A Discourse on Trial: The Promotion of Human Rights and the Prosecution of Sa‘ad Eddin Ibrahim in...

Journal of Human Rights, 5:185–204, 2006Copyright c© Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN: 1475-4835 print / 1475-4843 onlineDOI: 10.1080/14754830600653470

A Discourse on Trial: The Promotionof Human Rights and the Prosecutionof Sa‘ad Eddin Ibrahim in Egypt

BOSMAT YEFET-AVSHALOM AND LUIS RONIGER

The research on human rights has stressed that human rights crises are one of thecrucial situations that challenge domestic scenarios, bringing to the fore incon-sistencies in the interface between domestic beliefs or practices and internationalnorms. Such circumstances can, in turn, enable and even energize the work ofdomestic coalitions in favor of human rights. It has been observed, for instance,that perhaps one of the most tragically ironic features in the evolution of universalhuman rights is “the fact that the major efforts to promote dimensions of humanrights have been coupled with enormous traumas and catastrophes.”1 Similarly, ithas been indicated that once cases involving human wrongs resonate widely, theyheighten the sense of shared human commitment to new standards of behavior andcurtailment of arbitrary power.2 Research has also shown that human rights crisesmay have long-lasting effects on a society.3 And yet, not every crisis prompts sucha shift in the road to the universal recognition of human rights.

The purpose of this article is to draw attention to the problematic promotion ofhuman rights in societies that, while paying formal homage to this internationallyrecognized discourse of human rights, maintain a tension-ridden relationship withthe latter, often considering it an idiom disguising foreign interests and the pursuitof Western hegemony.4

Such a view is replicated on an academic plane by scholars deemed realists,who expect few states to comply with unwanted international norms promoted asif they were global. On the other hand, scholars favoring constructivism argue thatstates may be socialized globally into compliance, whereas case study analyseshighlight the distinctive weight of local forces with transnational connections andclout as a key factor in effecting such development, at least in Latin America andEastern Europe.5

The interplay between the domestic resistance to the effective incorporationof the discourse of human rights and the forces willing to promote it throughtransnational human rights alliances and advocacy networks is brought into fullrelief as we analyze the case of Sa‘ad Eddin Ibrahim’s trial in Egypt. This analysis

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indicates an uneven transition to the implementation of principles of human rights,which resembles parallel tensions and truncated developments in other MiddleEastern settings.6

It also identifies the weakness and limits of domestic human rights net-works and intellectuals in facing governmental authoritarian moves, as they findthemselves trapped in the rhetoric and values of national consolidation and anti-imperialistic unity, in terms that resemble somehow the experience that societiessuch as those of South America knew in the 1960s and 1970s.7 And yet, in sharp con-trast with the latter authoritarian regimes, especially in their most repressive stagein the 1970s and 1980s,8 transnational human rights advocacy groups have thusfar failed to engage the Egyptian government in an argumentative and bargainingprocess that could induce change and push forward a fuller commitment to humanrights.

HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS FACE TRIAL

Sa‘ad Eddin Ibrahim, a professor of sociology at the American University in Cairo,head of the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies,9 and one of the mostprominent human rights activists in the Arab world, was arrested on July 1, 2000along with twenty-seven of the center’s employees. The authorities arrested himfor having received illegal foreign funds to be used for preparing and distributingreports harmful to the social, economic, and political interests of Egypt, all of whichcould undermine the stability of the regime, threaten public peace, and harm thecountry’s international standing.10

In early August, after 45 days in custody, as he was released on bail and inspite of the ongoing investigation against him and the other employees, Ibrahimannounced that he intended to continue his activities, especially those concerningthe supervision of the elections, a project he had been working on since 1995. Thegovernment’s response was not late to come. Four days after those declarationsit was announced that indictment charges would be filed against Ibrahim and theCenter’s employees.11

Charges, as reported by the Egyptian general attorney, included the unautho-rized receipt of foreign funding, involvement in the forgery of electoral registrytickets, the improper handling of funds, and the preparation of slanderous reportsabout Egypt.12 The trial began on November 18, 2000 at the High State SecurityCourt (mahkamat ’amn al-dawla al-‘ulya), which sentenced Ibrahim on May 21,2001 to seven years in prison, whereas another twenty employees of the Ibn Khal-dun Center received sentences ranging from one to five years.13 On February 2002Ibrahim and the other defendants were temporarily released, as the High Court ofAppeals ordered a retrial. The Court took such decision on dual grounds: Some ofthe laws by which the defendants were convicted seemed not to have been fully en-acted14 and the Supreme Court of Defense was said to have ignored documents andevidence presented by Ibrahim’s lawyers, which might have changed the verdict.15

In the retrial aired at the High Court of Appeals, however, the previous verdict

A DISCOURSE ON TRIAL 187

was approved on August 25, 2002. On March 18, 2003, following overt pressureby international forces and especially by the United States, the Court of Appealsacquitted Ibrahim and the rest of the defendants of all charges.16

IMPLICATIONS AND REACTIONS

The trial became a litmus test for assessing the domestic hold of a discourse ofhuman rights and the weight of the supporting global networks to be acceptedas legitimate players by the domestic institutions and social mainstream. It soonbecame apparent that at stake was more than just the trial of one intellectual andhuman rights activists.

The case seemed to affect the entire human rights movement in Egypt as wellas the networks active in promoting the banners of democracy and equality. Thisnot only due to the interest it raised in the West, but rather as it reflected that theinterplay of human rights with discourses aimed at democratic reform was held injeopardy by a government acting in an autocratic manner and by countervailingcoalitions of forces speaking in the name of alternative visions. Moreover, the trialwas important because of the impact it had over the organizations operating in thepublic domain in Egypt, reactivating the self-imposed limitations on freedom ofspeech and reinforcing the patterns in which these organizations and individualsoperate.

The trial brought to surface issues of human rights and human rights violations.In its aftermath many issues were raised as part of public debate: the relationship ofhuman rights to the international arena, the status of nongovernmental and nonprofitorganizations, and the question of foreign funding of domestic activists, particularlythose defying power structures. By analyzing this case study we may thus evaluatenot only the domestic standing of human rights but also the prospects of freedom ofspeech and autonomous public participation in Egypt in ways that, until recently,were opaque and less transparent.

