A Framework to Assess Collaborative Governance: A New Look at Four Water Resource Management Cases

Working Draft DO NOT CITE Please direct comments to co-authors. 11/23/09

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A Framework to Assess Collaborative Governance:

A New Look at Four Water Resource Management Cases

Kirk Emerson, Andrea K. Gerlak, Olivier Barreteau, Marilyn Buchholtz ten Brink, Neda

Farahbakhshazad, Greg Morrison, and Panomsak Promburon1

Prepared for Presentation at

2009 Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change Conference

Amsterdam December 2 -4, 2009

I. Introduction

The dynamism and uncertainties associated with changing climate conditions present

major challenges for earth systems governance. Research across a range of disciplinary fields

offers insights into how to identify and prepare for these challenges For example, systems

researchers have been studying how environmental and human systems adapt to the nature and

scale of such change and how to improve system resilience, particularly for the most vulnerable

ecological and human communities (Janssen et al. 2006; Gallopin 2006; Nelson et al. 2007).

International relations scholars have been studying how to design environmental institutions to

handle this global dynamism more effectively (Haas, Keohane, and Levy 1993; Bernauer 1995;

Young 1994; 1999). Adaptive management scholars have been studying how to manage natural

1 Kirk Emerson, PhD, Research Associate, School of Government and Public Policy and the Udall Center for

Studies in Public Policy, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, USA [email protected]

Andrea K. Gerlak, PhD, Director of Academic Development, International Studies Association and Senior Policy

Scholar, Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy, University of Arizona. Tucson, Arizona USA

[email protected]

Olivier Barreteau, PhD, Cemagref, UMR G-EAU, Montpellier, France [email protected]

Marilyn Buchholtz ten Brink, PhD, US Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Research and Development

(ORD) National Health and Environmental Effects Research Laboratory (NHEERL), Atlantic Ecology

Division, Narragansett, Rhode Island USA [email protected]

Neda Farahbakhshazad, PhD, Royal Institute of Technology, Dept of Land and Water Resources Engineering,

Stockholm, Sweden, [email protected] (she is currently working at the Swedish International Development

Cooperation Agency, SIDA)

Greg Morrison, PhD, Chalmers University of Technology, Water Environment Technology, Göteborg, Sweden,

[email protected]

Panomsak Promburon, PhD, Multiple Cropping Center, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand,

[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]








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resources under uncertain conditions with limited knowledge (Holling 1978; Walters 1986; Lee

1993). And collaboration scholars have been studying how to create governance systems that

can better address the complex, interdependency of many public policy issues, like climate

change, and are more responsive and accountable to a broader range of public and private

interests (Ansell and Gash 2007; Bryson et al. 2006; Thomson and Perry 2006).

We argue that collaborative governance should enable greater adaptive flexibility in the

face of climate change, but little is currently known about the performance of collaborative

governance to substantiate that position. In order to consider such a claim, a framework is

needed to study collaborative governance in a variety of settings and scales. We have been

working to develop such a framework , drawing on an array of theory and practice from different

fields and specific lines of research (Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh 2009). With an integrative

framework , we can begin to articulate and test the extent to which collaborative governance is

effectively performing, adapting in response to its performance and to changing external

conditions.

Our framework is designed to encompass the contributions and interactions of leaders

and participants in cooperation; shared capacity (including motivation, structural mechanisms,

resources, and knowledge); and processes of collaborative engagement (including joint

definition, deliberation, and determination), along with the articulation of implementing actions,

system impacts, and governance adaptation. The framework is sufficiently generic to apply

across a wide range of policy arenas, scales, and geographic settings, yet specific enough to be

operationalized and enable empirical investigation. Here we apply the framework to four

collaborative water resources initiatives located in Sweden, the United States, France, and

Thailand. We explore the framework‘s utility in describing and illuminating the dimensions of

collaborative governance and its performance.

II. From Adaptation to Collaborative Governance

Climate change has galvanized the call for research on adaptation. Considerable

scientific attention is being given to the potential and limits of natural systems to adapt to

changing climate conditions. The research on the human dimensions of climate change also

focuses on adaptation, studying such concepts as resilience, vulnerability and adaptive capacity


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(Janssen et al. 2006). The degree of vulnerability felt by a population to stress is dependent upon,

among other things, their capacity to respond or adapt to these stressors (Gallopin 2006).

Adaptive capacity can be seen as the capacity to cope with environmental contingencies or

disturbances and to improve its condition in relation to its environment, even if the latter does

not change, or to extend the range of environments to which it is adapted (Gallopin 2006; Nelson

et al 2006). The capacity to design and implement effective adaptation strategies is based to a

large extent upon the resources available, including material wealth, human capital, technology

and infrastructure, information, knowledge, and management capabilities like the capacity to

learn and social capital (Haddad 2005; Nelson et al. 2006; Eakin and Lemos 2006). In this way,

adaptive capacity is not fixed but rather, it may change and evolve over time as institutions and

their environments evolve (Young et al. 2006).

In environments characterized by high adaptability, actors have the capacity to reorganize

the system within desired states in response to changing conditions and disturbance events

(Folke at al. 2005; Walker et al. 2004). Research on collaborative institutions has begun to

suggest that it may be the capacity to change and adapt the operational choices of institutions in

response to external changes that makes them enduring and robust (Scholz and Stiftel 2005;

Brunner et al. 2005). Adaptation can be seen as the decision-making process and the set of

actions undertaken to maintain the capacity to deal with future change or perturbations to a

social-ecological system without undergoing significant changes in function or identity (Nelson

et al. 2007). Adaptation can involve adaptive capacity to the extent that individuals or groups

adjust to changes and implement adaptation decisions, such as transforming capacity into action

(Nelson et al. 2007). System adaptedness is an expected outcome of an adaptation process and

refers to the ―level of effectiveness in the way a system relates with the environment and meets

the normative goals of system managers and stakeholders‖ (Nelson et al. 2007, 400).

International relations scholars who study environmental institutions see performance

(evaluated by criteria which include efficiency, equity and sustainability) as a central component

of understanding how institutions operate and contribute to environmental change (Young et al

2008). In this context, adaptive capacity might be part of the effectiveness of an environmental

regime, which Young defines as the ability to influence participant behavior and solve problems

(Young 1994; 1999). Similarly, Bernauer (1995) argues that an important measure of the


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effectiveness of environmental institutions is their ability to attain their goals and resolve

environmental or natural resources challenges they are designed to address.

In this way, performance will likely be shaped by the operations and design of the institution.

International relations research suggests that institutions have higher chances of promoting

cooperation when they can rapidly overcome conflict through the use of effective conflict

management techniques (Hansen et al. 2008). Fostering the development of a base of commonly

accepted scientific knowledge is also thought to be an important part of institutional setting

(Underdal 2008; Bernauer and Kalbhenn 2009). In addition, the free flow of ideas, knowledge

and technology (Eakin and Lemos 2006), as well as joint and participative information

production (Raadgever 2008) are thought to be critical institutional characteristics that can be

associated with performance.

