonio político, 2 vols. (Mexico City: Fernández

Editores, 1988), p. 1002.

206

Castro’s Decision to Suspend the Crisis

After confirming Castro’s interest in talks, Carter decided to send Tarnoff to

Havana to take over the rest. Carter and Muskie had to be careful about Austin’s

unauthorized proposal.525

If Castro asked about the summit, Tarnoff was instructed to

characterize it as Austin’s “private suggestion,” to which the U.S. president would follow

up after negotiations made “solid advances.”526

On September 12, immediately after

landing in Havana, Tarnoff informed Padrón that Austin’s visit was “unofficial.”

Thereafter, according to Tarnoff, Castro said little of the visit except to ask if Austin had

met with Carter to report on the trip. When Tarnoff assured him that Austin was

debriefed by a third person, Castro stated that the visit allowed him to express a

willingness to engage in dialogue. “There is no doubt in my mind,” Tarnoff later reported

to Carter, “that Castro has dismissed any proposal that Austin may have made.” Because

the Cuban leader did not make a big fuss about it, Austin’s mishaps made “no irreparable

damage” to U.S.-Cuban dialogue.527

Thereafter, Tarnoff followed the original talking points, reiterating Washington’s

wishes to improve U.S.-Cuban relations. Tarnoff proposed two-stage talks to discuss

migration issues first and broader issues of U.S.-Cuban relations later. In response, Castro

525

When he read the report, Muskie underlined and put exclamation mark (!) on the line about the

Carter-Castro summit meeting before Christmas. Muskie to Carter, September 8, 1980, NLC-128-1-

18-7-2, RAC, JCL.

526 Carter seemed more willing to talk with the Cubans than Muskie’s State Department. For example,

the State Department tried to limit the items of medicines that the Washington would exempt from its

embargo on Cuba to “rare medicines.” Carter erased the adjective, exempting all kinds of medicines.

Muskie to Carter, September 8, 1980; and “Talking Points and Responses to be Made for Peter

Tarnoff,” n.d., both in folder “Cuba—Alpha Channel 6/79-9/80,” box 11, GF, ZBC, JCL.

527 Tarnoff to Carter, September 12, 1980, NLC-6-15-2-17-9, RAC, JCL. This report was for Eyes

Only for Carter, Brzezinski, Muskie, and Christopher.

207

conveyed his formal decision to take five measures, most of which he had already

mentioned in his talks with Austin. First, Cuba would not condone any more U.S.-to-

Cuba hijacking. Second, Cuba would release all thirty-three U.S. prisoners. Third, Cuba

would “suspend” the departure of any Cubans from Mariel until November 4. “What we

want is to make a gesture to Jimmy Carter, not to Ronald Reagan,” Castro stressed. Cuba

would be ready to discuss a concrete solution to the migration problem with Carter if the

latter won reelection. Fourth, Cuba would permit all remaining Cubans in the USINT in

Havana to depart for the United States. Fifth, Cuba would refrain from taking any

measures “which might be harmful in terms of the U.S. domestic situation.”528

Castro demanded nothing in return from the United States despite offers from

Washington. By calling these decisions “unilateral,” Castro stressed that he had no

expectations that Carter would reciprocate them.529

This approach might have originated

from Castro’s concerns about U.S. domestic politics. Tarnoff thought that Castro did a

favor for Carter by avoiding public conversations “that could possibly damage the

president’s reelection chance.”530

However, the reasoning behind Castro’s gesture

derived from not only a fear of Reagan’s victory but also a positive assessment of

Carter’s change in attitude. As Carter accepted negotiations on all bilateral issues, it was

clear that the U.S. president accepted Cuba’s demand that the two countries discuss

528

Memcon (Tarnoff, Castro, Padrón), September 17, 1980, NLC-15-60-5-14-9, RAC, JCL; and

Tarnoff, interview transcript by David Engstrom, pp. 16-17, in folder, “Tarnoff,” box 1, Mirta Ojito

Papers, UM-CHC. For a story on the Cuban part, see Ramírez Cañedo and Morales, De la confrontación, 2da edición, pp. 363-68.

529 Ibid. See also, “Talking Points and Responses to be Made for Peter Tarnoff.”

530 Tarnoff to Carter, September 12, 1980.

208

migration issues only in the broader context of bilateral relations. After Tarnoff’s visit,

recalled Padrón, the Cuban leadership saw “a possibility” that the two countries could

reach some understanding on their relations, pursue mutual interests, and coexist—if

Carter was reelected.531

The Absence of a Lasting Agreement

With the close of the Mariel port in sight, Washington poured much effort and

resources into the resettlement of Mariel Cubans. In October 1980, Carter signed the

Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980, increased necessary funding for state and

local governments, and improved federal intergovernmental cooperation.532

By

November, due to the intensified resettlement efforts, over 90 percent of Mariel Cubans

and Haitians had resettled into U.S. communities.533

The Cuban-Haitian Task Force,

which Carter had established to advance migrants’ resettlement in mid-July, eventually

closed the four processing camps and moved all remaining Cubans to the Atlanta

Penitentiary.534

According to the Congressional Research Service, the estimated total

costs related to the boatlift in 1980 and 1981 were over $739 million, or $5,914 per

531

Padrón, interview transcript, November 4, 2013, p. 6. Padrón noted that the Cubans also assumed

that Carter relieved Brzezinski from the making of Cuban policy. Such an assessment might have

explained Cuba’s optimistic views of the prospect of U.S.-Cuban dialogue. Ibid., p. 9.

532 Engstrom, Adrift, pp. 164-68; and Rivera, Decision and Structure, pp. 204-6.

533 Christian R. Holms to Patricia R. Harris (secretary of HHS), October 11, 1980, in Robert L.

Bowen, ed., Report of the CHTF.

534 The least popular group remained in the camp. Racial factors worked, since sponsors requested at

times that they would not take a black Cuban. A June 1981 confidential memorandum reported that 95

percent of the remaining Cubans were blacks with little skills and education. Fernández, Twenty Years

Later, p. 74. When the camp closed 1,410 of the inmates went to the Atlanta Penitentiary. For their

fates, see the next chapter.

209

emigrant.535

The expenses included the task force’s operations, camp management, and

reimbursement to states for cash, medical, social services, law enforcement costs,

educational relief, as well as the maintenance of jails, hospitals, and special care

institutions.536

For Carter, the migration crisis was also politically costly. “They’re not going to

hurt our country,” Carter stressed to American voters. “I am very proud that our country

has once again proven that we’ve not lost the ideals and the human beliefs and the

religious beliefs and the generosity that has made this country great.” Carter repeated,

“Our country is not going to be hurt. It’s going to be helped.”537

Carter’s prediction was

probably true. Years later, many became restaurant owners, musicians, television anchors,

psychologists, bedding designers, and other professionals making notable achievements

in various fields.538

But the majority of the U.S. voters of 1980 did not believe in the U.S.

president. Along with the Iranian hostage crisis, the Mariel boatlift severely damaged the

prospects for Carter’s reelection in several key states, as the U.S. president noted the day

after his loss.539

535

Cited in Howard H. Frederick, Cuban-American Radio Wars: Ideology in International

Telecommunications (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1986), p. 40.

536 CHTF Data Book, pp. 43, 56.

537 Carter, October 13, 1980, APP.

538 MH, April 18, 2000, p. 1A; MH, April 21, 2000, p. 1E; Rivera, Decision and Structure, p. 221; and

García, Havana USA, pp. 115-17. Gastón Fernández rather emphasizes the traumatic impact on

nonwhite Mariel Cubans, especially those who had to stay in the camps for a long time. He read the

statistical data to conclude that the stigma of Mariel resulted in their higher rate of unemployment,

mental disorders, and imprisonment. Fernández, Twenty Years Later, pp. 78-83.

539 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1980, vol. 3 (Washington, DC:

Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 2693.

210

U.S.-Cuban talks over migration started a month after the 1980 election, although

they failed to reach an agreement. The U.S. and Cuban delegations met in New York in

December 1980 and in Washington in January 1981. U.S. officials sought to establish an

orderly departure program, repatriate thousands of “undesirable” Mariel Cubans, and gain

Havana’s pledge of “no more Mariels,” a promise that the Cuban government would not

allow migration crises like the Mariel boatlift to occur in the future.540

But Cuban

officials flatly denied any commitment to “no more Mariels.” Moreover, the Cubans

stated that Havana would agree to receive up to 3,000 Mariel Cubans only if they

“voluntarily” expressed a desire to return and were approved by Cuban authorities on a

case-by-case basis.541

The U.S. delegation found this condition “completely

unacceptable,” since it believed that few “undesirable” Mariel Cubans would volunteer to

be deported to Cuba, and few of the people with mental illnesses were capable of making

decisions.542

U.S. officials thought that the Cubans intentionally delayed the conclusion of an

agreement with the Carter administration in hopes of beginning relations with the

540

Washington also wanted to reinstate the anti-hijacking agreement. Muskie to Carter, January 9,

1981, in folder “Cuba 11/80-1/81,” box 15, RNSA-Country Files, JCL.

541 The Cuban version of the minutes are: “Breve reseña de los aspectos básicos discutidos en

conversaciones con el gobierno norteamericano en torno al problema migratorio entre ambos países,

22-23,12, 80,” December 29, 1980, MINREX; and “Síntesis de los aspectos esenciales discutidos en

conversaciones en Washington entre el 12 y el 16 de enero de 1981,” n.d., MINREX. For quotes, see

Cuba’s prepared text of the agreement. “Acuerdo relativo a la normalización de relaciones migratorias

entre Cuba y Estados Unidos,” Caja “Migratorios 7,” MINREX.

542 For the U.S. views, see State Department Scope Paper, “Guidance to US Delegation for Possible

Discussions with the Government of Cuba Concerning Migration Issues,” n.d., in folder “Cuba

(3/19/1984-4/18/1984),” box 29, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country Files (hereafter NSC-ES-CF),

RRL.

211

incoming administration on a positive note.543

There is no documentary evidence to

support this claim. A Cuban report on the talks indicates that Havana perceived

disagreements with Washington as genuinely profound.544

As such, the report even

recommended the opening of public relations campaigns against Washington’s refusal to

increase visa issuance for Cubans in the absence of a migration agreement. The Cuban

government could use interviews and newspapers, mobilize civic, religious, and cultural

groups, and employ “propaganda actions and agitation in favor of family reunification

and free immigration of Cubans by friend organizations.” It could direct Cuban emigrants

waiting for visas to send letters to families living in the United States, asking for

Washington’s expedition of visa-issuing process.545

The report also probed the idea of the “utilization of irregular emigration routes,”

in which the government would selectively load Cubans whose family members

reclaimed on their ships from the United States. The measure not only would “alleviate

the migration situation” in Cuba, but also would serve as a “mechanism of pressure” on

Washington. If this procedure did not produce desirable outcomes, then “the possible

organization of disguised illegal departure” was to be considered. At this point, the author

of the paper may have noticed that he or she was going too far. The paper made clear that

it was not recommending “the resumption of similar [migration] flow to that of Mariel.”

543

Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, p. 236.

544 Informe sobre el diferendo Cuba-EE.UU. sobre cuestiones migratorias, attached to José Viera to

Isidoro Malmierca, June 21, 1984, MINREX. In his September 1980 talks with Tarnoff, Castro

himself had displayed an unwillingness to receive any Mariel Cubans. Tarnoff to Carter, September

13, 1980, NLC-6-15-2-17-9, RAC, JCL.

545 “Síntesis de los aspectos esenciales,” pp. 8-10.

212

Should a migration crisis of such scale reoccur, the paper reasoned, the incoming

administration might use it to justify aggression against Cuba.546

Such was Havana’s

thinking on migration issues just before Reagan assumed the presidency. Even after the

end of the Mariel boatlift, Cuban officials were exploring diverse methods in search of a

better deal on migration control.

Conclusion

Castro preferred Carter to Reagan in the 1980 U.S. presidential election. Then,

why did Castro not move earlier to end the boatlift and assist Carter’s campaign? For this

question, it may be instructive to consider Castro’s speech of June 14, 1980, three days

prior to the failed talks in Havana. Here, Castro proclaimed that Cuba would forever

defend the moral and dignity of national sovereignty and was willing to wait until the

United States treated his revolution with respect. “We have time [to wait before] they

learn [us],” said the Cuban leader. “We [will wait for] 20 years…40 years…and 100

years, if necessary.”547

True to this proclamation, Castro agreed to terminate the boatlift

only after he recognized a meaningful change in U.S. attitudes toward Cuba. In addition

to his concerns about Reagan, Carter’s gesture toward Castro contributed to the opening

of U.S.-Cuban negotiations.

In retrospect, Carter could have moved much earlier. One may suggest that Carter

should have followed the precedent of Lyndon Johnson, who ended a similar migration

546

Ibid, pp. 10-11.

547 Castro’s speech, in Granma, June 16, 1980, pp. 2-3.

213

crisis fifteen years earlier by quickly opening talks with Castro.548

Internal and external

dynamics apparently combined to work against following this step, however. In 1980, the

number of Cubans wishing to leave the island, as well as the number of Miami Cubans

trying to bring in their families, was far greater than in 1965. Contrary to the immediate

aftermath of the 1965 U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic, U.S. preoccupation

about Cuba’s threats magnified dramatically in 1979-1980, as seen in Carter’s decisions

in PD52. For the U.S. president, it was not easy to accept what was considered as a major

foreign policy defeat. More than national pride was at stake in an election year. Carter’s

advisers wanted to avoid paying political costs by capitulating to Castro’s demand when

the latter challenged the U.S. control of migration.

Yet, given the price of an uncontrolled migration crisis like the Mariel boatlift,

Carter could have chosen to cut his losses, rather than enlarging them. Unable to stop the

boatlift, prevent camp riots, and return “criminals and other undesirables” to Cuba, the

U.S. president found the course of events too unfavorable to continue. Few of the

measures advocated by Brzezinski and his NSC, such as international machinations

against Cuba, propaganda campaigns abroad, and contingency planning for military

operations, proved adequate for restoring migration normalcy in the Florida Straits. By

the summer of 1980, Carter reassessed his strategy, sent emissaries to Havana, and agreed

with Castro’s proposal for comprehensive discussions on all bilateral issues, of which

migration control was only part. Prodded by Muskie’s State Department, he apparently

548

In the times of Camarioca exodus, in which 5,000 Cubans started to arrive in a similar fashion, the

Johnson administration quickly moved to conclude negotiations with the Cuban government for an

orderly departure program for about 268,000 Cubans between 1965 and 1973. See Chapter One.

214

reached a conclusion that the decision to endorse negotiations with Cuba would have

been politically costly, but probably much wiser.

Behind the end of the Mariel boatlift appeared a “diplomatic revolution,” in which

a big country yielded to a small one. What made this turnaround possible was no less

than the massive migration of Cubans who desired a new life in the United States and

their families who aspired to bring out their loved ones. The crisis of 1980 was a product

of such interaction between diplomacy and human migration, which continued to shape

U.S. relations with Cuba in the coming years.

215

CHAPTER 5: Superhero’s Dilemma

Ronald Reagan, the Cuban American Lobby, and the Legacy of the Mariel Crisis

On May 20, 1983, Ronald Reagan acted as a “superhero” for Cuban

counterrevolutionaries in Miami. Invited by Jorge Mas Canosa and his Cuban American

National Foundation (CANF), the U.S. president attended a ceremony for Cuba’s

“independence” day in Miami. Whereas the Cuban government claimed to achieve full

independence on January 1, 1959, its foes in Miami commemorated May 20, 1902, as the

day when the U.S. military government in Cuba transferred formal sovereignty to Cuba’s

first government. Havana-Miami conflicts of memories were not the subject of concern

for Reagan, however. Following the remarks of Mas Canosa and Florida Senator Paula

Hawkins, the U.S. president proceeded to the podium.549

“It’s a great pleasure for me to be with a group of Americans,” Reagan began his

speech, “who have demonstrated how much can be accomplished when people are free.”

Having praised the achievements of Mas Canosa and other Miami Cubans, the U.S.

president attributed their success to “a consuming passion for liberty,” or what he called

“the American spirit.” According to Reagan, this was something that both Latin and

549

Schedule of Reagan, May 20, 1983, in folder “5/20/1983,” box 30, Office of the President:

Presidential Briefing Papers, RRL. Even after the formal transfer of sovereignty to the Cuban

government, the United States claimed its right to intervene in Cuba’s domestic affairs and stationed

its troops indefinitely at the base of Guantánamo. For this arrangement, see Pérez, Reform and Revolution, chap. 7.

216

North Americans treasured. He repeated, “We are all Americans here in the Western

Hemisphere.”550

If “freedom” or “liberty” was a magical word for blurring boundaries between

Latin and North Americans, it also was a convenient rationale for the U.S. policy of

hostility toward Cuba. While comparing Havana’s economic difficulties and Cuban

Americans’ prosperity in Miami, Reagan reiterated the superiority of the American way

of life over the one of Marxism-Leninism, which he wanted to remove from human

history. Here in the name of freedom, Reagan asked Miami Cubans to support his war

against “the Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan axis.” The U.S. president quoted Cuba’s hero of

independence, José Martí. “Every moment is critical for the preservation of freedom,” he

declared.551

Reagan’s audience stopped this speech thirty-two times with standing ovations.

By extending the “American spirit” to cover all the Americas, Reagan helped Miami

Cubans remove any contradictions in their entering the U.S. political system without

compromising political claims in their homeland. Reagan’s appearance at the Cuban

“independence day” set a precedent. In the coming decades, U.S. presidents and

presidential hopefuls would come to Miami to speak of their historical roles in narratives

of freedom. Among them was Barack Obama, who stood by CANF leaders, called Cuban

Americans “ambassadors of freedom,” and quoted the same line of José Martí as Reagan

550

Speech by Reagan, May 20, 1983, APP.

551 Ibid.

217

did.552

Regardless of the varying nuances and interpretations, “freedom” has been the

word that U.S. leaders frequently used to legitimatize Miami Cuban advocacy.

This chapter provides one of the first historical analyses of interlocking U.S.

policies toward Havana and Miami in the early 1980s. It confirms the existence of a

strong ideological hostility toward Castro on Reagan’s part, which guided U.S. foreign

policy in Latin America throughout his presidency. Determined to “frighten” Cuba out of

its actions abroad, the Reagan administration mounted verbal attacks on Castro, escalated

tensions in the Florida Straits, and refused to open any new U.S.-Cuban dialogue unless

Havana radically changed its foreign policy. In Miami, these hard-line postures gained

massive support. Reagan worked with CANF in promoting Radio Martí, a new weapon in

the ideological war against revolutionary Cuba.553

Yet, unlike previous studies, this chapter also stresses that Reagan’s goals and

priorities ultimately differed from those of his followers in Miami. Reagan refused to

commit any U.S. force against Cuba, primarily due to Havana’s massive defense buildup,

his concern about U.S. public opinion, and a perceived willingness in Moscow to

intervene in any U.S.-Cuban military conflict. He did not approve a naval blockade, close

the USINT in Havana, or repeal the non-invasion pledge that had been a crucial part of

the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding. Even by early 1982, the U.S. government

552

Obama added, “Every moment is critical. And this must be our moment. Freedom. Opportunity.

Dignity. These are not just the values of the United States—they are the values of the Americas.”

Speech by Obama, May 23, 2008, APP.

553 Schoultz, Infernal, chap. 11; LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Chennel, chap. 6; Nestor García

Iturbe, De Ford a Bush (Havana: Editora Política, 2008), pp. 32-41; Ramón Sánchez-Parodi, Cuba-USA: diez tiempos de una relación (Mexico City: Ocean Sur, 2011), pp. 185-190; and idem., “The

Reagan-Castro Years: The New Right and Its Anti-Cuban Obsession,” in Castro Mariño and Pruessen,

eds., Fifty Years of Revolution, pp. 261-278.

218

harbored little intention of intervening in Cuba’s internal politics, a position contradictory

to the hopes of counterrevolutionaries who sought the destruction of the Castro regime.

Furthermore, in 1984, Reagan opened negotiations with Castro over migration, an

important diplomatic achievement in U.S.-Cuban relations.554

The early 1980s thus reveal how migration cut both ways. Cuban migration

helped create a new political force within the United States, which was extremely hostile

to the idea of an improvement of U.S.-Cuban relations. Yet, Cuban migration also was a

critical transnational issue, which required communications between the two countries.

Although migration control is seen as a trivial issue for foreign policy analysts who are

strictly concerned about the state and its power, in this period it was tremendously

important to the U.S. president, the White House, and the general U.S. public, which was

otherwise paying little attention to its Caribbean neighbor. In May 1983, Reagan might

have appeared as a “superhero” in the eyes of his followers in Miami. For multiple

reasons, however, Reagan was soon compelled to compromise this image by seeking

cooperation with the Cuban government.

Ronald Reagan Confronts Fidel Castro

In the early 1980s, the Cold War entered one of its most perilous moments. The

United States and the Soviet Union participated in the simultaneously escalating conflicts

554

The best secondary source on Washington-Miami relations is Haney and Vanderbush, Embargo,

chaps. 3-4. Yet, their emphasis on a shared ideology among Washington and Miami tends to downplay

conflicting aspects of the relations. Lars Schoultz’s views of CANF are ambiguous. At one point his

book tells about “Cuban American capture” of U.S. policy toward Cuba, but later it downplays

CANF’s agency and power, paying more attention to a shared anti-Castro ideology with Washington.

See, Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 370-71, 402, 418, 565-66.

219

in Afghanistan, Iran, Poland, Southern Africa, Southeast Asia, Central America, and the

Caribbean. In the mind of Ronald Reagan and his supporters, the Soviet Union was an

“evil empire,” which used Cuba as its “surrogate” and exploited every opportunity to

advance a communist march over the globe. Determined to eradicate such “red menace,”

they undertook the largest defense military-buildup in history, escalated the verbal attacks

on communist countries, and tried to send powerful messages to allies that the United

States had the will and capabilities of protecting its interests. They could not tolerate any

defeat in the Western Hemisphere for fear of its impact on domestic and international

politics.555

Fidel Castro had good reason to worry about Reagan even before he became U.S.

president. Horrified by Reagan’s foreign policy views during the 1980 election, which he

called “extremely reactionary and dangerous,” Castro started to mobilize the entire nation

for defense.556

As historian Piero Gleijeses describes, Cuba developed a new military

doctrine, the War of the Entire People, and organized the entire population into

Territorial Militia Troops. Inspired by Vietnamese allies, Havana prepared for “another

Vietnam,” which would be a costly, but victorious guerrilla war against the invading

force. Cuba received 1.5 million weapons from the Soviet Union and other socialist

555

Gleijeses, Visions, p. 167; Schoutlz, Infernal, pp. 362-66; and Michael Grow, U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions: Pursuing Regime Change in the Cold War (Lawrence: University Press

of Kansas, 2008), pp. 123-28. The military expansion cost $1.6 trillion over five years. For Reagan’s

views, see Reagan, An American Life: Ronald Reagan, The Autobiography (New York: Simon &

Schuster, 1990), pp. esp. 471-73.

556 See the previous chapter. During the 1980 campaign Reagan advocated a naval blockade of Cuba

several times. See for example, NYT, January 28, 1980, p. B5.

220

countries.557

Raúl Castro, a chief of the Cuban military, later recalled that the purpose of

this mobilization was to elevate the estimated cost for the invaders to deter the

invasion.558

Castro also assisted revolutionaries elsewhere in Latin America. He took the lead

in creating a clandestine transportation network of weapons and munitions from Moscow

through Havana to destinations in Nicaragua and Grenada.559

More important was Cuba’s

aid to the revolutionary movement in El Salvador, the region’s most unequal society, full

of rural poverty and class tensions. After unifying Salvadoran revolutionaries under the

Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), Cuba helped the FMLN devise

military strategies and secure military supplies from the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and the

Palestine Liberation Organization. On January 10, 1981, the guerillas launched the “final

offensive,” seeking to present the revolution as a fait accompli prior to Reagan’s

assumption of the presidency. The operation failed, however. The civil war entered a

bloody deadlock.560

Once he became a U.S. president, Reagan claimed that Cuba was the main source

of the Central American turmoil. The U.S. president did not ignore the social and

557

Gleijeses, Visions, p. 175. See also, Vorotnikov, Gavana—Моskva, pp. 121, 262.

558 Raúl Castro was certain that they would achieve victory as long as at least twenty percent of the

armed Cubans engaged in such a protracted war. Mario Vázquez Raña, Raúl Castro: Entrevista al periódico El Sol de México (Havana: Editorial Capitán San Luis, 1993), pp. 34-37.

559 Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, pp. 100-101; Agreement between USSR and Grenada, July 27,

1980, in Paul Seabury and Walter A. McDougall, eds., The Grenada Papers (San Francisco: Institute

for Contemporary Studies, 1984), pp. 23-28; and Protocol between USSR and Grenada, October 27,

1980, in Seabury and McDougall, eds., Grenada Papers, pp. 29-30.

560 Andrea Oñate, “The Red Affairs: FMLN-Cuban Relations during the Salvadoran Civil War, 1981-

1992,” Cold War History 11, no. 2 (May 2011): 133-154. Based on her interviews with the FMLN

commanders, Oñate delineates how the FMLN and Cuban leaders interacted. See also, Wanye Smith,

Closest of Enemies, p. 241.

221

economic origins of the problem. But his emphasis was definitely on the external

environment, in particular the roles of Cuba. On this point, he agreed with Secretary of

State Alexander Haig, who viewed El Salvador as “a classic case of internal unrest

capitalized upon by foreign communists.”561

Captive to the Cold War mindset, Reagan

set the prevention of “another Cuba” as the most important U.S. goal in the region.562

He

declared at one of the NSC meetings, “I don’t want to back down. I don’t want to accept

defeat.” By defeat, he meant the admission of the legitimacy of the revolutionary rule in

Nicaragua and the political claims of the guerillas in El Salvador.563

Still, Reagan was more reluctant than Haig to deploy U.S. military forces to the

region. Aware that most Americans feared that U.S. involvement would lead to “another

Vietnam,” Reagan worried about public perceptions of himself as a warmonger. “I knew

that Americans would be just as reluctant to send their sons to fight in Central America,”

he wrote in his memoir, “and I had no intention of asking them to do that.” 564

As a self-

proclaimed believer of the “we are all Americans” concept, Reagan also appeared to

worry about the Latin American image of North Americans as the “Yankee colossus” that

was “too willing to send in the marines and interfere with their governments.”565

At one

561

Haig to Reagan, January 26, 1981, in folder “NSC 3,” box 91282, Executive Secretariat, NSC:

Meeting File (hereafter NSC-ES-MF), RRL.

562 Reagan said, “We must not let Central America become another Cuba…It cannot happen.”

Minutes, NSC 2, February 11, 1981, p. 5, in folder “NSC 2,” box 91282, NSC-ES-MF, RRL.

563 Minutes, NSC 24, November 10, 1981, p. 6, in folder “NSC 24,” box 91283, NSC-ES-MF, RRL.

564 Reagan, American Life, p. 239. On the U.S. public, see also, William M. LeoGrande, Central

America and the Polls (Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 1987), esp. pp. 41-42.

565 Reagan repeatedly mentioned this concept at various NSC meetings and in his diary. Minutes, NSC

24, pp. 5-6; Minutes, February 6, 1981, p. 3, in folder “NSC 1,” box 91282, NSC-ES-MF, RRL;

Reagan, American Life, p. 239-240; and Ronald Reagan, The Reagan Diaries Unabridged, ed.

Douglas Brinkley (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), vol. 1, pp. 176-77 (December 3, 1982).

222

time he said at a NSC meeting, “North and South America together equals China, a pretty

big colossus if we were all buddies.”566

Whether or not he actually believed in this idea was difficult to tell. Even so, his

three-dimensional policy would have been far from meeting an expectation among his

center-to-leftist audiences in Latin America. First, the U.S. government attempted to

reverse revolutionary trends in the Caribbean and Central America. In El Salvador, it

enlarged military and nonmilitary aid to the government, regardless of its highly

problematic human rights records. In Nicaragua, the U.S. government accused the

Sandinistas of taking part in the Salvadoran war, demanded a break with Cuba, and

sponsored counterrevolutionary groups (contras). Second, Reagan hoped to garner

domestic and international support through public relations campaigns, as well as the

Caribbean Basin Initiative. In collaboration with Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela, the

U.S. president presented this project as a peaceful means to preempt revolutions. The

initiative, he believed, would uproot regional poverty and economic dissatisfaction

through greater flow of trade and investment, rather than traditional forms of foreign

aids.567

The third and most difficult part was about what to do with Havana. Right after

his inauguration, Reagan rejected the cancellation of the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev

agreement, in which the United States pledged no-invasion in Cuba. “Now that we have

no Monroe Doctrine,” he wrote, “I can see where we have a chance to lose a point by just

566

Minutes, February 10, 1982, p. 19, in folder “NSC 40,” box 91283, NSC-ES-MF, RRL.

567 See esp. Strategy Paper for the NSC and its Executive Summary, [around March 23, 1981], in

folder “NSC 6,” box 91282, NSC-ES-MF, RRL.

223

cancelling the agreement.”568

Haig nonetheless kept insisting on the invasion of Cuba,

and assigned Thomas Enders, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, to

chair the Restricted Interagency Group (RIG) to probe for military options. But to Haig’s

annoyance, the RIG found it too costly to intervene in Cuba, which would involve

thousands of U.S. casualties. The number was probably high enough to deter anybody but

Haig in Washington from pondering such operations.569

Instead of a direct U.S. military invasion, the Reagan administration chose to

employ a comprehensive set of hostile measures against Cuba as the third pillar of its

policy in the region. Washington launched military exercises in the Caribbean Sea,

mounted pressure on Latin American countries to cut their relations with Cuba, imposed

new restrictions on the activities of Cuban diplomats in the United States, strengthened

the economic embargo, and intensified psychological warfare by releasing faked

intelligence on the movement of U.S. forces. All these measures intended to exacerbate

“Castro’s paranoia over the likelihood of a U.S. invasion” and force Cuba to divert its

limited resources away from greater involvements in Central America.570

As former

568

Handwritten note on Allen to Reagan, January 30, 1981; and Haig to Reagan, “Analysis of the

1962 US-USSR Understanding on Cuba,” January 26, 1981, both in folder “Cuba (01/04/1981-

02/21/1981),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL.

569 Charles A. Gillespie (executive assistant for Thomas Enders), interview transcript, pp. 236-37,

FAOH. See also, Joe David Glassman (State Department policy planning staff), interview transcript,

pp. 21-23, FAOH; and Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New

York: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 127-29; and Robert C. McFarlane with Zofia Smardz, Special Trust (New

York: Cadell & Davies, 1994), pp. 177-181. For the White House’s objection to Haig’s activities, see

also Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 366-69.

570 Richard Allen’s Briefing Book for NSC Meeting on February 6, 1981, in folder “NSC1,” box

91282, NSC-ES-MF, RRL. For Cuba’s views of anti-Castro policies, see Sánchez-Parodi, “The

Reagan-Castro Years,” p. 264-69.

224

USINT chief Wayne Smith wrote in his memoir, the basic assumption of this policy was

that Washington could intimidate Havana to change its behavior.571

Cuba and the Soviet Union React

Even before Reagan implemented his anti-Cuban policies, Castro was already

shifting his goals in Central America. Once the final offensive fell apart and Reagan took

power, Cuba suspended the flow of military aid to the guerillas in El Salvador and started

to call for a reduction of U.S.-Cuban tensions. Havana appeared ready to settle for

something less than victory in El Salvador if this concession would help to preserve the

revolutionary government in Nicaragua, promote a negotiated peace in El Salvador, and

avert a U.S. attack on Cuba itself.572

U.S. officials were aware of Havana’s new moves,

as they commented at the joint U.S.-British-Canadian talk.573

Even the hawkish Haig

wrote in his memoir that the flow of arms into Nicaragua and El Salvador “slackened” as

Havana and Moscow supposedly “had received and understood the American

message.”574

571

Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, p. 245.

572 Ibid., pp. 241-42; and Wayne Smith to Haig, March 21, 1981, in folder “Cuba (02/14/1981-

04/17/1981),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL.

573 John Bushnell’s remark in Ottawa to Canadian embassy in Havana, April 16, 1981, vol. 22007, 20-

Cuba-1-3-USA, part 6, RG25, LAC.

574 Haig, Caveat, p. 131; and Wayne Smith to Haig, et.al., June 1, 1981, in folder “Cuba (05/22/1981-

06/02/1981),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. See also, Oñate, “Red Affairs,” p. 146.

225

But Washington saw Havana’s gestures as simply signs of weakness that had to

be exploited further. 575

Washington was satisfied with the deterioration in Cuban

relations with Jamaica, Venezuela, Peru, and several other Latin American countries.576

Convinced of the utility of their public relations campaigns, some emboldened U.S.

officials began to doubt the degree of Soviet commitment to the defense of Cuba, much

less to the fighting of El Salvador.577

Equally remarkable were Cuba’s economic

difficulties. After all, the structural problems that helped to cause the Mariel boatlift

remained, including low productivity and low morale among workers.578

Indeed, the

Mexican embassy in Cuba observed that Havana’s mobilization of the population for

national defense had consumed considerable resources, suspended economic activities,

and squandered “the expectation of the improvement of the living condition of the Cuban

population.”579

That Washington intensified its anti-Cuban campaigns, instead of reciprocating

Havana’s gestures, must have irritated the Cuban leader. For a while Castro moderated

his rhetoric to avoid inflaming U.S.-Cuban tensions.580

Yet in his July 26, 1981, speech,

Castro exploded in anger by charging the Reagan administration with introducing an

575

Ottawa to Canadian embassy in Havana, April 16, 1981, vol. 22007, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 6,

RG25, LAC.

576 Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 371-72.

577 Paula Dobriansky to Allen, “Soviet Defense Commitment to Cuba,” March 25, 1981, in folder

“Cuba (02/14/1981-04/17/1981),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL.

578 Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 372-73, 405-6.

579 Informe, attached to the Mexican embassy in Havana to Mexico City, October 12, 1982, III-3552-

1, AHGE.

580 Speech by Fidel Castro, April 16, 1981, April 19, 1981, Discursos.

226

epidemic of dengue fever that had killed 113 people, including 81 children.581

Even

harsher was his remark at the Inter-Parliamentary Union meeting in Havana on

September 15. “The U.S. system is not fascist,” he said, “but…the group that constitutes

the main nucleus of the current U.S. administration is fascist; its thinking is fascist.”582

In

a private talk with visiting U.S. congressmen a week later, Castro expressed his wishes to

resume dialogue with Washington.583

But in less than a month, when two U.S. columnists

wrote in the Washington Post about “another Cuban foreign intervention” by five-to-six

hundred special forces in Nicaragua, Castro’s anger went over its limit. He publicly

accused Washington of manufacturing “a huge lie” to justify its anti-Cuban policies.584

Castro could not afford to ignore such a baseless allegation, due to his belief that

Reagan would use it as a pretext for military actions. No less worrisome were the

statements by Secretary Haig. In his September 1981 meeting with Soviet foreign

minister Andrei Gromyko in New York, the secretary of state denied any intention of

intervening in Cuban internal affairs. But more than attacking Soviet deliveries of

weapons to the island, he claimed that Cuba’s international activities posed “a major

581

The number of casualties increased to 158, and 101 were children. The U.S. government

categorically denied any responsibility for this outbreak of the epidemic by pointing out Cuba’s public

health mismanagement. For U.S. views, see State Department’s Bureau of Public Affairs, “Case Study

of Cuban Hypocrisy: The 1981 Dengue Epidemic in Cuba,” December 1985.

582 Speech by Fidel Castro, September 15, 1981, LANIC.

583 Vance Hyndman to Edward J. Derwinski and George E. Danielson, “Castro meeting,” September

28, 1981, in folder “Cuba (9/30/1981-10/8/1981),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. Allen sent this to

Reagan for weekend reading.

584 WP, October 19, 1981, p. A15; and Speech by Fidel Castro, October 24, 1981, LANIC. Cuban

officials told Canadian diplomats that the speech was mandatory reading for understanding the outline

of Cuban domestic and foreign policy. Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, October 28, 1981, vol.

22007, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 6, RG25, LAC. Castro’s anger blew up in front of the Soviet

ambassador in Havana. “This is a shameless and gross lie!” Vorotnikov, Gavana—Моskva, p. 262.

227

threat” to the United States.585

Then, less than two weeks after the appearance of the

Washington Post column, Haig publicly declared that the administration had completed

“extensive studies” on ways to thwart Cuban intervention in the Western Hemisphere.586

Havana quickly reacted to this statement by resorting to the massive mobilization of

reservists and deploying troops along the coasts.587

When the escalation of U.S.-Cuban tensions appeared to go out of control, the

Soviet Union intervened. In his letters to Reagan, Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev

repeatedly urged Reagan to stop anti-Cuban campaigns in favor of the normalization of

diplomatic relations. “This is a dangerous, slippery road,” Brezhnev claimed. “At the

same time, we are convinced that any step by the U.S. towards normalization of relations

with Cuba would find an appropriate response on the part of that country.”588

When

tensions nonetheless escalated, Moscow’s attitudes became more forceful. The Soviet

Union demanded Washington’s compliance with the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev

agreement, amplified its military supplies to Havana, and dispatched new MiGs to the

island for its defense. Haig finally relented, although he continued to advocate anything

short of an invasion.589

By this time Reagan was wary of the prospect of a war, as well as

585

Quoted in “Your Presentation to Gromyko, January 26, 1982, Checklist,” January 15, 1982, U.S.

Department of State, Freedom of Information Act Virtual Reading Room (hereafter DOS-FOIA).

586 WP, October 30, 1981, p. A9.

587 Vorotnikov, Gavana—Моskva, pp. 263-64. Havana was closely following Haig’s moves and

statements, as well as the U.S. military maneuver in the Caribbean.

588 Brezhnev to Reagan (unofficial translation), October 15, 1981, in folder “USSR 8106115,” box 37,

Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State Files (hereafter NSC-ES-HS), RRL; and Brezhnev to

Reagan (unofficial translation), December 1, 1981, in folder “USSR 8190038, 8190057,” box 37,

NSC-ES-HS, RRL.

589 Vorotnikov, Gavana—Моskva, p. 264; and Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, November 26,

1981, vol. 22007, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 6, RG25, LAC. For Haig’s advocacy for the use of force,

228

the public perceptions of him being a warmonger. Encouraged by Mexican President José

López Portillo, Washington agreed to send Haig to Mexico City for a meeting with

Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodríguez.590

No Meeting of Minds

Reagan finally agreed to try diplomacy but only to demand a radical change in

Cuban foreign relations. He apparently thought that Havana might take this offer because

“Castro is in trouble—his popularity is fading, the [economy] is sinking and [the] Soviets

are in no position to help.”591

The Haig-Rodríguez talk in Mexico City produced no

meeting of minds. Haig reassured Rodríguez that Washington did not challenge the

internal social system in Cuba, while stressing that the United States was capable of

coexisting with China, Yugoslavia, and other communist countries. “I do not believe that

President Reagan has some kind of preconceived notion regarding the social system in

Cuba,” he said. “This must be determined by the people of Cuba.”592

The dialogue essentially ended here. Despite his gesture to Cuba’s sensitivity to

its claim of national sovereignty, Haig then demanded that Cuba change its foreign policy

to make U.S.-Cuban coexistence possible. In reply, Rodríguez claimed that Cuba’s

see his comments in Minutes, NSC 24, November 10, 1981. For CIA’s analysis of Soviet-Cuban

relations, see CIA, “Cuba-USSR: Vulnerabilities in the Next Six Months,” February 12, 1982,

CREST, NARA.

590 López Portillo, Mis tiempos, pp. 1047, 1053-54, 1063-65, 1082, 1094. See also, Wayne Smith,

Closest of Enemies, p. 250.