Ibrahim’s arrest and subsequent trial came as a surprise for many. Up to thetrial Ibrahim was almost part of the establishment. He was perceived as havinghigh-ranking connections in the government. Many former government executives,ministers, and prime ministers had served on the Center’s board of trusties. In a quidpro quo, the regime could confidently boast over this respected liberal and his IbnKhaldun Center as proof of tolerance.17 Moreover, Ibrahim’s studies on the socialorigins of militant Islamic groups influenced the manner in which the governmentconducted its struggle with them.18 During the 1990s Ibrahim had a television showin which he appealed to the nation, expressing his opinions over the importance ofcivil society and the struggle with extreme Islamic organizations.19

From the start, the case of Sa‘ad Eddin Ibrahim was perceived by his supportersas well as by international observers and some independent analysts in Egypt as apolitical case reflecting the dominant relationship of the Egyptian state over civilsociety.20 Many interpreted the arrest as implying that the public discourse overpolitical issues in Egypt is vague and that there are no specific rules as to what


is permissible to say. One could easily claim that the government made no effortto outline clear boundaries, preferring to react according to the level of protestits policies raised and the circumstances surrounding such protest. In this respectMubarak’s administration does not differ from the regimes of Nasser and Sadat thatmanipulated the intellectuals, the Islamic activists, and other forces for their ownpolitical gain, while sporadically relieving the limitations over freedom of speechof different groups in accordance with changing needs and strategy.21

Bahey Eddin Hassan, a prominent human rights activist and the head of theCairo Institute for Human rights, claimed that the allegations against Ibrahim in-dicated the case had a clear public demonstration effect, buttressed by politicalconsiderations. Because of their general character, most of the allegations were re-lated to publications, declarations, and reports with a focus on issues of democracy,fair elections, and minority rights in the Arab world. Allegations such as these couldeasily have been raised against a wide number of independent writers, reporters,political figures, and nongovernmental and human rights organizations, who like-wise have been portrayed in the media as harmful to Egypt’s international imageand reputation.22

And yet, others thought Ibrahim had crossed the line of governmental toler-ation by systematically touching on raw nerves. The timing of the arrest and theindictment were seen as mainly related to the elections to parliament, which wouldtake place in November 2000. Ibrahim, who for years assumed the role of overseerof the electoral process in Egypt, had claimed that the process was corrupted andthat he planned to supervise the propriety of the oncoming elections as he had donebefore.23 He also produced a film, whose script was written by ‘Ali Salem, a knownsupporter of the peace treaty with Israel, encouraging citizens to take part in theelections,24 a film that according to the government contained political statementsdetrimental to the country’s reputation abroad and that also threatened nationalsecurity.25

In addition to this sensitive issue, the status of the Coptic minority had becomepart of Ibrahim’s agenda. He classified the Copts of Egypt together with otherdiscriminated or repressed minorities like the Kurds and Southern Sudanese andcriticized their discrimination. In addition, he acted to bring about a change in theEgyptian constitution so that it would be adjusted to the needs of this Christianminority by reforming the clause that determines that Islamic law is the mainsource of legitimacy of the constitution.26 Dealing with this and raising criticismsover minority rights was perceived by the authorities and by many in society asproblematic.27 The Egyptian state, which considers the Copts an integral part ofthe nation, has systematically denied the existence of any problem in this regard,to the point that the very use of the word “minority” in reference to the Copts cameto be seen as a violation of a national consensus.28

A complementary explanation for the timing of Ibrahim’s arrest and the changein the regime’s attitude toward his activities relates to an article he published in theArab magazine al-Majala immediately after the change of leadership in Syria.In that article, he coined the term “al-jamlukiyya,” a term purposely combining


the Arab words for Republic (jamhuriyya) and Monarchy (malkiyya), alluding bythis neologism to a tendency he identified in Arab republican regimes toward thetransmission of power by inheritance. In his opinion, in cases such as Syria, Iraq,Yemen, and Libya the presidents in office began to see the state as a personalproperty, thus prompting their will to pass rule within their family.29 The messagewas read by local circles as intimating President Mubarak, who had no designateddeputy, to avoid a future replication of Syrian’s transition pattern in the form ofenthronement of his son Jamal as successor.30

TRESPASSING ACCEPTED BOUNDARIES OF PRACTICEAND DISCOURSE

Ibrahim’s case received an unprecedented space in the media. Right after his arrest,the Egyptian government opened a frontal attack that went on for the entire threeyears of the trial, trying to depict Ibrahim and those operating in a similar way inthe public domain, as a threat to social stability and as treasonous.31 Although theofficial strategy was clear, Mubarak himself carefully distanced himself from thewitch hunt, indicating that “there is much of a fuss around the man and there aresome in Egypt who see him as a traitor.”32

The reports in the media strengthened the government’s strategy. These re-ports denied the possibility that the issues at hand were freedom of speech andautonomous participation in the public sphere, while suggesting that such falseclaims could only originate in Western campaigns to discredit the Egyptian judicialsystem. As far as the mainstream of the media was concerned, the trial was aboutnational security and high treason. By going too far in expressing radical opinions,Ibrahim had crossed the line separating Egyptian interests and foreign interests,and thus he betrayed the nation.33

Within this strategy, aimed at the domestic public opinion, which stressedthe harm done to Egypt’s image and solidarity, the judges went out of ordinaryprocedures and gave interviews to the press explaining the verdict. In their opinion,although they treated all charges equally, the most severe was the distribution offalse information abroad, because of the harm it caused to the international reputa-tion of Egypt. They also determined that what made Ibrahim’s criticisms stand outwas the fact that in comparison with other writers and intellectuals who criticizedthe election process and the position of the Copts, his criticism was aimed at for-eign ears and was faxed to the European Union and other European metropolitancenters.34

To enforce the conception of treason against Egypt, the case was not devoid ofallusions to Ibrahim’s connections to Israel. The media published a series of items,later on revealed as unfounded, regarding an alleged Israeli involvement in the caseas well as about Prime Minister Ariel Sharon expressing an official protest to theEgyptian government regarding the verdict.35 Likewise, the media publicized theclose academic ties between the Ibn Khaldun Center and Zionist intellectuals and


about cooperation in research projects claimed to compromise Egyptian nationalsecurity.36 It was also claimed that Ibrahim’s research on political parties in the Arabworld was funded by an Israeli organization operating through Boston University.37

As the verdict was appealed, the court raised new allegations about the receiptof funding from foreign sources, among them the Al-Jazeera television station andHaifa University in Israel.38 Putting an emphasis on Ibrahim’s connection to Israelwas meant to strengthen the arguments for turning down his court appeal and forundermining Ibrahim’s and the Ibn Khaldun Center’s credibility, because supportingthe normalization process with Israel has been seen by many in Egypt as politicallycondemnable.

The strategy followed by the judges gained the support of the domestic me-dia and intellectuals. Even though Ibrahim was seen as a prominent sociologistwith many international connections, his opinions did not gain the support of theEgyptian public and intellectuals.

His deviation from the domestic “common sense” raised the criticism of sev-eral publics: His secularist position on the role of Islam in Egyptian politics andsociety raised harsh criticisms in the Islamic circles; his position regarding the Cop-tic minority was perceived as national slander meant for the benefit of alienatedcircles trying to generate factionalism; and his pro-Western views, global connec-tions, and moreover his positions on the normalization of international ties withIsrael were condemned by the Leftist and nationalist circles.39 All these variedvoices joined the media and the semiofficial position of reprove and condemnation,demanding a most severe sentence at the trial.

