In this interesting work in Applied Philosophy. Dr. Oyeshiledemonstrates the relevance of existentialist philosophy to the onerous,but necessary, task of managing ethnic conflicts and the challenge ofestablishing stable and functional political communities in Africa. Forhim:

conflict resolution has an ontological basis,which requires that we consider others asends in themselves not as mere means to thesatisfaction of our own desires. It is when wetreat others as persons and. ends likeourselves within the context of democraticvalues, such as justice, power-sharing,equitable allocation of resources, goodgovernance and integrity in public office, thatwe can resolve ethnic conflicts and engendersustainable development in Africa.

Here indeed is a fresh insight into one ofthe crucial probleins militatingagainst African development in the contemporary world. .

Dr. Olatunji A. Oyeshile is a lecturer in the Department of Philosophy,University ofIbadan. He has published several articles in both nationaland international learned journals. He is the author of A Compendium 0/ .Philosophical and Political Quotations (1998) and co-author ofElements of Philosophy and Logic (1997). He was a columnist with TheObserver newspaper, Benin (1995-1996), and a former Lecturer in theDepartment of Philosophy, Edo State University, Ekpoma.

ISBN 978-80801-3-8

Hope Publicationslbadan. Nigeria.

iRECONCILING THE SELF

WITH THE OTHEti

+AN EH I STENTI AL 1ST PERSPECTI UE ON

,

THE MANAGEMENT OF ETHN I C CONFL I CTSIN

AFRICA

.•Reconciling the Self with the Other:

• An Existentialist Perspective on the Management ofEthnic Conflicts in Africa

Olatunji A. Oyeshile

Hope Publications.Ibadan, Nigeria

CONIENTSFirst Published 2005 byHope Publications Ltd.

GAAF Building110-112,OyoRoad

P.O.Box22331University Post Office

Ibadan, Nigeria

Acknowledgements . 6

Preface .' . 7

Introduction. ... ... .. 9

The Nigerian Socio-political Situation ,.... 14

© Olatunji A. Oyeshile Colonialism and Ethnicity in Africa '" 21

ISBN978-8080-l3-8An Existentialist Perspective on Conflict

Management . 25

All rights reserved. No part of this publication maybe reproduced, stored in a retrieval system ortransmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,without the prior permission of the publisher.

Resolving Ethnic Conflicts in Africa ThroughThe Existentialist Framework . 30

Management of Ethnic Conflicts for sustainableDevelopment in Africa . 44

References. .................. ........ .. .............. 47

Printed by: Omoade Printing Press, Box 22761, Tel: 080-23790165,080-32203113, Ibadan.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Today, it is no longer news that the African continentparades the highest number of failed states. Look at Sudan(particularly Darfur region), Cote D'Ivoire, Democratic Republicof Congo, Zimbabwe, Nigeria (especially on agitation for resourcecontrol), Burundi, Sierra Leone and Angola. In many of thesestates things continue to fall apart, leaving the centre less cohesive.The causes are also as diverse as the people - colonialism, ethnicity,corruption, bad leadership, bad followership and militarism. Whatis the way forward, since development, growth, acquisition ofknowledge and unity are values cherished by the human race whichincludes Africans?

Our work tackles the problem of ethnic conflicts which isone ofth~ maj~r causes of oWstate ofunderdevelopment in Africa. .Ethnicity whether construed as a natural or artificial (mythical)configuration is a phenomenon that has not only come to stay withus, but has largely defined our social relations as Africans. Inaddressing this issue we adopt an existentialistperspective of inter-subjectivity noting that one of the major causes of ethnic conflictsin Africa is our inability to reconcile the' self', which could be aparticular.ethnic group, with the 'other', which are invariably theother ethnic groups. We draw existentialist paradigms from theworks of Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Martin Buber and Gabriel Marcel to' show that the notion ofinterdependence construed as dialogue, sharing, mutuality and co-operation are germane and shouldbe tbe basisof inter-ethnic relations.

Wecondudethatconflict reso~onhas anontologicalbass, whichrequiresthatwe considerothersas~aslnthemselvesnot asmeremeansto the satisfaction of our own desires. It is when we treat others aspersons and ends like ourselveswitbinthecontextofdemoCraticva1ues,suchasjustice,power-sharing, equitableallocationof resources, goodgovernance and integrity in public office, that we can-resolve ethnicconflicts and engender sustainable development in Africa.

PREFACE

The strong urge that one can make meaning from theprevalent absurdity of human existence has prompted the writingof this treatise on the problem of ethnic conflicts with a view toproffering solutions from the existentialist perspective. I thank myteachers and colleagues in the Department ofPhilosophy, UniversityofIbadan, for providing an amicable working environment. Myprofound gratitude also goes to my present and former studentsat the SS Peter and Paul Major Seminary, Bodija; DominicanInstitute of Philosophy, Samonda and University ofIbadan, forconfronting me with the challenge of applying my research inexistentialism to practical problems of existence.

My wife, Bisi, and children, Tobi, Tolu and Tomi, haveprovided the unflinching support to a deviant husband and Dad inhis inquires into the absurdity, paradoxes and contradictions ofhuman existence. I thank God for his favour and mercies. Finally,this work is dedicated to "all victims of ethnic conflicts and allthose who believe in the oneness of humanity" .

Olatunji A. OyeshileNoy. 2005

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Nation-states we may call them, but recent ethnicconflicts in most parts of African states clearly reflect

that these states are far from attaining the nationhood status.Unending postulations regarding reasons and solutions to theuner:~g crisisin African states seem to have had no lasting effects.Onemaj or reasonwhy this has been the case is that theoreticianson political conflicts in Africa have ignored the role of the humanconsciousness or the human Cogito, the I or the Self, inhumansocial organisation. This role can be discerned in the variousattempts by the existentialist thinkers to situate the Cogito or theauthentic individual in interpersonal relationship.

Contrary to the popularly held opinion that existentialist ethics.eromotes only the indivi~als selfish desires, existentialist ethicsprlvides a good fr+ork for the achievement of the common.good. It therefore encompasses a viable framework for resolving. conflicts at various levels. It is perhaps Friedrich Nietzsche thatcan be said to provide an extreme individualist ethics. But athorough perusal ofNietzsche's works shows that he was reactingagainst the unjust moral and religious dispositions ~fhis time, byemphasising the need to save the individualfrom the overwhelminginfluence of the society in order to promote the vital element inman - the will to power. Our attempt in this work is to extrapolatecertain eiements in the works of some existentialist philosopherslike Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Buber and Marcel as meansof resolving ethnic conflicts in Africa.