591 Reagan, Diaries Unabridged, vol. 1, p. 101.

592 Memcon (Haig, Rodríguez), November 23, 1981, p. 209, in Cold War International History Project

Bulletin 8-9 (Winter 1996): pp. 207-215. This version was translated from Spanish to Russian, and to

English.

229

foreign affairs, including Havana’s solidarity with Third World countries and ties to the

Soviet Union, were non-negotiable. Cuba would not sacrifice these “principles” just for

the sake of improving relations with the United States.593

Another clandestine meeting in

March 1982 of Vernon Walters with Fidel Castro in Havana also failed to break this

deadlock. Walters later wrote in his memoir that Castro repeated, “Everything is

negotiable.” Yet, Walters thought the Cuban leader was contradicting this word by stating

that he would continue to ally with the Soviet Union and Third World revolutionaries.

Therefore, Walters concluded, the Cuban leader was not serious about the dialogue, but

merely interested in buying time.594

Canadian diplomatic records indicate that Walters’s conclusion was imprecise.

Despite its rhetoric and open defiance, Cuba was in fact ready to compromise its foreign

policy, not as the result of U.S. pressure but as the practical necessity for negotiated

peace in Central America. On November 24, 1981, just a day after the Mexico City talks,

Rodríguez met with the Canadian ambassador in Havana and proposed what he called a

“global accord.” The essence of this proposal was mutual non-intervention from outside

the region. Cuba would renounce its support for the revolutionaries. In return, the United

States would give a security guarantee to Nicaragua, stop aiding the Salvadoran junta,

and work on a negotiated settlement in El Salvador and “democracy” in Guatemala.595

593

Ibid., esp. pp. 212-13. See also, Gleijeses, Visions, pp. 170-72; Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 379-380; and

LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, pp. 228-230.

594 Vernon Walters, The Mighty and the Meek: Dispatches from the Front Line of Diplomacy (London:

St. Ermin’s, 2001), pp. 152-56. See also, Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 381-84; and LeoGrande and

Kornbluh, Back Channel, pp. 230-33.

595 Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, November 27, 1981, vol. 22007, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part

6, RG25, LAC.

230

The Canadian ambassador found the proposal favorable to Cuba, but still promising

enough to form a basis for the start of a U.S.-Cuban dialogue.596

Ottawa soon sent this

information to Washington. To reinforce its sincerity, furthermore, Cuba informed

Wayne Smith, chief of the USINT in Havana, that it had suspended all shipment of

military equipment to Nicaragua.597

Cuba was also urging the Salvadoran government to

initiate dialogue with its revolutionary opposition.598

Washington apparently did not respond to this proposal.599

Perhaps, the U.S.

government was unable to consider any gestures from Castro because of a deep-seated

suspicion about his motivation.600

Yet given the nature of Cuba’s proposal, the question

was also about whether Washington could allow social and political changes to evolve

without outside interference, including its own.601

Thus, it is important to explore what Washington was thinking about Central

America and the Caribbean. In early November, top U.S. officials had important

596

Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, November 30, 1981, vol. 22007, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part

6, RG25, LAC. Numerous Canadian records indicate that Cuba expected that Canada would play a

constructive role as a back channel to the United States. Because of its support for a negotiated peace

in Central America, Ottawa was closer to Havana than Washington on this issue. Months later U.S.

visitors in Cuba heard of a similar Cuba’s proposal. See LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, p.

234.

597 Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, p. 254.

598 Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, December 3, 1981, vol. 22007, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 6,

RG25, LAC.

599 Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, December 21, 1981, vol. 22007, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part

6, RG25, LAC.

600 Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, pp. 65-66. William LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh take the

similar view to reiterate Washington’s ideological preconception that Havana had no interest in the

talks. See their work, Back Channel, pp. 234-36.

601 Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, December 21, 1981, vol. 22007, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part

6, RG25, LAC.

231

discussions on U.S. policy toward the region. After subsequent NSC meetings, Reagan

concluded on January 4, 1982, that it was necessary to “assist in defeating the insurgency

in El Salvador” and “oppose actions by Cuba, Nicaragua, or others” aiding the leftist

insurgents. To this end, the U.S. president authorized a comprehensive set of U.S.

policies, including the increased military and economic assistance to the Salvadoran

government, military training and support for Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries, the

tightening of the embargo on Cuba, and contingency plans for direct military actions

against Cuba and Nicaragua.602

While spearheading a counterrevolutionary war in

Central America, the Reagan administration designated Cuba as a state sponsor of

terrorism, halted the commercial air link between Miami and Havana, and re-imposed

new sanctions on U.S. citizens travelling to Cuba.603

The fact that the Castro-Walters meeting took place even as Reagan was

implementing these measures suggests that he was unwilling to consider U.S. withdrawal

from the region, with or without Cuban compromises. To satisfy Washington, Havana

would have had to cut ties with the Soviet Union and abandon revolutionary allies in the

region. Otherwise, even if Havana was ready to modify its foreign policy to some extent,

602

National Security Decision Directive (hereafter NSDD) 17, January 4, 1982; and Follow-up Note,

January 13, 1982, in folder, “January 13, 1982,” box 2, William Clark Files, RRL. Other measures

included: creation of public information task force; emergency economic assistance; renewal of

intelligence gathering; and enhancement of U.S. military preparedness. Some items remain classified

in NSDD 17, but appear in Follow-up Note.

603 Trying to impede Cuba’s exports, the United States also demanded that its trade partners sell

products that contained no Cuban nickel. Washington also allowed the 1977 fishing agreement to lapse

by refusing to reopen the talk with Havana.

232

it was unlikely to be enough.604

When Havana categorically refused these demands, U.S.

policymakers found it convenient to claim that Castro had no interest in talks whatsoever,

citing his ideology and anti-U.S. sentiment.605

This episode makes clear that the U.S. and Cuban governments continued to fight

over importan foreign policy interests. Nevertheless, the fact that Reagan and Castro

explored talks was still noteworthy. The U.S. government did not demand changes in the

internal affairs of Cuba, as it would do in later years. Haig did not lie to Rodríguez. The

Reagan files of 1981-1982 contain little evidence to suggest that the administration

actively worked to topple the Castro regime in the short span. If the CIA reported on

Cuba’s vulnerabilities at home, for example, its chief aim was to explore ways to exploit

Cuba’s domestic difficulties for the purpose of undermining Cuba’s foreign policy, not

vice versa.606

Internal change in Cuba might have been desirable. Yet, the principal focus

of Washington remained on Cuba’s foreign affairs, not its internal affairs. Reagan’s

supporters in Miami had different ideas.

604

Lars Schoultz also points to a series of bureaucratic problems exacerbated by change of personnel

as another factor. But this author found little documentary support for this assertion. Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 384-86. Wayne Smith suspected that Reagan simply wanted “a charade” to give the impression

that diplomatic attempts were made. Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, pp. 257-58. This author’s

view is that Reagan had not noticed that his goal of breaking Cuban-Soviet ties through verbal

persuasion was unattainable in the first place.

605 On Cuba’s repeated proposal for U.S.-Cuban dialogue, see for example, Shultz to Ferch, “Weicker-

Castro Conversation,” April 7, 1983, in folder “Cuba (1/5/1983-5/9/1983),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF,

RRL; Canadian Embassy in Havana to Ottawa, May 25, 1983, June 8, 1983, vol. 19386, 20-Cuba-1-3,

part 16, RG25, LAC; MH, June 17, 1983, p. 1A; and Transcript of interview with Fidel Castro, in

Cuba Update 4, no. 4 (August 1983), Supplement, pp. 1-7.

606 CIA, “Cuba: Tactics and Strategy for Central America,” August 1982, DDRS; and CIA, “Cuban

Actions Inimical to U.S. Interests,” November 9, 1982, CREST, NARA.

233

Ronald Reagan and Miami Cubans

In Miami, Reagan’s Cuban policy rekindled the counterrevolutionary dream of

Castro’s overthrow. Many anti-Castro organizations declared support for Reagan, such as

the National Association of Cuban American Women, a nonprofit and nonpartisan group

aiming to protect the rights of minorities and women. “Support President Reagan’s

foreign policy,” its pamphlet stated, “which… has imparted dignity to the fact that we

face up to communism every day.”607

Numerous stories and cartoons that depicted the

U.S. president as a friend, ally, and “superhero” appeared in Spanish-language tabloids,

newspapers, and magazines.608

In the 1980 and 1984 presidential elections, 90 percent of

votes cast by Miami Cubans went to Reagan.609

Numerous Cuban Americans readily took

diplomatic and foreign policy posts. For example, Otto Reich became head of the State

Department’s Office of Public Diplomacy. José Sorzano served as deputy chief of the

U.S. mission to the United Nations and later Latin America specialist for the NSC.

Reagan was popular not only because he was an anticommunist warrior, but also

because he was respectful of Miami Cubans, who strongly felt that they had been

victimized by the Mariel boatlift. The image of Cubans in the United States had

plummeted nationwide, as report after report on Cubans detailed crime, rape, mental

607

Ana María Perera to Reagan with Brochure, July 29, 1981, #034899, Federal Government

Organizations 006-01, WHORM: Subject File, RRL.

608 Many of them are available at the University of Miami’s Cuban Heritage Collection and the Florida

International University’s Special Collections. See also, Hideaki Kami, “Ethnic Community, Party

Politics, and the Cold War: The Political Ascendancy of Miami Cubans, 1980-2000,” Japanese

Journal of American Studies 23 (2012), pp. 191-93.

609 García, Havana USA, p. 146.

234

health problems, unemployment, and gang violence.610

Typical headlines of U.S.

newspaper articles were: “Miami’s Agony,” “America’s New Bandidos,” and “Castro’s

‘gifts’ filling New York jails.”611

According to a public opinion poll in 1982, the U.S.

public viewed Cubans as the least welcome migrants in U.S. history.612

With Al Pacino

starring as a Mariel Cuban who turned into a drug kingpin, Brian de Palma’s ultraviolent

movie Scarface capitalized on this popular anti-Cuban sentiment. “Think about it,” De

Palma exclaimed in an interview, “CUBANS! COCAINE! AL PACINO! MACHINE

GUNS! GIRLS! WOW! That’s what I want to see.”613

In contrast, Reagan continued to call Miami Cubans “freedom fighters.” His

participation in Cuba’s “independence” day was only one of many indications of his deep

sympathy for Miami Cubans. “I’ve always thought,” Reagan later wrote in his memoir,

“[that] it was a tragic error for President Kennedy to abandon the Cuban freedom fighters

during the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion.” Kennedy’s decision not to send air cover for the

invading forces stranded “those courageous men on the beach, letting them die or be

captured.” This episode was even more tragic because Kennedy could have at least “let

610

Nick Nichols, “Castro’s Revenge,” Washington Monthly 14 (1982): 38-42; and Masud-Piloto, From Welcomed Exiles, pp. 94-95.

611 WP, December 8, 1981, pp. A1-A2; Time, October 12 1981, p. 31; and Chicago Tribune, February

21, 1982, p. 5.

612 Only 9 percent of respondents felt that Cuban migration generally had been “a good thing for the

country,” and 59 percent felt it had been “a bad thing.” The approval rate for Cuban migrants ranked

last of a total of fifteen immigrant groups included in the survey, much lower than Vietnamese and

Haitians. 1982 Roper Reports, quoted in Portes and Stepick, City on the Edge, p. 31.

613 Laurence F. Knapp, ed., Brian de Palma Interviews (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi,

2003), p. 89. Scarface appeared from Universal Studio in 1983.

235

the planes come in and rescue them.”614

It is not difficult to surmise from this recollection

that the U.S. president had not forgotten the U.S. role in the invasion nor did he ignore

the historical responsibility that Washington might have taken on to regard these Cold

War warriors with respect.

Reagan did not treat all anti-Castro activists equally, however. Already in October

1980, one of the militant groups, Alpha 66, recruited recent Mariel arrivals, trained them

in Florida camps, and carried out their first raid against Cuba since 1977, which

reportedly killed a Cuban policeman and wounded others. Jimmy Carter’s State

Department again pledged its opposition to such raids and increased the surveillance of

“these anti-Castro terrorist groups.”615

The Reagan administration followed that line,

although its rationale might have been less informed by moral standpoints than

practicality. Reagan’s national security staff feared that random military operations

would draw the United States into not only unexpected military confrontation but also

exchanges of terrorism with Cuba. In this scenario, a briefing book stated, the United

States was “much more vulnerable.”616

The Reagan administration did more than monitor the Cuban American

community. It also provided information to the Cuban government behind the scenes. On

October 9, 1981, for example, the State Department informed the Cuban foreign ministry

614

Italics mine. Reagan, American Life, p. 472. For other Reagan’s remarks on Cuba and Miami

Cubans, see Cuban American National Foundation, Reagan on Cuba (Washington, DC: CANF, 1984).

615 Muskie to Carter, “Transition Issues,” November 10, 1980, NLC-12-13-1-31-9, RAC, JCL.

616 Allen Briefing Book for 6 Feb NSC Meeting, in folder “NSC1,” box 91282, NSC-ES-MF, RRL.

236

of a counterrevolutionary terrorist’s plan to attack a Cuban airliner in Miami.617

Four

days later, Washington notified Havana that the FBI arrested a suspect named Armando

César Santana Alvarez and was going to hold a press conference.618

The FBI also started

to arrest members of a terrorist organization named Omega 7, including its leader

Eduardo Arocena, for planning to assassinate Cuba’s UN ambassador Raúl Roa Kourí in

1980.619

The level and consistency of information-sharing and law enforcement might

have been far from ideal from Cuba’s perspectives. Yet at one point, Castro referred

favorably to this development of U.S.-Cuban cooperation on counterterrorism.620

The Emergence of CANF

With the arrival of Reagan’s presidency and the crackdown on terrorism, political

dynamics in Miami favored the appearance of a new organization called Cuban American

National Foundation (CANF).621

Unlike traditional militants and hardliners, the

foundation aimed to topple the Castro regime by accumulating power within the U.S.

political system instead of raiding the island. This strategy worked well. Within the first

617

Resúmen de los Hechos Más Importantes de la Situación Política de los EE.UU., no. 101, pg. 11,

October 9, 1981, MINREX.

618 Resúmen de los Hechos Más Importantes de la Situación Política de los EE.UU., no. 102, pp. 11-

12, October 16, 1981, MINREX.

619 In 1984, U.S. judges pronounced a life sentence on Arocena. See FBI, “Omega 7,” October 29,

1993, obtained from Cuban Information Archives, http://www.cuban-exile.com/doc_001-

025/doc0011.html (accessed November 25, 2009).

620 Fidel Castro’s announcement, December 14, 1984, printed in Bohemia, December 21, 1984, p. 42.

621 For details of this section and others related to CANF, see Kami, “Creating an Ethnic Lobby:

Ronald Reagan, Jorge Mas Canosa, and the Birth of the Foundation,” in Andrew L. Johns and Mitchell

Lerner, eds., The “Tocqueville Oscillation”: The Intersection of Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2016), currently revising for publication.

237

few years after its birth, the foundation cemented its position as the most influential

Cuban American group in the United States. Based on interviews with Washington

officials and media reports, many previous studies attribute the success of the foundation

to its connection with Reagan Republicans.622

Indeed, Reagan welcomed and supported

the foundation’s activities in numerous ways. Most importantly, the foundation gained

access to his top-level advisers and at times, the president himself.

But little known was the emergence of the foundation as a product of anti-Castro

hardliners’ reactions to Cuba’s public relations efforts in the United States. In the late

1970s, these activists recognized that the Cuban government intensified its approaches to

various U.S. sectors, including Cuban émigré society, to facilitate an improvement of

U.S.-Cuban relations. They saw numerous trips made by U.S. politicians, business people,

and tourists to Cuba with much chagrin. They also felt that Castro was utilizing human

rights issues, something that nobody could contest, to neutralize their opposition to a

U.S.-Cuban dialogue—to some extent in collaboration with Jimmy Carter. The 1978

Havana-Miami dialogue was a shocking event for Mas Canosa, to-be chair of CANF,

who acknowledged that it was Castro’s victory and their defeat. Mas Canosa and his

friends started to explore ways to stem this seemingly inevitable trend for a U.S.-Cuban

rapprochement.623

622

Torres, Mirrors, p. 115; Haney and Vanderbush, Embargo, pp. 32-36; and Arboleya, Cuba y los

cubanoamericanos, pp. 178-79. These authors give the impression that the inspiration for the

foundation came from U.S. officials such as national security adviser Richard Allen and CIA director

William Casey.

623 Kami, “Creating an Ethnic Lobby.”

238

CANF would have emerged as one of the first nationwide Cuban American

political groups with or without Reagan’s assistance, although the latter was critical to the

foundation’s early success. Carlos Salman, long-time Republican activist and CANF’s

founding member, had contact with Richard Allen, who was to be Reagan’s first national

security adviser. Allen not only endorsed the idea of forming a Cuban American lobby,

but he also agreed to meet with the group a couple of times during the 1980 campaign. At

the same time the group looked to more than Reagan Republicans for assistance. José

Ruiz Rodríguez, another CANF founding member, brought in his Jewish friend, Barney

Barnett, who in turn introduced the group to Tom Dine, executive director of the

American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). It was this most powerful Jewish

lobby group that set up the orientation seminars for all CANF directors and taught them

how to lobby Washington. Barnett also played another important role; he gave the name

of CANF to the group.624

CANF was born on July 6, 1981, as an organization working “to advise, educate,

and otherwise inform the public of the advantages of a democratic form of government

and the threat by communistic forms of government in the Western Hemisphere, such as

those represented by the country of Cuba.”625

Mas Canosa became the first chairman.

Born in Santiago de Cuba, he had criticized the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, left

Cuba in opposition to Fidel Castro, and joined the Bay of Pigs invasion, although he

never landed at the island. After his brief service for the U.S. military, he continued to

624

Ibid. See also, Vargas Llosa, El exilio indomable, p. 121.

625 Articles of Incorporation, July 6, 1981, and By-laws of CANF, Article 2, in folder “Incorporation

and By-Laws,” box 1.04, CANF Archive.

239

engage himself in anti-Castro organizations such as RECE. Meanwhile, Mas Canosa also

advanced his career to be president of Church and Tower, a firm of engineering

contractors. Benefitting from ethnic solidarity, language abilities, and a variety of

different forms of government and nongovernment assistance, he and the other sixteen

businessmen apparently achieved the “American Dream” in just one generation.626

Because of this background, the members of CANF found it relatively easy to

“Americanize” anti-Castro politics. These individuals saw little contradiction in asking

for the help of the U.S. government to achieve their aims of toppling the Cuban

government. Besides, in contrast to diehard militants, they shared a certain degree of

pragmatism with the administration, as indicated in a paper written by Mas Canosa days

after the 1980 election. In this paper, he analyzed the situation as follows:

While Castro’s Cuba continues in a relentless offensive…the Soviet Union

continues to utilize it’s [sic] Third World proxy, Cuba, to attain further victories

against the West….In the implementation of a policy which could put an end to

such revolutionary adventurism, however, caution must be observed in order to

avoid an open confrontation which could lead to a situation of high tension,

where the use of armed force may become inevitable.

626

“Jorge Mas Canosa,” in Thomas M. Leonard, ed., Encyclopedia of Cuban-United States Relations

(Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2010). (E-Book; accessed October 25, 2014). For a more critical portrait,

see for example, Arboleya, Counterrevolution, pp. 228-231.

240

Instead, he proposed that the U.S. government initiate new radio broadcasting to Cuba,

which was to be Radio Martí.627

CANF became one of the most powerful ethnic lobbying groups in U.S. history

by combining the rising Cuban American economic power with decades-long

counterrevolutionary goals. Unlike preceding anti-Castro groups, the foundation was

most successful in raising and utilizing funds. Its directors, trustees, and patrons were

wealthy business leaders who generously contributed $10,000, $5,000, and $1,000 per

year. With numerous luncheons, dinner parties, and fundraising campaigns, CANF

gathered $363,709 in the first twelve months after its establishment. Looking to the

AIPAC as a model, the foundation adopted a corporate management structure and built a

strong organizational base to utilize resources efficiently. In particular, they set up CANF

as a non-profit educational organization to be eligible for tax-exempt status of 501 (c) 3,

while using the Free Cuba PAC as a political action committee and the Cuban American

Foundation as a lobbying group. In addition to much sympathy from the president and

other high-ranking officials, the financial and organizational strength as an interest group

distinguished the foundation from hundreds of other anti-Castro organizations that had

appeared since 1959.628

CANF also had its bipartisan allies in the U.S. Congress, such as Florida Senator

Paula Hawkins, Miami congressman Dante Fascell, and other members of the Florida

627

Italics added. Mas Canosa, Back-Up Paper, November 10, 1980, folder “Radio Free Cuba (5),” box

OA 90051, Carnes Lord Files, RRL.

628 Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, April 20, 1982, and CANF Financial Report,

August 11, 1982, both in folder “Minutes, 1981-1985,” box 1.04, CANF Archive. Some directors

contributed much more than the minimum of $10,000.

241

delegation. But outside Florida the foundation had to overcome North Americans’

stereotype of Miami Cubans as terrorists and drug traffickers, the image reinforced by

newspaper reports and movies like Scarface.629

Thus, while trying to compete with the

Cuban government in Havana, the foundation incessantly invited senators and

representatives—along with their families—to Miami, where they enjoyed generous

fundraising events and comfortable stays in winter. The directors of CANF were all men,

yet according to Irma Mas Canosa, wife of Jorge Mas, their wives had an important role

to play at parties. They tried to present “the best face” of Cubans as “united and

civilized” to convince the invitees that they were “ordinary” American families and their

cause was therefore “American.”630

By the time Reagan prepared for his 1984 reelection campaign, the White House

could not miss the growing presence of CANF, as well as Reagan’s popularity among

Miami Cubans. Approached by Michael Deaver, White House’s deputy chief of staff,

CANF proposed that the U.S. president join Miami Cubans to celebrate Cuba’s formal

independence on May 20, 1983. But when Mas Canosa and Deaver met to discuss this

idea, there emerged a disagreement on one issue; Deaver insisted that the Republican

Party of Dade County had to be the host of the event, whereas Mas Canosa demanded

that the event had to be nonpartisan since it was a patriotic event. The meeting went

nowhere, and Mas Canosa stood up. “Well, when you are ready, let us know.” Three

weeks later the White House came back to the foundation. CANF became “the sole

629

Pepe Hernández, interview, in Jorge Mas Canosa, vol. 2, pp. 1473-74; and Vargas Llosa, El exilio indomable, p. 130.

630 Irma Santos de Mas Canosa (wife of Jorge Mas Canosa), interview, Luis J. Botifoll Oral History

Project (hereafter LBOHP), UM-CHC.

242

sponsor” of the event. As such, the foundation would choose whom it could invite. The

White House would make sure that there was no sign appearing on the backdrop on the

Dade County Auditorium except for the foundation’s one.631

Reagan’s visit to Miami on May 20, 1983, became the biggest public relations

coup for the foundation. Various small Cuban American organizations still advocated

U.S.-Cuban dialogue, family reunification, and the lifting of the embargo.632

But their

demonstrated power was not comparable to that of CANF, which could not only sponsor

the presidential visit to Miami, but also negotiate over the terms of the visit with the

White House. Rather than a puppet of the Reagan administration, the foundation acted on

its own purpose, capitalized on Reagan’s popularity among Miami Cubans, and turned its

access to the Reagan administration into its claim to the sole authority among Miami

Cubans.

Radio Martí as Gospel of Freedom

In October 1983, in collaboration with Mas Canosa’s CANF, the Reagan

administration won congressional approval for Radio Martí, a U.S.-sponsored radio

broadcaster to Cuba. The administration viewed propaganda campaigns as a central

component of its Cuban policy, partly because Reagan saw the Cold War as a conflict of

631

Kami, “Creating an Ethnic Lobby.” See esp. Memorandum of Understanding for Miami Event,

May 20, 1983, May 13, 1983, in folder “Cuba/ Jorge Mas,” box 1, Series 7, Paula Hawkins Papers,

Winter Park Public Library (hereafter WPPL).

632 Cuban American Coordinating Committee, with a Statement of Purpose, May 16, 1983, in folder

“98th-1st-1983 Cuba,” box 2480, Dante Fascell Papers, UM-SC.

243

ideals and worldviews as much as it was a clash of arms and interests.633

Reagan and his

officials believed that by directly sending “true” information to Cubans on the island, the

United States could convince them to stand up against Castro for their rights and freedom

as well as an affluent and “better” American way of life. After abandoning military

intervention as infeasible in the short term, Washington considered radio broadcasting a

long-term effort intended to encourage an ultimate transition to U.S.-led democracy and a

reinstatement of the Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere.

Initially, however, Reagan Republicans envisioned this radio broadcasting mainly

as an instrument for breaking Cuba-Soviet ties. In the above-mentioned Santa Fe report

of May 1980, Roger Fontaine, who later became a member of Reagan’s national security

staff in charge of Latin American affairs, advocated new radio broadcasting to Cuba,

declaring that “if propaganda fails, a war of national liberation against Castro must be

launched.” But regardless of such confrontational rhetoric, the report also recommended

that Washington promise “generous” assistance to Havana if the latter decide to terminate

its alliance with Moscow. “U.S. assistance,” it stated, “should go well beyond what even

the Castro regime is demanding as an American step toward normalization of

relations.”634

Once the Soviet Union disappeared, Fontaine came out in opposition to Mas

Canosa by advocating the end to the U.S. embargo on Cuba.635

633

On Reagan, see Reagan, American Life. See also, John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin, 2005), chap. 6; and James M. Scott, Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan

Doctrine and American Foreign Policy (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996).

634 Committee of Santa Fe, A New Inter-American Policy for the Eighties (Washington, DC: Council

for Inter-American Security, 1980), pp. 46-47.

635 Fontaine and William Ratliff, “Liberate Cuba. Liberate Us. Lift the Embargo, Now; Conservatives,

Lead the Way,” NYT, February 17, 1994. Academic OneFile. Web. (accessed September 16, 2014). For

244

In contrast, Mas Canosa and his supporters aimed for much more than a change of

foreign policy in Cuba. Referring to the Mariel boatlift, his November 1980

memorandum highlighted “a marked desire within the Cuban population to increase anti-

government activities of a disruptive nature.” For him, the purpose of new, powerful

radio broadcasting to Cuba was to “respond encouragingly to the highly motivated

opposition to Castro’s regime.” Mas Canosa sought to stimulate internal discontent and

help it to topple the Cuban government. He would have supported the termination of the

Havana-Moscow alliance only if it would fit within the greater purpose of regime

change.636

Of course, as long as Cuba remained allied with the Soviet Union, these

differences did not affect the collaboration between the Reagan administration and Miami

Cubans. These two lines of purpose often merged into an attack on the same enemy.

While considering Mas Canosa’s report and others, the NSC staff concluded that Radio

Free Cuba, a U.S.-sponsored radio broadcaster, was “vital to U.S. interests.” Modeled on

Radio Free Europe, this planned radio broadcast intended to break the monopoly on

communications in Cuba. In the long run, it would hopefully create “the conditions

necessary for an upheaval to occur―an upheaval that would fundamentally alter the

character of the Cuban regime.”637

By October 1981, when the administration announced

his earlier views, Fontaine, On Negotiating with Cuba (Washington, DC: American Enterprise

Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975).

636 Mas Canosa, Radio Free Cuba “Project,” November 10, 1980, in folder “Cuba (5/22/1981),” box

29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. Richard Allen forwarded Mas Canosa’s proposal to Fontaine.

637 Fontaine and Carnes Lord to Allen, March 24, 1981, in folder “Cuba/ Broadcasting/ Radio Free

Cuba (5),” box 90125, Roger Fontaine Files, RRL.

245

this project, the NSC staff further elaborated its organization, budget, programming, and

schedule of implementation.

The next step was to set up the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba,

a special advisory board to undertake further preparation for Radio Free Cuba. The NSC

staff wanted to make sure that each member of the commission not only shared “the

administration’s general philosophy on foreign policy,” but also represented no

“particular faction of the exile community” in order to avoid being hijacked for particular

political purposes.638

The administration’s choice for a Cuban American representative

was Mas Canosa, who was not an American citizen at that time but gained a strong

endorsement by Florida Senator Paula Hawkins.639

Along with the other nine

conservative U.S. citizens on the commission, Mas Canosa, himself a specialist on

propaganda, gained an official title in government and started to play an insider-role in

preparing for the radio broadcasting, now known as Radio Martí.640

The final step was to gain Congressional support for providing the radio

broadcasting with a budget. CANF lobbied intensively, but faced opposition from the

National Association of Broadcasters that expressed concerns about the Cuban

government’s capability of jamming U.S. radio airwaves. Teaming up with powerful

638

Carnes Lord and Fontaine, “Suggested Initiative: Radio Free Cuba,” in Allen to Haig, June 2, 1981,

in folder “Cuba/Broadcasting/ Radio Free Cuba (4),” box 90125, Roger Fontaine Files, RRL.

639 Hawkins to Allen, September 25, 1981, in folder “Cuba-Radio Broadcasting/ Radio Martí (2)”; and

Hawkins to Allen, October 23, 1981, in folder “Cuba-Radio Broadcasting/ Radio Martí (1),” both in

box 90125, Roger Fontaine Files, RRL. Hawkins later lobbied the INS and FBI to speed up the

process of Mas Canosa to be a naturalized U.S. citizen. Hawkins to John Gossart, November 18, 1981;

and Hawkins to Bill Garvey, November 20, 1982, both in folder “Cuba/ Jorge Mas,” box 1, Series 7,

Paula Hawkins Papers, WPPL.

640 See Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba, Final Report (Washington, DC:

Government Printing Office, 1982).

246

farm lobbies, which represented interests of agricultural businesses that relied on radio

information on weather, the association mobilized their allies in the U.S. Senate and

defeated a move to call up Radio Martí in the autumn of 1982. Regardless, the bill passed

in the next autumn. Foes and friends of the new radio initiative eventually agreed on a

compromise. The U.S. government would procure five million dollars to compensate U.S.

radio stations in case of Cuba’s jamming and would place Radio Martí under the VOA

and an advisory board to guarantee its political neutrality and operational effectiveness.641

Radio Martí became the first major achievement for CANF, which spent around

$2.5 million in its lobbying efforts. The foundation’s booklet claimed, “Now Radio Martí

is a beautiful reality,” making “a substantive contribution for the cause of Free Cuba.”642

Although this early victory would have been unattainable without the support of the

administration, CANF increased its credibility of power among Miami Cubans and

further strengthened the anti-Castro movement. Many deepened their sense of political

efficacy and became more inclined to vote for politicians who paid attention to their

feelings against the Cuban government.643

The administration welcomed this trend. By

selecting Mas Canosa as chair of the Presidential Advisory Board, Washington chose him

641

Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 402-4; Daniel C. Walsh, An Air War with Cuba: The United States Radio

Campaign against Castro (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 2012), pp. 78-87; and Fredrick,

Radio Wars, pp. 31-37. For the amount of spending, see Jacqueline Tillman to McFarlane, “Cuban-

American Agenda,” January 16, 1985, in folder “Cuba (12/7/1984-1/16/1985),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF,

RRL.

642 Jacqueline Tillman to McFarlane, “Cuban-American Agenda,” January 16, 1985, in folder “Cuba

(12/7/1984-1/16/1985),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL; and CANF, Radio Martí ya es una realidad…! (Washington, DC: CANF, ca. 1984).

247

as a leader of Miami Cubans and made “an important symbolic commitment” to his

followers.644

Migration as Reagan’s Achilles Heel

Whereas Reagan promoted Radio Martí, his administration still suffered from the

disastrous legacy of the 1980 Mariel boatlift. In the early 1980s, Washington repeatedly

demanded that Havana accept thousands of Mariel Cubans without precondition, but to

little avail. This inability to solve the ongoing migration problems amplified the political,

economic, and psychological baggage of the Mariel boatlift. The return of Mariel Cubans

remained “the most pressing bilateral problem with Cuba,” according to Kenneth

Skoug.645

Yet, Washington’s migration problems were more than this single issue. Aware

of a U.S. vulnerability to similar migration crises, John Bushnell, deputy assistant

secretary of state, recalled that he had told Haig that “the ace Castro always had up his

643

Kami, “Ethnic Community.”

644 Walter Raymond, a NSC specialist, strongly opposed this selection precisely because he worried

about making a commitment to Miami Cubans. However, Mas Canosa and his congressional allies

campaigned hard for this post. Mas Canosa gained endorsement from Hawkins, Dante Fascell, ex-

Senator Richard Stone, House Republican leader Bob Michel among others. Raymond to McFarlane,

February 14, 1984, in folder “Radio Martí (2/4/1984-3/14/1984),” box 8, Walter Raymond Files, RRL.

For letters on behalf of Mas Canosa, see Dennis Thomas and David L. Wright to McFarlane, February

9, 1984, in folder “Radio Martí (2/4/1984-3/14/1984),” box 8, Walter Raymond Files, RRL; Stone to

Clark, September 29, 1983, reproduced in John Elliston, Psywar on Cuba: The Declassified History of U.S. Anti-Castro Propaganda (Melbourne: Ocean, 1999), pp. 222-24; Hawkins to Ed Meese, July 29,

1983, Hawkins to Baker, July 29, 1983; and Hawkins to José Salgado, October 12, 1983, all in folder

“Cuba/ Jorge Mas,” box 1, Series 7, Paula Hawkins Papers, WPPL.

645 Kenneth N. Skoug, Jr., The United States and Cuba under Reagan and Shultz: A Foreign Service

Officer Reports (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), p. 9.

248

sleeve was sending lots of Cubans to the U.S. as boat people.”646

Another U.S. official

also remembers that the prevention of another Mariel was “a major obsession.”647

To capture fully the importance of migration in foreign relations, it is necessary to

look at the rising anti-immigrant sentiment in U.S. society. In the early 1980s, poll after

poll indicated that the overwhelming majority of U.S. citizens opposed further Cuban

migration into the United States.648

Worried about the fiscal strain on already stretched

social programs, many Americans also questioned the capabilities of newcomers to

become “American.”649

They rallied around new anti-immigration groups such as the

Federation for American Immigration Reform, which started to shape public debate

through its well-organized lobbying efforts. Roger Conner, the federation’s executive

director, frankly stated that the Mariel boatlift was a “catalyst” to make Americans aware

646

John Bushnell, interview transcript, p. 507, FAOH.

647 G. Phillip Hughes (deputy foreign policy adviser to George Bush, 1981-85), interview transcript, p.

53, FAOH.

648 For example, 71 percent of the respondents of a CBS News and the New York Times survey on June

24, 1980, opposed the settlement of Mariel Cubans into the United States. 73 percent of the Harris poll

on July 17, 1980, agreed that it would be wrong to accept so many Cubans into their country at the

times of economic troubles at home. 81 percent of the respondents of the Harris Survey on August 26,

1980, viewed negatively of Carter’s handling of the Mariel Crisis. 76 percent of the respondents of the

Research Forecasts survey from September to November 1980 agreed that the United States had been

too willing to accept Cubans and South Vietnamese as refugees. There was no racial boundary. 78

percent of white respondents and 73 percent of black respondents of the ABC News and the

Washington Post survey on March 23, 1981, believed that the U.S. government should discourage

Cubans from coming into the United States. All poll data cited here are found in folder “Attitudes on

Immigration Prepared by Reagan-Bush ’84 (July 26, 1984),” OA11586, Michael Deaver Files, RRL.

649 Carl J. Bon Tempo, Americans at the Gate: The United States and Refugees during the Cold War

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), chap. 7.

249

of “something they had been reading about and thinking about for a while but not really

brought into focus.”650

Although Reagan in principle wanted to reduce the size of the U.S. government,

the loss of migration control would have forced him to do the opposite. The costs for the

Cuban-Haitian programs were $425.6 million in FY 1981 and $405.6 million in FY1982.

Thus, Reagan was spending millions of dollars for unwelcome strangers, at the same time

that he cut social welfare programs for native-born Americans.651

Washington also faced

the demand of state and local governments for compensation for similar expenditures. As

of September 1981, the estimated unreimbursed cost for Florida alone in dealing with the

Mariel crisis was over $80 million.652

The presence of criminals, people with mental

illness, and children without parents among Mariel Cubans added a special financial

burden. The White House and Justice Department continued to discuss options of

building and expanding new jails, detention centers, and special facilities across the states,

although they would cost additional millions of dollars.653

Due to political and financial pressure, Reagan’s White House set the restoration

of migration control as one of its top-priority domestic issues. After a cabinet meeting on

650

U.S. Senate Committee on Judiciary, Annual Refugee Consultation for 1982, 97th Cong., 1st sess.,

September 22, 1981, p. 296. See also, Reagan, July 30, 1981, APP.

651 Office of U.S. coordinator for refugee affairs, “Report on Costs for Refugees and Cuban and

Haitian Entrants,” October 25, 1982, in U.S. Senate Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on

Immigration and Refugee Policy, Refugee Consultation, 97th Cong., 1st sess., September 29, 1982,

pp. 33-52.

652 Data by National Association of Counties, September 1981, in U.S. Senate, Annual Refugee

Consultation for 1982, p. 179.

653 Edward C. Schmults (deputy attorney general) to James A. Baker III, et. al., March 10, 1982, in

folder “Immigration Policy: Cubans and Haitians,” box 10, James W. Cicconi Files, RRL. For

discussion on the new detention centers, see other documents in the same file.

250

February 26, 1981, Reagan directed Attorney General William French Smith to establish

an inter-agency task force and review five major migration issues, one of which

concerned Cuban migration.654

Shortly thereafter, this task force recommended that the

U.S. government allow one-hundred and sixty thousand Cuban and Haitian “entrants,”

who came to the United States during the Mariel boatlift, to apply for permanent resident

status after residing in the United States for two years. Given the strong anti-immigration

feelings, however, it also proposed various measures to deter another possible migration

crisis. Aside from strengthening law enforcement capacities, its report suggested the

repeal of the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act and the closing of the special path toward

permanent residency for future Cuban migrants.655

The repeal of the Cuban Adjustment Act would have been politically

controversial, however. On January 13, 1982, an INS officer detained Andrés Rodríguez

Hernández, a Cuban stowaway, found on a Panamanian vessel in Miami. Although

Rodríguez applied for asylum in the United States, the Justice Department immediately

repatriated him to Cuba, making him the first Cuban in decades who failed to remain in

the United States.656

Because the State Department confirmed from the Cuban

654

Reagan to William French Smith, et. al., March 6, 1981, in folder “Pending-State Cubans Work

File #5, January-December 1981,”in box 2394, Dante Fascell Papers, UM-SC. The five main issues

are: (1) flow of aliens (level of immigration and temporary worker program); (2) illegal aliens in the

U.S. (legalization); (3) enforcement (employer sanctions; worker ID; expedited legal procedures); (4)

Haitian influx; and (5) Cuban refugee policy.

655 William French Smith to Reagan, June 26, 1981, in folder “Immigration and Refugee Matters (3),”

OA6518, Edwin Meese Papers, RRL; Craig L. Fuller (Director of Office of Cabinet Administration)

for the Cabinet, July 10, 1981, in folder “Immigration and Refugee Matters (Task Force Report),”

OA9945, Edwin Meese Papers, RRL; and Speech by Reagan, July 30, 1981, APP.

656 Chronology in Alan C. Nelson (acting commissioner of INS) to William French Smith, January 22,

1982, in folder “Immigration: Cubans/Haitians,” OA11593, Michael Uhlmann Files, RRL; and Memo

251

government that Rodríguez would not be unduly treated, he was unable to establish a

“well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a

particular social group, or political opinion”—a necessary condition for asylum approval

under the Refugee Act of 1980. Havana was well aware of the symbolic importance of

this deportation. Cuban authorities not only dropped illegal exit charges against

Rodríguez, but also allowed the Miami Herald to interview him and his family in

Havana.657

Yet as often happened, Havana’s satisfaction meant Miami’s resentment. The

deportation instigated a riot in Miami; five thousand angry demonstrators clashed with

local police officers. In dealing with the crisis, the city of Miami soon established a blue

ribbon commission, whose members included Jorge Mas Canosa, and issued a resolution

condemning the deportation, instead of the demonstration.658

Angry Miami Cubans also

came to meet with White House chief of staff James A. Baker III to convey “the

unprecedented rise of anti-Reagan sentiment.”659

Attorney General Smith still defended

the deportation as “consistent” with U.S. “policy of discouraging mass migrations to the

United States, like the Mariel boatlift.” 660

But the White House relented; thereafter, all

for William P. Clark, “Repatriation of Cuban Stowaway,” January 29, 1982, in folder “Cuba

(1/23/1982-2/1/1982),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL.