THE REACTION OF THE DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT

Human rights groups in Egypt expressed shock and surprise at the severity of thepunishment cast on Ibrahim.40 Compared with the international response, whichwas swift and decisive reprimanding the verdict,41 the local activists in the humanrights network reacted in a relatively subdued manner.

Since the mid-1990s the human rights movement in Egypt has taken someblows that undermined its efforts. As part of a narrowing political leeway available tothe opposition, the Egyptian government has systematically attacked human rightsactivists, whereas most of the media has been hostile to their efforts. Public opinionhas treated them with suspicion, viewing them as a fifth column that profits out ofinvolving the rest of the world in the discussion over Egypt’s internal problems andissues.

The human rights organizations, which took part in the struggle to changethe law limiting the registration and funding of nongovernmental organizations(NGOs), suffered a defeat in 1999 when ignoring promises it had given earlier, thegovernment passed a law assuming a higher level of control over the funding, rangeof activity, and leadership of these organizations.42 The passing of this law was acrushing defeat for the coalition of human rights groups and other NGOs. Moreover,once enacted, it created a split in the human rights movement over the question of


whether to obey the new regulations. Some NGOs suggested disobedience to thenew registration demands, whereas others preferred to obey them so to be able tocontinue their activities in the public domain.43

Ibrahim’s trial was the first for a human rights activist to be tried on accusationsof slandering Egypt’s name and receiving unauthorized foreign funds.44 The humanrights movement saw this trial as a continuation of the government’s hostile policyagainst civic institutions in Egypt and perceived it as a terrorizing campaign aimedat silencing any autonomous organizations working for the defense of human rightsand the evolvement of democracy.45 Advocate Nejad Al-Bura‘i, one of the leadingfigures of the domestic human rights network, claimed that the government treatshuman rights organizations as if they were part of the political opposition. Accordingto Al-Bura‘i, Ibrahim’s verdict was a message to civil society that Egypt has no placefor NGOs dealing with human rights.46 The public nature and publicity of the trialplus the fact that the defendant was a well-connected man holding dual citizenship(Egyptian and American) added to the conviction of human rights activists thatthe government had chosen to use this case as a paradigmatic case and model ofthe conditional and limited role it will allow these groups to play in the publicdomain.47

Without making them fully explicit, activists had to realize that there existed“boundaries of legitimate discourse” and that crossing them would carry out severeconsequences. The message did not go unnoticed and led to the perhaps odd contrastbetween the presence of diplomats and international human rights representativesall along the trial and the attendance of only a small number of local human rightsactivists.48 As indicated, Ibrahim’s past connections with the regime, the fact that hehad supported the peace with Israel—a controversial approach among intellectualsin Egypt—and the emphasis he put on the problem of the Copts all contributed tothe half-hearted approach human rights organizations had about the trial. Ibrahim’sconduct after his arrest distanced the activists even more.

Right after his arrest, Ibrahim announced that he would continue to dedicatehis time to supervising the elections.49 These declarations were resented by manyhuman rights activists who feared the government would react in a confrontationalmanner against the entire movement, without distinctions. Therefore, when relat-ing to the case, human rights activists would stress the political and ideologicaldistance separating them from Ibrahim.50 The existing gap between Ibrahim andthe other human rights activists was emphasized on the occasion of a visit to Cairoof the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, when Ibrahim releaseda declaration on the existing discrimination against the Copts. Even though he hadnot met with the commission, his announcement made an impression on the com-mission’s evaluations of the domestic situation. Human rights activists disagreedwith Ibrahim’s move, claiming that it only strengthened the commission’s preju-dice. As for the commission’s report, they claimed it ran into conclusions withoutany comprehensive study or empirical finding.51

The negative opinion expressed by human rights activists about Ibrahim’s dec-larations on the Copts did reflect these activists’ fear of the governmental reaction


and an understanding that there is little popular support for their activities, supportthat might wear down even more if they would allow themselves to be affiliatedwith Ibrahim. However, their concerns also reflect the limitations of inner debateand discussion within the human rights movement itself.

Although the movement’s activists rely in their work on international humanrights principles and adopt the strategy of reliance on international laws and normsto advance their goals of domestic promotion of human rights, such global outlookis incomplete and limited. The activists are self-restrained by the norms and visionsprevailing in their society. Their reaction to Ibrahim’s activity on the Coptic issuetestifies to the fact that they are influenced by many of the axioms dominant in Egypt,which ideologically deny the existence of discrimination toward this minority. Thedomestic human rights movement seems still dominated by the nationalist ideology,which, albeit strange in terms of their profession of faith and voice, stands out asreasonable once one follows the history of the movement, along with the backgroundof many of its leaders and their commitment to the goal of Arab nationalism.52

Because of the government’s policy and the message it sent to the humanrights activists throughout the trial, the public campaign that went on in the pressand also the existing gap between them and Ibrahim, the domestic human rightsnetwork chose to ignore the principled issues standing behind the trial, especiallythose relevant to freedom of speech and civic participation. Instead, it opted tofocus on the legal aspects, particularly the issue of judicial independence and theuse the government made of the legal system to promote its goals. Accordingly,the human rights activists focused in their declarations on the body that ran theinvestigation and on the allegations raised against Ibrahim, which were based onflawed interpretation of legal clauses that draw their authority from an emergencysituation, in what they saw as a deviation from the legal normative code that wassupposed to ensure the legal rights and freedoms of citizens.53

Contrasting with such roaring silence, independent writers expressed theirsupport of freedom of speech. An outstanding example is that of the poet Abd al-Mu‘ati Hijazi, who said that despite the respect he has for the integrity of Egypt’sjudicial system, Ibrahim’s case was about freedom of speech and democracy.54 Thepublicist Ibrahim ‘Isa stated that Ibrahim was the target of a political and moralassassination only because he had dared to raise the demand for clean elections anddemocracy in the homeland.55 Others related to the apparent gap between Egypt andthe West, where intellectuals do not get locked up when they express opinions thatdo not go along with the consensus.56 These demonstrations of support were few,however, and did not come from within the ranks of the human rights movement.

