A CASE STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ABORIGINAL TOURISM ENTERPRISE: The Coorong Wilderness Lodge of...

A CASE STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ABORIGINAL TOURISM ENTERPRISEThe Coorong Wilderness Lodge of South Australia— an emic perspective

Freya Higgins-Desbiolles, Joc Schmiechen, George Trevorrow

The Coorong Wilderness Lodge of South Australia—an emic perspective

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National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication Entry

Author: Higgins-Desbiolles, Freya.

Title: A Case Study in the Development of an Aboriginal Tourism Enterpris: The Coorong Wilderness Lodge

of South Australia—an emic perspective / Freya Higgins-Desbiolles; Joc Schmiechen; George Trevorrow.

ISBN: 9781921658174 (pbk.) 9781921658679 (web)

Notes: Bibliography.

Subjects: Coorong Wilderness Lodge. Aboriginal Australians—Economic aspects—Case studies.

Aboriginal Australians—Economic conditions—Case studies.

Other Authors/Contributors: Schmiechen, Joc. Trevorrow, George. CRC for Sustainable Tourism (Australia).

Dewey Number: 338.900899915

Copyright © CRC for Sustainable Tourism Pty Ltd 2010

All rights reserved. Apart from fair dealing for the purposes of study, research, criticism or review as permitted

under the Copyright Act, no part of this book may be reproduced by any process without written permission

from the publisher. Any enquiries should be directed to:

General Manager, Communications and Industry Extension or Publishing Manager, [email protected]

First published in Australia in 2010 by CRC for Sustainable Tourism Pty Ltd

Cover images courtesy of Tourism Australia, Tourism WA (Margaret River), Tourism NT and SATC

Printed in Australia (Gold Coast, Queensland)

http://sustainabletourismcrc.cmail3.com/l/424209/s4i6d21/www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx?sm=cCMy_2fyZbjAjkr2Vy5LopCg_3d_3d

mailto:[email protected]

A CASE STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN

ABORIGINAL TOURISM ENTERPRISE

iii

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements................................................................................................................................................ v

List of Acronyms Used in this Report ............................................................................................................ v

Abstract ............................................................................................................................................................ ii

SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................................................... iii

Objectives of Study ......................................................................................................................................... iii

Methodology ................................................................................................................................................... iii

Key Findings ................................................................................................................................................... iv

Future Action ................................................................................................................................................... v

Supporting Agencies ....................................................................................................................................... v

Policy Reform ................................................................................................................................................. v

Coorong Wilderness Lodge ........................................................................................................................... vi

Research ...................................................................................................................................................... vii

Chapter 1 ........................................................................................................................................................... 8

OVERVIEW OF THE PROJECT AND METHODOLOGY............................................................................ 8

Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................... 8

Aim and Scope of the Study ............................................................................................................................ 8

Objectives of Study .......................................................................................................................................... 8

Research Methods ........................................................................................................................................... 9

Chapter 2 ......................................................................................................................................................... 10

OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE ON INDIGENOUS AUSTRALIAN TOURISM POLICY . 10

Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 10

History of ATSI Tourism Development in Australia ................................................................................. 11

The National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Tourism Industry Strategy ................................... 11

Figure 1: ...................................................................................................................................................... 13

Current Federal Support Programs and Initiatives for Indigenous Australian Involvement in tourism:

Moving to Market and Commercial Imperatives ............................................................................................. 13

Indigenous Australian Tourism Policy in South Australia ........................................................................ 15

Chapter 3 ......................................................................................................................................................... 19

CASE STUDY OF THE COORONG WILDERNESS LODGE .................................................................... 19

Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 19

Coorong Wilderness Lodge Facilities 2000-2008 ....................................................................................... 21

Facilities recently completed ....................................................................................................................... 21

Activities offered .......................................................................................................................................... 21

Foundations and Overview of the Coorong Wilderness Lodge ................................................................... 21

Infrastructure Development ......................................................................................................................... 26

Marketing ....................................................................................................................................................... 31

Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 31

Marketing Opportunities ............................................................................................................................. 31

Marketing to international visitors .............................................................................................................. 32

Marketing to domestic visitors .................................................................................................................... 34

Capturing the Drive by Market ................................................................................................................... 35


iv

Visitor Guides .............................................................................................................................................. 35

Use of Regional Associations’ Networks ..................................................................................................... 38

Poor Consultants’ Advice ............................................................................................................................ 38

Market Sources and Visitor Mix .................................................................................................................. 39

Infrastructure delays result in a lack of capacity ........................................................................................ 41

Summary on the Marketing of the CWL ...................................................................................................... 42

CDEP and Training ..................................................................................................................................... 42

Employment ................................................................................................................................................. 45

Joint Venture Arrangements ........................................................................................................................ 46

Mentoring .................................................................................................................................................... 47

Diverging Cultural Values........................................................................................................................... 48

Racism and Cross-cultural Barriers ............................................................................................................ 50

Land Title .................................................................................................................................................... 52

Impact of the Degraded State of the Coorong, Lower Lakes and River Environment on the Ngarrindjeri

community and the CWL.............................................................................................................................. 54

Leadership ................................................................................................................................................... 55

Is the Commitment to Indigenous Tourism Really There? ........................................................................... 56

Chapter 4 ......................................................................................................................................................... 58

RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................................................ 58

Supporting Agencies ..................................................................................................................................... 58

Policy Reform ................................................................................................................................................ 59

Coorong Wilderness Lodge .......................................................................................................................... 59

Future Research ............................................................................................................................................ 60

Chapter 5 ......................................................................................................................................................... 61

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................... 61

Chapter 6 ......................................................................................................................................................... 62

EPILOGUE ..................................................................................................................................................... 62

APPENDIX A: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES ................................................................................................... 65

APPENDIX B: DESIGN PLANS FOR TOURISM FACILITIES AND ACCOMMODATION FOR THE

CWL 1997–2008 ................................................................................................................................................... 67

APPENDIX C: SATC‘S ‗SOUTH AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINAL CULTURAL EXPERIENCES‘

BROCHURE (2001) ............................................................................................................................................. 84

APPENDIX D: PHOTOS ................................................................................................................................ 86

References ....................................................................................................................................................... 92

AUTHORS ..................................................................................................................................................... 95

Freya Higgins-Desbiolles ............................................................................................................................ 95

Joc Schmiechen ........................................................................................................................................... 95

George Trevorrow ....................................................................................................................................... 95



v

List of Tables

Table 1: Aboriginal Tourism Development Strategies, SA Tourism Plan 2003–2008 (SATC 2002, p. 29). ____ 17 Table 2: Business Plan Estimate of Visitors to the CWL __________________________________________ 39 Table 3: Sources of Visitors in Bus Groups to the CWL ___________________________________________ 41

List of Figures

Figure 1: Stages in enterprise development of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander tourism ventures ______ 12 Figure 2: Map of region where Coorong Wilderness Lodge is located _______________________________ 20 Figure 3: Advertisement for the CWL in the Limestone Coast Visitors Guide 2002 ______________________ 36 Figure 4: Advertisement for the CWL in the Fleurieu Peninsula Visitors Guide 2008 ____________________ 38

Acknowledgements

Sustainable Tourism Cooperative Research Centre, established and supported under the Australian

Government‘s Cooperative Research Centres Program, funded this research. The authors wish to acknowledge

the funding provided to undertake this research on the Coorong Wilderness Lodge and policy supports for small

Aboriginal tourism enterprise. Professor Noel Lindsay provided advice in the early stages of this project which

was helpful in developing the research methodology. Gabrielle Russell-Mundine provided research assistance for

the literature review. Dr. Olga Gostin provided editorial assistance and advice. Additionally, we are grateful for

the assistance of Caroline Densley and Richard Trembath who served on the industry reference group for this

research project.

List of Acronyms Used in this Report

ATA Aboriginal Tourism Australia

ATEC Australian Tourism Export Council

ATSIC Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission

BRPIT Business Ready Program for Indigenous Tourism

CDEP Community Development and Employment Program

CWL Coorong Wilderness Lodge

DITR Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources

IBA Indigenous Business Australia

ILC Indigenous Land Corporation

ITA Indigenous Tourism Australia

ITOs Inbound Tourism Operators

NATSITIS National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Tourism Industry Strategy

NLPA Ngarrindjeri Lands and Progress Association

ONT Office of National Tourism

RCIADIC Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody

ROC Respecting Our Cultures program

SATC South Australia Tourism Commission


ii

Abstract

Boyle‘s scoping study (2001) of Indigenous tourism in Australia indicated a need for research that utilises a case

study approach to examine in greater depth the experience of Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises in order

to identify the factors contributing to economic success and failure. This report provides benchmarking data

gathered from primary documents and interviews on a South Australian Aboriginal tourism enterprise, the

Coorong Wilderness Lodge (CWL), covering a period between 1995 and 2008, in order to ascertain the factors

contributing to the success of this enterprise and also to delineate the factors that have hindered or threatened this

enterprise during its years of operation. Success factors include: timely inputs of advice and support, good

leadership, adequate training, coordination between marketing and development of facilities, an entrepreneurial

spirit by the owner. Key barriers include: a lack of a holistic and coordinated approach by government, a lack of

entrepreneurial capacity, inability to access financial capital, a lack of title to the land, cross-cultural barriers and

latent racism. The development and promotion of Indigenous Australian tourism requires a long-term

commitment to supporting these enterprises through a transition process of moving away from a reliance on

government support mechanisms to a state of commercial viability as an enterprise capable of sustaining itself.



iii

SUMMARY

This research project presents a detailed analysis of a long-running family-owned Aboriginal tourism enterprise,

the Coorong Wilderness Lodge (CWL) in South Australia, covering the period 1995 through 2008. This

addresses a deficiency pointed out in Boyle‘s scoping study (2002) of Indigenous tourism in which she

recommended research that utilises a case study approach to examine in greater depth the experience of

Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises. This report provides an in-depth case study analysis of the CWL in

order to ascertain the factors contributing to the success of this enterprise and also to delineate obstacles

encountered during its development.

Objectives of Study

The objectives of this study were to:

provide a comprehensive account of an Aboriginal enterprise from inception to the present

plot the pivotal decision-making moments in the enterprise‘s history and evaluate the outcomes from

such decisions

identify success factors that aided progress and identify barriers that hindered progress of this enterprise

contrast the vision that inspired this enterprise by examining its current status and speculating what

could have been if the vision had been assisted to fruition by government agencies

examine the impact of government policy and support mechanisms in the development of this enterprise

examine the training and support mechanisms applied to this enterprise

analyse the marketing, logistics and consumer demand/response to this venture.

Methodology

This project employed a case study approach to evaluate the policy supports for the CWL between 1995 and

2008. Multiple sources of information were gathered including twenty-six in-depth, semi-structured interviews

with key informants; policy documentation from governments and other relevant agencies; primary documents

on the foundation, set up and maintenance of the CWL; and participant observations of the development of the

enterprise over the life of the enterprise.

Five in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with George Trevorrow, founder and manager of

the CWL between 2006 and 2009. This provided an oral history of the development and operations of the

enterprise. It also provided a comprehensive narrative used to extrapolate the factors that enabled success, as

well as the threats and hindrances that were encountered. The narrative also identified the pivotal decision-

making points and their outcomes. Lastly, it identified other key informants with vital insights into the history

and development of the CWL.

In-depth, semi-structured interviews were then conducted with the twenty-one informants identified. This

included relevant personnel from the South Australian Tourism Commission (SATC), regional tourism

associations, Indigenous Business Australia (IBA), Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC),

private tourism ventures, business consultants and training providers. These informants confirmed the list of key

persons to interview obtained from George Trevorrow and/or key others identified in the course of interviews.

The policy context that operated at the time of the development was evaluated by a critical analysis of the

official policies on Indigenous Australian tourism formulated by both federal and South Australian state

governments. Insights into informal policy were gained through interviews with public servants.

The data from the interviews and the examination of the policy context enabled the development of a

narrative history of the CWL from multiple perspectives. This was ordered into a chronology sequence in order

to identify points of success, missed opportunities, barriers and policy failures.

An important facet of the research methodology for this project was the inclusion of George Trevorrow as a

co-researcher. It seemed evident to us that the analysis of the success or otherwise of Indigenous Australian

tourism enterprises must necessarily involve a research methodology including Indigenous Australian tourism

leaders such as George Trevorrow. Only thus could we obtain an emic perspective and thereby gain fresh

insights into the difficulties of Indigenous Australian tourism enterprise development. While this necessarily

complicates the outcomes of the research with possible concerns with biased perspectives, we determined the


iv

richness of the unique insights gained outweighs these difficulties.

Key Findings

While governments at all levels have supported the development of Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises

since the Miller Report of 1985 advocated this line of business (Altman 2002), the record of achieving viable

commercial enterprises is patchy at best.

Our study of the Coorong Wilderness Lodge identified many problems arising for Indigenous small to

medium tourism enterprises as have been reported in previous studies (i.e. Bennett 2005; Burchett 1993;

Buultjens, Waller, Graham and Carson 2002; Buultjens and Fuller 2007; James 1996; Schmiechen 2006), as

well as some new and interesting issues. These include: lack of capital available to Indigenous Australian

entrepreneurs; problems in determining land title; continuing dependence on government funds and supports; a

resulting welfare mentality which inhibits the exercise of business acumen; the need for external managerial

inputs to these businesses such as mentors, business managers or joint venture partners; the significance of

individual leadership for business success; the fragility of succession; barriers presented by ongoing racism,

stereotypes and cross-cultural barriers; and the question of how committed governments truly are in supporting

these types of enterprises in their transition to commercial viability.

Our research resulted in the following key findings:

The nature of success of Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises is not commonly agreed by all

parties, as governments measure it primarily in commercial terms, while Indigenous Australian

operators measure it by wider indicators including employment, community benefit, social and cultural

outcomes, environmental outcomes and spin-off opportunities in other areas of community

development.

The ad hoc approach of various supporting agencies for Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises is not

conducive to achieving commercially sustainable enterprises. A holistic approach based on coordination

of all inputs from various levels of government and through various funding mechanisms is essential.

Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises generally lack capital resources and will require long-term

support in order to achieve commercial viability.

Significant barriers to success will need to be overcome for Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises

to achieve commercial viability, including land title issues and access to financial capital. As George

Trevorrow states ― I think as Aboriginal business there‘s many more hurdles to jump than just out in the

ordinary world‖ (pers. comm. 4 September 2006).

Current policy contexts require proactive entrepreneurial initiatives from tourism operators for tourism

enterprises to succeed. However this is often lacking in the Indigenous Australian tourism situation and

this acts as a hindrance to the successful development of Aboriginal tourism enterprises. Evidence

suggests this is the result of a variety of complex factors, including: dependence on government support

in the absence of access to land and financial equity; a historical legacy of government welfare since

dispossession; and the fact that most are not dedicated to providing full time attention to nurturing their

business because of cultural obligations that diverts their energies to such issues as native title, heritage

protection and environmental protection.

Indigenous tourism enterprises are likely to remain in a precarious situation until land title issues are

successfully addressed.

Diverging cultural views on the reason for engaging in tourism business are a clear source of

misunderstanding between supporting government agencies, consultants and Indigenous Australian tour

operators.

Significant barriers to communication exist between supporting government agencies and consultants

and Indigenous Australian tour operators.

Historical legacies, latent racism, pervasive stereotypes and cross-cultural barriers present blocks to

successful communication and cooperation between Indigenous Australian tourism operators and

supporting agencies and personnel.

The development and promotion of Indigenous Australian tourism requires a long-term commitment to

supporting these enterprises through a transition process of moving away from a reliance on

government support mechanisms to a state of commercial viability as an enterprise capable of

sustaining itself.



v

Future Action

We have developed a series of recommendations directed at changing the practice of support agencies of

Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises, reforming the policy environment for Indigenous Australian tourism

enterprise and changing the mode of operations of the Coorong Wilderness Lodge itself. Please note that these

recommendations must be read and understood within the context of the complex history and circumstances

recounted in the body of this report. Some of the recommendations that result from this research include:

Supporting Agencies

Supporting agencies for Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises need to develop a holistic and

coordinated approach to both policy and funding initiatives.

Government agencies supporting Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises need to commit funding and

support mechanisms for the long-term if commercial viability targets are to be sustainably achieved.

Such funds need to be provided within more realistic commercial time frames (under two years) to

ensure enterprise viability.

Government agencies will have to accept that some enterprises will not reach commercial viability but

remain worthy of government support for the other returns that they provide, including social and

environmental benefits.

These agencies need to foster expertise in Indigenous Australian tourism products, circumstances and

cultures within their organisations. This policy arena requires consistency and commitment to attain

successful outcomes.

Government agencies need to coordinate their actions in support of Indigenous Australian enterprises,

both intra-agency and inter-agency. In our case study, we found a great need for the South Australian

Tourism Commission, Indigenous Business Australia and the Indigenous Land Corporation to

coordinate their activities in support of the CWL to avoid duplication of efforts, conflicting outcomes

and inefficiencies.

Agencies should ensure that they employ consultants who have specific expertise in tourism and

understand its commercial realities as well as the special circumstances of Indigenous Australian

tourism. This is essential in providing realistic market analyses.

These agencies should ensure they really listen to Indigenous Australian tourism operators and their

articulation of needs. This requires a more thorough engagement with Indigenous Australian tourism

operators.

These agencies need to recognise the mixed goals that Indigenous Australian tourism operators are

frequently trying to secure and the community orientation that often features in their priorities.

Supporting agencies should foster the development of the domestic market for Indigenous Australian

tourism product, through education and marketing campaigns as well as incentives, as this is a more

reliable and accessible market for Indigenous Australian tourism to rely on. Because of ongoing racism

and stereotyping, a commitment to long-term education of non-Indigenous Australians is essential to

change attitudes and open up this market. Reliance on the international market is not an optimum

strategy as it comprises only a small proportion of Australian tourism and is likely to be impacted in

difficult financial times.

Reinforcing the need for long-term, holistic approaches, Indigenous Australian tourism operators who

are supported to attend major trade show events, such as International Tourismus Borse (ITB) in

Germany, must receive ongoing advice and assistance in following up such opportunities through

continued networking with the wholesalers at subsequent events and related tradeshows.

All supporting agencies need to address the historical legacies of exclusion and marginalisation which

present a context for Indigenous and non-Indigenous relations. Latent racism, stereotyping and cross-

cultural barriers are issues which need to be addressed through cross-cultural training, improved

communications and a commitment to bridging differences.

Policy Reform

Further research and pilot projects are required to identify means to overcome the lack of proactive and

entrepreneurial attitudes within Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises. Possible solutions include

facilitating joint ventures with non-Indigenous business partners, appointing non-Indigenous advisors

and managers to assist in the running of Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises that are funded by


vi

IBA, and establishing a business incubator program sufficiently resourced for a long-term commitment

to fostering entrepreneurial tourism developments.

The development of Indigenous Australian tourism requires a holistic and coordinated approach. For

instance, the development of the infrastructure of an enterprise must be developed in conjunction with

the marketing program and skills training program in order that the business achieves viability.

The development of Indigenous Australian tourism requires a long-term commitment on the part of

government agencies to support Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises through their transition from

a government-supported development to a commercial enterprise capable of sustaining itself.

The role of specialist inbound tour operators must be recognised and supported for the role they could

play in marketing Indigenous Australian tourism products and services to the international market,

including international tour wholesalers.

All programs need to be realistically conceptualised, supported beyond political election cycles and

sufficiently funded. It is clear that former programs such as the Business Ready Program for Indigenous

Tourism (BPRIT) have been under-funded and given insufficient time in which to achieve their aims.

Assistance through channels such as the Community Development and Employment Program (CDEP)

are beneficial for Indigenous tourism start-up, but enterprises need to be facilitated to move away from

dependence on these sources of funding to being reliant on their own generation of profits.

Indigenous Australian tourism businesses may need effective bridges between Indigenous cultures and

the business culture they are entering. This may be accomplished through the use of non-Indigenous

business managers who can assist in holistically developing the enterprise and making sure efforts are

targeted at attaining optimum outcomes in tight commercial timeframes. Joint venture business

structures with non-Indigenous partners are another pathway to bridging this gap.

The policy arena must acknowledge and address the possible different cultural views on the nature of

engagement in tourism business held by Indigenous Australian tourism operators and the policy

professionals that assist them.

The lack of clear title to land is a key inhibitor to Indigenous Australian enterprise development,

particularly securing commercial bank loans. All levels of government should work collaboratively to

resolve this long-standing barrier to Indigenous Australian business success.

Coorong Wilderness Lodge

While acknowledging the myriad of difficulties and obstacles confronted by the Trevorrows in establishing the

CWL as recounted in the body of this report, future success of the CWL depends on addressing the following

issues:

The management must place greater emphasis on business imperatives and operate according to

commercial requirements. Meeting the loan repayments is a significant requirement and securing

profitability is essential to meeting these obligations.

Leadership is a key strength of the enterprise, but strong leadership has resulted in weak succession. It

will be important to encourage younger family members to return to the enterprise and to assume

management and leadership responsibilities.

The management needs to be much more proactive in securing business opportunities through

networking, undertaking marketing initiatives and cultivating business relationships.

The CWL staff needs to ensure reliable and efficient communications with all stakeholders and clients.

A much more professional approach in business communications will be needed to capitalise on the

opportunities the new developments offer.

If the CWL wants to cultivate the international market, it has to commit efforts to a sustained

engagement with wholesalers and inbound tour operators.

The CWL needs to better manage and coordinate all programs and sources of assistance that it receives.

Not all assistance offered is necessarily beneficial.

The CWL leadership may confront limits to the amount of employment that can realistically be

supported by such a small tourism.

The CWL management confronts a future when CDEP and Abstudy funding can no longer be relied on

to support the enterprise. It must generate sufficient profits to sustain the business and its employees.

The CWL staff should strengthen relationships and networks with other tour operators, tourism

networks and regional tourism associations in order to foster the interests of the business.

Now that the accommodation units are completed, the CWL needs to focus on appropriate marketing,

market development and a professional web presence.



vii

The CWL management must cultivate a commercial business perspective if the business is to survive as

a commercial entity.

The CWL may need to generate sufficient profits to employ a dedicated business manager to achieve

some of these goals.

Research There is a need for additional case study research to examine the catalysts for success and barriers

confronted by other Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises.

Collaborative research conducted with other Indigenous Australian tour operators would be helpful in

gaining an emic perspective into the situations confronted by Indigenous Australian tour operators.


8

Chapter 1

OVERVIEW OF THE PROJECT AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction

There has been limited research into Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises addressing both reasons for

success and factors contributing to failure. As a result, knowledge about what contributes to sustainable

Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises is lacking. Boyle‘s (2002) scoping study into the factors contributing

to the economic success and failure of Indigenous Australian tourism indicated a need for research that utilises a

case study approach to examine Australian Indigenous tourism enterprise experiences in greater depth. Joc

Schmiechen‘s (2006) work in developing a national Indigenous tourism research agenda from consultations with

key stakeholders in Indigenous Australian tourism confirmed the utility of generating greater knowledge of the

factors for success in Indigenous Australian tourism through case study research analysis.

Aim and Scope of the Study

Altman noted success in Indigenous Australian development is ―… invariably predicated on comparative

advantage, appropriate institutional design, strong leadership, robust governance, a degree of political stability

and shared development aspirations among Indigenous people and, often, commercial leverage of some form –

that is all,‖ (2002, p.11). Significantly, there are few commercially successful Indigenous Australian tourism

enterprises across the nation that ―can stand alone without continued grant assistance or community support in

the form of CDEP funds‖ (James 1996, p. 35). This provides a strong caution against the optimism and

enthusiasm that the tourism industry and governments have placed on tourism for Indigenous Australian

economic development. Even the most successful Indigenous tourism enterprise in Australia, Tjapukai, located

near Cairns, barely manages to capture a major market share of international visitors to that gateway (Judy

Freeman presentation at the Australian Indigenous Tourism Conference in 2006 cited by Joc Schmiechen pers.

comm. 31 May 2007). However, there has been little research investigating the experience of specific enterprises

and explaining this poor record of success through the analysis of the history of the enterprise, its development

and its ongoing management.

This research project developed in response to these clearly identified needs to understand more about the

development of sustainable Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises and how they relate to associated support

systems and government policies. It uses a case analysis approach to provide benchmarking data on a pioneering

South Australian Aboriginal Tourism enterprise, the Coorong Wilderness Lodge (CWL). The major purpose of

this project is to provide a comprehensive account of an Aboriginal enterprise from inception to the present

(1995-2008) in order to analyse the potentials, problems and pitfalls that typically confront Indigenous

Australian tourism enterprises. Recognising that many of these types of enterprises are dependent on a variety of

government and non-government support mechanisms due to such factors as lack of land title and poor access to

capital, this project particularly focuses on government policy and mechanisms supporting the development of

Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises. The in-depth analysis provides valuable insights into the experiences

of Indigenous Australian tourism operators in order to better inform future policy development and

implementation in the future.

Objectives of Study

Provide a comprehensive account of an Aboriginal enterprise from inception to the present

Plot the pivotal decision-making moments in the enterprise‘s history and evaluate the outcomes from

such decisions

Identify success factors that aided progress and identify barriers that hindered progress of this enterprise

Contrast the vision that inspired this enterprise by examining its current status and speculating what

could have been if the vision had been assisted to fruition by government agencies

Examine the impact of government policy and support mechanisms in the development of this

enterprise

Examine the training and support mechanisms applied to this enterprise

Analyse the marketing, logistics and consumer demand/response to this venture



9

Research Methods

This project employed a case study approach to evaluate the policy supports for the CWL between 1995 and

2008. A case study is ―an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life

context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident‖ (Yin 2003, p.

13). Case study methodology is a rigorous research approach requiring multiple sources of evidence in order to

arrive at an understanding of a subject within its specific context (Xiao & Smith 2006, p. 740). For this project,

multiple sources of information were gathered including twenty-six in-depth, semi-structured interviews with

key informants; policy documentation from governments and other relevant agencies; primary documents on the

foundation, set up and maintenance of the CWL; and participant observations of the development of the

enterprise.

Five in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with George Trevorrow, founder and manager of

the CWL between 2006 and 2009. This provided an oral history of the development and operations of the

enterprise. It also provided a comprehensive narrative used to extrapolate the factors enabling success, threats

and hindrances encountered, as well as the pivotal decision-making points and their outcomes. Lastly, these

interviews identified other key informants with vital insights into the history and development of the CWL.

In-depth, semi-structured interviews were then conducted with twenty-one informants identified from

preceding interviews. These included relevant personnel from the South Australian Tourism Commission,

regional tourism associations, Indigenous Business Australia, ATSIC, private tourism ventures, business

consultants and training providers (for a full list of interviewees see Appendix A).

The policy context that was operational at the time of the development was evaluated by a critical analysis of

the official Indigenous Australian tourism policies of both federal and South Australian state governments.

Insights into informal policy were gained through interviews with relevant public servants.

The data from the interviews and the examination of the policy context enabled the development of a

narrative history of the CWL from multiple perspectives. This was ordered into a chronology which helped to

identify points of success, missed opportunities, barriers and policy failures.

An important facet of the research methodology for this project was the inclusion of George Trevorrow as

co-researcher. The barriers to success for Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises can only be properly

ascertained through a research methodology that includes Indigenous Australian tourism leaders. This is

imperative to obtaining an emic perspective and thereby gaining fresh insights into the difficulties of Indigenous

Australian tourism enterprise development. Trevorrow has a significant experience of national leadership in

Indigenous Australian tourism; for instance in 1994 he served as Chairman of the National Aboriginal and

Torres Strait Islander Tourism Reference Group facilitating the first gathering of Indigenous tour operators as a

pilot project under the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Tourism Industry Strategy (NATSITIS).

Additionally, Trevorrow was also elected the inaugural chair of the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait

Islander Tourism Operators Association in 1995.

The theoretical approach to the study incorporated the insights gained from social construction theory which

suggests that tourism policy, planning and implementation are ―dynamic, socially constructed activities that

involve a wide range of agents and organisations characterised by varying degrees of interest and commitment‖

(Dredge & Jenkins 2007, p. 14). The information gained from the interviews for this project represented several

differing social constructions on the nature, capacities and needs of Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises

and provided insights into the dynamics of building the CWL as a business. Key dimensions of a social

constructionist analysis include analysis of spatial dimensions, time scales, institutional contexts, issue drivers,

actors and the characteristics of policy dialogues and exchanges (Dredge & Jenkins 2007, pp. 16-20).


10

Chapter 2

OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE ON INDIGENOUS

AUSTRALIAN TOURISM POLICY

Introduction

In the past two decades, in particular, there has been considerable effort exerted to encourage Indigenous

Australians1 to enter the tourism industry. There have been a variety of motivations driving this push, including a

growing interest exhibited by tourists in Indigenous products and experiences; the tourism industry‘s interest in

developing diverse niche markets to entice international tourists to Australia; the interests of governments in

moving Indigenous Australians from ―welfare to work‖; and an increasing interest by some Indigenous

Australians in using tourism to obtain diverse goals for communities and individuals. However, the number of

successful Indigenous Australian tourism ventures established in this period has remained surprising small.