657 MH, January 21, 1982, p. A1; and Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, January 27, 1982, vol.

22007, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 6, RG25, LAC.

658 City of Miami, Blue Ribbon Committee Report on Miami Cuban Demonstration of January 16,

1982, Miami, July 28, 1982.

659 Elizabeth H. Dole to Baker, January 21, 1982, in folder “Immigration: Cubans/Haitians,”

OA11593, Michael Uhlmann Files, RRL.

660 Craig Fuller to William French Smith, January 28, 1982; and Smith to Fuller, February 5, 1982, in

folder “Immigration Policy: Cubans and Haitians,” box 10, James W. Cicconi Files, RRL.

252

Cubans, including stowaways, could remain in the United States.661

Further, the White

House blocked Myles Frechette, whom Mas Canosa considered responsible for the

deportation, from becoming chief of the USINT in Havana and later from becoming

deputy assistant secretary for inter-American affairs.662

After shelving the proposal for repealing the Cuban Adjustment Act, U.S.

policymakers looked for other formulas to prevent another possible Mariel. While

drawing on the task force report, the State Department continued to devise a contingency

plan and made a list of emergency procedures that included a naval blockade of South

Florida. According to its early 1982 memorandum, the Coast Guard would “seal selected

southern Florida ports” to prevent all U.S. flag vessels from departing to Cuba in search

of their families. Since such a forceful measure would be legally questionable, the

memorandum directed the Justice Department to prepare for lawsuits.663

The operation

required the cooperation of the state of Florida. Starting in 1983, the federal government

and Florida discussed the plan, leading to a simulation exercise in January 1984.664

661

William P. Clark reported to Reagan that nobody would be returned to Cuba. Clark to Reagan,

“More Cuban Stowaways,” January 30, 1982, DDRS.

662 Frechette ended up going to Cameroon as ambassador. For this episode, see also Kami, “Creating

an Ethnic Lobby.”

663 Clark and William French Smith to Reagan, “Contingency Planning for a Cuban Boatlift,” January

20, 1982, in folder “Cuba (2/8/1982-2/11/1982),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. William Clark reported

verbally to Reagan on the summarized version of this report, “Preventing another Mariel,” on

February 11, 1982. Handwritten note on William P. Clark to Reagan, “Contingency Planning for a

Cuban Boatlift,” February 11, 1982, in folder “Cuba (2/8/1982-2/11/1982),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF,

RRL.

664 State of Florida, Background: Mass Immigration Contingency Plan, in folder “Mass Immigration

Emergency Plan,” box 7, Governor Chiles’s Office of General Counsel’s Immigration Policy Files,

State Archive of Florida (hereafter SAF).

253

Yet even with this envisioned “containment” of Florida, the problem apparently

remained unresolved unless Washington discouraged Havana from “using migration as a

weapon against the United States.”665

Rumors of a new boatlift periodically circulated in

Miami. On June 10, 1983, the news that a U.S. cabin cruiser was in Varadero, Cuba,

possibly preparing to bring Cubans into Florida, recalled a traumatic memory of Mariel.

Washington held an interagency group meeting three days later, and concluded that the

State Department would ask Cuba not to repeat Mariel. “I was appalled,” wrote its Cuban

desk officer Kenneth Skoug in his memoir. “If our defense against a ‘Second Mariel’ was

to ask Cuban forbearance, we were in bad shape.”666

The specter of another Mariel

continued to haunt Washington.

Military Options of Returning “Excludables”

Apparently in Reagan’s mind, the most important migration issue during the first

term was how to return thousands of Mariel “excludables,” or those whom the U.S.

government considered “ineligible” for resettling in U.S. society. On May 18, 1981,

when he received the above-mentioned task force report on immigration, the U.S.

president wrote in his diary: “Our 1st problem is what to do with 1000’s of Cubans—

criminals and the insane that Castro loaded on refugee boats and sent here.”667

Since then

he had kept referring to this issue as if it had been the single most important issue of both

665

Clark and William French Smith to Reagan, “Contingency Planning for a Cuban Boatlift,” January

20, 1982.

666 Skoug, United States, p. 15.

667 Reagan, Diaries Unabridged, vo. 1, p. 40.

254

migration policy and U.S. relations with Cuba.668

One of the principal reasons why

Reagan accepted Mexico’s suggestion for the opening of the U.S.-Cuban talk at Mexico

City was his desire to solve this problem, as Haig noted in his memoir.669

“Ask him

[Castro] one thing,” said Reagan at one of the NSC meetings. “We’d have a lot better

time if they [the Cubans] would take back all those Cubans we have.”670

By then, Mariel “excludables” consisted of three groups. The first group was

those who admitted or supposedly admitted to having committed felonies and those

whom the INS deemed as excludable under U.S. immigration laws. The second group

came from the Fort Chafee and other processing centers. They were those whom the U.S.

government found “very hard” to resettle into U.S society due to mental illnesses or

criminal records either in the United States or Cuba. The third group was those whom the

INS detained due to their committed crimes after the initial resettlement, although the

crimes were not necessarily of the magnitude that would make automatically these people

excludable. Once the INS revoked their parole, however, they had to be excluded from

the United States as soon as possible.671

The State Department estimated that the cost of

668

Reagan, Diaries Unabridged, vol. 1, pp. 54, 55, 56. See also, Portillo, Mis tiempos, p. 1063.

669 Haig, Caveat, p. 133.

670 Minutes, NSC 17, July 7, 1981, p. 12, in folder “NSC 17,” box 91282, NSC-ES-MF, RRL.

671 Unlike deportation hearings, the burden of proof at the exclusionary hearing was on the applicant.

For the details of procedure, see Michael Cardozo to Lloyd Cutler and Watson, “Exclusion of

Undesirable Cubans from the States,” in folder “Cuban Refugees,” box 178, DPS-Eizenstat, JCL.

Hearings proceeded without witnesses and any access to documentation from the Cuban government.

When there was insufficient evidence or changed testimony of the witnesses or of the detainee by the

time of exclusion hearing, the judge usually found the detainees excludable due to its entrance without

proper documents. Detainees suspected on criminal grounds were also sentenced exclusion on

“documentary grounds” or lesser offenses. INS officers’ lack of familiarity with Cuban colloquialism

and idiom also caused confusion. Rivera, Decision and Structure, pp. 134-35.

255

detaining these Cubans was $10,000 per person per year, but the existence of the third

category meant that the number of detainees was likely to increase as time progressed.672

As political and financial pressure mounted, the Reagan administration,

particularly Haig’s State Department, examined the military options of sending Mariel

“excludables” back to Cuba.673

According to Gillespie, a participant of the RIG group,

they started to sketch the following plan:

In San Francisco Bay, in northern California, there was a number of old Liberty

cargo ships, vessels used during World War II to carry goods back and forth. The

idea would be to take enough of those vessels, deploy them to a port somewhere

along the Gulf of Mexico, and install metal benches on the decks which would

hold as many people as possible. There would be CIA hired or recruited crews to

operate the ships. In the dead of night we would seek court orders through the

Attorney General, take these Cubans out of the federal prisons, bus them, truck

them, or fly them, in chains, to the ships, and put them aboard. Actually, they

would be shackled to the benches. There would be an automatic machine to open

the shackles at a certain moment to release all of them. The Liberty ships would

then leave the U.S. port, go to Varadero Beach on the North Coast of Cuba, in

Matanzas Province and be steered toward the beach, on automatic pilot. The

672

U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and

Trade and the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Issues in United States-Cuba Relations, 97th

Cong., 2nd sess., December 14, 1982, pp. 19-20.

673 Mike Guhin to Bud McFarlane, “Return of excludables to Cuba,” February 22, 1982, in folder

“Cuba (2/13/1982-11/6/1982),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL.

256

crews would then be lifted off by helicopters at the last moment. Then, lo and

behold, the ships would hit the beach, and all of these criminal and insane

Marielitos would be back in Cuba.

This discussion was unforgettable for Gillespie. “This subject was discussed in this kind

of detail by grown men who…were considered senior executives” of the U.S.

government.674

Stephen Bosworth, deputy assistant secretary of state for inter-American

affairs, quibbled. “I mean these people all needed adult supervision.” Speaking of the

reaction of his boss, Bosworth lamented, “Haig actually said he thought it was a great

idea and commended us for our imagination.”675

Declassified secret U.S. records suggest that the civilians were not the only ones

who wasted time and resources in such a manner. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)

dutifully considered “various imaginative military options” such as the ones of sending

them back secretly via small boats, via helicopters, and others. But the JCS ended up

rejecting all of these schemes owing to the high risk of Cuban detection, the substantial

risk of the loss of lives of both U.S. personnel and migrants, expected negative publicity,

low prospect of success, violations of international laws against exposing innocent

persons to harm in such an operation, and most importantly, the desire to maintain the

674

Gillespie, interview transcript, pp. 237-38, FAOH.

675 Stephen Bosworth, interview transcript, p. 65, FAOH. See also, Haig, Caveat, p. 137.

257

U.S. commitment to human rights and safety of life at sea. The end could not justify the

means, its report concluded.676

Finally by February 1982, the NSC determined the military options as

unmistakenly infeasible.677

Meanwhile, the U.S. legal system complicated problems. In

August 1981, federal judge Marvin Shoob questioned the legality of indefinite detention

of Mariel “excludables” and directed the U.S. government to initiate a review process for

their release.678

This sentence was a victory for civil libertarians, but a nightmare for the

Justice Department, which immediately appealed. “A judge threatens to release them

from our jails and turn them loose on society,” an irritated Reagan complained in his

diary. “The problem—as yet unsolved is how to return them.”679

But except for the

opening of the talk with Havana, what else could he do?

The Reagan administration turned to diplomacy again, but not before halting the

immigration visa issuance for Cuban citizens in Havana. The State Department wanted to

use this measure as leverage to persuade Cuba to agree on an immigration accord, even

though the most affected group was counterrevolutionary ex-prisoners, whom Miami

Cubans regarded as their heroes.680

On May 25, 1983, just five days after Reagan’s visit

676

Working Paper, “Cuban Detainee Repatriation,” n.d., attached to John A. Wickham, Jr. to

Weinberger, “Cuban Detainee Repatriation,” November 2, 1983, in folder “Cuba (11/5/1983),” box

29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL.

677 See also, Attachment to Background Study on Preventing Another Mariel, n.d., in folder “Cuba

(2/8/1982-2/11/1982),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL.

678 Rivera, Decision and Structure, p. 138.

679 Reagan, Diaries Unabridged, vo. 1, p. 113.

680 The State Department continued to issue visas for immediate family members of U.S. citizens and

permanent residents. State Department, “U.S. Efforts to Negotiate the Return to Cuba of the Mariel

excludables,” June 14, 1984, in folder “Cuba (4/27/1984-6/26/1984),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL.

258

to Miami, Enders met with Ramón Sánchez-Parodi, head of the CUINT in Washington,

to remark on this measure, hand over the first list of 789 “excludables,” and repeat the

same demand that Havana accept these Cubans without any precondition.681

Apparently,

the Cubans were “surprised” that Washington was seeking to resolve this migration issue

“when so many other more urgent matters required addressing.”682

After Havana rejected

Washington’s demand, the State Department again sent a similar note.683

Cuba again refused the U.S. demand and reiterated its position. In its diplomatic

note on September 11, 1983, Havana claimed that the U.S. government caused the

migration crisis, drove massive propaganda, and welcomed Mariel Cubans to embarrass

the revolutionary regime. In Cuba’s views, most Mariel Cubans were “simply a group of

persons who were social misfits by choice and devoid of the principles that govern the

life of the Cuban national community, who refused to do any useful work or to assume

any social responsibility, and some of whom participated in antisocial and criminal

activities.” Referring to the hijacking incidents preceding the boatlift, the note argued, the

U.S. government nonetheless presented these elements as “heroes” in front of world

opinion only to demand later that Cuba accept some of them. While calling such U.S.

behavior “irresponsible,” the note stated that Cuba would be ready to talk about this issue

681

Cable from Washington to Havana, attached to José Viera to Fidel Castro, May 25, 1983,

MINREX.

682 Comment by José Arbesú (chief of North American section of the Cuban Community Party’s

Central Committee) to Canadian ambassador, in Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, June 2,

1983, vol. 22004, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 7, RG25, LAC.

683 Draft response, attached to José Viera to Rodríguez, May 31, 1983, MINREX; and Diplomatic note

(translated in Spanish), July 7, 1983, MINREX.

259

only in the context of comprehensive talks on migration normalization.684

In the face of

Havana’s defiance, Washington’s diplomacy by strength hit a wall.

Conclusion—and Prelude to the Next

Determined to prevent another “defeat” in Latin America, Ronald Reagan

targeted Cuba as the principal source of turmoil in Central America. While intensifying

its assistance to counterrevolutionary allies in the region, Washington implemented a

series of hostile measures against Cuba, escalated regional tensions, and disregarded any

Cuban proposal for a negotiated settlement over Central America. In talks in Mexico City

and Havana, Washington avoided interfering in Cuban internal affairs yet demanded that

Havana completely break its ties with Moscow and change its foreign policy. In Miami,

Reagan allied with Cuban counterrevolutionaries. He worked with CANF to create Radio

Martí and prepare for a new campaign of psychological warfare against revolutionary

Cuba.

Multiple domestic and international restraints continued to limit Reagan’s

policymaking, however. When Cuba refused to cut its relations with Moscow and

revolutionary allies in the Third World, the United States found little it could do. As

Castro mobilized the entire nation to deter possible U.S. aggression, the calculated cost of

U.S. casualties reinforced the administration’s reluctance to commit forces against the

island. The Soviet Union repeatedly demanded that Reagan confirm the 1962 Kennedy-

Khrushchev agreement. In dealing with the legacy of the 1980 Mariel boatlift, moreover,

684

Translated Note from Ferch to Shultz, “GOC Response to USG Note on Return of Marielitos,”

September 22, 1983, in folder “Cuba (11/25/1983),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL.

260

Reagan desperately looked for all military options for sending back thousands of Mariel

Cubans to the island for the first three years. It took a little more time for him to realize

that a show of hostility alone would not resolve these issues.

In spite of being a problem whose solution clearly required bilateral cooperation,

Cuba-to-U.S. migration also created a U.S. constituency hostile to any dealings with

revolutionary Cuba. Far from being puppets of the Reagan administration, Mas Canosa

and his newly-born CANF had their own purposes from the very beginning. They not

only capitalized on Reagan’s rhetoric of “freedom,” but also proved willing to go beyond

the scheme envisioned by the Reagan administration. Despite a shared ideological

hostility toward Castro, anti-Castro activists and U.S. officials often entered into

discussions, negotiations, and power struggles, as shown in the deportation of Andrés

Rodríguez Hernández and the May 1983 reception of Reagan in Miami. Although the

administration looked to Radio Martí as an instrument intended to press Havana to cut

relations with Moscow, Mas Canosa considered it a weapon of regime change. The

entrance of counterrevolutionary Cubans into U.S. politics made the story of U.S.-Cuban

relations more complex.

261

CHAPTER 6: Reaching Equilibrium

Migration Talks, Propaganda War, and the Future Trajectory of U.S. Relations with Cuba

Only a month after Reagan’s celebration of Cuba’s “independence” day in Miami,

Cuban diplomats advocated upgrading public relations efforts in the United States. In a

report to Havana, the Cuban mission to the United Nations worried that U.S. citizens

knew little about Cuban society. The U.S. blockade limited the amount of information

from the island reaching U.S. citizens, leaving cultural and political activities by Cubans

living in the United States as the sole voices. Although artists and writers of Cuban origin

claimed to represent “Cuban” culture, the mission lamented, their works exhibited “a

permanently negative, distorted, and false image of our realities” and reinforced “anti-

Cuban prejudices that transcend broad sectors of U.S. society.” The mission also referred

to the emergence of CANF, which aspired to influence U.S. opinions to support a hostile

policy toward the Cuban government.685

The report illustrates how the growing presence of Miami Cubans complicated

Cuba’s political strategies in the United States. Since the late 1970s, the revolutionary

government sought to broaden contact with various U.S. sectors, improve its image, and

magnify Cuba’s “political influence” in shaping Washington’s Cuba policy. Yet, as

685

Informe (by Cuban Mission to the United Nations), June 29, 1983, Caja “Bilateral 25,” MINREX.

The mission recommended an interagency meeting involving the Communist Party, the MINREX, the

Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Higher Education to discuss this

issue.

262

Reagan escalated tensions with the island and Miami Cubans consolidated their roles as

“freedom fighters,” Havana was put on the defensive. In May 1985, two years after the

above-mentioned memo, the U.S. government launched Radio Martí, a U.S.-sponsored

radio broadcaster to Cuba. Washington sided with Miami counterrevolutionaries,

notwithstanding Havana’s cooperation over migration issues and intensified public

relations efforts.

Based on primary sources in the United States, Cuba, and elsewhere, this chapter

reassesses interrelated political dynamics among Washington, Havana, and Miami in the

mid-1980s. As noted in previous studies, the escalation of U.S.-Cuban tensions reached a

peak with the 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada. But this chapter also shows that it was

immediately after this invasion that Reagan finally realized the inevitability of

negotiation with Castro, no matter how reluctant the U.S. president might have been. To

pursue one of his most important agenda items, migration control, Reagan accepted the

necessity of talks with Castro, even though such meant a retreat from U.S. policy of

hostility toward the island. Aware of this political importance, Havana modified its stance

on migration and accepted his offer for talks.686

Reagan’s turn to diplomacy in turn merged with local and global forces,

generating new political dynamics across the Florida Straits. Because Havana judged the

process of migration talks with Washington as constructive, it doubled advocacy efforts

686

Due to the difficulty in gaining access to historical records, scholarship on U.S.-Cuban relations in

this period is scarce. For the best available secondary sources, see Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 390-404; and

LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, esp. pp. 236-246. These works situate U.S.-Cuban relations

in the broader context of Central American conflicts, although they reveal little about the process of

the 1984 migration agreement, the Radio Martí startup, nor the connection between the two episodes.

263

for a relaxation of U.S.-Cuban tensions in light of promising signs of a U.S.-Soviet

rapprochement that appeared around the same time. To attenuate Washington’s hostile

attitudes, Castro himself appeared on U.S. media, appealed to U.S. audiences for peace,

and repeated overtures for better relations. Across the sea, however, anti-Castro forces in

Miami and their allies in the U.S. Congress intensified their lobbying. With the startup of

Radio Martí, CANF’s Jorge Mas Canosa was trying to ensure that the U.S. government

would make a new commitment to “freedom” in Cuba.

This chapter thus illustrates how contradictory impulses from Miami and Havana

formidably reinforced the emerging equilibrium in U.S. relations with Cuba. Washington

came to terms with the existence of a revolutionary regime in Havana and probed for

cooperation on issues of mutual concern such as migration. Yet, by pledging the

promotion of Cuba’s “freedom” to Miami Cubans, Washington not only made its

cooperation with Havana more difficult, but also made any progress toward diplomatic

normalization almost impossible. Even before the Cold War ended, Washington began to

set drastic changes in Havana’s internal structure, as well as radical shifts in Havana’s

foreign policy, as pivotal preconditions for a substantial improvement in U.S.-Cuban

relations. Between Miami and Havana, Washington’s preference was often too clear.

Behind the Curtain of a Cold War Sideshow

U.S.-Cuban relations cooled even after the focal point of Cold War confrontation

moved away from the Florida Straits. Although George Shultz replaced Alexander Haig

as U.S. Secretary of State, he struggled to seize the control of the foreign policy agenda

264

from anticommunist hardliners overly obsessed with the red menace across the world.

Meanwhile, Reagan’s dream of “We are all Americans” was falling apart. U.S. support

for the United Kingdom in the 1982 Falklands/ Malvinas War alienated most Latin

American countries by shattering the myth of hemispheric defense, a central component

of the Monroe Doctrine. Latin America’s debt problems with western banks further

exposed a North-South divide between wealthy and poor countries, pushing the latter

closer to Cuba. Reagan’s Central American policy, especially his promotion of

counterrevolution in Nicaragua, also remained divisive at best.687

For its part, Cuba’s position was far from stable. With its capability of mobilizing

Cuban public support, the Cuban government defied intimidation by the superpower. A

series of Reagan’s anti-Cuban policies nonetheless disrupted Cuba’s scarce resources,

which could have been used to improve living standards. Along with the Falkland/

Malvinas War, the debt crisis, and the contra war, the democratization processes of Latin

American countries helped Cuba win broader sympathetic audiences in the Western

Hemisphere. To Havana’s disappointment, however, the Soviet Union was losing interest

in the region, including the defense of Cuba. At the end of 1982, Moscow conveyed to

Havana that the former was unable to protect the latter forever. Cuba would have to rely

687

The Canadians observed that Cuba was the only winner of the Falkland/ Malvinas War, as it helped

to break the isolation in Latin America. Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, July 15, 1982,

vol.18498, 20-Cuba-1-3, part 15, RG25, LAC. On Shultz’s struggles inside the Reagan administration,

see George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Scribner,

1993), esp. pp. 310-17. On Central America, see William M. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The

United States in Central America, 1977-1992 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998),

esp. chap. 8.

265

on itself in case of emergency.688

This thinking probably shaped Cuba’s response to the

U.S. invasion of Grenada in October 1983.

The U.S. invasion of Grenada marked a turning point in the Cold War in the

Caribbean. Since the late 1970s, the United States had worried about the radicalization of

Caribbean politics due to population growth, economic difficulties, and social frustration.

The 1979 Grenadian Revolution, led by Maurice Bishop’s New Jewel Movement, and its

alliance with the Cuban government alerted Washington to the danger of this leftward

trend. Washington tried to preempt another revolution by taking the lead in the Caribbean

Basin Initiative to strengthen security and economic assistance to neighboring countries.

While Bishop pursued the Cuban model and implemented drastic revolutionary

programs, the Reagan administration also implemented economic destabilization,

conducted military exercises, and made hostile remarks about Grenada. By 1983,

Grenada entered a crisis. As its economic and political order broke down, most of the

population became disillusioned with the revolution.689

In late October, Reagan ordered U.S. troops to invade this small island. According

to historian Michael Grow, the principal Reagan motivation was his fear of “another

Teheran.” With the presence of 800 U.S. citizens attending a medical school in Grenada,

he worried that a hostage crisis like the one in Iran in 1979 might have taken place and

provoked a tremendous political disaster. Reagan was also receiving requests for the

invasion by Grenada’s neighbors, including Jamaica, Barbados, St. Vincent’s, St. Lucia,

688

Gleijeses, Visions, pp. 216-18. See also, Memcon (Raúl Castro, Andropov), December 29, 1982,

WCDA; and Comments by Andropov, in Minutes of Politburo Discussion, May 31, 1983, WCDA.

689 Grow, U.S. Presidents, pp. 139-145.

266

Dominica, and Antigua. The leaders of these countries feared that revolutionary chaos

would spread beyond Grenada.690

The invasion was highly popular in the United States and these Caribbean

countries, although most of the rest of the world deplored the outright military takeover

of the island.691

By achieving a quick victory, the U.S. president secured an image among

the U.S. public as a powerful and effective leader and minimized the political impact of

the deaths of 262 U.S. troops in Lebanon a few days before. U.S. public approval ratings

for Reagan shot up. As the invasion reversed the leftward trend in the Caribbean,

moreover, U.S. concerns about another Cuba waned rapidly and Washington’s attention

moved to other regions and other issues. The July 1982 replacement of Haig by Shultz at

the top of the State Department must have reinforced this shift in priority. The perception

of Cuba as a direct national security threat to the United States markedly declined.692

But Cuba did not simply fade into the background. Cuba continued to be a key

player in Central America and Southern Africa, where conflicts persisted.693

No less

important was the U.S. preoccupation with Cuban migration. Indeed, the U.S. invasion of

Grenada brought to the forefront the issues of Mariel “excludables,” thousands of Mariel

690

According to Michael Grow, this speculation of “another Teheran” was “based entirely on

conjecture,” as none of the New Jewel Movement had such plans. Grow, U.S. Presidents, pp. 149-153.

Some suspect that the bombing in Lebanon might have tipped the balance for the intervention. But

Reagan’s diary appeared to indicate that the U.S. president made a decision prior to the bombing.

Reagan, Diaries Unabridged, vol. 1, p. 278.

691 The OAS and the UN General Assembly passed resolutions against the invasion. Franklin, Cuba,

pp. 194-96.

692 Grow, U.S. Presidents, p. 158; F. Phillip Hughes, interview transcript, pp. 55-56, FAOH. On the

shift from Haig to Shultz, see Skoug, United States, p. i.

693 For Africa, see Gleijeses, Visions.

267

Cubans whom U.S. authorities found it necessary to return to the island. The news that

the U.S. occupation forces captured 692 Cubans in Grenada as prisoners of war (POWs)

mobilized 189 U.S. senators and representatives. Together they demanded that Reagan

seize this “ideal opportunity” to send back Mariel “excludables” to Cuba along with the

POWs. To reinforce this point, the U.S. Senate even adopted an amendment to the debt-

ceiling bill trying to hold up repatriation of the POWs until Castro’s acceptance of Mariel

“excludables.”694

It was under such intense congressional pressure that Reagan directed

the JCS, the State Department, the Justice Department, the Pentagon, and the CIA to

explore a top-secret plan to mix the “excludables” and the POWs.

Declassified U.S. records show how seriously Washington contemplated this

exercise. According to a JCS working paper, which someone had to “DESTROY WHEN

NO LONGER NEEDED,” they envisioned the following steps: (1) The U.S. military

would force the Mariel detainees to move to U.S.-occupied Grenada, possibly by the use

of force; (2) the U.S. navy would lure the Cuban ship Vietnam Herocia in Trinidad and

Tobago to Grenada—possibly using deception—to make Castro (and the International

Committee of the Red Cross) believe that the U.S. government would repatriate the

Cuban POWs via this ship; (3) When the ship approached Grenada, specially trained U.S.

694

Bill McCollum, et. al. to Reagan, October 26, 1983, in folder “CO038 (180000-182499),”

WHORM, RRL. See also, Lawton Chiles to Reagan, October 26, 1983; and Chiles to Reagan, October

28, 1983, in the same folder.

268

teams would neutralize it, load the Mariel detainees, and head it toward Cuba, with or

without escort.695

This operation was politically costly, legally questionable, and problematic from a

humanitarian viewpoint. Under the 1949 Third Geneva Convention on POWs, all

countries must release and repatriate POWs immediately after the cessation of hostilities

without condition. A State Department legal adviser feared that the U.S. operation would

create a bad precedent for other nation-states to justify indefinite detention of U.S.

POWs.696

The operation would probably involve casualties if the Cubans resisted, and

might cost innocent lives. Washington also feared the possibility that Castro would

become aware of such clandestine maneuvers. If he stopped all repatriation, the JCS

thought, more unwelcome Cubans would remain in U.S. hands.697

Once again, the U.S.

government had to shelve this scheme. Within three weeks of the invasion, therefore,

Reagan sent back the POWs alone.

But Reagan could not give up the idea of returning Mariel detainees, who

remained in U.S. jails. At his insistence, Washington reviewed all the existing military

options and contemplated several new ones, such as the covert transfer of the detainees to

Cuba via Nicaragua. Yet, transferring them to another hostile regime would not only

arouse undesirable international sympathy, but also would help to cause another problem

695

Working Paper, “Cuban Detainee Repatriation,” n.d., attached to John A. Wickham, Jr. to Caspar

Weinberger, “Cuban Detainee Repatriation,” November 2, 1983, in folder “Cuba (11/5/1983),” box

29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. This story never appeared in media or any of secondary sources cited above.

696 James H. Michel to Lawrence Eagleburger, October 28, 1983, in folder “CO038 (180000-

182499),” WHORM, RRL.

697 Robert C. McFarlane to Reagan, “Mariel excludables,” November 5, 1983, in folder “Cuba

(11/5/1983),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL.

269

if the regime chose to do the same against pro-U.S. countries like Honduras. Because

Central America was too close to the United States, Washington also worried that many

of the deported might find a way back to the United States somehow. Another option was

returning them to Cuba through the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo. But the operation

would contradict the terms of the lease and jeopardize the legal status of the base.

Sending them back from the base to Cuban territory would not be easy. The JCS feared

that Cuba might respond by forcing more Cubans to flood into the base, requiring the

U.S. military “either to shoot innocent Cuban civilians or allow the base to be rendered

inoperative.”698

The JCS considered many more imaginative, yet even more bizarre options.

Without much surprise, however, they concluded that all these options were too risky, too

inhumane, or too questionable in terms of international and domestic laws.699

Finally,

national security adviser Robert McFarlane reported to Reagan the unpleasant news about

the infeasibility of military operations, as well as on the desirability of diplomacy.

Although negotiations with Castro would involve “the adverse consequences” on U.S.

relations with Cuba, McFarlane reported, the Grenada invasion “obviated such delicacy”

by making U.S.-Cuban relations bad enough to take new directions.700

Although the logic

of this reasoning may be puzzling, it was probably designed to warm Reagan to the idea

698

“Plan for Returning Mariel excludables to Cuba,” attached to Charles Hill to McFarlane, “Mariel

excludables,” November 25, 1983, in folder “Cuba (11/25/1983),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL.

699 Working Paper, “Cuban excludables,” n.d., attached to John A. Wickham, Jr. to Weinberger,

“Cuban excludables,” November 4, 1983, in folder “Cuba (11/5/1983),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL.

700 The Justice and State Departments concurred, yet the Defense Department and the CIA remained

skeptical of this approach. McFarlane to Reagan, “Mariel excludables,” November 5, 1983, in folder

“Cuba (11/5/1983),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL; and Weinberger to McFarlane, “Mariel excludables,”

n.d., in folder “Cuba (11/25/1983),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL.

270

of talking with Castro.701

Three weeks later George Shultz’s State Department came back

to the U.S. president seeking his approval of negotiations with Cuba.702

The Reagan administration had to act immediately. First, since the military

options were impractical, it had to assure the Congress that the U.S. president was

making real efforts to return the Mariel detainees. Second, Cuban Americans and their

congressional allies put forth a bill by Peter W. Rodino to resume immigrant visa

issuance for Cubans in Havana on behalf of ex-prisoners and their families. In May 1983,

the State Department suspended the visa issuance to use it as a bargaining chip for

making Havana agree on the return of the Mariel detainees. But supporters of the bill

argued that Washington was “penalizing the wrong people.”703

Driven by these “two

compelling domestic political reasons,” Shultz’s State Department sent a diplomatic note

to Havana to propose U.S.-Cuban talks on migration.704

For the first time, the note did

not ask Havana to accept the “undesirables” before opening the talks.705

701

Reagan to Shultz, Weinberger, and William French Smith, “Mariel excludables,” November 6,

1983, in folder “Cuba (11/25/1983),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL.

702 It is noteworthy that even at this moment the military options remained on the table in case that

Cuba reject the U.S. proposal or the negotiations prove unsatisfactory. Under such circumstances, the

report stated, the U.S. government would abandon the talks and publicly announce its intentions of

implementing the operation. The report set the D-Day after April 1984 and recommended that the

president consult with the Congress to satisfy the requirements of the War Power Resolution. “Plan for

Returning Mariel excludables to Cuba,” attached to Charles Hill to McFarlane, “Mariel excludables,”

November 25, 1983, in folder “Cuba (11/25/1983),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL.

703 U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and

International Law, Cuban/Haitian Adjustment, 98th Cong. 2nd sess., May 9, 1984, pp. 32-34, 37.

704 Tony Motley to Shultz, March 19, 1984; and Hill to McFarlane, March 19, 1984, both in folder

“Cuba (7/16/1984-7/23/1984), box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL.

705 Informe sobre el diferendo Cuba-EE.UU. sobre cuestiones migratorias, attached to José Viera to

Isidoro Malmierca, p.6, June 21, 1984, MINREX. On May 2, 1984, Washington sent another

diplomatic note to request a Cuba’s response to the U.S. note of March 20.

271

Breaking Deadlock?

At first glance it remained uncertain whether Cuba would agree to the U.S.

proposal. In the immediate aftermath of the Grenada invasion, Fidel Castro presented a

list of “nineteen lies” about Reagan’s statement justifying the Grenada invasion and

comparing the U.S. president with Adolf Hitler for his use of “lies” in misleading the

public.706

Castro did not stop attacking Reagan for a while. In his speech on February 24,

1984, the Cuban leader denounced the invasion as a “monstrous crime” and stressed that

all the Cubans would fight until the last one died should the United States invade Cuba.707

Years later in his talk with Soviet foreign minister Eduardo Shevardnadze, Castro

recalled that Cuba had reinforced the defenses of Cuba and Nicaragua. “After [the

invasion of] Grenada, the Nicaraguans fortified themselves militarily a lot,” he said. “We

sent more advisers, prepared more people, and assisted in coordination with the Soviets

in sending more arms.”708

There was always a gap between rhetoric and practices, however. On receipt of

the U.S. diplomatic notes, Cuba appreciated the U.S. disposition to initiate talks on

migration problems, although it agreed on the dates only after the U.S. presidential

election. Cuba’s note of May 22, 1984, pointed at the hostile and threatening speeches

against Cuba by Reagan and other U.S. officials, as well as the recent military exercises

706

Castro claimed that Reagan lied about Cuba’s responsibilities for disorder in Grenada, the threats to

the lives of U.S. students there, and the nature of Cuba’s assistance to the Grenadian revolutionary

regime. Fidel Castro’s address, November 14, 1983, printed in Bohemia, November 18, 1983, pp. 50-

56.

707 Speech by Fidel Castro, February 24, 1984, in Bohemia, March 2, 1984, pp. 50-59. See also,

speech by Fidel Castro, January 1, 1984, in Bohemia, January 6, 1984, pp. 50-55.

708 Memcon (Fidel Castro, Shevardnadze), October 28, 1985, p. 14, WCDA.

272

near Cuban waters. These actions, the note claimed, did not reflect a U.S. willingness to

talk “with equality and mutual respect.” This answer was unsatisfactory for the U.S.

government, which wanted to solve migration problems as soon as possible.709

Two weeks later, however, the dynamics of U.S.-Cuban diplomacy seemed to

change, as Reverend Jesse Jackson met Castro in Havana. Jackson claimed that the

Rainbow Coalition, his U.S.-born social justice movement, had to go beyond the United

States, and presented a “greater dialogue” for peace as an alternative to Reagan’s policy

in Central America.710

To this end he advocated normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations,

visited Central American countries, and exchanged opinions with the Cuban leader, who

announced the release of twenty-two U.S. prisoners and twenty-six Cuban prisoners as a

good-will gesture.711

At a press conference in Havana, Jackson claimed that he had

persuaded Castro to agree on the resolution of migration problems as a starting point for

the dialogue.712

On June 6, Cuba sent a diplomatic note to confirm that Jackson’s visit

created “the adequate condition for the start of the discussion.”713

On July 12 and 13, the

U.S.-Cuban talks on migration started in New York.

709

Diplomatic note, May 22, 1984, MINREX. See also, Hill to McFarlane, “Cuba Rejects Talks on

Mariel excludables,” May 24, 1984, in folder “Cuba (4/27/1984-6/26/1984),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF,

RRL.

710 “Mission for Peace in Central America: The Reasons for Our Visit,” in folder “Cuba-US

(11/29/1983-8/15/1984),” box 90507, Latin American Affairs Directorate, NSC (hereafter NSC-

LAAD), RRL.

711 Hill to McFarlane, “Release of Political Prisoners by Cuba in Response to Request of Reverend

Jesse Jackson,” June 17, 1984, in folder “Cuba (6/27/1984-7/14/1984),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL.

712 Press Conference, June 26, 1984, in Bohemia, July 6, 1984, pp. 53-57.

713 Diplomatic note, July 6, 1984, MINREX.

273

It is difficult to determine if Jackson’s visit was the determinative factor that

broke the deadlock. Certainly, the Cuban leader did not want to help Reagan’s reelection

to the disadvantage of the Democratic Party’s candidates like Jackson and Walter

Mondale. This reasoning explains why he obtained Mondale’s concurrence prior to the

opening of the talks.714

Also, part of Cuba’s motivation would have been to engage the

United States in dialogue with Cuba and complicate a U.S. posture toward Cuba after

Reagan’s reelection.715

The Cubans built underground shelters, rejuvenated the senior

military ranks, and prepared for massive military mobilization, testing a defense

strategy.716

In his talks with the Canadian ambassador in September 1984, Cuban Vice

President Carlos Rafael Rodríguez explained that Cuba could not afford to be idle when a

reelected Reagan might exploit his relatively greater freedom of maneuver to attack

Cuba.717

Thus, the opening of the talks might have been an attempt to deter possible U.S.

aggression against Cuba.718

714

Fidel Castro’s announcement, December 14, 1984, printed in Bohemia, December 21, 1984, p. 39.

715 Skoug, United States, p. 70.

716 Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, August 13, 1984, vol. 24967, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 8,

RG25, LAC.

717 Days later José Viera and Isidro Malmierca talked with Candian diplomats and presented similar

views on the danger of reelected Reagan to Cuba. This information was for Canadian Eyes Only.

Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, September 20, 1984, vol. 24967, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 8,

RG25, LAC. See also, Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, October 24, 1984; and Canadian

embassy in Havana to Ottawa, September 24, 1984, both in the same folder.

718 Cuba also actively received nongovernmental U.S.-based organizations such as the League of

United Latin American Citizens. Interestingly, Washington received a report from General Noriega in

Panama on his meeting with Castro on July 5, 1984. Castro reportedly told Noriega that Reagan would

win the 1984 election and it would be better for Cuba to improve relations with the United States

before the election, rather than risking a further deterioration after the election. Oliver L. North and

Raymond F. Burghardt to McFarlane, “Mariel excludables,” July 23, 1984, in folder “Cuba

(7/16/1984-7/23/1984),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL.

274

Finally, an attribution of the opening of the migration talks to Jackson’s visit

alone might overlook another Cuban motivation. As reported by Mexican and Canadian

diplomats, Havana’s agreement for the talks also drew from its desire to reduce social

discontent at home. Plagued by low labor morale, inefficient governance, the decline of

sugar prices, and the U.S. embargo, Cuba’s economic woes appeared to reach no end.

Much like the Mariel boatlift a few years earlier, they reported, Cuban youth grew

dissatisfied with their lives.719

As in the case of the massive visit of Cuban Americans in

1979, moreover, the consumer behavior of thousands of foreign tourists from capitalist

countries like Mexico and Canada also had an unavoidable impact on the mindset of the

Cuban population.720

In his talk with the Canadians, Alfredo García Almeida, an official

of the central committee of Cuba’s Communist Party, frankly admitted that the lack of

emigration was causing a “serious local problem.”721

The Cuban desire to initiate

migration talks was not as strong as the U.S.’s. But the solution of the migration

problems met the interests of Havana and Washington.

Washington Talks with Havana, July 1984

According to a guidance paper written by the State Department, the most

important U.S. aim at the migration talks was to make Cuba accept Mariel “excludables.”

719

Mexican embassy in Havana to Mexico City, August 29, 1984, August 31, 1984, and November 13,

1984, all in III-3793-1, AHGE.

720 Mexican embassy in Havana to Mexico City, September 3, 1984, III-3793-1, AHGE. For the 1979

visit, see Chapter Six.

721 Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, April 17, 1984, vol. 24967, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 8,

RG25, LAC.