Besides emphasizing the legal aspects of the trial, human rights activists choseto relate to the question of the foreign funding of their organizations, a controver-sial issue before the trial and more so as the latter began. Ibrahim’s trial, the firstwhere a human rights activist was convicted for receiving unauthorized foreignfunding, was seen as part of a wider struggle by the government against NGOs,in an attempt to control their cash flow. The government itself, as a way to avoiddealing with freedom of speech-related issues, chose to focus along the trial on the


question of foreign funding, especially that of organizations dealing with humanrights and the promotion of democracy.57 It mainly used the subject as a means ofundermining the credibility of these organizations and emphasizing the correspon-dence between the flow of foreign funds and the agenda these groups set, depictingthem as perhaps naıve and probably malevolent agents of American hegemonyand interests. The domestic press related to the connections between the foreignfunds and the percolation of foreigners into Egypt, which in the wording of thecritics transformed the domestic organizations into “boutiques for the sale of theEgyptian soul” to international organizations, under the argument of promotingdemocracy.58 Even after Ibrahim’s complete acquittal in March 2003, the verbalassault on the Ibn Khaldun Center’s reliance on foreign funds continued, relatingthe intention of transferring two million dollars to the Center to the subsequent an-nouncement made by the United States about its agenda of promoting democracyin the region. The Ibn Khaldun Center (IKC) was portrayed as being reciprocatedfor adopting the American ideology and the receipt of these funds was depicted as aconscious act of defiance against the government, on guard in defense of the nationalinterest.59

Anyhow, the implications of the primary ruling in the trial over the activitiesof the human rights networks were crucial and meant the suspension or closingdown of operations. The implementation of the military regulations on which theallegations against Ibrahim were based meant stopping foreign funding and thus theend of the human rights movement because most of its activity was enabled by suchfunding. Local financing sources too were drained because they feared to be tied toorganizations who criticized the government.60 The organizations were forced tofire employees, shut down local branches, and seriously cut back on their activities.Where there were once many agencies with branches, and various sections, only afew individuals continued operating in the name of organizations that hardly exist.Even the Egyptian Human Rights Organization, the largest in the country, entereda serious financial crisis.61

The issues at hand are neither new nor exceptional. On the contrary, theautonomy of such NGOs is an issue that had been raised before and provoked avigorous and relatively open discussion. In 1998–1999 the NGOs, headed by thehuman rights organizations, were united in a public campaign in favor of moreliberal association laws. This struggle ended with their failure when a strict unionlaw was legislated, granting the government the power to intervene the financialand administrative structures of the NGOs.62 In the public debate that followedthe Ibrahim trial, these organizations showed poor achievements. In the media thedebate was channeled by the government to demonize the associations acting inthe name of human rights and democracy, portraying them as peons of Westerninterests. The domestic media served the government’s purpose also by deflectingthe debate from the fundamental questions standing behind Ibrahim’s trial.

The strategies used by the government were not the only cause for the nar-rowing margins of public debate on these issues. International involvement, mainlyby the United States, and the reaction it provoked in the domestic public sphere


also played a role in limiting the discussion over the significance of the trial and insilencing principled questions of freedom of speech and democratic participation.

INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT AND THE NARROWING BORDERSOF HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY

The international involvement in general and the American one in particular havelimited the terms of debate even more. Such concern and involvement were exploitedby the government on nationalist grounds to enhance the assault on Ibrahim’s claimsand patterns of operation.

Since Ibrahim’s arrest in July 2000, the Egyptian government was put undergreat criticism by the international community, which perceived the case as po-litically driven.63 The formal reaction of foreign governments was not as strong,however. The United States chose not to apply any substantial public pressure onthe Egyptian government to release Ibrahim and limited itself to critical remarks onthe arrest and verdict, while operating behind the scenes.64 Nonetheless, the caseexposed the tensions in American–Egyptian relationships, and the American reac-tion was interpreted in Egypt and in the Arab world as deriving from the Egyptianstance on other issues like the war in Iraq, Sudan, and the stand toward Arafat.Ibrahim’s second indictment occurred a few days after signing the peace agreementbetween the Sudanese government and the Sudanese militia, with US mediationand arbitration. Egypt was not invited to take part in the marathon negotiations thatlasted about five weeks, even though the issue of a unified Sudan has always beenan important topic at the forefront of the Egyptian foreign policy.65 Some observersthought that by turning Ibrahim’s appeal down, Egypt probably sent a diplomaticmessage to the United States, whereas others claimed that if there was a message,it had more to do with the Bush administration’s pro-Israeli approach and the USplans to invade Iraq than with the Sudanese situation.66

The international reaction, however mild, was well exploited by the Egyptiangovernment and media. As part of the campaign launched to depict Ibrahim astraitor, the media emphasized the American connection and foreign involvement inthe case. The American stance and the publications in the American press criticizingthe verdict were portrayed as a direct assault on the Egyptian judicial system andsovereignty. Top officials pointed out the relationship of this case to the safeguardof Egyptian independence. Ahmed Maher, minister of Foreign Affairs, emphasizedthe independence of the judicial system in his country and demanded that foreignelements respect the Egyptian courts in the same way Egypt does refrain fromintervening in the internal affairs of other countries. He stressed as well that hiscountry would not yield to international pressure.67 The spokesman of the Egyptianembassy in Washington defended the verdict, saying that “Egypt, like the USA, is acountry that appreciates its sovereignty. Political pressures to change the verdict area calling for [external] political hegemony.”68 Independent elements in the Egyptianmedia expressed a similar approach and called on their country’s Foreign Affairsoffice to formulate a firm stand and defend the national sovereignty.69


Well aware of this problematic connection between the charges against himand the theme of foreign penetration, Ibrahim and his lawyers tried to avoid tyingthe case to American pressure. Ibrahim announced that he had full confidence inthe Egyptian courts, that he faced trial as an Egyptian citizen, and that he sought thesupport of local and international human rights organizations and not that of foreigngovernments.70 American policy submitted to this line of not interfering openly, andyet the rejection of Ibrahim’s appeal in August 2002 changed that policy. The trial,which was perceived by the United States as closely related to issues of personalfreedom, was now tied directly to America’s financial aid to Egypt. On August 15,2002 the United States announced that it would not compromise the existing aidprogram amounting to two billion dollars, but it would deprive Egypt of additionalaid that would have amounted to another one hundred thirty million dollars.71

The American “threat” galvanized the nationalist atmosphere in Egypt and ledto verbal and written attacks of the American policy, seen as an unjust interferencein Egypt’s internal affairs and an assault against its sovereignty. The domestic presswent out against the US “hysterical” overreaction to the court’s verdict.72 Forces inthe opposition came out in support of the government. The Wafd party criticized theforeign interference in Egypt’s internal affairs, declared its complete solidarity withthe government, and called it not to agree with the American interference.73 Similarstands were taken by the Nasserist party, the al-Tajamu‘ party, and smaller politicalparties.74 Even the Muslim Brotherhood, hundreds of whose members had beensentenced to imprisonment by military courts, was uncharacteristically supportive.It chose to ignore its usual struggle with the secular regime and praised the latter’sinsistence on the issue, calling it to oppose any American involvement or financialaid. Leading figures referred to the use the Americans make of the human rights issueas a means of disguising their interests in the region. ‘Isam al-‘Aryan mentioned thetrial of September 2, 2002, in which one hundred one of the Brotherhood’s activistsfaced charges of disturbing public order and attempting to disrupt the elections,claiming that theirs was as much as a human rights trial as Ibrahim’s case was saidto be. Similarly to Ibrahim’s attempt to supervise the elections, the members of theBrotherhood wanted to influence the course of the elections and were deterred bythe government. In al-‘Aryan’s opinion, the fact that the United States and Europedid not come out to the defense of those detainees, who were tried in military courtsunder emergency laws, proved the double standards in the Western view of humanrights. As far as the Muslim Brotherhood was concerned, any reform made in Egyptshould express the will of the nation, which in the Arab case means standing againstthe American will of rule and dictatorship.75