Adaptive resource management literature centers on how to integrate evolving science

over time into more flexible, experimental management regimes. The concept of adaptive

management stresses the ability to change management practices based on new knowledge and

experiences (Holling, 1978; Walters, 1986; Lee, 1993; Karkkainen 2002). Decisions are part of

an iterative process, continually evaluated and altered to meet changing circumstances

(Gunderson et al., 2002; Folke et al., 2005; Olsson et al., 2006). Central to adaptive management

is the development of adaptive capacity that allows actors to more effectively manage, This

capacity can be fostered through improved social learning, where stakeholders and managers

learn about their ecosystem and the social interactions that characterize it (Pahl-Wostl 2007).

Raadgever‘s (2008) framework emphasizes regime features that support effective adaptive

management in a transboundary context, emphasizing both important process and structural

features.

In the last few decades, we have begun to see the emergence of more flexible and

responsive governance systems that work at different scales and across jurisdictional boundaries,

engaging multiple levels of government, the private sectors, and representative stakeholders

(Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Frederickson 1991 and 1999; Jun 2002; Kettl 2002 and 2006,

Koontz et al., 2004). Largely independently from the research streams noted above, researchers

in political science and public administration have been documenting these developments in

collaborative public management, (Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Cooper, Bryer and Meek 2006),

collaborative resource management (Keast et al., 2004), public network management (Provan


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and Milward 1995; Milward and Provan 2000), and collaborative planning (Innes and Booher

1999). These collaborative governance processes/networks/systems may be seen as institutional

adaptations to existing hierarchical bureaucracies that are unable to manage the complex,

interdependent nature of today‘s ―wicked‖ policy problems (Rittel and Weber 1973). They are

designed to be more transparent, participatory and responsive than more centralized and

hierarchical forms of public management (Bingham et al. 2008; Thomson et al. 2006; Cooper et

la. 2008; Fung 2006). Collaborative governance is also intended to be more agile and adaptive,

able to deal better with the increasing levels of change and uncertainty than state-centric, rigid

bureaucracies (Bingham and O‘Leary 2008; Emerson and Murchie 2010; Salehyen 2008). The

social, political, and informational capital built through collaborative governance allows for

more nimble, experimental mechanisms, which are necessary for managing in the face of

uncertainty such as that posed by climate change. Collaborative governance is expected to be

more effective and accountable when the development of processes and structures are tailored to

fit the problem or resource scale.

We are interested in exploring how collaborative governance could provide adaptive

flexibility in the face of significant social, political, economic, and ecological uncertainty. In

order to do that, we need to know more about the overall performance of collaborative

governance and then determine the extent to which those outcomes foster adaptation.

Unfortunately, assessing the performance of collaborative governance has been difficult

(O‘Leary and Bingham 2006; Koontz and Thomas 2006). There are a number of reasons for

this, not the least of which is the complex provenance of collaborative governance itself that

draws on multiple theories and research traditions from collective action to conflict resolution,

from institutional analysis to network analysis, from direct to deliberative democracy (Henton

and Melville 2005; Cooper et al. 2006). This leads some researchers to emphasize process

factors like communication and negotiation, assistance to conflict resolution, setting ground rules

and proceeding through a consensus building process (O‘Leary and Bingham 2003; Sabatier et

al, 2005; Thomson and Perry 2006; Emerson et al 2009), while others focus on structural factors

like networks and institutional arrangements (Blomquist and Schlager 2005; Provan and Milward

1995). Some focus primarily on the role of science and knowledge generation; others emphasis

the normative values of democratic deliberation and stakeholder involvement (Brunner et al

2005; Lubbell, 2005; Fung 2006).


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This had led to considerable diversity in the definitions and terminology employed in the

study of collaborative systems and collaborative governance which has made it difficult to

generate cumulative knowledge and build theory (Bingham and O‘Leary 2008). This is not

helped by the broad diversity in applications of collaborative governance across numerable

policy arenas, from social service delivery (e.g., Provan and Milward; Berry et al. 2008; Graddy

and Chen 2006; Page 2008) to law enforcement (e.g., Nicholson-Crotty and O‗Toole 2004),

crisis management (e.g., Farazamand 2007; Kettl 2006), and the environmental, including natural

resources management (e.g., Durant et al. 2004; Koontz and Craig 2006), forest management

(e.g., Manring 2005; Ebrahim 2004) and open-space preservation (e.g., Smith 2009).

Other methodological challenges are also at play when studying collaborative

governance. The highly contingent nature of collaborative governance processes makes it

difficult to design a common framework for a variety of case studies (Miettinen and Virkunnen,

2005). The complex, dynamic and iterative nature of collaborative engagement warrants

longitudinal analysis in many cases. Cross-sector collaborative processes and emergent

institutional arrangements take time and their contributions to substantive performance outcomes

can be difficult to trace. It is not straighforward how to compare collaborative governance to

other governance arrangements, since collaborative systems are often a hybrid of or embedded in

existing regulatory and market systems. The complexities of each case lend themselves more to

individual in-depth case analysis and less to cross-case comparisons or large sample quantitative

analysis. For example, it can be challenging just to determine the unit of analysis, which may be

individual or collective action, case level or participant level data.

These and other challenges lead many researchers to focus primarily on process outcomes

(e.g., agreements reached, improved working relationships) and other important normative and

instrumental achievements like fairness, inclusion, participant satisfaction, and

representativeness in accordance with the democratic roots of collaborative approaches (Sipe and

Stiftel 1995; Innes and Booher 1999; Meier and O‘Toole 2001; O‘Leary and Bingham 2003;

O‘Leary and Bingham 2006; Bingham and O‘Leary 2008). One of the more recent efforts to

explore the workings of collaboration examined 137 case studies and found that most focused on

―process outcomes‖ rather than on policy or management outcomes (Ansell and Gash 2007).

Another recent evaluation of 52 environmental conflict resolution cases modeled the direct

linkage between practice factors and performance, but focused on the intermediate outcomes of


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agreements reached, their quality, and improvements in working relationships, stopping short of

evaluating substantive outcomes (Emerson et al 2009).

These research challenges are manifest in the lack of coherent theory about how

collaboration and collaborative governance works, without which it is difficult to test

hypotheses, demonstrate performance over multiple applications, and advance improved theory

and practice. That said, there are some frameworks that have been emerging to model

collaborative governance (Ansell and Gash 2007; Fung 2006), cross-sector collaboration (Bryson

et al. 2006), collaborative planning (Innes and Booher 1999), collaboration processes (Thomson

and Perry 2006; Wood and Gray 1991; Ring and Van de Ven 1994), collaborative public

management (Cooper et al. 2006), and environmental conflict resolution (Orr et al. 2008;

Emerson et al. 2009). While most of these frameworks acknowledge substantive outcomes as

important performance indicators, they are primarily procedural in nature and do not explicitly

make the link to performance outcomes or to adaptation functions that can be attributed to

collaborative governance.