275

If Cuba agreed, the U.S. government would take three actions; it would resume normal

preference immigrant visa issuances of up to 20,000 per year, process refugee admissions

for counterrevolutionary prisoners in Cuba to the United States within existing limits, and

consider enlarging the number of refugee admissions from Cuba in later years.722

Due to

its anti-Cuban posture, Washington also wanted to limit the discussion strictly to

migration issues. When Havana chose vice foreign minister Ricardo Alarcón to lead the

Cuban delegation, the State Department wondered if this choice of a high-ranking official

indicated Cuba’s effort to introduce broader political issues. To preempt this move, the

State Department assigned Michael G. Kozak, its lower-ranking deputy legal adviser, to

lead the U.S. delegation.723

Whereas Washington prioritized discussion on the exclusion issue, Havana

considered it only in the context of all aspects of migration. In his opening remark,

Alarcón displayed Havana’s willingness to normalize U.S.-Cuban migration. “By

establishing a normal situation,” he said, the two countries “will eliminate the causes that

provoked the situation of Mariel and will also remove the dramatic baggage that

accompanied this problem.” Alarcón explained that Havana wanted to establish the

mechanism for family reunification and resolve the issue of ex-prisoners and their

families who wanted to leave for the United States. The Cuban government would

722

State Department Scope Paper, “Guidance to US Delegation for Possible Discussions with the

Government of Cuba Concerning Migration Issues,” and “Executive Summary,” n.d., in folder “Cuba

(3/19/1984-4/18/1984),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. The NSC agreed to use this paper as the

framework for the negotiations with Cuba. Oliver L. North and Raymond F. Burghardt to McFarlane,

“Mariel excludables,” July 23, 1984, in folder “Cuba (7/16/1984-7/23/1984),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF,

RRL.

723 The maximum number of 20,000 was established by the 1965 U.S. immigration law. Hill to

McFarlane, July 10, 1984, in folder “Cuba (6/27/84-7/14/84),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL.

276

consider the U.S. plea for accepting Mariel “excludables,” although it believed that Cuba

had no obligation to receive those who had committed crimes after arriving in the United

States.724

In the first round of the talks on July 12-13, 1984, the two delegations tried to

maximize the number of Cubans whom they wanted to send from their countries. The

U.S. delegation presented a new list of 2,647 “excludables,” including the seventy-eight

people with mental disorders, and stated that the final number might reach five thousand.

Although the Cuban delegation eventually accepted the new list, it protested that the

recent increase in the number of criminals and people with mental disorders—between

May 1983 and February 1984—indicated that they became problems only after they

reached the United States. Furthermore, each time the U.S. delegation requested

Havana’s guarantee of accepting these individuals, the Cuban delegation stressed that the

exclusion problem was not a precondition but a part of the package of the migration

agreement. In the face of Cuba’s claims, the U.S. delegation ultimately conceded on this

point.725

For its part, the Cuban delegation demanded that the U.S. government receive as

many ex-prisoners and their families as possible from the island. At one point, the

724

Palabras iniciales del Ricardo Alarcón, July 12, 1984, MINREX.

725 “Sintesis de las Conversaciones entre Cuba y Estados Unidos sobre Materia Migratoria,” July 16,

1984, MINREX. See also, Comentarios finales de la mañana del primer día de conversaciones por

Ricardo Alarcón, July 12, 1984, MINREX; and Memcon (Alarcón, Kozak), July 13, 1984, (part 2),

MINREX. Since all the returnees had to go through exclusion hearings and possibly appeal process,

the U.S. government could not determine the final number of returnees. Regarding those who were in

state and local prisons, moreover, the Justice Department worried that the simple inquiry for state and

local authorities about the names of those who had committed crimes in the United States would

trigger unrest in the Cuban community.

277

Cubans noted that approximately 15,000 had solicited special admissions into the United

States prior to the Mariel boatlift, and additional 15,000 Cubans would likely join this

group once the door was open. The total number of 30,000 surprised the U.S. delegation,

which contemplated 1,000 as the annual quota for Cuban refugee admissions. Referring

to the 1965 immigration laws and the 1980 Refugee Act, Kozak explained that its

increase required the administration’s consultation with the Congress, which he promised

to do. Kozak added that because the number of immediate family members of U.S.

citizens to enter the United States was limitless, the total annual number of Cubans who

would enter the United States might be larger. This answer apparently satisfied Alarcón,

who expressed some understanding for the complex nature of U.S. legal system.726

At the end of this first round of the talks, both Washington and Havana seemed

content with the progress. The State Department cheerfully reported that by confining the

talks to migration issues alone, it was able to mitigate the political impact.727

But the

Cuban foreign ministry saw this point very differently. “The most important result,” its

analysis paper stated, “is that we have obliged the United States to accept that the

migration accord has to be integral and simultaneous with all the aspects of migration

problems.” Since the agreement would have “the character of the ‘package,’” the Reagan

administration “needs to negotiate with the Congress, which guarantees a bipartisan

compromise and amplifies the significance of the accord between the two countries.” The

726

Kozak also added that those who came as refugees could be permanent residents, who could then

request family reunification. Memcon (Alarcón, Kozak), July 13, 1984, (part 1), pp. 3-4, 6, 15,

MINREX.

727 Hill to McFarlane, July 14, 1984, in folder “Cuba (6/27/84-7/14/84),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL.

This report on the U.S.-Cuban talks is more concise than Cuba’s counterparts, but largely confirms the

above-mentioned analysis.

278

paper also noted that if “excludables” were transferred in groups, “the period of

implementation of this agreement…will be necessarily prolonged,” probably for “several

years.” The upshot was that “all this will multiply the political meaning of the

process.”728

The first round of the talks was “a positive beginning” for Havana precisely

because of the political implications of the very existence of the talks for U.S.-Cuban

relations.729

Toward the Migration Agreement of 1984

The second round of U.S.-Cuban talks took place from July 31 to August 2. Apart

from the details of the legal and administrative matters, the focal points of the talks were

the number of returnees, the time span of the exclusion process, and the number of

admissions for counterrevolutionary prisoners. The U.S. delegation attempted to make

Cuba accept at least 2,647 persons on the list within a year, and send more of those

Mariel Cubans determined excludable at a later time. For its part, the Cuban delegation

refused the initially requested number of five thousand for Mariel detainees returning to

Cuba, but indicated its willingness to receive up to two thousand. The Cuban delegation

also insisted that the time span for the process be over five years due to the necessity of

the successful reintegration of these individuals into Cuban society.730

Owing to these

728

“Sintesis de las Conversaciones entre Cuba y Estados Unidos sobre Materia Migratoria,” July 16,

1984, MINREX.

729 Alarcón’s letter to Kozak (translated in English), July 18, 1984; and Hill to McFarlane, July 20,

1984, in folder “Cuba (7/16/1984-7/23/1984),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL.

730 According to a Cuban document, Alarcón told Kozak and Skoug that the number of 5,000 returnees

was “unacceptable” to Cuba. Thereafter the U.S. delegation stuck to the number of 2,647, although it

continued to speak of the likelihood of the increase of the number at later points. “Sintesis de las

279

remaining disagreements, the two delegations agreed to hold another round of talks

around September.

Yet, the overall atmosphere of the talks was “cordial and more relaxed” than the

previous ones.731

The U.S. and Cuban delegations came closer to compromise on the

number of refugee admissions. Whereas the U.S. government increased the annual

number of refugee admissions in FY 85 from 1,000 to 3,000 (plus 700 unused slots for

FY 84 if agreed by September 30) leaving behind the decision for later years, the Cuban

government lowered its requested annual number from 7,000 to 5,000.732

The U.S. and

Cuban delegations also tried to be cooperative on practical matters of the exclusion

process. Whereas the Cuban delegation requested that it conduct a case-by-case review of

all individuals, the U.S. delegation agreed to provide additional personal information. To

Washington’s delight, the Cuban delegation agreed to conduct the review prior to the

final agreement and to accept unconditionally those who passed the review.733

Furthermore, although the second round of talks did not solve the time-span

problem, the U.S.-Cuban disagreements were to disappear soon. By this time, the U.S.

delegation gained the impression that Havana feared “that once the ‘excludables’ are

Conversaciones,” August 2, 1984, MINREX. For Cuba’s position, see also Alarcón’s letter to Kozak

(translated in English), July 18, 1984; and Hill to McFarlane, July 20, 1984, in folder “Cuba

(7/16/1984-7/23/1984),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. For a U.S.’s position, see also Hill to McFarlane,

July 27, 1984, in folder “Cuba (7/27/1984-8/23/1984),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL.

731 “Sintesis de las Conversaciones,” August 2, 1984, MINREX. The Cuban delegation also favorably

commented on the U.S. attitudes, referring to Kozak’s statement that both Reagan and Shultz were

directly informed of the process of the talks. The State Department used similar phrase—“businesslike

and free of polemics”—to describe the same talks. Hill to McFarlane, August 4, 1984, in folder “Cuba

(7/27/1984-8/23/1984),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 732

“Sintesis de las Conversaciones,” August 2, 1984, MINREX.

733 Hill to McFarlane, August 4, 1984.

280

returned, the United States will cease to honor its own commitments.” But after the

second round of talks, the State Department completely dropped its insistence on the

immediate return of all Mariel detainees—to the effect of eliminating such perceived

concerns—simply because it realized that the exclusion process would likely take several

years owing to complicated U.S. legal procedures for exclusion.734

The U.S.-Cuban talks proceeded so smoothly that they avoided being paralyzed

indefinitely by a politically sensitive incident such as the U.S. overflights of a SR-71

aircraft over Havana on August 11, 1984. The Cuban government expressed “profound

indignation,” demanded a U.S. explanation, and conveyed Castro’s message that “the

future course of the U.S.-Cuban talks …will depend on the U.S. response to the Cuban

protest.”735

Washington refused to acknowledge or deny the overflights, blamed Cuba’s

“interventionism” for all necessary U.S. steps, and disregarded the linkage between

migration and other bilateral matters.736

In late October, however, whereas Havana

reaffirmed its interest in the resumption of the talks, Washington assured it that the U.S.

actions were “no in way intended to humiliate Cuba or to affect its stand in the

734

Ibid. For the procedure, see note 724.

735 USINT in Havana to Washington (with Cuba’s protest note translated in English), August 15, 1984,

and USINT in Havana to Washington, August 23, 1984, both in folder “Cuba (9/5/1984-9/17/1984),”

box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL.

736 Hill to McFarlane, August 31, 1984; and Kimmitt to Hill, September 7, 1984, in folder “Cuba

(9/5/1984-9/17/1984),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL.

281

negotiating process.”737

The two countries agreed to hold a third round of talks in New

York in late November.738

According to U.S. documents, the third-round talks went through many debates,

demands, and concessions before reaching an agreement. Most important for

Washington, Cuba examined all individual cases and agreed to readmit some 2,000

Mariel detainees. In return, the U.S. delegation would resume the processing of

immigrant visas for up to 20,000 per year, although it resisted Cuba’s attempt to set a

minimal number at 15,000 per year. The U.S. delegation also deflected Cuba’s effort to

increase the number of refugee admissions for ex-political prisoners and their families. It

set 3,000 as the quota of FY 1985. A major U.S. concession was on the time range of the

return process. The U.S. delegation compromised with Cuba’s request for five years, and

settled on a 28-29 month period starting thirty days after the signing of the agreement. It

also agreed that the returns would be at the normal rate of 100 per month, and if the level

was not achieved, the remaining number could be used in subsequent months, provided

that the number would not reach 150 per month.739

Despite “considerable and repeated” U.S. efforts, however, Cuba rejected any

explicit promise of “no more Mariels”—a pledge that it would never allow massive

migration crises to occur in the future. Whenever the U.S. made this request, the Cuban

737

Burghardt to McFarlane, October 24, 1984, in folder “Cuba (10/2/1984-10/18/1984),” box 30,

NSC-ES-CF, RRL.

738 Hill to McFarlane, November 1, 1984, in folder “Cuba (11/1/1984-11/27/1984),” box 30, NSC-ES-

CF, RRL. See also, a Cuba’s diplomatic note, October 29, 1984, MINREX.

739 Hill to McFarlane, “Draft Agreement Reached with Cuban Delegation on Mariel Issues,”

December 7, 1984, (attached with Communique and Minute of Implementation) in folder “Cuba

(12/7/1984-1/16/1985),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL.

282

delegation demanded a U.S. commitment to stem illegal immigration from the island,

something that the U.S. delegation could not accept apparently due to its “traditional

policy of giving refuge to Cubans who escape from the island.” Neither could the U.S.

delegation obtain a Cuban assurance to accept future Mariel “excludables,” those whom

the U.S. government might judge “excludable” after the conclusion of the agreement.740

The lack of language of “no more Mariels” and of Cuban commitment to the acceptance

of future “excludables” in a draft agreement was disturbing enough for the INS and the

Justice Department to oppose it. Nevertheless, the State Department, the NSC staff, and

Reagan himself concluded that an imperfect agreement was still better than no

agreement. Before the final round of the talks in December, the U.S. president authorized

the conclusion of the agreement even if such language did not exist.741

Finally, on December 14, 1984, the White House announced the U.S.-Cuban

agreement on migration. Cuba would take back 2,746 Mariel detainees, and might accept

more whom the U.S. government later would find “excludable.” The U.S. government

would send 100 individuals each month. In return, the United States would also receive

as many as 20,000 Cubans each year, although it provided additional number of visas to

3,000 political prisoners and their families in 1985 alone. By offering the same annual

740

The State Department concluded that Washington would be in a stronger position to implement any

unilateral measures, such as the suspension of immigrant visa processing, if Cuba refused them again.

Ibid.

741 Hill to McFarlane, December 7, 1984; McFarlane to Reagan, December 11, 1984; and Kimmitt to

Hill, December 11, 1984, all in folder “Cuba (12/7/1984-1/16/1985),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. For

INS and Justice Department’s insistence on “no more Mariel,” see Handwritten note by McFarlane on

Burghardt to McFarlane, November 7, 1984, in folder “Cuba (11/1/1984-11/27/1984),” box 30, NSC-

ES-CF, RRL. This topic came up briefly at a first round of the talks only to face an impasse. Memcon

(Alarcón, Kozak), July 13, 1984, (part 2), p. 6, MINREX.

283

number for those from the other countries, Washington not only treated Cuba as an

ordinary country but also viewed Cubans leaving the island more as economically-

motivated “immigrants” than politically-motivated “refugees.” U.S. and Cuban

representatives would meet each six months to analyze the implementation of the accord.

With the agreement in hand, the Reagan administration also decided to allow the rest of

Cuban “entrants” to adjust their status through the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act, opening

the gate for them to become U.S. permanent residents.

On the same day in Havana, Fidel Castro addressed the nation, underscoring the

historical importance of the agreement. U.S.-Cuban migration problems had existed for

more than a quarter of a century, during which the United States had accepted terrorists

and criminals as “heroes” and had used Cuban emigration—particularly the illegal

departure of Cubans—as a “political weapon.” Things had changed, however. First, the

Reagan administration took measures against terrorists. Second, the United States lost

interest in provoking illegal departure of Cubans. Third, Cuba continued to cooperate on

hijacking issues by jailing those who were responsible. The Cuban leader pointed out

these changes as something that facilitated the U.S.-Cuban agreement. Furthermore, he

complimented both the U.S. and Cuban attitudes of solving problems of mutual concern

and expressed his wishes for the positive repercussions of the agreement across the

world:

There will be conversations with Contadora in Central America, conversations

between the revolutionary forces and the Salvadoran government, conversations

284

between the United States and Nicaragua at Manzanillo. Soon in January extremely

important conversations between the foreign minister of USSR and the United

States, Gromyko and Shultz, about questions of transcendent importance will begin

in Geneva. Conversations about problems of South Africa will take place, and

conversations about diverse themes regarding peace and world economy will start

in other parts of the world. I wish that the same spirit that had presided over these

conversations will preside over the other conversations in the coming weeks and

months…and I wish that they reach rational results! This is possible, I repeat, when

we discuss without arrogance, with seriousness, with responsibility, and with

willingness to find solutions.742

If the Cuban leader believed in what he said that day, his expectation was to be betrayed

by the start of Radio Martí.

The Delay of Radio Martí’s Startup

The U.S.-Cuban migration agreement disturbed the Cuban American community

in Miami. If Reagan delighted anti-Castro Cubans by invading Grenada as if it were a

prelude to another invasion of Cuba, the start of the U.S.-Cuban talks contradicted their

expectation about what would come next. Miami Spanish local radio stations even

received dozens of calls from those who were upset that Reagan negotiated with

742

Fidel Castro’s announcement, December 14, 1984, printed in Bohemia, December 21, 1984, pp. 38-

43 (for quotes, see esp. pp. 41-43).

285

Castro.743

For them, the Reagan administration repeatedly declared that the U.S.-Cuban

talks were not “the beginning of a new deal with Castro” nor “departure from firm [U.S.]

policy toward Cuba.”744

Yet, the choice of the White House as announcer of the

agreement apparently boosted popular expectation for the next. The State Department’s

Cuban desk officer Kenneth Skoug expressed frustration when the Miami Herald placed

“a total misrepresentation” of his speech to indicate Washington’s willingness to broaden

U.S.-Cuban talks.745

The fruits of the migration talks also disturbed many Miami Cubans. On February

21, 1985, the first group of Mariel detainees returned to Cuba, underscoring the symbolic

importance of migration normalization.746

One Miami Herald article reported that some

Mariel Cubans with mental disorders dropped out of mental-health institutions for fear of

deportation, while quoting local officials’ worries about a “surge of crime.” Added to the

confusion was the rumor that Mariel Cubans might be deported without serious

inspection. The INS posited that any Mariel Cubans who had committed crime were

excludable. Yet, as the INS did not release the list of 2,746 names nor specify the types of

crimes that would result in exclusion, it was suspected that U.S. immigration authorities

were returning persons guilty of only petty crimes or no offenses except for illegal

743

MH, July 14, 1984, p. 11A.

744 Hill to McFarlane, December 12, 1984; Taking Points for use with Congressional and Cuban

Community Leaders; and Walter Raymond, Jr., to Kimmitt, December 13, 1984, all in folder “Cuba

(11/1/1984-11/27/1984),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. See also, Skoug and McFarlane, quoted in MH,

July 26, 1984, p. 1A and MH, December 18, 1984, p. 19A.

745 Skoug to Ferch, December 29, 1984, DOS-FOIA. The article he referred to was: Alfonso Chardy,

“U.S. Aide: We’d Talk to Cuba on Two Issues,” MH, December 19, 1984, p. 14A.

746 A month later, Ricardo Alarcón met John Ferch to review the implementation of the migration

agreement. Joaquín Mas to Malmierca, n.d. (ca. March 29, 1985), MINREX.

286

entry.747

The degree of such anxiety was too strong to ignore for Cuban American

organizations like CANF.748

The suspicion of “another betrayal” by Washington circulated also because

Reagan had not yet started Radio Martí. The U.S. Congress had passed the legislation in

October 1983, and the White House undertook preparatory works in the hope of starting

radio broadcasting in the spring of 1984.749

To this end, Reagan quickly appointed Jorge

Mas Canosa to be chair of the Presidential Advisory Board for Radio Martí, an important

organization overseeing the entire process of broadcasting. The selection of other

personnel took more time, however. When the U.S. government recruited Spanish-

English bilinguals who possessed good knowledge of Cuba, most of these people turned

out to be naturalized U.S. citizens of Cuban origin. As foreign-born nationals, they all

had to go through lengthy and extensive security clearances.750

Yet, a more important reason for the delay was Washington’s fear of a radio war

with Havana. From the very beginning, Castro vigorously attacked Washington’s plan to

set up Radio Martí. “One can’t think of a more vulgar and brutal way of intervention in

the domestic affairs of another country,” he declared in a speech on October 24, 1981.

While condemning the use of José Martí, the name of Cuba’s independence hero, Castro

747

Skoug to Michel, “Mental Patients Fear Deportation to Cuba,” March 20, 1985, DOS-FOIA. See

also, Skoug to Michel, “Alleged Return of ‘Minor Criminals’ to Cuba,” March 20, 1985, DOS-FOIA.

748 Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, February 20, 1985, box 1.04, CANF archive.

749 John Lenczowski to McFarlane, “Contingency Plans for Cuba Reprisals,” January 16, 1984, in

folder “Cuba (11/28/1983-1/20/1984),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL.

750 Skoug, interview transcript, p. 143, FAOH; and Charles Wick to McFarlane, “Update on the

Progress of Putting the Radio Marti Program on the Air,” July 30, 1984, in folder “Radio Marti

(7/21/1984-10/3/1984),” box 8, Walter Raymond Files, RRL.

287

implied a countermeasure of his own. “Let them not forget that we are not in Europe or

Asia, that we are here, very near the U.S. coasts and our radio waves can also reach

them.” He added, “We shall see who can resist the most; we shall see who, we or they,

are the strongest morally and politically.”751

Castro was very serious about this matter, according to the memoir of the Soviet

ambassador in Havana. By the time of this speech, the Cuban leader already had

requested that the Soviet Union send equipment for five 500-kilowatt radio stations

within a year. When the Soviet ambassador conveyed Moscow’s denial of this demand on

the basis of technical problems, Castro’s frustration exploded. “The Americans suffocate

us with propaganda,” he exclaimed, “and we cannot shoot back!” Finally in July 1982, at

Havana’s insistence, Moscow decided to help Cuba construct two medium wave radio

stations with capacity of 1,000 kilowatts during the period of 1984-1986.752

The report of

Cuba’s preparation eventually reached the White House, which noted that Castro spent

$40 million developing jamming capabilities of U.S. commercial radio stations as far as

the Mid-West.753

Cuba’s preparation had the effect of dividing Washington and Miami into two

teams with differing priorities. U.S. diplomats tried to solve this matter in talks with

Cuban officials without abandoning Radio Martí. Through the mediation of the

International Telecommunication Union, the U.S. and Cuban delegations met in San José,

751

Speech by Fidel Castro, October 24, 1981, LANIC.

752 Vorotnikov, Gavana—Моskva, pp. 263-65, 267.

753 McFarlane to Reagan, n.d., in folder “NSPG 0107 (2) [Radio Martí],” box 91307, Executive

Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (hereafter NSC-ES-NSPG), RRL.

288

Costa Rica, to discuss radio interference in August 1983. Although they agreed to

schedule the next meeting in Havana in December, the enactment of the Radio Martí bill

by the U.S. Senate prompted Havana to suspend it.754

Unable to persuade the Cuban

government to accept the radio broadcasting, Washington took Castro’s October 1981

warning seriously and feared that Havana might jam U.S. commercial radio programs in

response to the startup. The U.S. government spent several months trying in vain to

explore both preventive and contingency actions.755

Unaware of these machinations, Miami Cubans and their allies in the U.S.

Congress mounted growing pressure on the Reagan administration for the immediate

startup of Radio Martí. The leading advocate was Florida Senator Paula Hawkins, who

incessantly lobbied Reagan to ask for personal intervention in order to “keep our word

with the Cuban Americans…and the freedom loving people in the world.”756

When she

and another Florida senator, Lawton Chiles, spoke to U.S. Information Agency director

Charles Wick, their plea could not have been blunter. “They said,” Wick recalled, “This

is important to us. [We] had a big Cuban population…Cuban-American [in the state of

754

Informe sobre el Estado Actual de las Conversaciones Cuba-USA para resolver las

incompatibilidades entre las Radioemisoras de Ondas Medias, attached to René Hernández Cartaya to

Joaquín Más, January 8, 1985, Caja “Agresión Comunicaciones 28,” MINREX.

755 Hill to McFarlane, “Radio Martí: Political/ Diplomatic Action Plan,” April 11, 1984, in folder

“8490463,” Executive Secretariat, NSC: System Files (hereafter NSC-ES-SF), RRL; and Minutes,

“NSPG Meeting,” December 14, 1984, in folder “NSPG 0107,” box 91307, NSC-ES-NSPG, RRL.

756 Hawkins to Reagan, December 12, 1984, in folder “Radio Martí (3/9/1985-3/31/1985),” box 8,

Walter Raymond Files, RRL.

289

Florida].”757

Elected in 1980 with the aid of Carter’s unpopular handling of the Mariel

boatlift, Hawkins was facing a tough reelection in 1986.

It was against this background that Reagan presided over a December 14, 1984,

National Security Planning Group (NSPG) meeting, which he found “most

unsatisfactory.” Referring to lobbying by Miami Cubans and Hawkins, Wick advocated

the startup on January 28, 1985. Yet, CIA Director William Casey commented that

Cuba’s jamming and counter-broadcasting capabilities grew rapidly with the assistance of

the Soviet bloc. The United States was not ready for such a radio war, the State

Department continued. If a radio war lasted for more than a week, a five-million-dollar

compensation fund would be inadequate to cover losses for U.S. broadcasters, leading the

U.S. government to back down and face a “very costly defeat.” 758 A humiliation of this

kind was unacceptable. “If we retreat we lose face which can hurt us in all of Latin

[America],” Reagan wrote in his diary. “What to do? Right now I don’t know.”759

Weeks

later Reagan hesitantly approved the delay for another four months and ordered the

Pentagon to develop a $60 million retaliatory capability against a possible Cuban

reprisal.760

757

Wick, interview transcript, pp. 38-39, Presidential Oral History, University of Virginia’s Miller

Center (hereafter UV-MC).

758 Minutes, NSPG Meeting, “Radio Martí,” December 14, 1984, in folder “NSPG 0107 (1) [Radio

Martí],” box 91307, NSC-ES-NSPG, RRL.

759 Reagan, Diaries Unabridged, vol. 1, pp. 407-8 (December 14, 1984).

760 Reagan, Diaries Unabridged, vol. 1, pp. 416 (January 16, 1985); McFarlane to NSPG principals,

January 17, 1985, in folder “NSPG 0103 (1) [Radio Martí],” box 91307, NSC-ES-NSPG, RRL; and

McFarlane to NSPG principals, May 16, 1985, in folder “NSPG 0107 (1) [Radio Martí],” box 91307,

NSC-ES-NSPG, RRL.

290

Jorge Mas Canosa, the White House, and Radio Martí

For Jorge Mas Canosa’s CANF and its allies, another delay of Radio Martí was

alarming, especially because it coincided with a ground-breaking turn in international

events. In January 1985, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign

Minister Andrei Gromyko met in Geneva to explore a relaxation of Cold War tensions

across the world. Although the future course of the superpower relations remained

unforeseen, the kickoff of a U.S.-Soviet rapprochement amplified the anxiety of

counterrevolutionary Cubans in Miami. Shortly thereafter, Mas Canosa and CANF

directors met Vice President George H. W. Bush to express their worries that the Reagan

administration might have been using Radio Martí as a “bargaining chip” in the migration

negotiations with Cuba and in the Geneva talks with the Soviet Union. Bush assured

them that such was not the case.761

Mas Canosa was not the type of a man who would leave a meeting empty-handed,

however. His CANF proposed a trade-off; if there was no radio broadcasting on January

28, 1985, Reagan should make a presidential statement celebrating the 132nd anniversary

of the birth of José Martí. With the support of Bush and NSC officials, Reagan did not

oppose this seemingly harmless proposal. “Today we are proud to honor his [José

Martí’s] numerous accomplishments on behalf of his fellow Cubans,” Reagan said in his

radio address to Miami and Havana. The speech had little noteworthy content. Yet, by

761

Bush, Handwritten note on Don Gregg and Philip Hughes to Bush, “Meeting with Directors of the

Cuban-American National Foundation, January 16, 1985,” January 15, 1985; Philip Hughes to Bush,

January 18, 1985, both in folder “Cuba (Safe 3) 3/27/1985-5/23/1985,” box 90510, NSC-LAAD,

RRL; Jacqueline Tillman to McFarlane, “Cuban-American Agenda,” January 16, 1985, in folder

“Cuba (12/7/1984-1/16/1985),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL.

291

making the U.S. president declare his support for “an independent Cuba” and pledge that

Radio Martí would start “in the near future,” CANF managed to build the U.S.

president’s personal commitment to its counterrevolutionary cause in Cuba.762

Still, the presidential statement did not end the politics over Radio Martí. Paula

Hawkins, the Florida Senator facing a tough reelection fight, resented the delay and

refused to receive the State and Defense Departments’ briefing teams denying the rumor

that the administration had used Radio Martí as a bargaining chip.763

Two months later,

the U.S. president found Hawkins “still complaining about Radio Martí” and even using

her vote on the MX intercontinental missile—the centerpiece of Reagan’s nuclear

policy—to persuade him to start the radio broadcasting.764

Trying to defuse political

pressure from the Cuban American community, National Security Advisor Robert

McFarlane sought to enlist the support of Mas Canosa.765

Yet when McFarlane revealed

that Radio Martí could not start because of the administration’s concern about Cuba’s

jamming, Mas Canosa went into an uproar. After meeting with Secretary Shultz, Mas

Canosa started to speculate that both McFarlane and Shultz were looking for ways to

762

CANF apparently provided the text of the statement to the administration. Reagan, Statement on

the 132nd Anniversary of the Birth of José Martí, January 28, 1985, APP.

763 News from Paula Hawkins, January 29, 1985, in folder “Radio Martí (1/23/1985-1/29/1985),” box

8, Walter Raymond Files, RRL; Raymond to Poindexter, “Congressional Briefing Plan,” January 31,

1985, in folder “8590108,” NSC-ES-SF, RRL; and Handwritten note on McFarlane to Reagan, “Radio

Martí,” March 19, 1985, in folder “8502186,” NSC-ES-SF, RRL.

764 Raymond to McFarlane, “Paula Hawkins,” March 19, 1985, in folder “Radio Martí (3/9/1985-

3/31/1985),” box 8, Walter Raymond Files, RRL; and Handwritten note on Recommended Telephone

Call to Senator Paula Hawkins, March 18, 1985, in folder “Radio Marti (3/9/1985-3/31/1985),” box 8,

Walter Raymond Files, RRL.

765 Raymond to McFarlane, “Talking Points for Meeting with Jorge Mas,” January 30, 1985, in folder

“8590106,” NSC-ES-SF, RRL.

292

scrap the project behind the scenes.766

To Mas Canosa’s chagrin, moreover, McFarlane

shelved his proposal that the administration set a “deadline” for the startup.767

Fidel Castro and Public Relations Efforts

Since Radio Martí did not go on the air in a timely manner, expectations that

Ronald Reagan might opt for better relations with Cuba continued to grow. Cuba’s public

relations efforts assisted this trend. In January 1985, the Cuban government invited to

Havana William V. Alexander, Jr., the chief deputy of the majority whip in the U.S.

House of Representatives, as well as a large delegation of Arkansas business leaders

seeking a new avenue for agricultural trade. In thirty-seven hours of talks, Castro

indicated his hope for better relations with the United States, supported a negotiated

peace settlement in Central America and Southern Africa, and referred to hijacking

issues, radio interference, coast-guard cooperation, and fishing as grounds for new U.S.-

Cuban negotiations.768

Days after their trip, Castro also received a delegation of the U.S.

national conference of Catholic bishops, who supported the normalization of relations.769

766

Mas Canosa, interview, in Jorge Mas Canosa, vol. 2, pp. 1479-80. See also, Vargas Llosa, El exilio indomable, p. 132.

767 Walter Raymond, Jr. to McFarlane, “Radio Martí,” March 4, 1985, in folder “8501679,” NSC-ES-

SF, RRL.

768 Back home, Alexander became the leading supporter of U.S. talks with Castro. Stenographic

Minutes of U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs,

Briefing—Cuban Trip, February 6, 1985, in folder “Cuban Affairs,” box 353, Claude Pepper Papers,

Florida State University Libraries. For a quote, see p. 25. See also, NYT, February 14, 1985, p. A31.

769 As the bishops urged Castro to release 147 current prisoners, Castro offered to free 75. Skouog,

United States, p. 86; and Schoultz, Infernal, p. 417.

293

As he took command of this public relations campaign, Castro himself made

numerous appearances in Western media in early 1985. In an interview with El País, a

major Spanish newspaper, Castro expressed his desire to reach some understanding with

the Reagan administration. He commended the U.S.-Cuban migration talks, which he

described as “serious, flexible, and respectful.” Cuba was closely watching the

development of the Shultz-Gromyko talks in Geneva. “Who knows if Reagan intends to

enter history as president of peace!” the Cuban leader stated. “This concerns the interests

of the United States as well as the rest of the world.”770

Similar messages of hope for

peace appeared in his interviews with the Washington Post, the Spanish news agency

EFE, the Mexican daily Excelsior, PBS’s “NewsHour,” and CBS’s “60 Minutes.”771

The U.S. government found Castro’s appeal for better ties irritating, and termed it

a “peace offensive.” 772

When he visited Cuba for a week in late January to discuss the

implementation of the migration agreement, State Department’s coordinator of Cuban

affairs Kenneth Skoug found that Havana had “no intention to alter [its] basic approach to

foreign policy.” Yet, more puzzling for him was Havana’s reluctance to talk about Radio

Martí. Skoug gained the impression that Castro “could head off Radio Martí by

suggesting trade and talks on bilateral issues.”773

Such thinking might have appeared

during the interviews of Cuban deputy foreign minister Ricardo Alarcón with the Miami

Herald. Alarcón explained that Cuba recently found Reagan more pragmatic than his

770

Fidel Castro, interview quoted in El País (Madrid), January 20, 1985, pp. 1-4.

771 See for example, WP, February 3, 1985, p. A1. Also, Franklin, Cuba, pp. 210-11.

772 Skouog, United States, pp. 84-93, 97.

773 Ibid.

294

rhetoric suggested, referring to the U.S.-Soviet talks in Geneva, the crackdown of Miami

terrorists, and the delay of Radio Martí. On the last point, Alarcón facetiously speculated

that the entire project must be “a joke.”774

On March 21, 1985, after cultivating U.S. public interest in talks, Castro formally

proposed bilateral U.S.-Cuban discussions on a wide range of issues, including Central

America and Southern Africa. On receipt of this message, John Ferch, USINT chief in

Havana, suspected that Castro had taken this step because he hoped to stall U.S. moves in

the two regions through diplomatic engagement. Based on such an assessment,

Washington was unwilling to enter talks with Cuba on geopolitical matters. But the

administration was disposed to extend dialogue on migration into other areas, such as

narcotics interdiction, radio interference, hijacking, and safety of life at sea. Such a cool

but communicative approach was identical to U.S. dealings with other unfriendly

communist countries like Vietnam. In early May, the State Department instructed Ferch

to convey Washington’s willingness to talk on these “technical” issues on his scheduled

departure next month.775

Although it remains unclear why Havana took these notable actions around this

time, one reason may be Cuba’s economic recession in late 1984. As Castro himself

described in his 1986 report to the Third Congress of Cuba’s Communist Party, declining

economic performance and increasing trade deficits prompted the Cuban leadership to

774

Alarcón, cited in MH, March 29, 1985, p. 14A; and Alarcón, cited in MH, March 31, 1985, p. 3A.

775 Raymond F. Burghardt to McFarlane, “Dealing with Cuba,” May 8, 1985, in folder “NSPG 0107

(1) [Radio Marti],” box 91307, NSC-ES-NSPG, RRL. By that time, Cuba began to signal its desire to

join regional peace talks in Southern Africa, because Cuba’s ally, Angola, accepted the linkage

between Namibian independence and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from the country. LeoGrande

and Korbluh, Back Channel, pp. 250-51.

295

hold meetings, make new announcements, and take various emergency actions.776

For

example, on December 4, 1984, the Cuban leadership issued an alarm to all Cuban people

about the nation’s economic situation, appealing for the saving of combustibles and raw

materials. “Our problem is the future,” said Castro. “We cannot mortgage our future for

10 square meters of fabric.”777

Under such circumstances, the Canadian embassy in

Havana acquired information from its Mexican counterpart that Cuba was seeking a third

country’s help in initiating negotiations with the United States.778

Yet, probably more important than Cuba’s economic deterioration was a political

factor, which Raúl Castro confided to Gorbachev. In his view, Washington believed that

Havana was “desperate to start discussion” but such thinking was “totally wrong.”

Havana was deliberately sending messages of peace “to complicate [Washington’s]

aggressive line against Cuba, to earn time, and to win political space.” Contact with

legislators and the Catholic Church, Raúl said, would help to “influence more liberal and

moderate elements” of U.S. society. Rather, it was Washington that grew more anxious to

talk, as he explained that Ferch was the one who suggested that the Cubans propose an

agenda for talks. “Of course,” he said, “our strategy is not taking a seat to talk with them,

except for [on] some problems that are of their interest, such as the one of immigration.”

776

Fidel Castro, Cuba: La situación internacional. Informe al 3er. Congreso del PCC. Febrero de

1986 (Buenos Aires: Editorial Anteo, 1986), pp. 31-46.

777 Speech by Castro, December 4, 1984, Discursos.

778 Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa (Canadian Eyes Only), February 7, 1985, vol. 24967, 20-

Cuba-1-3-USA, part 8, RG25, LAC.

296

Cuba was not optimistic about Reagan’s intentions. Raúl remarked to Gorbachev, “we

will establish a play with them.”779

Both the effectiveness and importance of Cuba’s public relations efforts seemed

even greater at this critical moment of international relations. Fidel Castro’s above-

mentioned statement on December 14, 1984, suggests that the Cuban leader had a larger

picture in mind in evaluating the importance of the migration agreement. In his interview

with U.S. congressman Mervin M. Dymally, he again emphasized that the migration

agreement was “constructive,” that the agreement coincided with the start of U.S.-Soviet

détente, and that the United States and Cuba would be able to foster friendship based on

mutual respect.780

Sensing a change in the tide of history, the Cuban leader apparently

thought that this new development might accompany a significant change in U.S.

attitudes toward Cuba. Yet, Raúl’s comment to Gorbachev suggests that even if such a

shift did not occur, Cuba’s good-will gestures could at least buy time and increase Cuba’s

political influence in the United States.

Radio Martí on the Air

Notwithstanding Havana’s overtures for better relations, Washington’s decision to

779

Memcon (Gorbachev, Raúl Castro), March 20, 1985, esp. 18-19, WCDA. Apparently Havana and

Washington had some misperceptions of each other’s moves. Raúl claimed that Ferch’s suggestion

was an indication of Washington’s anxious of talks. Yet, there was no such indication in U.S. records.

This initiative probably derived from State Department’s preference of secret diplomacy over public

appearances by Fidel.

780 Fidel Castro, Nada podrá detener la marcha de la historia: entrevista concedida a Jeffrey Elliot y

Mervin Dymally sobre múltiples temas económicos, políticos e históricos (Havana: Editora Política,

1985), esp. pp. 8-13, and 27-31. The edited version of this interview appears in Playboy 32, no. 8

(August 1985).

297

start Radio Martí wiped out any uncertainty about the course of U.S.-Cuban relations.

Radio Martí finally went on the air on May 20, 1985, the Cuban “independence” day.

Havana’s response was prompt. By then only 201 Mariel detainees had returned to Cuba

and only eleven ex-prisoners had been admitted to the United States as the result of the

1984 migration agreement. But in light of “cynical and provocative” U.S. actions,

Havana suspended its implementation, leaving thousands of Mariel detainees and ex-

prisoners stranded. Aiming at Miami, Havana also halted the visits of Cubans in the

United States to the island. U.S.-Cuban relations entered one of the lowest points during

the 1980s. The tone of Cuba’s note was apocalyptic. “One day the people of the United

States themselves will terminate such egoistic, insensitive, blinded, and sterile policy.”781

Newly declassified U.S. records indicate that Reagan authorized the startup at the

risk of causing—and even losing—a radio war. Because Congressman Joe Addabbo,

chair of the House Appropriations Committee, had stonewalled the administration’s

effort to reprogram the budget, the administration was unable to build retaliatory

capabilities as planned. At a May 17, 1985, NSPG meeting, McFarlane presented three

options: “(1) cancel Radio Martí; (2) go on the air and try…to engage in dialogue with

Cuba so as to deter counter-broadcasting; and (3) delay the plan to develop a retaliatory

capability short of our original plan to interfere partially with Cuban television.” It is

noteworthy that for the first time the NSC seriously considered the cancellation of the

plan as an option, even though its preference seemed to be for option two. Meanwhile,

Shultz strongly opposed the startup in favor of option three. He insisted that Washington

781

The Cuban government’s note, May 19, 1985, printed in Bohemia, May 24, 1985, pp. 48-49.