The change in American policy and the sanctions—however mild—adoptedtoward the Egyptian government were used to deflect the discussion to the themes ofnational sovereignty and unity. This strategy was surprisingly supported also by do-mestic human rights activists. Contrary to international human rights organizationsthat celebrated the change in American policy toward what they saw was a renewedwillingness to confront policies of oppression, even among allies, the domestic hu-man rights network in Egypt preferred in this case to adopt the dominant conception


and stand by the government in opposing external pressures. This stand was excep-tional especially if one considers that the domestic human rights movements centertheir activity in recording domestic violations of human rights and publishing theirfindings abroad, which in itself both hinges on—and promotes—campaigns of sol-idarity reaching out far beyond the local scene, to foreign governments and humanrights activists worldwide.

But, just like the Islamic circles in the domestic public sphere, the humanrights organizations seriously doubted the integrity of American policy and pointedout its double standards in the protection of human rights. Bahey Eddin Hassanclaimed that the American war on terror since September 11, 2001 compromisedcivil rights and democracy all over the world. Therefore it was difficult for humanrights activists to accept the United States as a genuine supporter and leading engineof their cause. Also, in his opinion, the American pressure in the Ibrahim case wasnothing but a rhetorical gesture because the aid that was pulled off was simply extramoney that Egypt demanded after two hundred million were handed over to Israelas part of a five point one billion dollars fund reserved for the war on terror. Thisgesture was meant, he said, to prove both to the international community and tothe liberal circles within the United States that the administration is drawing a firmline in the face of oppression and does not take human rights violations lightly. Onthe other hand, this move allowed some US leverage also in other issues, withouthaving to raise them directly.76

Hafez Abu-Sa‘ada, CEO of the Egyptian Human rights Organization, madea similar claim, saying that even though his organization was not against the useof international pressure to achieve certain goals, he did not approve such pressurewhen double standards are involved in its implementation. The United States hadthe right to protect Ibrahim because he was an American citizen, but it should notuse financial aid as a means of pressure, especially when Israel enjoys the US aidand support, even though according to him it breaks international human rightslaws.77

Contrary to their patterns of operation, based mainly on the application offoreign pressure on their government, the stance advanced by such human rightsactivists reflects the problematic position they were in. In this case, as the UnitedStates tied-up its financial aid to the outcome of a trial, they feared to express opin-ions close to those of the West, which would add arguments to those portrayingthem as agents of Western agendas. In addition, their stance on this issue provedonce again that the movement’s activists are an integral part of local cultural codes.In this case, such domestic anchoring relates to colonial history and resentmentagainst all forms of foreign interference. As Hafez Abu-Sa’ada remarked: “Egyptis a country that has fought for years, at a great price, to free itself from colonial-ism. Now that it is independent, it would not allow its policy to be dictated by othercountries.”78 In this aspect, the Egyptian human rights activists, like all other do-mestic intellectuals, are in a position which Hazem Saghiyah defined as being tornbetween Emanuel Kant on one hand and Salah al Din fighting the crusaders on theother.79


CONCLUSIONS

The failure of the domestic human rights network to provide adequate moral, legal,and political support to Sa‘ad Eddin Ibrahim reflected the existing limitations ofthe advocacy groups projecting a discourse of human rights in Egypt. The humanrights network, which stands at the front line of the efforts to promote human rights,has been constrained by a variety of inner trends that imposed severe limitationson its ability to generate a deeper and wider commitment to human rights and tosocialize the domestic society to the discourse of human rights.

As envisaged by a realist analytical perspective, the regime played a majorrole in imposing these limitations. The policy the government chose to pursueand its choice of upholding an open trial against Ibrahim, created a snowball ofpublic opinion closing ranks around the government against those individuals andassociations—like Ibrahim’s—that could easily be portrayed as “alienated fromthe national interest.” Such configuration of public opinion, reinforced by mostintellectuals and political forces, contributed to a self-imposed silence and regresson the part of most activists and associations usually leading the human rights causeat the domestic scene.

Although the case revealed the weakness of the network in facing officialpower, it also clarified how deep seated were certain attitudes, easily mobilizedagainst what in the West are clearly perceived as basic rights of association, partic-ipation, and speech. Perhaps it can be claimed, following Ibrahim’s own position,that the effectiveness of the American pressure to release him proves that the fightto widen these margins is possible.80 Nonetheless, the parallel claim that externalpressures pushing the government to making concessions can strengthen the do-mestic groups fails to hold water once one follows how the activists on the groundactually felt and how they did react. Ibrahim’s case almost brought about the endof any kind of controversial political activity, until recently, when developmentsin Lebanon and the Palestine Authority—linked to US presence in Iraq—openeda new window of opportunities, leading to unprecedented amount of open debateand a nascent reform movement.

The strategies assumed by the Egyptian government contributed as well to thedeflection of the discussion from principled issues toward the technical and legalaspects of the case. The government chose to emphasize, through a wide publiccampaign, Ibrahim’s patterns of organizational operation, which were defined aswe have seen as disloyal and harmful to the country’s unity. Other issues that werementioned were the question of foreign funding and influence and the relationshipof human rights to the international arena and the Western agenda. In general, thegovernment designed the public discourse in a way that strengthened the nationalsentiment against foreign influence, thus putting the focus on questions relevant toits own interests. The irony—which was not exploited at all—is that Egypt is de-pendant on huge foreign aid, coming from the very same source and country whoseinfluence on the inner distribution of power and on the human rights network itresents.


In view of the restrictions imposed in the public arena, the human rightsmovement’s ability to create and sustain an alternative discourse and system ofbeliefs—what some constructivists expect to develop out of a coalition of forcesreaching out to transnational advocacy networks—seemed very weak in Egypt,because it was easily averted by the use of instrumental politics and reinforce-ment of the traditional anticolonialist rhetoric. The case under analysis actuallyexpressed the potential entailed in such discourse evolving in the public sphere,as Ibrahim’s trial was intentionally conducted with open doors and criticism waspermitted. However, the opportunity remained embryonic, as the development ofsuch discourse relating to inherent issues of human rights is accruing in a concreteconstellation of forces where the government holds unlimited power, allowing it todiscursively manipulate the public agenda.

Complementing this interpretation one realizes how deep seated are somecultural assumptions working to the detriment of the human rights network. Eventhough the human rights groups have assumed an important role in this discourseand would be expected to participate in the definition of the issues at hand inIbrahim’s case, whether those were principled issues of freedom of speech or thetechnicalities of the law, they are imbued by domestic ways of thought. Accordingly,as analyzed above, the conceptions they shared with those in power have had a greatdeal of influence on the agenda they have chosen to promote.