Bearing these challenges in mind, we have developed a conceptual framework for

collaborative governance that both integrates procedural, structural, and substantive variables,

and considers their impacts in the field and the adaptation generated. With this, we contribute to

the growing discussion of performance in collaborative settings and also to the growing research

on adaptation in resource management. Here, we apply our framework to an analysis of four

collaborative water resource cases in different parts of the world. This allows us to begin to

evaluate the contribution of specific aspects of collaboration to the development and persistence

of governance systems that further adaptation in the management of natural resources.

III. Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance

The following framework grew out of an initial effort to design a conceptual model to

evaluate collaborative governance approaches to both climate change mitigation and adaptation

(Emerson and Murchie 2008). An interdisciplinary team of political scientists, public

administration scholars, environmental scientists, and natural resource managers, including this

paper‘s coauthors and Dr. Tina Nabatchi at Syracuse University‘s Maxwell School, reshaped the

initial framework with reference to their combined expertise and areas of scholarship, and


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broadened its application (Emerson et al. 2009). In this paper, we further develop and apply

qualitative performance measures and indicators .

The framework, presented in Figure 1, includes seven primary elements: the system

context and conditions; cooperation among leaders and participants; shared capacity including

shared will, organization, resources, and knowledge; dynamic engagement involving definition,

deliberation and determinations; implementing actions; system impacts; and governance

adaptation. The major interactions among these elements are indicated by the arrows in the

figure and are described below. We recognize that the framework does not explicitly incorporate

measures of temporal and spatial scale, however, it is designed to be applicable at multiple

and/or sequential scales.

System Context and Condition: The external context within which collaborative governance

works is complex and multi-layered, presenting factors and conditions that drive and shape the

collaboration potential (Borrini-Feyerabend 1996). Among these are: resource conditions; issue

salience or perceived risk; legal (administrative, regulatory, or judicial) triggers or requirements;

perceived conflict; socio-economic and cultural health and diversity; and political dynamics and

power relations. A three dimensional boxed space depicts this system context and conditions as

surrounding and continually influencing the dynamics of collaborative governance. The bi-

directional arrows suggest that as the collaborative governance unfolds, it also affects and the

system context and conditions.

Cooperation: We define cooperation among leaders and participants as a dynamic element of

collaborative governance that contributes to building shared capacity and collaborative

engagement. Leadership is widely recognized as an essential factor in successful collaboration

(Ansell and Gash 2007; Bingham and O‘Leary 2008; Carlson 2007; Susskind and Cruikshank

1987). It is critical at the outset, during moments of deliberation or conflict, and when

championing the collaborative determinations through to implementation (Agranoff 2006;

Bryson et al. 2006; Carlson 2007). Leadership does not always encompass authority. We

incorporate authority, as legal authority or executive decision making authority, in the next

element of shared capacity.


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FIGURE 1: FRAMEWORK FOR COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE

Cooperation

Leaders

Participants

Shared Capacity

Will

Organization

Resources

Knowledge

Engagement

Definition

Deliberation

Determinations Action

Implementing Steps

Impact

Adaptation

Feedback and Adjustment

System Context and Conditions


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Getting the ―right‖ people to the table also matters in collaborative governance (Ansell

and Gash 2007; Carlson 2007; Carpenter 2001; Emerson et al. 2009; Susskind et al 2001). The

principles that guide the selection of participants are inclusion and diversity. These are not only

normative operating principles, but are instrumental as well, providing ―voice‖ from multiple

perspectives about different interests by those who will be affected by subsequent actions or

decisions, those who have the power to contribute or to block progress, and those who possess

skills, expertise, knowledge and resources essential to collaborative performance (Beirele and

Cayford 2002; Sirianni 2009). Participant selection will vary depending on their role and the

expectations and structure of the collaborative purpose (Fung 2006), however, exclusion of

critical agents may compromise either the process or the outcome of the collaborative effort

(Dietz and Stern 2008; Weber, 2003).

Shared Capacity: Out of cooperation comes the development of shared capacity. As shared

capacity is built, cooperation is strengthened among leaders and participants, this feedback is

indicated in the diagram with two arrows. This dynamic contributes to the development of trust

and to improvements in working relationships that are essential to improving cooperation and

sustaining engagement (Leach and Sabatier 2005; Frame et al 2004; Emerson et al 2009).

Dimensions of shared capacity include: shared will; organizational structure and protocols;

administrative, technical, and expert resources; and knowledge.

Shared will is derived from the recognition of and commitment to some mutual purpose

which could be based on a commonality of interests and goals or a complementarity of divergent,

but interdependent needs (Thomson and Perry 2006, citing Powell 1990). It can be expressed in

mission or vision statements and the extent of time or resource commitments made. It may be

affected by how leaders and participants manage the tension between their commitments to the

collaborative effort and their obligations to those they represent or those for whom they work

(Thompson and Perry 2006; Huxham and Vangen 2005).

Organizational structures and protocols enable repeated interactions over time within

collaborative governance. These structures may vary depending on function (be they

informational, developmental, outreach, or action networks as defined by Agranoff (2003) and

by form (as a self-managing system, led by a designated agency, or with a newly created

collaborative institution per Milward and Provan (2006). The larger, more complex, and long-


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lived the collaborative effort, the more explicit the institutional structures and management

requirements (Milward and Provan 2000, 2006). Informal ―norms of reciprocity‖ and/or more

formal rules of network interactions guide the protocols within collaboration (Thompson and

Perry 2006). The common pool resource literature explicates the different kinds of rules and

institutional arrangements for collaborative action, including constitutional rules outlining the

basic scope and authorities for joint effort, decision making rules and operating procedures

(Ostrom 1990; Bingham 2009; Susskind et al 1999; Gerlak and Heikkila, 2006). The structural

connection to external organizations and legal authorities is also critical, particularly when

implementation steps require decisions or actions of public entities.

Collaborative governance requires resources adequate to the shared task, leveraged and

mobilized beyond what any one participant or participating organization has available. Shared

resources may include funding, legal, technical and expert assistance, logistical and

administrative support, communication and information technology, and even power. The

fairness, legitimacy, and efficacy of collaborative efforts depend in part on how well these

resources are shared, developed, and managed (Thomson and Perry 2008; Bingham 2008).

Knowledge can be viewed as a resource, providing the currency of collaboration. It

includes informational resources (data, maps, historical and projected trends analysis) from

relevant scientific, technical, socio-economic, and cultural sources. In addition, however,

knowledge encompasses the weighing and valuing of information, the generation of meaning,

sense-making, and judgment. Participants in collaborative governance will not only have

different perspectives on the issues at hand, but possess different capabilities for understanding

and gaining access to information. The role of shared knowledge generation, clarification, and

legitimization is important for the internal progress of collaboration and to its external legitimacy

(Agranoff 2008); Provan and Milward 1995). It is crucial to track knowledge flows in a

collaborative governance process, since this involves potential transfer of power, which

sometimes intensify power discrepancies instead of mitigating them. Participants are often very

unequal in their capacity to deal with this strategic resource.