Research into Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises has also been limited. As Ellis states, ―For over 20 years

research on ‗Indigenous experiences‘ has been a priority but to date comprehensive data has not been

forthcoming. Much of the development of Indigenous tourism has occurred in an information vacuum, perhaps

contributing to the unacceptably high failure rate among tourism enterprises‖ (2003).

The National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Tourism Industry Strategy (NATSITIS) (ATSIC & ONT

1997) defined Indigenous tourism as including all forms of participation by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander

people in tourism:

as employers

as employees

as investors

as joint venture partners

providing Indigenous cultural tourism products, and

providing mainstream tourism products.

This definition acknowledges that Indigenous tourism is not limited to cultural products; it also includes

mainstream tourism activities and service provision. An ambitious and contemporary vision for Indigenous

tourism is presented by Tourism Queensland which suggests it should:

present Indigenous people as vibrant participants in Australian society

be sensitive to the culture and beliefs of Indigenous people

be a means to creating wealth for Indigenous people

integrate seamlessly with the mainstream industry, and

target a broad range of market niches with a similarly broad range of products (Tourism Queensland

2004, p. 6).

1 The appropriate terminology for Australia‘s Indigenous peoples is contested and this impacts on the terminology used in

this report. Previously, Aboriginal tourism was the commonly used term in government reports and tourism industry

publications because Aboriginal stereotypical imagery prevailed (boomerangs, didgeridoos and loincloths) and Torres Strait

Islanders had little engagement with tourism. However, with the involvement of Torres Strait Islanders in Australian tourism

in the new millennium, this term no longer predominates. Common terminology now uses Aboriginal and Torres Strait

Islander tourism or Indigenous Australian tourism for the discussion of broad, national level perspectives. However,

controversy still exists amongst Aboriginal communities about whether ―Aboriginal‖ is a preferable title to ―Indigenous‖ as a

generic label for their communities. Names of specific nations should be used when referring to specific communities and

enterprises, such as the Ngarrindjeri and the Coorong Wilderness Lodge.



11

Since the 1990s, governments at both the federal level and the state/territory level have made concerted

efforts to develop strategies and plans for fostering Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander tourism in order to

promote beneficial outcomes for all stakeholders. The following section examines the federal strategy,

NATSITIS, in some detail. It then discusses more recent Commonwealth government initiatives in Indigenous

Australian tourism.

Finally, the South Australian Indigenous tourism context is examined in order to understand the policy

environment in effect during the establishment of the Coorong Wilderness Lodge.2

History of ATSI Tourism Development in Australia

It is useful to place Indigenous involvement in contemporary tourism within the context of Indigenous history

and politics. It was only as recently as 1967 that a referendum was passed, changing the Australian Constitution

and allowing the federal government to legislate for the benefit of Indigenous Australians and thus overrule

some discriminatory state legislation that caused Indigenous Australian marginalisation. The referendum led to

Indigenous Australians receiving the same citizenship rights as other Australians, including the right to fair

wages for their labour, unrestricted movement off missions and a halt to the forced removal of children (known

as the Stolen Generations). Coincidentally, it was about this time that Australia began to concentrate on

formulating tourism policy and engaging with this potentially lucrative source of economic growth. Altman

(1993, 2001) claims that calls for Aboriginal involvement in the tourism industry date back to this time in the

mid 1960s when the first comprehensive study into the Australian tourism industry was undertaken. While

Indigenous tourism had not advanced very far at this time, Trudi Ridge suggests that changes in Indigenous

Australian social and political status ―indirectly influenced Indigenous tourism development‖ as movements for

self-determination grew (2005, p. 1).

Officially, the suggestion to explore tourism as a source for Indigenous community development was

articulated in the 1991 Report of the Inquiry into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (RCIADIC) where it was seen as

a promising source of self-esteem and economic opportunity (ATSIC & ONT 1997). Following this suggestion

by RCIADIC, a number of organisations including ATSIC worked to develop a national framework for

Indigenous tourism that became the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Tourism Industry Strategy

(henceforth referred to as NATSITIS or ―the strategy‖) (ATSIC & ONT 1997, p. 4). Some $15 million was

allocated to fund this effort.

The National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Tourism Industry Strategy

NATSITIS was given a timeframe of four years between 1997 and 2001 in which to increase Indigenous

Australian involvement in tourism, thus providing ―… for the period in the lead up to the Sydney Olympics, the

Paralympics and the Centenary of Federation, so that any review of the Strategy can learn from the experience of

these events‖ as well as symbolically coinciding with much of the UN‘s declared International Decade of the

World‘s Indigenous People (1995–2005) (ATSIC & ONT 1997, p. 3). The plan involved the release of a draft

strategy in 1994 which was followed by extensive consultations with Indigenous Australian communities; the

launch of numerous innovative pilot projects to test components of the draft strategy; collaboration with industry

and other stakeholders; as well as cooperation between federal and state/territory governments. The aim of

NATSITIS was to support the development of Indigenous Australian tourism through the support of Indigenous

Australian people‘s efforts to get into tourism with assistance from the mainstream tourism industry and

government agencies (ATSIC & ONT 1997, p. 4). The vision set forth within the strategy was:

choice for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people about their involvement in the tourism industry,

high quality presentation of unique and living cultures,

a vibrant Indigenous component of the tourism industry,

a means of economic independence for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander participants,

development of Indigenous tourism product by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people with

appropriate support from the mainstream tourism industry, and

a productive and progressive partnership between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people and non-

Indigenous Australians within the industry as a whole (ATSIC & ONT 1997, p. 1).

2 This is a focused discussion. For a wider literature review on the development of Indigenous tourism in Australia,

recommended readings include Zeppel (2001) and Boyle (2001).


12

The first statement of the NATSITIS vision set out above is an important one as tourism has often been seen

as a force foisted on Indigenous communities and one that works to the advantage of other interests while the

negative impacts of tourism are experienced by Indigenous communities. Provided that Indigenous Australians

willingly decide to engage with tourism, the strategy envisions beneficial outcomes for them including jobs,

income and ―strengthening of cultural value‖ (ATSIC & ONT 1997, p. 4). However the strategy also delineates

the benefits for other stakeholders: ―Support for participation by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people is

important to governments because of the potential to create employment and economic benefits, and it is

important to the tourism industry because of its potential to add to the range and quality of Australian tourism

products‖ (ATSIC & ONT 1997, p. 4).

NATSITIS presents a model of the stages in enterprise development for ATSI tourism (see Figure 1).

NATSITIS describes this as a simple model of the possible stages of enterprise development for ATSI tourism

enterprises and argues that there is no intention to imply ―… that enterprises should move from one step to

another …‖ and that it only represents the stages of progression necessary for those ―… participants who do

want to ‗grow‘ their enterprise‖ to follow in order to consolidate their development (ATSIC & ONT 1997, pp. 7–

8). NATSITIS contends that ―… the vast majority of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander tourism enterprises

are operating within steps 1–3‖ (ATSIC & ONT 1997, p. 7). Steps one through three, in fact, represent the facets

of community development and engagement with tourism while steps four through six represent an enterprise

embarking on the commercialisation of their tourism and full engagement with the processes of the tourism

industry. The Coorong Wilderness Lodge under study here was one of the few Indigenous Australian tourism

operations viewed as holding the capacity to advance to stage 6 and to be marketed to international tourists.

In the implementation section of the strategy, Section Four, states ―most of the existing Indigenous tourism

product is seen as commercially fragile … for this reason, the Commonwealth and state/territory governments

see it as a priority to consolidate the most successful existing products rather than to promote development of

new products in the short term‖ (ATSIC & ONT 1997, p. 35). This approach is significant to understanding the

policy context for the development, support and promotion of enterprises such as the Coorong Wilderness

Lodge.

The ultimate aim of NATSITIS is to see ATSI involvement in tourism integrated within the mainstream

tourism sector rather than be treated as a separate segment so that it can benefit from access to support

mechanisms and infrastructure including ―… bookings, transport, marketing and wholesaling‖ (ATSIC & ONT

1997, p. 6).

In fact, a key section of NATSITIS is that addressing the support initiatives required to facilitate Indigenous

Australian involvement in tourism. Recognising that concerted support from a variety of stakeholders is required

for success, this section comprises nearly one-third of the entire document. It addresses such support

requirements as: fostering of support networks, sharing information, providing training, and assistance with

product development. It also discusses planning issues, the physical infrastructure required, the need to obtain

funding, the need for market research, assistance with marketing, and the management of the impacts of tourism

(ATSIC & ONT 1997, pp. 28–46).

As Parkin states, ―to date, NATSITIS is the most important document produced to direct the future

development of Indigenous tourism‖ (2001, p. 258). While NATSITIS recommended some seventy-five actions

within the strategy document, its weakness was that it never received a commitment of funds to implement these

suggested actions nor agreements by relevant agencies to do their part in implementing them (Parkin 2001,

p. 259). Also significant to piecemeal implementation of NATSITIS was a change in control of federal

government from Labor to the Liberal Coalition. As a result, action on the agenda items of NATSITIS were left

to a plethora of government agencies to fulfil and this has occurred in an ad hoc manner.



13

Figure 1: Stages in enterprise development of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander tourism ventures

Current Federal Support Programs and Initiatives for Indigenous Australian

Involvement in tourism: Moving to Market and Commercial Imperatives

Since 1998, the Commonwealth government has taken a much more market focused approach to the

development of Indigenous Australian tourism. The Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs

released a discussion paper entitled Removing the Welfare Shackles in April 1998 proposing important changes

to legislative and administrative policies on Indigenous Australian economic development (Pritchard 1998, p. 9).

In particular, the government established a new statutory authority, Indigenous Business Australia (IBA),

answerable directly to the Minister. IBA was charged to take on the roles of the former Commercial

Development Corporation including equity investment and joint venture responsibilities, ATSIC‘s Business

Funding Scheme and the Indigenous Business Initiative Programme. It was also to manage the Aboriginal and

Torres Strait Islander Land Fund and the Aboriginal Benefit Trust Account. IBA was established ―to operate

without the benefit of recurrent Government funding; its ability to function remains entirely dependent on the

ability to source sound investments that are able to turn a profit‖ (IBA 2005). While integrating functions in this

manner was advocated as a way to obtain efficiency and effectiveness, ATSIC argued that in fact it complicated

matters and added little benefit (ATSIC 1998).3 The development of IBA out of previous programs and agencies

3 In fact, with the benefit of hindsight, the creation of IBA can be seen as part of the process of undermining ATSIC which

was abolished in 2005. Empowering IBA and limiting ATSIC had the effect of moving away from a body expressing the

right to Indigenous Australian self-determination and sovereignty to a body developed to narrowly support Indigenous

Australian enterprise development. Importantly, it also moved away from a notion of the legitimacy of on-going government

Step 6: Getting onto the World Stage—the product is

reliable and stable. It meets particular expectations of

different inbound (export) markets, and there is an

ability to respond quickly to inquiries. High quality

promotional materials are essential.

Step 5: Dealing with Wholesalers—the product must be

developed sufficiently to be able to present it to a broader market.

Promotion should encourage realistic expectations from tourists

(distance, conditions, what they will experience, etc), and a seven

day week availability is generally required.

Step 4: Achieving Viability—this involves presenting a reliable and well

tested product for marketing, with sufficient cash flow to be able to offer

commissions. It is necessary to have well developed skills, and a high

level of reliability in terms of product and participants.

Step 3: Planning and Organising—for this step to be taken, it is necessary to

clearly establish what there is to offer to tourists, refine the product to the stage

where it can be sold, and establish the model for participation and management of

impacts.

Step 2: Learning about the Industry—this involves defining a desirable tourism product,

and allowing people to sort out their level of individual commitment, as well as thinking

about potential impacts of tourism and how to manage them. It may involve some research,

to see if the products are marketable.

Step 1: Cultural Revival and Maintenance—in many areas, people need to develop their own

strategies for presenting their own local culture and how to be involved in the tourism industry. They

may also wish to provide a watchdog role in relation to misappropriation of cultural heritage by

others. This is an important step for involvement in cultural tourism.

Source: National Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Tourism Industry Strategy (ATSIC & ONT

1997, p. 8.).


14

marked a shift away from government supported initiatives to a new era where Indigenous Australian business

development was expected to run according to market rules and achieve commercial viability rapidly.

In 2004, the Australian government released its white paper on tourism. Contained therein was a section in

which the government outlined its plans to encourage Indigenous tourism. This policy direction was in response

to research by the Australian Tourism Commission which showed that the tourism industry was meeting only

half of the market demand for Indigenous Tourism experiences. The government also stated that tourism offered

the ―prospect of a pathway to economic independence‖ (Australian Government 2004, p. 31).

Currently, the Commonwealth Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources (DITR) focuses its policy on

impediments to the development of business skills of Indigenous Australian tourism operators as this is viewed

as the major obstacle to meeting the demand for Indigenous tourism product. In response the government has

focused on capacity building through three key initiatives which are:

1. Funding Indigenous Business Australia to provide venture capital to Indigenous Businesses.

2. Funding a guide for start up businesses entitled ―The Financial Management Guide—the Business

of Indigenous Tourism‖ produced by Aboriginal Tourism Australia.

3. Funding the ―Business Ready Program for Indigenous Tourism‖ (BRPIT) which is designed to help

individuals in early stages of business development over a two year period to help them get to a

stage where they are ―business ready‖ and then to introduce them to investors, venture capitalists or

strategic alliances in the tourism industry (Australian Government 2004, p. 32).

The BRPIT is a mentoring program funded at $3.8 million.4 This program was an outcome of the federal

government‘s Tourism White Paper and focused on developing ―management skills, business and strategic

planning, market research and understanding tourism distribution networks and commercial practices in the

tourism industry‖ (Australian Government 2004, p. 32). It is designed to support individuals or early stage

businesses with professional mentoring in order to develop the professionalism and commercial viability of their

enterprises. Six mentors have been appointed to mentor between five and ten businesses each throughout

Australia.

Additionally there are numerous programmes available that can be accessed by Indigenous Australians to

assist them in entering the tourism industry. Current Commonwealth programmes providing grants or other

supporting funds fostering Indigenous Australian involvement in tourism include:

Australia Council (e.g. Community Cultural Development Fund)

National Library of Australia (e.g. Community Heritage Grants)

Department of the Environment and Heritage (e.g. Coastcare, Commemoration of Historic Events and

Famous Persons Grant-in-Aid Program)

Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources (e.g. Australian Tourism Development Programme and

the BRPIT)

Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme

CentreLink (through the Wage Assistance Card—a wage subsidy for employers who employ

Indigenous job seekers)

Department of Transport and Regional Services (e.g. regional partnerships)

AusTrade (e.g. Export Market Development Grant)

National Parks Australia and state/territory parks authorities

Department of Education, Employment and WorkPlace Relations (a wide range of programs and

funding initiatives for Indigenous employment and training) (Ridge 2005).

The development of Indigenous Australian tourism is also fostered by the creation of new national bodies

within the last decade. As an outcome of the NATSITIS pilot project facilitating the first gathering of Indigenous

operators in Alice Springs in 1995, a national operators association was formed. This body, Aboriginal Tourism

Australia (ATA), struggled for 12 years to become the key national organisation for Indigenous Australian

tourism whilst seeking membership support from Indigenous tourism operators from across Australia. ATA

described its aims as follows: ―ATA draws on its national membership to provide leadership and a focus for the

development of Indigenous tourism, consistent with Indigenous economic, cultural and environmental values.

ATA promotes cultural integrity and authenticity across the tourism industry and provides education on

support for such initiatives and instead requiring such enterprises to operate according to commercial and market imperatives. 4 In the 2008–2009 budget, the federal government committed another $1.8 million to the BRPIT.

http://www.centrelink.gov.au/internet/internet.nsf/indigenous/wageassist.htm



15

Indigenous protocols to the broader tourism industry‖ (ATA n.d.).

Headed by its Chair Lois Peeler, ATA continuously struggled to obtain support and funding from

government and industry to fund its initiatives. One of its major achievements was the Respecting Our Cultures

(ROC) Program, a certification program for Indigenous Australian enterprises. ROC Certified businesses

promised to: ―observe cultural protocols of Australia‘s Indigenous people … aim to preserve cultural integrity

and authenticity, utilise sensitive environmental practices and perform all areas of their business at the highest

professional standards‖ (ATA n.d.).

ATA also convened an annual Business Development Symposium, stating: ―Since launching in 2002, this

strategic forum provides Indigenous tourism operators with practical information and skills to strengthen and

improve their business operations, achieve long-term business sustainability and meet international travel

industry standards‖ (ATA n.d.). Despite these important initiatives, in June 2007 ATA ceased operations due to a

lack of funds.

This loss leaves a vacuum as there is currently no independent peak body for Indigenous Australian tourism

operating at the national level.5

More recently, Indigenous Tourism Australia (ITA) was established by the Commonwealth government as

part of the development of the national tourism body Tourism Australia in 2005. Its key aims include:

developing a ‗national footprint‘ for sustainable Indigenous experiences

influencing capacity building, skills training and business mentoring to improve Indigenous tourism

cultural product

assist in creating better linkages between the Indigenous tourism sector and the international

distribution system including the Australian Tourism Export Council (ATEC), inbound tourism

operators (ITOs) and tourism wholesalers

developing a more compelling market message (Tourism Australia n.d.).

There was clearly an overlap of roles between ATA and ITA and this raises the question why another

national Indigenous Australian tourism body was created. However, the development of ITA and its placement

within Tourism Australia are indicative of a heightened profile for Indigenous Australian tourism with both the

federal government and the tourism industry. Simultaneously state governments have also been focusing on the

development of their Indigenous Australian tourism experiences and products. This discussion focuses only on

recent South Australian Indigenous tourism policy in order to develop clear insight into the policy context

impacting the development of the CWL business enterprise.

Indigenous Australian Tourism Policy in South Australia

While not as well known for Indigenous Australian tourism experiences as other states and territories such as the

Northern Territory,6 South Australia (SA) has been involved in the development and promotion of this sector

since the 1990s. As part of the efforts to develop the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Tourism

Industry Strategy, the South Australian Tourism Commission (SATC) conducted a pilot study on joint ventures

resulting in the publication Guidelines for tourism joint ventures between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal

partners (SATC 1996a).7

In 1995, SATC appointed a dedicated Aboriginal Tourism Development Officer and produced an Aboriginal

Tourism Strategy (1995). This reflected a new view and approach to Aboriginal tourism expressed in the South

Australian Tourism Plan 1996–2001 (SATC 1996c). This plan distanced itself from a commonly held former

view that the high degree of interest in Aboriginal tourism expressed by tourists would automatically generate

lucrative business. Instead, it argued ―success will depend on consumer demand, a high level of professionalism

and delivery of an authentic quality experience‖ (SATC 1996c, p. 29).

5 Regional peak bodies such as the Western Australia Indigenous Tourism Operators Committee provide effective local

advocacy but the national constituency for Indigenous Australian tourism is currently under-served. There is unfortunately no

similar body in South Australia despite Aboriginal tourism operators in SA requesting one be formed for a number of years. 6 SATC research conducted in Melbourne and Sydney in 2002, found that 87% of respondents associated the Northern

Territory with Aboriginal culture, compared to 43% for Western Australia, 25% for Queensland and only 11% for South

Australia (SATC 2002, p. 29) 7 At this time, South Australian government documents and tourism brochures utilised the term Aboriginal tourism

exclusively.


16

Additionally, it held that success requires: an understanding of the parameters ensuring viability of tourism

businesses; partnerships with mainstream industry and expertise; Aboriginal tourism to be developed on a

regional basis well networked with complementary products and experiences; marketing campaigns not to take

place independently of Aboriginal tourism operators; recognition that it can take up to six years to gain a

presence in the international market; and development of business and service skills to ensure viability of

Aboriginal tourism product (SATC 1996c, p. 29). These are all important realistic insights into the requirements

for achieving viability and are relevant to the Coorong Wilderness Lodge case study which follows.

SATC, driven by this policy initiative, created a dedicated brochure on Indigenous tourism products and

experiences in South Australia to market this niche (see: SATC 1996b). However, SATC‘s commitment to

promoting Aboriginal tourism waned significantly when the Aboriginal Tourism Development Officer‘s two

year contract expired and was not renewed. However, Aboriginal tourism in South Australia remained partially

supported by the Department of Aboriginal Affairs at this time.

In 2000, as part of a renewed special interest tourism focus, Wayne Emery took responsibility for Aboriginal

tourism and other niche tourism segments for the SATC. A key problem Emery noted at the time was that

although some half a dozen Aboriginal experiences ―have been up and running for quite a few years … [they]

are basically surviving on funding rather than commercial operation so one of the objectives is to actually wean

them off that process and make them commercially viable and so sustainable‖ (Boyle 2001, pp. 7–8). Emery

noted that he acted as a liaison between various subsections of SATC and Aboriginal operators, with the key

areas of focus including marketing, business development skills, planning and infrastructure, and training. He

also identified a key role in internal education within SATC to ensure everyone had some understanding of

Aboriginal tourism (Boyle 2001, pp. 7–8). However, he also noted a history of poor coordination between

diverse government agencies, a lack of follow through funding to support initiatives and bureaucratic inertia

which hindered progress. Emery noted initiatives such as the development of an Aboriginal tour operators‘

network and inter-agency meetings as attempts to overcome these difficulties. Specifically, Emery outlined the

following key issues or requirements for the successful development of South Australia‘s Indigenous tourism:

increased knowledge about and assistance for marketing planning

increased knowledge about and assistance for business planning and development skills

increased small business product development and infrastructure development knowledge

increased facilitation of education and employment in mainstream tourism

increased resources for implementation of existing strategies

increased cooperation/collaboration with arts/heritage/environment units

development of Indigenous operator group/networks for mutual support and knowledge sharing

consideration of an Indigenous ‗Business Incubator‘

development of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), benchmarks and associated responsibilities against

which strategy implementation can be measured (Boyle 2001, Appendix C).

In late 2000, Joc Schmiechen held a meeting with Bill Spurr, then CEO of the SATC, and a number of key

managers of relevant departments of SATC to discuss the current state and future development of Aboriginal

tourism in SA. As a result of this meeting, Spurr committed to more decisive support for Aboriginal tourism

enterprises, with a focus especially on Iga Warta in the Flinders Ranges and the Coorong Wilderness Lodge in

the Coorong. Amongst other things, it was agreed that a more focused project management approach to

supporting the enterprises was needed and it was agreed that a dedicated Aboriginal tourism position in the

SATC should be re-established (Schmiechen, pers. comm. 31 May 2007). Wayne Emery was given the

responsibility to act on these decisions. As part of these efforts, Carroll Karpany, a Ngarrindjeri Aboriginal man

with tourism industry experience as a cultural performer, was employed by SATC in 2002 to assume

responsibility for the promotion of Aboriginal tourism. Before his employment, responsibility for Indigenous

product was the shared responsibility of several SATC departments and the budgets were small ($6000). With

Karpany‘s arrival, Aboriginal tourism was boosted by having a dedicated champion to promote the development

of Aboriginal tourism in SA and a person who could bridge the gaps between Aboriginal tourism operators,

SATC and the tourism industry. For instance, at the onset of his work, Karpany described the CWL as having a

“lack of confidence in the SATC” and a “high level of suspicion rather than a high level of proactiveness to

engage governments” (pers. comm. 16 Nov 2006). Karpany‘s role in supporting enterprises such as the CWL

has provided more effective support and advice to these operators in recent years. However, Karpany‘s potential

impact has been curtailed by: his focus at a state-wide level on developing the acknowledgement, recognition

and respect strategy (outlined below) which limited his attention to individual enterprises; his responsibility for a

large portfolio of the state‘s Aboriginal tourism operators; and the fragmented nature of SATC operations



17

(divided responsibilities between marketing, infrastructure development, policy). 8

Karpany‘s new approach to Aboriginal tourism in SA was based on acknowledgement, recognition and

respect for Aboriginal custodians. This approach involved extensive negotiations with the regional tourism

bodies of South Australia and has led to good recognition of Aboriginal traditional owners in the maps and texts

included in the regional visitor guides in some key regions like the Fleurieu Peninsula, Flinders Ranges and

Limestone Coast region. This strategy has been pursued because Karpany as the Aboriginal product officer of

SATC viewed this as a prerequisite to overcoming previous poor relationships between SATC, the SA tourism

industry and Aboriginal tourism operators. He viewed this strategy as conducive to moving Aboriginal people to

better trust the tourism industry and SATC, and so as a precursor to achieving better networking between the

mainstream tourism industry and Indigenous Australian tour operators. However, this focus has meant that his

energies have been diverted away from the focus on delivering practical outcomes and opportunities for

Aboriginal enterprises such as the CWL.

Current SATC Aboriginal tourism policy is set out in the South Australian Tourism Plan 2003–2008. It

focuses on improving the ability of South Australian Aboriginal operators to attract greater market share of

international visitors interested in experiencing Indigenous Australian culture during their Australia visit.9 This

document lists ten strategies to strengthen this sector and improve its results. These address such diverse issues

as cultural self-determination through tourism, cross-cultural training of tourism professionals in SATC,

marketing and business viability and development (see Table 1).

Table 1: Aboriginal Tourism Development Strategies, SA Tourism Plan 2003–2008 (SATC 2002, p. 29).

Cultural self-

determination

Strategy 1: Empower Aboriginal operators to explore opportunities for cultural self-

determination and community independence through tourism.

Industry cross-

cultural training

Strategy 3: Participate in cultural awareness programs to develop knowledge and

understanding of protocols and cultural management issues.

Business viability Strategy 2: Through appropriate management training, ensure the sustainability of

Aboriginal tourism by maintaining the integrity of Indigenous experiences.

Strategy 4: Encourage the participation of Aboriginal businesses in mainstream tourism.

Strategy 9: Work with Aboriginal operators to develop Aboriginal product and increase

accreditation and consistency of the experience.

Marketing Strategy 5: Develop, in conjunction with traditional custodians, a coordinated approach

to marketing and promoting the state‘s Aboriginal sites, displays, music and customs.

Strategy 6: Use the Aboriginal Cultures Gallery, Tandanya and Warriparinga as the

flagships to position South Australia as the ‗induction‘ destination for Aboriginal

experience.

Strategy 7: Develop Aboriginal experiences, particularly in regions, through linkages

with nature-based and ecotourism initiatives, and cooperative marketing.

Strategy 8: Adopt national guidelines and requirements for branding an authentic

Aboriginal tourism experience.

Strategy 10: Increase the range of communication tools used to market and support the

Aboriginal tourism segment e.g. Indigenous marketing network, central booking agency

and website development.

8 The tensions between the need for holistic, individually focussed business support and SATC‘s internal structure together

with their broad functions in facilitating tourism (and indigenous tourism) across all of the state remain pervasive sources of

misunderstanding and malcontent reported throughout this study. 9 The plan notes ―While 40 percent of international tourists to South Australia take part in Aboriginal tourism activities at

some stage in their stay in Australia, only 6 percent do so in South Australia‖ (SATC 2002, p. 29).


18

In 2009, the SATC has commissioned a consultant to develop an Aboriginal Cultural Tourism Strategy ―for the

ongoing development and expansion of the Aboriginal tourism sector‖ in line with the objectives established in

the South Australian Tourism Plan 2003–2008.10

In their analysis of public sector initiatives to support Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises, Buultjens et

al. (2002) indicate that South Australia may lag behind other states (such as Queensland and Western Australia)

in their efforts to support Indigenous tourism businesses. The following case study will provide an in-depth

insight into the development of an Aboriginal tourism enterprise, the Coorong Wilderness Lodge, from its initial

conceptualisation in the mid-1980s until 2008. This case study analysis will highlight the policy and

development supports that have been provided to the enterprise and narrate the difficulties and successes

experienced in this process.

10 However as of June, 2009, this strategy has not be finalised nor released.



19

Chapter 3

CASE STUDY OF THE COORONG WILDERNESS LODGE

Introduction I‘ve got a place here, I think it‘s one of the most beautiful tourism places in the world, and I‘ve travelled a lot

of the world looking for different places, and this is unique, it‘s different (George Trevorrow, pers. comm. 4

April 2007).

The Coorong Wilderness Lodge (CWL) is an Aboriginal tourism facility founded in 1997 and operated by

George and Shirley Trevorrow and their family. It is a family-run enterprise located on land leased for twenty-

five years (with an option to renew) from the Ngarrindjeri community.

The Trevorrows are respected community leaders of the Ngarrindjeri nation, with George currently serving

as Rupelle of the Ngarrindjeri Tendi and Chair of the Ngarrindjeri Regional Authority.11

George Trevorrow also

has important tourism leadership experience at the national level; in the early 1990s he initially served as the

Chairman of the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Tourism Reference Group and then became the

first elected Chairman of the fledgling Aboriginal Tourism Operators Association (NTTC 1995, p. 56).