In parallel to the human rights network and in the same public sphere thereexists a wide range of alternative voices, originating both in the establishment andamong religious Islamic groups. The latter have the same agenda and face the samedilemma with which the human rights movements have been forced to deal with, adilemma evident in their constant insecurity vis-a-vis the seats of power regardingthe issues they promote. The open support expressed by opposition forces, amongthem the Islamic groups, for the government’s position in the Ibrahim case andtheir strong opposition to the American involvement, all these show how fractionedare the forces stemming from civil society and how captive of the governmentaldiscourse many of them are, thus precluding the formation of a wide coalition ableto launch a dynamic leading to the institutionalization of human rights provisions.81

Because of the lack of support and popular base for its ideas, the human rightsnetwork had to make sure, as always, that the stand it took did not provoke too muchantagonism in the public. Therefore, it tried not to be affiliated with Ibrahim’s cause,whose opinions and activity in fields such as religion versus secularity, the role ofIslam in Egyptian politics and society, the condition of the Coptic minority, andthe normalization process with Israel are controversial and opposed to what mostEgyptians believe.

It can also be inferred that the human rights movement’s choice not to defendIbrahim’s freedoms and to focus on legal issues proves how limited and incompleteis the hold of the universalistic human rights provisions it is trying to promote.Despite their address of international norms of human rights and their reliance onthe use of international leverage, the local ideological and material influence andthe stand many activists hold on issues of nationalism and resistance to colonialism


in its new twenty-first century form, limit, and define the discourse they promote,up to the point where they serve governmental interests detrimental to human rightsand help sustain the existing power structures by reconstructing and duplicating ahegemonic perception, while leaving little room for an autonomous and pluralisticdemocratic participation.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We acknowledge with gratitude the support of this research by the Minerva Centerfor Human Rights and the Davis Center for International Relations.

NOTES

1. Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights. Philadelphia: University of PennsylvaniaPress, 1998, p. 290.

2. See among others Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Arguments at Home and Abroad. Notre Dame:University of Notre Dame Press, 1994; Richard A Falk, Human Rights Horizons. New York: Routledge,2000, part 3; Mara Loveman, “High-Risk Collective Action: Defending Human Rights in Chile, Uruguay andArgentina.” American Journal of Sociology, 104, 2 (1998): 477–525.

3. Elazar Barkan, The Guilt of Nations. New York: Norton, 2000; Alexandra Barahona de Brito et al. (eds.).The Politics of Memory. Oxford University Press, 2001; Nigel Biggar (ed.). Burying the Past. Washington:Georgetown University Press, 2001.

4. This tension relates to the problematique of relativism, which we refrain from addressing it directly here forreasons of space. The issues and debate can be followed among others in Alison Dundes Renteln, “Relativismand the Search for Human Rights.” American Anthropologist, 90, 1 (1988): 56–72; Abdullahi A. An-Na’im,“Problems and Prospects of Universal Cultural Legitimacy for Human Rights,” in An-Na’im and FrancisMading Deng (eds.). Human Rights in Africa. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1990, pp. 331–367; idem,eds. Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992;Michael J. Perry, “Are Human Rights Universal? The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters.” HumanRights Quarterly, 19 (1997): 461–509. On its connection to globalization issues see also Brian Turner, “TheProblem of Cultural Relativism for the Sociology of Human Rights: Weber, Schmitt and Strauss.” Journal ofHuman Rights, 4, 1 (2002): 587–605; and Michael Goodhart, “Origins and Universality in the HR Debates:Cultural Essentialism and the Challenge of Globalization.” Human Rights Quarterly, 25 (2003): 935–964.

5. Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.). The Power of Human Rights. InternationalNorms and Domestic Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan,Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-CommunistEurope. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.

6. Prominent examples are the campaign to eliminate the so-called crimes of honor in Jordan and the campaignagainst female genital mutilation in Egypt.

7. Albeit with much less autonomous mobilization stemming from civil society than in South America.8. Ian Guest, Behind the Disappearances. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990; Luis Roniger

and Mario Sznajder, The Legacy of Human rights Violations in the Southern Cone. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1999.

9. The Ibn Khaldun Center (IKC) is an independent research institute whose major goals are the advancement ofsocial studies in the Arab world and in developing countries. The center has run important research projectsand has organized conferences on issues concerning democratic reform and the strengthening of civil society,with an emphasis on women’s rights and on unveiling the relations between Moslems and Coptic Christiansin Egypt.

10. al-Hayat, 3 July 2000.11. Cairo Times, 28 September–4 October 2000.12. “The state of Egypt vs. free expression: The Ibn Khaldun trial.” Human Rights Watch, 14, 1 (January 2000):

9–10; Lars Berger, “The case of Sa‘ad Eddin Ibrahim and current relationship between state and civil societyin Egypt.” Orient, 41, 4 (December 2000): 667–668.


13. Cairo Times, 31 May–6 June 2001.14. 14. For example, the law announced after the 1992 earthquake aimed at limiting the ability of different

organizations to receive foreign funds was never approved by the upper house of Parliament.15. al-Ahram Weekly, 7–13th February 2002.16. See an English translation of the verdict on http://www.democracy-egypt/acquittal/reasonofacquittal

Jugedment.doc. There is a seeming connection between the timing of the case and the beginning of USmilitary activities in Iraq, even if different bodies in Egypt, among them, Ibrahim’s family, denied this possi-bility and emphasized the independence of the judicial system.

17. See testimonies of prominent public figures at the trial, in which they turned to Ibrahim’s defense, utterlyconfirming his academic and moral integrity, among them Dr. Ahmad Kamal Abu al-Majd; Dr. ‘Abd al-Mun‘imSa‘id; Dr. Mohamad al-Juhari, and Dr. Sa‘id al-Najar, al-Hayat, 21 January 2001.

18. Some of Ibrahim’s early studies on the subject were published in English. See Sa‘ad Eddin Ibrahim, “Anatomyof Egypt Militant Groups: Methodological Notes and Preliminary Findings”, International Journal of MiddleEast Studies, 12 (1980): 343–364; idem, “An Islamic Alternative in Egypt: The Muslim Brotherhood andSadat”, Arab Studies Quarterly, 4 (1981): 75–93. See also the volume of his collected writings: Egypt Islamand Democracy: Critical Essays. Cairo and New-York: The American University in Cairo Press, 2002 (c.1996).

19. Mona El-Ghobashy, “Antimonies of the Sa‘ad Eddin Ibrahim case,” Merip press information, note 106,15 August 2002.

20. See the joint statement by seven international human rights organizations, among them Amnesty International,human rights Watch, and the international Anti-Torture Federation, Concerns about ongoing of detention ofhuman rights defenders (London, 14 July 2000) (AI Index: MDE 23 December 2000).