Engagement: Collaborative engagement can be described as fair and open civil discourse,

informed by the perspectives and knowledge of all participants. Researchers link effective

engagement to numerous positive outcomes, including: improved clarity on key issues and


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concerns; effective management of differences and conflicts; enhanced trust and mutual respect

built among the parties; increased social, operation, and decision making capacity; better

integration of relevant knowledge into deliberations; greater perceived legitimacy within and

outside of the collaboration; and producing fairer, more durable and robust agreements (Bryson

et al. 2006; Emerson et al. 2009; Fung 2006; Leach and Sabatier 2005; Susskind and Cruikshank,

1987; Sipe and Stiftel 1995; Innes and Booher 1999; Milward and Provan 2000). Engagement

is comprised of three iterative processes, which are definition, deliberation, and determination.

Definition refers to the development and articulation of shared purposes and objectives, shared

scope for their joint efforts, shared terminology for communicating, and shared criteria to assess

information and accomplishments. Deliberation is the process of dynamic discourse through

which ―voice‖ is exercised, ideas generated, and problems solved. Determinations are

considered as ―outputs‖ including joint agreements, decisions, or recommendations.

Actions: The performance of collaborative governance must be judged by the actions it propels

in accordance with the determinations made by the participants. These actions might include

securing external endorsements, enacting policies, laws or regulations, marshalling additional

external resources, siting and permitting uses or facilities, carrying out new management

practices, building or cleaning up, enforcing compliance, and planning for action. Those actions

intended to be implemented in accordance with collaborative determinations should be specified

in agreements, expected actions and milestones. The more proximate these actions are to the

determinations, the easier it is to attribute these achievements to the collaborative efforts. Often,

these actions take place over an extended period of time and are result of multiple factors in

addition to the collaborative effort, making direct attribution more difficult.

System Impacts: The actions instigated by collaborative governance have consequences that

impact the surrounding context and conditions. These system impacts represent some addition or

change of state intended by the participants as a target goal or mission of the joint effort. These

targeted impacts are intended to be reached through some shared theory of action that has

evolved through the collaborative engagement. These impacts (sometimes referred to as

―outcomes‖ in the language of performance evaluation) can be physical, environmental, social,

economic, and/or political. They can be specific, short term impacts, or longer term, more

systemic or cumulative in nature. Monitoring for short and long term impacts is of course

essential for feedback and accountability purposes.


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Governance Adaptation: In this framework, the elements of the collaborative governance

system, cooperation, shared capacity, and engagement, are expected to change and adapt as a

consequence of system impacts and other internal and external factors and influences.

Institutional adaptation can be viewed as the outcome of institutions‘ evolving in response to

external and internal forces (Adger 2000). Based on the impacts achieved, new problems may

emerge and require new knowledge generation, or more resources, or further determinations. In

the context of adaptive resource management, for example, the management practices

themselves may need to change as a result of experimental research findings (Holling 1978).

The structures and processes of collaborative governance itself can change as well. New

participants may need to be integrated into the collaboration or new decision rules developed to

accommodate changes in jurisdictions or leadership. A new responsibility or mission may evolve

that shifts priorities and increases the reach or diversity of the system; or a completed mission

may conclude the need for collaborative governance itself. This adaptation is considered an

important part of the dynamic and evolving nature of collaborative governance yet, it remains

one of the least studied and understood elements of collaborative governance.

IV. Applying the Framework: Analysis of Four Water Resource Management Cases

In order to illustrate and study the utility of the collaborative governance framework, we

selected four cases with which our co-authors were familiar as researchers and practitioners. We

chose cases which were reasonably well documented and had been in existence for at least a few

years so that evidence of some level of performance might be available. We focused on one

specific policy area and scale of natural resources management –collaborative water resource

management activities in small-scale river systems as summarized in Table 1. Water resources in

many if not most regions of the globe will bear the primary impacts of climate change and

require the most significant human and institutional adaptation (IPCC 2007). We specifically

decided to focus in this paper on small-scale river systems within and not between countries,

with the hopes of better understanding the performance metrics in smaller scale settings before

trying to scale up to more complex, cross-border contexts and evaluating systems that have a

broader range of disparity in our indicators.


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The four cases include: the Melby River and associated lake management in South West

Sweden; water quality protection in the Piscataqua River and Estuaries Region along the Coast

of New Hampshire and Maine in the U.S.; agricultural irrigation in the Drome River basin in

South East France; and natural resource management in the Mae Hae area in Northern Thailand.

In addition to their geographic diversity, the cases vary across time, across political boundaries

and in their management objectives.

Table 1: Overview of Cases

Cases Geographic

Location

Time frame Resource Uses Resource Challenges

Melby River South West

Sweden

Mid 1990‘s-

today

Good water

quality for

downstream lakes

Water quality and quantity

concerns

Piscataqua

River and

Estuaries

Region

Coastal New

England,

United States

1995-today Clean water,

wetland and

marine habitat

protection, and

shellfish resources

Land use and development

degrade waters and habitat

Drome River South East

France

1999-2004 Water for

irrigation

Water sharing in dry season

Mae Hae River Northern

Thailand

2003-today Forest

encroachment for

increasing

agricultural land

and water for

irrigation

Erosion, national park

regulations and water sharing

during dry season and major

droughts

In researching these cases, we drew on published and gray literature, available case

meeting summaries and reports, direct first-hand experience and observations, discussions with

individuals embedded in the cases, and survey or interview results. Data on the cases were

collected during the summer and fall of 2009. The framework dimensions (Figure 1) were further

refined into performance dimensions and qualitative indicators that were used to guide the case

investigations. The summary of our qualitative assessments for each case are provided in Table 2

and discussed in the following text.


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Table 2: Assessing Performance across the Cases*

Performance Dimensions Melby

River

Piscataqua

Region

Drome

River

Mae Hae

River

Cooperation Effective leadership/multiple leadership roles

+ ++ + +

Broad stakeholder representation and participation

+ + - +

Shared Capacity Trust and working relationships improved

+ + ++ +

Joint commitment to shared goals

+ + + -

Appropriate internal organizational structures

+ + + +

Organizational relationship to external authorities

+ + + -

Adequate funding and other resources

+ +/- + +

Appropriate legal, technical and expert capacity

+ ++ + -

Knowledge generation, use and access

+ +/- + +

Engagement Scope and terms of collaboration well defined

+ + + +

Deliberation and open communication among all parties

+ + + +

Consultation with broader public/constituents

+ +/- - +

Effective conflict resolution + + + +

Joint determinations made + + + +

Quality of determinations ++ ++ + 0

Implementing Actions Implementing actions taken + +/- +/- -

Actions consistent with determinations

+ + + N/A

Impacts Specific short term targets met + +/- + -

Longer term direct/indirect impacts observed

+ + 0 N/A

Adaptation


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Actions and impacts monitored + +/- +/- N/A

Adjustments made to subsequent priorities, tasks, determinations

+ + + N/A

Adaptation of collaboration based on feedback

+ + 0 -

Key: Strong positive presence or trend (++); positive presence (+); not observed (0); negative or absent (-); strongly

negative occurence (--); not applicable (N/A)

System Context and Conditions

All four cases studied here represent collaborative governance settings that are

characterized by significant resource challenges and conflicts which make them vulnerable to

changing climatic and ecological conditions as well as exogenous social, economic or political

factors. The cases range considerably in terms of their context and conditions; across four

countries and three continents, from rural farming environments to more developed urban areas,

with diverse management challenges.