The Coorong Wilderness Lodge is located at Hack‘s Point approximately 25 kilometres southeast of

Meningie, South Australia and approximately 200 kilometres south-east of Adelaide, the capital of South

Australia (see Figure 2). It sits on one of Australia‘s major touring routes, the Adelaide to Melbourne Great

Ocean Road drive.

Additionally the CWL is adjacent to the Coorong National Park which is one of the iconic regions of

Australia. The Coorong ―forms part of the complex of lakes and wetlands into which the Murray-Darling river

system flows‖ and it lies adjacent to the mouth of the Murray River (NPWSA 1999, p. 1). It is on the ―List of

Wetlands of International Importance‖ under the Ramsar Convention and is subject to international agreements

for the protection of migratory bird species. Its national park status was designated for its archaeological,

recreational and conservation values and it attracts local, intrastate, interstate and international visitors.

Importantly, the Ngarrindjeri people‘s historical and current association with the area is a key asset. As the book

The Coorong Park Notes states:

The physical remains of the highly cohesive and viable Ngarrindjeri occupation of the Coorong must be

recognised as one of the most outstanding records of coastal adaptation in temperate Australia, a resource

therefore of world-wide as well as national significance (NPWSA 1999, p. 36).

As previously mentioned, George Trevorrow has played an important role as a national leader in Indigenous

Australian tourism. Additionally, the CWL has received significant advice and support from various levels of

government, business advisors, training experts and other business development experts between 1997 and 2007.

The CWL has also benefited from the strong level of political support for Aboriginal tourism current in South

Australia during its development. Tourism Minister Jane Lomax-Smith (serving in this portfolio since 2002) has

been an ardent supporter of Aboriginal tourism and has instructed her staff to clear administrative blockages and

facilitate development. Former head of SATC, Bill Spurr, has actively pushed his staff to support the

development of key South Australian Aboriginal tourism enterprises such as the CWL. Aboriginal tourism

leaders such as George Trevorrow contact the Minister and the CEO of SATC when necessary to request

assistance or seek help in removing obstacles. These favourable conditions would suggest this business should

have attained commercial viability by now and would be enjoying a steady income from serving tourists. This is

however not the case despite enduring commitment and effort on the part of the Trevorrow family. This study

examines the case of the CWL in order to explain this apparent contradiction. Before detailing some of the

history of the development of the CWL, the following section outlines the existing and planned facilities of the

11 The Rupelle is the head of the tendi. The tendi is a ―unified system of governance‖ which preceded European invasion of

South Australia in the 1830s (Bell 1998, p. 137). At this time, the Ngarrindjeri nation comprised 18 clans called lakalinyeri,

each headed by a rupelle or leader. In a unique system of governance for Aboriginal Australia, the lakalinyeri would

periodically meet to form a tendi - a forum for discussion and resolving issues relevant to the clans. The tendi system was

devastated by the European invasion and has only recently been reactivated.


20

CWL as well as the experiences and activities offered to tourists.

Figure 2: Map of region where Coorong Wilderness Lodge is located



21

Coorong Wilderness Lodge Facilities 2000-2008 An ex-Olympic accommodation unit containing three basic ensuite bedrooms with one bunk bed and

two single beds each and1 basic ensuite bedroom with one queen bed and one sofa bed

A restaurant (built in the shape of a fish) offering light meals

A small interpretative space and souvenir outlet located in the restaurant

Camping area and powered caravan sites

Shower and ablution block

Kayaks for hire.

Facilities recently completed Five accommodation units with kitchenettes and ensuites

Conference facility

Activities offered Guided walks interpreting the environment, animals, bush medicine and plants of the Coorong, as well

as aspects of Ngarrindjeri culture

Kayaking on the Coorong

Heritage and cultural interpretation of the Coorong

Campfire storytelling focused on Ngarrindjeri Dreaming stories

Meals including traditional bush tucker ingredients

Trekking across the sand dunes of the Coorong National Park to the shores of the Southern Ocean

Collecting cockles and crabs from the ocean as Ngarrindjeri have done for millennia

Talking to Ngarrindjeri people about their history, culture and connections to land or ―country‖

Learning about contemporary Ngarrindjeri living.

Foundations and Overview of the Coorong Wilderness Lodge Brothers George and Tom Trevorrow grew up in the Coorong in the fringe camps

12 that existed as late as the

1950s and 1960s and these origins provide the impetus for much of their work. They know their country and

culture well, have experienced racism and discrimination and have dedicated their lives to overturning the

ignorance and divisions that fuel these negative viewpoints. They characterise this work as race relations

education and they have developed the technique of using educational camps to do this through the Camp

Coorong Race Relations and Cultural Education Centre (Higgins-Desbiolles 2003). The origins of the Coorong

Wilderness Lodge lie in the development of Camp Coorong.

The idea for Camp Coorong grew out of efforts since 1982 to develop a cross-cultural education program that

could be offered to school groups to increase understanding of Aboriginal culture. As George Trevorrow notes

there was a historical legacy of racism and separation that had to be overcome in order to foster positive ties

between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australians:

We started on race relations a long time ago. Need of people being together and having more understanding

of each other. There has never been enough of that in this country and that goes right back to the old days

when you couldn‘t socialise together. It was against the law (pers. comm. 4 September 2006).

George Trevorrow was working in the Education Department in the area of Aboriginal studies at a time when

Aboriginal studies became a core part of South Australian curriculum. Camp Coorong was developed as a

facility to support Aboriginal studies by providing Ngarrindjeri cultural camps which teachers and students could

access to inform their study units. George served as Manager of Camp Coorong until his brother, Tom

Trevorrow, took over. However, over time tourists began to encroach on this cultural education work as they

sought the Aboriginal experiences Camp Coorong could offer. This was partly a result of a rising demand for

Aboriginal tourism experiences amongst international tourists, the related desire of the South Australian Tourism

Commission to meet this demand and the lack of other Aboriginal tourism enterprises to satisfy this demand.

However, the Trevorrows resisted Camp Coorong transforming into a tourism enterprise because they felt the

12 Fringe camps existed on the outskirts of non-Indigenous settlements and were places where Indigenous people gathered

due to displacement from traditional lands. The fringe camps are important in the claims for Native Title because they show

that the Ngarrindjeri have an unbroken relationship to their lands and waters.


22

race relations work was too important:

It was felt that for every small group of tourists, they take so much energy and time and we were missing out

on a class of maybe 20 or 30 students of different areas of education and felt that losing out on that was far

too important (George Trevorrow, pers. comm. 4 September 2006).

The Coorong Wilderness Lodge was intentionally set up by George Trevorrow13

as a family tourism

enterprise to remove the tourism pressure from Camp Coorong so that it could continue the race relations work

that the Ngarrindjeri community viewed as so vital. It was also set up to provide additional employment

opportunities for Ngarrindjeri:

But I feel strongly that with … a small amount of infrastructure, we could make this viable, viable enough to

run, you know, a couple of families and keep it … a few families going. Because there‘s no work out there,

there‘s no-one in this community that‘s going to employ my people, so we‘ve got to get creative and things

so we can create employment for our people (George Trevorrow, pers. comm. 4 April 2007).

A former pastoral property covering the peninsula of Hacks Point, or Warnung as it is known to the

Ngarrindjeri, some twenty kilometres southeast of Camp Coorong came on the market in the early 1990s.

Covering some 400 hectares and with two dwellings, its location adjacent to the Coorong National Park and its

natural attributes made it ideal for a tourism venture. Like many Aboriginal tourism entrepreneurs, Trevorrow

lacked capital to purchase the property which proved a major initial hurdle to his goals. In 1993, he approached

the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) for funds to purchase the property, but they were

unable to allocate funding for land purchases at that time. Iain Greenwood, of Osprey Wildlife Expeditions

which offered ecological/cultural tours, placed George in contact with a benefactor, Tess McGrath. She was

willing to purchase the property and enter into a joint venture agreement with George, giving him a 51% share in

the enterprise while reserving 49% for herself. Trevorrow describes the vision behind this agreement as:

I think the very good thing about her was Tess made me 51% shareholder and her and her partner 49%. She did

that with a view that if I worked hard enough here she would take all that into account and any funding that I got

would allow me to start buying her shares and putting it into mine. She said it would probably take 5 to 10 years

for me and my family to actually own this property ourselves and that‘s what she wanted to see (pers. comm. 4

September 2006).

The joint venture company was launched as Warnung Proprietary Ltd. Trevorrow and his partner began to

plan accommodation and tours to offer to the tourist market.

However, in 1996 ATSIC informed Trevorrow that they could supply the funds to purchase the property but

only on the behalf of the Ngarrindjeri community, not for the Trevorrow family. This presented Trevorrow with

a significant decision; whether to establish his enterprise as a joint venture with a non-Indigenous partner in his

own personal interests or whether to establish a more community-oriented venture in which the Ngarrindjeri

community, through the Ngarrindjeri Lands and Progress Association (NLPA), held the land tenure. Swaying

Trevorrow‘s decision towards the latter option was his significant leadership role in the Ngarrindjeri community;

he was in fact Chair of the NLPA at that time. Trevorrow explains:

With ATSIC‘s approach, the rest of the community members—organisation members — said to me ―well

George we should purchase that land—use the money from ATSIC to purchase the land from Warnung

Propriety Limited.‖ And that way at least it will be in the hands of the community. Shirley and I and the

family could still carry on our tourism project/enterprise on the place but it would safely be in the hands of

the Ngarrindjeri people (pers. comm. 4 September 2006).

This decision presented Trevorrow and his family with many complications and delays. Trevorrow‘s

leadership role in the NLPA prevented him from being more forceful in promoting the development of the

business so as not to be seen to be using his position to pursue his own selfish interests. Additionally, any

developments now had to await community decisions and it took three full community meetings before

Trevorrow received approval to establish the CWL. One of the interesting questions Trevorrow occasionally asks

himself is where would he now be in if he had chosen to pursue the joint venture opportunity instead of

following the community route with the NLPA. He believes he would have owned the CWL by 2002 if he had

chosen the former option (George Trevorrow, pers. comm. 4 September 2006).

13 Henceforth, Trevorrow will be used to refer to George Trevorrow in this report.



23

Having chosen the route of buying the land with ATSIC funds in the name of the NLPA, Trevorrow and his

wife developed a twenty-five year lease agreement with the NLPA with an option for renewal for another

twenty-five years through the company they established, Kurangk Proprietary Ltd.

While the CWL is in fact a family enterprise, it has community-oriented characteristics as the lease comes

from the NLPA and Trevorrow is a Ngarrindjeri leader dedicated to improving the lives of Ngarrindjeri people.

This blend of goals can be seen in the early planning documents for the enterprise and reflects the complex

multiple objectives that underlie many Indigenous tourism ventures:

It must be stressed that this is not a typical application for a tourism development. Rather, this proposal

brings together concepts of Aboriginal ownership and management of lands of high environmental quality,

while providing an informed and high quality interpretation of the Ngarrindjeri people and their affinity with

this land.

This proposal is therefore based on the equity, environmental and cultural benefits of allowing a culturally-

driven and environmentally-aware group, the NLPA, to develop and manage a small scale, commercially-

based tourism development which is strongly underpinned by proven interpretative programs (MLCS 1996,

p. 2).

When purchased, the land at Hacks Point was zoned as a general farming area and was therefore not zoned

for tourism development. The developers of the CWL sought the assistance of the South Australian Tourism

Commission (SATC) in obtaining approval for tourism development under the provisions of the SA

Development Act 1993. Because of its location in a general farming zone, the proposal to develop the CWL

would be a ―non-complying‖ land use inconsistent with the local development plan. This required making an

application to the local council seeking approval for a non-complying development based on the merit of the

proposed development. The expertise and support of SATC personnel, particularly the Tourism Development

Officer, assisted in navigating this policy process and securing approval for the development.

ATSIC commissioned a market analysis for the CWL (then known as Warnung) which indicated that ―a

strong market exists for an eco/Indigenous tourism commercial development at Warnung [CWL]‖ (Andrew

Wilson and Associates 1995, p. 22). It identified possible ―pent up demand‖ flowing from the events, festivals

and conventions niche based in Adelaide, as well as non-Indigenous owned eco-tours, backpacker tours, the

educational and experiential tourism niche and international visitors from Northern Europe, the UK and the USA

(Andrew Wilson and Associates 1995, pp. 21–22).

In order to establish a viable business and to secure funding and investment in the enterprise, it was essential

for CWL to develop sound business plans. ATSIC paid for Mark Lewis Corporate Services (MLCS) to draft a

business plan for the CWL which could then be used to apply for further funding and support. This business plan

argued:

While neither the NLPA nor members of the community have the financial ability to undertake the

Development, what does exist is a 100% personal commitment from the Trevorrow family to the success of

Warnung [CWL] as has been achieved at Camp Coorong. The latter establishment has been a social success

and, seemingly, nothing should prevent Warnung being a similar catalyst to the tourist industry in South

Australia (MLCS 1996, p. 8).

The business plan stipulated the need for a $2.2 million of capital base to create the envisioned development,

potentially as a combination of debt, equity and grant funding (MLCS 1996, p. 1). After this initial injection of

capital, the business plan optimistically projected a viable commercial enterprise: ―Warnung [CWL] is expected

to enjoy solid and profitable financial growth after allowing for its initial set-up years. Its five year projection

indicates annual gross revenues in excess of $1.6 million and net profit before interest of $400,000‖ (MLCS,

1996, p.1).

The $2.2 million required was to meet the estimated costs to develop an access road, landscape the

development, deliver essential services such as water and electricity, build guest facilities such as a kitchen and

laundry, build 20 guest units, build a manager‘s residence and purchase a new coaster bus and two second-hand

troop carriers (MLCS 1996, p. 6). Despite the optimistic projections of the MLCS in the business plan, the CWL

did not promise a significant return on investment sufficiently enticing to attract private venture capital, nor was

there equity in land or other resources to secure a bank loan (MLCS 1996, p. 7). This left the CWL dependent on

governmental funding through bodies such as ATSIC.


24

However, because large funds such as the $2.2 million projected were not available under the limited funds

offered by ATSIC‘s Business Development Scheme (which could only provide a maximum of $500,000), a

staged, incremental approach to developing the enterprise was unavoidable. 14

The original building plans envisioned the initial development of ten accommodation units and a central

facility for dining and meetings. Funding was sought from a variety of sources and levels of government during

the establishment phase of the CWL between 1997-2007, including ATSIC, SATC, MFP Development

Corporation and the Department of State Aboriginal Affairs (DOSAA). 15

ATSIC provided approximately $40,000 for MLCS to undertake a feasibility study for the business in 1995.

ATSIC also provided $105,000 to purchase an ex-Olympic portable accommodation unit as well as additional

funding for the restaurant and the foundations for accommodation units. ATSIC‘s total contribution was

approximately $580,000. SATC provided $400,000 for a power supply upgrade with solar and wind energy

capacity, a powered caravan site, landscaping, a road upgrade and an improvement of the entrance from the main

road. TAFE SA provided in-kind support for training packages in hospitality, canoe license and bus license. The

Commonwealth government‘s CDEP program provided $384,000 for funding 20 trainee positions in 1998. The

Commonwealth Department for Employment, Education and Training (DEET) provided another $384,000 for

funding another 20 traineeships over two years. The South Australian Department for Aboriginal Affairs

provided $75,000 for an ablutions block. Mentoring services have been funded by both the Commonwealth‘s

DEET and the Department for Industry Training and Resources. Miscellaneous donations and in-kind support

has come from various sources, including the Lend Lease Foundation, ETSA, Boral, Dulux, MLCS, Michael

Beltos Architects and Netley Training. Due to a lack of detailed record keeping, the funding during this period is

difficult to fully ascertain. However, it is clear that these agencies made significant contributions to the

development of the CWL and helped to keep the enterprise afloat. This situation clearly demonstrates the

difficulties that arise for Indigenous enterprises when money is given in an ad hoc manner without considered

project management and planning to coordinate and maximise such inputs. Also enterprise development

undertaken in such ways may generate a culture of dependency similar to that generated by the welfare state.

SATC has been one of the most significant sources of funding and support for the CWL. SATC now has

infrastructural development funds which businesses such as the CWL can access, whereas some other Australian

states and territories do not have this facility (Craig Grocke, pers. comm. 15 November 2006). However, this

infrastructural money was not available until 1999/2000 for individual tourism enterprises such as the CWL, so

the support of SATC was late in coming to the CWL, but it was significant when it became available (Craig

Grocke, pers. comm. 15 November 2006). For instance, in 2002/2003, the Minister for Tourism secured

$200,000 for CWL development from the 2004 state budget. Additionally, a person from within SATC was

appointed to serve as a ―project officer‖—in effect to oversee the project, arrange design plans, obtain

development approvals and ensure that SATC funds were properly and effectively spent. However, Trevorrow‘s

account of this period of funding reveals that the development did not go according to plan and that difficulties

soon arose.

According to Trevorrow, the infrastructural costs of bringing power, water and a reliable roadway through

the peninsula was much more expensive than originally thought, so the ATSIC funding was used to meet these

additional expenses. Trevorrow believed the promised SATC money would cover the costs of other facets of the

initial development planned. A contractor was commissioned to build the central facility and lay the foundations

for the units using Ngarrindjeri labour. According to Trevorrow, the money expected from SATC was not

forthcoming when needed to finish the ten units. This was a major disappointment because he had the

Ngarrindjeri labour trained and ready to complete the units but when funding promised did not come through,

this proved a major impediment to his plan for commercial success. It limited the money the business could earn

by forcing him to cater to the lower value day-visitor market rather than securing the higher value overnight

visitors market through their purchase of accommodation and other services. In an effort to secure some

accommodation capacity for the CWL, ATSIC funded the purchase of an ex-Olympic accommodation unit at

14

This placed the CWL in a vicious cycle of dependency on further grants, as the MLCS business plan noted the CWL

required significantly more accommodation capacity to generate the profits that sustain comparable non-Indigenous

commercial enterprises (MLCS 1995). 15

It has been difficult for the researchers to obtain a clear picture of the full funding arrangements for the development of

the CWL as a result of the length of time that has passed, the number of players involved, changes to the personnel involved,

the paucity of record keeping by the CWL and the inability to access the full records of supporting agencies. Therefore we

have pieced together a picture of the funding supports for the enterprise to the best of our abilities but acknowledge that it is

incomplete and approximate.



25

$105,000 which could accommodate up to 20 visitors.

Considerable difficulties were experienced in providing electricity supply to the site and planning the

architectural layout of the facilities. With CWL being an ecotourism venture adjacent to the Coorong National

Park (CNP), a wetland of world importance specifically for its birdlife, Trevorrow wanted the electricity cables

buried underground. This was particularly important because Hacks Point is located in a significant bird fly-way.

While initially the environmental committee attached to the ETSA Utilities (South Australia's electricity

distributor) was supportive of this plan, it was eventually abandoned in favour of overhead power lines. The

reasons given for this decision included the expense of burying cables and the fact that the proposed power

supply was not to service a community but rather a business supporting a few Ngarrindjeri people (George

Trevorrow, pers. comm. 4 September 2006). Strangely, neither National Parks and Wildlife of South Australia

nor SATC raised any objection to this proposal despite the fact that ecotourism and protection of the CNP were

high on the agenda at that time (George Trevorrow, pers. comm. 4 September 2006). As a result visually

intrusive pylons and overhead cables have tarnished some of the aesthetic of the CWL as a ―pristine‖ wilderness

experience. However, in 2003, a remote area power system was installed using a wind generator and battery

bank which can create excess power supply that can be returned to the grid thus securing costs savings. This

additional electricity supply was installed as a solution to problem of power outages which had been a frequent

occurrence. An important consideration is the green credentials it gives the CWL as an eco-tourism enterprise.

Another missed opportunity in the development of the CWL has been the difficulties in agreeing on and

implementing an architectural plan for the development. While originally renowned architect Ken Latona was

commissioned to develop a plan for an environmentally sensitive development, these plans were not

implemented due to the higher costs (Trevorrow, pers. comm. 18 July 2009). Plan after plan has followed,

frittering away funds provided by ATSIC and SATC and delaying the establishment of a viable business. This

saga is one of the most important in understanding the trajectory of the development of the CWL and is

discussed more fully in the next section.

One of the first focuses in planning the CWL was obtaining TAFE training in building and construction for

Ngarrindjeri people with the goal of securing the employment opportunities that building the accommodation

and other infrastructure would provide. These trained construction workers had already built facilities needed

throughout Ngarrindjeri country, including Camp Coorong, well before funding came through for the

development of facilities for the CWL. Ngarrindjeri workers constructed the first infrastructure at Hacks Point

for the CWL development, including the restaurant and the foundations for the accommodation units.

After construction training, further training in other areas was secured through TAFE. These programs

provided certificates in hospitality and tourism and other areas vital to running a small business enterprise.

Approximately 30 Ngarrindjeri people were trained under these programs and their certification and

qualifications enabled them to move on to other employment. What contributed to the success of these training

programs was the insistence that the training be done on site and tailored to Ngarrindjeri needs. The

appropriateness of the training led to a high success rate in these programs.

The target market identified in the mid-1990s for the CWL included a market niche classed as ―discoverers‖

by the SATC which included both interstate and international tourists. Initially, the business plan suggested

aiming for these higher-spending tourists rather than backpackers who became the focus as the accommodations

infrastructure underwent delays. Secondary markets were identified as spinoffs of Camp Coorong, pre and post

conference tours and tours run by existing tour operators to the region (MLCS 1996, p. 12). The first source of

visitors to CWL was through Osprey Wildlife Expeditions which offered a seven day ―Ngurunderi‘s Journey‖

experience and appeared in the SA tourism brochure ―The South Australian Aboriginal Tourism Experience‖

produced by SATC in 1996. In subsequent years, the CWL formed relationships with such ground tour operators

as Wayward Bus, AAT Kings and Adventure Tours who provided a small but steady group of clients for the

walking trail experience and a meal at the restaurant. Diverse Travel, a non-Indigenous business marketing

Indigenous Australian tourism experiences, provided marketing assistance and advice to the CWL for a number

of years. The CWL hosts approximately 2800 visitors per year (Georgina Trevorrow pers. comm. 18 July 2009).

Apart from running the CWL, Trevorrow also participated in national promotional events such as the

Australian Tourism Exchange with mixed outcomes. At the event held in Adelaide in 2006, Aboriginal operators

promoting Aboriginal tourism products and experiences such as the CWL lacked sufficient support from SATC

resulting in less than optimal results. Some of the problems included inaccurate brochures, poor exposure at the

event as the state‘s Aboriginal operators had to rotate their time on the Indigenous product display booth and a

lack of full inclusion and consultation (George Trevorrow and Tim Hartmann pers. comm.. 4 September 2006).

While SATC has voiced commitment to promoting Indigenous Australian tourism and has a position dedicated

specifically to deal with Aboriginal product, the experience of promotional events exposes a discrepancy in


26

understanding about the degree and level of support to Indigenous tourism development – and within that the

specific needs of individual businesses.

Participation at international tourism events are intended to get successful Indigenous Australian tourism

product out to the international market, on to the world stage and in an ―export ready‖ state.16

In 2002,

Trevorrow went to Europe on a tour organised by SATC to provide exposure for South Australian Indigenous

tourism operators, culminating in participation at the global tourism trade fair, International Tourismus Borse

(ITB), in Germany. Whereas it was expected that the CWL would be one of a handful of Indigenous Australian

tourism product that would be ―export ready‖, the difficulties that will be outlined in this report mean that the

CWL has failed to attain this goal.

Against this background history of the CWL and some preliminary discussion of some of the key concerns,

this report will now address particular issues in greater depth, focusing on those that impacted the development

of the enterprise and explain why the CWL has failed to achieve the ambitions set for it. Areas of focus include

problems in building up the CWL enterprise particularly relating to infrastructure, marketing, training,

employment, joint venture arrangements and mentoring. This is followed by some discussion of a range of issues

that the research uncovered including diverging cultural values, leadership and racism. This leads to a

consideration of the commitment of governments to supporting Indigenous Australian enterprises such as the

CWL before concluding with recommendations that arise from the analysis.

Infrastructure Development Mark Lewis Corporate Services (MLCS) developed the first tourism development report for the CWL in 1995

and projected a need for $1.35 million for the initial capital costs of the project. The 1996 business plan

developed by MLCS increased this projection to $2.2 million. Because the CWL, unlike many non-Indigenous

tourism enterprises, could not raise finance from the private sector and was therefore dependent on public sector

sources of funding it was forced to follow a staged approach to the development. This has been a key inhibiting

factor to the successful development of the business. As the MLCS Report stated:

As the degree of success in attracting tourist visitation is an unknown, the Development at Warnung [CWL]

must incorporate the ability to expand the accommodation and respective central facilities. In a truly

commercial environment, the achievement of commercial return on investment may require two to three

times the level of accommodation facilities that are proposed. In view of capital funding restrictions, such

expansion (and improved financial viability) will occur at a later date (MLCS 1995, p. 14).

This led to what became a four phase development plan for the enterprise (so far). Phases 1 and 2 are

currently completed and Phase 3 has only just been completed in 2008.

Phase 1: Phase 1 was funded by ATSIC and the South Australian Department of Aboriginal Affairs. It

consisted of:

the construction of an unsealed roadway to the site

installation of all services

initial construction work on foundations for ten accommodation units and provision of services to them

construction of restaurant and kitchen

construction of ablutions block for campers, and

[the purchase of] an Ausco Manly 9 ex-Olympic portable housing unit accommodating up to 16 people

in quality backpacker-type accommodation.

16 Export ready characteristics of Indigenous tourism enterprises include: having a documented business plan and

marketing plan; consistently delivers on the programs it commits to in relation to stated opening hours or program

delivery; having data collection mechanisms in place to know visitor numbers per year and major market information;

having booking mechanisms in place for domestic and International markets i.e. email facilities and responds within 12

hours and is available to take bookings 7 days per week; understanding the distribution system and pricing and

commission structures i.e. commissionable to suit the international market; understanding the needs of the domestic and

international markets; working cooperatively with the State Tourism Body; working cooperatively with the Regional

Tourism Organisations/Association (RTO/RTA) and the Local Tourism Association (LTA); having a strong

understanding of customer service environment; having products saleable in a manner and at a cost suitable to

wholesalers; having a website maintained with current information available on products, times, prices etc.; having

relevant licenses and insurances (source: Indigenous Tourism Australia‘s National Indigenous Tourism Product Manual

2007).



27

The total cost of Phase 1 was $664,000 plus the ―sweat equity‖ contributed by the CWL and CDEP

employees (MLCS 2006, p. 5).

Phase 2: This consisted of the upgrading of power supply with both solar and wind generation plants,

landscaping and construction of powered caravan and campervan sites, upgrading and relocating the entry to the

site. SATC funded Phase 2 at a cost of $200,000 (MLCS 2006, p. 5).

Phase 3: Phase 3 involved the initial construction of five cabins and associated other infrastructure plus some

crucial cash flow funds to allow the business to build its operations and marketing while its customer base grows

over the initial few years (MLCS 2006, p. 5). Funding for Phase 3 included $200,000 from SATC, a mixed

loan/grant from Indigenous Business Australia of $368,000 and $380,000 from the Indigenous Land Council.

This phase of development was completed in 2008.

Phase 4: Phase 4 plans include expanding the central facility, constructing an additional five cabins,

constructing staff accommodation, purchasing a coaster bus and purchasing a purpose-built boat to a projected

cost of $1,325,000.

Considering that the CWL has only recently completed Phase 3 and Phase 4 will be some way off, it is a

major concern that the 1995 tourism development report states clearly that the CWL cannot be expected to make

a profit until the development is expanded beyond the initial plans of 10 units and a dormitory. This report states:

The level of initial proposed works for the Development indicates that a meaningful profit is not achievable

until an expansion takes place. That is, the initial proposed number of rooms/beds does not achieve critical

mass for bottom line profitability. This does not signify that Warnung [CWL] will never achieve such profit,

rather that further capital expenditure will be required (MLCS 1995, p. 17).

The first step in the building of the infrastructure occurred when South Coast Construction built the

restaurant in 1998. South Coast Construction also laid hexagonal foundations for 10 accommodation units.

However, as noted in the previous section, SATC did not come through with funding to complete the

accommodation units until 2002–2003. This in fact, has been the source of one of the most disheartening and

frustrating aspects of developing the CWL: obtaining a design for the accommodation units that met George‘s

vision (see appendix B).

As noted previously, in the mid to late 1990s renowned architect Ken Latona drew up architectural design

plans in consultation with Trevorrow that not only reflected Trevorrow‘s vision, but also suited the eco-lodge

nature of the proposed development and was in harmony with the Coorong environment (see Appendix B 2a-c).