The Nature of Ethnic Conflicts in AfricaThere is no controversy as to who an African is, But when

we move away from this general tag it becomes veryunsettling to

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OLATUNfl A. OYESIDLE

,.. determine who a Nigerian or Sudanese or Cote D ,Ivoirean or aZambian is. Let us recall the case of Abduraham Shugaba inNigeria's second republic who was deported from Nigeriaallegebly for not being a citizen of Nigeria. The case of one timepresident of Zambia, Dr Keneth Kaunda, who in the nick ofanother election was declared a citizen of Malawi and the case ofAlhassanQuatara ofCote'Devoire who once held the position ofPrime Minister but was declared a foreigner lately, are a fewinstances of the problem and politics of ethnic dramatisation inAfiica. Colonialand Militaryincursioninto theAfiican bodypolitichave fuelled the flames of ethnicity,to the extent that the concept'ethnicity' has come to be identified with the ignoble,backwardness, conflict and underdevelopment.

Let us note that ethnicity itself is as primordial as humanevolution sincepeople areborn into specificcultures within certainpolitical and geographical space. But why has this concept beenused in such a way that it has become an albatross in pur path todevelopment, causing large scale conflicts that have resultedinto the decimation of human lives and the dissipation ofeconomic and other resources? Conflicts, we should also note,are an ever-present human phenomenon that has to be managedat all levels. The problematic inherent here is simply due to theways ethnic conflicts have been managed, which we believeare highly inadequate because they leave the human elementout,by focusing primarily on political, legal and economicstructures.

We cannot controvert the fact that ethnic conflicts haveresulted in gross underdevelopment in most parts ofthe Africancontinent. Looking at Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan,one can only visualise horror in the face of ethnic conflicts.Nigeria too is not extricated from this scenario considering the •countries civil war between 1967 and ·1970, and the variousskirmishes among various ethnic groups in Nigeria in recenttimes. A glance at Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of

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RECONCILING THE SELFWTIHTHE OTHER

Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola and Cote D'Ivoire, tomention a few instances, show that ethnicity itself is thespringboard for human and material destruction. The Hutusand Tutsis spread within Rwanda, Burundi and DemocraticRepublic of Congo, have been engaged in conflicts which, withinthe last few decades, have resulted into millions of deaths. Yetthere seems to be no end to such conflicts. Peace talks and

. negotiations based on political solutions seem to always fail. Inthis kind of situation development can only exist in theimagination of the people not in actual experience.

Apart from deaths and wanton destruction of life andproperty there has been stagnation in terms of human resourcesdevelopment as well as material development. The educationof the children in particular has suffered. Scientific andtechnological advancement has also been truncated in mostcases. The Sudanese case is a typical example. The warbetween the Khartoum Muslim! Arab led government andSouthern Christian/Animist black led by John Garrang wenton for as many as twenty one years, with the southern part ofSudan experiencing no development in both human and materialspheres. The list of such stagnation in Africa cannot beexhausted.

We then ask: What are the causes of ethnic conflicts?Scholars of various shades of opinion have come up with

. different reasons for ethnic conflicts: Two major factors havebeen adduced for these conflicts. These are the control ofpolitical power and struggle over economic resources. Thetwo are related in the sense that in a multi-ethnic state, theethnic group that controls the political power invariably controlseconomic resources, whether or not the resources are foundwithin the region of the dominating unit. These problems ofcontrol of political power and lopsided distribution of economicresources subsequently lead to marginalisation of some groups

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or ontright cheating of other groups in the authoritative allocationof resources. This trend is noticeable in Liberia, Somalia,Nigeria, Sudan, Congo, Rwanda and Burundi. (See Nnoli, 1980;Ekeh, 1975; Summer, 1959).

The likelihood of conflicts in a multi-ethnic society wherethere is injustice in the allocation of resources and the sharingof political power is on the high side and this often leads toethnocentricism, which is a tendency to project one's owngroup as the centre of everything desirable while neglectingother groups. Such ethnocentricism often leads to deep-rootedprejudice on the part of the domineering and dominated groups.G.W. Allport in his book The Nature of Prejudice has outlined'five types of features that are likely to be displayed by aprejudiced person towards another. These are:.!. One, negative remarks. This means that a person speaks

disparagingly about the group that he dislikes.•:. Two, avoidance. This means that a prejudiced person tries

to shun anyone who does not belong to his group .•:. Three, discrimination. This means that a prejudiced person

often excludes members of the maligned group from certaintypes of employment,places of residence, or socialprivileges.

.:. Four, physical attack. The prejudiced person often becomesa party to violence,which is designed to intimidate the peoplehe has come to hate.

.:. Five, extermination.The prejudiced person often participatesin lynchings, massacres, or extermination programmes.(Awake!, Sept. 8,2004: 5).These features can be said to have featured in the Nazi's

attack on the Jews in Germany in the mid-Zu'" century, theconflict in Yugoslavia and the current crisis in Burundi, CoteD'Ivoire and the Sudanese Dafour region where as at March2005, 70,000 people had been killed and 2 million peopledisplaced.

I!

Apart from the reasons stated above, colonialism and itsconsequences have been taken as another major factorresponsible for the present ethnic-crisis situation in most partsof Africa. Let us have a further insight into the problem ofcolonialismin Africa, starting our analysiswith the Nigerian socoi-political situation.

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Chief Obafemi Awolowo describes thus: "Nigeria, as a geo-political entity, is an artificial creation of British Imperialism".Nigeria, as the most populous black nation, has three major ethnicgroups, namely: the HausaiFulani, the Igbo and the Yoruba.There are about 250 other smaller ethnic groups such as theTivs, Idoma, Ijaw, Itsekiri, Urbobo, Nupes and Junkuns. Thereis also a multiplicity oflanguages running into hundreds.