The Melby River in Southwest Sweden is threatened by effluent discharges from

wastewater and irrigation affecting the river quality with high loads of phosphorus and nitrogen,

resulting in fish kills in the region (Nyman 1988, 1997). The impact of climate change is also

expected to play a role in the health of the river as intensive rainfalls may increase the storm

water flow and worsen the water quality of the receiving waters. Beginning in the late-1980s,

measures were taken to create a collaborative process of stakeholders, farmers, politicians and

authorities to address pollution issues that impact nearby Lake Anten. The process was managed

by the Anten Committee, which later joined the downstream Lake Mjörn (Map 1) to create the

Anten-Mjörn Committee. The committee spent the early part of the1990‘s mapping the situation

through inventories and measurements, which poised the collaborative group to acquire

municipal, regional and state funding for restorative measures from the late 1990‘s onwards

(Orakazai 2007; Anten-Mjörn Committee 2006).

The Piscataqua River and Estuaries Region, on the coast of New Hampshire and southern

Maine in the U.S., is home to a diverse set of communities (Map 2). The river is on the boundary

between the states of New Hampshire and Maine, and the shallow Great Bay estuary, NH, is

connected via the river to the Gulf of Maine. Increasing population, land development, and


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legacy contaminants in this coastal region present significant challenges to management goals of

improving water quality and quantity, and healthy living resources and coastal habitats. The

Piscataqua Region Estuaries Partnership (PREP). (PREP 2009a) is part of the federal National

Estuaries Program (NEP) (US EPA 2009a), which aims to establish a partnership focused around

estuary management that is an effective, efficient, collaborative, and adaptive community-based

program (Schneider, et al. 2003). First established in 1995 as the New Hampshire Estuaries

Project to protect Great Bay Estuary in NH, PREP aims to maintain water quality in the estuary

and its watershed, including protection of public water supplies and the protection of shellfish,

fish, and wildlife, recreational activities, and control of point and nonpoint sources of pollution

to supplement existing controls of pollution. Initial collaborative efforts focused on developing

a vision, goals, and actions through creation of a management plan that was released in 2000.

Initial actions to reduce nitrogen loading and direct pollution in New Hampshire‘s waters

occurred, and an update of the plan was released in 2005 (NHEP 2005). Improvement of water

quality in estuaries has been a major focus of the NEP, with development of indicators and

monitoring for water quality and estuarine health (PREP 2008). In 2007, the participation and

collaboration was expanded to included the Maine side of the Great Bay watershed, substantially

increasing the partners and communities involved (NHEP 2008). PREP actively encourages

public participation in the management process, recognizing that the support of informed

municipal decision-makers, recreational interests, commercial groups, and environmental

organizations. Climate change is expected to impact both habitats and ecosystem dynamics, e.g.,

sea level rise can flood wetlands and increased river flow can remobilize sediment deposits.

The Drome River, a tributary of the Rhone River, is located in southeastern France (Map

3). The downstream region of the river is characterized by heavy droughts, due to naturally

varying hydrology, and withdrawals for irrigation of crops. Climate and hydrology of the area

are highly variable with severe drought due to lack of rain in spring and summer and lack of

snow in winter; climate change is expected to reinforce this variability. Under the 1992 French

Water Act, small basin users are encouraged to develop a collaborative process for integrated

water management, named SAGE (Schéma d‘Aménagement et de Gestion des Eaux – Water

Management and Planning Scheme), which frames the collaborative process. As part of the

process, a local water commission has been established to jointly define the objectives and

manage the resource. This local water commission or CLE is to be constructed of 50% locally


18

elected people, 25% state administration representatives and 25% stakeholders (civil society, i.e.

representatives of NGOs and various industries). The first stage of the collaborative process

involves establishing minimum flows at the outlet of the river. Cemagref, a French agricultural

and environmental engineering research institute, has been involved in facilitating the

collaborative process among the farming sector together with representatives of the local water

commission through the development of simulation models and facilitation of collaborative work

in order to make the irrigating farmers collectively comply with the water use agreement

(Barreteau et al 2003).

Mae Hae is a small watershed in Northern Thailand, mainly covered by forest, with

heavy slopes and farming on terraces and in valleys (Map 4). Because it is in the golden triangle,

the region was historically characterized by both opium production and shifting crops of upland

rice. Presently, the watershed region has attracted attention from the Thai government, which

aims to ensure economic alternatives to local farmers, in the absence of drug production and also

to prevent further erosion and to enforce National Park regulations which forbid forest

encroachment on the slopes. Farmers have considerable resource challenges due to climate as

well as institutional driving forces, including severe droughts, forest encroachment in a land

tenure situation that has to deal with several sources of legitimacy, and greater erosion, which

threatens forest resources and water resources availability according to local people‘s

representations. This creates local conflict among villages and both ethnic groups in case of too

important forest encroachment which does not fit current agreement on land tenure at the

community level, as well as conflict between upstream and downstream farmers. In addition, the

local population has been divided culturally among two ethnic groups, Hmong and Karen people.

A companion modeling approach (Bousquet et al 2002) has been implemented in recent years led

by researchers from Chiang Mai University to facilitate dialogue among stakeholders about

management of land and forest in this watershed (Promburon and Bousquet 2008). This

participatory modeling process has launched more understanding among villagers about water

sharing, and has helped in the facilitation of a dialogue among villagers about land and forest

encroachment issue.


19

Cooperation

Cooperation in this framework describes the quality and adequacy of representation and

leadership. Across all four cases, we observe a significant degree of stakeholder representation

and participation. Generally, we observe that the diverse public and private sector interests

affected by the water resource and its management are present in the collaborative settings

studies here. For example, the Anten-Mjörn Committee includes representatives across a broad

range of those interested in and affected by water quality in the Melby River and its lakes,

including municipalities, farmers, and interest groups. In the Piscataqua River and Estuaries

Region, municipal decision-makers, recreational interests, commercial groups, and

environmental organizations are involved in the partnership (e.g., Truslow 2009). In the Drome

River effort, representatives of farmers from the irrigated sector along with members of the local

water commission worked together to establish a minimum flow at the outlet of the basin.