It is notable that Latona was more than just an environmentally sensitive architect but also a very successful

tourism entrepreneur. He had already applied his architectural vision to developing eco-sensitive tourism

ventures that effectively captured the sense of place and offered tourists a holistic experience. The Freycinet

Experience Walk utilising the Friendly Beaches Lodge and the Bay of Fires Walk utilising the Bay of Fires

Lodge are highly successful tourism ventures that Latona helped develop in Tasmania. Both have strong

similarities to the mix of natural and cultural assets found in the Coorong and it was Latona‘s ability to capture

the essence of place that created an immediate empathy with Trevorrow‘s vision. Latona‘s empathy with

Trevorrow‘s vision is clear from a letter he wrote to MLCS offering a quote for the CWL tourism development:

The proposal for 10 guest units and 20 backpacker beds has been amended after discussion with the client

and yourself to provide consistent and quality accommodation which can maximise returns (without

incurring too great additional capital expenditure). The motivation for the design concept is the original

Aboriginal shelter for the Coorong —the ―pulgi‖ —and follows George Trevorrow‘s comment that he would

rather live with the ―arch‖ than in square modern rooms. The forms acknowledge the direction and strength

of local wind patterns … with all buildings located to take advantage of impressive views to the Coorong and

sand dunes of the Younghusband Peninsula. Building materials are yet to be finalised but a limited palette of

rammed earth walls and floors with timber framed, iron-clad roofs could be appropriate, relatively straight

forward and economically realistic (Ken Latona, letter 14 November 1996).

SATC did not implement the Latona architectural plan because it was viewed as too costly to implement;

they clearly did not recognise the significance of Latona‘s natural affinity with Trevorrow and the added value

he could have brought to the project, including future marketing linkages (Schmiechen, pers. comm. 31 May

2007). SATC‘s rejection of Latona‘s plan necessitated the commissioning of alternative architectural plans.17

17

In the previewing of the draft of this document, Michael Geddes clarified the reason that SATC failed to implement the

Latona architectural plans: ―Those plans came from outside the process that the SATC were involved in and that at the


28

Thereafter SATC presented Trevorrow with plan after plan it commissioned for the project (see Appendix B),

but Trevorrow stood his ground steadfastly:

But I think pretty hard line over the last few years in regards to what we need built here. I‘ve had many

different designs sent to me now over the last few year, which I wouldn‘t even have on the property and if it

meant I won‘t get anything then so be it. Some of them are just quite disgusting. And out of whack with the

whole environment. So we revert back to really the original plans that were always there that after the

discussions with Latona; he drew them up for me. I keep referring back to those plans now. I think people

probably get a bit upset with me sometimes because I‘m sticking to what I believe the needs are for this place

and they think I‘m being difficult. I‘m not being difficult. I want something that‘s sensible, that fits in the

environment and that‘s unique, it has a Ngarrindjeri flavour and that means something to us. Anyway the

square box sitting out here, galvanised iron shelter that they put up in the mid-North in the early ‗70s and all

that sort of stuff … I‘ve been offered that over the years of putting them up. I don‘t need any of that (pers.

comm. 4 September 2006).

Here Trevorrow is referring to one design plan commissioned by SATC which he opposed because of the use

of corrugated iron cladding that George negatively associated with mission buildings up North. Craig Grocke of

SATC acknowledged Trevorrow‘s view and instead recommended a change to timber-cladding in the

construction (pers. comm. 15 November 2006).

By 2001–2002, Trevorrow had secured a design he found appropriate at a price that was affordable tendered

by the Murray Bridge CDEP called Tangglun Piltengi Yunti (TPY) (see Appendix B8b for this design plan).

According to Bill van der Spelt, the manager of TPY:

George showed me some of his little foundations that he had there, little hexagonal units which he didn‘t

like; it just wouldn‘t have suited the area. It had no meaning. Hexagonal was not Aboriginal. So we tried to

can that and come up with a different idea. So I then decided that it was a good idea if I drew one of these

accommodation units out, which is shaped like a fish. He thought that was a great idea. We then lodged it

with the SA Tourism who turned around and took it on board, took it with them and probably three months

later come back with a plan that didn‘t look anything like that. So that‘s virtually how it all started. And that

was the first roadblock we had, thinking that we were going to turn around and have a fish shaped unit

overlooking the Coorong and we ended up with virtually a square box, very European style, had nothing to

do with the area, had nothing to do with the restaurant or anything else (pers. comm. 9 May 2007).

Disagreements over the design of the units between Trevorrow and SATC meant that building was delayed

for a number of years. Bill van der Spelt described the problem:

Virtually what‘s happened is the funding bodies haven‘t been listening to what we‘ve been saying. Every

time we come up with the same design they change it and they go back and say, look we‘ve had meetings at

SATC, we‘ve also had meetings with him at Coorong Wilderness Lodge and every time we give them this

type of plan they come back with a different design. And the last design they come up with was in actual fact,

it was going to cost George something like about $150, 000 to $160,000 just for one little unit and of course

the money wasn‘t there anymore. This had been going over a period of four years where the architects have

drawn money out of it and we‘ve got nothing, absolutely nothing (pers. comm. 9 May 2007).

One result of this failure to agree on a design and proceed with building was a decrease in the funds available

to finance development as architects and consultants were paid for their plans and services. Importantly, use of

SATC commissioned designers and builders would have meant that these building works would provide less

benefit to the Ngarrindjeri community than using the Ngarrindjeri TPY CDEP proposal which would have

provided construction employment opportunities. Meantime, IBA‘s offer of loan/grant lapsed due to SATC‘s

delayed acceptance of design plans.18

Another significant outcome of this delay was a change in legislation which made obtaining planning

approvals more onerous. The River Murray Act of 2003 was designed to protect the Murray River and its values

and thus provided regulations to control and restrict development in these areas. According to SATC planner

Craig Grocke:

particular stage of the project, with other designs already being discussed, they were just not able to be considered‖ (pers.

comm. 1 May 2009).

18 As will be recounted, George did eventually secure the IBA loan/grant .



29

Because of the new act there was a bit of confusion as to whether council was responsible for processing the

application or whether it was Planning SA … So the new processes were brought in for any development

along the Murray River and associated water ways. So I think it was a process of everyone trying to

understand what‘s the process we have to work through now to meet the requirements of this act. For

example, it now meant that EPA gets involved, seeking public comment and they‘ve got 6 weeks to

comment. There was a bit of to-ing and fro-ing between, understanding the process, putting the application

in, a lot of coming back for more information, so we provided more information. Then Planning SA wanted

us to then do a landscape plan … So we had a lot of hoops to jump through. So really it took over 12 months

just to get planning approval to go through (pers. comm. 15 November 2006).

The new restrictive regulations highlight the price paid for the slow process of pushing through the barriers to

get the development fully operational and capitalise on the earlier planning approvals which had signalled the

development could proceed. All of these were now challenged by the new legislative framework.

The frustrations which dogged the plans for the accommodation units were paralleled in the design of the car

park intended to service the accommodation units. SATC supported plans that placed the car park for the units a

significant distance away from the units because of the rigorous landscaping demands from Planning SA to

preserve the visual aesthetics of the Coorong. Trevorrow wanted cars parked beside each unit in order to suit the

convenience of visitors in unloading luggage and avoiding the inclement weather frequently experienced in the

Coorong. During the early 2000s when various plans for the accommodation units were presented and argued

over, the location of the car park was a continual source of disagreement (George Trevorrow, pers. comm. 4

September 2006). In Phase 3, the fish-shaped accommodation units were completed with a car park beside each

unit as George demanded (See Appendix B for the design plan of the five units and conference facility).

A further complication was that the design of the accommodation units was tied up with the development of

other infrastructure at the CWL which created blockages to progress. In the interest of cost effectiveness, SATC

bracketed the tender for the accommodation units together with the redesign of the entrance to the CWL and the

building of an entrance bay and information area. When disagreements on the design of the units prevented

progress, the building of the entrance infrastructure also stalled. It is likely that much of the passing highway

traffic travelling on the Adelaide-Melbourne touring route that could have been attracted to visit the CWL would

have been missed due to poor signage and lack of publicity of the CWL‘s variety of attractions and services. The

signage that existed prior to the entrance re-development was a brown road sign merely stating ―Coorong

Wilderness Lodge‖. This gave little incentive for passing travellers to deviate from their route. The signage

would only have attracted those who had pre-booked their accommodation at the CWL or those seeking lodging

on the ―spur of the moment‖. The passing road traffic was not informed about the restaurant and café facilities,

the camp ground site, Aboriginal tours and cultural experiences, nor the ability to kayak on the Coorong and

access the Southern Ocean beach.

The impasse on the accommodation units lasted more than four years and thus delayed the building of the

roadside information bay. This situation hindered the growth of the enterprise by inhibiting its capacity to service

the drive-by tourist market passing by its very door. It underlines the very real hiatus that exists between the

needs of individual Indigenous tourism entrepreneurs and the broader functioning and interrelationships existing

among different departments within SATC. The SATC professionals supporting the development of the

infrastructural capacities of the CWL appeared to be narrowly focused on their component of the project

resulting in the marketing needs of the enterprise being neglected to the detriment of the building of the business.

But by the same token, neither did the CWL undertake any proactive initiative to secure passing trade from the

traffic on the Princes Highway and remained paralysed as it awaited the building of the long-delayed

accommodation units.

There has also been some disagreement on whether the waste water treatment facilities required upgrading as

the building phases evolved. SATC‘s Craig Grocke argued that an upgrade was required due to Environment

Protection Authority (EPA) and Planning SA advice based on the New River Murray legislation (pers. comm. 15

November 2006). However, Trevorrow claimed the Council inspector said current facilities were sufficient to

meet the needs of the development well into the future (pers. comm. 4 April 2007). The additional cost to

upgrade the system was estimated at $50,000 and Trevorrow and SATC were deadlocked in their disagreement

on this. This dispute may be the result of different requirements for development at different levels of

government. Thus the health inspector from the Council confirmed the current system to be sufficient whereas

Grocke supported the more stringent requirements of the EPA and Planning SA whose preferred option was an

envirocycle system that could service the long-term capacity of the development.

Four years of stalemate on the building of the accommodation units finally shifted in 2007 when TPY

provided another set of designs based on the fish shape. Advantages of the TPY bid included the fact that their


30

price per unit was reasonable at approximately $85,000 per unit and they would employ Ngarrindjeri labour in

the construction of the units. However, it was the McCracken Homes tender using a fish-shaped design that was

finally implemented because by this time the CDEP program on which TPY relied for funding was under threat

of being dismantled by the Commonwealth government and could no longer be relied on to see the project

through to completion (see Appendix B).

The previous impasse with SATC on building the units was effectively overcome with the input of Paul Case

who was appointed as a Business Manager for the project by IBA. Case facilitated meetings with all agencies

and brokered the funding agreements to make the building work go ahead. In particular, an IBA loan/grant offer

needed to be finalised and ILC funding aligned. This led to lengthy delays as disagreements and wrangling over

the design and costs of the units caused delay after delay. In 2006, this seemed to be overcome as the building to

the entrance way was separated from the plans to build the accommodation units. In late 2007, SATC, IBA and

ILC jointly agreed to the building of five units as a viable accommodation infrastructure in the short

term.Unfortunately, SATC failed to follow up its initiative after the Roadshow and did not capitalise on the

connections made and to keep the Aboriginal operators or their products top of mind. The CWL did not have the

capacity at that time to take a more proactive approach to market the business themselves and to capitalise on the

connection made in Europe (Caroline Densley, pers. comm. 15 January 2007).

The events described above indicate the delays and frustrations that bureaucratic processes can impose on

Indigenous Australian tourism operators and the ways they can inhibit business development.

Interviews for this research project indicated a level of misunderstanding of roles in the process of

developing the infrastructure for the CWL and the discord that resulted from this misunderstanding. Trevorrow

expressed the view that SATC planning people were sometimes a barrier to progress rather than a source of

assistance. SATC personnel, on the other hand, saw themselves as hard-working facilitators of the development,

helping sort through the complicated planning process. These contradictory views were evident in the clash over

upgrading the waste water treatment facilities as mentioned above. Craig Grocke of SATC argued that in dealing

with Planning SA extensive efforts were made to meet their demands because their favourable recommendation

of the development application was crucial to the future of the CWL. He stated:

So I guess we are trying to do a lot to try and ease processes which George probably hasn‘t necessarily been

involved in or seen our movements behind the scenes to try and facilitate things. And that‘s a lot of what we

do … to get things through, get things happening (pers. comm. 15 November 2006).

Conversely, some SATC personnel indicated that a significant impediment to progress was Trevorrow‘s

perceived frequent change of mind on the design of the accommodation units (Michael Geddes, pers. comm. 16

November 2006). For instance, it was claimed that Trevorrow had earlier supported the hexagonal design drawn

up by Iain Greenwood, before he finally focused on the current fish-shaped units (Michael Geddes, pers. comm.

16 November 2006). Trevorrow argued that he resisted what he considered inappropriate design plans that failed

to capture his ongoing vision to capture the sense of place of his location. From Trevorrow‘s perspective, he

―wanted the Latona design implemented from the outset‖ as this design was developed in consultation with him

and best represented his vision for the development, but he was then ―forced further and further away from this

vision over the years as subsequent designs offered escalated in price from $10,000 per unit to over $165,000 per

unit‖ (George Trevorrow, pers. comm. 18 July 2009). In the interviews for this project, Trevorrow emphasised

the frustration he encountered in getting agency representatives to listen to him and concluded it shows ―how

much more difficult it is for an Aboriginal person to go into business than for anybody else‖ (George Trevorrow,

pers. comm. 18 July 2009).

More significantly, Michael Geddes along with some other interviewees argued that a key weakness of the

CWL was that the project was not proponent-driven, unlike most non-Indigenous development projects. They

stated that non-Indigenous tourism operators are unlikely to be dependent on funding from SATC, instead

commissioning their own designs and plans, and working to commercial timelines and pressures. With the CWL,

all the funding for the design of the accommodation units came from SATC while SATC personnel such as

Craig Grocke drove the process. This meant SATC followed its transparent tender process which was time-

consuming and produced design plans which were only then seen by Trevorrow who turned them down because,

as Geddes views it, Trevorrow was not clear on what he wanted. Geddes stated:

In this particular case, they had no design people of their own, no consultants of their own and they have no

funds of their own. The government funds were the only funds which were basically forthcoming. Because

the government process needs to be open and fair, rather than just going down the road and asking …

builders to build these things, we needed to create a documented design outcome that would then go to a



31

broad tender process. Because we were driving this process, the level of documentation that we were doing

would not be dissimilar to anybody else, but we were driving it, not somebody else. And because of the fact

that they didn‘t really know what they wanted until they saw the drawings, that‘s why I think the process was

so slow (pers. comm. 16 November 2006).

This highlights the lack of understanding and ability to respect what the proponent, Trevorrow, envisioned

for his land. From the earliest inception of the project, Trevorrow had a strong empathy for the Latona proposal

which SATC had failed to engage with because of bureaucratic requirements. From this point onwards, SATC-

commissioned designs clearly lacked empathy with George‘s vision for the CWL. The unfortunate outcome of

all of this was the money provided for building the accommodation units was whittled down on architectural fees

and forced Trevorrow to take the IBA loan/grant offer. This placed the CWL in a financially vulnerable position

as it now must meet loan repayment obligations. According to Bill Spurr, CEO of SATC:

Out of the original monies I think there‘s only, so I‘ve been told, about $100,000 left for the accommodation.

I wouldn‘t like to see George commit to loans, particularly at a time, I understand, that the business is

running out of puff (pers. comm. 18 December 2006).

However, Trevorrow had been left in an unenviable position as the accommodation units are considered to be

a key element to achieving financial viability for the business, though not all SATC personnel interviewed for

this project agreed on this point. When asked whether the installation of the accommodation units would

contribute to the viability of the business, Chris Burchett responded:

Yeah, they will change things. They‘ll change the economics backwards. It will require more government

money … and nil response. There‘s lots of alternative accommodation. And five units will never take a

coach. We‘ve already identified one of the biggest sectors on the market is the Britz [Britz campervans] who

want the opportunity to camp in an interesting place, which they‘ve got. They‘ve got a little camping area

there. I don‘t see those accommodation units being an asset; I see them as a liability (pers. comm. 20

December 2006).

It is important to understand that a ten-year delay in building the accommodation units resulted in a loss of

revenue as, for example, this meant an inability to service the tourists that Diverse Travel could have placed

there (co-founder of Diverse Travel, Caroline Densley, pers. comm. 15 January 2007).19 As a result, the CWL

languished and failed to thrive in a period when other small to medium (SME) tourism enterprises would have

either achieved viability or closed their doors.

As Paul Case noted:

In the meantime the focus has been for George, to sort through barriers of red tape to try and get his five

cabins. He‘s been doing that for two or three years and because of that he hasn‘t been able to focus on his

marketing. He hasn‘t been able to focus on developing his product, developing his connections and getting

people down there because he‘s been focusing on the next infrastructure, that‘s been a problem all along

(pers. comm. 11 January 2007).

Marketing

Introduction Effective marketing of a tourism business is an essential ingredient for ongoing success. It tends to be the most

under-resourced facet of many Indigenous tourism enterprises. A great deal of capital is expended on feasibility

studies, infrastructure and training with little consideration given to the costs and strategies required to market

the product to relevant target markets. This is also true in the case of the CWL and is a key part of the story. The

lack of recognition of the importance of relevant marketing by the Aboriginal proponents, misguided and poor

advice from a variety of consultants and the lack of synergy and coordination by the SATC, as a major financial

contributor to the project and a key player in marketing SA tourism products, have all contributed to a poor

market profile for the CWL.

Marketing opportunities A number of marketing options are open to tourism enterprises such as the CWL, including: development of

19 Diverse Travel used other local accommodation providers to host visitors to the CWL to obtain the quality accommodation

this market demanded.


32

brochures, advertising in tourism publications, mail outs, participation in national and international trade shows,

using the opportunities offered by the state tourism commissions (web, print, media), hosting travel agents and

journalists, product launch, direct roadside advertisement and signage.

Potential key assets in marketing the CWL include its location in the Coorong, a Ramsar wetland of

international significance, and more recently its recognition as part of the Great Ocean Road touring route

between Adelaide and Melbourne. The Coorong region and this touring route have only recently received the

national attention due to such a significant ecological location. As Ralph Jackson of the Wayward Bus company

explained:

The Coorong always suffered from poor visitor perception and also from poor marketing perception and a

lack of understanding of what that environment offers, and you‘ve sort of hit on one thing that it‘s actually an

incredibly mood struck environmental landscape, but it‘s then supplemented by this fantastic and rich

cultural landscape which is well documented and quite visible in the Coorong in the right way. And in many

ways the Coorong is sort of the equal of Kakadu in terms of an Indigenous perspective. It had an equally

strong Indigenous population, so that is a real strength but it very rarely seems to get any credence.

I noticed that Dick Smith rates it in the top five environments in Australia, as would I in my travels, but it‘s

something very little understood in the market place or by travellers. But there is now an increasing traffic

flow, as opposed to 10 years ago, along that route, mainly through some fairly good marketing of the whole

Great Ocean Road context, all the way through to Adelaide (pers. comm. 18 November 2006).

From the outset of developing the enterprise, its major attraction was going to be the unique natural

environment of the Coorong coupled with its powerful connection to Ngarrindjeri culture and history stretching

back millennia. Early promotions to specialist niche overseas markets described this as a temperate version of

the World Heritage listed Kakadu National Park in Australia‘s tropical north. Ken Latona, who worked on the

initial concept plan for George Trevorrow and who later successfully developed the Bay of Fires walk in

Tasmania (a world-class tourism experience), recognised strong ecotourism and nature-based tourism

opportunities in the vision Trevorrow had for Hacks Point and the CWL (Joc Schmiechen pers. comm.31 May

2007).

Marketing to international visitors From the outset the international tourism market was considered a key focus for marketing the growing

Indigenous Australian tourism segment. It is commonly acknowledged that international visitors are more

interested in Indigenous Australian tourism experiences than the domestic market (Schmiechen 2006; Tourism

Queensland 2002). While surveys may indicate strong international interest in Indigenous tourism experiences,

this does not translate into high numbers of bookings. As founder of the Wayward Bus Touring Company, Ralph

Jackson observes:

… people shy away from it when they‘re on the ground. People will tick surveys which might ask them are

they interested in an Indigenous experience when they‘re in Australia and 75% will tick yes. But put the

opportunity to do the experience in front of people, the time needed for it, it‘s the cost of it, and that 75% will

dwindle down to 2% (pers. comm. 18 November 2006).

Concerted support to market Indigenous tourism product in South Australia was slow to develop for a variety

of reasons, including the limited product available and lack of market readiness of this product. During the time

of the development of the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Tourism Industry Strategy (ATSIC &

ONT 1997), the SATC drafted its own Aboriginal Tourism Strategy (1995) and produced a brochure entitled the

South Australian Aboriginal Tourism Experience (1996b). However, neither of these initiatives did little more

than raise awareness of Aboriginal tourism. Most importantly, these developments were not tied to a concerted

marketing campaign by the SATC, which would have made their impacts more significant.

In 2001, the SATC developed a new marketing brochure entitled South Australian Aboriginal Cultural

Experiences, which featured the CWL among five Aboriginal tourism products selected for their readiness for

the international market (see Appendix C). This brochure targeted the international market for Indigenous

Australian tourism experiences and was distributed to inbound tour operators and wholesalers. Additionally 500

copies were provided to the CWL to use in its own promotional activities. The brochure focused on the CWL

offering a three-day experience described as a ―wilderness and cultural adventure tour‖, thereby trying to attract

several market niches for an extended stay that would represent significant value for the enterprise (see

Appendix C for a copy of this advertisement for the CWL). At this time accommodation at the CWL was limited



33

to camping or rooms in the ex-Olympic portable unit. These accommodation and camping facilities did not suit

the needs of the high yield niche market that inbound operators like Diverse Travel attracted. This gap in

accommodation capacity inhibited the uptake of the three day Ngarrindjeri cultural experience and meant that the

marketing opportunity provided by the brochure was ineffective in expanding the business.

In a further marketing initiative, the SATC organised for select South Australian Aboriginal tourism

operators, including the CWL, to go on a promotional ―road show‖ to Europe to coincide with the annual travel

trade event, the International Tourism Bourse (ITB), held in Germany in 2002. SATC asked Diverse Travel to

organise the planning and running of what became known as the ―Aboriginal 2002 Roadshow‖. Diverse Travel

submitted a grant request to Oz Industry and obtained $20,000 to support the trip. Diverse Travel assisted the

Aboriginal operators in preparing and delivering presentations on their products, as well as networking during

events. Diverse created a product manual entitled A guide to selected Aboriginal travel product in South

Australia (2002) and distributed it at the Roadshow events to travel wholesalers and distributors. In the sample

itineraries offered in this brochure, the CWL featured as a three-day experience as well as an overnight stay as

part of a larger 13-day Aboriginal tour experience. This was an important initial step to market the CWL to

inbound tourists.

Unfortunately, SATC failed to follow up its initiative after the Roadshow and did not capitalise on the

connections made and to keep the Aboriginal operators or their products top of mind. The CWL did not have

the capacity at that time to take a more proactive approach to market the business themselves and to capitalise

on the connection made in Europe (Caroline Densley, pers. comm. 15 January 2007). As a result little business

was generated from this event despite a considerable investment in the initiative. This episode indicates a lack

of communication and coordination within the SATC between the marketing, product development and

infrastructure sections which should have been taking a more cohesive approach to supporting the development

of the CWL. Inadequate marketing remains a key shortcoming in the development of the CWL business to this

day.

The employment of an Aboriginal tourism development officer within SATC in 2004 gave rise to

considerable optimism that some of the internal barriers within the SATC to a more holistic view of Aboriginal

tourism could be overcome. A key marketing success in this period was the inclusion of Aboriginal tourism

enterprises such as the CWL in the Australia Tourism Data Warehouse (ATDW). This is a digital repository of

data on tourism operators used by wholesalers, retailers and distributors and is a key marketing tool for

Australia‘s tourism enterprises both nationally and internationally.

A perennial problem for Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises is their poor business communications

(i.e. lack of response to phone calls and emails) and the perception of unreliability that can result from this. Most

major international wholesalers and agents find Indigenous product of interest but are wary because of the

contact and communication problems they encounter. Rather than book directly with the Indigenous Australian

tourism enterprise, they often prefer to work with Inbound Tour Operators who can facilitate their bookings.

Unfortunately, many of the large Australian Inbound Operators experience the same difficulties in

communications with Indigenous Australian tour operators and therefore do not see it as good business to chase

up Indigenous operators. There are only a very small number of Inbound Operators who specialise or are willing

to deal with Indigenous products and they are important mediators or middle persons between international

wholesalers and small Indigenous businesses like the CWL. Since most tourists seek a variety of experiences,

not just Indigenous Australian ones, a good Inbound Operator is able to select these various products into one

complete package for wholesalers to offer their clients. As Kristi O‘Brien of Diverse Travel noted:

Both trade and consumers wanting an Indigenous experience often find this a difficult, frustrating and

daunting task as the mainstream travel industry has little knowledge of the diversity and spread of Indigenous

experiences available, except for large Indigenous experiences including Anangu Tours and Tjapukai. You

therefore need one booking point like Diverse who understand how to flavour mainstream itineraries with

Indigenous product to connect people to the diverse Indigenous experiences available throughout Australia.

People generally don‘t want a 100% Indigenous experience but elements of it included in mainstream

itineraries (Kristi O‘Brien, pers. comm. 28 January 2008).

A key conclusion able to be drawn from the above interviewees is that the SATC fails to recognize, or simply

lacks the structural or legal mandate20

to act upon the key differences between Indigenous businesses and non-

20 State Agencies (such as STOs) are commonly required to follow a position of ‗competitive neutrality‘ – i.e. as offering

general as opposed to specific support – which cuts across many of the aspects identified as specific business needs for

Indigenous tourism as exemplified in this case study.


34

Indigenous ones that necessitate a middle person between the former enterprises and international wholesalers.

Close cooperation and a long standing relationship with Diverse Travel has been an important source of

support for the CWL over the years and their contribution to marketing the CWL should not go unrecognised.

For instance, Diverse produced an attractive brochure from their own funds focused on the backpacker market

offering a two day/two night Coorong Ngarrindjeri experience at the CWL, which emphasised kayaking,

heritage and culture, traditional food-gathering, campfire dreamtime stories, bushwalking and wildlife. The

Diverse Travel website markets the CWL and other Indigenous Australian tourism experiences at a fair rate of

commission. Diverse Travel provides a very important web presence for Indigenous Australian enterprises such

as the CWL as many of these businesses have not yet fully developed their own websites. Over the years, Kristi

O‘Brien and Caroline Densley of Diverse Travel assisted the CWL in a multitude of ways. Nonetheless, Diverse

Travel has only channelled a small number of clients to the CWL, about 10 visitors booked for the 2–3 day tour

in previous years (Caroline Densley, 15 January 2007). This is indicative of both the limitations of the

international market (despite the rhetoric hailing its promise) and the lack of suitable accommodation at that time

for more upmarket visitors.

An online presence is a key feature in marketing to the contemporary international tourism market. Recently,

a new section has been added to the southaustralia.com website focused on Aboriginal experiences which

features the CWL as one offering. However, the CWL does not currently possess an adequate website of its own.

SATC‘s Manager of Regional Marketing recommends developing a very good website for the CWL because its

main market would be international tourists and the web ―opens up the world then‖ (Michelle Hocking, 5 April

2007). Additionally this website could be linked to the regional tourism website for the Limestone Coast which

also links back into the SATC‘s southaustralia.com website. However, only a rudimentary website for the CWL

is currently under development by volunteers and it is not likely to meet the informational requirements of the

international market. This is unfortunate because it is increasingly apparent that the internet provides a

significant marketing opportunity in this age of technology.

But the initiatives described above, including brochures, trade show events and web presence are not

sufficient in themselves to ensure a business achieves marketing success. Additionally, success in the

international market requires a very proactive and continuous marketing effort to build both presence and

establish a recognised profile. As Kristi O Brien advises:

I‘m saying that you need a really good web presence followed up with visits to Europe on a constant basis,

getting into programs wherever you can, to keep these Aboriginal experiences top of mind. You also need to

know how to effectively package Indigenous experiences and must be available to respond to bookings

within 24 hours to maintain credibility with wholesalers. Because remember, Indigenous culture interests

people but it‘s just part of the experience they‘re coming to Australia for. There are very few people that ask

for a 100% Indigenous experience, in fact no one I know has. Unless they‘re buying Aboriginal art (pers.

comm. 28 January 2007).