21. On the policies of Nasser and Sadat, see among others Raymond Baker, Egypt’s Uncertain Revolution underNasser and Sadat. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978; Raymond Hinnebusch, Egyptian Politicsunder Sadat: The Post-populist Development of an Authoritarian Modernizing State. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1985; Kirk J. Beattie, Egypt during the Nasser Years: Ideology, Politics and Civil Society,Boulder: Westview, 1994; and idem, Egypt during the Sadat Years. New York: Palgrave, 2000.

22. Hassan Bahey Eddin, “The prisoner as message.” al-Ahram Weekly, 5–11 September 2002.23. Ibrahim attributed the arrest to his intention to supervise the elections (see http://www.arabicnews.com,

26 September 2000). Mahmud Khandil, a human rights activist, claimed too that the government did not wantthe human rights movement taking any part in the supervision of the elections, al-Ahram al-‘Arabi, 8 July2000. See also Mona El-Ghobashy, “Antinomies of the Saad Eddin Ibrahim case,” Merip press information,note 106, 15 August 2002.

24. The script was published in al-Hayat. (London). 5 July 2000.25. al-Hayat, 3 July 2000.26. In recent years the IKC sponsored a series of conferences on ethnic and religious minorities in the Arab world

that have drawn a great deal of criticism from intellectuals and government; see Cairo Times, 1 July 2000;also al-Ahram weekly, 7–13 February 2002. For Ibrahim’s own analysis, see Sa‘ad Eddin Ibrahim, The Coptsin Egypt. London: Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies, 1996.

27. The statement by the editor in chief of al-Musawar, Makram Muhamad Ahmad, which is illustrative, can befound in al-Musawar, 30 May 2001.

28. For the status of the Coptic community within Egypt and the rhetoric of national unity see Paul Sedra, “ClassCleavages and Ethnic Conflict: Coptic Cristian communities in Modern Egypt Politics.” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 10, 2 (1999): 219–235; David Zeidan, “The Cops—Equal, Protected or persecuted? TheImpact of Islamization on Muslim-Christian Relations in Modern Egypt.” Islam and Christian-Muslim Rela-tions, 10, 1 (1999): 53–67; A. Ayalon, “Egypt’s Coptic Pandora’s Box.” In O. Bengio and Gabriel Ben-Dor(eds.). Minorities and the State in the Arab World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999), pp. 53–71.

29. Sa‘ad Eddin Ibrahim, “‘Ala al-’umah ’an tudif mustalh ‘jamlukiyya’ ‘ala qamusha al-siyasi.” al-Majala,2–8 July 2000.

30. Mona El-Ghobashy, “Antinomies of the Saad Eddin Ibrahim case.” Merip press information note 106,15 August 2002. This issue has continued to resonate politically in Egypt to 2005.

31. Illustrations could be found in the Egyptian State information service website, “Wherases of sentencing Sa‘adEddin Ibrahim,” 26 August 2002. http://www.sis.gov.eg/ online/html/aug.htm

32. See interview with President Hosni Mubarak in Newsweek, March 31, 2001.33. E.g. the article by Dr. ‘Abd al-‘Azim Ramadan in al-Jamhuria, June 2, 2001. The editor in chief of al-Musawar

stated this was not an issue of freedom of conscience but an issue of an academic integrity, freedom of researchin Egypt, and the relation between local research centers and political organizations, al-Musawar, 30 May2001.


34. al-Musawar, 1 June 2001.35. This information appeared first in al-’Akhbar on 27 May 2001; al-Musawar, 30 May 2001; al-Jamhuria, 2

June 2001. Even though it was revealed false, it was repeated in al-’Usbu‘ on 14 January 2002, where it wassaid that Sharon had shown more involvement in this case than in the case of Azam Azam, a Druze Israelicitizen imprisoned in Egypt for alleged spying. The Israeli embassy published a formal refutation, reportedin al-ahram Weekly on 31 May 2001.

36. al-‘Usbu‘, 14 January 2002.37. al-’Akhbar, 8 July 2000.38. The verdict in Arabic is brought in http://www.egypt-democracy.org/saadweb/alhokm/ alhokmcomp.pdf Ac-

cording to Ibrahim’s family, the funds received from Haifa University in Israel were a payment for asubscription to the journal Civil Society published by the Ibn Khaldun Center, whereas the money fromal-Jazeera was a payment for his participation in a television show. See Cairo Times, 5–11 September2002.

39. al-’Ahrar, 9 July 2000; al-Musawar, 30 May 2001.40. See for example the joint press release by six Egyptian human rights organizations, namely the Cairo Institute

for human rights, the Hisham Mubarak Law Center, The Human Rights Center for the Assistance of Prisoners,The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, the Arab Center for the Independence of Judiciary, and al-Nadim Center for the Rehabilitation of the Victims of Violence—Al-hakm bilsijn liSa‘ad al-Din Ibrahimwazamalat ta‘adid limuasasat al-mujtama‘ al-madani fi al-misr, 24 May 2001, to be found in the followingsite: http://www.hrcap.org/ar 11 press/ar 11 press.htm

41. See the joint declaration by seven international human rights organizations from 14 July 2000. Concernsabout ongoing of detention of human rights defenders (London, 14 July 2000) (AI Index: MDE 23 December2000).

42. For a detailed discussion over the human rights movement’s campaign against the law and the reasons forits failure see Vickie Langohr, “Too Much Civil Society, Too Little Politics: Egypt and Liberalizing ArabRegimes.” Comparative Politics, 36, 2 (2004): 193–200. Decree 153 was later on debarred for constitutionalreasons, and a new more balanced law was passed in April 2002, which was welcome by all sides involved.See Bassem Hafez, “Egypt NGO’s: coming into their own.” Human Rights Defenders, 15–21 March 2004,p. 7.

43. One of the most prominent organizations in Egypt, the Human Rights Center of Legal Aid, split into twoorganizations following an internal argument regarding the required registration under Decree 153. BassemHafez, “Egypt NGOs.” op. cit.

44. The CEO of the Egyptian Human Rights Organization, Hafez Abu Sa‘ada, was arrested on 1998 and wascharged of receiving unauthorized foreign funds and yet no indictment was submitted. Abu Sa‘ada consideredthat, unlike his own arrest, Ibrahim’s arrest was due to a long-term plan to undermine civil society associations.Cairo Times, 27 July–9 August 2000.

45. See the joint declaration by the six Egyptian human rights organizations. (See note 38 above).46. As quoted from al Ahram Weekly, 31 May–6 June 2001.47. The trial did not take place in a military court but at the Supreme Court of Defense, whose decisions can

be appealed. Some see this as an indication that the Egyptian government had a vested interest in havinga public trial that anybody, including the Western media could follow directly, as a sign of openness andtransparency. See the statement by one of Egypt’s leading intellectuals, Mohamad Sid Ahmad, in al-AhramWeekly, 5–11 October 2000.