Given the above configuration of the Nigerian State, wecan only talk of factions, if appropriate at all, under the guiseof North and South, Muslims and Christians. But in recenttimes these classifications do not hold rigidly as Nigerians haveinterpenetrated themselves and intermingled in terms ofmarriage, economic preoccupations (trade), religon, politicaland socio-cultural ties. However, politicians (whether in militaryuniform or civilian robes) play up these artificial divisions forpoliticai reasons, especially when there are hotly contestednational issues.

Before delving into the analysis of recent socio-politicalsituation in Nigeria, we want to look at some of the contentionsof some ethnic groups that make up the Nigerian entity. It isinteresting to note that the three major groups (HausalFulani,Igbo and Yoruba) who most often than not pretend to representthe interest of the minority groups are propelled rby their urgeto dominate and further the interest of their kinsmen within thepolity. For instance, the HausalFulani believe not only thatthey are more in population but also that they are lagging behindthe Igbo and Yoruba in terms of educational development andcommerce. So they do everything possible to control thepoitical machinery and determine who rules the nation. TheIgbos, on their part, believe that the Nigeria-Biafra civil war(1967-1970) brought untold hardship to their kinsmen and thatmost parts of the Eastern region are underdeveloped. Addedto this is the inability of the Igbos to rise to the position of head

THE NIGERIAN SOCIO-POLITICAL SITUATION

An appraisal of the socio-political situationinNigeria mayonly be appropriate more in descriptive 'rather than in

evaluative terms as the Nigerian polity seems to be an enigmaticphenomenon. This is not only due to the complex nature of thevarious nationalities within the Nigerian nation, but also becauseof the ever anomalous hydra-headed socio-political problemswhich seem to be unamenable to easy and lasting solutions sincethe formal independence of the country in 1960. The followingaccounts will show how the problems of the Nigerian nation arean epitome of the general African predicament, a continent in direneed of sustainable development.

Nigeria is a country with multi-faceted socio-politicalproblems. The problems range from ethnicity,class-stratification,corruption, and religious violence to unmitigated poverty, whichhas compounded the plight of the common man. These problemsdid not just emerge overnight. They have their history in the forcedamalgamation of the Southern andNorthern protectorates by LordLugard in 1914, the unholy alliance that subsequentlymetamorphosed into the Nigeria state. This has made it difficultto experience sustainable development in Nigeria in the sense of"expanding and adaptive capacity of the society in'satisfying thematerial and cultural needs of its members" (Irele, 1993: 15)

The Nigerian nation is often construed to be made up of theNorthern Muslims and Southern Christians. However, there aretraditional believers who apart from being in the majority belongeither to the Islamic and Christian religions. British imperialistsused the missionaries and British trade companies to penetrateinto the different nationalities ofNigeria. The result of this is what

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OLATUNJI A. OYESHILE ImCONCll..ING THE SELF WITH THE OTHER

At' his swearing-in on May 29, 1999, President OlusegunObasanjo raised the hope of Nigerians, especially through hispromise to restore the country's glory. On October 1~l 1999, thepresident in his speech emphasised the essential ingredients ofnational development. According to him, social progress whichwe allyearn for requires more than the construction of roads, thebuilding of schools, the supply of electricity, water, etc. For allthese social amenities to be sustainable, they need a moralfoundation. This presupposes that a society is as good as thequality of its moral underpinning (Oladipo, 2000: 64):.

What the above implies is that there is need for an ethicalbasis for addressing the multi-faceted problems of the Nigeriannation. But almost four years after president Obasanjo made thisdetermined speech little or no progress has been made. Thereasons for these are obvious. According to Oladipo, where themoral underpinning is strong and resilent the society survives andthrives but where it is weak and fragile, the society's capacity forsocial progress becomes impaired. There is no doubt that Nigeriais more of an example of the latter phenomenon than.the former(Oladipo, 2000: 65).

The campaign for a national rebirth by President Obasanj 0

seems not to have addressed the problem of social relationshipswhich Nigerians have establishedamong themselves over the years.The fact is that the predominant social relationships, especially atthe level of governance (Federal-State- Local governments), havebeen authoritarian, oppressive and exploitative (Ibid.) These kindsof relationship have rather produced different kinds of socialpathologies which do not support the ingredientsof social progress.The effects ofthese have made corruption to be rampant, whileethnic and other social conflicts abound. This situation hasinvariably restricted the functions of government purely to that ofcrisis management to the exclusion of the pursuit of the publicgood.

Let us, for instance, take the issue of ethnicity which has

17

of state or president of the country. This is a developmentthey see as punishment for their role inthe civil war.

In the.caseofthe Yoruba they believe that the federation hasnot been fair to them in the allocation of federal resources and thatthe Federal Character Principle works against their interest asmany oftheir qualified hands are not either appointed or in somecases admitted intohigher institutionssincetheyhave more qualifiedcandidates than their federal quota allows. They are also recentlyembittered by the annulment of June 12, 1993presidentialelection,which one of their kinsmen, ChiefM.K. O. Abiola, 'won. Hence,they question the basis of their remaining in the Nigeria nation,

The minority groups also have their grievances. The mostprominent is the agitation in the Niger-Delta over the control ofpetroleum resources. Their basic argument is that this zone, whichproduces about 90% of the nations wealth, has been neglected.Apart from this, there is massive environmental degradation as aresult of the activitiesofforeign oil prospecting companies such as

. Shell. Hence, agitations by the Ogoni, the Ijaw and even theUrhobo youths are a manifestation 'of injustice of the NigerianState. Apart from the issue of natural resources, there have beenother conflicts among various groups, particuarly ,over land. Inthis regard, we can talk about Itsekiri, Urhobo and Ijaw (South-South) skirmishes, .Tiv versus Junkuns (North), Ife versusModakeke (South West), Aguleri versus Omuleri (SouthEast)conflicts. All these are a pointer to the fact that the people havenot really seen the need to put behind them their differences andlive together as one people. This has even resulted in the call fora Sovereign National Conference, which some Nigerian leaderssee as something inimicalto the corporate existence of the nation.

Having identified the major contentions and the relativepositions of various groups that make up the Nigerian polity, wewant to refocus on the current attempts at engendering a stablesocial order, especially from the inception of new democraticgovernment in 1999.