Marketing to domestic visitors Despite the ongoing fixation with the international market, by far the greatest and most accessible market is in

the domestic sphere. Unfortunately, anecdotal evidence suggests that since the Mabo decision and the resulting

uncertainties over Native Title, as well as on-going public concern over the adverse media representations on

conditions and events in Aboriginal communities, the domestic traveller has little enthusiasm for Indigenous

Australian tourism. Additionally, research data indicates that domestic tourists have little interest in experiencing

Indigenous Australian culture through tourism (Tourism Queensland 2002). Glen Miller, Tourism Queensland‘s

Indigenous tourism product developer, suggests successfully marketing Aboriginal product to the domestic

market requires a re-focusing away from culture to other features such as nature and adventure (2000). The

CWL, with its location adjacent to the Coorong National Park, has the potential to do this as its products and

experiences can be marketed as ecotourism or adventure tourism. The Coorong is highly attractive to 4WD

enthusiasts, bird-watchers and nature lovers. Most significantly it has a growing drive market due to the

successful marketing campaign for the Great Ocean Road touring route.

Although restricted by not having its final accommodation units built, the CWL has been operational since

2000, offering a range of budget and camping accommodation, as well as restaurant facilities and experiential

guided tours. During this time, the CWL marketing focus was unfortunately on the international market. This

prevented the CWL from taking more locally-based marketing initiatives, as the result of a belief that the

enterprise was not ready for a proactive marketing campaign because the planned accommodation was lacking.

The most glaring example of this deficiency was the failure to make efforts to attract the drive-by tourist traffic



35

from the highway which is a part of the Great Ocean Road touring route.

Capturing the Drive by Market The success of the Great Ocean Road as a major tourism route both at the international and national level

presents considerable opportunity for the CWL. The establishment of a total driving experience from Melbourne

to Adelaide with the last section incorporating the Coorong has placed this previously forgotten region into the

marketing limelight. For the CWL, a long standing problem was poor signage on the highway. Since its opening

there was a brown state interpretative sign located on the main highway stating ―Coorong Wilderness Lodge‖

with only very basic additional symbols indicating other services. Coming from Adelaide the sign was poorly

placed on a bend on a road with a 100 km/hour speed limit, so that drivers often passed the entrance before

realising it. Additionally, the use of the term ―lodge‖ in the name of the enterprise and used in the signage was

not evocative of all the activities and facilities available and restricted the number of ―drop-ins‖ the business

receives. The term ―lodge‖ failed to identify the services potentially offered by the restaurant, including basic

café services and bar facilities, as well as the tours, kayaking access to the ocean beach and general camping

facilities. This means considerable drive-by custom was probably lost. Few people if any would

opportunistically turn off to go to an accommodation lodge unless they had pre-booked. Those seeking to camp

along the Coorong to break their journey had no indication of the facilities offered at the CWL from the signage

that had initially been erected. This situation was rectified recently when the front entrance was landscaped and a

detailed interpretive entry sign was built at the main entrance adjacent to the highway.

The CWL, in addition to offering camping sites that are in close proximity to the lagoon and the wild scenery

of islands and the dunal landscapes of the Younghusband Peninsula, is one of the few places were travellers can

access the Coorong‘s remote ocean beach. Advertising these features and developing some additional initiatives

such as offering a wilderness café facility, rather than focusing on ―lodge‖ accommodation could more

effectively entice drivers to leave the highway and stop at the CWL (Schmiechen pers comm., 31 May 2007). To

date little effort has been made to tap this market through better signage, changing the product mix and

cooperative marketing at the main entry points along the route. Much of the early momentum to establish the

CWL as a premium stop along this route has been lost due to this inertia. The prolonged drought and

increasingly deteriorating state of the Coorong wetlands is significantly limiting the marketing potential based on

these natural assets.

Visitor Guides The failure to attract passing visitors off the highway has been compounded by CWL‘s poor use of the SATC‘s

regional guides as a prime marketing tool to inform drivers seeking information about their journey. SA tourism

is divided into 12 regions. The CWL sits across the marketing activities of four of these regional organisations:

the Limestone Coast, the Fleurieu Peninsula, the Murraylands and the Riverland, listed in order of importance to

the CWL. This is a unique situation compared with other South Australian Aboriginal tourism enterprises such

as Iga Warta in the Flinders Ranges and Aboriginal Cultural Tours on Adjahdura Land located on Yorke

Peninsula, both of which are located in a single marketing region. This is significant because advertisements in

the annual regional visitor guides provide a key marketing opportunity for the tourism market—with about

100,000 copies produced with a shelf life of one year. This offers a very diverse informational and advertising

opportunity that is currently barely utilised. The Fleurieu Peninsula and Limestone Coast regional guides are the

two most critical publications that should be major marketing tools for the CWL in its marketing efforts.

Since 2002, the SATC has sought to create greater focus on the Aboriginal aspects of the state by

acknowledging Aboriginal custodians in the editorial text and modifying the maps to highlight the main

Aboriginal language groups in each of its regional guides. For example, in the 2005 Fleurieu Peninsula Visitor

Guide, these pages are entitled ―Early Beginnings: Underpinning it all is a venerable sense of history‖ (Fleurieu

Peninsula Tourism 2005, p. 4). Here one can find information about the Ngarrindjeri, their relationship to the

land through the Dreaming and their ongoing relationship of responsibility. This section states:

Ngarrindjeri maintain two centres, both adjacent to the Coorong and near Meningie. Camp Coorong (phone

08 8575 1557) provides specialist cross-cultural educational forums and cultural displays, while Coorong

Wilderness Lodge (phone 08 8575 6001) offers visitors accommodation and guided walks (Fleurieu

Peninsula Tourism 2005, p. 4).

However this was not sufficient advertising to ensure that potential visitors actually booked accommodation

with the CWL. The CWL, the SATC Indigenous product development officer and the marketing managers of

SATC failed to ensure that the CWL purchased advertising space in the accommodation section of this visitor‘s


36

guide, which is what users turn to when organising their bookings. Thus the CWL presence in the visitors guide

was limited to a name and a phone number in a section of the guide which many people do not even read, or at

least do not use at the moment of making their bookings. This is clearly a missed marketing opportunity by

failing to promote the CWL‘s main attractions and qualities, especially to the drive-by market, in this important

marketing guide.

The Limestone Coast Visitors Guide of 2002, the guide that actually covers the region where the CWL is

located, did better with an ad appearing in the 2001 edition that stated ―Accommodation is planned for 2001‖

(Limestone Coast Tourism 2001, p. 17). The 2002 guide provides greater editorial focus for the Aboriginal

experiences in the Coorong. It states ―six thousand years of habitation by the Ngarrindjeri Aboriginal people has

left a precious legacy at The Coorong which descendants are happy to share with respectful visitors‖ (Limestone

Coast Tourism 2002, p. 13). On the two pages devoted to the Coorong, it states ―learn about Aboriginal heritage

at the Coorong Wilderness Lodge or Camp Coorong‖ (Limestone Coast Tourism 2002, pp. 20-21). Another ad

for the Lodge appears on page 22 in the section on accommodation in the Coorong similar to the previous year

(see Figure 2 below). These ads were steps in the right direction, but highlighted the ongoing accommodation

problem the CWL was experiencing.

Figure 3: Advertisement for the CWL in the Limestone Coast Visitors Guide 2002

(Source: Limestone Coast Tourism 2002, p. 22).

From 2005, specific reference to Aboriginal past and present in the region was highlighted in the introductory

sections of South Australian tourism regional visitor‘s guides. The 2007 Limestone Coast Visitors Guide like the

Fleurieu Guide had a two-page section entitled ―Beginnings‖, which states ―the history of the Limestone Coast

stretched back thousands of years. It is recorded in the rich oral histories of the Ngarrindjeri people and reflected

in a network of Indigenous sites located throughout the region‖ (Limestone Coast Tourism 2007, p. 8). These

pages feature two colour photos from Camp Coorong, including Ngarrindjeri people looking at a display in the

cultural museum at Camp Coorong and a photo of the hands of a Ngarrindjeri woman doing traditional weaving.

However, neither Camp Coorong nor the CWL are listed under the section of ―things to do‖. Despite the initial

use of the Limestone Coast guide for marketing the CWL, efforts were sporadic, with no paid ad placed for the

CWL in the 2007 guide. As a result, it can be assumed that potential tourists were lost because they were not

informed of how to book this tourism experience.

The 2008 Fleurieu Peninsula Visitor Guide indicated that these weaknesses in advertising had been

recognised and were being addressed. A new ad demonstrated awareness of the potential needs and interests of

their target market (Fleurieu Peninsula Tourism 2008, p. 8). In the accommodation section of the guide, the

CWL had a colour ad which occupies one-third of an A4 page (see Figure 4). While it characterised itself as ―an

Aboriginal cultural experience‖, it also directed the information at domestic tourists by describing itself as ―a

wilderness sanctuary offering adventure, discovery and tranquillity,‖ thus appealing to adventure and nature-

based tourists (Fleurieu Peninsula Tourism 2008, p. 54). This is a reflection of a more focused approach largely

due to the efforts of Caroline Densley from Diverse Travel who was appointed as a mentor to the CWL under the

Commonwealth Business Ready program between 2006 and 2009. Her prior work with the CWL had convinced

Densley of the need to bridge this critical gap in promoting and profiling the CWL in the market place.



37


38

Figure 4: Advertisement for the CWL in the Fleurieu Peninsula Visitors Guide 2008

(Source: Fleurieu Peninsula Tourism 2008, p. 54).

Use of Regional Associations’ Networks In addition to using the regional tourism guides that such regions produce, businesses such as the CWL need to

take advantage of the networking and communications opportunities that their regional tourism bodies offer.

Some offer membership services to tourism enterprises which provide opportunities and advice that can help

develop the business. But this networking takes time, persistence and effort. Such a strategy is imperative

because, as research has shown, Indigenous tourism product in many cases has insufficient drawing power on its

own to sustain commercially viable enterprises. Canadian researcher Notzke asserts ―over the last several years

realisation has grown that rather than constituting a stand-alone product, aboriginal tourism is a niche product

best marketed as part of a regional or conceptual theme‖ (2004, p. 49).

It is clear from this overview that the CWL has not taken best advantage of the opportunities that regional

tourism associations offer. Chris Burchett of SATC stated that numerous efforts were made by regional tourism

managers and private tourism operators to contact the CWL with marketing and business opportunities with little

to no response, including an invitation to participate in the Limestone Coast‘s Waders Festival (Chris Burchett,

pers. comm. 20 December 2006). Similar poor response occurred to various promotions undertaken to develop

the Great Ocean Road tourism route which could have provided a vital source of future business for the CWL.

This perplexing inertia often is the result of poor communication and lack of understanding of sound tourism

marketing principles that is common to many emerging Indigenous tourism enterprises. It is clear that the CWL

failed to recognise that marketing and securing clients are as essential to business survival as getting the correct

infrastructure in place. For instance, a key weakness has been the failure of CWL staff and management to

establish networks with Visitor Information Centres (VICs) located at major gateways to the Coorong and

businesses along the touring route which could market and recommend the CWL to visitors (Ralph Jackson,

pers. comm. 18 November 2006). Brochures should be distributed at key points along the touring route and this

has not been systematically organised previously. Ralph Jackson recommended offering weekend familiarisation

visits to the owners of hire care and campervan businesses in Adelaide and Melbourne as well as VIC staff in

Robe and Kingston as a technique to increase business. A lack of sound marketing advice has also contributed to

the poor marketing strategies of the CWL.

Poor Consultants’ Advice The deficiencies in marketing and providing support networks for Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises

were highlighted as early as 1993 by Chris Burchett who noted:

Consultancies have been received that ignore the relationship between market access and viability, or include

glib assessments of load factors without identifying specific strategies for achieving those goals.

Many Aboriginal operators have been capitalised without any regard for the complementary marketing

initiatives required to maintain viable cash flows. In an industry that relies heavily on expensive, structured

marketing forums (trade shows like the International Tourismus Borse (ITB) in Berlin have a shared booth

registration fee of $7000, without considering airfares, accommodation or meals), failure to adequately plan



39

and cost marketing over an extended start-up period is disastrous. Marketing plans, if they exist, reflect little

understanding of market segmentation, specialist niches, product placement, price sensitivities, commission

rates or other subtleties of the industry (1993, p. 23).

Such problems cause significant concern because analyses of Indigenous tourism enterprises emphasise the

need for ―market realism‖ (e.g. Ryan & Huyton 2000; Notzke 2004). From research into the CWL, these

deficiencies remain clearly evident over a decade since Burchett‘s observation.

Investigation of the plans developed by consultancies for the CWL indicates underdeveloped marketing

strategies. For instance, the 2005 proposal developed for the CWL demonstrated a lack of awareness of how to

develop a marketing strategy (Kurangk Pty. Ltd. 2005). In a section entitled ―creating awareness to potential

customers‖, it recommends: preparing web pages; developing a global booking format; listing in Tourism SA

publications such as the ―Shorts‖ brochure; promotion by Aboriginal bodies such as ATSIC, DOSAA and

Tandanya; listing in the yellow pages; participation in tourism awards competitions; marketing through the

Australian Tourism Exchange; promotion via Camp Coorong; promotion via bus companies; promotion via

ecotourism operators; and promotion via lifestyle television programmes (Kurangk Pty. Ltd. 2005, p. 12). While

many of these are valid marketing tactics for this business, the disorganisation of the list and lack of a clear

action plan indicates a scattergun approach and key omissions indicate a lack of awareness of strategies to reach

key visitor markets. This applies particularly to the international market which requires a long term approach

through utilising opportunities such as the Australian Tourism Exchange (ATE) followed by extensive follow-

ups and contacts in subsequent years.

One of the biggest problems is the improper use of statistics to justify cash flow projections. The CWL‘s

2006 Business Plan (MLCS 2006) suggests a possible market profile of clients based on domestic and

international tourists to the Limestone Coast tourism region with an estimate that the CWL would be able to

attract 9,160 clients per year (see Table 2 below).

Table 2: Business Plan Estimate of Visitors to the CWL

Segment Total visitors to

Limestone Coast

CWL‘s likely market

%

Visitors to CWL

Domestic FIT

556,000 1 5,560

Domestic

Backpackers

35,000 5 1,750

International

9,000 5 450

International

Backpackers

28,000 5 1,400

Total 9,160

(Source: Mark Lewis Corporate Services (MLCS) 2006, p. 14).

Projections such as this may be flawed as they do not take into account the actual tourism dynamics applying

to the area under analysis and the selected market segments. In this Table for instance, both the domestic and

international backpacker segments are largely dependent on the limited number of transport providers that

operate along this route (Wayward Bus, AAT Kings and Going South). If these operators do not place the CWL

on their itinerary or provide only a limited number of visits per week for limited durations, there is little chance

of meeting these projections. Very few backpackers will rent a car and drive themselves, and there are few other

options to access the CWL. This would suggest that the total figure projected in this plan is unrealistic and would

make the projected cash flows inflated.

Market Sources and Visitor Mix The keys to success are getting the right type of visitor and developing the enterprise to meet requirements of

specific target markets. From the initial concept stage it was always envisaged to target the higher end of the

market and serve small visitor numbers offering an exclusive experience. This was very much the approach of

Osprey Wildlife Expeditions which pioneered some of the early Aboriginal cultural experience programs offered

in conjunction with Camp Coorong, and which later suggested the same approach for Trevorrow at the CWL

(Schmiechen, pers. comm. 31 May 2007). However, as we have seen, the history of the development resulted in


40

the restaurant being built first, followed by the development of a serviced camping area and then the purchase of

an ex Olympic accommodation unit both of which offered only budget accommodation. The continuous delay in

developing the planned, more upmarket accommodation units which were a prerequisite to attracting the high-

yield niche markets the CWL initially wanted to attract, has been a major impediment to the development of a

successful business. This forced the CWL to settle for whatever clients it could attract from the unreliable

backpacker and bus market and to make do with the small income that resulted from the very low utilisation of

its facilities.

The CWL relied on the following sources of visitors:

backpackers on Wayward Bus Tours between Adelaide and Melbourne

coach tours of AAT Kings

inbound and specialist tour operator like Diverse Travel who provide access to more upmarket, high

yield visitors interested in Aboriginal experiences

drive-by market on the Great Ocean Road travel route

specialty groups such as university, environmental and reconciliation groups

Of these sources, the bus groups provided the main source of clients and activity and as such generated a very

low and uncertain return that was not sufficient to sustain the ongoing operation of the CWL.

Over the years, the CWL formed relationships with the Wayward Bus tour company which had been one of

the major providers servicing the backpacker market travelling along the Great Ocean Road. They stopped at the

CWL four to five times per week bringing on average 14 tourists per visit. However, there was great seasonal

variation between peak summer periods and the drop off in winter. The Wayward Bus market comprised largely

international backpackers; only 10 percent of clients were from Australia and New Zealand. The relationship

between Wayward and CWL started in the mid-1990s when Wayward Buses stopped at the site on their

Adelaide–Melbourne route for Ngarrindjeri insights and experiences. When the restaurant was built in 2000

Wayward stopped for a two-hour visit for a bushtucker walk, with lunch as an optional extra. The visit to CWL

was the only Aboriginal experience on the Wayward tour itinerary along the Great Ocean Road route.

Interestingly, Wayward Bus Company told its clients that the CWL should not be seen as a ―completed

tourism destination‖ but rather as a work in progress. This was an important attitude to foster because of the

delays in developing the infrastructure and accommodation. Ralph Jackson of Wayward described his

perspective as follows:

I like to talk about it as a project. If I‘m taking a trip through, I‘ll give the people travelling with me a bit of a

sort of history on the development of it, and where they‘re looking at going. I don‘t introduce it as a sort of a

completed thing that‘s all sort of been built and it‘s all ready for visitors. Their experience as a visitor is

seeing these Indigenous communities as projects in the developmental stages and I point out what they‘d like

to see added to increase and improve the facilities that they can offer … So there‘s not necessarily a neat and

tidy or fully landscaped, all completed you know, theme park, it‘s something still under construction. And so

in a way it‘s, rather than a completed thing, it‘s a living development … and so you know, that would be

nice to perhaps see that arranged a little bit better but in a way, it‘s rather than pulling up at a completed

tourism destination, there‘s a feeling of pulling up at a bit of a sort of a remote project almost … So you‘ve

got a little bit of that feeling, that you‘re somewhere remote that you‘ve pulled up to and I think in looking to

you know, see things perhaps a bit sort of neater and laid out better, it doesn‘t want to go too far that way, it

wants to retain a bit of that feeling of a, like you‘ve pulled up at a bit of a remote community (pers. comm. 18

November 2006).

Under such circumstances, the CWL had little leeway to wrest maximal or even optimal profits from these

day visitors. The CWL‘s offerings to tour groups like Wayward were significantly underpriced, but the CWL

was afraid to raise the costs and jeopardise this market. Modest though it was, it was a vital lifeline and the CWL

depended on this source of access to tourists (see Table 3).

During the course of this research, the Wayward Bus Company was sold to Australian Adventure Tours. This

is one of the major operators in the Australian and international markets and it is increasingly moving away from

backpacker tours to the upper end of the market. By 2008 the regular stops at the CWL were terminated and the

loss of regular income was a severe blow to the CWL‘s viability.



41

Table 3: Sources of Visitors in Bus Groups to the CWL

Present source of

tourists

Average

buses/vehicles

per week

Average tourists

per bus/vehicle

Average spend

per tourist

Average gross

weekly income

AAT Kings

Tours

2 35 $12.00 $848.00

Wayward Tours

6 22 $16.00 $2,112.00

Going South

2 8 $7.00 $112.00

Casual ‘off-road’

8 $25.00 $200.00

Total weekly

tourists and

income

226 $3,272.00

(Source: Kurangk Pty. Ltd. 2005).

This heavy dependence on very limited sources of tourists has to a degree been a byproduct of Trevorrow‘s

preoccupation with the impediments to infrastructural and particularly, accommodation development. This came

at the expense of securing extra income by developing other capacities that already existed. For instance, the

CWL had neglected to publicise and attract the drive market and entice them to join the already programmed

lunch and guided walk activities offered regularly to the bus groups. This could have provided additional income

at little extra expense or effort. Dependence on the backpacker market channelled through tour companies such

as Wayward Bus did secure the short-term survival of the CWL in the years of waiting for the accommodation

units to be built, but it was also a very low rate of return and fostered a blinkered view of the tourism

opportunities available to the CWL.

The CWL still hopes to better tap the international market offered by Diverse Travel and other international

wholesalers now that the five accommodation units are finished. However, this will require a significant shift in

focus away from the inexpensive offerings catering to the backpacker market which has evolved to date. Instead,

multi-day packages with value-adding experiences will have to be developed. Such a strategy is now imperative

in order to achieve commercial viability and repay the loan from IBA.

In 2008, the CWL established a marketing relationship with Gunya Tourism based on at least five

accommodation units being available for the upmarket clients they serve. Gunya has gained considerable

publicity through its joint venture in Central Australia with the Titjikala community east of Alice Springs. Gunya

developed safari tent accommodation near the community aimed at the high-end market attracted to Aboriginal

cultural experiences. Gunya‘s clientele chiefly come from the corporate sector and it has attained a high profile

in Indigenous Australian tourism in recent years. Gunya was so confident of its model of joint venture

partnerships with Aboriginal communities it presented the Commonwealth government with a policy paper

entitled ―Indigenous Economic Development Scheme‖ in 2007, in which it advised on how the government

could implement policies to harness private sector capacities to support Indigenous Australian enterprises. In

recent years, Gunya has sought opportunities to market similar experiences in other destinations throughout

Australia, including the CWL in the Coorong. In light of the collapse of the bus and backpacker markets as

sources of clients for the CWL, the relationship with Gunya may be critical to establishing a regular source of

more upmarket visitors to the CWL now that the new accommodation units are available.

Finally, the SATC, through its Aboriginal tourism product development officer, has worked on developing a

Ngarrindjeri trail incorporating the Ngarrindjeri tourism and hospitality offerings of the CWL, Camp Coorong,

Ngaut Ngaut and Pomberuk in one tour package. This tour would feature river and road travel and would offer a

variety of experiences to the tourists and value add to Ngarrindjeri earnings from tourism (Cheryl Ross, pers.

comm. 19 February 2007). However, this initiative has yet to come to fruition due to the fragility of many of the

components.

Infrastructure delays result in a lack of capacity The primary blockage to being able to shift the market focus from the low-yield backpacker market to the more

high-yield luxury traveller market has been the infrastructure delays. Significantly, the CWL delayed vital

marketing initiatives in anticipation of the promised infrastructural development. Thus began a vicious cycle

where lack of accommodation restricted the growth and profitability of the enterprise, but delays in marketing

also meant that existing facilities and services failed to be advertised with long term detrimental impacts on


42

building the market profile of the CWL and the cash flows of the business.

The 2005 business plan for the CWL stated that:

There is a high risk of closure in the longer term unless the CWL is able to value add and increase the

duration of at least 20% of the tourists visiting the facility. At this stage the business and its products have

not been extensively promoted due to a lack of site accommodation (Kurangk Pty. Ltd. 2005, p. 1).

This business plan indicated quite clearly that commercial success for the CWL depended on catering to the

higher yield end of market which was not possible before the accommodation units had been completed. This

problem was seen to be compounded by the lack of a holistic approach by SATC in supporting enterprises such

as the CWL. Greater focus was given to infrastructural development without supporting the marketing efforts

that would underpin financial viability. According to Kristi O‘Brien of Diverse Travel:

From my observations the government put considerable money into infrastructure, but not effective

marketing, for example, once a road show is completed contacts need to be followed up, the appropriate

packages promoted and created (if they don‘t already exist), and these contacts need to be worked on a

regular basis. Booking product needs to be easy and via a central website. Indigenous operators generally

need assistance with this.

Diverse tried to get funding for marketing and couldn‘t, there was just none around, it was all for either

infrastructure, helping operators with their business skills, but nothing for marketing, which was a key

element (pers. comm. 28 January 2007).

The 2005 business plan clearly indicated that building five accommodation units and offering a three day

experience were essential for the CWL to attain business viability. There is a belief that when this happens, now

projected for early 2009, the CWL will better cater to the Free Independent Traveller (FIT) market, capture the

higher yield clients promised by Gunya and accommodate international tourists channelled through companies

such as Diverse Travel. This will enable the CWL to rise above dependency on the trickle through of

backpackers and others. However, this requires appropriate marketing to capitalise on the opportunity and with a

two-year lead time for such marketing to be effective with international travel agents and wholesalers, the CWL

is still likely to experience a delay in benefits from these developments.

Summary on the Marketing of the CWL It is well recognised by all stakeholders interviewed for this project that marketing has been a key weakness in

the development of the CWL. As part of the mentoring under the Commonwealth Government‘s Business Ready

program, a key focus is examining all of the marketing opportunities that have been missed and developing

strategies to seize marketing opportunities, including through backpackers‘ establishments, camper van rentals,

regional brochures produced by the SA tourism regions and visitor information centres (VICs) along the touring

route.21

Another initiative is securing accreditation of the CWL as an authentic and professional provider of

Indigenous Australian tourism experiences under Aboriginal Tourism Australia‘s Respecting Our Cultures

(ROC) accreditation system, which may appeal to international wholesalers and international tourists alike.

It is argued that the SATC has failed to assist the CWL adequately with its marketing needs during this

developmental phase of the enterprise, which has contributed to limiting the potential economic returns to the

business. One key problem is the disjointed nature of administration within SATC which means there is little

coordination between the marketing and development departments of the organisation. The uncoordinated

approaches that have evolved within SATC means that the holistic support required to help Aboriginal tourism is

not implemented to the detriment of enterprises such as CWL (Chris Burchett, pers. comm. 20 December 2006).

A good example is the failure to resolve the lack of information at the entrance way to the CWL to attract the

drive-by market. As a result of the interview for this project, Chris Burchett stated that he intended to take the

preliminary findings on this problem back to SATC for discussion and remedy. It has only been late in 2008 that

the main issues of the entrance have been finally resolved.

CDEP and Training Early plans and projections (MLCS 1995; MLCS 1996) for the CWL stressed the need for subsidy of the

enterprise‘s wages and salaries through the CDEP scheme and training programs in the early years of the

enterprise, before profits were generated sufficiently to secure commercial viability.

21 See mentoring section below for greater detail on this program and its work with the CWL.



43

Fuller, Howard and Buultjens have analysed the Community Development and Employment Program

(CDEP) in some depth (2005). Established in 1977, CDEP is a Commonwealth funded program frequently

described as a ―work for the dole‖ scheme provided to certain Indigenous Australian communities; it is worth

approximately $490 million per year and is thus ―the Australian Government‘s largest Indigenous program in

budgetary terms‖ (Fuller et al. 2005, p. 173). ATSIC was given responsibility for running the scheme and

envisioned a dual purpose: ―to enable Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities and organisations to

take control of their own community, economic and social development and to provide employment for people

in their communities‖ (2000, p. 2). The program was devised as follows:

CDEP offers Indigenous Australians the opportunity to work in a wide range of community development

projects and enterprises. To partake in the scheme unemployed members of the community or group choose

to give up their entitlements to Department of Family and Community Services allowances [Centrelink

benefits]. ATSIC provides a grant to the community to enable it to undertake community-managed activities

and pay wages to participants. Community organisations responsible for the management of projects also

receive funding to cover the costs of administration and capital items required to conduct work projects

(ATSIC 2000, p. 2)

Jon Altman, expert in Indigenous economic development has described CDEP:

CDEP was first introduced to remote Indigenous communities as a progressive and mixed community

development, employment creation and income support scheme. I noted then that its part-time characteristics

might suit Indigenous people who may want flexible employment with the capacity to enhance income

through additional market engagement like arts production and sale; or through participation in the

customary (non-market) wildlife harvesting sector to generate livelihood benefits. In reality, most of the

5,000 Indigenous artists in the NT, as well as 400 community-based rangers in the Top End, are all CDEP

participants.

The beauty of the scheme is that it maximises individual choice; participants could work part-time for a

minimum income or work full-time and overtime if they were income maximisers (2007).

Although CDEP has come in for recent criticism and political pressure, it is clear that it has delivered on

economic development and social goals for many Indigenous Australian communities.22

In effect one can see its

utility to small, developing Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises in the way it has been used by the CWL to

support a small number of workers in the development phases of the enterprise. Currently CDEP funds are used

to pay for the labour of workers for the business rather than using up the profits generated by the business.

However, CDEP does not fund training, so enterprises such as the CWL must apply for additional support for

training from TAFE and others providers.

Arguing that many small Indigenous Australian enterprises ―do not possess the skills which are required to

operate in a fully autonomous manner‖, Fuller et al. (2005, p. 183) conclude CDEP funding may work best when

these enterprises enter into joint venture arrangements with non-Indigenous business partners. They suggest that

such non-Indigenous enterprises should be provided with ―… incentives to impart capital and training and

expertise that will equip Indigenous Australians to become more economically self-sufficient in the future‖

(Fuller et al. 2005, p. 183). This suggests that training and professionalisation of Aboriginal tour operators is a

key area of concern.