48. See reports on their presence in al-Ahram Weekly, 2–8 May 2002.49. Cairo Times, 28 September–4 October 2000.50. See for example the claims of Hassan Bahey Eddin, a prominent human rights activist who said that

Ibrahim’s status as one of the most renowned sociologists in the Arab world should not be ignored justbecause he holds different opinions on political and human rights issues: al-Ahram Weekly, 5–11 September2002.

51. http://www.arabicnews.com 6 February 2001. See also the discussion over the commission’s visit andthe reaction of Egyptian huamn rights movements in Vickie Langohr, “Frosty reception for US religiousfreedom commission in Egypt.” Middle East Report Online, 29 March 2001 (http://www.merip.org/mero/mero032901.html); and Omayma Abdel Latif, “A Case of Double Standarts.” al-Ahram Weekly, 23–30 May2001.

52. On the impact of the nationalist origin of some of the movement’s leaders on their perception of minorityrights see Mustapha K. al-Sayyid, “Theoretical Issues in the Arab Human Rights Movement.” Arab StudiesQuarterly, 19,1 (winter 1997), p. 29.


53. They claimed that the allegations were based on Military Decree No. 4 from 1992 that is based on the authoritygiven to the military governor under emergency law no. 162 dating back to 1958 (note 38), and see also thecontents of the press release by the Egyptian human rights organization dated 29 July 2002 referring to thelegal aspects in the base of the case.

54. al-Musawar, 1 June 2001, pp. 18–21.55. al-Hayat, 14 July 2000.56. See the words of Dr. Sa‘id Sadeq in al-Akhrar, 30 September 2001; see the calling of liberal Arab intellectuals

for the release of Ibrahim published in al-Kuds al-‘Arabi, 30 September 2002. Most of them were not Egyptians,but among them were some who operated in Egypt such as Dr. Jamal Abd al-Jawad, a researcher at the al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies, playwright ‘Ali Salem, author Muhammad al-Badri and more. See alsothe article by Edward Sa‘id in al-Hayat, 28 June 2001.

57. The debate focused on the funding of human rights organizations, which contrasted with the absence of anydebate over the funding of organizations dealing with development, the environment, and the status of women.See Berger, “The case of Sa‘ad Eddin Ibrahim.” p. 672.

58. al-’Usbu‘, 14 January 2002.59. al-’Usbu‘, 10 November 2003; al-‘Arabi, 16 November 2003. It must be mentioned that in an interview with

al-Ahram, Ibrahim claimed he had not received any of these funds. This claim was later confirmed by agovernment official in al-Ahram Weekly, 27 November 2003. In September 2004 Saad Eddin Ibrahim wasof the opinion that “all the major changes that came to Egypt and the Arab world came externally becauseinternal powers blocked change. . . . But you cannot have change by external factors alone. It is sometimesnecessary, yes, but never sufficient” (http://www.egypttoday.com, January 2006, vol. 27, 1).

60. See the words of Hisham Kasem, human rights activist and the editor of the Cairo Times in al-Ahram Weekly,12 December 2002.

61. Abu Sa‘ada claimed that the government’s plan proved itself effective, as nongovernmental and human rightsorganizations became to fear any foreign aid. Even if aware of this dynamic, his own organization was facingbankruptcy. Cairo Times, 27 July–9 August 2000.

62. See discussion over the public campaign against the associations and civil institutions law in Langohr, “TooMuch Civil Society, Too Little Politics” (note 40 above).

63. See the publications by international human rights groups quoted above. The international media related to thecase in many occasions. See for example: “Egypt’s Affront to Democracy.” Washington Post, 23 May 2001;Mary Anne Weaver, “Mubarak regime is now on trial in Egypt.” New York Times, 17 June 2001; ThomasL. Freidman, “Tarnished pyramids.” New York Times, 25 May 2001. This article raised a stormy reaction inthe Egyptian media, see e.g., al-’Usbu‘, 30 May 2001 and Sawt al-’Umma 30 May 2001. The internationalmedia did, of course, criticize America’s policy as well (e.g., Thomas L. Freidman, “Bush’s shame”, NewYork Times, 4 August 2002).

64. The State department reacted to the verdict with expressions of disappointment: Federal News Service, Statedepartment briefing: Phil Reeker Department deputy spokesman, 29 July 2002; See also the reaction ofthe European Union: European Commission’s press release of 13 December 2000. IP/00/1495. The variedconstellation of forces shaping US policies on human rights as part of foreign policy is beyond the scope ofthis analysis. See for instance David Forsythe, “US Foreign Policy and Human Rights.” Journal of HumanRights, 1, 4 (2002): 501–521.

65. This is related to Egypt’s reliance on the Nile’s water.66. The press claimed that the outcry raised in the world on behalf of Ibrahim was far from being naıve or credible

and that there were elements, mainly Zionist-Israeli oriented ones, that operated against Egypt and her rolein the Arab world, that saw this case as a chance to slander it. See for example the words by the editor ofal-‘Akhbar Jallal Duyder, al-’Akhbar, 29 May 2001; al-Musawar, 30 May 2001; See also al-Wasat (London),20 August 2000, where the American criticism was tied to the failure of the Camp David talks and the USdisappointment over Egypt’s refusal to pressure Arafat into returning to the negotiations.

67. http://www.arabicnews.com, 31 May 2001.68. Letter by spokesperson Majdi Shakar to the editor of The New York Times, 10 August 2002.69. See for example the words of Dr. Abd Al-‘Aziz Ramadan, al-Jamhuriyya, 2 June 2001.70. al-Ahram Weekly, 9-15 May 2002.71. Washington Post, 15 August 2002.72. al-’Akhbar, 18 August 2002.73. al-Wafd, 17 August 2002.74. See quotation of their leaders in Akhar Sa‘a, 21 August 2002.


75. ‘Isam al-‘Aryan, quoted in al-Ahram Weekly, 22-28 August 2002. Similar opinions were expressed by thejournalist Fahmi Huwaydi al-Sharq al-’Awsat, 18 August 2002.

76. Bahey Eddin’s statements in al-Ahram Weekly, 5–11 September 2002. See also the conference organized bythe Cairo Institute for human rights that dealt with human rights, the American aid, and issue of Sa‘ad EddinIbrahim, Sawasiyya, no. 45–46 (2002).

77. As quoted in al-Ahram Weekly, 22–28 September 2002. See also Akhar Sa‘a, 21 August 2002.78. al-Ahram Weekly, 22–28 September 2002.79. See the connection he made to the Egyptian political culture in al-Hayat, 29 July 2001.80. See the interview with Saad Eddin Ibrahim in the Washington Post, 17 May 2003.81. There are few analyses tracing the mutual hostility and suspicion of both groups. See, e.g., Neil Hicks, “Does

Islamist Human Rights Activism Offer a Remedy to the Crisis of HR Implementation in the Middle East,”Human Rights Quarterly, 24 (2002): 361–381.

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