Similarly, in the majority of cases studied here, we see multiple leadership roles and

effective leadership demonstrated. In the Melby River case, local municipal leaders have led

effective stakeholder dialogues through the Anten-Mjörn Committee. In the Piscataqua Region,

leadership is drawn from multiple levels, including federal, state, multi-state, and local, engaging

larger scale resource management consortiums like the Gulf of Maine Council and the New

England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC 2009) as well as smaller scale ones such as the

New Hampshire regional planning offices (e.g., NHARPC 2009). Along the Drome River, farm

leaders actively participate in the CLE. The president of the CLE, together with key officers,

monitor and provide the means for the process of establishing rules at the irrigation sector level

to take place. In addition to their strategic involvement in the CLE full group work, farm leaders

also engage increasingly in smaller working groups with a few officers of CLE in order to find a

way to reach an agreement. In the Mae Hae watershed, a diverse set of active leaders participate,

including leaders at the village level and village network, along with community leaders and

elected representatives in the local administration. This diversity in leadership is an asset but it

has also meant that no central leadership group holds the legitimacy to enforce the group‘s

agreements.

Initial and ongoing cooperation is often explicitly fostered by outreach and information

gathering mechanisms. For example, in the Piscatqua Region case, state coastal management


20

programs conduct surveys of stakeholder needs (e.g., Taylor 2008) and educational activities and

opportunities for participation are provided by the two states (NH 2009; ME 2008), the Sea

Grant Centers (NOAA 2009b), the Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment

(GOMCME 2007), and the many active environmentally-oriented NGOs (e.g., CWP 2008) and

academic centers operating in the region.

Shared Capacity

Across our cases we see a fairly high degree of shared capacity being built, including

joint commitments to shared goals, internal organizational rules and structures, knowledge

generation, and, to a more mixed extent, resource development. In the Melby River case, shared

will and commitment appear to be rather strong among local stakeholders with an interest in the

river and downstream lakes. Explicit shared goals were developed by the committee. The

committee‘s collaborative structure has been built up over time from early unilateral studies by

one researcher to the initial Anten committee and then to a more effective Anten-Mjörn

Committee that has been restructured and adopted further capacity in terms of investigation,

impact and operational capacities. Although the committee does not have legal authority, it

exercises a strong advisory role to the counties.

In the Drome River case, through the collaborative process, there has been a true change

in relationships between farming sector representatives and CLE representatives, who hold rather

urban and pro-environment concerns. What began as tense relations, evolved over time into a

process characterized by greater trust, joint action and information sharing. Today, leaders of

CLE and farming sector stakeholders come together and make joint presentations in local

workshops on water management.

In addition, we see a high degree of knowledge generation, use and access across the

cases. In the Melby case, committee investigations and information gathering have helped

produce research reports and inventories which have helped communicate knowledge about the

system and spur greater concern for the region. In the Drome case, while little new knowledge

has been generated, usual assumptions about resource use have been challenged, and real needs

of water availability, use and timing have been widely shared. In the Mae Hae watershed,

knowledge at the individual-level has helped spur management changes on individual farms to

better account for environmental uncertainties. Collectively, knowledge has increased about


21

modalities to resolve conflict, establish rules for water sharing, and protect resources. In

contrast, however, in the Piscataqua Estuary Region, while technical knowledge production has

been significant, its availability to municipal decision-makers and the general public is

inadequate. In this case, the broad participation of the professional environmental science and

management community is not matched by engagement of the non-technical community.

With respect to shared resource development, we observe some challenges regarding

legal capacity and adequate funding in a few cases. Notably, in the Mae Hae watershed, external

adequate legal resources (comprehensive of local constraints, and including incentives beside

sanctions) that are needed to consolidate the agreements of the village network are missing. The

place of state as a regulatory agent is actually rather weak in this remote area, even though it is a

place that is receiving a lot of attention for economic development. Similarly in the Piscataqua

Region, while processes to transfer knowledge and attract the necessary funding have been

created (Hunter 2009; NOAA 2009a), limited time and fiscal resources act as impediments to

fuller implementation. Further, although a strong federal and state regulatory and environmental

management framework exist, much of the legal authority for enforcement and implementation

lies with local municipalities, and their interest varies considerably. In both the Melby and

Piscataqua Region, we see that funding depends to a large extent on the political climate and

external political factors like agency budgets.

Engagement

Across the four cases, there is evidence of effective collaborative engagement through

well defined terms and scopes of joint efforts, deliberation and open communication among all

parties, in most instances consultation with the broader public, effective conflict resolution, and

achievement of joint determinations. In all cases, references to trust building through

collaborative engagement were mentioned. In the Anten-Mjörn Committee, for example, farmers

did not initially trust the intentions of the authorities regarding future use restrictions on the use

of their land. However, this changed as agreements were reached and support was provided for

planting protective grass buffers to retain nutrients from entering the lake without interfering

with private land use or ownership. Early conflicts among stakeholders over whether dissolved

oxygen levels would become a tipping point and require oxygenation of the lake and over how to


22

interpret the exact meaning of ―Good Water Quality‖ in requirements of the EU Directive were

resolved in part through the translating of the county administrative board and the municipalities.

In the Piscataqua case, the collaborative process has been formally underway for 15 years

and has resulted in the creation of agreed-upon goals, action plans, technical advances, and

institutional structures (NHEP 2005). Ambitious goals were established through engagement to

create and update a comprehensive management plan that set clear expectations, suggested

potential actions and identified incentives. The institutional structures have allowed stakeholders

to convene at regular intervals, strengthened a communication network among the professional,

regulatory, and individual interest groups, and made it significantly easier to share knowledge

and other resources. It has not yet however, generated broad inclusion of the general public or

shared interest in accelerating implementation.

In the Drome River case, the rather strong interests of the participants resulted in vivid,

well attended early debates in public progress report meetings. Computer simulation outcomes

were used to help facilitate engagement among the conflicting stakeholder groups and to better

allow the parties to establish and meet explicit goals. The parties gradually acknowledged that

while they had some antagonistic goals, they could share joint objective: the future development

of the area. They were then able to work together to design precise rules to manage water

shortage periods. Some external factors have helped prompt this cooperation including the

decrease of water fees for communities organized with a collaborative governance process as

well as the joint fight against the French railway company in the design of a new high speed line.

Engagement truly progressed following the beginning of the progress report workshops. As a

result, the farming sector wrote up a charter with local administration defining rules to adapt in

case of low water, as well as means to reduce vulnerability with a physical storage and

connection with another basin. The process came up with a charter signed up by farmers‘

representatives, irrigation networks institutions, and the CLE. Although it is not legally binding,

the charter served as a reference in further negotiations, such as during the 2003 major drought.

Stakeholders in the Mae Hae process have been involved in various joint activities: role

playing games in a first stage, and joint surveys as well as several meetings in a second stage.

According to interviews with participants, deliberation took place in a rather good atmosphere.

The role of the researcher, first as leader and facilitator, then as independent consultant was


23

helpful in building trust over a long lasting engagement. The stakeholders actively addressed a

conflict together involving an outsider trying to settle on the heavy slopes of the catchments‘

head. Leaders organized joint activities to deal with this issue, such as surveying the conflict

area, planting new trees or organizing religious ceremonies to protect trees.