From the very beginning, Trevorrow has had a vision to use the CWL as a vehicle for obtaining training for

Ngarrindjeri people. In agreements with South Australian TAFEs such as Onkaparinga TAFE, some 30

Ngarrindjeri community members have obtained training and qualifications at the CWL. Support from Tourism

Training South Australia through its Structured Training and Employment Program has been an important source

22 The Howard Coalition government decided to abolish the program in 2007 declaring it a failed program and claimed to

shift the focus to establishing ―real jobs‖ for Indigenous Australians. Altman claims such a policy will lead to far greater

unemployment rates for Indigenous Australians and suggests the reasons for the decision might be ―to sacrifice CDEP

positions … to bring participants and their earnings under the single scheme of quarantining that will apply to welfare

payments … Another part of the agenda seems to be to further de-politicise Indigenous organisations, in this case robust

CDEP organisations, perhaps to give government-appointed community administrators greater powers‖ (2007). However,

Howard‘s coalition government lost the election in late 2007 and the incoming Rudd Labor government has stated it will not

abolish the CDEP program.


44

of advice and support. Areas of training included: hospitality, alcoholic beverage service, canoe licenses, bus

driving license and construction. Many of these people have gone on to work for the community in other areas

funded by CDEP or got paid employment in other places. For those employed at the CWL, the arrangements

were made to obtain CDEP funding for 20 hours per week and for Abstudy money to top up 20–24 hours of

training per week. Approximately six individuals from the CWL did training certificates to improve their skills

for running and working at the CWL.

Others also joined the training programs, approximately eight at a time in various fields. Trevorrow credits

on-site training tailored to Ngarrindjeri needs as a key to success in these training programmes.

Training packages undertaken include:

Land Management Certificate 1 and 2

Tourism Certificate 2, 3 and 4

Marketing Certificate 4

MYOB

Food handling

Liquor license

Kayaking

First Aid

Bus and truck licenses

Building and construction

However, despite this extensive training, one of the repeated themes of non-Indigenous interviewees who

actually supported the CWL was the lack of reliability and professionalism of the CWL staff and management.

Complaints included difficulty in communications, unreliability of the staff and the poor maintenance of the

grounds and facilities despite the numerous training courses undertaken.23

Chris Burchett of SATC has been

critical of the value and outcomes of these training programs, particularly in light of the fact that the

professionalism and reliability of service at the CWL has frequently been described as patchy:

I sensed quite a lot of cynicism relating to training projects … [from] both the deliverers and the potential

receivers. The potential receivers see it as probably an alternative to CDEP or employment and the givers see

it as a statistic [on outcomes]. And I think those sort of extremes of attitude really don‘t add much to the mix.

One wonders how many training courses have actually gone into a collective of Camp Coorong and Coorong

Wilderness Lodge with what outcomes? (pers. comm. 20 December 2006).

There is also a cultural dimension to the assessment of the outcomes of the training and the subsequent

running of the business. TAFE Trainer Sue Atkins remarked:

So they were trained in their marketing, they knew exactly what to do, and basically we started doing a little

bit, but what I found was, I had to keep pushing them and pushing them and pushing them. That was the

issue. If I was there and hammered the desk, then something would be done (pers. comm. 22 January 2007).

In Atkins‘ judgement, staff did not put in the time or the money that was needed to grow the business. CWL

staff and management expected to do their hours between 10am to 2pm and then leave. She argues the lack of

commitment was due to pressing other priorities “The Indigenous culture is very family- oriented, and family

comes first no matter what. So that was one of the issues, that was a problem, and I tried to make them

understand that‖ (Sue Atkins, pers. comm. 22 January 2007).

Several respondents noted that reliance on government support was an obstacle to entrepreneurial endeavour:

―But the potential is there, it’s just that everything they’ve got has been paid for by government grants ... It’s

that stepping-stone from reliance on government support into the business world that is the issue, is one of the

issues‖ (Sue Atkins, pers. comm. 22 January 2007). In a similar view, Chris Burchett of SATC observed that the

training schemes provided a training wage or allowance and could in fact act perversely ―replacing the object of

developing a commercial return” (pers. comm. 20 December 2006). The CWL‘s Business Ready mentor

suggested that in some cases training was undertaken for the wage rather than for the strategic needs of the

23 Notzke noted similar findings from her research in Alberta, Canada with Aboriginal tourism operators and suggests this

indicates a ―lack of market readiness to potential visitors and the travel trade alike‖ (2004, p. 49). To remedy this difficulty

she proposes a Code of Professionalism for Aboriginal tourism suppliers and operators comparable to the Visitor Guidelines

created for tourists (Notzke 2004, p. 50).



45

business and skills development of the personnel (Caroline Densley, pers. comm. 15 January 2007).

Chris Burchett also pointed out that hoping to get the staff of the CWL trained and professional in four major

areas of business, including providing accommodation, food and drinks, guiding and Aboriginal culture, was

perhaps an unrealistic goal, nor was it helpful to ―gloss over‖ the deficiencies of the enterprise on the grounds of

it being an Indigenous business (pers. comm. 20 December 2006).

From Trevorrow‘s point of view, the CDEP and the CWL were means to secure training for as many

Ngarrindjeri as possible. While only a handful of those trained people could be retained by the CWL, the vision

was to get people skilled so they could secure employment elsewhere in the community in such areas as

construction and hospitality. Nevertheless many Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises expect more

employment in the enterprise than the business can sustain and this would appear to be the case with the CWL as

well. This can be due to a variety of reasons as noted by researcher Diana James including ―the preference for

guides to work as a group, to ensure absences can be covered, to provide more community employment, to

ensure a rich cultural experience for the visitor and to ensure communication of cultural knowledge from senior

to younger guides‖ (1996, p. 31). While these motivations are understandable, hard commercial reality suggests

that a business that employs more people than profits can sustain will not attain commercial viability under

current circumstances.

Employment The potential social benefits of employment and training offered through the CWL are considerable. As

Trevorrow wrote in a letter to one of the training bodies in 1998:

As you are probably aware the unemployment rate for Aboriginal people in the Meningie area before the

project commenced in August 1997 was close to 100%. We now have 25 trainees gainfully employed on

projects injecting enthusiasm and a feeling of worth in the Community.

Another very disturbing aspect to my people before August 1997 was the premature death of our young

people through substance abuse and lack of positive role models. Nearly all of the past and present trainees

have been involved in serious breaches of the law adding to the inevitable downward spiral. I would like you

to be aware that since the project commencement in August felonies and misdemeanours have nearly ceased

and the trainees are now positive role models for younger people. In fact a large number of the younger ones

have continued their high school studies as a direct result of the project and trainees advice to them (letter

from George Trevorrow, March 1998).

The development of the CWL was intended to provide employment for Trevorrow‘s family and other

members of the Ngarrindjeri community. In the business plan developed by MLCS in 1995 for the CWL, it

specified the CWL would need to fill the following employment positions:

manager

duty/assistant manager

administration/reception

senior cook/chef

assistant cook/apprentice chef

kitchen hand

waiting staff

housekeeping

bartenders

purchasing

transport drivers

laundry

maintenance

yardie

tour guide

It was projected that by the fifth year of operations, the CWL would need the equivalent of 18 full time staff

positions under a plan which forecast a profit of $416,000 (MLCS 1995, Attachment 6). Such planning assumed

that Community Development and Employment Program monies would be available: ―The use of CDEP will be

important in both controlling costs and allowing flexibility in the early years of operation when occupancy is

low‖ (MLCS 1995, Attachment 6). This was clearly over-ambitious for the capacities of the enterprise and again


46

a clear indication of the lack of practical insight into the nature of small to medium Indigenous tourism

enterprises.

It was intended that many of these positions would be filled by family members with some additional

positions for community members who would be trained to be multi-skilled to cover more than one of the areas

listed above. Six members of the Trevorrow family have undertaken the training and served as employees of the

CWL throughout the years. CDEP and Department of Employment, Education and Training (DEET) funds were

used to pay the wages of employees rather than the profits earned by the enterprise. This was a matter of

necessity because the CWL failed to generate necessary profits due to the difficulties recounted earlier. In

addition, unpaid volunteer labour of committed individuals was also important during this time. To date, the

CWL has been unable to fund full wages for its staff.

One key aspect of employment is the discrepancy between the multi-skilled tasks demanded by this tourism

enterprise and the desire to generate jobs for as many family/community members as possible and the

commercial reality that such a small tourism enterprise can in reality only support two full-time positions

(perhaps augmented by two part-time positions) within the constraints imposed by commercial viability.

An important point to note is that the business could not have survived if the managers and staff had not been

willing or able to forego salaries. This meant that CWL‘s recurrent expenses were kept to a minimum during the

difficult years of development. Wages were not paid from the inception of the business in 1997 to the present;

instead staff have received about $250–300 per week as CDEP or Abstudy trainee supports. Significant unpaid

labour has been provided as well. This unorthodox financial/wage profile shows to what extent the enterprise

was and remains embedded in kinship and other cultural values which have no relationship to financial

considerations. It is an important distinctive aspect of Indigenous enterprise where economic factors are often

secondary to social and especially kinship considerations.

However, due to recent policy changes, CDEP and Abstudy can no longer be used in this manner. Therefore

it is imperative that the business deliver the commercial returns to deliver salaries and living wages to staff. In

2005, there were nine members of the family and extended family employed at the CWL. Currently, only George

and Shirley Trevorrow operate the CWL with the significant support their daughter Georgina Trevorrow and

extended family member Gordie Rigney. Younger family members have had to leave to secure full-time

employment in major regional centres due to the commercial fragility of the CWL and the loss of CDEP and

training funds to subsidise salaries. The major cause of this unfortunate situation is the long delay in completing

the infrastructural work which meant that business failed to reach a critical momentum to generate the income

that could have sustained the wages to keep the trained family members with the CWL. Additionally, the fact

that the CWL failed to capitalise on the assets and opportunities that it did possess in this period resulted in this

disappointing situation.

While the benefits of employment might not have reached early expectations, other benefits have accrued to

the Ngarrindjeri community including new buildings that were constructed by these trainees, new enterprises and

their associated services, as well as additional income in circulation in the community as contract monies were

spent locally.

Joint Venture Arrangements As stated previously, Fuller et al. (2005, p. 183) suggest joint ventures may be useful to nascent Indigenous

Australian tourism enterprises. Altman (1993) also acknowledged that establishing joint ventures may be

necessary to ensure commercial viability. As noted earlier, the CWL could have been established as a joint

venture at the outset when George and Shirley Trevorrow originally agreed on a joint venture arrangement with

non-Indigenous partner Tess McGrath who purchased the land at Hacks Point. However, this opportunity was

rejected by the Trevorrows when ATSIC offered funding to the NLPA for the property. The NLPA then leased

the land to the Trevorrows to start their enterprise. The history of this enterprise might have been entirely

different if the first path had been pursued, but this is now a moot point. The question now worth posing is

whether establishing a joint venture arrangement at this point in the development of the enterprise would be a

strategy for attaining commercial success.

According to Paul Case, business consultant to the CWL:

Our clients who have success more than not are joint ventures. When you‘ve got a joint venture partner who

is a specialist in that industry and you bring them together with the Indigenous client, that‘s when our client

have the greatest success. That‘s where we started approaching … CDC 13 years ago, as a joint venture

partner (but they declined). George excels in doing the day to day. He can do all that has to be done but to

reach the greatest potential he would benefit from a partner alongside of him who specialises in the rest of the



47

business. He [the business partner] doesn‘t have to know a lot about product delivery, but he needs to

understand how to manage the capital business and marketing development.

George still can take on a joint venture partner now or perhaps we assign tasks to specialists to assist (but at

whose cost?), Government would need to assign a full time person to the project for three years and say, right

you are the commercial person ... And yes, a range of consultants and government can help to some extent

but it‘s the physical someone knocking on people‘s doors, sending their emails out, with a sole purpose to

make the business work.

I still talk to George about this—I said, once you get your capital in … you‘re going to have $3 million of

capital sitting there, surely there‘s an opportunity for a 5 year, 10 year deal with somebody who can supply

the part of the business you can‘t, the part you struggle with and you might be able to come to some cost

sharing arrangements. They put in this effort, you put in this effort … better to have half of something than

not make any money. So I still think that‘s an opportunity. It‘s that fundamental understanding that when

Indigenous tourism goes wrong and not fixing it at the start and not finding the right partners at the start, I

think has been missing … in this process (pers. comm. 11 January 2007).

With the granting of the IBA loan/grant to the CWL in 2007, a joint venture arrangement is in fact in place

due to IBA‘s investment in the business and it is now a matter whether IBA‘s commitment to providing ongoing

advice and assistance translates into economic viability for the CWL.

Additionally, in 2007 negotiations with Gunya Tourism were undertaken to discuss the possible

establishment of a joint venture partnership with the CWL. Gunya Tourism is well known nationally for

establishing a successful joint venture with Titjikala community in Central Australia. On its website, Gunya

Tourism states it aims ―to build Indigenous capacity through the successful operation of joint ventures within the

tourism market, by combining our sales and marketing/hotel operation skills with a locally controlled and

delivered Indigenous tourism product‖ (Gunya Tourism n.d.). An MOU has been signed with Gunya making

them an important marketing arm for CWL. It is hoped that this will be a major catalyst in securing bookings for

the new accommodation units now that they are completed.

Mentoring Mentoring has served as an important support for the CWL since its inception. ATSIC and later IBA paid for

Ron Flavel to act as business advisor and mentor for the enterprise. During this time, he assisted with writing

grant submissions for funding and other support and also with setting up the accounts and bookkeeping for the

business. When Flavel retired in 2005, IBA hired MLCS Corporate, which assigned Paul Case to serve as

consultant to the enterprise. IBA has committed to ongoing funding for marketing planning, business planning,

project management and mentoring in the aftermath of the loan/grant to CWL.

Another key source of mentoring and advice has been the SATC. As a result of the NATSITIS policy

development in the mid-1990s, the SATC appointed Meredith Bogish to develop a South Australian Aboriginal

Tourism Strategy and this niche area received increased attention. It was recognised that someone within SATC

needed to focus attention on this area and that such a person would require marketing expertise, significant

industry experience and know-how in promotions through international tourism industry exchanges. Soon

thereafter, Wayne Emery was appointed to foster this niche along with several other specialist tourism segments.

About this time, SATC promoted the development of an Indigenous tourism operators‘ network comprised of

South Australia‘s Aboriginal tourism operators as another key to successful business development.

There was a period when interest and support for Aboriginal tourism waned in the late 1990s as there was no

dedicated staff assigned with responsibility for this area. Responsibility for Indigenous product was then the

shared responsibility of several SATC departments and the budgets were small (approximately $6000). In 2002,

the SATC once again took on a more proactive focus with the appointment of Carroll Karpany, a Ngarrindjeri

Aboriginal man with experience in the tourism industry. He was employed to act as a promoter of Indigenous

tourism in the SATC. His role was to serve as a dedicated champion and a person who could bridge the gaps

between SATC and the Indigenous Australian tour operators. At the onset of his work, Karpany described the

CWL as having a “lack of confidence in the SATC” and a “high level of suspicion rather than a high level of

proactiveness to engage governments” (pers. comm. 16 Nov 2006). Karpany‘s role in supporting the CWL

provided one source of advice and support that the CWL has used in recent years. However, his impact had been

limited because of the fact that Karpany had to be responsive to the needs of all of the state‘s Aboriginal tourism

operators, not just the CWL; Karpany‘s focus on the ―acknowledgement, recognition and respect‖ strategy

discussed previously; and the fragmented nature of SATC operations.


48

A significant mentoring program initiated in 2006 saw the appointment of Caroline Densley of Diverse

Travel as a business mentor for the CWL funded by the Commonwealth government‘s Business Ready Program

for Indigenous Tourism (BRPIT). This was in effect a mentoring scheme for Indigenous Australian tourism

enterprises. The focus of this mentoring was on achieving accreditation with Aboriginal Tourism Australia

which gives a tick of authenticity—a valuable asset for marketing the CWL in appropriate markets. As part of

this process of accreditation, key aspects of the business have to meet specified standards in OHS&W, insurance,

licenses and risk management. Densley noted that for her mentoring to really succeed, she would need a business

manager based at the CWL on a day-to-day basis so that she could teach the hands on work that she identified in

her role as mentor. A significant problem encountered was a lack of follow through on advice given, which was

why Densley saw the appointment of a business manager as necessary. The administrative person then charged

with carrying out these tasks failed to put in the necessary time because of the lack of salary and family demands

on his time. Densley believed the skills and knowledge were largely there, given the considerable training and

mentoring already undertaken by staff at the CWL (Caroline Densley, pers. comm. 15 January 2007). It is

important to note that the BRPIT program had been criticised as being underfunded and unable to meet the

expectations placed on mentors (Paul Case, pers. comm. 11 January 2007). As a result there were real constraints

on what could be accomplished within the timelines established.

Another mentoring project running parallel to those mentioned above was funded by DEEWAR, which

funded Indigenous Australian business entrepreneur John Moriarty to personally mentor six Indigenous

businesses. One of his selections was the CWL. This mentoring program had no coordination with any of the

other mentoring and support initiatives provided to the CWL and focused mainly on obtaining different

architectural plans for the accommodation units during the period of impasse between the CWL and SATC. This

caused some consternation among SATC personnel, as they were working with their own architects to develop

appropriate designs. Bill Spurr, Chief Executive Officer of SATC, indicated he was not sure what this federal

mentoring project was for and what it was achieving for the business (pers. comm. 18 December 2006).

In addition to these more formalised mentoring schemes, the CWL has also received informal mentoring

from people involved with the enterprise in other capacities. Over the years, this has included many different

people, such as trainer Sue Atkins who found herself mentoring the enterprise in many different ways during her

years of working with the personnel of the CWL. Additionally, biologist Joan Gibbs has worked with the CWL

on a revegetation project to rehabilitate the degraded environment at Hacks Point and has during that time acted

as an informal mentor.

It was apparent from the interviews that there have been too many mentoring projects that were overlapping

due to poor communication and coordination. This had the potential to hamper progress as issues were being re-

worked after having already been addressed by someone else or another agency. A good example is the building

designs brought in through the Moriarty mentoring project which upset SATC with a new input at a time they

were trying to finalise their own plans. Of course, it was the duty of George Trevorrow to manage these inputs

and ensure that at least a minimum of communication and coordination was achieved. However, perhaps due to a

belief that ―the more help received the better‖, Trevorrow may have indirectly encouraged too many varied

inputs into the business which resulted in miscommunication and wasted efforts. This again suggests the value of

employing a dedicated business manager to oversee the coordination of activities in order to obtain optimum

outcomes from such opportunities.

Diverging Cultural Values Richard Trudgen has suggested that mutual misunderstanding of values is at the heart of problems between

Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians (2000, pp. 68–136). While currently Indigenous Australian tourism

enterprises are expected to run according to commercial imperatives and have to meet rigorous mainstream

business requirements, there is an underlying cultural difference with underpins the fragility of Indigenous

Australian tourism businesses and thwarts the successful collaboration with mainstream support mechanisms.

While this is widely known, little has been done to ameliorate the gap between these differences in values. As

Redpath and Nielson argue in their assessment of native culture, non-native culture and management in the

Canadian context, ―traditional Native values persist … By more clearly identifying and understanding Native

culture and the structures and processes for organization and problem-solving, external agents will be better

equipped to assist these communities along the road to development‖ (1997, p. 337).

There is additionally an emerging field of Indigenous entrepreneurship which suggests that Indigenous values

do not have to be seen as a barrier to business success. Research by Hindle and Lansdowne indicated that ―the

paths to an entrepreneurial future could come directly from the heartland of Indigenous tradition if only we

understood that tradition well enough and were adventurous enough to use it creatively‖ (2005, p. 137).



49

This research indicates that Aboriginal tourism entrepreneurs can be seen to be at the crossroads of two

cultures. Thus Trevorrow:

The tourism business in particular is difficult because you know we dare to step out and put our hands up and

create something—you can get slapped on both ears. You are frightened of the white system that is there and

all facets because you are an Aboriginal group standing up trying to do business and that‘s not heard of

enough in this country. And then you have your own people, you know the‖ tall poppy syndrome‖ type of

situation saying ―who the hell do you think you are‖. So you can cop it, you do cop it both ways. And so

Aboriginal people in business can sit out there pretty lonely sometimes in the middle of these two worlds in

which they are trying to live. And if it weren‘t for the support of being able to sometimes get together with

other people in the same boat you‘d probably go mad (pers. comm.. 4 September 2006).

One significant issue apparent from the interviews was the difference in expectation of effective

communication between the people from supporting agencies and Trevorrow and others at the CWL. It is not

clear why the staff at the CWL fail to appropriately respond to phone calls and email communications despite

significant training, mentoring and experience in this area. Another instance of poor communications was

Trevorrow‘s failure to tell SATC personnel working with the CWL about the IBA grant/loan money for a period

of 12 to 18 months (Craig Grocke, pers. comm. 15 November 2006). Significant distrust of government agencies

is a key feature of Indigenous Australian experience and this may be an underlying cause of such reluctance to

proactively communicate.

Another frequent observation made by many respondents concerned a perceived Indigenous Australian

welfare mentality or a reliance on government assistance. This was contrasted with a more proactive,

entrepreneurial spirit more characteristic of non-Indigenous business leaders. Paul Case stated:

There isn‘t the same level of hunger as you get in the corporate world … time is not necessarily as important.

For me, that‘s eight years lost … eight years‘ struggle … they feel this is the way things go. Whereas you or I

would have said what is the shortest point from A to B. And that‘s just not the way George thinks … Not the

way he‘s allowed to think as there are large levels of competing family, social and cultural issues that are just

as or more a priority (pers. comm. 11 January 2007).

The compliant and time-tolerant attitudes implicit in this evaluation reflects a cultural attitude that is seen as an

impediment to achieving a viable business enterprise. Many respondents felt there is a need to be more

aggressively proactive like non-Indigenous businesses. Paul Case explains:

They have trusted SATC will take care of things and that‘s not what you do if you‘re in business by yourself

because you make sure that all the government agents are doing what they promised. You need to be

proactive with government; you don‘t wait for government to come to you. I think that‘s sometimes

misplacing confidence in people who will say they will help you … thinking that all these people have got

our best interests at heart and maybe they‘ll help me. Whereas in reality you need to proactively chase them

to help you (pers. comm. 11 January 2007).

Caroline Densley also remarked on the welfare mentality whereby the people at the CWL and other

Aboriginal enterprises expect to be funded or subsidised for such things as ads placed in the regional tourism

guides and attendance at travel expos and tourism conferences. From her experience of working with South

Australian Indigenous tourism operators such as the CWL, she concluded that they do not have the business

acumen of seeing the promotional opportunities as an integral part of their ongoing budget. She has found such

attitudes to be a block to the mentoring programs offered. In a similar vein, Densley found that she had to

―hound‖ staff at the CWL to fill out forms to receive subsidised support for attending an Aboriginal development

symposium which cost approximately $450. In 2007, IBA funded Indigenous Australian tourism operators to

participate in another European Roadshow, but CWL staff did not bother to apply, missing a vital opportunity to

market the CWL to the international market (Caroline Densley, pers. comm. 15 January 2007).

On the other hand, Trevorrow sees SATC‘s refusal to listen to his views as tourism operator as indicative of a

―we know what‘s best for you‖ attitude reminiscent of missionary attitudes that Indigenous Australians suffered

in the past. He recognises that some bureaucrats in government thought of the people at the CWL as just

“another bunch of blackfellows sitting there looking for a hand out”. According to him:

We came with the family intent on creating a business. Looking to experience the full extent of what business

is about. We sit under the weight of the Government systems. The Land tenure locks us in to the hand out

system—with little opportunity for joint ventures (pers. comm. 7 June 2007).


50

It is also important to recognise that Indigenous Australian leaders such as George Trevorrow engage with

tourism for a variety of motivations extending beyond mere economic returns. The commitment to community

welfare that Trevorrow holds as a Ngarrindjeri leader means that the divide between individual/family enterprise

and community enterprise is not as clear as would be the case in the non-Indigenous sphere. Nor is net profitability

the necessary driving force – other factors like employment, self-esteem and respect for [conflicting] cultural

obligations form part of the complex motivating equation.

As the MLCS business plan of 1995 noted, the ―return on investment‖ for the CWL to the Trevorrow family

and wider Ngarrindjeri community is much larger than financial measures as it encompasses social and cultural

benefits of great significance. Some of these benefits include:

It takes the tourism pressure off of Camp Coorong so it can continue its race relations work.

It helps educate another market about Ngarrindjeri and Aboriginal culture.

It provides access to part-time, full-time, direct and indirect employment.

It has secured training for some 30 Ngarrindjeri community members.

It has [attempted to] restore a degraded environment through revegetation.

It serves as a model for other Ngarrindjeri to achieve ambitions.

It serves as a model for other Aboriginal people.

It has helped foster further projects for the CDEP (MLCS, 1995, p. 20).

TAFE trainer Sue Atkins also emphasised the significant cultural differences that motivate the Trevorrow

family in their engagement with tourism and in particular the focus on family issues as priority (pers. comm. 22

January 2007).

This is not to imply that there is a monolith of cultural values. Manager of Camp Coorong and Chair of the

Ngarrindjeri Lands and Progress Association Tom Trevorrow noted that some in the Ngarrindjeri community did

not understand why George‘s business was privately-owned and why the CWL‘s profits were not declared to the

Ngarrindjeri community. He has had to explain to these interrogators that the CWL is a private business that

leases the land from the NLPA and that it is not a community enterprise like Camp Coorong. Tom Trevorrow

states:

This is where you sometimes find cultural conflicts between Aboriginal way and whitefella way. And this is

where we‘re torn at times in developing businesses where you can only develop that business the whitefella

way, and that doesn‘t suit the rest of our Aboriginal people in the community. So sometimes it causes

conflicts (pers. comm. 4 April 2007).

Kirsti O‘Brien of Diverse Travel also notes a barrier to cooperation between the Aboriginal tourism operators

and agencies such as SATC because of the unrecognised cultural gap between them:

Some government agencies do not have a comprehensive understanding of Indigenous culture, they don‘t

understand how they work or how they see business e.g. the success of a business is not necessarily about

profit. A lot of operators are interested in creating employment opportunities for their communities and

keeping their culture alive through cultural exchanges with visitors. Some operators do the business side well

but generally you need a middle person like Diverse managing the whole thing, creating the programs for the

very different Indigenous experiences around Australia (pers. comm. 28 January 2007).

It is clear from these observations that the vision that governments and industry hold of creating several

commercially viable, export-market ready Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises may not be realistic

considering the value and cultural differences recorded in this case and noted in many others. Such enterprises

find themselves in a bind as they seek to secure cultural, social, familial, environmental and economic outcomes

from their engagement with cultural tourism but are under considerable constraints imposed by the commercial

realities of the marketplace and the supporting agencies that facilitate access to the marketplace. As Altman

stated over a decade ago: ―Enterprises that provide cultural tours can usually only accommodate small numbers

for limited periods and the need to competitively price routes makes overall viability impossible‖ (Altman, 1993,

p. 85).

Racism and Cross-cultural Barriers The use of stereotyping in marketing Indigenous tourism has long been a topic of concern. However,

stereotyping and associated racism has wider impacts on the development of Indigenous Australian tourism

enterprises. For instance in 1993, Chris Burchett, Manager of the Cultural and Heritage Tourism Division of the

Northern Territory Tourism Commission indirectly acknowledged such forces at work when he claimed:



51

Wholesalers, retailers and mainstream operators alike have become used to the concept of Indigenous

cultural experiences in the hands of non-Indigenous people. To introduce Aboriginal-operated products will

require the development of an industry confidence in operational standards, reliability and professionalism,

as well as overcoming entrenched negative stereotyping (1993, p. 23).

Fuller et al. (2005) note that Indigenous Australian enterprises are impacted by institutional racism when they

approach organisations, institutions and government bodies in their efforts to secure economic development.

They utilise the following definition of institutional racism in their analysis:

Forms of racism which are structured into political and social institutions. It occurs when organisations,

institutions and governments discriminate, either deliberately or indirectly, against certain groups of people

to limit their rights. This form of racism reflects the cultural assumptions of the dominant group … It

regularly and systematically advantages some ethnic and cultural groups and disadvantages and marginalises

others (Social Change Online 2003 cited in Fuller et al. 2005, p. 217).

Referring to work done by the Australian parliament‘s Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait

Islander Affairs in 1993 on Indigenous Australian access to governmental services, Fuller et al. quoted:

Cultural barriers … represent the greatest obstacle to Access and Equity for Aboriginal and Torres Strait

Islander peoples … government services were not oriented towards the needs of Aboriginal individuals and

communities, but rather based on white systems and values (cited in Fuller et al. 2005, p. 218).

Data collected from the interviews for this project confirm this as an issue that confronts enterprises such as

the CWL, even though it is a very difficult topic to discuss openly. When considering policy formation and

activities of the SATC, it was clear that valuable efforts have been made in previous years to engage with

Indigenous Australians through undertaking cross-cultural training at Camp Coorong24

and employing an

Aboriginal person to deal with Indigenous Australian tourism product. However, the latter may have

unintentionally caused a situation where SATC employees do not have to engage with Indigenous perspectives

themselves because that responsibility now rests with this individual and therefore SATC employees feel they

can absolve themselves of such responsibility (Chris Burchett, pers. comm. 20 December 2007) .