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delay the startup until it acquired enough capabilities for deterring a radio war.782

But rather than following the guidance of his advisers, Reagan personally

determined the Radio Martí startup. The discussion virtually ended when Reagan simply

declared, “we have to go on the air.” Neither the cancellation nor any further delay was

acceptable. According to Wick, who was present at the NSPG meeting, this meeting was

“one of the most graphic illustrations of Reagan overruling everybody there—each expert

in his own way.”783

On the next day, the persistent State Department sent updated

information about Cuba’s jamming capabilities to Reagan. But the U.S. president was

adamant. “Right now…we shouldn’t do anything in view of our Monday startup of Radio

Martí,” he wrote. “I’m sorry to have to go against George [Shultz] but I feel very strongly

we must go ahead even if we do have to shut down [Radio Martí] temporarily if he

[Castro] jams our commercial channels.”784

A major source of Reagan’s stubborness might have been his ideological belief

that Radio Martí was simply the right thing to do. The Reagan administration was

planning to create this radio broadcast in the image of Radio Free Europe, which was

designed to promote American value of freedom beyond the Iron Curtain. Given

Reagan’s view of Cuba in the larger picture of the Cold War, it was not surprising that he

782

Minutes, NSPG Meeting, May 17, 1985, in folder “NSPG 0107 (1) [Radio Martí],” box 91307,

NSC-ES-NSPG, RRL. The NSC speculated the most important reason for Addabboo’s opposition was

his belief that the Reagan administration was seeking a Tonkin Gulf-type incident to destroy Cuba’s

transmitters and escalate a military confrontation with Cuba. Walter Raymond to McFarlane, “Radio

Martí,” April 17, 1985, in folder “8590418,” NSC-ES-SF, RRL.

783 By reading the minutes Reagan seemed to have already made up his mind. Ibid. For Wick’s

account, see Wick, interview transcript, pp. 39-40, 46-47, UV-MC.

784 Handwritten memo, Reagan to McFarlane, May 18, 1985, folder “NSDD 170 (1),” box 91296,

Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Decision Directives (hereafter NSC-ES-NSDD), RRL.

299

would have tried to do the same across the Florida Straits. The analogy of Eastern Europe

and Cuba was “faulty,” according to communication specialist Howard Frederick.

“Communism was imposed on Poland against the will of its people,” but

“Cubans…brought about a revolution against a hated dictatorship without outside

intervention.”785

Reagan took a different view. He denied the legitimacy of the Cuban

Revolution by calling counterrevolutionaries “freedom fighters.” For him, Radio Martí

was necessary to promote “freedom” in Cuba.

However, this explanation alone does not address the question of why he could

not have waited any longer. Here, Jorge Mas Canosa played an interesting role. As

explained above, Mas Canosa’s CANF and its allies were working incessantly to

persuade Reagan officials, including the president, to build a personal commitment to the

project. This effort continued until the last moment, as shown in Mas Canosa’s letter to

Reagan just prior to the NSPG meeting. In this letter, Mas Canosa not only reminded the

U.S. president of his commitment to “freedom” in Cuba, but also emphasized that

Havana Cubans were mocking the United States for the inability to start Radio Martí,

referring to Ricardo Alarcón’s comment that the plan must be a “joke.” In Mas Canosa’s

presentation, further delay of the broadcast would become a major foreign policy defeat

for Reagan against Fidel Castro, something that Reagan’s pride could not have tolerated.

“Now is the time,” he appealed to Reagan, “for demonstrating your continued resolve to

785

Frederick, Cuban-American Radio Wars, pp. 37-41.

300

carry forward in the struggle against totalitarians in the Americas; Radio Martí must go

on the air.”786

It is impossible to gauge to what extent Reagan considered these points. But his

diary clearly shows that Reagan read the letter and the Miami Herald articles sent by Mas

Canosa. “Now some of Castro’s flunky’s have gone public laughing at us because we

haven’t gone on the air,” he wrote on May 17, 1985. “Monday is Cuba’s freedom day.

I’ve ordered us to start broadcasting on…May 20.”787

This writing illustrates that Reagan

reacted as anticipated by Mas Canosa. Among thousands of letters from Miami Cubans

asking for special attention to their needs and voices, few reached the U.S. president’s

desk. From his capacity as chair of the Presidential Advisory Board, Mas Canosa seized

Reagan’s attention and used the language to which he would listen. “Ronald Reagan was

the star,” Mas Canosa commented a week later on his influence on Reagan’s decision.

“But we deserve an Oscar for the best supporting role.”788

In Miami, the symbolic importance of Washington’s decision to start Radio Martí

was immeasurable. Unlike NSC staff in Washington, anti-Castro folks in Miami

considered the radio not only as a pressure tactic to break Soviet-Cuban ties, but also as a

pivotal instrument for promoting “freedom” in Cuba.789

Days after the startup, Tomás

786

Mas Canosa to Reagan, April 25, 1985, in folder “8590466,” NSC-ES-SF, RRL. The letter was

attached to: McFarlane to Reagan, “The Startup of Radio Martí,” May 15, 1985, in the same folder. It

was Mas Canosa who sent to the U.S. president two Miami Herald articles, including the cited MH,

March 31, 1985, p. 3A. These materials are also found in folder “Radio Marti-Classified,” box 1.61,

CANF Archive.

787 Reagan, Diaries Unabridged, vol. 1, p. 460.

788 Quoted in MH, May 26, 1985, p. 24A.

789 On this point, see the previous chapter.

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Relegado, news director of a local Spanish radio station, summed up the rising

expectation in Miami. “Radio Martí is perceived here not just a radio station but as a

gesture of the United States’ moral support” for Cuba’s pursuit of freedom. For them,

Radio Martí marked “a new era of confrontation between the United States and [Castro’s]

Cuba.”790

Years later Mas Canosa called May 20, 1985, “the most emotional day” in his

entire life. When he oversaw the beginning of radio broadcasting, he recalled, he and his

wife could not hold back tears.791

Across the sea, the Radio Martí startup apparently caught several Cuban officials

by surprise. According to the Washington Post, Havana doubted the startup up to the last

moment because Reagan had reached a migration agreement with Cuba, probed for

Namibian independence, and softened his rhetoric against Cuba. Havana, therefore, was

hoping that Reagan might have wanted to avoid conflicts with Cuba, intentionally

delayed the startup, and sought a pretext to abandon it.792

The report had some validity. In

talks with Canadian and Mexican diplomats, several high-ranking Cuban officials

admitted that the startup was indeed a surprise for them, especially because Reagan could

have delayed it in the atmosphere of dialogue following the migration agreement.793

Washington also employed diplomatic schemes to mislead Havana. Days before the

790

Quoted in NYT, May 22, 1985, p. A11.

791 Mas Canosa, interview, in Jorge Mas Canosa, vol. 2, p. 1484.

792 WP, June 5, 1985, pp. A25, A29.

793 Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, May 20, 1985, and Canadian embassy in Havana to

Ottawa, May 23, 1985, both in vol. 24967, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 8, RG25, LAC; and Mexican

embassy in Havana to Mexico City, May 28, 1985, III-3969-2, AHGE.

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startup, U.S. diplomats met Cuban officials in Havana to discuss radio interference

problems.794

Nevertheless, the Cuban government had discussed contingency plans in case of

the Radio Martí startup. Havana calibrated this countermeasure very carefully. Aware

that Reagan’s fear of a migration crisis was genuine, Cuban officials looked to the

suspension of the migration agreement as not a provocative measure that would trigger

U.S. military aggression, but still an effective counterattack against Washington. It is also

important to note that the startup altered the political situation in which Cuba had

accepted migration talks in the first place. Indeed, on many occasions Fidel Castro

warned that if Reagan broadcast Radio Martí “all cooperation will disappear ‘in every

sphere.’”795

Triangular Dynamics Continued, 1986-1988

The triangular Washington-Havana-Miami dynamics continued to shape the

course of U.S.-Cuban relations during the rest of Reagan’s presidency. On May 24, 1985,

only a few days after the cancellation of the migration agreement, Havana opened the

safety valve for social discontent at home by allowing Cubans to leave for the United

States via third countries. Regardless of antipathy to Havana, relatives and families in the

United States of these Cubans, especially ex-prisoners, supported this opening of new

794

A year later, Carlos Martínez, an official of the Cuban Ministry of Communication, angrily recalled

his surprise at the startup. See Memcon (Martínez, Jahn), April 9, 1986, p. 5, attached to Germán

Blanco to Malmierca, April 17, 1986, Caja “Agresión Comunicaciones 28,” MINREX.

795 For example, see Vance Hyndman to Edward J. Derwinski and George E. Danielson, “Castro

meeting,” September 28, 1981, in folder “Cuba (9/30/1981-10/8/1981),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL.

The memo was sent to Reagan via the NSC.

303

emigration routes by sending money to cover their travel fees and expenses. But

Washington’s important aim remained the one of sending Mariel “excludables” back to

Havana. The U.S. government suspended the USINT issuance of preference immigrant

visas in Havana, trying to pressure Havana to reactivate the migration agreement. This

measure greatly disturbed Miami Cubans, who lobbied the White House and Congress to

quickly accept the ex-prisoners.796

Washington tried to break this impasse by negotiating with both Havana and

Miami simultaneously. In October 1987, as Miami Cubans threatened to pass a bill in the

U.S. Congress to resume the visa processing in Havana, the administration decided to

negotiate with CANF in order to gain its endorsement for a new round of Washington’s

talks with Havana. The result was its authorization for a new semi-private refugee

program, the Cuban Exodus Relief Fund, in which CANF would bring around ten

thousand Cubans in third countries into the United States.797

A month later, the U.S. and

Cuban governments agreed to reactivate the migration agreement. To the surprise of

Washington, however, this agreement provoked riots among the Mariel “excludables” at

the Oakdale federal alien detention center in Louisiana and the Atlanta federal

penitentiary. As a result of a deal with the rioters, the Justice Department reviewed each

796

Claude Pepper et al. to Reagan, November 25, 1985; Jeb Bush to Edwin Meese, June 25, 1986;

Frank Calzón to Patrick J. Buchanan, July 8, 1986; and Frank Calzón to Elliot Abrams, July 9, 1986,

all in #400828, Immigration/ Naturalization, WHORM: Subject File, RRL.

797 Skoug, United States, pp. 167-68.

304

case for deportation. By June 1991, Washington paroled over 1,800 and repatriated only

627 on the original list of 2,746 “excludables.”798

Much like after the first migration agreement, the same rumor that Washington

and Havana would soon normalize relations again spread among Miami Cubans.799

The

United States and the Soviet Union continued to go down the path toward the end of the

Cold War. Reagan’s war in Central America reached its limits as the Iran-Contra affair

drove out numerous hawkish anticommunist ideologues from power. Remaining officials

proved far more pragmatic in dealing with Cuba, even on an issue like Southern Africa.

After a major Cuban victory against invading South African forces in Angola, the United

States agreed to invite Cuba into regional peace talks. Quadripartite negotiations

involving the United States, Cuba, Angola, and South Africa ensued. In December 1988,

the four parties reached a comprehensive accord, which included the implementation of

UN Resolution 435 (Namibian independence) and the timetable for the withdrawal of

Cuban troops.800

In addition to this diplomatic breakthrough, the U.S. and Cuban

governments also made progress in their cooperation on nuclear safety and drug

interdiction. These developments led some foreign policy analysts to express their hope

for the normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations.801

798

As of June 1991, up to 300 Cubans on the list remained in jails, according to an INS testimony.

See, U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs,

Recent Development in the United States-Cuban Relations: Immigration and Nuclear Power, 102nd

Cong., 1st sess., June 5, 1991, pp. 12, 23, 39, 46.

799 Skoug, United States, pp. 186-190. For Miami Cubans’ criticisms of Reagan’s softening of stance

on Cuba, see MH, May 2, 1988, p. 1A; and MH, May 1, 1988, p. 22A.

800 Gleijeses, Visions, chaps. 15-19. See also, LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, pp. 253-57.

801 Jorge I. Domínguez and Rafael Hernández, eds., U.S.-Cuban Relations in the 1990s (Boulder, CO:

Westview, 1989), pp. 1-2.

305

Yet at the same time, Washington continued Radio Martí and cooperated with

Miami in attacking Cuba’s internal society. Of special importance was the inclusion of

Armando Valladares on the U.S. delegation to the United Nation Commission on Human

Rights (UNCHR). Released from a Cuban jail in 1982, he enlisted CANF’s assistance in

publishing his memoir, Contra toda esperanza (Against All Hope). As in the case of

Radio Martí, Reagan’s advisors originally viewed criticisms of Cuba’s human rights

record as an instrument of mounting pressure on Cuba to change its foreign policy.802

Yet

by the end of his presidency, Reagan and Miami Cubans elevated Cuba’s “freedom” itself

to an important goal of U.S. foreign policy from just a tool for achieving something else.

Reagan’s May 1988 speech before Miami Cubans symbolized this turnaround in the U.S.

rationale for an anti-Cuban policy. “We will never, ever, negotiate away the dream of

every Cuban-American,” the U.S. president said, “that Cuba will again join the family of

free and democratic nations.”803

While Reagan declared Cuba’s “freedom” non-negotiable, Vice President George

H. W. Bush was promoting TV Martí, a television-version of Radio Martí. Again, behind

the scenes, Mas Canosa mobilized his congressional allies in the same manner that he did

for Radio Martí. In December 1987, a month after the second migration agreement, the

U.S. Congress passed a bill proposed by Florida Senator Lawton Chiles to provide

$100,000 for a study to determine whether television broadcasting to Cuba was

802

See for example, a top secret National Security Council document (“U.S. Policy in Central

America and Cuba through F.Y. ‘84, Summary Paper”) leaked to the New York Times. Here, the

attacks on Cuba’s human rights records, as well as the enlistment of support among Cuban émigrés,

emerged as a policy of preventing a “proliferation of Cuba-model states” in Central America. NYT,

April 7, 1983, p. 16A.

803 White House Press Release of Reagan’s Speech, May 20, 1988.

306

technically feasible. The National Association of Broadcasters opposed the funding,

accusing supporters of the project of “trying to court the Cuban-American votes.”804

Skeptical of this project’s effectiveness and the cost, State Department specialists avoided

making any commitment to the project.805

Yet, Bush’s public endorsement of TV Martí

came at his speech before CANF’s annual congress in June 1988. “Support for freedom,

democracy, and human rights,” Bush publicly declared, “must be the organizing principle

of American foreign policy.”806

Bush’s commitment to TV Martí was nothing but a political strategy to co-opt

Miami Cubans before the 1988 election. Its chief architect was Jeb Bush, a son of the

vice president, who had worked for years to cultivate support for the Republican Party

among Miami Cubans. In 1982, the Republican Party in Florida recruited Jeb for

Hispanic outreach because he lived in Miami, spoke Spanish, and could use his name

recognition on local radio programs.807

After assuming the chair of the Dade County

Republican Party, he took credit for the close victory in the 1986 Florida gubernatorial

election and was appointed by the governor of Florida, Bob Martínez, as Florida’s

Secretary of Commerce. Jeb frequently advised his father on issues related to Cuba and

Miami Cubans. Jeb was a business partner of Armando Codina, one of the youngest

804

NYT, June 18, 1988, p. 1.

805 Skoug, United States, pp. 201-3.

806 Bush also denied the rumor that the U.S. government secretly negotiated with the Cuban

government on normalization of relations. Speech to the CANF Annual Congress, Washington, DC,

June 13, 1988, in Cuban American National Foundation, Bush on Cuba (Washington, DC: CANF,

1991), p. 34.

807 MH, May 21, 1982, p. 4C.

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directors of CANF, and served as campaign manager for Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the first

Cuban-American representative to be elected in 1989.808

When the rumor that the U.S. and Cuban governments would normalize relations

circulated among Miami Cubans, it was Jeb who alerted the vice president and his staff to

its possible impact on his father’s campaign in Florida.809

In a report to the vice president,

Jeb apparently went “so far as to say that Cuban-Americans are close to abandoning the

administration” and recommended that his father immediately make a strong statement to

support TV Martí to stem this trend.810

Bush concurred with his son. “We must continue

to champion the free Cuba cause,” he directed his staff, referring to “concern [among

Miami Cubans] about Administration [’s] ‘drift’ [from policy of hostility toward

Havana].”811

Such was the calculation behind his support for the new television

broadcasting to Cuba at the CANF congress in June 1988. Two months later, the U.S.

Senate approved $7.5 million for the initial ninety days of a TV Martí broadcasting test.

808

Both the Reagan and Bush Presidential Libraries held numerous documents that showed Jeb Bush’s

strong interest in Cuba, as well as Republican outreach to Miami Cubans. See for example, Jeb to

George Bush, n.d. (signature of “GB” dated May 16, 1982) with an attached study report, “Focus

Group, April 12, 1982, Cuban American Perceptions, Dade County, Florida,” in Name File, “Jeb and

George Bush,” Office of Vice President George Bush, Bush Vice Presidential Records (hereafter

BVPR), GHWBL. See also Chapter Seven.

809 Don Gregg to Bush, May 6, 1988, in folder “Cuba 1988,” Donald P. Gregg Files: Country Files,

BVPR, GHWBL. There are numerous handwritten notes indicating that Bush’s advisers were in

contact with Jeb on this matter.

810 Gregg and Sam Watson to Bush, May 24, 1988, in folder “Cuba 1988,” Donald P. Gregg Files:

Country Files, BVPR, GHWBL.

811 Emphasis is original. Bush to Craig Fuller, June 2, 1988, in folder “Cuba 1988,” Donald P. Gregg

Files: Country Files, BVPR, GHWBL. See also, Bush to Craig Fuller, June 3, 1988, in folder “Cuba

1988,” Donald P. Gregg Files: Country Files, BVPR, GHWBL.

308

In the November presidential election, Bush garnered 85 percent of the Miami Cuban

votes.812

Conclusion—Washington’s Contradictory Impulses

The start of the migration talks clearly marked a significant departure from the

line the Reagan administration had previously held. For the first three years the

administration demanded Havana’s cooperation on migration and even contemplated

military options, but to little avail. At the urging of George Shultz, the U.S. president

accepted the necessity of talks with Cuba right after the U.S. invasion of Grenada. This

change in U.S. attitudes was positive in the eyes of Cuban officials in Havana. The

opening of the talks was a way to preempt a security threat by improving the U.S. image

of Cuba. As long as the two countries discussed and cooperated on issues of mutual

concern, Cuba could deflect the worst of Washington intentions. Cuba’s desire to open a

safety valve for discontents at home also reinforced the inclination for talks. As

Washington and Havana engaged in discussions in pursuit of mutual interests, the 1984

migration agreement became a small, but meaningful, crack in the wall of suspicion

across the Florida Straits.813

But the Reagan years also witnessed another development that contradicted this

trend toward greater cooperation. In his November 1981 talks with Carlos Rafael

812

García, Havana USA, p. 156.

813 According to William LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh, the U.S. government disingenuously made

the Cuban government believe that “Cuban concessions on migration would lead to better relations

and a broader dialogue.” LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, p. 402. Neither U.S. nor Cuban

sources confirm this point. Rather, it seems that Cubans drew the conclusion of their own regarding

the merit of the talks.

309

Rodríguez, Alexander Haig assured the Cuban vice president that Washington had no

intention of intervening in the internal affairs of Cuba. With the growing presence of

Miami Cubans in the United States, however, this was no longer the case. The driving

force behind Radio Martí was CANF’s Mas Canosa, who worked for the legislation in

the Congress, solidified his power among Miami Cubans, and cemented his access to the

U.S. president. His personal capacity for lobbying in Washington was nothing but

remarkable. It would not be an exaggeration to assert that, in the wake of the Radio Martí

startup, Reagan listened to Mas Canosa’s opinion over George Shultz’s. Perhaps, the

significance of the startup was that it set an important precedent for Washington to be the

custodian of “freedom” in Cuba. In the name of “freedom,” which Reagan called

nonnegotiable in Cuba, Washington found itself obliged to intervene in the internal

affairs of Cuba, in addition to its external affairs.

Even as the Cold War came close to its end, the next administration could not

ignore Reagan’s legacy in U.S.-Cuban relations. At the urging of Washington, Havana

agreed to resume migration talks in 1986, leading to a new agreement a year later.

Despite continued conflicts in Central America and Southern Africa, Havana also would

concur with Washington in extending cooperation into other bilateral issues such as drug-

trafficking, nuclear safety, and the maintenance of the U.S. military base at Guantánamo

Bay.814

This show of Havana’s good-will toward Washington nonetheless appeared to

have little impact on U.S.-Cuban relations. As Bush supported TV Martí and followed up

Reagan’s commitment to “freedom” in Cuba, Havana recognized the shadow of Mas

814

Ziegler, U.S.-Cuban Cooperation.

310

Canosa and CANF—the “enemies of the Cuban Revolution”—behind this declaration of

“ideological aggression.”815

Washington’s catering to Miami’s wishes complicated

Havana’s public relations efforts in the United States. As the Cuban mission to the United

Nations lamented, the image of the Cuban Revolution in U.S. society was as bad as ever.

815

See for example, MINREX, Dirección de Prensa, Divulgación y Relaciones Culturales,

“Cronología televisión Martí (I),” June 1988, La Biblioteca del Centro de Estudios Hemisféricos y

sobre Estados Unidos, Universidad de la Habana [Library at the Center for Hemispheric and United

States Studies, University of Havana].

311

CHAPTER 7: Making Foreign Policy Domestic?

The End of the Cold War and the Political Ascendancy of Miami Cubans

For counterrevolutionary Cubans in Miami, the end of the Cold War presented a

golden opportunity to realize their dream—the toppling of the Castro regime in Havana.

Their leading voice was CANF chairman Jorge Mas Canosa, who had worked to mount a

public relations campaign against the Cuban government since 1981. At the foundation’s

special meeting on July 29, 1989, in Naples, Florida, Mas Canosa declared that Cuba now

entered a critical moment in history. To seize this chance, he stated, the foundation must

expand its role to “assume a more protagonist role in bringing real change to Cuba.”

CANF would now become “THE opposition to Castro,” something akin to a government-

in-exile. As such, the foundation should develop a plan for “re-establishment of

democracy and freedom.”816

Mas Canosa’s call for a new responsibility for the future of Cuba drew

enthusiastic responses from CANF’s board of directors. The foundation succeeded in

establishing Radio Martí, and TV Martí too would start its broadcasting soon. The

support of 44,000 annual contributors, including 4,800 monthly members, made CANF

the largest and most influential Cuban American organization in the United States. Being

proud of what they had accomplished so far, Mas Canosa and his followers claimed to the

816

CANF Special Board Meeting Minutes, July 29-30, 1989, pp. 2-3, box 1.04, CANF Archive.

312

sole authority in speaking for the entire Cuban American community and later the Cuban

population on the island. There would be “no dialogue with the Castro brothers,” Mas

Canosa pledged. Under his leadership, the foundation embarked on planning for “post-

Castro Cuba,” including Cuba’s new constitution and economic reconstruction.817

The story of CANF as a Janus-faced organization looking at both the United

States and Cuba is another example of how migration could complicate the conduct of

U.S. relations with Cuba. From its stronghold in Miami and elsewhere the foundation

mobilized resources and expanded the network of support in Washington. Its magnified

lobbying capabilities in turn helped Mas Canosa not only to increase the credibility of his

power in the eyes of fellow counterrevolutionaries, but also to channel his preeminence

into a claim to represent all Cubans who opposed the Cuban government. As this cycle of

power-credibility generation went on, U.S. policy toward Cuba apparently reflected more

the interests of Mas Canosa and his followers in Miami than what U.S. policymakers

might have perceived as the best interests of the United States.

Based on U.S. and non-U.S. historical records, including private documents of

CANF, this chapter argues that migration remained a critical element of U.S. relations

with Cuba. In explaining the roles of Miami Cubans in the making of U.S. policy toward

Cuba, the existing scholarship emphasizes a decline of Cuba’s importance as a national

security issue around the end of the Cold War.818

Yet, as this chapter reveals, George H.

W. Bush’s policy toward Cuba was a continuation of Reagan’s, subject to the same

817

Ibid., pp. 3-5.

818 Schoultz, Infernal, chap. 10, esp. p. 448. Some scholars are skeptical of Cuban American influence

during the Bush years, yet they have few records to prove it. Haney and Vanderbush, Embargo.

313

contradictory impulses that had shaped Washington’s attitudes toward Havana and Miami

since the mid-1980s. Like his predecessor, Bush set Cuba’s “freedom” as a final goal of

U.S. policy toward Cuba because freedom was good in itself and it would be good for his

constituency service for the Cuban American community in Miami.

At the same time, however, the Bush administration insisted that the change in

Cuba be “peaceful” and come from inside, even from the initiative of Fidel Castro.

Whereas counterrevolutionary Cubans in Miami aimed for the immediate end of the

Castro regime, U.S. officials in Washington were willing to wait for signs of a “positive”

change on the island, kept contact with Havana over issues of mutual concern, and

weighed the opinions of non-U.S. countries in making their policy toward Cuba.

Contradictions in approaches between Washington and Miami eventually became salient

over the issue of U.S. enforcement of the Neutrality Act and the content of the Cuban

“Democracy” Act. Although Bush ultimately yielded to the political influence of Miami

Cubans, this chapter confirms that the basic pattern of contradiction in U.S. behavior

remained the same as before.819

U.S.-Cuban Relations Cooling Down

George H. W. Bush had no intention of normalizing relations with Cuba when he

became U.S. President. Since the early days of his vice presidency, he was a strong

supporter of the counterrevolutionary cause in Cuba, as seen in his advocacy for Radio

819

On the pattern, see the previous chapter.

314

and TV Martí.820

Working with Secretary of State James Baker and National Security

Adviser Brent Scowcroft, Bush pursued a more pragmatic policy in Central America than

Reagan and proved more willing to explore diplomacy. Baker instructed Assistant

Secretary of State Bernard Aronson to deescalate regional tension and remove this matter

from U.S. politics. Yet in Cuba, despite the resolution of crises in Southern Africa and

later Central America, Bush carried over Reagan’s policies, attacked Cuba’s internal

politics, and further tightened the embargo on the island.821

Bush’s hostile attitudes toward Cuba had several origins. First, the U.S. and

Cuban governments disagreed vehemently over their roles in Central America. Unlike

Reagan, Bush endorsed the “Esquipulas” peace process among Central American

presidents. Yet, Washington continued to sponsor Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries,

even though the Esquipulas agreement called for the termination of aid from outside the

region to “irregular forces or insurrectionist movements.” In contrast, despite its support

for the peace process, Havana insisted that it continue military assistance to the FMLN

unless all parties agreed to terminate the delivery of military equipment.822

The Havana-

Washington dichotomy stood out more prominently after Moscow suspended military

assistance to Nicaragua and asked Managua and Havana not to deliver Soviet-made

820

See the previous chapter, as well as numerous speeches in CANF, Bush on Cuba.

821 Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 419-420; Morley and McGillion, Unfinished Business, p. 22; and

LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, chap. 13.

822 For Castro’s earlier proposal in November 1981, see Chapter Five. On Esquipulas, see Central

American ambassadors to the UN General Assembly, August 31, 1987, available at

http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CR%20HN%20GT%20NI%20SV_870807_Es

quipulasII.pdf (accessed October 18, 2015).

315

weapons to the FMLN. Aware of the Havana-Moscow divergence of positions, Bush

called Castro “a major source of problems in the region.”823

Equally contentious was Washington’s interference in Cuba’s internal affairs.

Bush displayed strong interest in Cuba’s human rights record and drove this point high on

the U.S. agenda.824

Before the opening of discussion at the UNCHR, the U.S. president

personally lobbied the leaders of foreign nations, such as Venezuela, Colombia, and

Mexico.825

Like his predecessor, Bush also made numerous speeches in front of Miami

Cubans. “I am unalterably committed to a free, united, democratic Cuba,” he said on May

22, 1989. “Unless Fidel Castro is willing to change his policies and behavior, we will

maintain our present policy toward Cuba.” The U.S. president even endorsed Armando

Valladares’s Against All Hope, which denounced the inhumane treatment of Cuban

political prisoners. “It meant a lot to the entire Bush family and has certainly been an

inspiration to me.” Bush chose the author to lead the U.S. delegation at the UNCHR.826

By then, Havana must have lost nearly all hope for an improvement of U.S.-

Cuban relations. In the early days of the Bush presidency, Castro exhibited cautious

optimism regarding the prospect of better relations, referring to the successful conclusion

823

Memcon (Bush, Gorbachev), December 2, 1989, part I (10:00-11:55 a.m.), p.5, George H. W. Bush

Presidential Library Website (hereafter GHWBL-Web). All memcons and telcons cited in this chapter

are available at the following site (https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/memcons-telcons).

824 Robert Gates to Scowcroft, February 24, 1989, #019497, PR013-08, White House Office of

Records Management Subject File (hereafter WHORM), GHWBL.

825 For example, see Memcon (Bush, Carlos Andrés Pérez), March 3, 1989; G. Philip Huges to

Melvyn Levitsky (on Bush’s call to Colombian President Virgilio Barco), March 9, 1989; and

Memcon (Bush, Fernarndo Solana), March 20, 1989, GHWBL-Web.

826 Bush’s Remarks, May 22, 1989, APP. Valladares published this work in 1986 with Mas Canosa’s

support. See his Against All Hope: Prison Memoirs (New York: Knopf, 1986). The Cuban government

disputed the validity of his account.

316

of a negotiated peace settlement in Southern Africa and Cuba’s willingness to engage in

similar discussion on Central America.827

Yet, the March 1989 leak of Baker’s

memorandum, in which he denied any U.S. intention of amplifying discussion with Cuba

in the absence of political change on the island, apparently dismayed Havana.828

In April,

Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev visited Havana and met Castro. As Gorbachev

expressed his wishes that the settlement of Central American conflicts would lead to

improved U.S.-Cuban relations, Castro complained that Washington did not follow its

“promise” of considering a change of policy after the conclusion of the peace accord over

Southern Africa.829

Two days after the May 20, 1989, speech by Bush, Castro apparently wrote an

editorial for Granma. By dictating Cuba’s internal affairs in front of Miami Cubans, the

editorial said, Bush acted more as “consul of [counterrevolutionary] worms of Miami”

than the U.S. president. Like his predecessor, Bush deemed May 20 as “self-styled”

Cuba’s Independence Day, the date when Cuba transited from a Spanish colony to a U.S.

“neo-colony.” His invited guests, including Valladares, were “annexationists.” The

editorial claimed that Cuba had no idea of abandoning its independence for the sake of

normalizing relations with the United States. “Nobody gave us our freedom. To preserve

827

For example, see his remark in El regreso de Fidel a Caracas, 1989 (Caracas: Ediciones de la

Biblioteca de la Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1989), pp. 10-11.

828 See for example, René Mujica (then deputy chief of CUINT in Washington), “The Future of

Cuban-US Relations: A Cuban View,” in H. Michael Erisman and John M. Kirk, eds., Cuban Foreign Policy Confronts a New International Order (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 63-76; and

Carlos Alzugaray Treto, “Cuban Foreign Policy during the ‘Special Period’: Interests, Aims, and

Outcomes,” in H. Michael Erisman and John M. Kirk, eds., Redefining Cuban Foreign Policy: The Impact of the ‘‘Special Period’’ (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006), pp. 49-71.

829 LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, p. 260. Castro repeated the same argument when Eduard

Shevardnadze visited Cuba in October 1989. See Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, pp. 220-21.

317

our freedom we are prepared [to fight].” For the Cubans, “socialism or death is a real

option.”830

The Canadian embassy concluded, “Cuban-U.S. relations appear to be back to

their customary vitriolic level.”831

Havana’s Thinking of Bilateral Issues

U.S.-Cuban relations might have improved if Washington refrained from

launching TV Martí and avoided intervening in Cuba’s internal affairs. In June 1989,

Carlos Aldana, the influential secretary of the Cuban Communist Party Central

Committee, had lunch with John Taylor, chief of USINT in Havana. While expressing

bewilderment regarding Bush’s connection with “anti-Cuban” activists in Miami, Aldana

reiterated opposition to TV Martí and proposed negotiations on exchanges of TV

programs as an alternative. If this was infeasible, he suggested, Havana would introduce

the Cable News Network (CNN), which he praised as relatively objective and timely.832

Thereafter, Aldana kept discussing Central America and TV Martí with Taylor, noting

that there would be “good perspectives” on other issues of mutual interest. But, as Taylor

recalled, Aldana repeatedly warned that Cuba would see the broadcasts as “evidence that

U.S. hostility toward Cuba would not change whatever the regime did.”833

830

Editorial, May 24, 1989, Granma, p. 1.

831 Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, May 26, 1989, vol. 28310, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 10,

RG25, LAC. The Mexican embassy in Havana also concluded that a seeming relaxation of U.S.-

Cuban tensions from the beginning of Bush presidency ended by May 1989. Informe, p. 5, attached to

Mexican embassy in Havana to Mexico City, June 2, 1989, III-4394-1, AHGE.

832 USINT in Havana to Washington, June 20, 1989, in author’s possession.

833 Taylor, interview transcript, FAOH, pp. 146-47. For Aldana’s view of TV Martí and CANF, see

also Aldana, interview for Areíto, September 10, 1989, in Granma Weekly Review (translated in

318

Another possible key item of mutual concern was drug interdiction. In February

1988, U.S. authorities arrested Reinaldo Ruiz, a Miami Cuban drug trafficker, who

smuggled cocaine through Cuba into the United States. After he confessed collaboration

with Cuban officials, Taylor approached Aldana, who promised an investigation. The

result was the late June 1989 arrest of Arnaldo Ochoa, a famous military commander, and

Antonio de la Guardia, head of the Ministry of Interior’s department in charge of

circumventing the U.S. blockade of Cuba.834

Both of them were executed. Others, such as

Interior Minister José Abrantes, were imprisoned. To underscore a hard stance on drug

issues, Cuba even declared a policy of shooting down any aircraft that illegally penetrated

Cuban airspace and refused to obey an order to land. Although Washington opposed this

policy for fear of risking innocent lives, it welcomed Havana’s efforts to crack down on

drug businesses.835

By addressing Washington’s bilateral concerns, Havana sought to deny

Washington any ammunition for negative campaigns and deter possible aggression. Also

noteworthy in this regard was Cuba’s discussion on “migration and commercial politics

with Cubans in the United States.”836

In September 1989, when Jaime Crombet, secretary

for the Central Committee of the Communist Party, presided over an interagency meeting

English), attached to Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, September 13, 1989, vol. 28310, 20-

Cuba-1-3-USA, part 10, RG25, LAC.

834 Ziegler, U.S.-Cuban Cooperation, pp. 67-68; Gleijeses, Visions, pp. 493-94; and LeoGrande and

Kornbluh, Back Channel, pp. 327-28. See also, Morley, interview transcript, pp. 91-92, FAOH; and

Taylor, interview transcript, pp. 165-66, FAOH.

835 Non-Paper handed by Taylor, n.d., attached to Germán Blanco to Malmierca, July 1, 1989; and

Malmierca to Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, July 12, 1989, both in MINREX.

836 Sánchez-Parodi to Malmerica, September 11, 1989, Caja “Migratorios 14,” MINREX.

319

on this issue, the Cuban foreign ministry reiterated concern about migration fraud. In the

judicial process against the ex-Interior Minister, Cuban authorities confirmed the

existence of illegal practices that had financially exploited family travel and emigration.

The foreign ministry argued that Cuba had a “legitimate right” as a sovereign nation to

receive economic benefits from migration flows, especially as it confronted the U.S.

blockade. Still, it also claimed that the government should adopt a “just and humane”

migration policy to avoid being exposed to accusations of inhumane politics and

fraudulent commercial practices.837

The World Transformed?

As in the previous decades, Moscow was fully supportive of Cuban attempts at

dialogue with Washington. Gorbachev’s USSR sought to mediate U.S.-Cuban differences

in hopes of reducing Cold War tensions, facilitating peace talks in Central America, and

reducing the cost of supporting its allies in Havana. In light of growing economic and

political difficulties at home, Gorbachev undertook major internal reforms and

reevaluated foreign policy goals in the Third World. During this process Moscow shared

the objective with Washington of persuading Castro to change his internal and foreign

policies. Yet unlike Washington, Moscow believed that Castro was not as dogmatic as

Bush claimed he was. Rather than mounting pressure on Castro, Soviet policymakers

837

Sánchez-Parodi to Crombet, September 11, 1989, Caja “Migratorios 14,” MINREX. The report

draws on a Miami newspaper in referring to Jorge Mas Canosa’s announcement that CANF would

study this subject. The MINREX archive had numerous documents on the irregular flows of Cubans,

such as those left for Puerto Rico through the Dominican Republic. Cuban officials paid close

attention to this matter, trying to figure out if there was any violation of laws.

320

urged U.S. counterparts to engage him in talks and encourage him to introduce change at

his initiative.838

Washington discarded Moscow’s pleas, including the ones personally made by

Gorbachev. Since his April 1989 trip to Havana, Gorbachev exploited as many

opportunities as possible to remind U.S. leaders that Castro was in favor of talks, peace,

and the normalization of relations.839

Then came the December 1989 Malta Summit.

While ranking Central America and Cuba as top-priority items, Bush demanded that

Gorbachev halt economic and military assistance to Cuba, which he estimated at $5.5

billion per year.840

Instead of yielding to this demand, however, the Soviet premier

emphasized “Cuba’s interest in normalizing relations with the United States” and offered

his mediation. In response, Bush cited Costa Rican President Oscar Arias’s suspicion that

Cuba masterminded the major FMLN offensive in El Salvador, which occurred a few

weeks earlier. By underscoring Costa Rican concern about Cuba’s role in the region, the

838

Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, pp. 205-211, 216-17. For Gorbachev’s personal views of Cuba, see

for example, Pavel Palazchenko, My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze: The Memoir of a Soviet Interpreter (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p. 88. See also,

Anatoly S. Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev, trans. Robert English and Elizabeth Tucker

(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), p. 204.

839 Gorbachev to Bush (unofficial translation), May 6, 1989, in folder “Gorbachev Correspondence-

Outgoing [2],” Soviet Union-USSR Subject Files, NSC: Condoleeza Rice Files, GHWBL; and Memcon (Gorbachev, Baker), May 11, 1989, in folder “FM Shevardnadze, Edouard-USSR [3],”

Soviet Union-USSR Subject Files, NSC: Condoleeza Rice Files, GHWBL.

840 Selected Released Pages of Briefing Book for the President, “The President’s Meetings with Soviet

President Gorbachev, December 2-3, 1989, Malta,” n.d., available at National Security Archive

Website, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB298/Document%209.pdf (accessed

October 31, 2014).

321

U.S. president claimed that Castro was “clearly out of step” with the trend of

democratization across the world.841

Bush’s argument did not end there. “Castro poses yet another grave problem,” he

continued. “I am talking about many Cubans who have been expelled from Cuba and

whose relatives in Cuba are being persecuted. Many such Cubans tend to live in southern

Florida, and their passions run high against this man who is considered to be the worst

dictator.”842

After this remark the U.S. president went back to the same demand that

Moscow cut its ties to Havana to remove “this serious element of friction in Soviet-

American relations.”843

Gorbachev reminded Bush that Cuba was a sovereign country

with its own government, urging the U.S. president to probe the idea of dialogue. “I

mention Castro’s signal because I think it shows Castro sees his interest lies in changing

his relations with the U.S. and others,” the Soviet leader explained. “So please give it

some thought.” Bush conceded a little. “We have had feelers from him. But [I can

respond only] if he could do something in human rights.”844

841

Soviet Transcript of the Malta Summit, December 2, 1989, p. 14-15. For a U.S. version, see

Memcon (Bush, Gorbachev), December 2, 1989, part II (12:00-1:00 p.m.), pp. 1-2, GHWBL-Web. For

Oscar Arias’s view of Cuba, see Telcon (Bush, Arias), November 28, 1989, GHWBL-Web.