Implementing Actions

Turning from observations of the internal workings of collaborative governance to

performance elements, we found evidence of implementing actions consistent with the

collaborative determinations in three cases. The Melby and Piscataqua management actions

taken were in accordance with their consensus-based plans. Tangible measures were

implemented to improve water quality in the Melby River lakes. The progress in implementing

the Piscataqua Region management plan has been significant and generally consistently

positive, however, not all of the planned or target actions have been taken. The intermittent

political and legislative support has affected the rate of progress, as has access to funds Actions

that have been highly incentivized, e.g., fines to reduce illegal pollutant discharge, have been

more successful than actions that required multiple concessions at local scales.

In the case of Mae Hae, joint action coordinating upstream and downstream users has not

occurred, due in large part to the reported lack of external enforcement of the agreed upon rules.

At collective levels, some rules came out on water sharing and have been in use, mainly at local

level such as water sharing among neighbors. Collective actions appeared to be either symbolic,

like organizing religious ceremonies to protect the trees, or in the shared discourse to formalize

agreements. At the individual level, however, some farmers have changed some of their

irrigation practices in response to what they learned from collaborative engagement. Similarly,

in the Drome case, the water sharing protocols that had been developed have not been

implemented due to continuing drought conditions that have impeded the filling of the planned

reservoir, a necessary pre-condition to the sharing agreement.

Impacts

We investigated the short and longer term impacts of these cases in accordance with the

framework. In the Melby and the Piscataqua projects, ongoing monitoring and periodic

evaluation reports (e.g., PREP 2009b) enabled the recording of specific environmental conditions

after specific management actions were taken. Achievement of some specific targets (but not


24

all) were recorded. Improvements in environmental conditions on the Drome and in the Mae

Hae case are less apparent. Site-specific impacts from individual actions may have occurred.

According to a 2008 evaluation, the environmental targets set for Lake Mjörn have been

met; those set for Lake Anten and the Melby River are not expected to be reached in 2010

(Medins Report, 2008). The reductions in phosphorus loadings in Lake Mjörn have occurred, but

the state of Lake Anten has been relatively unchanged during the last 20 years. As a result of the

committee‘s investigation, water authorities are suggesting that the deadline for achieving Water

Framework Directive‘s good water quality status in Mellby River and Lake Anten would be

extended to 2021(Anten-Mjörn Committee, 2009). Indirect economic and quality of life impacts

may also accrue in the future through the financing of wetlands restoration, shoreline buffers,

improving household wastewater treatment systems, and improved water quality by enhancing

biodiversity and enabling fishing, bathing, and other recreational activities.

The ecological resources of the Piscataqua Region are much better monitored, mapped,

and their importance to human health and well-being better understood than they were when the

New Hampshire Estuaries NEP was first established in 1995. Shellfish beds have reopened,

wetlands and water flow has been restored, and contaminant sources reduced. Guidance

documents, outreach mechanisms, and regular deliberative forums have been established.

Coordination between federal, state, local, and citizen interests has increased and the capacity to

address new issues has been demonstrated (C. NEG/ECP 2001; Davis et al. 2007; US EPA

2009b; NROC, 2009). Resources for implementation of other critical action items have not

been identified. Reductions of nitrogen loading that resulted from improved wastewater

infrastructure and land-use practices have, however, been overwhelmed by increases in

development and population.

The direct impacts of the collaborative process in the Drome River area on water demand

have not yet been felt, in large part because in 2003, the first season after signature of the charter,

the area faced a major drought. However, there is evidence from personal reports by the CLE

leaders, that the jointly devised reference levels in their charter for water withdrawals assisted

the farmers during the drought crisis in managing their crops. Farming sector leaders and CLE

officers had agreed upon these references, taking into account the needs and sensitivity to

drought of main crops at this time of the year. Farmers used this during a major crisis


25

interpreting them according to plant growth stage. Changes in attitudes of leaders towards water

shortage events management were noticed: farmers became pro-active in sharing information

instead of retaining their information as either had done prior to this collective process. Since the

crisis of the mid 2000‘s, the farming sector has become the main provider of information for

joint crisis management.

The collaborative work in the Mae Hae basin continues, but monitoring has not yet been

put in place to track short or long term impacts. The lack of enforcement of the collective

agreement on forest encroachment has limited discernable progress. No major drought has

occurred to test the rules put in place to manage those conditions.

Adaptation

There are signs of institutional adaptation in both the Melby and Piscataqua cases. The

longest running of our cases, the Anten-Mjörn Committee, is moving into a new phase after

preliminary measures have been carried out. The committee reorganized in 2001 in order to gain

more responsibilities. Cooperation with government authorities and volunteering based activities

has improved since the establishment of the committee. The outcomes of knowledge and

investigations in the latest report on water quality of Anten and Mjörn might also result in new

challenges and adaptation to new circumstances. Institutional adaptation enables the Anten-

Mjörn committee to face additional challenges brought by the requirements of the Water

Framework Directive. After the 2008 report on the state of the Anten and Mjörn, the committee

faces the challenge of finding new measures to improve the water quality (Medins Report 2008;

Anten-Mjörn Committee 2009). Building of new buffer zones, wetlands, new methods to

improve agricultural practices, and better control of individual wastewater systems, gaining new

knowledge and finding new expertise are all in the agenda. The new challenges facing the

committee include the need for a more holistic understanding of the whole watershed with a

balancing of the socio-technical and natural systems for improving the water quality and

adapting to conditions of climate. Adaptation of the overall system, particularly the wastewater

system, to handle extreme weather events will be a challenge. Improving the river‘s ability to

adapt (after having been straightened and dredged) and buffer extreme events through a

constructed wetland type system in the river will also be a challenge.


26

The PREP process within the Piscataqua Region is designed to have periodic review,

participatory updates and setting of priorities, and to establish persisting structures for

collaboration. These have all occurred. Important governance adaptations include the decision

to include the Maine portion of the Piscataqua-Great Bay estuary watershed, the addition of

invasive species in the management scope, a recent focus on outreach to increase municipal and

citizen participation, and the integration of State, federal, and PREP resources and new planning

for climate change impacts. Another institutional adaptation is the transfer of the PREP

management from the New Hampshire state offices to the University of New Hampshire.

Additional monitoring, Community Technical Support funds, and restoration projects have

resulted when existing programs were seen to be successful.

No real monitoring has been put in place yet in the Mae Hae river basin. Adaptation

mainly occurred at the individual level, through experience made possible in game setting and

exchange of experience. For example, one farmer learned on the basis of his participation in an

educational game that he should decrease his area planted with lettuce at any given time, in order

to be less vulnerable to changing market prices as well as reducing the demand on the water

system. He clearly explained this new management strategy as a way to be more resilient in face

of local uncertainties due to climate and others‘ practices. Collectively the process brought in

new knowledge on practices and attitudes for handling conflict or collaborative processes and

has been used for other issues since then. So arguably, the process has improved its shared

capacity in this regard. But adaptation is also currently occurring at local level, due to the

absence of enforcement of agreements, interpreted as a failure of the Village Network: new local

institutions between villages and the Village Network which replicate the division among Karen

and Hmong people are now emerging. They are the negative sign of the local dynamics in

dealing with collaborative governance of natural resources.