Poor communication and poor understanding that arises from a lack of cultural understanding has led to poor

outcomes and suspicions on both sides of the exchange. This statement from SATC‘s General Manager of

Tourism Development indicates this disjuncture:

So it‘s really a different management style and it‘s a management style which Aboriginal people need to

sneak up on; it‘s not incumbent in their thinking often, in the broad way, looking after money and managing

business processes. So you need a much crisper approach to this. Now if there was a very crisp approach to

the finances of the Coorong Wilderness Lodge then maybe there might have been some, I don‘t know, we

don‘t know enough about it, we don‘t know anything about it in terms of the availability of their own capital,

they must be earning income from something (Michael Geddes, pers. comm. 16 November 2006).

In numerous interviews, such criticisms of failure of the CWL to reach mainstream standards led to

discussion of the merits of having a non-Indigenous manager in place to look after those aspects of the business

that were not being addressed by CWL staff and managers effectively.

Additionally, racism on the part of potential visitors cannot be ignored and may explain why in particular the

domestic market has not been successfully tapped. Ralph Jackson of Wayward Bus Company observes:

Unfortunately some of the older Australians, New Zealanders or Canadians will often have a little bit of a

prejudice or a bee in their bonnet about being taken to Indigenous tourism and there‘d be comments about you

know, did they build this with government funding, etc. (pers. comm. 18 November 2006).

There was also evidence of poor communication between the Trevorrow family and government supporting

agencies such as the SATC due to a lack of cultural understanding. According to Tom Trevorrow:

And maybe SA Tourism needs a bit of a cross cultural workshop to understand where we come from. Where

24 SATC organised for senior management to undergo cultural awareness training at Camp Coorong in 2002.


52

fellas like me and George and Ellen, we from the fringe dwelling camps, and we grew up with nothing and

our parents, like my parents when they died they never even had a dollar to leave to me. And neither did

George. So we‘ve struggled from nothing to what we‘ve got now, from poverty to where we are. I think they

need to understand that a bit more and then maybe they might consider things a bit better than what they are

now. But the problem is I believe that we‘re in the tourism basket totally with all the others, the Barossa

Valley, the Fleurieu Peninsula. You name it, all the other tourism companies and products in the state. I think

we‘re in there and they‘re simply looking at us a bit differently and taking into account our background of

where we come from and give us some credit from what we‘re doing over the years and where we are now

and give us a helping hand so we can really help with the Indigenous tourism side of things in the state (pers.

comm. 4 April 2007).

This failure to understand the history and experience of Aboriginal leaders such as George and Tom

Trevorrow has meant that some public servants, consultants and trainers brought in to support the development

of the enterprise have not understood the reasons that working with Indigenous Australian tourism operators is

significantly different from working with non-Indigenous tourism operators. One topic where this was evident

was the continued emphasis of the dependence on the CWL on public funding. For instance, Michael Geddes of

SATC criticised Trevorrow for changing his mind on the design of the units:

And while you‘ve talked of the broad cultural issues about that design issue, the fish shaped building, I think

it would be fair to say that George and his family have changed their opinions on the design a number of

times without any consistency and that‘s been a little bit frustrating. And I guess if we go back to the original

hexagonal style, sort of mimicking the original house styles which the Ngarrindjeri people might have used,

why was that valid 10 years ago but wasn‘t three years ago when we started doing something else? Why did

the designs which everybody thought they agreed to then suddenly get changed—and look people are capable

of changing their minds, I know that but they‘re changing their minds at the expense of the public purse, not

of their own. These decisions they‘re making, whether they‘re cultural design or anything else, is not hurting

their back pocket because the money is coming from somewhere else. So I think there‘s an overlay of a series

of things, both of culture and the broad finances and the lack of management skills which perhaps they have,

or don‘t have (Michael Geddes, pers. comm. 16 November 2006).

Business consultant Paul Case appointed by IBA to support the CWL did recognise that dealing with

Indigenous tourism businesses is different and that non-Indigenous yardsticks do not work:

It‘s that dimension [the down-to-earth nature] is what makes the Indigenous, that‘s what is who they are. So

we need to acknowledge it or don‘t promote it, and there‘s nowhere in between. If we want to have this

product we need to take it and understand who the people are, understand its strengths and understand their

culture. Some people see the culture as a weakness but their culture is their strength. You‘ve just got to take

it for what it is and have special mechanisms to support it (pers. comm. 11 January 2007).

.

Land Title Title to land is an essential foundation for developing successful Indigenous economic enterprises. In 2006, the

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner conducted a national survey of Indigenous

Australians residing on Indigenous land. Responses came from both traditional land owners and other

Indigenous Australians with interests in land and land-use, resulting in 54 completed surveys. The survey

questions asked Indigenous respondents ―to identify their aspirations for their land and to identify their capacity

to earn an income from the land‖ (Australian Human Rights Commission 2006). The results found:

The most important land priority for traditional owners is custodial responsibilities and capacity to

either live on, or access the land.

Economic development is welcomed by traditional owners, though many lack capacity to develop ideas

into enterprise.

A majority of traditional owners do not have a good understanding of the native title system and

associated agreements.

Entities with responsibility or potential to progress economic development are not funded to do so and

have numerous statutory obligations that consume existing time and resources.

The staff of native title representative bodies are likely to over-estimate the level of understanding of

their Indigenous clients.

Less than 50 percent of the native title representative body survey respondents claimed to be accessing

funds specifically targeted to economic development.



53

There is no consistent and reliable research that identifies the needs and aspirations of traditional

owners by location.

Forty-two percent of survey respondents argued that skilled personnel are needed to assist Indigenous

land owners with economic development. Thirteen per cent of respondents identified a need for training

and employment (Australian Human Rights Commission 2006).

Land title is a fundamental issue for the Trevorrows and the CWL. The NLPA owns the perpetual crown

lease of Warnung, the land on which the CWL sits, under a grant from the Aboriginal Lands Trust. This is a

more precarious type of title which depends on the political status quo and is far inferior to holding freehold title.

Sovereignty over the land is limited, as for instance, any arrangements by the NLPA to sublet, encumber or

mortgage this land requires the Minister‘s consent. The NLPA leases the land to George and Shirley Trevorrow

for 25 years within an option for another 25 years. This situation makes it difficult for them to attract finance and

capital. George Trevorrow describes his view of the situation:

The land is still held by the NLPA community group. Shirley and I are Kurangk Propriety Ltd we‘re the two

directors—we lease this 25-year right of renewal for another 25. And right at this time we are negotiating out

a different lease deal with the community.

I suppose the dream of anybody in business and particularly Ngarrindjeri people or Aboriginal people—you

want to back onto a traditional piece of land such as this, your dream at the end of the day is to be able to

own it so that you know that all of your years of work and effort are actually for something.

So as I say to Joc [Schmiechen] sometimes and my kids actually say to me ―Dad, why are you working your

guts out when at the end of the day you know you‘re never going to own it‖. And I suppose that we just want

to be in the same position as any other business people that we can work hard, make a business and if we are

getting old and tired and we can hand it over to the our kids or if we die they have something to carry on

with, just like normal people. But under the current structure of land holding in regards to government that

isn‘t possible for Aboriginal people. And as much as NLPA think they own the title to this property that

could change with a change of government.

So that‘s another disturbing factor I think that is put out to the public of Australia and the world on how

much land Aboriginal people own. If you dig into the title deep enough you will find there are caveats over

every piece of land that we own and that the biggest percentage of the title lie within government structures,

and that‘s a real worry.

They are going to let you sit on the land and sit there and sit there—whether you do anything or not is up to

you. But I don‘t believe that there‘s many other business people out there who would create a business on

land such as that —under such circumstances they‘d tell people to get stuffed. It‘s not a lot of common sense

but I think here for the sake of sanity and keeping active and trying to achieve. I‘ve brought my family in

here and with the view that you never know, one day the law might change and we might be able to get the

land. I‘m still living in that hope I guess and in the meantime I realise we still have got to do something and

so that‘s why for the last 10 years or so we‘ve been running a tourism program here (pers. comm. 4

September 2006).

Professionals supporting the Trevorrows in the development of the enterprise also acknowledge the

precarious nature of building a business in such circumstances. As IBA-appointed business consultant Paul Case

observed:

There is at least $2–3 million of infrastructure on site brought about by George‘s sweat and tears, but in the

end he doesn‘t own a cracker (pers. comm. 11 January 2007).

In 2005 the Howard government began considering implementing 99 year lease arrangements on Aboriginal

lands in order to overcome the financial inhibitions such land title arrangements have caused. Trevorrow

responded to this possibility:

It very well could come under the 99 year lease. We could probably approach them, negotiate a 99 year lease

here. That would open the doors up in the area of business. Because there‘s an operating business, we‘re not

in the same boat as other business people in regards to bank finances, joint ventures and all that. There‘s

probably a dozen people I‘ve talked to over the years that could possibly have gone into a joint venture with

me with ideas for this place.


54

But what most people ... want is security of their finance and if you have no security in land tenure then you

have lost out. Therefore as Aboriginal people on Aboriginal land doing business you can‘t encourage joint

ventureship and that sort of thing because of security of land tenure so you‘ve lost in that area. I think as

Aboriginal business there‘s many more hurdles to jump than just out in the ordinary world (pers. comm. 4

September 2006).

Impact of the Degraded State of the Coorong, Lower Lakes and River

Environment on the Ngarrindjeri community and the CWL Ngarrindjeri country features incredible land and water resources and biodiversity making it vital to the

community and attractive to tourists. In particular, a look at the map of Ngarrindjeri country highlights the

central importance of the lower reaches of the Murray River, Lakes Alexandrina and Albert and the Coorong

wetlands to this community. As stated previously, the Coorong was placed on the ―List of Wetlands of

International Importance‖ under the Ramsar Convention in 1985 and is subject to international agreements for

the protection of migratory bird species. Despite the recognition of the significance of these areas, the Murray

River, the Lower Lakes and the Coorong have suffered extensive degradation in recent years due to long-term

drought conditions and human impacts particularly through over-extraction of water resources from the Murray-

Darling River system. In fact it was reported in 2007 that ―the Coorong is dying‖ (Jenkin 2007). National news

has featured numerous stories in recent years on the acid-sulfate soils being exposed in the drying lake beds, the

rising salinity levels of the Coorong lagoons, the drying up of the water and the reductions in migratory birds

visiting the area. The Ngarrindjeri people, and George Trevorrow as one of their leaders and Elders, have tried

to communicate the vital social, spiritual, cultural and environmental importance of the lands and waters to the

Ngarrindjeri people through submissions to government environmental reviews and reports in order to catalyse a

response. The Ngarrindjeri community‘s Ngarrindjeri Ramsar Working Group (NRWG) presented a submission

that attempted to explain the nature of their attachment to the area covered by the plan in one of the Ramsar

consultation processes:

The Ngarrindjeri lands – in particular the River, Lakes and the Coorong are crucial for the survival of the

Ngarrindjeri people. They have a spiritual and religious connection with the land and the living things

associated with it. (NRWG 1999, p. 61)

Similarly, the Ngarrindjeri made a submission to the Sea Country management process funded by the

Commonwealth government which stated:

The Ngarrindjeri vision for Yarluwar-Ruwe Sea Country has always been and remains the same. The waters

of the Seas, the Kurangk (Coorong), the Rivers and inland waters are life-giving waters. Our Ancestors

taught us how to respect and understand the connections between the lands, waters and beyond. The places

where fresh and salt waters mix, are places of creation, where life dwells in abundance and where Ngaijties

[Ngartjis] breed. Ngarrindjeri people have rejoiced to see the return to Ngarrindjeri Seas of Kondoli our

Whale Ancestors. Some of our Ngaitjies have not returned to our land and waters. We mourn the loss of our

friends. We fear for animals, fish, birds and all living things in our seas and water-ways.

The land and waters is a living body. We the Ngarrindjeri people are part of its existence. The land and

waters must be healthy for the Ngarrindjeri people to be healthy. Ngarrindjeri say if Ruwi (land) dies, the

waters die our Ngaitjies (friends) die, and then the Ngarrindjeri surely will die. (Ngarrindjeri Natural

Resource Management Working Group, cited in Department for Environment and Heritage 2006, pp. 224–

225)

As a result of this process, the Ngarrindjeri developed the Ngarrindjeri Nation Sea Country Plan: Caring

for Ngarrindjeri Country and Culture (Ngarrindjeri Tendi, 2006) which took a proactive stance to inform

governments about the vital importance of sea country to the community and advise on sound environmental

management practices required to redress problems and manage the area sustainably from a Ngarrindjeri

perspective.

The Ngarrindjeri express this relationship frequently to outsiders, through such planning exercises and

through ecotourism.

The sense of feeling, sense of belonging, sense of responsibility for the river, Lakes and Coorong

experienced by Ngarrindjeri people has survived occupation, dispersal and attempted assimilation. It

continues to exist irrespective of where Ngarrindjeri people currently live. The link with the land lies at the

heart and soul of Ngarrindjeri culture. (NRWG 1999, p. 61)

Despite the ongoing and time-consuming efforts, the Ngarrindjeri are still not seeing the results that they

require for their survival. This is in fact a human rights issue as noted by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander



55

Social Justice Commissioner and Race Discrimination Commissioner Tom Calma who stated that this in fact

represents ―a new wave of dispossession‖ for Aboriginal nations such as the Ngarrindjeri (2008).

It is also a business issue for the CWL because the CWL is marketed as an ecolodge adjacent to the

―pristine‖ Coorong National Park. Trevorrow has noted that the degradation of the Coorong environment is one

of the key concerns he has about the viability of the enterprise:

We built here on the basis that we‘re on a beautiful pristine area of the Coorong; where there's not much

traffic, there's no boating, there's hardly anything here, it's really a wilderness area, the southern lagoon, and

if we‘re going to lose that, well then we‘ve lost everything that we built this for … You know, a little while

back we could hardly do a kayaking tour, there was that little water here (pers. comm. 18 July 2009).

Circumstances in 2009 point to potential improvements with discussion of placing the Murray-Darling

Basin system under the auspices of one authority in the hopes that the over-allocation and mismanagement can

be overturned. Additionally heavy rains in the catchment and talks of release of floodwaters from these rains as

well as buy-backs may see the Lakes, the Coorong and the Murray Mouth finally see some useful, life-giving

flows again. Yet, despite these promising possibilities, the Coorong, Lakes and Murray River are by no means

saved from danger and this perhaps presents the most sobering obstacle to the success of the CWL as a viable

tourism enterprise.

Leadership One of the things that stands out in this study of the CWL is the exceptional leadership role of George Trevorrow

and the impact that this has had on the development of the enterprise. This leadership role includes facets as a

national leader in the development of Indigenous Australian tourism, as a community leader of the Ngarrindjeri

people and as a leader in the establishment of the CWL as a family business enterprise. As noted earlier,

Trevorrow has had a key role as a national leader in Indigenous Australian tourism since his time as Chairman of

the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Tourism Reference Group in the 1990s. Additionally

Trevorrow has been the Rupelle of the Ngarrindjeri Tendi, Chair of the NLPA and founder of Camp Coorong

and his role within the community entails significant responsibility and a high level of demands. Finally,

Trevorrow‘s vision has guided the development of the CWL as an enterprise and it is his commitment, charisma

and determined effort which has secured the continuing support of governmental leadership from the Minister

for Tourism for SA, to the CEO of SATC, to the individual employees as well as many others from the

governmental, non-governmental and business sectors of South Australia. As business consultant Paul Case said:

George is fantastic at the product delivery, he really understands his Indigenous product and he is an

outstanding asset and so are his family and they‘re all trained in tourism and they do get it. They are trying

very hard to learn every other facet of the business but it is difficult to do everything when you‘re by yourself

and you don‘t have that cash to go … employ a special marketing person and support staff to do the stuff that

you need and don‘t have time to do (pers. comm. 11 January 2007).

According to Joan Gibbs of the University of South Australia:

My opinion is that George and Shirley have persisted in the face of incredible odds and I think people on the

outside don‘t understand exactly how severe these odds are. The things that they have to battle, the struggle

and for George and Shirley to persist, I have great admiration for their ability to persist, because lesser people

would give up. It hasn‘t been lucrative for them but it has given them some pride. And in my opinion,

considering all the barriers and the difficulties they have done an incredible job to keep going (pers. comm.

20 April 2007).

Son-in-law Tim Hartman has also noted the significance of George and Shirley Trevorrow‘s leadership of the

business: ―George and Shirley have shown great resilience and they‘ve kept true to what their goals and

objectives were‖ (pers. comm. 28 July 2009).

But Trevorrow‘s leadership of the enterprise is based on the solid commitment and support of his immediate

family which have been instrumental in the survival of the business to date. When asked to identify a key

strength of the CWL, Cheryl Ross of IBA stated:

Tenacity of the family I‘d say. Lots of other people would have given up a long time before this. And I have

to admire for what they‘ve done over a long period of time with so little (pers. comm. 19 February 2007).


56

Given this assessment, it is clear that succession is a vital issue in securing the long-term future of the

enterprise. George and Shirley Trevorrow need at least one of their children to take over the enterprise as they

approach retirement age. However, although their children and their partners have received extensive training

and have worked at the CWL through the years, they have recently had to leave to get paid employment in

nearby towns as the reliability of a good wage has failed to materialise and training and CDEP funds have dried

up and profits remain elusive. Each of them have a family with young children and the risk of the business

enterprise may not give the security they need for their family‘s future. A key question arises: are they unwilling

to take risks that the older generation was willing to? Indeed, without the dedicated support of an extended

family member who has volunteered a significant part of his time, the business might have folded.

Ironically, George Trevorrow‘s strong leadership role is also related to the uncertainty and weakness of the

succession issue for the CWL. As TAFE trainer Sue Atkins suggested:

I think George is the mainstay of the business, I think he‘s the one with the vision. I think he is the one that

pushed, but he would not give responsibility to the younger ones. So everything they did, they have to check,

if George was away on Ngarrindjeri business, it didn‘t happen. And probably I felt a frustration with the

younger ones, very often. But you know, it was George‘s baby (pers. comm. 22 January 2007).

Cheryl Ross of IBA has noted that a key consideration for future business planning provided by IBA

planning for succession within the enterprise so that things can move from George and Shirley Trevorrow to the

next generation (19 February 2007). In her opinion, the key to this is addressing the motivation of this second

generation, which has been undermined by the failure of the business to thrive due to the conditions outlined

earlier. If these efforts fail, then the need for a non-Indigenous business manager becomes inescapable. For this

to be possible in the long term, the business must achieve sufficient profitability to generate funds to pay for this

service.

Is the Commitment to Indigenous Tourism Really There? Although state and commonwealth governments of Australia have been involved in supporting the development

of Indigenous Australian tourism since the early 1990s, one should question the nature and depth of this

commitment. Currently, the poor record of success that sees few commercially-viable and export-ready

Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises, suggests that a radical rethink of approach is needed. George

Trevorrow‘s insight as a long-standing leader of Indigenous Australian tourism should be heeded:

And when the tourism industry continuously does that and you don‘t see change over so many years you

know it straight away that it‘s happening. Once again being used as a token gesture to the country to the

world ... they don‘t realise that in their own interest they should change that attitude. Change the focus, deal

with it sensibly, deal with it correctly, and put it up properly as it should be. If they want to use it, put it up

and deal with it properly, not skin flint on it and stick you in the corner and every now and again say here‘s

our Indigenous product here ... because that doesn‘t show the rest of the world much at all, when they see it

being treated like that. It doesn‘t help South Australia, in this instance, to get a good name in regards to

Indigenous product … they‘ll work it out … Is Indigenous tourism a major focus and is it as important as

they make out to be or isn‘t it? Because if it isn‘t, just continue treating it the way it is (pers. comm. 4

September 2006).

It was evident from the interviews that agencies such as the SATC recognise the importance of Indigenous

Australian tourism offerings to the success of the wider tourism industry. As one SATC official stated:

We need Aboriginal tourism product here. From a broader agency policy position, we don‘t have a lot of

good Aboriginal product in this state. We know from the broader international business statistics that most

international travellers would like to have or experience some form of Aboriginal product when they‘re here

in Australia, as well as seeing some of the other things. So with our state having relatively small numbers of

product in terms of Aboriginal product, I think it‘s vital for us as an agency to continue to support those few

that we have; especially that have already got a degree of things on the ground if you like, that have got the

embryonics, which are moving forward. And so where you‘ve got an environment which is quite interesting,

you‘ve got some facilities which are nearly there and can be worked on, to continue to put some support into

these things is, I think is quite important. I have a fundamental belief that if we as a state are interested in

continuing to have Aboriginal tourism experiences, then we need to be working with these people probably

over the next decade or more to ensure that they do have basically a commercially run business (Michael

Geddes, pers. comm. 16 November 2006).

Business consultant Paul Case recognised the fragility of the endeavour to support the development of



57

Indigenous Australian enterprises such as the CWL, but suggested if the government and tourism industry want

Indigenous products, they are going to have to support them:

And look, there was a risk and it is still risk. But for the Indigenous product to succeed when a normal

mainstream person wouldn‘t go near it, that‘s honesty, that‘s reality. Then someone, the government, has to

be prepared to put the $2 million infrastructure from the dirt. If they want to have Indigenous product in this

state they‘ve got to recognise it‘s not viable from a capital point of view. So don‘t sit there and talk about

commercial returns, if you want to have this sort of product in your state you‘ve got to be prepared to invest

in it seriously for the state … put the capital in and then put the operational support in and find them, find

those business partners and do it properly. You can‘t just think it‘s going to happen by treating it like a main

stream tourism operation. They‘re worlds apart. If they want an Indigenous tourism sector, you need to have

some winners. And George is 10 years ahead of most people, so do you back someone who is running a

business or do you back someone who is starting from scratch? … It‘s how we recognise Indigenous tourism

too. If you want it as a national commodity we need to invest it properly because it‘s not a sustainable

commodity by itself (Paul Case, pers. comm. 11 January 2007).

It was clear from the interviews with senior SATC people, including the then CEO, that the CWL and other

key Indigenous Australian tourism ventures in SA would not be allowed to fail. However, this study of the CWL

indicates that this commitment to help in dire situations of looming failure is not sufficient to ensure the success

of such enterprises. While the CWL has indeed received significant funding and support over the previous

decade, the incremental nature of the injections of support and the ad hoc and uncoordinated manner of delivery

by diverse agencies of government have resulted in a very fragile enterprise. Perhaps in a non-Indigenous

tourism setting, the business would have either achieved commercial viability within the first five years of

operation or it would have folded. In contrast, the CWL has been set up to be commercially precarious with

incomplete infrastructure and sizable loan repayments. The costs in terms of labour and commitment for George

Trevorrow and his family and in terms of investment, prestige and market diversity for SATC and the tourism

industry are considerable such that failure of the business would be a considerable disappointment to all

stakeholders in the business. But in particular for Trevorrow and other South Australian Indigenous tourism

operators, the CWL‘s business failure could irreparably dampen the enthusiasm to engage in the tourism sector.

Therefore it is imperative that lessons are learned from this experience and that processes supporting Indigenous

Australian tourism development are suitably modified to ensure long-term viability which may not correspond

totally to non-Indigenous notions of success. Whether the required support for success of these enterprises is

possible in current circumstances is unclear. As Zeppel states ―Aboriginal tourism strategies by state agencies

are market-led and responsive to commercial needs of the tourism industry. Aboriginal cultural and community

concerns are little addressed in tourism‖ (2001, p. 242).


58

Chapter 4

RECOMMENDATIONS

We have developed a series of recommendations directed at changing the practice of support agencies of

Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises, reforming the policy environment for Indigenous Australian tourism

enterprise and changing the mode of operations of the Coorong Wilderness Lodge itself. Please note that these

recommendations must be read and understood within the context of the complex history and circumstances

recounted in the body of this report. Some of the recommendations that result from this research include:

Supporting Agencies

Supporting agencies for Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises need to develop a holistic and

coordinated approach to both policy and funding initiatives.

Government agencies supporting Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises need to commit funding and

support mechanisms in the long-term if commercial viability targets are to be sustainably achieved.

Such funds need to be provided within more realistic commercial time frames to ensure enterprise

viability.

Government agencies will have to accept that some enterprises will not reach commercial viability but

remain worthy of government support for the other returns that they provide (including social and

environmental benefits).

These agencies need to foster expertise on Indigenous Australian tourism product, circumstances and

cultures within their organisations. This policy arena requires consistency and commitment for

successful results to be attained.

These agencies need to coordinate their actions in support of Indigenous Australian enterprises, both

intra-agency and inter-agency. In our case study, we found a great need for the South Australian

Tourism Commission, Indigenous Business Australia and the Indigenous Land Corporation to

coordinate their activities in support of the CWL in order to avoid duplication of efforts, conflicting

outcomes and inefficiencies.

Agencies should ensure that they employ consultants who have specific expertise in tourism and

understand its commercial realities as well as the special circumstances of Indigenous Australian

tourism. This is essential to providing realistic market analyses.

These agencies should ensure they really listen to Indigenous Australian tourism operators and their

articulation of needs. This requires a more thorough engagement with Indigenous Australian tourism

operators.

These agencies need to recognise the mixed goals that Indigenous Australian tourism operators are

frequently trying to secure and the community orientation that often features in their priorities.

Supporting agencies should foster the development of the domestic market for Indigenous Australian

tourism product through education campaigns, marketing campaigns and incentives as this is a more

reliable and accessible market for Indigenous Australian tourism to rely on. Because of ongoing racism

and stereotyping, a commitment to long-term education of non-Indigenous Australians is essential to

change attitudes and open up this market. Reliance on the international market is not an optimum

strategy as it forms only a small proportion of Australian tourism and is likely to be impacted in

difficult financial times.

Reinforcing the need for long-term, holistic approaches, Indigenous Australian tourism operators who

are supported to attend major trade show events, such as International Tourismus Borse (ITB) in

Germany, must receive ongoing advice and assistance in following up such opportunities through

continued networking.

All supporting agencies need to address the historical legacies of exclusion and marginalisation which

presents a context for Indigenous and non-Indigenous relations. Latent racism, stereotyping and cross-

cultural barriers are issues which need to be addressed through cross-cultural training, improved

communications and a commitment to bridging differences.



59

Policy Reform

Further research and pilot projects are required to identify means to overcome the lack of proactive and

entrepreneurial attitudes within Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises. Possible solutions include:

facilitating joint ventures with non-Indigenous business partners; appointing non-Indigenous advisors

and managers to assist in the running of Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises that are funded by

IBA; and establishing a business incubator program sufficiently resourced for a long-term commitment

to fostering entrepreneurial tourism developments.

The development of Indigenous Australian tourism requires a holistic and coordinated approach. For

instance, the development of the infrastructure of an enterprise must be developed in conjunction with

the marketing and skills training programs in order that the business achieves viability.

The development of Indigenous Australian tourism requires a long-term commitment on the part of

government agencies to support Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises through their transition from

a government-supported development to a commercial enterprise capable of sustaining itself.

For the successful promotion of Indigenous Australian tourism products and services, the role of

specialist inbound tour operators must be recognised and supported for the role they play in marketing

Indigenous Australian tourism product to the international market, including international tour

wholesalers.

All programs need to be realistically conceptualised, supported beyond political election cycles and

sufficiently funded. It is clear that former programs such as the Business Ready Program for Indigenous

Tourism (BPRIT) have been under-funded and given insufficient time in which to achieve their aims.

Assistance through programs such as the Community Development and Employment (CDEP) scheme

are beneficial for Indigenous tourism start-up but enterprises need to be facilitated to move away from

dependence on these sources of funding to being reliant on their own generation of profits.

Indigenous Australian tourism businesses may need effective bridges between Indigenous cultures and

the business culture they are entering. This may be accomplished through the use of non-Indigenous

business managers who can assist in holistically developing the enterprise and making sure efforts are

targeted at attaining optimum outcomes in tight commercial timeframes. Joint venture business

structures with non-Indigenous partners are another pathway to bridging this gap.

The policy arena must acknowledge and address the sometimes different cultural views on the nature of

engagement in tourism held by Indigenous Australian tourism operators and the policy professionals

that assist them.

The lack of clear title to land is a key inhibitor to Indigenous Australian enterprise development. All

levels of government should work collaboratively to resolve this long-standing barrier to Indigenous

Australian business success.

Coorong Wilderness Lodge

While acknowledging the myriad of difficulties and obstacles confronted by the Trevorrows in establishing the

CWL as recounted in the body of this report, future success of the CWL depends on addressing the following

issues:

The management must place greater emphasis on business imperatives and operate according to

commercial requirements. Meeting the loan repayments is a significant requirement and securing

profitability is essential to meeting these obligations.

Leadership is a key strength of the enterprise, but strong leadership has resulted in weak succession. It

will be important to encourage younger family members to return to the enterprise and to assume

management and leadership responsibilities.