842 Quoted in Soviet Transcript of the Malta Summit, December 2, 1989, p. 15. Similar but weaker

languages also appear in the U.S. version. “There is another major Castro problem—the emigres (in

Florida) who have strong emotions about this last dictator.” Memcon (Bush, Gorbachev), December 2,

1989, part II (12:00-1:00 p.m.), p. 2.

843 Soviet Transcript of the Malta Summit, December 2, 1989, p. 17.

844 Memcon (Bush, Gorbachev), December 2, 1989, part II (12:00-1:00 p.m.), p. 4. Partial story of this

meeting appear in Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs, trans. Georges Peronansky and Tatjana Varsavsky

(New York: Doubleday, 1995), pp. 512-13; and George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Vintage, 1998), pp. 165-66.

322

Bush’s incentive to listen to Castro probably lessened as the world transformed in

his favor. After the November 1989 collapse of the Berlin Wall, the survival of

communist regimes in Eastern Europe grew doubtful. The wind of change also swept the

Western Hemisphere, as Bush remarked in his Thanksgiving Address, stating that

Panama, Nicaragua, and Cuba were the only three major exceptions to the regional trend

toward democratization.845

But two of these did not merit further concerns after the

December 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama and the February 1990 electoral defeat of the

Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Even the entrenched guerilla war in El Salvador came closer to

its end, as Cuba finally suspended its military assistance to the FMLN.846

The age of the

military missions of Cuban internationalists was ending. It became obvious that Cuba

posed no security threats against any types of Latin American regimes, not to mention the

U.S. government.847

U.S.-Cuban tensions nonetheless reached a peak on March 27, 1990, when the

U.S. government started TV Martí. Two months earlier, Cuba’s foreign minister Isidoro

Malmierca wrote to President of the UN Security Council Essy Amara to condemn this

project as a “violation of Cuban national sovereignty.” The startup “would not only lead

to a greater deterioration of relations between Cuba and the United States,” the letter

claimed, “but would unleash a crisis of unforeseeable consequences.” Aside from these

warnings, Havana also expressed its disposition to negotiate with the United States,

845

Thanksgiving Address to the Nation by Bush, November 29, 1989, APP.

846 Report on a Conversation with Fidel Castro, from the Diary of Yu.V. Petrov, June 20, 1990,

TsKhSD. F. 89, op. 8, d. 62, l. 1-6, WCDA.

847 Vázquez Raña, Raúl Castro, pp. 61-62. See also, Mexican embassy in Havana to Mexico City,

October 24, 1990, III-4520-1, AHGE.

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including the exchange of radio and television programs “on a basis of absolute

reciprocity and mutual respect.” Cuba was also willing to place U.S.-Cuban disputes

under “international arbitration” to resolve this issue.848

The Cuban foreign ministry sent

this letter to all countries with which Cuba had diplomatic relations, as well as U.S.

congressmen.849

As often was the case, Cuba’s appeal for peace fell on deaf ears in Washington.

CANF had long promoted the TV Martí project and Bush had publicly endorsed it in

front of the foundation’s supporters in June 1988. As one State Department official

recalled, the TV station “really was an issue of ‘we have to do it’ and so it became an

issue of how do we do it.”850

As the U.S. government considered its sponsoring of TV

Martí as “nonnegotiable,” any attempt at U.S.-Cuban dialogue seemed to reach a dead-

end.851

Cuba’s reactions to the start of the broadcasts were predictable. The Cuban

government jammed the station and accused the United States of creating “conditions

necessary to launch a military aggression.”852

Undoubtedly, the startup of TV Martí

damaged Havana’s remaining hopes of improving relations with the United States. In

848

Fidel Castro approved the revised draft. Malmerica to Amara (unofficial translation), January 17,

1990, Caja “Agresión Radio TV Martí 34,” MINREX.

849 Malmierca to Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, January 17, 1990, Caja “Agresión Radio TV Martí 34,”

MINREX. The same box had numerous letters from Malmierca to foreign ministers. See also, Raúl

Roa Kourí to Malmierca, January 10, 1990; and Malmierca to José M. Miyar Barrueco, January 11,

1990, Caja “Agresión Radio TV Martí 34,” MINREX.

850 Vicki Huddleston, interview, cited in Morley and McGillion, Unfinished Business, p. 32

851 For U.S.-Cuban contacts prior to the startup, see Cronológico sobre contactos oficiales bilaterales

relacionados con Acuerdo migratorio e interferencias radiales, attached to Germán Blanco to José

Viera, May 21, 1990, Caja “Agresión Comunicaciones 28,” MINREX.

852 Declaration of MINREX, March 27, 1990, Caja “Agresión Radio TV Martí 34,” MINREX. See the

previous chapter for Bush’s endorsement of TV Martí. The television broadcasting has been

controversial up to this day. See, Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 441-44.

324

May, Global Shield, a U.S. military exercise at the U.S. naval base in Guantánamo,

triggered a Cuban counter-maneuver, Cuban Shield.853

Jorge Mas Canosa’s CANF

TV Martí was another major victory for Mas Canosa’s CANF, which continued to

increase its power in Washington. By 1990, the Cuban-origin population in the United

States reached over a million. Over 60 percent lived in South Florida, where the Hispanic

population had gained prominence in almost all spheres of life. Cuban American

politicians stepped up the political ladder to be representatives at local, state, and federal

levels. CANF also tapped the rising economic prowess of Miami Cubans by recruiting

new members and building new chapters across the nation and beyond. By June 1992, the

foundation held its chapters in Atlanta, Chicago, Jacksonville (Florida), California, New

Jersey, New Orleans, New York, Orlando (Florida), Puerto Rico, West Florida,

Venezuela, Hong Kong, Mexico, and Madrid. Between July 1981 and November 1992,

the number of CANF’s directors paying an annual fee of $10,000, increased from 14 to

62, with 71 trustees.854

CANF was controversial yet popular among Miami Cubans. There emerged

numerous reports on Mas Canosa’s alleged abuse of influence, and their volume kept

growing as he became more politically powerful. He was unmistakably harsh toward his

853

Mujica, “A Cuban View,” p. 67.

854 Kami, “Ethnic Community.” By the early 1990s Cuban Americans achieved approximating

economic parity with the national population despite the handicap of a much shorter average length of

residence in the country. Portes, “The Cuban American Community Today: A Brief Portrait,” January

1993, in folder “Cuba,” box 61, Bernardo Benes Collection, UM-CHC.

325

political enemies, such as Ramón Cernuda, who antagonized the chair of the foundation

by challenging the rationale for tightening of the U.S. embargo. When U.S. Customs

agents raided the home of Cernuda to confiscate more than 200 paintings from Cuba,

Mas Canosa bragged on radio that he was the one who convinced federal agents to do

so.855

Because of such behavior, even some former directors of the foundation, such as

Raúl Masvidal, called him “paternalistic and authoritarian.”856

In light of growing

criticisms, Mas Canosa himself admitted that he was driven by passion, but only because

he believed in what he was doing. “We never forget our friends,” said Mas Canosa. “And

we always remember our enemies.”857

Yet despite these problems, the clear majority of Miami Cubans favored the

foundation’s hardline stance on the Cuban government. According to a Florida

International University survey in March 1991, over three-fourths of Miami Cubans

favored increased economic pressure on Cuba, the denial of diplomatic and trade

relations with the island, and even U.S. support of an armed internal rebellion against the

Cuban government.858

Several other polls conducted by a local Spanish television station

not only produced similar results, but also demonstrated the positive evaluation of CANF

855

The federal agents returned the paintings to Cernuda after they confirmed that he did not violate

any U.S. laws. John Newhouse, “A Reporter at Large: Socialism or Death,” New Yorker, April 27,

1992, pp. 81-82; and Carla Anne Robbins, “Dateline Washington: Cuban-American Clout,” Foreign Policy (Fall 1992), pp. 162-182.

856 Wall Street Journal, May 11, 1990, p. A1; García, Havana USA, pp. 150-2; and Schoultz, Infernal,

pp. 436-37.

857 Los Angeles Times Magazine, May 3, 1992, p. 23.

858 MH, March 31, 1991, pp. 1B and 2B. These results were largely identical in polls taken in October

1991 and 1993. See Gullermo J. Grenier, Hugh Gladwin, and Douglas McLaughen, The 1993 FIU

Cuba Poll: Views on Policy Options toward Cuba held by Cuban-American Residents of Dade

County, Florida, July 1, 1993, available at https://cri.fiu.edu/research/cuba-poll/1993-cuba-poll.pdf

(accessed January 6, 2015).

326

among many Miami Cubans. A poll taken in April 1992 was particularly encouraging for

the foundation because half of Cuban American respondents chose CANF as “the most

respected [Cuban American] organization.”859

CANF incessantly worked to broaden bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress. At

times, the foundation collaborated with nationwide conservative groups to make Cuban

issues a litmus test for electoral retaliation in districts where Cuban American votes were

few. At other times, the foundation made inroads into the liberal wings of U.S. politics by

enlisting the help of influential congressmen such as Dante Fascell and Claude Pepper, as

well as friendly lobbyists like Jerome Berlin, a top Democratic fundraiser in Miami.860

Most noteworthy was the foundation’s ability to turn around two liberal Democrats who

occupied important posts in the congressional making of foreign policy. One was

Claiborne Pell, chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The other was Robert

Torricelli, chair of the subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the House

Committee on Foreign Affairs.861

CANF’s access to the executive office grew stronger because of the role played

by Jeb Bush, the son of the U.S. president. After persuading his father to endorse TV

Martí, Jeb continued to serve as an intimate conduit to the White House for the

foundation. He not only delivered letters from Miami Cubans to his father’s office, but

859

MH, May 5, 1992, p. 2B. For the foundation’s view of this poll, see Minutes of the Meeting of the

Board of Directors, May 15, 1992, p. 3, CANF Archive. See also, MH, May 9, 1991, p. 1B.

860 Berlin was national finance chair of the Democratic senatorial candidates in the 1988 election. Bob

Graham’s press secretary Ken Klein commented. “Everybody wins. The foundation gets access to the

Democratic mainstream and Jerry brokers the money.” MH, April 11, 1988, p. 1A.

861 Philip Brenner and Saul Landau, “Passive Aggressive,” NACLA Report on the Americans 27, no. 3

(November 1990), pp. 18-19; and Morley and McGillion, Unfinished Business, pp. 14-16.

327

also added favorable comments on their pleas. On various occasions, Jeb personally

lobbied his father to meet Cuban American leaders, including Mas Canosa. It was also

Jeb who helped Mas Canosa to send his policy recommendations to the Bush transition

team several weeks after his father’s electoral victory in November 1988.862

Jeb’s

writings almost always drew the attention of his father and the staff working for him. At

one point Bush passed a memo from Jeb on Cuba to National Security Adviser Scowcroft,

noting that it was from “my boy in Cuba.”863

Jeb Bush actively engaged in Miami politics. In August 1989, he became a

campaign manager for Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, who became the first Hispanic

congresswoman in the United States. He also lobbied on behalf of Orlando Bosch, an

anti-Castro militant who orchestrated more than thirty acts of terrorism. After serving for

years in a Venezuelan jail, Bosch asked for political asylum on his return to the United

States. The White House initially let the Justice Department undertake a review of his

records and make a decision on his case. But when the Justice Department ruled in favor

of his deportation, the decision caused a massive protest in Miami, where Jeb joined Mas

Canosa and Ros-Lehtinen to demand White House intervention in this judicial process.864

862

Mas Canosa thanked Codina and Jeb Bush for this arrangement at one of CANF’s meetings.

Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, November 22, 1988, p. 3, box 1.04, CANF Archive.

For Jeb’s activities in Miami in the 1980s, see the previous chapter.

863 Handwritten note by Bush to Scowcroft, June 25, 1991, attached to Jeb to George Bush, June 12,

1991, in folder “Cuba: TV Marti [1],” NSC: Charles Gillespie Files, Subject Files, GHWBL.

864 U.S. Justice Department, Office of the Associate Attorney General, “In the Matters of Orlando

Bosch-Avila,” June 23, 1989, and Sichan Siv and Shiree Sánchez to Bush, June 30, 1989, both in

folder “Cuban Americans-Florida/ Orlando Bosch,” White House Office of Public Liaison: James

Schaefer Files, GHWBL. Bush’s public liaison officers noted Jeb’s attendance in the protest as if it

were an important matter for the U.S. president’s consideration. For a protest, see MH, June 30, 1989,

p. 1A.

328

In June 1990, Bosch was released. As the New York Times pointed out, it was “a startling

example of political justice.” The administration “coddles one of the hemisphere’s most

notorious terrorists” to carry favor in South Florida.865

Planning for the “Post-Castro” Dream

With its strong influence in Washington, CANF started to assume the role of

“government-in-exile” after Mas Canosa’s July 1989 announcement. The first job was to

send messages to the Cuban people on the island to dispel the “myth” that “the exiles are

only interested in taking back forcefully everything they once owned.”866

To this end, the

foundation set up La Voz de La Fundación, its own radio broadcasting to the island.

Apart from Radio and TV Martí, Mas Canosa appeared on this radio station, trying to

explain about the foundation’s views of the island, the implications of international

change for Cuba, and the foundation’s visions for post-Castro Cuba. CANF officially

declared that it would make responsible nobody but the Castro brothers, and expressed its

willingness to talk with any governmental officials to find a political solution to the

Cuban problem.867

CANF’s planning for post-Castro Cuba mainly consisted of two parts. Mel

Martínez, a principal organizer of CANF’s chapter in Orlando and future U.S. Senator

from Florida, led a group of directors to establish a political work commission. Its task

was to study Cuba’s political system during and after the imagined Cuban transition to

865

Editorial, NYT, July 20, 1990, p. A26.

866 Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, March 15, 1990, p. 3, box 1.04, CANF Archive.

867 See numerous speeches, talks, and interviews in Jorge Mas Canosa, vol. II, esp. pp. 809-38.

329

democracy, including the release of political prisoners, the establishment of civil rights

and human rights, and the creation of a new Cuban constitution. Based on the

commission’s discussion, the board of directors agreed that CANF would negotiate with

any elements in Cuba that aimed to remove the Castro brothers from power and promote

“freedom as we know it” inside Cuba.868

The commission also presented a “Fundamental

Law for Transition,” which would help a provisional government to build free enterprise

and democracy.869

A twin was an economic work commission chaired by Tony Costa, president of a

foliage company in Miami. Pessimistic about the availability of economic assistance from

Western countries, the commission identified privatization and foreign investment as a

guide for Cuba’s economic future.870

The inspiration for such ideas probably came from

disciples of the economist Milton Friedman, who readily preached to CANF directors

about the gospel of laissez-faire and small government. According to these guest

lecturers, the post-Castro regime should “capitalize as quickly and as much as possible”

to build “a just society.”871

When Mas Canosa toured Wall Street to recruit future

investment in Cuba, Malcolm S. Forbes Jr., editor of the U.S. business magazine Forbes,

868

Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, December 8, 1989, p. 4, box 1.04, CANF

Archive.

869 Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, January 26, 1990, box 1.04, CANF Archive.

870 Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, December 8, 1989, p. 5, box 1.04, CANF

Archive.

871 Minutes of CANF Congress, June 22-24, 1990, p. 2, box 1.04, CANF Archive. Three guest

speakers were Manuel Ayau, president of the University Francisco Marroquín in Guatemala; Eduardo

Maryora, dean of the school of law of the same university; and Victor Canto, associate of economist

Arthur Laffer. The former two studied under Milton Friedman.

330

endorsed this move. “With the guidance of men like Mas,” he wrote, “Cuba could

quickly become a model for the rest of Latin America.”872

Yet ultimately, CANF directors were not true believers of laissez-faire, as seen in

their unequivocal opposition to the flow of capitals that would benefit their enemy.873

Most important, they championed the Mack Amendment, which would block foreign

subsidiaries of U.S. companies from trading with Cuba. Other measures that Mas Canosa

contemplated were those to prohibit vessels trading with Cuba from entering U.S. ports

for six months; to require countries borrowing U.S. loans to stop lending trade credits to

Cuba; to eliminate U.S. sugar quotas of all nations that imported Cuban sugar; to reduce

U.S. aid to any country purchasing Cuban sugar by an amount equal to those purchases;

and to send a strong signal to dissuade foreign nations from granting concessional trade

credits to Cuba.874

Mas Canosa was willing to support measures that would infringe other

nation’s sovereignty only if he believed they would hasten Castro’s fall.

In early March 1990, Mas Canosa enlisted the help of Jeb Bush to bring these

ideas to the attention of the U.S. president and his chief of staff John Sununu.875

In a

proposal paper titled “The Cuban Democracy Act,” Mas Canosa contended that radical

changes in Eastern Europe and Central America presented “new opportunities to promote

872

Malcolm S. Forbes, Jr., “Soon to Come: Capitalist Cuba,” Forbes, September 17, 1990, pp. 19-20.

873 See the discussion in Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, April 14, 1991, box 1.04,

CANF Archive.

874 Paper, “Cuban Democracy Act,” attached to Mas Canosa to Sununu, March 6, 1990, #120195,

CO038, WHORM, GHWBL. Armando Codina was also present.

875 Bush to Sununu, February 13, 1990, #129424, FG001-07, WHORM, GHWBL; and Mas Canosa to

Bush, March 5, 1990, with the attached “U.S. Policy toward Cuba: Measures and Consideration,” in

folder “Cuba, General—January-June 1990 (3),” NSC: William T. Pryce Files, GHWBL.

331

a free and democratic Cuba.” Mas Canosa introduced the above-mentioned measures that

tightened the U.S. embargo. But he also proposed the opening of a direct mail service to

Cuba and the authorization of U.S. funds for supporting dissident groups.876

These two

items belong to what future scholars would term “Track II,” whose aim was to influence

Cuban internal politics through greater communication with the island, rather than

isolating the island from the rest of the world (“Track I”). Scholarship has mistakenly

attributed the origin of such approaches to Congressman Robert Torricelli.877

Yet, it was

Mas Canosa who sat at the driving seat in the anti-Castro movement in the United States.

Cuba at a Crossroads—Trade, Foreign Investment, Tourism, Culture, and More

Whereas Mas Canosa sought to reduce Cuba’s economic relations abroad, Fidel

Castro expanded them as quickly as possible. By the mid-1980s, the Cuban leader

already faced a stagnating economy, and the U.S. embargo was not the only thing to

blame. Sovietization of the Cuban economy in the early 1970s brought some tangible

benefits in the short span. Yet, following the 1976 drop in sugar market prices, the Cuban

economy suffered from trade deficits, mismanagement, and growing labor indiscipline

and inefficiency. Then, before the 1986 opening of the Third Congress of the Cuban

Communist Party, Castro identified Cuba’s “errors,” undertook austerity measures, and

attacked market mechanisms, private enterprise, and material incentives for labor. Unlike

876

Paper by Mas Canosa, “Cuban Democracy Act.”

877 See for example, Haney and Vanderbush, Embargo, pp. 90-100. For CANF, so-called “Track II”

actually started with the Radio Martí startup of 1985.

332

Gorbachev’s perestroika, Castro’s “rectification” apparently prioritized intensive

ideological and political work over the pursuit of economic growth.878

Yet, regardless of his diatribes against capitalism, Castro never repealed the Law

Decree no. 50 of 1982, which authorized foreign investment in the form of joint ventures

with a Cuban entity. As Gorbachev launched his reforms and the future of the socialist

bloc became uncertain, Cuba could no longer rely on the socialist bloc, which had

supported the Cuban economy through preferential trade, barter, and financial

arrangements.879

Even as early as July 1989, Castro declared that Cuba might have to

survive without the Soviet Union. “Just imagine,” the Cuban leader rhetorically asked,

“what would happen in the world if the socialist community disappeared?” Castro made a

historical reference to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, in which the Cubans were left alone

in front of the United States. “I believe in the people,” he stated. Even if the USSR

dissolved or entered a civil war, “Cuba and the Cuban Revolution would continue

struggling and resisting.”880

To prepare for days without the Soviet Union, the Cuban leader sought ways to

energize the economy. For example, the revolutionary government discounted tourism as

878

Resolution on the Program of the Community Party of Cuba, in Gail Reed, Island in the Storm: The Cuban Community Party’s Fourth Congress (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1992), pp. 101-110. For

Cuba’s economic performances, see also the previous chapters. On rectification, see Pérez-López,

Second Economy, pp. 120-23.

879 Over the period of 1983-1989, the socialist bloc accounted for over 80 percent of Cuba’s trade.

After 1976, the Soviet Union paid four or five times the world market price to purchase Cuban sugar.

The Soviet Union also supplied oil to Cuba at preferential prices, and allowed the island to re-export

since the late 1970s. The socialist bloc also provided development assistance to the island. Pérez-

López, Second Economy, pp. 123-28.

880 Speech by Fidel Castro, July 26, 1989, LANIC. 70 percent of Cuba’s overall trade was with the

Soviet Union and 15-18 percent with Eastern Europe. Schoultz, Infernal, p. 429. For Cuba’s memory

of the crisis, see Blight and Brenner, Sad and Luminous.

333

a vehicle for economic development due to its close association with the capitalist evils

of prostitution, drugs, gambling, and organized crime. Yet at his mid-December 1989

luncheon meeting with EEC ambassadors, Castro emphasized that tourism was vital to

Cuba’s future economy and that Varadero, sixty miles east of Havana, would become a

major international tourism resort.881

In May 1990, the revolutionary government for the

first time oversaw the inauguration of hotels jointly built with foreign capitalists in

Varadero. Thereafter, the government constructed hotels, invited foreign capital for joint

ventures, and increased rentable cars, taxi drivers, and special stores selling consumer

goods for foreign tourists.882

International visitors more than tripled from 132,000 in

1981 to around 424,000 in 1991.883

Havana also sought to increase revenue through cultural diplomacy in the United

States. According to quarterly reports from Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky &

Lieberman, P.C., a law firm in New York that represented the Cuban government in the

United States, Cuban officials discussed ways to take advantage of the 1988 Berman

Amendment, which had exempted “informational materials” from U.S. trade sanctions. In

April 1989, Cuba’s Ministry of Culture founded ARTEX, an entity to advance the

“commercialization” of Cuban cultural products and make “financial contributions” to

881

The British embassy briefed the Canadians on Castro’s remarks. The Canadian embassy in Havana

to Ottawa, December 29, 1989, vol. 28301, 20-Cuba-1-3, part 23, RG25, LAC. Castro again showed

up for a seven-hour luncheon with EEC ambassadors and emphasized new financial opportunities in

Cuba. Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, January 26, 1990, vol. 28301, 20-Cuba-1-3, part 23,

RG25, LAC.

882 Mexican embassy in Havana to Mexico City, May 4, 1989, III-4394-1, AHGE.

883 María Dolores Espino, “Tourism in Cuba: A Development Strategy for the 1990s?” in Jorge F.

Pérez-López, ed., Cuba at a Crossroads: Politics and Economics after the Fourth Party Congress

(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), pp. 147-166.

334

the island. Directed by the Ministry of Culture, the law firm assisted ARTEX in

promoting books, songs, films, paintings, sculptures, and other financially valuable

works. Music was the most important. The law firm identified appropriate U.S. record

companies, explained the amendment, and cultivated their interest in Cuban musicians.884

Capitol Records, a major U.S. record company, released the first record, Cuban jazz

pianist Gonzalo Rubalcaba’s The Blessing, in the spring of 1991.

More than trade, foreign investment, tourism, and promotion of culture, Cuba also

worked to augment political ties with countries beyond the socialist bloc. Of particular

importance was Latin America, a natural area for Havana’s diplomatic effort. Despite the

U.S. policy of isolating Cuba, the region’s democratization had reduced anticommunist

zeal and increased the call for Cuba’s reintegration into the Western Hemisphere. During

the 1980s and early 1990s, Cuba established, normalized, or repaired relations with

Brazil, Uruguay, Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador, Chile, and Colombia. Cuba became

a full member of the Latin American and the Caribbean Economic System, an

organization to promote economic integration and social development in the region. In

1990, with the region’s support, Cuba gained a seat on the UN Security Council for a

two-year term.885

By choosing Cuba to take up this post, Latin American diplomats

884

The firm’s representatives made numerous trips to Havana and met with top Cuban officials,

including Armando Hart, Cuba’s Minister of Culture. See for example, Krinsky to Bank Nacional de

Cuba, “Combined Quarterly Reports for the Periods ending September 30 and December 31, 1989,”

February 5, 1990, pp. 4-5, 12-16, 20-26, as well as other reports, in Caja “Bloqueo 1990-1992,”

MINREX. On ARTEX, see its website, http://www.artexsa.com/quienes-somos (accessed October 13,

2015).

885 Damián J. Fernández, “Continuity and Change in Cuba’s International Relations in the 1990s,” in

Jorge F. Pérez-López, ed., Cuba at a Crossroads: Politics and Economics after the Fourth Party Congress (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), pp. 49-54.

335

encouraged the Cuban government to work beside the United States, a permanent

member of the council.886

Approaches by Mexico, Canada, and USSR

As U.S.-Cuban tensions flared up, various third parties sought to mediate

differences. For example, Mexico stood at the forefront in expanding relations with Cuba

in the late 1980s and early 1990s, even as it deepened economic ties with the United

States. After joining other regional powers to call for the return of Cuba to the OAS, the

Mexican foreign ministry probed the idea of contributing to an improvement in the

relations between the two neighboring countries. In its view, Washington’s startup of TV

Martí was particularly worrisome, as it believed might cause an armed confrontation and

entail further radicalization of the Cuban Revolution. In late February 1990, Mexico thus

offered its assistance to Havana and Washington for establishing a confidential

communication channel to discuss TV Martí problems.887

Despite the wishes of Mexico, it could not stop U.S.-Cuban relations from

deteriorating. Washington’s response to Mexico’s efforts was icy. The U.S. State

Department rejected the offer, affirmed its right to start TV Martí, and insisted that Cuba

886

NYT, October 19, 1989, p. A19. Cuba also began signaling its change of a stance on the Treaty of

Tlatelolco, which prohibited testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition of nuclear weapons.

For a long time Cuba reiterated U.S. hostility toward Cuba as the principal reason for its inability to

participate. Carmen Moreno de Del Cueto to Antonio Villegas Villalobos, September 19, 1989, III-

4394-1, AHGE.

887 “Estrategia para proporcionar distención Cuba y Estados Unidos,” February 26, 1990, III-4520-1,

AHGE; and Mexico City to Mexican embassy in Havana, February 27, 1990, III-4520-1, AHGE. For

earlier thinking, see also Mexican foreign ministry’s office of Latin America and the Caribbean affairs

to Sergio González Galves, September 28, 1989, III-4394-1, AHGE.

336

hold “fair, competitive elections” before being readmitted into the OAS.888

In contrast,

Havana appreciated the offer, reaffirmed its willingness to solve the issue by peaceful

means, and even assured that it would not undermine Mexico’s interests under any

circumstances.889

Not surprisingly, the Mexicans concluded that Washington, rather than

Havana, was the one that created an obstacle to dialogue and resolved to assist Cuba’s

reintegration into the region. Much like the Soviet Union, Mexico hoped to see a change

in Cuba’s political system, but with “strict respect” for Cuba’s sovereignty.890

Similar ideas of mediation emerged in Canada, another major U.S. trading partner

that maintained economic ties with Cuba. For years political disagreements persisted

between Ottawa and Havana over the latter’s intervention in Africa and Latin America. In

December 1989, as Cuba’s military activities declined, Canadian Foreign Minister Joe

Clark conducted a “thorough” policy review.891

Its conclusion was that Ottawa could

convince Havana to undertake political change and mend fences with Washington by

promoting Canadian trade with the island and using it as leverage. In April 1990, Clark

sent his assistant deputy Louise Frechette to initiate a new dialogue with Castro.892

“We

888

Non-paper, forwarded to Sergio González Galvez, March 14, 1990, III-4520-1, AHGE.

889 Sánchez-Parodi to Malmierca, March 20, 1990; and a memorándum del Gobierno de México a

Cuba, n.d., both in Caja “Agresión Radio TV Martí 34,” MINREX.

890 Memorandum para Información Superior, “Cuba—Relaciones Bilaterales entre Cuba y Estados

Unidos,” April 11, 1990, III-4520-1, AHGE. Later Washington blamed Havana for Mexico’s persistent

demand on a dialogue. U.S. note, “Mexican Proposal on Cuba,” attached to Mexico City to Mexican

Embassy in Washington, May 29, 1990, III-4520-1, AHGE.

891 Message of Joe Clark, quoted in Ottawa to Canadian embassy in Havana, December 7, 1989, vol.

14500, 20-1-2-Cuba, part 37, RG25, LAC. See also, Briefing Note for Cuba Strategy Roundtable

(chaired by Clark), December 18, 1989, vol. 14500, 20-1-2-Cuba, part 37, RG25, LAC.

892 Quoted in Ottawa to Canadian embassy in Havana, February 19, 1990, vol. 14500, 20-1-2-Cuba,

part 37, RG25, LAC.

337

are…one of few countries that can help Cubans [to] correctly assess outside realities and

recognize need for change,” Clark wrote to a skeptical Canadian ambassador in

Washington. “Now is the time to use whatever measure of influence we may have in

Havana.”893

Yet, Ottawa’s enthusiasm about dialogue waned rapidly, as it confirmed the

importance of U.S. domestic politics. Because of the existence of the Cuban American

lobby, U.S. policy toward Cuba was “not a foreign policy question, but one of domestic

policy,” something outside the scope of Canadian influence. As such, Ottawa lacked

leverage either on Washington or Havana.894

What is surprising is that Bush himself did

not even deny this perception in a private phone conversation with Canadian Prime

Minister Brian Mulroney. According to Mulroney, he stressed to Gorbachev prior to the

May-June 1990 Washington summit that Soviet aid to Cuba posed a “[domestic political]

problem for George Bush.” The Soviets must understand that “Cuban Americans play a

big role in the Republican Party” and that Cuba was a “fundamental issue” for the U.S.

president. Bush did not express displeasure at the Canadian interpretation of the problem.

Instead, Bush thanked Mulroney for his assistance, saying, “That’s very helpful,

Brian.”895

893

Ottawa to Canadian embassy in Washington, May 9, 1990, vol. 16002, 20-1-2-Cuba, part 38,

RG25, LAC.

894 Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, November 2, 1990, vol. 16002, 20-1-2-Cuba, part 38,

RG25, LAC. Similar observations appear in numerous Canadian reports. See for example, Briefing

Note for Cuba Strategy Roundtable, December 18, 1989, vol. 14500, 20-1-2-Cuba, part 37, RG25,

LAC; Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, November 2, 1990, vol. 16002, 20-1-2-Cuba, part 38,

RG25, LAC; and Briefing Note for the Meeting, November 5, 1990, vol. 16002, 20-1-2-Cuba, part 38,

RG25, LAC.

895 Memcon (Bush, Mulroney), May 31, 1990, p. 1, GHWBL-Web.

338

Gorbachev refused to surrender so easily despite rapidly deteriorating economic

conditions at home. To Havana, Soviet delegations in 1990 and 1991 repeatedly

addressed Moscow’s desire to review the terms of bilateral trade and observe massive

political and economic reforms on the island.896

To Washington, the Soviet leadership

made clear its intention of transiting to a “regulated market economy,” stressed the

importance of Western assistance, and requested a U.S. loan of approximately $15 to 20

billion dollars.897

But when Bush asked Gorbachev to cut economic ties with Cuba once

and for all, Gorbachev again dug in his heels. The Soviet leader instead asked Bush to

open talks with Castro. “It is better if he hears from you rather from us,” he remarked. In

reply, Bush described the Cuban-American “patriotic” community, noting that the issue

was “emotional” in the United States.898

Tellingly, Bush even vetoed Secretary Baker’s proposal for softening the U.S.

stance on Cuba. Trying to shift gears, Baker hinted at the opening of U.S. talks with Cuba

if the latter terminated support for the FMLN. Soviet foreign minister Eduard

Shevardnadze did not miss this silver lining. “If the U.S. treats Cuba as an equal,” he

896

Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, pp. 216-17. For information on the Soviet delegation by Leonid

Abalkin in April 1990, see Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, pp. 179-180; and Canadian embassy in

Moscow to Ottawa, June 1, 1990, vol. 16002, 20-1-2-Cuba, part 38, RG25, LAC. For the Cuba lobby

in Moscow, see Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, pp. 176-78. See also, Report on a Conversation with

Fidel Castro, from the Diary of Yu.V. Petrov, June 20, 1990, TsKhSD. F. 89, op. 8, d. 62, l. 1-6,

WCDA. For the other Soviet-Cuban talks over economic relations, see Report on a Conversation with

Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, from the Diary of Yu.V. Petrov, August 31, 1990, TsKhSD. F. 89, op. 8, d.

61, l. 1-3, WCDA.

897 Memcon (Gorbachev, Baker), May 18, 1990, pp. 9-10, in folder “Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive

1989-June 1990 [4],” Special Separate USSR Notes Files: Gorbachev Files, Brent Scowcroft

Collection (hereafter BSC), GHWBL.

898 Memcon [Draft] (Bush, Gorbachev), June 2, 1990 (11:15 a.m.-12:59 p.m.), pp. 6-7, in folder

“Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July-December 1990 [2],” Special Separate USSR Notes Files:

Gorbachev Files, BSC, GHWBL.

339

quickly followed, “[this] thing might work—as in the case of Angola, where we made it

work after they got treated like equal partners.” Baker was emboldened. “Here is a wild

suggestion: that you [Gorbachev] tell him [Castro] the President [Bush] said that there

will be an improvement in relations and a dialogue, if he will firmly sign on to and

support Esquipulas, which bans the export of insurgency [into] Central America.” But

Bush jumped in and overruled Baker’s suggestion. “That only deals with a small part of

the problem,” he complained. “For the establishment of full relations with Cuba the

people must be able to have free elections, and must enjoy human rights.”899

Here again, despite the U.S.-Soviet rapprochement, the U.S. president sided with

his favorite constituency in Miami. Because Bush clearly stated that Cuba’s foreign

policy was “only a small part of the problem”—smaller than Cuba’s internal politics—the

Soviets were again reminded that the idea of a U.S. diplomatic opening with Castro prior

to Cuba’s political change was not in tune with Bush’s thinking.900

But such a U.S. stance

was unacceptable for Havana. When top-level Soviet officials participated in a “Miami-

Moscow dialogue,” a conference organized by CANF just prior to the Washington

summit, the Cuban government promptly protested their dealings with “the enemies of

the Cuban Revolution.” According to Yuri Pavlov, chief of Latin American affairs at the

Soviet foreign ministry, Carlos Aldana warned that any further contact with the

899

Italics mine. Ibid., pp. 7-8. By Esquipulas, Baker was referring to the termination of Cuban support

for the FMLN. U.S. military support for the “irregular forces” practically ended after February 1990,

when the contras won the Nicaraguan election. See an earlier section on the U.S.-Cuban

disagreements over this issue.

900 Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, p. 217. “Bush will remain hostile toward Castro until the Cuban-

American community blesses a change,” said an anonymous Soviet official. Quoted in Time, June 18,

1990, p. 22.

340

foundation would be considered “disloyal to Cuba.” When Pavlov brought up an idea of

lessening tensions with Cubans abroad, Aldana shook his head. “The national

reconciliation will be achieved,” he stated, “but not with these people.”901

Bush’s Preference for “the Status Quo”—No Abrogation of TV Martí

An alliance between Washington and Miami was never complete, however.

Within a week after launching TV Martí, George Bush found something disturbing in the

Fort Worth Star Telegram, a local newspaper in Texas. An article written by Georgie

Anne Geyer accused Jorge Mas Canosa of advancing his “ambitions to be president of a

post-Castro Cuba.” According to this piece, CANF directors spoke of using Radio and

TV Martí for the aim of “invoking a ‘confrontation’ between the United States and Cuba.”

If Castro responded to a U.S. provocation, they expected, “President Bush will have to

retaliate.” Bush underlined the last sentence: “Someone in the White House has got to

straighten this out.” Puzzled by this warning, Bush forwarded it to his chief of staff John

Sununu with a probing question. “Is Mas [Canosa] playing games [with me]?”902

There exist many other indications that Bush and his administration did not

automatically side with counterrevolutionary Cubans, whose ultimate goal was the

immediate toppling of the Castro regime. For example, the NSC specialist for Latin

901

Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, pp. 161-62. For the conference, see Jacqueline Tillman (CANF

executive director) to Robert Gates, May 18, 1990, in folder “Cuba, General—July-December 1990

(4),” NSC: William T. Pryce Files, GHWBL; and James C. Siegel, Moscow-Miami Dialogue: The

Mini-Summit, occasional paper series III, no. 4 (Miami, FL: University of Miami, Institute for Soviet

and East European Studies, 1990).

902 Bush read this article and underlined all quoted sentences. Bush to Sununu, April 23, 1990,

attached to Georgie Anne Geyer, “Taxpayers support illusions about Cuba,” Fort Worth Star Telegram,

p. 45B, found in #310079, FG434, WHORM, GHWBL.

341

American affairs William Pryce confided to the Canadians that after the startup of TV

Martí the majority opinion of the administration in fact favored the status quo and thus

differed from the one of CANF. The U.S. government would maintain pressure on

Havana on regional peace, human rights, and democratization, and continue to broadcast

TV Martí under whatever circumstances. But it would oppose any further tightening of

the embargo, avoid risking any unnecessary confrontation, and keep exploring

opportunities for cooperation on issues of mutual concern.903

Among the most important of such bilateral issues was the control of migration.

In June 1990 in New York, Michael Kozak, deputy assistant secretary of state for inter-

American affairs, met Ricardo Alarcón, Cuban ambassador to the United Nations. The

meeting solved few problems. Whereas Kozak tried to increase the number of Mariel

returnees to the island, Alarcón urged the U.S. delegation to accept close to 20,000

Cubans as immigrants per year and comply with the “spirit” of the previous migration

agreement. Despite the lack of notable accomplishments, however, both sides agreed to

maintain contact.904

They also discussed the irregular flow of Cubans into the United

States via third countries like Panama. When Kozak asked if the two countries could

exchange information on migration fraud, Alarcón called such cooperation “useful.”

903

Canadian embassy in Washington to Ottawa, May 15, 1990, vol. 28651, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 12,

RG25, LAC. The Canadians gained similar information from Robert Morley, State Department’s

coordinator for Cuban affairs. Canadian embassy in Washington to Ottawa, June 28, 1990, vol. 28651,

20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 12, RG25, LAC.

904 On instruction from Havana, the Cuban embassy in Ottawa briefed the Canadian government of the

meeting. Canadian embassy in Washington to Ottawa, July 12, 1990, vol. 28651, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA,

part 12, RG25, LAC.

342

Kozak promised that he would provide relevant information in the future and ask the

Cubans to do the same.905

Havana’s acceptance of U.S.-Cuban talks on migration did not mean that Cuban

leaders remained hopeful for the normalization of relations. In his talks with the Soviet

ambassador in Havana, Castro “clearly confirmed Cuba’s readiness to normalize

relations,” yet he also manifested “pessimism” about U.S. intentions, highlighting

Washington’s demand for political change. The Cuban leader also revealed that he had

instructed the Cuban delegation in New York not to give “the impression that we are in a

hurry” for a U.S.-Cuban rapprochement.906

Especially after the startup of TV Martí,

Havana seemed to believe that Washington would take advantage of any sign of

weakness. In an interview with CNN, he declared that Cuba would “never accept any

conditions that have to do with the internal policy of the country” for the sake of

improving Cuban relations with the United States.907

Havana’s reactions to a new U.S. proposal for an exchange of television programs

confirm this point. This proposal originated from Washington’s hesitation to distance

itself from Miami. Based on a poll and on-site verification, the USINT in Havana

reported TV Martí had gained the zero reception in Cuba. But under Mas Canosa’s

influence, the U.S. Information Agency commissioned a survey based on interviews with

Cubans coming into Miami to present the opposite result. Despite its awareness of

905

Memcon (Kozak, Alarcón), June 21, 1990, pp. 3-4, MINREX.