V. Discussion and Conclusion

We posited at the beginning of this paper that collaborative governance might provide the

kind of adaptive flexibility called for by those studying the human dimensions of climate change.

In order to investigate that proposition, however, we needed to better understand how

collaboration works and if it builds the adaptive capacity necessary for institutional adaptation.

We hoped this initial investigation would help us better understand the relationship of


27

performance to adaptation and to the more-process-oriented features of the collaborative

process. The construction of a working framework for collaborative governance and this

analysis of four water resource cases has been a helpful beginning. Despite the geographic,

cultural, and political diversity of the cases, they can each be viewed through the lens of the

collaborative governance framework presented here.

The case narratives provided through the analyses are instructive in themselves,

prompting interesting research questions about interactions among the framework elements. We

can see, for example, the Anten-Mjörn Committee, itself an institutional evolution based on

increased knowledge about Melby River and its lake system, evaluate the impacts of its

collective management actions and refocus on establishing new measures for water quality

improvement. We can observe an otherwise successful collaborative governance initiative in the

Piscataqua Region struggle with resource challenges, despite its robust intergovernmental

cooperation, and begin to form a hypothesis about whether the limited consultation with the

broader public over time may have contributed to the resource gap. We find that external

drought conditions have affected the implementing actions of the Drome River collaboration

and discover the indirect impacts of improved reference levels for water withdrawals contained

in the charter that assisted farmers in better managing their crops during the drought crisis.

Finally, our investigation of the Mae Hae case suggests the importance of the structural

connection with external enforcement authorities and hypothesize that its absence might affect

the generation of shared commitment and process credibility.

The timeframes represented by these cases range from approximately five to fifteen

years. Although we have not explicitly explored the factor of time in these case analyses, the

comparison between the older (Melby and Piscataqua) and more recent (Drome and Mae Hae)

cases reminds us of the dynamic, evolving nature of collaborative systems. It informs us that it

takes time to build shared capacity. Collaborative engagement occurs over time and iteratively.

Further, time is required to implement individual and collective actions, track their impacts and

adapt to changing conditions. Assessing performance of collaborative governance must take the

time factor into account, either by discounting relative case performance based on their duration,

specifying appropriate time intervals or project milestones when evaluation is appropriate, or

taking multiple measures over time in longitudinal studies.


28

Our framework allows us to more closely examine adaptation – specifically, the

institutional adaptation that occurs in response to monitored impacts in collaborative settings.

Some of the cases demonstrate such adaptation over time. For example, the committee in the

Melby case extended its scope to include Lake Mjörn as well as Lake Anten, given their

ecological connectedness which was not apparent at the outset . In the Piscataqua PREP process,

several adaptations occurred in the scope and administration of the program, including the

extension of the study area to include the adjoining Maine watershed, the addition of invasive

species to its scope of analysis, and the transfer of program administration from a state agency to

a university office. However, less explicit in our cases are the adaptive functions inherent in

collaborative governance itself: the adaptation of individual interests to encompass collective

purpose; the adaptation of individual capacity as shared capacity is built; the adaptation through

engagement as common language and priorities are defined, as people deliberate, and reach joint

determinations. Importantly, the monitoring and assessment required to track the implementation

of actions and their subsequent impacts is an essential element of any adaptive system. This is

built in to collaborative governance, given the imperative to share information and demonstrate

effectiveness.

From this study, we expect to make several refinements to the performance elements of

the framework. For example, we have focused primarily on collective action and institutional

adaptation. We learned through these cases that there are important individual actions that

should be captured in future studies. With respect to adaptation, we focused on the internal

institutional adaptations of the governance system, when there may also be second and third

order adaptation among the participants and their organizations and agencies that warrants

attention.

As the framework itself is refined and better articulated, it will be useful to practitioners

as they design and monitor these processes and systems. It could serve as the basis for a self-

assessment tool for leaders and participants or as an evaluative framework for funders. As more

cases are described through the framework, they can serve as helpful reference points and

sources for lessons learned.

Next steps for this research will include designing more standardized instruments to

measure the performance indicators over a larger number of cases as well as more in depth


29

qualitative measures for exploring specific issues, for example, around embedded adaptation and

the generation and use of knowledge. We will be developing more consistent data collection

protocols and methodologies to serve a larger N study. Additional studies should also include

larger scale, cross-boundary resource systems.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to express their appreciation for the support provided to them

during the writing of this paper. The discussions which led to this paper started within an

informal group organized by Herman Karl, co-director of the MIT- US Geological Survey

Science Impact Collaborative (MUSIC) group at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

(MIT)‘s Department of Urban Studies and Planning (DUSP). Olivier Barreteau, Neda

Farahbakhshazad and Marilyn Buchholtz ten Brink met there as visiting scientists at MUSIC.

Kirk Emerson, a research associate at the University of Arizona, School of Government and

Public Policy and then visiting scholar at the State University of New York – College of

Environmental Science and Forestry, joined these discussions and presented the initial

framework from which they subsequently refined the framework and developed their case

investigations. Andrea Gerlak, also at the University of Arizona, leant her expertise in

international relations and natural resource policy to the analysis of the cases and our literature

review.

The Drome case study was made possible through financial support from the CCVD

(Communauté de Communes du Val de Drôme), in charge of the implementation of the water

management plan, and from the French Environment Department. Part of this paper presents

findings from PN25 ‗Companion Modeling for Resilient Water Management’, a project of the

CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and Food. The Piscataqua River and Estuaries Partnership

is supported by the US Environmental Protection Agency through the National Estuary Program

and through the commitment of the many PREP partners; it evaluation here is supported by EPA

ORD and Region 1.

The authors want to especially thank all the people in the case studies who generously

volunteered their time in answering interview questions.


30

This document is a pre-publication draft and has not been reviewed by the US EPA,

French Cemagref, or the Thai Chiang Mai University. It presents the individual views of the

authors and not any official agency views or positions.


31

Map 1. Melby River, Lake Anten and Lake Mjörn.

Anten Beach: EU Blue Flag

Lake MjörnLake Anten

Mellby River

Lake MjörnLake Anten

Mellby River

SwedenSweden


32

Map 2. Location map of the Piscataqua River and Estuaries Region in New Hampshire and Maine,

USA. (a) NE USA-eastern Gulf of Maine (b) Piscataqua Region Estuaries Partnership (PREP) focus area

showing the Piscataqua River, Great Bay Estuary and its watershed, and the boundaries of the towns

(PREP, 2009b).

(a)

(b)

BOSTON

MA

NH

ME

(a)


33

Map 3 SAGE Drôme

Area with irrigation issue


34

Map 4. The Mae Hae Watershed (From Promburon, 2009)

Mae Hae Landscape (Picture from M. Thongnoi )


35

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