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resulted inmany conflicts and agitations. There have been clashesbetween the Igbos and Hausas, the Yoruba and Hausas, the Ijawand Itsekiris to mention a few. These conflicts and agitations havealso resulted inthe formation of ethnic militiaand pressure groupssuch as Oduduwa peoples congress (OPC) in the South West,the Egbesu boys, andNiger-Delta youths (South-South), Afenifere(South-West) Ohaneze Ndigbo (South-East), Arewa PeoplesCongress (APC) in the North, among others. These groups havepursued issues ranging from power shift, the Sharia Islamic legalsystem, oil derivation, the off-shore!on-shore oil dichotomy, theNational Identity Card registration, privatization policy of thegovernment to the convocation of a sovereignnational conference.

This ethnic configurationhas resulted in the weakening of thefederal government. According to Odugbemi, ethnic identity hasresulted in a low levelallegianceto state authority. Several peopleand groups are overtly challengingthe state authority through allsorts of Militias (2001: 69). It has become the case that issues ofnational interest are no longer considered on their merits but onhow they affect the ethnic groups. A good case IS the attitude ofNigerians to the annulment of the June 12, 1991, presidentialelection which was purported to have been won by ChiefM.K.O.Abiola from the South-West of the country. According toOguejiofor, the North did not support a revisit of the June 12.1993 election simply because it controls the presidency. But thiscouldhavebeen the attitude of others lackinga senseof community.This is because:

has been a major obstacle to democracy, progress anddevelopment inAfrica. But sinceit is difficultto reverse our ethnicalignments and configurations, we must try as much as possible toengender a sense of community based on the principle of commongood and collective survival.

At the receiving end is the common man who is the recepientof all the by-products of antagonisms resulting from our socio-political configuration. Life indeed for the common man in Nigeriais becoming burdensome due to his inabilityto have the essentialthings oflife. In this situation corruption has almost become away of life. This is why the call for the restructuring of our bodypolity from the ethical and communal perspectives becomesimperative. According to Oladipo:

The other sections of Nigeria did not see theirinterest attacked by the cancellation of the election,while for most Yoruba who mounted serious protest,

. . it was doubtful whether they would have done soif the candidate who won the election were not ofYoruba extraction (Oguejiofor, 2000: 3)

There is no doubt then that the problem of ethnic clevages18

What is required for the renewal of hope in Nigeriaas a viable modem state is the establishment of anappropriate political' framework for mutual co-operation among the various nationalities in thecountry. (2000: 4).

Apart from this there is the need to restructure. our socialinstitutions in such a way that they willbe an effectivevanguard inthe promotion of civicvalues oftolerance, dialogue,understanding,compassion, justice, and equity (Oladipo: 2000: 4).

Our overview of the Nigerian political situation should notbe seen as patently negative. While criticising the inadequaciesof some of the policy measures of the Nigerian government,for instance, the recent increase in the prices of petroleumproducts, one should appreciate the fact that the governmentmeans well for its people. However, the measuresfor achievingits goals may not on all occasions be appropriate and realistic .

The Obasanjo administration, for instance, set up theHuman Right Violation Panel known as Oputa panel to lookinto human right abuses in Nigeria. While the panel wasdesirable, it is not clear why government has not enforced the

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. .findings of the panale, by compensating those victimized andpunishing those found guilty.We believe that mere reconciliationmay not provide the desired antidote againsthuman rightviolationsin the future.

The present effort of the Obasanjo administration Shouldalsobe seen as part of the attempt to unite and rehabilitate an ailingnation. The major problem of the administration seems to be thetask of pleasing incompatible associates that make up the Nigerianpolity. The reason is simply that what pleases a section of thecountry may be displeasing to the other. ..

The analysis of the socio-political problems ofthe Nigeriannation presented above reinforces the need for citizens in Nigeriain particular and those of other African countries' in general tolook beyond what differentiates them as a people to embracethose values that emphasize our common humanity. The viableoption in this regard then is to go back to the communal basis ofthe Africansocio-politicalorganisation and embrace the communalvalues therein. The globalisation trend is a basis for communalvalues because man cannot negotiate his security, happiness and .well-being in an isolated manner.

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COLONIALISM AND ETHNICITYIN AFRICA

Tt is an undeniable fact that colonialism brought into Africa.!new political and economic relationships. For instance

Freund correctly submitted that:

Colonialism largely destroyed the fundamentalrhythm of pre-capitalist social and economic lifewithout fully advancing a new self-sustainedprocess of accumulation (Freund, 1998:204)

The point here is that colonialism brought in capitalism in anexplosive dimension thereby creating a new class of haves andhave-nots especially through the extraction of wealth that wentoverseas. Coupled with the new political configuration which thecolonialists put inplace, the stage was rivalry and conflicts amongthe people of the colonies. Sadly enough, the political parties thatemerged after independence in most African states were autocraticand in no time most of the states became one-party states in theguise of protecting African communal kinshipvalue'system whichto many leaders of these new African states is averse to opposition.In this way, oppositions and. labour forces that fought forindependence were silenced or completely banned. For instance,this occurred in Ghana in 1961 and in Tanzania in 1964 (Freund, ,1998: 214). From this trend Freund opined further that thisbackground to African political economy brought two majordevelopmental crisis,namely:'<theproblematicrelationshipbetweenthe state and the mass ofpeople and the deteriorating condition of .the economy in the large majority of African countries" (Freund,'

, .

1998: 247).Many other distinguished scholars have addressed the

problem of ethnicity,federalism and power sharingWithinstates in21

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Africa so as to avoid the incesant conflictswithin the politybroughtabout largely by colonial configuration. (See Ake, 1996;Adekanye, 1998; Suberu 1994;Horowitz, 1994; Campbell, 1997;Ekeh 2004; Osaghae, 1992a and 1992b)

According to Adekanye (1998) Power-sharing is highlypreferable to the majoritarian principle especially in deeplyethnically divided societies as we have in Africa. This isunderstandably useful, according to Adekanye, giventhe four basiccharacteristics of power -sharing according to Arend Lijphart(1985). These are:

!.

Executive power-sharing among representativesof all significant groups; considerable internalautonomy for groups that wish it; proportionalrepresentation and proportional allocation of civilservicepositionsandpublicfunds;andthe possibilityof minority veto on vital questions. (Lijphart citedfrom Adekanye 1998: 26).