906 Report on a Conversation with Fidel Castro, from the Diary of Yu.V. Petrov, June 20, 1990,

TsKhSD. F. 89, op. 8, d. 62, l. 1-6, WCDA.

907 Fidel Castro, interview, found in An Encounter with Fidel: An Interview by Gianni Minà, trans.

Mary Todd (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1991), p. 257.

343

jamming problems, an interagency working group avoided judging the veracity of the

two outcomes. It instead recommended the opening of U.S.-Cuban talks as “a means of

securing a mass audience for TV Martí.” If Washington allowed Havana to broadcast its

programs in the United States, the group thought, Havana would stop jamming TV

Martí.908

Washington’s machination duped no one in Havana, as the Cuban government

knew that it had completely jammed TV Martí. In a memorandum to Fidel Castro,

Aldana summarized Cuba’s positions on this issue. The United States should abandon TV

Martí, and its use of the name of Jose Martí was “a grave affront to Cuba.” The U.S.

programs to be exchanged should not reflect “the points of view of the [Cuban]

counterrevolutionary emigration.” Rather, the exchanged programs should value an

ethical element and be consistent with mutual respect in terms of focus, visual

presentation, and language. In short, this project should serve a substitute, not a

justification for the continuation of TV Martí.909

In response to the proposal, Havana

suggested that negotiations begin only in September, knowing that Washington could not

908

“TV Martí: PCC Recommendations,” n.d., in folder “Cuba: TV Marti [7],” NSC: Charles A.

Gillespie Files, GWHBL. On the alleged Mas Canosa’s influence on the USIA, see also, Taylor,

interview transcript, pp. 155-57; and David Michael Wilson (executive assistant to deputy director of

USIA), interview transcript, pp. 67-69, FAOH.

909 Aldana noted that his staff was thinking of introducing a 27-minute-long weekly news program

into a Havana City TV Channel in exchange of broadcasting a program of Cuba’s equivalent in

Univision, the largest TV channel in Spanish in the United States. Aldana to Fidel Castro, August 18,

1990, Caja “Agresión Radio TV Martí 34,” MINREX.

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wait that long.910

In August, when Bush declared that TV Martí passed a five-month

preliminary test, releasing $16 million for its funding, Havana showed little surprise.911

Bush’s Preference for “the Status Quo”—Declaration of Non-Aggressive Intent

Castro’s will did not bend even as the Cuban economy entered a dangerous phase.

By the summer of 1990, Moscow began to experience difficulties in delivering products

to Havana.912

On September 28, Castro responded to this emergency by declaring a

“special period” (período especial) and undertaking additional austerity measures. Castro

warned that this period might become “very difficult and very harsh,” adding that his

enemies in Washington and Miami did their best to make the survival of the revolution

harder. “That is their hope,” he stated, “the hope of the counterrevolutionary community

there in Miami.” These people were “already thinking about the post-revolutionary

period…Undoubtedly their basic ambition would be to turn this country into a Miami,

and into a total gambling den.”913

As long as Havana vowed to defend the existing one-party political system,

Bush’s attitude would remain hostile. In the fall of 1990, trying to quicken the pace of the

negotiated settlement in El Salvador, the U.S. president approached the leaders of Spain,

Mexico, and Venezuela to convince Castro to restrain the FMLN. Yet, when Moscow

910

Aldana to Manuel Davis, August 20, 1990, Caja “Agresión Radio TV Martí 34,” MINREX. See

also, Aldana to Malmierica, August 2, 1990, Caja “Bilateral 21,” MINREX.

911 NYT, August 28, 1990, p. 2A; and Pro-Memoria, September 3, 1990, attached to Viera to

Rodríguez, September 3, 1990, Caja “Agresión Radio TV Martí 34,” MINREX.

912 Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, pp. 185-190; and Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, October

5, 1990, vol.16002, 20- 1-2-Cuba, part 38, RG25, LAC.

913 Speech by Castro, September 28, 1990, LANIC.

345

brought up the idea of inviting Cuba to U.S.-Soviet talks on regional peace, Washington

not only rejected it but also repeated the demand that the USSR cut economic ties with

Cuba.914

In the spring of 1991, Washington courted votes of newly emerged East

European countries and succeeded for the first time in passing a U.S.-sponsored

resolution against Cuba at the UNCHR in Geneva. In early May, Bush dismissed a

proposal by Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Pérez, who volunteered to mediate

U.S.-Cuban differences. “I don’t think we should be doing anything to support a

dictator,” Bush stated frankly.915

In the face of a Havana-Washington impasse, Moscow sought to defend its

Caribbean ally with declining capabilities. At the end of 1990, the Soviet Union forged a

new trade agreement with Cuba for the year 1991, although it never delivered most

products. Moscow also kept trying to persuade Washington to open talks with Havana on

issues like El Salvador and the Gulf War. More important were Moscow’s attempts to

withdraw a U.S. security guarantee for Cuba in exchange for Soviet reduction of its

military assistance to the island. In June 1990, the Soviet foreign ministry’s Pavlov

initiated such negotiations with Aronson. Soviet deputy foreign minister Georgiy

Mamedov followed up by conducting shuttle diplomacy among Moscow, Washington,

and Havana. Yet, the process dragged on due to the reluctance to make concession by

914

Diplomatic note handed by Soviet ambassador in Mexico to the Mexican foreign ministry, October

1, 1990, III-4520-1, AHGE. The note was on the Baker-Shevardnadze meeting in Moscow in

September-October 1990.

915 Memcon (Bush, Pérez), May 3, 1991, p. 8, GHWBL-Web.

346

both the U.S. and Soviet militaries. Further, Havana insisted that if the Soviets removed

their troops from Cuba, Washington should do the same from its base at Guantánamo.916

What came out of these maneuvers was a major speech by Bush on May 20, 1991.

Bush used all kinds of tough rhetoric and reiterated his “unwavering commitment for a

free and democratic Cuba.” He stated that U.S. goals in Cuba were “freedom and

democracy.” As such, “if Cuba holds fully free and fair elections under international

supervision, respects human rights, and stops subverting its neighbors, we can expect

relations between our two countries to improve significantly.”917

On the same day in

Miami, Assistant Secretary Bernard Aronson attended CANF’s tenth anniversary of its

founding to reiterate the same points.918

The newspapers heralded the presidential

message as a “new initiative on Cuba.” Scholars have agreed with this assessment,

calling Bush the first U.S. president to demand Cuba’s internal political change as a

primary condition for better U.S.-Cuban relations.919

916

U.S. embassy in Moscow to Washington, June 23, 1990, DOS-FOIA; Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, pp. 213-16, 223; and Canadian embassy in Moscow to Ottawa, March 15, 1991, vol. 16002,

20-1-2-Cuba, part 38, RG25, LAC. The Soviet ambassador in Ottawa later confirmed this story.

Ottawa to Canadian embassy in Moscow, June 13, 1991, vol. 16002, 20-1-2-Cuba, part 38, RG25,

LAC. According to a U.S. source, Soviet foreign minister Alexander Bessmertnykh offered a 2/3 cut

in Soviet military aid to Cuba in exchange for a U.S. non-invasion pledge. Fact Sheet “Central

America/ Cuba,” n.d., in folder “POTUS Trip to Moscow and Kiev, July 29-August 1, 1991 [2],” box

1, NSC: Nicholas Burns Files: Subject Files, GHWBL.

917 Speech by Bush, May 20, 1991, APP.

918 Remarks of Bernard Aronson to the CANF Tenth Anniversary Meeting, May 20, 1991, in folder

“Cuba (General) July 1991-October 1991 [1],” NSC: Charles A. Gillespie Files, GHWBL.

919 LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, p. 266; and Morris and McGillion, Unfinished Business,

p. 37. A major exception is Jorge I. Domínguez, “U.S. Policy toward Cuba in the 1980s and 1990s,”

The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 533 (May 1994): pp. 171-72.

For media coverage, see for example, MH, May 21, 1991, p. 1A.

347

Yet, according to the NSC officials who drafted the speech, it contained “no new

policy” because they knew that the United States had placed demands on Cuba’s

democracy since Reagan’s presidency.920

What was more remarkable about this speech

was the public declaration of nonaggressive intent, which Bush shrouded in the

overwhelming volume of hawkish language. Bush made clear an essentially peaceful

U.S. intent by challenging Castro to “let Cuba live in peace with its neighbors” including

the United States.921

However clumsy it might have sounded, this remark was significant

because a U.S. President unilaterally pledged, for the first time since the end of the Cold

War, that the United States had no plans to invade Cuba militarily. In his testimony

before the U.S. Congress, Aronson reinforced this point, speaking of Washington’s

expectation that Moscow receive this message favorably and consider the withdrawal of

its troops from Cuba.922

After this speech Washington largely went back to a wait-and-see approach,

looking for any new indication of Castro’s change of mind. Before the summit meeting in

Moscow, Bush telephoned Mexican President Carlos Salinas to discuss the issues of El

Salvador and Cuba. “I hope there will be pressure for [Castro] to reform,” he said. “We

would have instantly better relations if he did.” Bush essentially exhibited his incipient

920

David Pacelli to Robert M. Gates, May 17, 1991, in folder “Cuba (General) January 1991-June

1991 [2],” NSC: Charles A. Gillespie Files, GHWBL. Aronson also said that there was no change in

policy. Quoted in MH, May 21, 1991, p. 1A.

921 Speech by Bush, May 20, 1991.

922 U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East and on

Western Hemisphere Affairs, Cuba in a Changing World: The United States-Soviet-Cuban Triangle,

102nd Cong., 1st sess., April 30, July 11 and 31, 1991, pp. 105-6. For the State Department’s views,

see also Morley to Aronson, “Soviet Assets in Cuba and Potential Trade-offs,” May 29, 1990, DOS-

FOIA.

348

idea of a step-by-step approach, linking better relations with the United States with

domestic reforms in Cuba. “If Castro would do something, then we could do something.”

Bush hastened to add. “But without change on his side, I can’t do anything” because “I

have my own political problems here.” Bush denied any hostile feelings toward the

island. “We have great affection for the Cuban people and want better relations with

Cuba.” Then he uttered something enigmatic. “After all, there are more Cubans in Miami

than there are in Cuba.”923

CANF and Corporate America

Although Bush was equivocal in terms of numbers, he was probably conscious of

growing agitation in Miami. Three days before the May 20 speech, CANF announced the

establishment of a blue ribbon commission to establish a “blueprint for a free-market

economy in a post-Castro Cuba.” Mas Canosa teamed up with economic libertarians such

as Malcom Forbes and Arthur Laffer and prepared for drafts of bills and codes for

privatization laws; commercial, banking, foreign investment, and tax codes; currency and

monetary policy guidelines; foreign debt guidelines; and relations with international

financial organizations.924

The commission’s advisory board was composed of Florida

senators, Miami representatives, conservative thinkers, former U.S. officials, as well as

anti-Castro Cubans like Valladares.

923

Memcon (Bush, Salinas), July 11, 1991, GHWBL-Web.

924 CANF Press Release, May 17, 1991, in folder “Blue Ribbon Commission,” box 1.82, CANF

Archive.

349

In addition to political support, the foundation also looked for U.S. corporate

allies because private investment was the key to its economic transition plan.925

According to its internal documents, CANF’s “sale pitch” to U.S. corporations was to

make them believe that non-economic factors, such as “support for Cuban American

initiatives,” would become an important matter of consideration when the future Cuban

government assessed bids on commercial ventures and service contracts. In other words,

the foundation requested $25,000 as fees from U.S. corporations in return for their

imagined privileged access to investment opportunities in post-Castro Cuba.926

In dealing

with U.S. corporations whose property was seized by the Cuban government, the

foundation also emphasized that the project would lead to “quick resolution” of their

asset claims.927

Numerous U.S. corporations displayed interest in CANF’s blue ribbon

commission, which held conferences across major U.S. cities. The Mid-America

Committee for International Business and Government Corporation Inc., an association

of 160 multinational corporations in the Mid-West, co-sponsored one of the events in

Chicago, which attracted around 100 executives from U.S. companies. “I don’t think it’s

a matter of if Castro will fall, [but]…a matter of when,” said the committee chairman

925

CANF, Blue Ribbon Commission on the Economic Reconstruction of Cuba: Conceptual Outline,

March 27, 1991, in folder “Blue Ribbon Commission-Incoming Correspondence,” box 1.82, CANF

Archive.

926 A CANF leader may offer a special discounted rate “as a sliver bullet to close the deal.” Tom Cox,

“Blue Ribbon Commission: My Trip Backgrounder,” August 13, 1991, in folder “Blue Ribbon

Commission-Incoming Correspondence,” box 1.82, CANF Archive.

927 Tom Cox, “New York August 14, ‘Blue Ribbon Commission’ Meetings with Corporate Board

Candidates,” August 13, 1991, in folder “Blue Ribbon Commission-Incoming Correspondence,” box

1.82, CANF Archive.

350

Tom Miner. “And when he does, we want to be one of the first in.” According to Miner,

most of the associated companies operated in pre-Castro Cuba and looked to Mas Canosa

as the best candidate for the next Cuban president.928

Corporate America probably liked

him even more, after the foundation produced a transition paper. While presenting

democratic rule, corporate power, and individual freedom as remedies for Cuba’s ills, the

paper sentenced the 1959 “Castro’s” Revolution as “a consummate failure.”929

A Struggle for the Voice of the Community

In addition to Castro, however, CANF also confronted Cuban Americans who

supported dialogue and reconciliation among Cubans abroad and on the island. After the

cancellation of Diálogo following the 1980 Mariel boatlift, pro-dialogue forces lost

momentum. But groups like the Cuban American Committee continued to advocate the

lifting of the U.S. embargo, accused CANF of misrepresenting the voices of the

community, and complimented Bush’s declaration of non-aggressive intent as a “step in

the right direction.”930

Other new spokesmen also appeared in favor of greater

engagement, such as Ramón Cernuda, coordinator of dissident groups on the island, and

Francisco Aruca, owner of a travel company, Marazul, and director of Radio Progreso.

928

Chicago Tribune, October 29, 1992, pp. A1-A2.

929 CANF, Transition Paper, May 1993, in folder “Blue Ribbon Commission-Incoming

Correspondence,” box 1.82, CANF Archive.

930 For Alicia M. Torres’s testimony in the writing, see U.S. House, Cuba in a Changing World, p.

213. See also, Torres to Bush, June 29, 1990, in folder “Cuban American Committee,” White House

Office of Public Liaison: Shiree Sánchez Files, GHWBL; and Torres’s testimony in the writing,

included in U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Consideration of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., March 18, 25, April 2, 8, May 21, June 4, 5, 1992, pp. 500-509.

351

The rise of pro-dialogue voices partly reflected Miami’s continuing interest in

humanitarian issues. As indicated above, Cuban American opinion generally favored the

hardline stance advocated by CANF. But when it came to the question of family

reunification and greater communication, the same people endorsed engagement with the

island. According to a poll in March 1991, 76 percent of Cuban Americans favored

negotiations with the Cuban government to allow family members in Cuba to come to the

United States, and 62 percent favored dialogue to allow normal direct phone connections

with the island.931

Another poll indicated that 55 percent affirmed that the sending of

medicine, clothing, and money to families in Cuba was more important than mounting

pressure on the Cuban government.932

Accordingly, Havana’s emigration policy also became more nuanced and

responsive to human needs. In May 1985, the Cuban government halted Cuban American

visits to the island as if it were punishing the entire community for CANF’s promotion of

Radio Martí. Yet in November 1988, the Cuban government again eased restrictions on

U.S.-to-Cuba family visits and took no similar retaliatory measures in response to the

1990 startup of TV Martí.933

Another sign of Havana’s new attitude toward emigration

was a phased relaxation of emigration regulation, lowering the minimum age for short

visits to the United States to twenty. This policy change resulted in a surge of Cuban

applications for nonimmigrant visas at the USINT in Havana from 2,730 in 1988 to

931

MH, March 31, 1991, pp. 1B and 2B; and 1993 FIU Cuba Poll.

932 MH, May 9, 1991, p. 1B.

933 For Cuba’s thinking, see also Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, November 8, 1988, vol.

28310, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 10, RG25, LAC; and Carlos Aldana, interview with Areíto, September

10, 1989.

352

34,126 in 1990. As the number went over 32,000 during the first six months of 1991, the

USINT in Havana stopped accepting new applications to clear the backlog.934

Pro-dialogue forces supported increased contacts between Cubans on both sides

of the Florida Straits to alleviate hardships. Flights carried visitors back and forth three

times per week. U.S.-to-Cuba visitors purchased Cuban passports and visas for the

chance to bring back a plastic bag with cosmetics, medicine, and drugstore items like

aspirin, most of which were no longer available to their families on the island.935

Cuba-

to-U.S. visitors received family remittances in advance to cover travel fees so that they

could visit the United States and bring back more hard currency. For those who could

neither afford to travel to the island nor assist their families in coming to the United

States, businesses sending money, food, medicines, clothes, glasses, and everyday

products to Cuba advertised their services in Miami’s Spanish-language newspapers.936

But their advocacy for greater engagement put them on a collision course with

CANF’s pursuit of Castro’s fall. By arguing that travel, family remittances, and gift

shipments generated extra revenue for the Cuban government, Mas Canosa urged the

U.S. government to employ a stricter interpretation of the humanitarian exceptions to the

embargo.937

An interagency committee in Washington adopted this recommendation. On

934

Statement of Michael G. Kozak before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, House

of Representatives, June 5, 1991, in folder “Cuba (General) January 1991-June 1991 [2],” NSC:

Charles A. Gillespie Files, GHWBL.

935 Alan H. Flanigan (chief of USINT in Havana), interview transcript, p. 54, FAOH.

936 See for example, those on El Nuevo Herald, January 13, 1991, February 24, 1991, February 28,

1991; and DLA, January 13, 1991.

937 CANF estimated that the total amount of the revenue was as high as $234.8 million. Mas Canosa to

Pacelli, with a CANF’s report, March 1, 1991, in folder “Cuba (General) July 1991-October 1991

[2],” NSC: Charles A. Gillespie Files, GHWBL.

353

September 27, 1991, the Treasury Department announced new regulations that limited

the travel fees a U.S. national could send to Cuba to $500, lowered the maximum family

remittances per quarter from $500 to $300, and prohibited Cuba-to-U.S. visitors from

carrying more U.S. currency than they had declared on arrival in the United States.

Rather than allying with pro-dialogue forces, the administration was still attempting to

pacify anti-Castro hardliners.938

Dilemma of Regime Change—Loyalty, Voice, and Exit

The counterrevolutionary dream appeared closer to reality after the August 1991

coup in Moscow. The incident sapped the USSR’s will to support Cuba. On September

11, in the presence of Baker, Gorbachev announced the withdrawal of its 2,800-man

brigades from Cuba, a symbol of the Cuban-Soviet military alliance, without informing

Castro in advance. Much of Soviet aid and trade with Cuba soon disappeared.939

To

convert this momentous change into his favor, CANF’s Mas Canosa toured dozens of

countries and sought support for his post-Castro plans. He met world figures like Russia’s

Boris Yeltsin, Britain’s Margaret Thatcher, Mexico’s Carlos Salinas, Czech’s Vaclav

Havel, and Polish leader Lech Walesa. During his December 1991 trip to Moscow, he

938

The State Department thanked CANF for its study of this issue. Vicki Hulddeston to Mas Canosa,

October 24, 1991, in folder “Cuba, General—October-December 1991 (2),” NSC: Charles A.

Gillespie Files, GHWBL. A law firm that represented Cuba’s interests in the United States assumed

that OFAC adopted this provision “more for domestic political appearances than for actual, practical

effect.” Memorandum by Krinsky, October 7, 1991, Caja “Bloqueo 1990-1992,” MINREX.

939 Boris Pankin, The Last Hundred Days of the Soviet Union, trans. Alexei Pankin (London: I. B.

Tauris, 1996), pp. 105-7, 114-16; and James A. Baker, III with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: Putnam’s, 1995), pp. 528-29

354

received “a toast to a free and democratic Cuba” by the Russian parliamentarians “with

Bacardi rum.”940

Broken abruptly from the socialist orbit, Cuba’s economy shrank by more than 40

percent between 1990 and 1993.941

The Cuban government responded to this emergency

in various ways. For instance, the government urged Cuban citizens to enter a national

debate before the Fourth Congress of the Cuban Communist Party. Appealing to their

loyalty for the leadership, the Political Bureau of the party sought out citizen participation,

commitment, and a “confrontation of idea, where the most convincing, best argued and

defended, wins out.”942

Some 3.5 million Cubans participated in 80,000 assemblies to

discuss various issues, principally non-political ones.943

Although the Fourth Congress

undertook only modest political reforms, Castro praised it as “the most democratic

political congress ever held” in revolutionary Cuba.944

The Cuban government harshly treated its dissidents. Individuals such as Gustavo

Arcos, Osvaldo Payá Sardiñas, and Elizardo Sánchez Santa Cruz requested a national

dialogue, greater respect for human rights, and a free and democratic election in Cuba.

940

Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, January 17, 1992, p. 5, box 1.04, CANF

Archive. CANF lobbied Russia to halt all economic and military aid to Cuba, to withdraw all Soviet

troops from Cuba, and to gain commitment not to help the Cuban government in case of a “revolt”

against Fidel and Raúl Castro.

941 Pérez, Reform and Revolution, p. 293.

942 Statement by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Granma, June

23, 1990, pp. 4-5.

943 For the Communist Party’s preparative works, see Reed, Island in the Storm, esp. pp. 15-18.

944 Speech by Fidel Castro, in Reed, Island in the Storm, p. 196. For an evaluation of the Congress, see

William M. LeoGrande, “‘The Cuban Nation’s Single Party’: the Communist Party of Cuba Faces the

Future,” in Philip Brenner, et. al., eds., A Contemporary Cuba Reader: Reinventing the Revolution

(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), p. 53.

355

While ignoring these demands, the government attacked their declared support for the

U.S. motion at the UNCHR in Geneva, as they appeared to fall into a U.S. ploy.945

In late

August, moreover, the Cuban Ministry of the Interior declared that dissidents with

foreign contacts posed a direct threat to Cuba’s national security.946

In the wake of the

Soviet collapse, Cuban authorities intensified surveillance, harassment, and “acts of

repudiation.”947

Cuba’s internal opposition was rendered exceptionally weak compared to

those in Eastern European countries.

Whereas Washington attacked Havana’s human rights record, Havana condemned

Washington’s migration policy. Between 1985 and 1990, U.S. authorities rejected 80

percent of Cuban applicants for immigrant visas, leading only 7,428 Cubans to emigrate

to the United States as such.948

Washington explained that the increased number of

rejections did not result from any political design but from the inability of many Cuban

applicants to meet U.S. requirements.949

Nevertheless, Havana accused the U.S.

945

See Castro’s comment on “Trojan horse” mentioned earlier in this chapter.

946 The ministry claimed that it seized a letter from Carlos Alberto Montaner, an influential anti-Castro

Cuban activist in Spain, inviting the dissidents to form the new opposition force to the Castro regime.

Cuban Ministry of the Interior’s informative note, sent to the Mexican embassy, August 30, 1991, in

Mexican embassy in Havana to Mexico City, September 5, 1991, III-4806-1, AHGE. See also,

Mexican embassy in Havana to Mexico City, September 2, 1991, III-4806-1, AHGE.

947 For Mexico’s report on the dissident groups, see Informe, February 1990, attached to Mexican

embassy in Havana to Mexico City, February 20, 1990, III-4520-1, AHGE. For human rights groups’

reports, News from Americas Watch, “Cuba,” August 11, 1991; and Amnesty International, “Cuba:

Silencing the Voices of Dissent,” December 1992, available at

http://www.amnesty.org/es/library/asset/AMR25/026/1992/es/ec33ae5f-ed96-11dd-95f6-

0b268ecef84f/amr250261992en.html (accessed December 20, 2014).

948 Aja, Al cruzar, pp. 167-68; and Arboleya, Cuba y los cubanoamericanos, p. 58.

949 In May 1991, inquired by the Canadian embassy, Thomas Gerth, deputy head of the U.S. interest

sections, noted the “surprising” decline of applicants for immigration visas. The USINT had initially

expected the annual flow of about 12,000 to the United States based on numbers of sponsorship

petitions, some of which was made before 1980. Yet, it appeared that the substantial number of

356

government of manipulating the process to increase domestic discontent and create what

Castro called a “Trojan horse.”950

Although Cuba’s desire to increase emigration was

nothing new, the decline of the economy added some elements of urgency. Havana also

might have noticed that Mas Canosa and his congressional allies spoke of closing legal

Cuba-to-U.S. migration channels in order to foster a rebellion against the regime.951

But even if Washington had closed legal immigration routes, many discontented

Cubans would have preferred emigration to rebellion. The number of Cubans leaving the

island through illegal routes rose, as they still enjoyed a Cold War-era special treatment.

Once they entered the United States, they could apply for asylum, stay for a year and a

day, and adjust their status through the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act. There was no

likelihood that they would ever face deportation. Lured by such privilege, some came to

the United States as tourists and overstayed. Of 16,857 Cubans who travelled to the

United States from January to October 1992, 2,922 (17.3%) did not return to Cuba.952

Others arrived by boats, rafts, or whatever they assembled to cross the Florida Straits.

The number of the boaters increased from 59 in 1988, 391 in 1989, and 467 in 1990, to

applicants or their U.S.-resident sponsors had died by the 1987 migration agreement or had left via

third countries. Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, May 31, 1989, vol.28310, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA,

part 10, RG25, LAC.

950 Report on a Conversation with Fidel Castro, from the Diary of Yu.V. Petrov, June 20, 1990,

TsKhSD. F. 89, op. 8, d. 62, l. 1-6, WCDA. For Cuba’s viewpoints, Diplomatic note, May 23, 1989,

MINREX; and Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, October 26, 1988, vol.28310, 20-Cuba-1-3-

USA, part 10, RG25, LAC.

951 See comments by Torricelli and Mas Canosa in U.S. House, Cuba in a Changing World, pp. 173-

74.

952 Bienvenido García Negrín to Roberto Robaina González, July 6, 1993, Caja “Bilateral 36,”

MINREX. The INS exaggerated the volume by estimating that 33 percent of all Cuban travelers

overstayed in the United States, leading U.S. officials to call the phenomena “a slow motion Mariel.”

U.S. House, Cuba in a Changing World, pp. 15-16, 130.

357

747 already by May 23, 1991.953

Hundreds of silent and cold bodies also reached ashore

along the coasts of Florida.954

The specter of “another Mariel” again came across the Sunshine State. In one of

the U.S. congressional hearings, Assistant Secretary Aronson swore multiple times that

his government would not allow another Mariel. Aronson said, “This President and this

administration will not permit, I repeat, this President and this administration will not

permit another Mariel.”955

Yet, public declarations of no-more-Mariels did not satisfy the

Floridians, who failed to receive from the federal government $150 million out of the

total expense incurred during the Mariel boatlift.956

In May 1991, trying to pacify the

rising concerns, the INS provided local and state agencies with a 51-page-long paper,

“Mass Immigration Emergency Plan—Florida.”957

Yet, the State of Florida found the

project far from satisfactory, urging the federal government to “continuously pursue all

953

Cuban Arrival by Boat/ Raft, May 23, 1991, in folder “Mass Migration Immigration Plan (2),” box

9, Governor Lawton Chiles: Chief of Staff Subject Files, SAF.

954 Representative Lawrence J. Smith from Florida testified that from January to May 1991, Florida

found approximately 860 bodies of Cuban immigrants washed up on shores. The number was 467 all

in 1990. U.S. House, Cuba in a Changing World, p. 6.

955 Ibid., pp. 129-130.

956 The total cost was $400 million. Minutes of the Meeting, July 15, 1991, p. 1, in folder “Mass

Migration Immigration Working Group,” box 9, Governor Lawton Chiles: Chief of Staff Subject Files,

SAF. Also important was anti-immigration sentiment that remained high among the state’s non-

Hispanic populations. See for example, J. Arthur Heise, Hugh Gladwin, and Douglas McLaughen,

1989 FIU/ Florida Poll (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1989), pp. 221, 466; and ibid.,

1991 FIU/ Florida Poll (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991), pp. 192, 404.

957 U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, “Mass Immigration

Emergency Plan—Florida,” October 30, 1987 (revised on May 14, 1990), in folder “Mass Migration

Immigration Emergency Plan,” box 9, Governor Lawton Chiles: Chief of Staff Subject Files, SAF.

358

diplomatic avenues available.”958

The Bush administration did not come back to the state

of Florida for the following fourth months.

It was a dramatic spike of Haitian migration in late 1991 that prompted further

federal actions. The arrival of boatpeople aroused another round of debates over the equal

treatment of migrants as the U.S. government sent back Haitians while accepting Cubans.

In the face of massive criticisms of double-standard practices, the Bush administration

later modified this policy, kept Haitians at Guantánamo, and approved asylum cases for

at least ten thousand. On this occasion, the Bush administration approached the Cuban

government regarding the use of Guantánamo as a detention center, which completely

defied the terms of the lease. Luckily for Washington, Havana raised no objection. The

U.S. and Cuban governments agreed to cooperate on this migration issue.959

For the state of Florida, however, the Haitian crisis amplified the fear of similar

and even greater migration chaos from Cuba. On March 3, 1992, Governor Lawton

Chiles wrote to Bush urging a prompt federal reaction to the Floridian concern.960

In

response, the U.S. president reassured the governor by making clear his priority.

“Preventing another Mariel,” the president resolved, “is our first and foremost

958

William E. Sadowski to Jim Krog (Office of Governor’s chief of staff), June 3, 1991, in folder

“Mass Migration Immigration Emergency Plan,” box 9, Governor Lawton Chiles: Chief of Staff

Subject Files, SAF. For other numerous comments, see the papers attached to this letter.

959 For the debate, see for example, U.S. House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on

International Law, Immigration, and Refugees, Cuban and Haitian Immigration, 102nd Cong., 1st

sess., November 20, 1991.

960 Chiles to Bush, March 3, 1992, in folder “Cuba: Mariel [2],” NSC: Charles A. Gillespie Files,

GHWBL.

359

objective.”961

With this statement, the Bush administration started to work closely with

Florida in developing a contingency plan, which its successor would later use in the

migration crisis of 1994. Unlike Miami Cubans, the state of Florida prioritized migration

order over the toppling of the Castro regime. Bush’s reply to Chiles illustrated that the

U.S. government would side with Florida in case the latter’s interests clashed with those

of Miami Cubans.962

Debates over the Cuban Democracy Act

In the summer and fall of 1991, Bush and Castro adopted a policy of watchful

waiting without making any major moves toward each other.963

As Castro made clear to

José Córdoba, chief of staff to the Mexican president Carlos Salinas, Cuba reaffirmed

that socialism and the revolution were one and the same.964

And as Bush’s National

Security Adviser Scowcroft remarked to Córdoba, Havana’s position was unacceptable

for Washington. “If Castro frees up his economy, if he opens up to democracy,”

Scowcroft stated, “we would be ready to support such moves.”965

Salinas invited Castro

for a meeting in Cozumel, Mexico, as well as the presidents of Venezuela and Columbia.

961

Bush to Lawton Chiles, March 26, 1992, in folder “Cuba: Mariel [2],” NSC: Charles A. Gillespie

Files, GHWBL. The NSC officials inserted the quoted line into the draft prepared by the Justice

Department.

962 According to Robert Morley, the U.S. government had contingency plans for turning back Cubans,

as well as Haitians, if they were coming in unacceptable numbers. Morley, interview transcript, p.

108, FAOH.

963 See for example, Memcon (Bush, Salinas), July 11, 1991, GHWBL-Web; and Memcon (Bush,

Pérez), September 24, 1991, pp. 6-7, GHWBL-Web. Castro attended the conference.

964 Decismosexto breve informe sobre la situacion en Cuba, sent from the Mexican embassy in

Havana to Mexico City, October 1, 1991, III-4806-1, AHGE.

965 Memcon (Scowcroft, Córdoba), October 18, 1991, p.5, GHWBL-Web.

360

Well aware of Cuba’s desperate need for oil, these three wondered if Castro might make

concessions in exchange for access to their resources. Castro praised Mexico yet did little

to please them.966

It was Miami Cubans who seized a new initiative. CANF’s Mas Canosa grew

restless as multinational enterprises continued to make business with the island to

“position themselves for post-Castro business.”967

He had proposed the Mack

Amendment, which sought to prohibit foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies from

trading with Cuba. But the Bush administration refused to support the amendment

because major U.S. allies like Canada, Britain, and Mexico protested its extraterritorial

enforcement of U.S. laws in third countries.968

Mas Canosa expressed his frustration at a

local Spanish radio. “We always have said that there is conflict between the interests of

this great North American nation, which is also our nation, and the interest of the Cuban

966

In October 1991, when José Córdoba visited Cuba, Cuba’s Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodríguez

informed him of Cuba’s shortfall of oil and put out feelers at the possibility that Mexico would replace

the Soviet Union as a major provider of oil to the island. Decimosexto breve informe sobre la

situacion en Cuba, sent from the Mexican embassy in Havana to Mexico City, October 1, 1991, III-

4806-1, AHGE. A U.S. source indicates that Bush persuaded Mexico to “suspend subsidies on oil.”

Scowcroft’s comment in Memcon, “Meeting with Cuban-American Community Leaders,” May 6,

1992, p. 2, in folder “Presidential Meetings-Memorandum of Conversations 5/1/92-6/17/92,”

Presidential Correspondence Series, BSC, GHWBL.

967 Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, April 14, 1991, pp. 1-2, box 1.04, CANF

Archive.

968 U.S. House, Cuba in a Changing World, p. 128. See also, White House Press Statement,

“Memorandum of Disapproval,” November 16, 1990, in folder, “Cuba, General—July-December

1990 (1),” NSC: William T. Pryce Files, GHWBL. Canada was especially vocal in opposing the

amendment. See News Release, October 31, 1990, and February 19, 1991, both in vol. 16002, 20-1-2-

Cuba, part 38, RG25, LAC.

361

nation.” Unlike Bush, however, he was “on the side of the interest of [the] Cuban nation”

by prioritizing the fall of Castro.969

On February 5, 1992, Mas Canosa’s congressional allies submitted the so-called

Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) to the Congress. The bill consisted of three parts. Most

controversial was the first part, popularly dubbed as Track I, which proposed the

“internationalization” of the U.S. embargo on Cuba by expanding the scope of laws

beyond U.S. territory. Building on Mas Canosa’s earlier proposal to Bush, the bill would

prohibit foreign subsidiaries of U.S. businesses from trading with Cuba, deny the

entrance to U.S. ports of commercial ships entering Cuban waters within six months,

eliminate U.S. sugar quotas of any nation that imported Cuban sugar, and reduce U.S. aid

to any country purchasing Cuban sugar by an amount equal to those purchases. For U.S.

allies, all these were inconsistent with the principles of national sovereignty, international

law, and free commerce.970

In addition to these “sticks,” the second part, known as Track II, offered “carrots”

for the Cuban government to introduce change in the political system. The proposed

measures included permission for the donation of food through international

organizations, the limited export of medicine for humanitarian purposes, the increase of

telecommunications between the United States and Cuba, and the resumption of direct

mail service and payment to the Cuban government for telecommunication services.971

969

Programa, La Voz de la Fundación, retransmisión de “Mesa Redonda” por APR, Radio Mambí,

November 29, 1990, in Jorge Mas Canosa, vol. 1, p. 785.

970 Morley and McGillion, Unfinished Business, pp. 45-46.

971 Bill Text, H.R. 4168, Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, available at The Library of Congress

THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c102:H.R.4168: (accessed December 15, 2014).

362

Drawing on Mas Canosa’s earlier proposal, Torricelli and his staff helped CANF expand

a list of incentives so that the bill would receive broader congressional support.972

Ileana

Ros-Lehtinen, a Cuban American congresswoman whose stance was less flexible than

CANF’s, nonetheless prevented Torricelli from adding many more “liberal measures.”973

What was entirely new about CDA was “Track III,” which Mas Canosa called

“the guidelines” for the U.S. government to follow in post-Castro Cuba.974

The bill

proposed that the U.S. government deliver food, medicine, and medical supplies to Cuba

on a “transition to democracy.” Yet, prior to this change, the bill obliged a U.S. President

to “certify” to the U.S. Congress that the new government declared its intention of

holding free and fair elections, respected human rights and basic democratic freedoms,

and stopped subversive activities in other countries. If Cuba established a “democratic”

government, the U.S. government must grant full diplomatic recognition, provide

emergency relief, and end the U.S. embargo. And again to make this change occur, the

bill required a U.S. president to report to the U.S. Congress that Cuba “established

democratic institutions through free, fair, and open elections, under international

supervision, that represent the will of the majority of the Cuban people.”975

972

Morley and McGillion, Unfinished Business, pp. 41-42. The authors were unaware that Mas

Canosa already favored the opening of direct communication with Cuba.

973 MH, April 14, 1992, p. 16A.

974 For Mas Canosa’s comment at the CANF meeting, see Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of

Directors, January 17, 1992, p. 6. Torricelli also emphasized the importance of Track III. “We assist

them in this struggle by painting an alternate picture of Cuba’s future, what the future will be like after

Castro.” U.S. House, Cuban Democracy Act, p. 416.

975 Bill Text, H.R. 4168, Cuban Democracy Act of 1992.

363

Track III not only provided the definition of “democracy” in Cuba, but also

transferred from the President to the Congress the final authority pertaining to

determination about its political system. The implication was ominous for Alfredo Durán,

lawyer and former chair of the Florida Democratic Party, who claimed that Track III

would create “the image of a new Platt amendment.” Because anti-Castro groups in the

United States could mount “tremendous pressure” on the Congress, they could

“determine, or at least define what is politically correct.” Durán worried that should

Miami and Havana disagree on the transition process in post-Castro Cuba, the United

States would automatically side with Miami through such pre-set legal arrangements.976

At congressional hearings chaired by Dante Fascell, there appeared numerous

other concerns by individuals who never sympathized with Castro. Ramón Cernuda,

spokesman for the largest Cuban dissident association, condemned Track I as an attempt

to “starve our people to death in the name of human rights, in the name of democratic

ideals.”977

George McGovern, former senator from South Dakota, noted that the bill

would be counterproductive since Castro, whom he called a “dictator,” would use it as “a

political scapegoat to blame the problems of Cuba on the United States.”978

Many others

also referred to international opposition. “Is it really worth it for the United States,” asked

Susan Kaufman Purcell, vice president of the Americas Society, “to risk seriously

976

Testimony by Durán, in U.S. House, Cuban Democracy Act, pp. 99, 126, 132-33. Fascell conceded

that Durán made a good case but said nothing to assuage his worries.

977 Testimony by Cernuda, in U.S. House, Cuban Democracy Act, pp. 87-88. See also, Cernuda, et. al.,

to Senators and Representatives of U.S. Congress, February 14, 1992, included in U.S. House, Cuban

Democracy Act, pp. 164-66.

978 Testimony by McGovern, in U.S. House, Cuban Democracy Act, p. 151.

364

damaging its relations with important allies in order to achieve its policy goals in

Cuba?”979

Torricelli, Fascell, and other congressional supporters of the bill were not deaf to

these criticisms. Rather, each time they had difficulty in explaining their position, they

sought refuge in the presence of Cuban Americans. When Durán pointed out that the U.S.