The management needs to be much more proactive in securing business opportunities through

networking, undertaking marketing initiatives and cultivating business relationships.

The CWL staff needs to ensure reliable and efficient communications with all stakeholders and clients.

A much more professional approach in business communications will be needed to capitalise on the

opportunities the new developments offer.

If the CWL wants to cultivate the international market, it has to commit efforts to a sustained

engagement with wholesalers and inbound tour operators.

The CWL needs to better manage and coordinate all programs and sources of assistance that it receives.

Not all assistance offered is necessarily beneficial.

The CWL leadership may confront limits to the amount of employment that can realistically be

supported by such a small tourism.


60

The CWL management confronts a future when CDEP and Abstudy funding can no longer be relied on

to support the enterprise. It must generate sufficient profits to sustain the business and its employees.

The CWL staff should strengthen relationships and networks with other tour operators, tourism

networks and regional tourism associations in order to foster the interests of the business.

Now that the accommodation units are completed, the CWL needs to focus on appropriate marketing,

market development and a professional web presence.

The CWL management must cultivate a commercial business perspective if the business is to survive as

a commercial entity.

The CWL may need to generate sufficient profits to employ a dedicated business manager to achieve

some of these goals.

Future Research

There is a need for additional case study research examining the catalysts to success and barriers

confronted by other Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises. Such research should cover the diversity

of Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises, including family-owned, community-owned and joint

ventures models so that comparative data becomes available to assess which models offer the greatest

potential.

Research conducted with other Indigenous Australian tour operators as co-researchers would be helpful

in gaining an emic perspective into the situations confronted by Indigenous Australian tour operators.

Research into the policy process supporting the development of Indigenous Australian tourism

enterprises in other contexts needs to be undertaken in order to determine whether there is a widespread

duplicating propensity of government agencies and how their processes might be streamlined in order to

improve Indigenous access to government support and services.



61

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION

Speaking as Chairman of the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Tourism Reference Group in 1995,

George Trevorrow observed:

Too often, the needs of people out there at the coal face take second place to the needs of bureaucracies and

policy makers. Aboriginal tourism is highlighted again and again as a growth area, important to both the

economic development of Aboriginal people, and to the growth of Australia‘s tourism industry as a whole.

But every Aboriginal operator has a story to tell of frustrated attempts to get things happening (National

Aboriginal Tour Operators Forum 1995, p. 53).

This perspective has been confirmed by Buultjens et al. who found that there was ―generally poor

coordination between programs within and across jurisdictions … [and] programs provide little ongoing support

for businesses beyond the business planning phase, despite the heightened pressures on Indigenous enterprises to

succeed over the long term‖ (2002, p. 31). This research project reveals that little has changed in the more than

ten years since these statements were made.

Writing just over a decade ago, Diana James found from her study of Indigenous Australian tourism across

the nation that only one Aboriginal tourism enterprise, Tjapukai, could ―stand alone without continued grant

assistance or community support in the form of CDEP‖ (1996, p. 35). This provided a strong caution against the

optimism and enthusiasm that the tourism industry and governments had placed on tourism for Indigenous

Australian development. While a greater number of Indigenous Australian tourism businesses may have

achieved viability since James‘ startling assessment, the analysis of the CWL suggests that much of the same

fragility remains in some contemporary enterprises. Reliance on continued grants and supports such as CDEP,

IBA and DEET seem unlikely to be dissolved in the short-term as profits remain too small to support the level of

employment and opportunity that are desired and needed, and the market remains elusive.

This study of the CWL demonstrates that a key problem of the CWL is being in a reactive rather than a

proactive position awaiting government support due to its limited ability to access finance and leverage capital

due to uncertainty of land title and other assets. As of 2008, the CWL owns capital assets of approximately

$3 million as a result of the developmental work undertaken between 1995 and 2008 described within this report.

However, in effect George Trevorrow as owner/manager of the CWL owns nothing without title to the land on

which the business sits and is in a very vulnerable position due to the IBA loan recently undertaken. It is

unrealistic to expect proactive, entrepreneurially enterprises comparable to non-Indigenous business enterprises

in such circumstances, at least in the short-term.

The study has also drawn attention to a major systemic failure. It was found that governments at all levels

direct money at particular facets of enterprise development in an ad hoc and uncoordinated way rather than

developing a holistic approach that is needed to make disadvantaged Indigenous enterprises commercially viable

in the long-term. Marketing efforts, infrastructure development, professional training and business mentoring

were all undertaken disjointedly with little communications between the supporting agencies, all contributing to

poor outcomes for the CWL. Finally, it is clear that the government approach of incremental intervention and

funding has failed. As business consultant Paul Case observes:

In reality, if the government hadn‘t taken the seven or eight years to slowly drip feed in support and

infrastructure; if they‘d just done it up front like they [George and family] wanted, and then put the extra

capacity and training into it while the next generation was there. There is no point in government saying,

―we‘ve given all this money‖, as it has been over 10 years and therefore difficult to plan for. If they had the

coordinated resources upfront, faster and better outcomes would occur and that I think is the lesson learnt

(pers. comm. 11 January 2007).

The study of the CWL suggests that expecting Indigenous Australian tourism enterprises to attain

commercial viability in the short-term may not be realistic considering all the barriers that they face as well as

the poor levels of understanding of government and industry experts on how to successfully assist such

enterprises. It is hoped that the deficiencies and difficulties recounted in this report will contribute to a better

understanding of the issues and will contribute to more positive outcomes for Indigenous enterprises.


62

Chapter 6

EPILOGUE

The majority of interviews for this project were completed in 2007. Due to unforeseen circumstances, there has

been a delay in completing the project report. Things have changed for the CWL since this time and this

epilogue is provided as a source of a brief update.

First it is important to note that the context of state government support has changed. Since 2009, the SATC

has reduced its resourcing of and involvement in Aboriginal tourism. No one is currently filling the dedicated

position created in SATC in 2002 to support the development of Aboriginal tourism. SATC no longer sends a

representative to the Indigenous Tourism Government Agencies Forum, which is the major information

exchange on Indigenous Tourism between the Commonwealth, State and Territory tourism agencies. A new SA

Aboriginal Tourism Strategy is currently being developed by a consultant. The signs are not optimistic that this

new strategy will commit the SATC to providing any significant resourcing for the development of Aboriginal

tourism in SA. Nor is this strategy likely to address the myriad of difficulties that family-based Aboriginal

tourism enterprises such as the CWL face and that feature in this report.

The situation for the CWL has also changed. The bus market which sustained the CWL during recent lean

times has dried up almost completely. Wayward Tours was taken over by Adventure Tours Australia which has

changed the itinerary and no longer includes the CWL (George Trevorrow pers. comm. 18 July 2009). The CWL

is now focusing on other opportunities:

What we‘re developing at the moment is a cultural awareness programme and we‘re offering this to the local

government boards, all the major boards that are around the area. Just recently we had the Limestone Coast

Tourism Board … they had their board meeting and stayed overnight and did their business here. So has

Murray Bridge Regional Development Board. I'm hoping the cultural awareness programme will take up a

lot of slack for us. We‘ll also market to state government bodies. I think the need is certainly there, and I

think the first invite I‘ll make is to SATC to send some of their workers down here for a cultural awareness

wake up (George Trevorrow pers. comm. 18 July 2009).

Although there are still some fit-out issues still outstanding, the units and conference facility are basically

completed and ready for business. This gives the CWL the capacity to serve more upmarket clientele and thereby

extract greater value from the tourists who stop at the CWL. Gunya Coorong25

and Diverse Travel are marketing

these new facilities and are expected to supply clients to the CWL. Diverse Travel has booked one group of 10

people for two nights and has had other enquiries since the opening of the units.

Marketing is now a focus of concern. Gunya Tourism represented the CWL at the most recent Australian

Tourism Exchange held in Melbourne in 2009. New brochures and a website are currently being developed for

the business. But as the body of this report has indicated, there is a lag between having facilities available and

the time that marketing efforts start to show an affect. As George Trevorrow stated:

Even though we‘re almost at a stage where we think we've got everything we need and we‘re fully

operational, because of the long haul in getting word out there, it's going to take another serious effort in the

world of tourism, to now to say we are here. It takes time. It is still going to be a few years of solidifying

yourself in that market place, even though you are now fully ready (pers. comm. 18 July 2009).

However, when the bookings for the new units increase the CWL may find itself understaffed. Until recently,

there were four people employed on CDEP sourced wages and one person receiving a full time pension working

at the CWL at present. The CDEP program ended on June 30th 2009, so the CWL faces the major challenge of

how to pay staff to retain their labour at the facility. Trevorrow has been seeking more traineeships but with no

success. Most staff currently are working in unpaid, voluntary capacities. Trevorrow stated: ―Well really there

are no wages being met at the moment; it is really just family putting in and busting their guts trying to keep it all

open‖ (George Trevorrow pers. comm. 18 July 2009). As daughter Georgina Trevorrow stated:

25 See: http://www.itsagreengreenworld.com/public/eco_accommodation97.html



63

Well I am working here without a wage; I'm not on anything at all. I'm just here because mum and dad need

me … and it does get to me sometimes and I feel like just staying home, but, you know, I'm just not letting

myself down, I'm letting mum and dad down as well. And … I do think and care about what mum and dad

are doing here (pers. comm. 18 July 2009).

Succession remains an issue. Although son Cyril Trevorrow is available to help out at the CWL through his

role as an employee on a project funded by the ―Caring for our country‖ program of the Commonwealth

government and daughter Georgina Trevorrow works in a voluntary capacity, other family members that have

received training over the years that were hoped would stay with the business are employed elsewhere. As son-

in-law Tim Hartman noted when asked if he and other family members will consider coming back to the CWL:

It's possible; it‘s not off the cards. I suppose one of the biggest problems was that the development of the

infrastructure as per the business plan didn‘t happen in a timely fashion; if the finances were available at the

right time, if the builders had completed on the right times and approvals were done properly, it then would

have been a lot easier to plan that succession issues but the problem was a great deal of that didn‘t occur.

There were inconsistencies in the advice given to George and Shirley about the types of funding that were

available by government. I suppose he was put in a situation between a rock and a hard place of trying to

appease clientele and government and develop the business strategy and the vision. Because that took so long

unfortunately a lot of us who were a part of the process had to seek alternative income and employment.

Probably now things are getting back on track but unfortunately the CWL is still not at the stage where it

would wholly support larger family involvement and employment at this stage (Tim Hartman pers. comm. 28

July 2009).

For the foreseeable future, George and Shirley Trevorrow will remain the backbone of the enterprise.

The CWL must now meet loan repayment obligations to IBA. The pressure of meeting loan repayments is a

new stress for the Trevorrows and it will present a challenge to improve business practices. Particular focus is

required on a more proactive marketing effort and improved service quality and delivery to the more upmarket

clientele now within the reach of the business.

Business viability now becomes an even greater issue as the focus shifts from serving a small but regular

bus/tour market for a brief, half-day experience to catering to accommodated clients. This will require cleaning

and maintenance of facilities to a higher standard and a 24 hour a day, seven day a week commitment. This

greatly increases the servicing workload of the enterprise and may test the current capacity of the family.

Most importantly, marketing will be critical. There is no guarantee that the arrangements with Gunya

Coorong and Diverse Travel will deliver sufficient client flows to sustain the business. Many of the missed

opportunities highlighted in this report for broadening the potential market for the CWL will need to be seized in

the short-term future for the CWL to be able to ensure its ongoing viability.

Mentoring provided by Caroline Densley of Diverse Travel through the BRPIT program finished 30 April

2009. This program is no longer being funded. This is disappointing because it is now at this moment that the

CWL has its full business capacity that it could most benefit from the advice and support that this program

offered. This also highlights the often inconsistent approach of governments in supporting Indigenous Australian

enterprise development which results in the patchy record of success.

The CWL still remains in a precarious position as it tries to capitalise on the new accommodation units and

conference facility. While it is clear that the CWL has numerous strengths and opportunities especially now that

it has more complete facilities to offer to tourists, the weaknesses highlighted within this report stubbornly

remain and the threats to the enterprise are potentially significant.

When asked about the future, Trevorrow stated:

Oh look I'm certainly worried. I know we must create a fair bit of business through the next so many years

now to keep up those repayments [to IBA], and so it does worry me. It worries me because we were left

swinging so long by SATC; otherwise the first offer we had for financial support from IBA would have been

all grant money. The cost of the frustrating delay created by SATC meant IBA policy changed and then we

had a loan component to IBA‘s offer of support. Because of that time—it just took so long—so now we‘re in

the position where we have to repay a loan. We‘re making repayments at the moment; that's okay. I

understand how more important it is now to keep a regular flow of people through here, just to be able to do

that, and with all the other costs of running a business—with your tax commitments, your power, water, all

those sorts of issues, they're all major things to deal with (pers. comm. 18 July 2009).


64

Another frustrating result of the long delay in securing the accommodation units is the disastrous decline in

the state of the natural environment. When first envisioned, the CWL was nestled in a unique environment and

as Trevorrow stated ―we built here on the basis that we‘re on a beautiful pristine area of the Coorong‖ (pers.

comm. 18 July 2009). Due to over-allocation of water resources in the Murray-Darling Basin system and

prolonged drought, the southern lagoon of the Coorong is hyper-saline and has been described as ―dead‖ and the

migratory species of birds that the Coorong normally hosts are declining drastically in numbers.26

Now this

ecological catastrophe is a major issue for the CWL and the Ngarrinderji people:

The Ngarrindjeri people are really concerned about the state of the Coorong, and not only the Coorong

but also the Lakes and the Murray River. We‘re having a hell of a time at the moment trying to work

through those issues, environmentally, culturally and spiritually. There are a whole range of issues that

affect the Ngarrindjeri people‘s environment, and there's so many different ways which government is

talking about trying to fix the problem and we are trying to get them to listen to us about how to fix it

(George Trevorrow pers. comm. 18 July 2009).

In terms of the business, Trevorrow stated that the environmental issues are significant:

Well that certainly worries me tremendously. That's another side of things that we‘ll have to monitor day

by day, and to see where we‘re heading with that, how successful this can be is in actual fact. We built

here on the basis that we‘re on a beautiful pristine area of the Coorong; where there's not much traffic,

there's no boating, there's hardly anything here, it's really a wilderness area, the southern lagoon, and if

we‘re going to lose that, well then we‘ve lost everything that we built this for … You know, a little while

back we could hardly do a kayaking tour, there was that little water here. We had to drag our kayaks for

about 100 metres to find enough water to float in. Not only is this a key issue from a Ngarrindjeri

perspective, but also from a business perspective (pers. comm. 18 July 2009).

For Trevorrow the most outstanding obstacle to his attempts to build a successful tourism enterprise in the

CWL is the unaddressed issue of land title for Aboriginal people. He sees this as a barrier to his efforts to

build a viable business and to then pass the business on to his children:

Although it drives me mad, because I want my boys here—they're fully qualified, they're fully trained,

they can deal with any client in the world— but, I can't be hard on them either with the knowledge that

they could work for years like I have, and still be in my position at the end of the day of never have any

ownership of this place. If I had the title to it, I'm sure they'd be here working with me; with the

knowledge that, when Shirley and I get to a point in time we could quite happily say ―We‘re moving out

now kids, we want you to take this place on‖ and that could happen. But in the current system, we can't

do that. That's where we keep falling back to that same issue all the time: you can't pass it on to your

kids, you can't get loans, you can't get joint venture partners, you can't do anything, unless that title issue

is solved. That's the position we‘re in (George Trevorrow pers. comm. 18 July 2009).

Trevorrow‘s final words for closing this project are:

So I think in closing this epilogue, we should note the necessity for change within government to make it

possible for Aboriginal people to really experience the full extent of business. This has to be with land

title; otherwise you can't experience this without proper titles. I‘d like to say—I always say— there are

enough legal minds around today to ensure the protection and the integrity of holding onto lands for

Aboriginal people without having to have the system we have now. There can be a system set up where

Aboriginal people still hold title, but there could be a first point of sale back to a particular body or

particular government; there are ways to avoid the risk of losing the land for Aboriginal people in the

future. The point is we must be in a position like that of any other Australian in being able to run a

business and pass it on to our children (George Trevorrow pers. comm. 18 July 2009).

26 See http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2008/s2633510.htm.



65

APPENDIX A: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Organisation or affiliation at the

time of involvement with the CWL

Name, current role Location, date of interview

CWL George Trevorrow, Founder &

Manager

CWL, 4 September 2006

CWL Tim Hartmann, Administrator &

Guide

CWL, 4 September 2006

SATC Craig Grocke, Tourism

Development Officer

SATC 15 November 2006

SATC Carroll Karpany, Industry

Advisor Aboriginal Tourism

SATC 16 November 2006

SATC Michael Geddes, General

Manager of Tourism

Development

SATC, 16 November 2006

Wayward Bus Ralph Jackson, Owner Adelaide, 18 November 2006

SATC Bill Spurr, CEO SATC, 18 December 2006

SATC Chris Burchett, Regional

Support Manager

SATC, 20 December 2006

Diverse Travel Kirsti O‘Brien, Co-owner Adelaide, 28 January 2007

MLCS Corporate Paul Case, Director Adelaide, 11 January 2007

TAFE Sue Atkins, Trainer Adelaide, 22 January 2007

Ron Flavel Consulting Services Ron Flavel, business consultant Adelaide, 19 February 2007


Manager

CWL, 4 April 2007

Camp Coorong and NLPA Tom Trevorrow, Manager,

Cultural Educator, Chairperson

of NLPA

Camp Coorong, 4 April 2007

Camp Coorong Ellen Trevorrow, Cultural Camp Coorong, 4 April 2007


66

Educator

University of South Australia Joan Gibbs, Lecturer in School

of Natural & Built

Environments

Adelaide, 20 April 2007

Diverse Travel Caroline Densley, Director and

Co-owner

Adelaide, 15 January 2007

Email, 13 May 2009

IBA Cheryl Ross, Senior Economic

Development Officer

Adelaide, 19 February 2007

SATC Michelle Hocking, Manager of

Regional Marketing

SATC, 5 April 2007

TPY CDEP Bill van der Stelt, Manager Murray Bridge, 9 May 2007

Formerly an independent tour

operator/guide/consultant –

developing programs with

Osprey Wildlife expeditions

Joc Schmiechen Adelaide, 31 May 2007


Manager

CWL, 7 June 2007


Manager

CWL, 3 June 2009


Manager

CWL, 18 July 2009

CWL Georgina Trevorrow,

Administrator

CWL, 18 July 2009

Formerly of CWL Tim Hartman, Former

Administrator & Guide

Phone, 28 July 2009



67

APPENDIX B: DESIGN PLANS FOR TOURISM FACILITIES AND

ACCOMMODATION FOR THE CWL 1997–2008

This appendix communicates the timeline and some key events in the development of infrastructure for

the CWL and provides both site layouts and accommodation unit designs by the various builders and

architects commissioned for such plans.

The story of the Coorong Wilderness Lodge is embedded in the vision of George Trevorrow who wanted the

tourism facilities created at the CWL to capture the spirit and sense of place of the Coorong and through these

facilities impart this Ngarrindjeri vision to visiting tourists. This appendix is intended to supplement the content

of Chapter 3 and demonstrate through these various commissioned designs the long drawn out process of

establishing this enterprise. In particular these materials are intended to demonstrate the frustrating interactions

that Trevorrow endured for a number of years with less than responsive government officials, planners and

regulators. We have found this to be the essence of the story. In particular, it is worth noting the transition from

accommodation units that were culturally meaningful to designs representing pragmatic architectural plans that

Trevorrow saw as ―square boxes‖ and ―galvanised iron shelters‖ only to finally come back full circle to

Trevorrow‘s original vision for a design based on characteristics meaningful for Ngarrindjeri. This is well

illustrated by this selection of plans and designs presented here.

B1 Iain Greenwood’s design of CWL tourism facilities This was a concept plan based on the dome-shaped dwellings called “pulgi” that the Ngarrindjeri used as semi-

permanent shelters. Greenwood‘s plan indicates extensive plantings around each unit. It was from this first plan

that the concept of hexagonal shaped units evolved as a way of achieving the desired dome-shape of the pulgi

concept.

B2a Ken Latona site plan

Latona was commissioned by MLCS to flesh out the concept plans in more detail. According to Trevorrow,

Latona was one of the few architects/designers who listened to him and tried to implement his vision of the

dwellings into a practical design that would communicate a sense of place. Latona‘s comment in a letter of 1996

demonstrates the efforts he went to accomplish this: ― Arriving at the concept for the proposal has been a

difficult and demanding process and I need to find out if the Trevorrows feel that the interpretation of the ‗pulgi‘

form is appropriate before finalising the concept‖ (Ken Latona, letter 14 November 1996). Latona was one of the

few architects/ designers that showed a willingness to listen to Trevorrow, incorporate his wishes into his

presented designs and respond with empathy to his requirements. Latona‘s skills had been honed by creating

environmentally sensitive tourism developments, most notably in Tasmania. Unfortunately, Latona‘s services

were not engaged subsequent to his development of the initial concept plans shown here.

B2b Ken Latona’s 1995 design of accommodation unit This unit demonstrates the fish shape design that resonates with Ngarrindjeri connections to ―Ponde‖ or the

Murray cod that features in a significant Ngarrindjeri dreaming.

B2c Ken Latona’s side view of unit 1995

This design demonstrates how well suited and low key this design concept is for the Coorong environment.

B3 Jim Wilson site plan showing hexagonal units 1997

This was the first plan to utilise the hexagonal shape for the accommodation units.

B4 Total Kit Homes hexagonal unit design 1998

Total Kit Homes provided an initial design and costing for a hexagonal unit that tried to capture some of the

elements of the Ngarrindjeri traditional shelters. To a degree Trevorrow was in agreement with this approach and

keen to get some structures in place to get the business started. Costed at around $10,000 to $14,000 each, these

units were an inexpensive option and a marked contrast to the cost of the final units constructed in 2009. As the


68

process stretched out and ongoing modifications were proposed the building cost escalated to $25,000 in 2002 in

a quote provided by Burrundies (design not included in this Appendix).

B5a Sims Architects site plan (commissioned by SATC) 2004

B5b Sims Architects unit design (commissioned by SATC) 2004

From 2002, there was ongoing disagreement over the design of the accommodation units and the positioning of

the parking for the units. This site plan shows the car parking sited at some distance from the units which

Trevorrow opposed because of the frequent inclement weather experienced at the Coorong. Additionally, the

contract for the design for the accommodation was linked to the highway entrance landscaping and information

bay. The fact that ongoing disagreement over the unit designs blocked the development of the entrance bay

resulted in a significant loss of capacity to attract the passing road traffic with negative consequences for CWL‘s

profits. Sims was SATC‘s preferred project architect and they provided a series of design concepts that failed to

meet Trevorrow‘s demands and which he refused to approve. Sims‘ accommodation unit concept employed a

galvanised iron and mini-orb design considered an icon of Australiana; this was however unacceptable to

Trevorrow who viewed them as ―tin boxes‖.

B6a Phil Burton site plan 2005–06

B6b Phil Burton design of tourism facilities 2005–06

To add further confusion to an already complex situation, DEEWR had commissioned John Moriaty to act as a

special mentor to a number of Indigenous businesses including the CWL. As part of this project, and without

consultation with the SATC (who were driving the infrastructural development process of the CWL at this

stage), Moriaty commissioned Phil Burton to draft yet another site plan and unit design for the CWL. In this

design, parking was sited beside each accommodation unit.

B7 McCracken Homes fish-shaped units 2006 McCracken Homes presented a unit design which returned to the fish-shape that Trevorrow had advocated years

earlier. It was then agreed by both Trevorrow and SATC that these fish-shaped units were the preferred design

concept. A number of tenderers were approached to provide competitive bids for developing the final design to

be implemented (see B9).

B8a Architectural Services design of units (commissioned by TPY) 2007 TPY adapted the Sims plan refining the fish-shaped design of the cabins demonstrating that Trevorrow‘s vision

was a feasible option at a realistic costing.

B8b Architectural Services site plan (commissioned by TPY) 2007 TPY placed the car parks for the units by each unit as Trevorrow required.

B9 Page showing the concept designs of the 4 tenders considered by SATC for building

the accommodation units 2007 By April 2007, four tenders had been submitted to SATC for consideration as the design plans for the CWL

accommodation units (McCracken Homes and Architectural Services included within this appendix and designs

by Design Z and Chapman Homes which have not been included in this appendix). SATC presented an analysis

of the pros and cons of each tender and both the TPY commissioned design presented by Architectural Services

and the McCracken Homes design proved competitive on price per unit ($84,250 and $78,350 respectively).

TPY‘s commissioned design had in its favour the use of Ngarrindjeri labour to build the infrastructure. However,

McCracken homes was selected as the preferred tender because the of the good aesthetics of the fish-shaped

design at a reasonable costing and also because going with TPY was perceived as risky because its CDEP

funding was endangered as the CDEP program was in the process of being dismantled by the Commonwealth

government. In the final plan implemented in March 2008, the parking was located next each unit and the final

fish-shaped design was refined and agreed upon by both SATC and Trevorrow. This entailed the external fish

artwork shown in the McCracken design being omitted when the units were built.

B1 Iain Greenwood’s design of CWL tourism facilities

B2a Ken

Latona site plan 1995


70

B2b Ken Latona’s 1995 design of accommodation unit


72

B2c Ken Latona’s side view of unit 1995

B3 Jim Wilson Site Plan showing hexagonal units 1997


74

B4 Total Kit Homes hexagonal unit design 1998

B5a Sims Architects site plan (commissioned by SATC) 2004


76

B5b Sims Architects unit design (commissioned by SATC)

2004



77

B6a Phil Burton site plan 2005–06


78

B6b Phil Burton design of tourism facilities 2005–06



79

B7 McCracken Homes fish-shaped units 2006


80

B8a Architectural Services design of units (commissioned by TPY) 2007



81

B8b Architectural Services site plan (commissioned by TPY) 2007


82

B9 Page showing the concept designs of the 4 tenders considered by SATC for building

the accommodation units 2007

APPENDIX C: SATC’S ‘SOUTH AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINAL

CULTURAL EXPERIENCES’ BROCHURE (2001)



85


86

APPENDIX D: PHOTOS

Work site for the units



87

Accommodation units under construction 2008


88

Individual unit under construction



89

New entrance off the Princes Highway 2007

Close up of one of the panels of the entrance bay


90

George Trevorrow at the planned building site for the units (photo: Caroline Densley)



91

References

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Authors

Freya Higgins-Desbiolles Freya Higgins-Desbiolles is a lecturer in tourism with the School of Management, University of South Australia.

Freya is an active researcher in the area of tourism management and has several publications in top quality

journals and books. She serves on the editorial board of the Journal of International Volunteer Tourism and

Social Development and is on the advisory boards of the International Institute for Peace through Tourism

(Australian chapter) and the Ecumenical Coalition on Tourism. She has a keen interest in sustainable Indigenous

tourism and has worked with the Ngarrindjeri community on tourism for ten years. Current research projects

include Indigenous tourism, tourism policy and planning, the politics of tourism and alternative tourisms.

Email: [email protected]

Joc Schmiechen As Senior Research Fellow in Indigenous Tourism, with Charles Darwin University and the Sustainable Tourism

Cooperative Research Centre (STCRC), Joc developed a research agenda for Indigenous tourism for the group of

University and Industry partners comprising the STCRC. He has had extensive government and industry

experience in the Aboriginal and special interest tourism sectors throughout Australia. He developed a particular

interest in small operators and businesses working in regional and remote locations. This was coupled with an

ongoing concern about tourism impacts and developing sustainable practices in how we best use our natural and

cultural assets in tourism. He has worked extensively at the ‗grass roots‘ level with Aboriginal operators

throughout Australia and has a long commitment to furthering their aspirations.

Email: [email protected]

George Trevorrow George Trevorrow is the founder/owner/manager of the Coorong Wilderness Lodge in South Australia. He is a

Ngarrindjeri Elder who is well-respected for his role in the development of Indigenous Australian tourism. In the

early 1990s he initially served as the Chairman of the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Tourism

Reference Group and then became the first elected Chairman of the fledgling Aboriginal Tourism Operators

Association. Additionally, George is recognised for his leadership role in the Ngarrindjeri community and is a

respected cultural educator. He founded Camp Coorong Race Relations and Cultural Education Centre and

serves as Rupelle of the Ngarrindjeri Tendi and Chair of the Ngarrindjeri Regional Authority.


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2009_Tech report Cover 26.6.09.indd 2 23/11/2009 10:45:21 AM

Sustainable Tourism Cooperative Research Centre (STCRC) is established under the Australian Government’s Cooperative Research Centres Program.

STCRC is the world’s leading scientific institution delivering research to support the sustainability of travel and tourism—one of the world’s largest and fastest growing industries.

IntroductionSTCRC has grown to be the largest dedicated tourism research organisation in the world, with $187 million invested in tourism research programs, commercialisation and education since 1997.

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