Although these characteristic features of power-sharing aredesirable, they may not work well in states with acute socio-economic inequalities. In other words, following'Lernarchand(1993), there is hardly any power-sharing arrangement that cansurvive the stresses and strains generated by profound socio-economic inequalities (See Adekanye, 1998: 33). These socio-economic inequalities, for instance, have been responsible for theconflicts between the Tutsi and Hutus in Rwanda. There is muchtension with regard to which group controls political power sincethis is a sure avenue to enjoying certain privileges.

The post-colonial situation, according to Ake (1996), hasnot fared better due to the fact that political independence only

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brought some changes in the composition of state managers whilethe lop-sidedness ofthe state character remained the same as itwas under colonialism. This no doubt intensified ethnic struggleswithin most Africanstates. In fact, the state continued to be totalistic

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in scope, constituting a statist economy. It presented itself as anapparatus ofviolence with narrow social base. It also relied oncoercion rather than authority for compliance (Ake, 1996: 3).

While many scholars are not under any illusion as to theobtrusive nature of ethnicityin African socio-politicaldispensation,a few others have attempted to trivialise the potency of ethnicity

. by seeing it as a purely invented phenomenon and therefore amyth which has been perpetuated most by colonialism (SeeBenedict Anderson, 1983; Anthony Appiah, 1992 and KolawoleOwolabi, 2003).

According to Owolabi (2003 :6) ifwe accept the argumentsof Anderson (1983) and Appiah (1992), and he thinks we shouldaccept them, that identities are neither primordial nor natural butdeliberately invented, then there is an urgent need for a de-construction of ethnicity because of its overall negative effect inAfrica. The forging of national identity is more desirable than thesustenance ofthe fictionof ethnicitybecause, according to Owolabi(2003) the nation-state is the only form oflegal and legitimateidentity and also because it is the most effective structure that canensure the desired development in Africa.

The problematics that readily come to mind with this kind ofposition on the de-construction of ethnicityare: Is it reallypossibleto de-construct ethnicity? Is it possible for a Yoruba, an Igbo oran Hausa to see himself or herself first as a Nigerian before seeinghimselfor herself as Yoruba, Igbo andHausa? What kind of nation-state are we talking about? Is it possible to gloss over ethnicity inthe quest for nation-state, since in the first instance, the concept ofnation-state presupposes diverse ethnic groups who have cometo accept certain values that bind them together as people with acommon destiny? Perhaps what we need to strive foris a nation-state that gives adequate recognition to ethnic groups and whichalso incorporates the principle of justice in organising the diversegroups within the different nation-states in Africa. .

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Owolabi (2003 :21) that there is a need for national-integration inorder to avoid the evils of ethnicity and this integration can only beachieved if we resolve the problem of injustice, especially theproblem of consistent marginalisation of some groups within apolity. Infact:

The legitimacy,survivaland integrationof a nation-. state depends on how far the state as a legalinstitutioncanperformitsprimaryroleofdistributingbenefits and burdens among groups justifiablywithout any group feelingjustifiably aggrieved.(Owolabi,2003:22). .

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AN EXIS1ENTIALISTPERSPECfIVE ONCONFLICfMANAGEMENT

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Our focus in the foregoing has been on the politicaldimension to the crisis of ethnicity.However, this focus

is too narrow. This is because it leaves out certain ontological andmoral dimensions to resolution of conflicts, which are providedby some existentialists such as Heidegger, Sartre, Buber, Marceland Merleau-Ponty. But our application of the positions of thesephilosophers can only be properly appreciated within the generalexistentialist framework, What, then, does existentialistphilosophypurport to achieve?

Existentialism is concerned with man and his existence. It is aphilosophy that takes offfrom the individual's standpoint and it isopposed to any objective, rationalistic and system buildingapproach in providing solutions to the problems of the absurditiesof life in which man is enmeshed. To many existentialists theindividual is supposed to live an authentic life by playing the roleof an actor rather than that of a spectator in the issues of life andexistence. Although existentialism has its ancestry in the works ofthe Sophists who claim that (Manis the measure of all things' andSocrates who insisted that "Man know thyself', existentialistdoctrines are better appreciated through the works ofKierkegaard,Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, MerIeau-Ponty, Jaspers, Buber,Marcel, Dostoevsky, among others.

The African situation fits in correctly into the existentialistproject for two related reasons. The first is that individuals andethnic groups are self-centred. perhaps in pursuit of a naturalinclinationto thelaw of selfpreservation anda spurious authenticity.This factor is similar to the existentialist project of'individualityand subjectivity in which the 'Cogito', 'self, 'I', 'pour-so;' or

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'Dasein' isgiven a prime ofplace in the world. The second reasonis that individualsand ethnic groups in Africa pursue their goals tothe exclusion of'the general welfare of others. This factor is atvariance with the tenet of existentialism in the sense that there is ainbuilt regulator of human freedom, which is found in inter-subjectivity. In other words, when we pursue the concept ofindividual freedom to its logical conclusion, it would be discernedthat it allows for the freedom of others inspite of impressions tothe contrary. This is found, for example, in Sartre's statement that"when I choose for myself, I also choose for others" and inHeidegger's claim that: "Dasein is not only a being-in-the-world,he is also a being-with-others" (Unah, 1996:60). Our attempt willtherefore consist in addressing the self-centredness of ethnicgroups in Africa, using the existentialist framework.

What are the features of existentialism as a philosophy oflife?These consist of the individualand his systems.intentionalitybeing and absurdity, the nature and significance of choice; the roleof extreme experiences; and the nature of communication(MacIntyre, 1967: 14).

As regards the individual and his systems, the concept oftheindividual for Kierkegaard, for example, is contrasted both withthe concepts of the stereotype and the mass. This has made somethinkers to see the existentialists as disappointed rationalists. Theexistentialists reject any conceptual system that is all embracingfor all the facts about man. Dostoevsky stresses the unpredictablecharacter of the universe and sees the individual appearing face toface with pure contingency.Hence, he rejects anyrationalist systemabout man (MacIntyre, 1967: 147).