Congress legislated democracy in Cuba, but not in Eastern Europe, Torricelli defended

their special treatment of the island. “Cuba is different,” he exclaimed, “because the

Cuban-American people want it to be different, because our traditions, because of

geography, we want a better relationship with Cuba.”980

When McGovern asked Fascell

why the United States traded with the Soviet Union and China, but not with Cuba, Fascell

too mentioned geography and Cuban American advocacy, noting that “those who fell [in

Cuba] had ‘relatives who now live in the United States’ and kept their memories for a

while.”981

At one point, Purcell accused supporters of the bill of prioritizing Cuban issues

due to their Cuban American constituencies. The comment irritated Torricelli, but not

Fascell. “As a politician and a congressman,” he said, “I do not see anything wrong with

that.”982

979

Testimony by Purcell, in U.S. House, Cuban Democracy Act, p. 184.

980 Torricelli apparently forgot that Durán was a Cuban American. Comment by Torricelli, in U.S.

House, Cuban Democracy Act, pp. 126-27.

981 Comments by Fascell, in U.S. House, Cuban Democracy Act, pp. 167-68.

982 Ibid., pp. 194-95.

365

Miami’s “War” against Havana, Miami’s Victory over Washington

Unlike these U.S. congressmen, the Bush administration weighed international

opposition to CDA. Up to the last minute, the State Department sought to mend fences

over the drafted bill with Mas Canosa. But when he chose confrontation over

compromise, the administration found little choice but to declare its opposition to the

internationalization of the embargo.983

In his testimony before the Congress, Robert

Gelbard, deputy assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, expressed the

administration’s concern about international reactions, warning that the bill would cause

a paradigm shift by “changing the focus from Castro and Cuba to the United States.”984

U.S. public opinion apparently sided with the administration, as a poll in February 1992

indicated that as many as 65 percent opposed extraterritorial application of the U.S.

embargo on Cuba.985

Beneath Washington’s discussion over CDA was the escalation of tensions

between Miami and Havana. On December 29, 1991, Commando L, a militant group in

Miami, conducted a raid against Cuba, leading to the capture of three fighters. They

confessed a plan to cause an insurrection in a sensational trial broadcast on Cuban

television.986

Although several countries, including Spain, Mexico, Argentina, and the

United States, asked for clemency, Havana executed one and sentenced two others to

983

Vicki Huddleston to Distribution, January 16, 1992, in folder “H.R.4168,” box 2828, Dante Fascell

Papers, UM-SC. For details of State Department opposition, see Non-paper, attached to Vicki

Huddleston to Distribution, January 16, 1992, in folder “H.R.4168,” box 2828, Dante Fascell Papers,

UM-SC.

984 Testimony by Gelbard, in U.S. House, Cuban Democracy Act, p. 402.

985 Only 19 percent favored such measures. MH, February 11, 1992, pp. 1A, 9A.

986 MH, January 14, 1992, p. 1A.

366

thirty-year prison terms. The execution did little to defuse tensions. Whereas the Cuban

government intensified mobilization of the Cuban population and military vigilance over

the country, Miami Cubans rallied to Armando Pérez-Roura, an overzealous manager of a

local Spanish radio, who campaigned for 100,000 signatures to request the recognition of

their “belligerent rights” by a U.S. president.987

Unsure about what “belligerent rights” meant, NSC officials grabbed a piece of

the digest of international law. What they found was that regardless of varying

interpretations, most theorists agreed that the recognition followed facts and constituted

more than symbolic actions. The insurgent group claiming the status of belligerent power

must have a government and military organizations that were capable of mobilizing

forces and resources in accordance with rules and customs of war within the territory that

it claimed. Only under such circumstances could the foreign government recognize the

group’s belligerent rights and enter commercial and diplomatic relations as a belligerent

power in an equal status to the government against which it was fighting.988

In short, a

group of people in civilian clothes rhetorically calling for war on radio stations outside

the territory without actually showing intentions and capabilities of conducting war could

not be a belligerent power. Recognition of the group as such would be mockery of

international law.

987

For Havana, see the Mexican embassy in Havana to Mexico City, January 20, 1992, III-4929-1,

AHGE; and el Departamento de Caribe to Raúl Valdés, February 18, 1992, III-4929-1, AHGE.

988 Italicized mine. Digest of International Law, prepared by Marjorie M. Whiteman, Assistant Legal

Adviser, the Department of State, volume 2, pp. 498-521, in folder “Cuba (General) January 1992-

June 1992 [2],” NSC: Charles A. Gillespie Files, GHWBL.

367

The whole situation horrified top State Department officials, who suspected that

Miami Cubans had become almost out of control. Trying to cool down the temperature,

they reiterated the U.S. intention of enforcing the Neutrality Act, requested Cuba’s

information on the raid for a FBI investigation, and briefed the Miami Herald on

“ongoing” U.S.-Cuban cooperation on terrorism. “We condemn any efforts to use the

territory of the United States to prepare or promote violence in Cuba,” stated publicly a

State Department official.989

Yet such a declaration only bolstered Cuban American

defiance. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen sent an open letter to Baker claiming that the Neutrality

Act was inapplicable since the United States was never “in peace” with Cuba since

1959.990

Others called into question the sincerity of the U.S. interpretation of the law,

pointing out that U.S. actions in Nicaragua, Vietnam, Grenada, Angola, and the Bay of

Pigs were the “flagrant violations of the Neutrality Act.” The U.S. government enforced

the act only when it satisfied American interests. These voices of protest apparently

remained unchanged since 1970.991

Put on the defensive, Bush sent an opinion column to the Miami Herald, as well

as its Spanish-language version El Nuevo Herald. Here, the U.S. president again

employed tough rhetoric to cover the gap between Washington’s policy and Miami’s

989

MH, January 24, 1992, pp. 1A, 6A; and MH, January 25, 1992, p. 1A. See also, ARA Press

Guidance, “Cuba: Paramilitary Operations from the U.S.,” January 24, 1992, in folder “Cuba

(General) January 1992-June 1992 [2],” NSC: Charles A. Gillespie Files, GHWBL. The MINREX

received a State Department note that the FBI was investigating the case of the captured three

members of Commando L and asking for additional information. Sánchez-Parodi a Malmierca,

January 26, 1992, Caja “Bilateral 36,” MINREX.

990 Ros-Lehtinen to Baker, January 24, 1992, in DLA, January 29, 1992, p. 1B.

991 Italicized mine. Andres Vargas Gómez, “Exiled Cubans’ Right to Fight for their Country’s

Freedom,” MH, March 9, 1992, found in folder “Cuba (General) January 1992-June 1992 [2],” NSC:

Charles A. Gillespie Files, GHWBL. See Chapter One for the parallel development in 1970.

368

expectation. To promote a “peaceful” transition to democracy in Cuba, he declared, he

would do “everything possible” within the “confines of the existing laws of the United

States.” 992

Behind the scenes, however, Jeb again played a critical role. When Pérez-

Roura requested a meeting with his father to hand over a letter with over 250,000

signatures in favor of recognition of belligerence rights, Jeb not only delivered their plea

to his father’s eyes, but also urged him to change his stance on CDA. “There must be a

way to overcome the concerns of our allies and tighten the noose on Castro,” Jeb wrote.

“If it can be done then the Torricelli bill will disappear.” On the next day the U.S.

president congratulated his son. “Well Done! You did a terrific job.” He asked Scowcroft

to set up the meeting. The “State [Department] might have some problems with my

meeting…But I would like to do it unless there is a compelling reason not to.”993

Seeking reelection, the U.S. president felt it necessary to do something to pacify

Miami Cubans. Reading an April 10 piece from the Miami Herald, Bush highlighted the

paragraph that said: “Torricelli, who has made no secret of his intent to embarrass Bush

for what he considers a stagnant policy, seized on the opening.” This passage obviously

irritated Bush, as he dictated to Baker and Scowcroft: “I do not want to be out gunned by

Torricelli on this issue.”994

A week later Bush appropriated two elements of the bill to bar

foreign vessels from docking in U.S. ports within six months of their having docked at a

992

Bush, “A Challenge to Hold Free Elections,” MH, February 27, 1992, p. 19A; and Bush’s

Declaration, DLA, February 28, p. 5A.

993 Pérez Roura and Vargas Gómez to Bush, March 6, 1992; Jeb to George H. W. Bush, March 9,

1992; George H. W. Bush to Jeb, March 10, 1992; George H. W. Bush to Scowcroft, March 11, 1992,

all in folder “Cuba (General) January 1992-June 1992 [2],” NSC: Charles A. Gillespie Files, GHWBL.

For Jeb’s radio appearances, see MH, January 25, 1992, pp. 1A, 12A.

994 Bush to Baker and Scowcroft, “Torricelli and Cuba,” April 10, 1992, in folder “Cuba: Torricelli

Bill [2],” NSC: Charles A. Gillespie Files, GHWBL.

369

Cuban port and to authorize family-to-family shipments of food, medicine, and other

“humanitarian” items via charter flights directly from Miami to Havana. “With the

appropriate changes,” he added, “I expect to be able to sign this legislation.”995

Bush’s

declaration of his commitment to the bill elated its supporters, including Mas Canosa.

The issues of subsidiaries remained “the main problem,” he commented, “but I think that

will be overcome.”996

The Bush administration completely reversed its opposition to CDA after Mas

Canosa’s meeting with Bill Clinton, in which the latter declared his support for the bill.

As the existing scholarship notes, the meeting was a decisive factor in the

administration’s turnaround on U.S. policy toward Cuba.997

Yet, Bush’s crisis of

confidence among Miami Cubans preceded this event, especially regarding the

controversy over the Neutrality Act. By the time Clinton met Mas Canosa, Bush felt

extremely vulnerable to the fear of losing much of their electoral support for his 1992

reelection campaign in Florida, a crucial swing state with a large number of electoral

votes.998

In the eyes of the U.S. president and Jeb, the Clinton-Mas Canosa meeting was

not an isolated occurrence but the culmination of a chain of events, which progressively

compelled them to reconsider the administration’s position on CDA.

995

Statement by Bush, April 18, 1992, APP.

996 Mas Canosa, quoted in MH, April 19, 1992, pp. 1A, 10A.

997 Morley and McGillion, Unfinished Business, pp. 47-48; Haney and Vanderbush, Embargo, p. 88;

and Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 447-48.

998 Haney and Vanderbush, Embargo, pp. 88-89.

370

Pyrrhic Victory

On October 23, 1992, only a few weeks before the election, Bush signed CDA in

Miami, pledging that he “will be the first American President to set foot on the soil of a

free and independent Cuba.”999

Although Bush lost reelection and failed to deliver on this

promise, anti-Castro Miami Cubans remained convinced that they stood on the right side

of history. On November 4, Mas Canosa borrowed the language of Bush in writing to

president-elect Clinton. “You will be the first President to set foot in a free Havana.”1000

Convinced that their victory was just around the corner, CANF developed a

contingency plan, “Operation Encounter.”1001

If the military expulsed the Castro brothers

from the island, CANF would immediately dispatch a special delegation, present its

transition plan, and enter into negotiations with those in power. If the Castro brothers left

the island without a military coup, then the foundation would enter the island to be “the

first cohesive force of the people” to be counted in post-Castro Cuba. To this end, it was

necessary to bring in extra equipment, such as guns, jeeps, and provisions for CANF

forces. If Cuba entered a civil war, the foundation would wait and see to determine

whether and when it would conduct a landing. The existence of such plans indicates how

far this organization was disposed to go in order to achieve its objective around this

pivotal moment.1002

999

Remarks by Bush, October 23, 1992, APP. 1000

Mas Canosa and Francisco J. Hernández to Bill Clinton, November 4, 1992, folder “Letter 1992,”

box 7, The New Republic/ Jorge Mas Canosa Collections, Special Collections, Florida International

University Libraries. 1001

Contingency Plan, July 31, 1992, in folder “Operation Encounter,” box 1.82, CANF Archive.

1002 Memorandum, n.d., in folder “Operation Encounter,” box 1.82, CANF Archive.

371

For Mas Canosa, however, the enactment of CDA was a Pyrrhic victory. The

Bush administration refused to consider any further requests from Mas Canosa and his

allies, who wanted to see a substantial update of Radio and TV Martí. Complaining of

“the lack of strong commitment by the [Bush] administration,” CANF’s leader sought an

appointment with Bush to little avail.1003

Likewise, his group tried to change the VOA

guidelines for Radio Martí, which prohibited the “broadcast of any material which would

amount to or could be reasonably construed as incitement to revolt or other violence.”

The revision was necessary to send to Cuba something like Mas Canosa’s June 14, 1992,

speech calling for the Cuban military not to allow Fidel Castro’s plane to land as it

returned from abroad.1004

The State Department managed to prevent these moves.

Criticisms of CANF floated for a while, but became almost unstoppable after the

passage of CDA. The U.S. media repeated numerous episodes of Mas Canosa’s “bully”

character, his alleged ambition to be president of Cuba, as well as CANF’s responses to a

Miami Herald editorial against CDA.1005

After accusing the Miami Herald of being a

mouthpiece of Havana, the foundation launched a boycott campaign, leading its

supporters to make bomb threats against the Herald executives and to vandalize the

newspaper’s vending machines.1006

According to Americas Watch, these phenomena

1003

They wanted the addition of 530 kHz to Radio Martí broadcasting, as well as the daylight

broadcasting of TV Martí. Minutes of Advisory Board for Cuba Broadcasting, June 30, 1992, in folder

“Minutes,” box 1.61, CANF Archive.

1004 Rolando Bonachea to Chase Untermeyer, “Suppressed Broadcast Material on Radio Marti,” June

26, 1992, in folder “Cuba: Radio Marti 1992 [2],” NSC: Charles A. Gillespie Files, GHWBL.

1005 See for example, Economist, March 28, 1992, p. A24; MH, October 11, 1992, p. 21A; Time,

October 26, 1992, pp. 56-57; NYT, October 29, 1992, p. 18A; and Gaeton Fonzi, “Who is Jorge Mas

Canosa?” Esquire, January 1993, pp. 86-89, 119.

1006 Economist, March 28, 1992, p. A24.

372

constituted human rights violations through suppression of freedom of expression, for

which CANF was mainly responsible.1007

Although the foundation blamed Havana’s

“defamation campaign” for all these faults and fought back for its reputation, public

relations problems took their toll thereafter.1008

In Cuba, CDA was politically counterproductive since it gave the Cuban

government a convenient scapegoat for its economic ills. Because most of Cuba’s trade

with U.S. subsidiaries was in foodstuffs, Cuban leaders easily could blame food shortages

on the tightened U.S. embargo. Millions of Cubans endured the shortage of food,

electricity, and jobs. Thousands of them even suffered from the epidemic of optic

neuropathy due to malnutrition.1009

The government intensified its efforts to collect hard

currencies by opening hotels, shops, boutiques, clubs, and convenience stores for tourists,

and tried “almost anything” no matter how “un-socialist” it might have been.1010

Like

Chinese counterparts, Cuban communists apparently accepted economic change without

reversing the political system. Fidel Castro remained in power. Few Cubans risked their

lives to rally to Mas Canosa, a person whom they had never met and whose idea of a

laissez-faire economy was at best unfamiliar.

1007

Americas Watch, Dangerous Dialogue: Attacks on Freedom of Expression in Miami’s Cuban Exile

Community (New York: Americas Watch, August 1992).

1008 For Mas Canosa’s belief in Havana’s shadow, see Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of

Directors, December 13, 1991. On U.S. media, Mas Canosa commented that the media not only had

been supportive of Fidel Castro but also had been “unwilling to admit” that the Cuban American

community was “right about Cuba.” Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, November 20,

1992, p. 6, box 1.04, CANF Archive.

1009 Pérez-López, Second Economy, esp. 137-142; and Pérez, Reform and Revolution, pp. 293-98, 315-

17.

1010 Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, February 1, 1993, vol. 24993, 20-1-2-Cuba, part 39,

RG25, LAC.

373

By ignoring international opinion, furthermore, Miami Cubans and their

congressional allies achieved the opposite of what they viewed as the internalization of

the embargo. Major U.S. trading partners protested, and some passed counter-legislation

to prevent the enforcement of CDA in their territories. Public opinion in these countries

opposed CDA. So did almost all major newspapers across the political spectrum. Like

diplomats, many non-U.S. journalists dismissed the act’s enactment simply as election-

year politics, neither based on principle nor moral standpoints.1011

Such international

perception of this act was a diplomatic blessing for Havana. In the fall of 1991, for

example, Cuba failed to include the U.S. blockade on Cuba in the discussion at the UN

General Assembly. Cuba accused the United States of mounting pressure on member

states to foil this initiative.1012

World opinion trends shifted in 1992. Following Bush’s April announcement in

favor of CDA, the Cuban foreign ministry denounced the tightening of the blockade and

reminded the UN member states that the discussion was reopening.1013

This time, U.S.

efforts to block the Cuban initiative were no longer effective. In November, for the first

time ever, the UN General Assembly passed a Cuban resolution that condemned the U.S.

embargo on Cuba with a decisive 59-3 vote, with 71 abstentions. Canada, France, Spain,

Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, China, Indonesia, and many more

1011

Daily Digest of Foreign Media Reaction, November 2, 1992, in folder “Cuba: Torricelli Bill [1],”

NSC: Charles A. Gillespie Files, GHWBL.

1012 Cuba’s memorandum, August 19, 1991; U.S. demarches to member states (unknown), n.d. (ca. fall

1991); and Address by Alarcón, November 13, 1991, all cited in Michael Krinsky and David Golove,

eds., United States Economic Measures against Cuba: Proceedings in the United Nations and International Law Issues (Northampton, MA: Aletheia Press, 1993), pp. 18-20, 26-29, 344-45, 347-

355.

1013 MINREX statement, April 22, 1992, cited in ibid., pp. 363-65.

374

nonaligned nations voted for it. Other major U.S. allies in Western Europe and Japan

abstained and expressed concerns about the extraterritorial clauses of CDA.1014

An

editorial of Granma called this turnaround “the victory of principles.” Against

Washington’s menace, Havana declared that the world was on the side of Cuba and the

Cuban people.1015

Conclusion

With the January 1992 resolution of a twelve-year civil war in El Salvador, a

conflict between counterrevolutionary Miami and revolutionary Havana became the last

major battleground of Latin America’s Cold War. Since its establishment of July 1981,

Mas Canosa’s CANF kept expanding its political power and assumed the role of a

“government-in-exile.” The foundation was popular among Miami Cubans who dreamed

of establishing a new regime on the island. Its project to develop political and economic

plans for “post-Castro Cuba” gained much support from its allies in the U.S. Congress

and Corporate America. To advance its cause, the foundation played a critical role in

persuading the Bush administration to launch TV Martí and endorse CDA. CANF

advocated both the tightening of the embargo and the selective expansion of engagement.

Due to the turnaround of domestic politics, Bush ultimately yielded to Mas

Canosa’s CANF by giving up what he might have thought as the best interest of the

United States. In explaining Bush’s policy toward Cuba, some scholars emphasize

1014

Transcript of the General Assembly Debate, November 24, 1992, cited in ibid., pp. 52-84, 366-

377.

1015 “La victoria de los principios,” Granma, November 26, 1992, p. 1.

375

political necessity, noting that the U.S. president was pragmatic by nature yet vulnerable

to political pressure at home.1016

Others pay more attention to Bush’s ideological hostility

toward Castro and his triumphalist worldview after the end of the Cold War. The collapse

of the socialist bloc, they argue, revived Washington’s “dreams of rolling back the Cuban

revolution.”1017

This chapter suggests that both theories have merits of their own,

although they need more elaboration by focusing on Bush’s relations with Miami Cubans.

In particular, this chapter highlights the growing divergence of interests between

Washington and Miami. At the beginning Bush carried forward Reagan’s policy, paying

close attention to Cuba’s internal politics such as human rights. Combined with his

electoral political needs for Miami Cuban votes in Florida, the U.S. president’s

connection with Miami Cubans through Jeb Bush was particularly strong. George Bush

was hardly pragmatic in Cuba as shown in his denial of dialogue with Castro, his demand

for internal change in Cuba, as well as his support for TV Martí. Yet once he launched

the television broadcasting, Bush largely took a wait-and-see policy. Although Bush

never rolled back TV Martí as demanded by Havana, his preference afterward for the

status quo frustrated Miami Cubans calling for the immediate fall of the Castro

regime.1018

It is clear that Miami Cubans demanded much more than Bush could tolerate. By

pledging the TV Martí startup to Miami in his 1988 presdential campaign, Bush no doubt

1016

Brenner and Landau, “Passive Aggressive”; Haney and Vanderbush, Embargo; and Morley and

McGillion, Unfinished Business.

1017 LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, p. 225. See also, Schoultz, Infernal, p. 432, 564-67.

1018 This position is similar to the one advocated by Wayne Smith, former chief of the USINT in

Havana. Quoted in U.S. House, Cuba in a Changing World, p. 9.

376

wanted to oversee Cuba’s “transition to democracy.” Yet, he also believed that the

change had to be “peaceful” and come from inside, including the initiative of Castro. This

was what set him apart from thousands of Miami Cubans who fiercely demanded more of

U.S. actions, including symbolic recognition of their “belligerent rights.” When he

received the petition’s letter from Pérez-Roura, Bush responded, “I don’t know whether

this will be helpful.” While appreciating the letter, the U.S. president reiterated his

commitment to peace and democracy.1019

Neither did Bush want to see the outbreak of an

armed conflict or a migration crisis involving the United States. His administration kept

in touch with Havana on issues of mutual concern, including the curtailment of terrorism

and the control of migration.

At a critical juncture of history, many actors, including Miami Cubans, tried to

chart a new course for U.S.-Cuban relations. Yet, all these attempts largely failed to break

the impasse that had appeared in the late 1980s. Nothing was more responsible for this

deadlock than Washington’s contradictory attitudes toward Miami and Havana. In her

farewell memorandum after her service in Havana in 1992-1993, a Canadian ambassador

made a similar point. “I realize that…Cuba is a domestic issue in the United States,

valued mostly in terms of numbers of votes and potential votes,” she lamented. “Still, one

would think that the United States would be doing everything it could to avoid a

denouement which involves turmoil and bloodshed, especially in a country only ninety

1019

Memcon, “Meeting with Cuban-American Community Leaders,” May 6, 1992.

377

miles away.”1020

In terms of U.S. policy toward Cuba, Bush was far below Havana’s

expectation. Yet, neither was he as close to Miami Cubans as they wished.1021

1020

Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, February 1, 1993, vol. 24993, 20-1-2-Cuba, part 39,

RG25, LAC. This information was for Canadian Eyes Only.

1021 Morley, interview transcript, p. 97, FAOH.

378

CONCLUSION

For Alexander Watson, Assistant Secretary of State for inter-American affairs

from 1993 to 1996, the most important thing about Cuba was to prevent change. “The

biggest issue for me,” he recalled, “was to avoid a situation where some sort of changes

[occurred] in Cuba, perhaps very dramatic and rapid changes in Cuba.” He worried that it

would trigger a “conflict within Cuba between the partisans of the Castro regime and [its]

opponents.” The envisioned scenario would be disastrous. “This might end up on the one

hand sucking Americans into it, either volunteers would come charging out of Miami and

elsewhere and join the fray and help to feed the monster or the remnants of the situation

there,” he stated. The conflict might even “produce a huge migration again of Cubans

which we all remember was so problematic when we had the Mariel migrations.” Watson

had to think “very hard about how to manage all these things.”1022

His comment captured the essence of contradictory U.S. attitudes toward Cuba.

In the two decades after the Cold War, the U.S. government maintained a confrontational

stance against revolutionary Cuba and enlisted anti-Castro Miami Cubans as allies. But

U.S. leaders also feared the outbreak of chaos in the Caribbean and kept—and quietly

restored, if broken—contacts with Havana on issues of mutual concern. There were

1022

Watson, interview transcript, p. 251, FAOH. It is unclear whether he was aware of CANF’s

emergency planning.

379

numerous high-profile incidents, such as the 1994 migration crisis, the shoot-down of the

Brothers to the Rescue airplanes, the enactment of the Helms-Burton Act, and the

infamous Elián González saga. Yet the basic tenor of bilateral relations remained

unaltered. The status quo was the best word to describe U.S.-Cuban relations until

December 2014, when Barack Obama and Raúl Castro announced a “historical” shift.1023

This study has explained why U.S.-Cuban relations deadlocked so long by

analyzing its recent past. Throughout its narrative, this study has stressed that the Cold

War was important for both the United States and Cuba. Far from being Moscow’s

puppet, Cuba engaged actively in the Cold War in Africa and Latin America, especially

in the 1970s and 1980s. It was the Cubans who assumed a leading role and persuaded the

Russians to intervene in Southern Africa, not the other way around. For its part, the U.S.

government justified its refusal to normalize diplomatic relations by citing Cuban troops

in Africa and other forms of Cuban solidarity with revolutionaries elsewhere. The two

governments defended rival forces, pursued conflicting missions, and used the Third

World’s political-economic trends as markers in the ideological competition between

capitalism and socialism.

North-South imbalances in power and resources, as well as fundamental

differences in worldviews, also characterized U.S.-Cuban confrontations. Since the War

of 1898, the United States intervened in Cuba on numerous occasions, played a dominant

role in the Cuban economy and culture, and occupied a military base in Guantánamo Bay.

In the wake of the Cuban Revolution, the United States imposed an economic embargo

1023

For Clinton-Bush years, see LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, chaps. 7-8; and Schoutlz,

Infernal, chaps. 13-14.

380

on Cuba, not the other way around. Because of its sheer volume of power and resources,

Washington was capable of taking unilateral measures to demand unilateral concessions,

whereas Havana was not. In Havana’s view, Washington’s posture almost always

appeared “imperial” and antithetical to others’ pursuit of national sovereignty. Havana’s

revolutionary pride, its sense of injustice, and its refusal to yield to Washington’s

demands in turn narrowed the space for dialogue.

Yet, U.S.-Cuban relations grew even more complex because of the intricate

interaction of diplomacy and human migration. Since 1959, more than a million Cubans

left the island for the United States. Due to their political activities, abundant economic

resources, and linguistic and cultural advantages, Cuban émigrés in South Florida not

only helped to build a global city, Miami, but also helped to complicate the course of

U.S.-Cuban relations. Despite its internal contradictions and changes in tactics and

strategies, this military and political movement of Cubans, the so-called anti-Castro

politics, ensured the long-time endurance of Cuban strife across the Florida Straits. By

situating Cuba-to-U.S. migration into the larger context of the history of U.S.-Cuban

relations, this study illustrates how human migration acted as a critical element of

international politics.

Washington, Havana, and Cuba-to-U.S. Migration

Cuba-to-U.S. migration was an important component of diplomatic strategies for

policymakers. From very early on, Washington employed the outflow of Cubans from the

island as a foreign policy tool. Aiming for the immediate overthrow of the revolutionary

381

regime, Washington sponsored massive emigration through visa issuances, paroles, and

legislation. The U.S. presidents intended to use Castro’s “victims” not only for

clandestine operations orchestrated by the CIA, but also for propaganda campaigns to

denounce “the Cuban model” and undermine Cuba’s appeal to the rest of the world. This

U.S. migration policy persisted throughout the Cold War. Despite the increasing volume

of internal criticism, Washington did not repeal the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966,

which secured a special path for Cubans reaching U.S. shores to their settlement in the

United States.

Havana condemned Washington’s manipulation of Cuban migration in the

strongest possible terms. For the Cuban government, Washington’s open-door policy for

Cuban migrants, including those who murdered citizens, those who embezzled public

funds, and those who defected through illegal departures, was a deliberate attempt to lure

the remaining Cubans to capitalist evils and destabilize Cuba’s revolutionary society.

Despite much moral indignation, however, emigration also served Havana’s interests in

alleviating internal discontent. Because the revolutionary society was the one formed by

people who chose to be revolutionaries, Cuba claimed that it had no objection to the exit

of “anti-socials.” In the end, migration helped to make U.S. policy toward Cuba self-

defeating. The departure of disgruntled Cubans lowered the discontent that the embargo

aimed to increase.1024

The control of Cuba-to-U.S. migration itself emerged as a critical foreign policy

goal, especially in the aftermath of the Mariel boatlift of 1980. Washington and Havana

1024

When it comes to migration, Havana readily admitted that Cuba was a poor country and its people,

as in the rest of the world, were vulnerable to the appeal of wealth in North America.

382

exchanged verbal attacks, disputed the share of responsibility for the crisis, and disagreed

over the solution to the massive inflow of Cubans into the United States. Washington’s

loss of this diplomatic battle had a more far-reaching impact on U.S.-Cuban relations

than previously recognized. Analysis of declassified U.S. records demonstrates that

Ronald Reagan paid enormous attention to Mariel-related issues, especially the return of

Mariel “excludables,” thousands of Cubans whom the U.S. government was determined

to return to the island. The lack of alternatives, even military ones, compelled the most

hawkish U.S. president to accept the inevitability of talks at one of the most perilous

times in the history of U.S.-Cuban relations.

Havana’s acceptance of migration talks reflected its desire to improve the image

of the revolutionary regime and increase Cuba’s influence in the United States. But the

inflow of Cubans into the United States also frustrated Havana’s diplomatic design,

especially since May 1985. By persuading Reagan and George H. W. Bush to launch

Radio and TV Martí, CANF became the vanguard of the anti-Castro movement attacking

Cuba’s internal politics, in addition to Cuba’s foreign policy. As U.S. presidents

accommodated the concerns of former Cuban counterrevolutionaries-turned-U.S.

citizens, Cuba’s “freedom” became “nonnegotiable,” as seen in Bush’s rejection of James

Baker’s proposal for a U.S.-Cuban dialogue at the 1990 Washington Summit. Because

Washington’s catering to Miami’s needs was unacceptable to Havana, it also undermined

bilateral cooperation. More than the endurance of the Castro regime, the United States

thus feared an outbreak of chaos and a migration crisis.

383

Miami, Washington, and Contingencies in International History

For scholars of U.S. ethnic groups and the making of U.S. foreign policy, the case

of Miami Cubans may be nothing new. The United States received millions of

immigrants who became naturalized U.S. citizens but kept their ties to countries of origin.

Even second-, third-, or fourth-generations might remain attentive to the political,

economic, and cultural development of their ancestral countries. They formed ethnic

organizations that lobbied politicians at the local, state, and national levels. At various

times in history, these migrants exercised “significant,” if not determinative, influence on

U.S. policy toward their homeland and beyond. By mostly taking a Washington-centric

approach, foreign policy scholars use as evidence the number of votes and the volume of

financial contributions, as well as the ideological affinity of the migrants’ political

positions with the existing lines set by U.S. policy elites.1025

A careful analysis of historical records in Washington, Miami, and Havana

illuminates contingency in international history, an important element that has not

received adequate attention in the existing scholarship. First of all, it is important to note

that migrants engaged in a wide range of transnational politics. The formation of a

lobbying group was simply one of many ways migrants participated in international

relations. Cuban counterrevolutionaries fought on the battlefields, spent time in prison,

and tied their fate to the United States in support of a losing cause. When the U.S.

government opposed their invasion plans, some resorted to indiscriminate terrorism

1025

It is important to note that political scientists, not historians, have conducted most studies of the

topic. All too often, they lacked access to historical records, especially on the side of ethnic lobbying

organizations, whose analysis required “foreign” language capabilities as well as ample knowledge of

ethnic history.

384

against innocent civilians. Others, such as Bernardo Benes and Charles Dascal in the late

1970s, focused on their efforts on personal diplomacy to solve human rights issues.

Thousands of Miami Cubans joined the Mariel boatlift to bring their loved ones to the

United States. Each action had a varying degree of political impact. Rather than focusing

on ethnic lobby alone, it is thus necessary to appreciate this diversity of migrant political

life when appraising its impact on international relations.

Second, this study makes clear that the rise of the so-called Cuban American

lobby was far from pre-determined. Miami politics itself was an inflection of the ebb and

flow of Cold War tensions and U.S. politics. Of particular importance was the triangular

dialogue of the late 1970s, in which Jimmy Carter worked with Fidel Castro to neutralize

anti-Castro opposition among Miami Cubans. By containing terrorism and addressing

human rights issues, they sought to transform the community into a political bloc more

amenable to the idea of improved bilateral ties. It was the failure of this endeavor that

paved the way for the rise of CANF and its collaboration with Reagan Republicans. In

the aftermath of the Mariel boatlift, Reagan’s message of “freedom” was enormously

effective in courting Miami Cubans to enter U.S. politics and cementing Jorge Mas

Canosa’s leadership position in the community. Despite shared anti-Castro ideology, it is

undeniable that each U.S. president pursued different political goals in Miami. The

relation between migrant politics and U.S. foreign policy was less ideological than

political and personal.1026

1026

It also bears emphasizing that ideological factors cannot differentiate Reagan’s thinking from

Shultz’s in the wake of Radio Martí startup. Bush also differed from Baker in denying Castro an

opportunity to open a U.S.-Cuban dialogue.

385

Third, by addressing contingency in international history, the study of

Washington-Havana-Miami relations helps to assess Miami’s ultimate importance in

U.S.-Cuban relations. This research shows that Washington was not as close to Miami as

the latter desired. Anti-Castro leaders in Miami leveraged political power by mastering

rhetoric, assembling allies, and withdrawing constituency service from U.S. politicians.

Yet, U.S. presidents also made their own judgments on the merits of each policy, as seen

in Reagan’s decision to open migration negotiations with Cuba and Bush’s rejection of

armed confrontation with the island. Nevertheless, from Havana’s perspective,

Washington was far biased toward Miami. As long as U.S. presidents referred to Miami

Cubans as “agents of freedom,” Miami’s advocacy would possess more of Washington’s

attention than Havana’s demands, thereby complicating the latter’s efforts to increase its

influence in U.S. society. This finding reinforces an argument that scholarship on migrant

politics and foreign relations needs to look beyond Washington. What may be

unimportant for U.S. policymakers may have grave implications for ethnic groups, as

well as policy elites in their homelands.

Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggle—Havana and Miami

Along with Washington’s relations with Havana and Miami, this project

highlights how Havana and Miami also interacted on their own. The two engaged in what

political scientist Damían Fernandez called the “politics of passion,” politics construed as

a moral imperative for absolute ends. The political game was winner-takes-all, zero-sum.

The stakes were highest, not infrequently life and death, inclusion or exclusion from the

386

political community, honor or dishonor. Opponents were more than adversaries; they

were enemies, traitors, evil, and inhuman.1027

As if such were the case, the revolutionary

government and its counterrevolutionary foes used Manichaean language against each

other, as the battle they fought was good versus evil.

Despite such “bitter struggles,” however, Havana and Miami also forged

“intimate ties.”1028

As the Cuban population split across ideological lines, the ideas and

sentiment among separated Cuban families resonated with state-to-state interactions. In

the late 1970s, when Fidel Castro radically shifted his policy toward Cubans abroad, their

aspiration for family reunification took on special importance. Impressed by Carter’s

emphasis on human rights, the Cuban leader hosted Diálogo, released thousands of

prisoners, permitted their departure with their families, and allowed over 100,000 Cubans

living abroad to reunite with their families on the island. These accomplishments in turn

stimulated new momentum in favor of change in the lives of ordinary people on both

sides of the border. The dynamics culminated in a migration crisis of unprecedented

scale, for which neither Havana nor Washington was prepared.

It also bears emphasizing that adversaries in Havana and Miami also took actions

that responded to one another. To cultivate favorable opinion in the United States, the

revolutionary government made efforts to win allies in Washington, to improve its image

with the U.S. public, and to rectify the distorted information it perceived originating from

counterrevolutionary foes. Havana’s success on this front triggered Mas Canosa to do

1027

Damián J. Fernández, Cuba and the Politics of Passion (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000),

pp. 19-20.

1028 The author borrows these phrases from: Alan McPherson, Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles: The

United States and Latin America since 1945 (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006).

387

exactly the opposite by forming CANF, whose original purpose was to counter the

perceived ascendancy of pro-Cuban lobby in Washington. In turn, because Mas Canosa

thought the Mariel boatlift signified the vulnerability of the revolutionary regime to

ideological penetration, he promoted Radio Martí as a tool of regime change from the

very beginning. Aware of his intentions, Havana suspended the migration agreement of

1984 in the wake of the radio station’s startup. Cuban officials often saw Washington’s

catering to Miami’s advocacy as a demonstration of intense hostility toward the

revolutionary government.

After the end of the Cold War, revolutionaries in Havana and

counterrevolutionaries in Miami presented two conflicting visions of Cuba. CANF

designated itself as “The Opposition,” judged the revolution as a failure, and promoted its

plan for post-Castro Cuba. In response, Fidel Castro denounced their machinations, called

them “Miami mafias,” and declared his intention of defending the revolution against the

evil of capitalism. Beneath these seemingly endless exchanges of diatribes, however, the

nature of Miami-Havana relations gradually changed due to the generational shift, the

continued flow of Cubans into the United States, and remaining human ties. Along with

Barack Obama’s and Raúl Castro’s leadership and their calculation of the changing

dynamics of U.S.-Latin American relations, one may conclude that the demographic

transformation of Cubans on both sides of the border was among the most important

factors in undoing the Gordian knot.

Cuba’s conflict was part of Latin America’s Cold War, in which Latin Americans

played major roles. Such acknowledgement does not mean that the historical record of

388

U.S. intervention in Cuban politics was unimportant. Even before the end of the Cold

War, Washington resigned itself to the existence of the communist government in

Havana and explored opportunities for bilateral cooperation in areas of mutual concern,

such as migration issues. Yet, as Miami Cubans engaged in U.S. politics with the hope of

toppling the Cuban government, Reagan and his successors found themselves constrained

by an avowed commitment to “freedom” in their homeland. The U.S. government ended

up interfering in Cuban politics but satisfying no one. Havana regarded Washington with

intense suspicion while Miami Cubans complained that Washington was too “soft” on

Castro. Still, as Watson’s recollection suggests, Washington apparently had sought to

keep the volatile Miami-Havana conflict under some degree of control by finding a new

equilibrium.

The implications of the international movement of people for foreign relations

have become increasingly more important in the age of so-called globalization. The

growing volume of the flow of capital, goods, technology, and communication has

already captured scholarly attention across disciplinary boundaries. Yet, no movement is

more complicated than human migration, since it speaks about the countless number of

people who exercise agency in their everyday lives and cause a small yet cumulative

change in local, state, and international politics.

However powerful it may be, the United States is no exception. More than the

simple transfer of population into the United States, the movement of migrants

accompanies the gradual yet ongoing transformation of U.S. politics and, thus, the

389

making of U.S. foreign policy. As defined by historian Robert J. McMahon, the history of

U.S. foreign relations is a “Janus-faced field,” looking inward at the internal sources of

power and culture that shape U.S. foreign relations while, at the same time, looking

outward at the external forces that influence and constrain U.S. relations with the rest of

the world.1029

The study of migration and its implications for diplomacy is within the

realm of such endeavor, with a particular focus on the mixture of the internal and external

dynamics of U.S. foreign relations.

As we move on the surface of the globe, we also carry particular historical

baggage rooted in specific places and cultures. The story of U.S.-Cuban relations,

burdened by memories of bilateral bitterness, may appear somewhat exceptional due to

its unique trajectory of the past and geographical proximity. Yet, the themes in this

study—the Global Cold War, the North-South conflicts, and the intersection of human

migration and diplomacy—may be similarly relevant for the rest of the world. State-to-

state relations vibrate not only through diplomacy but also through the increasingly more

frequent, lively, and sustained transnational links of people and their activities. Analysis

of the meeting spots where diplomacy encounters migration is an effort to capture such

elements of contingency in international history.

1029

Robert J. McMahon, “Toward a Pluralist Vision: The Study of American Foreign Relations as

International History and National History,” in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Patterson, eds.,

Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University

Press, 2004), p. 45.

390

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SPAIN (Spanish)

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UNITED STATES (English)

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Abdala, Miami, Florida; Areíto, New York; Diario Las Américas, Miami, Florida

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