Most existentialists, save Kierkegaard, make use ofphenomenology to answer questions relating to beliefs, emotion,the act ofwill and so on. The phenomenologists, while explainingemotions and beliefs in naturalistic terms, emphasize the elementof intentionality in emotions and beliefs. They emphasize thatemotion or belief always has an object. For instance, inhatred,

26

RECONCILlNGTHESELFWfIHTHEO'TIIER

.~

.~

there is something hated. Most existentialists after HusserI,particularly Heidegger and Sartre, made use of the doctrine ofintentionality.

Another uniting feature among the existentialists is theemphasis placed on 'being and absurdity'. They all believe thatmen vainly aspire to comprehend being. They also deny theprinciple of sufficient reason. To them, there is no ultimateexplanation of why things are as they are and not otherwise.

Freedom and choice are central concepts to all existentialistphilosophers as well. Choice to them is central to human nature.To say that 'existence precedes essence', which is the motto ofthe existentialists, popularised by Sartre, implies that men do nothave any fixed nature that determines or restricts their choices.On the contrary, it is their choices that bring whatever nature theyhave into being. This, of course, is not static.

The existentialist thesis on freedom and choice involves threeseparate contentions:

The first is that choice is ubiquitous. All my actionsimply choices. Even when I do not choose explicitly,as I may do in majority of cases, my action bearswitness to an implicit choice. The second contentionis that although in many of my actions, my choicesare governed by criteria, the criteria which I employare themselves chosen and there are no rationalgrounds for such choices. The third is that no causalexplanation of my actions can be given (MacIntyre,1967:149)

The 'use of anxiety, dread and death is also prominent in thework ofthe existentialists. Kierkegaard, for example, argued thatin certain psychologically defined moments, truths about humannature are grasped. Such moments include when we areexperiencing dread. This dread is of nothing in particular andnothing or void is interpreted as original sin by Kierkegaard.

27

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Heidegger sees it as an ontological constituent of the universe,while Sartre sees it as a confrontation with the facts of freedom,

.of our future yet to be made. (MacIntyre, 1967: 149).In pursuing their notion offreedom, authenticity and individual

autonomy the existentia1istsfrown at anyform of socialconformism.Man, to them, is the creator of allvalues and should always try toactualise his 'will to power' by becoming a 'superman'. In all,there is a form of relativism of values in the existentialist systembecause each man is to determine his own value irrespective ofthe ideals of the community in which the individual finds himselfHeidegger, Sartre and Camus express the relativism of humanvalue in their different senses of authenticity.

Sartre, for instance, maintains that authenticity can only beachieved when an individual performs actions not because thesociety approves it or because they accord with some universalmoral norms, but because they are necessary for the survival andthe existence of that individual.Camus links authenticity with howto overcome the absurdity of human life. He believes that oneachieves authenticitywhen one adopts the attitude of revolt towardsabsurdity, when one refuses to commit suicide or tries to escapeany discomfiture and when one shows adequate solidarity towardshuman suffering (Unah, 1996: 42-43). •

. Accordingly, Heidegger identifies three factors which defineauthenticity. These are: (1) finding oneselfin a situation which onefreely chooses (2) understanding the situation, and (3).expressingthis situationin an authentic (genuine) language. On the other hand,inauthentic existence also has three factors namely: (1) ambiguityconcerning the situation and one's relation to it, (2) lack ofunderstanding, or mere curiosity about one's situation and (3)expression of that curiosity in terms offacile inauthentic speech(Stewart & Michunas, 1974: 70). .

At the first interpretation what directly bears pointingout is arelativistic, subjective philosophy devoid of objectivism andconsideration for the well-being of others. After an, Heidegger

28

RECONCll.JNGTIIE SELFWITHTIlE01HER

would urge that the Dasein (being-there) should be authentic;Nietzsche will stress the 'Will to power' and the transcending ofvalues; Kierkegaard would enjoin us to be actors in the drama oflife by trnascending our present stage and making appropriatechoices; and Sartre would assert that the "Other is bell", However,a thorough interpretation of the existentialist system would showthat it accommodates others and can be used as the basis forachievingpolitical order especially inAfricanmuIti-ethnic societies.This is what we attempt to achieve in this work.

29

5 RECONCILING THE SELF WITH THE OTHER

management would be appreciated when we pose the question:"How do individuals and minority ethnicgroups especially,survivein a multi-cultural society?" (Jamieson, 2004: 374). This questionis important because of many reasons, especially the growingcomplexity of modern societies in which only few people still livein a world that comprises only their own kind and their own set ofcultural values and customs (Jamieson, 2004:373). In other words,with increasing contact of various cultures and ethnic groups inparticular nation-states, with diverse set of values, there are boundto be numerous antagonistic tendencies which often result inconflict. In this process too, not onlywill marginalisedethnicgroupswant to leave a nation-state in which it is being oppressed, it willalso seek its own self-determination by bringing into prominencethe issue of self-identity.

The need for self-determination in a sphere of oppressionbecomes necessary when we consider the fact that:

Withinthe contextof existence,individualslivetheirlives. The self that wants to determine the contentof its everyday existence continuously andtenaciously reflects on the presence and absenceof freedom. (Kiros, 1987:56)

However, much as individuals and ethnic groups would wantto determine their own life course, mutual isolation from othergroups is not possible because at the end of the.day as Kirossuggests: The identity of individuals ingeneral and the identity of anation in particular is grounded upon the quest for a community(Kiros, 1987:57)

We should note then that the notion of community presupposesthat we don't simply gloss-over those negative factors in ourintergroup relations, but we also manage and resolve them suchthat they do not continue to lead to destructive frictions becauseofthe negativity of such destructive frictions. As Kiros notes again:"Human beings engaged in war are forgetful of the uncuttable

31

RESOLVING ETIINIC CONFLICTS IN AFRICAlHROUGH THE EXISTENTIALIST FRAMEWORK.

1I

Inthis section we attempt to extrapolate certain inbuilt. mechanisms within the existentialist framework that can

create a veritable basis for resolving ethnic conflicts in Africa. Theexistentialist approach to resolving ethnic conflicts is reinforcedby the fact that:We do not speak of conflict or crisis merely in theabstract; conflict, crisesand turbulence are the products of concretehuman situations (unah, 2000: 237). To further clarify the aboveposition, Unah notes that: •

Generally, conflicts do not occur in a RobinsonCrusoe situation. They occur fundamentally fromsocial relatedness. Consequently, insofar as we arehuman beings living in a human society, conflictscannot but occur (Unah, 2000: 237).

. .

The statements above reveal a fundamental axiom abouthuman existence - the inevitability of conflict especially at theinterpersonal level. Consequently, where diverse groups of peoplelive, conflict is bound to be present. The fundmantal issue then ishow we can manage such crises such that they do not degeneratethereby leading men back to the hypothetical Hobbesian state ofnature in which live is 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short'. Weattempt here to use Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Buber andMarcel as existentialist philosophers within whose work we canarrive at solutions to the ethnic problems facing Africa. We aretherefore going to use the 'notion ofintersubjectivity' entrenchedin existentialist ethics to provide solution to the problem weperceive in Africa as "the I's lack of consideration for ihe other".

Our discourse on the existentialist approach to conflict30

OLA11JNll A OYESHILE

human ties that constitute human bonds, brotherhood andsisterhood, love and solidarity" (Kiros, 1987: 60). It is becauseof the need to sustain human solidarity that we now.attempt toprovide some methods of managing ethnic conflicts and relationsin multi-ethnic Africa that we draw some insights from the worksof some existentialist philosophers.

Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) a German Existentialist,through his seminal work Being and Time (Sein and Zeit) 1927,provides averitable framework through which the Dasein, literally'Being-there', which also encompasses the individuality of being,could achieve its project of authenticity by coping with certainfacticities of lifeespeciallythe being of others. Heidegger; althoughre-emphasizes over and over again why the Dasein should beauthentic nevertheless allows for the consideration of others ininterpersonal relation whichis also a basisfor multi-ethnicharmony.

According to Jim Unah, a leading authority on Heidegger,«the Dasein is not only abeing-in-the-world, he is also a being-with-others" (Unah, 1996:60). The import of this is that not onlyis man constituted by his projects and his relations with the thingswhich he makes use of, he is also related to others because, in the .first instance; others are also beings-in-the-world just in the samemanner likehimself The implicationof this for us, givenour presentethnic predicament, is that, whether as an individual or a groupsaddled with particular projects and peculiar means of achievingthem, we are related to others who are also beings-in-the-world,Heidegger underscores this point when he notes that when a manappears on the scene of existence, he is immediately aware notonly of objects, but of other human beings as well. In otherwords, our own existence is necessarily tied to the existenceof others. Therefore in terms of survival, the individual mustpursue his goals and projects such as will make possible thesurvival goal of others. One's existence also depends onrecognition by others.

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The interdependency of the Dasein with others ispoignantly expressed thus:

The awareness of the being of others is part of theawareness of our own being, and implied in it asthe teacher implies the pupil, and the taxi-car impliesboth the driver and the passenger. We discoverourselves as existing with other people and ourbeing as being with others (Unah, 1996: 60r

As Daseins, both at the individual and ethnic group levels,survival is only possible if and only ifwe recognise the importanceof others not as mere objects standing in the way of achieving ourgoal of survival, but as ends in themselves who are not onlyimportant but also inevitable and inescapable in the realisation ofour goal of survival and freedom.

Jean-Paul Sartre [1905-1980], the French existentialistphilosopher whose life and works have passed through phases-such as an unrepentant affirmation of individual antonomyespecially in Being and Nothingness, Existentialism is aHumanism to Critique.of Dialectical Reason where he affirmedgroup solidarity via his turning to Marxism - has within theframework of existentialism those ingredients necessary for theaccommodation of the 'self and others', thereby making it possiblefor us to apply his thoughts to the resolution of group conflicts. Athorough perusal of his work will lead to such conclusion as "the Iowes its existence to others" because according to Sartre, eventhough individual's antomomy is defined through Ips freedom ofchoice, when as an individual "I choose, lalso choose for the restof mankind".

According to Lowen (I 999/2000), Sartre's earlier ethics wasnot totally relativistic as many people are wont to believe. It wasalso not radically individualistic because right from the beginninghe could not ignore the power of circumstances and the socio-

·1I.

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.I!!I\i

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OLATUNn A.OYESffiLE RECONCamGTHESELF~THTHEOTHER

political character of human existence. In fact, Sartre saw clearlythe relation of freedom to "others" and to the world - the roleothers play in promoting a person's self awareness, that is, ourdependence upon one another (Lowen, 199912000: 60). Toclearly see Sartre's preparedness to establish what we call .interhuman relationship let us look at Sartre's preoccupation inBeing and Nothingness.

Sartre is not only concerned with existence as having primacyover essence, he is mainly concerned with modes of existence.According to him, there are two kinds of entity inexistence, 'beingsin themselves' and 'being-for- themselves'. Beings-in-themselves'(singular:being-in-itselfor en-soiy are non-conscious things. Theypossess essence since they exist independently of any observer.They constitute the inanimate objects in the world. On the otherhand, 'being-for-themselves (singular: 'being-for-itself'or pour-soi) are conscious beings and it is their consciousness that rendersthem different from other things and their relations toone another(Sartre, 1958: ix).

Sartre identifies the being-for-itself with being ofconsciousness. The chief characteristic of the being-for-itselfisits activity; It is incapable ofbeing acted on from without, and itconsists in and is exhausted by its own intentional meaningconferring acts. On the other hand, being-in-itself or being ofthings' is characterised in terms of a complete incapacity for anyrelationship to itself' It is in Sartre's metaphorical language'Opaque', and it coincides exactly with itself All that can strictlybe said about it is that it is" (Olafson, 1967: 290-291)

Our analysis ofSartre's two modes of existence is instructivehere because of the attribute assigned to the "being-for-itself"which is its ability to work towards the achievement of its goal ofsurvival primarily. In achieving its goal however it has to contendwith the existence of others. And this shows that inhuman societywe are for others just aswe are for ourselves.' Accordingly, Sartrebelieves that:

Consciousness is its own foundationbut it remainscontingent in order that, there may be aconsciousness rather than an infinity of pure andsimple in-itself(Sartre, 1958: 82)

The import of the above isthat as conscious beingswe cannotavoid depending on other beings for our livelihood. This is becauseour consciousness has to be anchored to something outside ofitself through which it realises its project of self-transcending. Thiscan be linked to what Heidegger and Sartre describe as 'facticityof existence'. According to Sartre, the notion offacticity of humanexistence means that certain facts are given about us as humanbeings. These facts include our being born by certain parents, theenvironment in which we are born, the people we livewith and soforth. Sartre writes that this structure of the world sometimesforces us to conceal our freedom (which Sartre would also referto as bad faith or inauthentic existence) and subjectivity and tobelieve that there is a kind of causal determinism for every actionwe take.

What is important, given the above analysis, isthat.we cannotgloss over the existence of others. The existence of the othermind, for instance, isused by Sartre to give room for the individualto transcend his subjectivity, at least to make room for inter-subjectivity. The reason is that if one cannot tratiscend one'ssubjectivity, then one would not be able to accommodate otherswithin the world. This existence of others is arrived at throughman's subjectivity,which Sartre identifieswith the notion of shame.According to Sartre:

Shame is shame of oneself before the other. Thesetwo structures are inseparable. I need the other torealize fully the structures of my being. The 'for-itself' refers to the "for-others" (Sartre, 1958-:222)

34 35I'

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Humanism is an attempt to show that existentialism provides averitable ontological and ethical foundation for group solidarityand understanding which is lacking in contemporary multi-ethnicAfrica. Similar lines of thought is present in his Critique ofDialectical Reason, 1960. In this work, Sartre attempts to locateindividual freedom within the group. In fact, Sartre tends tosubsume Existentialism under Marxism at this point. The mainthrust of this work is a conscious effort by Sartre to give up theattempt to present and prove human freedom by reference to theconcrete fact that we each experience our own freedom in anguish.He seems to have given up the presentation of the 'being-for-itself' as conscious ofhimselfin the world (Warnock, 1970: 128).On the contrary, emphasis is placed on historical determinismbased on economic relations. The agent of change in history is nolonger the individual but the group. The problem isnot that whicharises from the nature of human consciousness but a conflict whichresults from class antagonism in society because of scarcity ofgoods.

Let us note that inspite ofall the amendments done to Sartre'sviews in Being and Nothingness as reflected in some of his laterworks, Sartre is still concerned with the problem of how humanbeings can have with each other the relations they ought to have.Ifwe grant that this is the case, then there is no radical break assuch from Sartre's doctrine in Being and Nothingness and hislatter views. What we have, on the contrary, is the modificationof the views in Being and Nothingness which is the affirmation ofgroup freedom of which the individual is an inextricable part.

Accordingly, Lowen describes Sartre this way:

He urged that our lives willhavemeaningby humanbeings loving and supporting each other in thisworld, and workingtogether to createtheir commonhumanity by constructing societies that fulfill theneeds of all. True humanism, Sartre stated, should

'.1· 'I,II

The above shows that through the concept of shame, I ambeing watched by somebody. The person who watches me isfeeling like myself as being watched by somebody else. It isobvious, therefore, that Sartre's subjectivism adequately providesfor the existence of other consciousness in the world. Sartrebelieves that the self must first be for the others as a preconditionfor having consciousness of himself and others as being for him.What allthese show is that as individuals and groups we have ourvarious latent and manifest identities; we cannot overlook theimportance of others and we must be prepared to accommodatethem, because it is when we accommodate them that they willalso accommodate us. This also lends weight to human solidarityinspite of the subjectivity embedded in Sartre's existentialism. Thisis so because a man who discovers himself through the cogitoalso discovers the others as the condition of his own existence.

This means that no matter what, the existence of others isbased on the subjectivity of the individual. And since I choosewhat is favourable to me through my subjectivity,I must also chosethe same for others because I do not live in isolation from others.The existence of others indirectly establishes my own existenceand therefore subjectivitybecause the other and I are lInkedtogetherillsome activities. Thus:

II

1\I'd,I

I cannot obtain any truth whatsoever about myselfexcept through the mediation of another. The otheris indispensable to my existence and equally so toany knowledge I can have of myself. Under theseconditions, the intimate discovery of myself is atthe same time the revelation of the other as afreedom which confronts me... We find ourselvesin a world of inter-subjectivity, It is in this worldthat man has to decide what he is and what othersare (Sartre, 1976: 155).

The above passage from Sartre's work Existentialism is a36 37

OLKfUNll A. OYESl-llLE RECONCILING THE SELFWITHTHE01'fIER

relations, rests ultimately on the structure of the human body andthe simple fact about the human body is that "it is similar in allmembers of the human species and that these bodies open uponone sole world in a similar way" (Low, 1996: 382). What wehave inMerleau-Ponty is then the establishment of interpersonaland intergroup relationship predicated on the notion of the body- a body that has the same ontologically shared experience ofthe world like any other body. We can say therefore that ourbodies provide the possibility of rational agreement anduniversality on which we can manage our differences. Although,we concede that there are differences in individual and grouporientations that inevitably lead to conflicts, these conflicts canbe managed on the realisation that the human beings constitutingthe various ethnic groups have the same biological make-upthat serves as the basis for their social engagement in a sharedworld.

Buber's work I and Thou (1937) (Ich und Du (1923),which is the most popular ifhis work, provides another veritablebasis for addressing conflicts that emanate from interpersonaland inter-ethnic relations. Living between 1878 and 1965, heapplied his philosophical disquisition to bringing aboutunderstanding between the Jews and Arabs and subsequentlyadvocated a bi-national state (Rader, 1980: 348). As far as hewas concerned there could be an alternative position toindividualism and collectivism, and this he attempts to establishin the I and thou through the elements of the interhuman.

The underlying assumption ofthe I and Thou ofBuber isthat one is a proper human being as one sees himselfin relationwith other human beings. Although most existentialist theorieswill aver that one consciousness tries to ·capture theconsciousness of the other and make him an object, this kindof approach cannot rule out the reality of the interhuman (Buber,1980: 351). The reason for this can be put thus: "The essential

I

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take these needs as its starting point and neverdeviate from them. True humanism can be builtonly. upon the mutual recognition by men andwomen of their human needs and of their right totheir satisfaction (Lowen, 1999/2000: 60).

We can glean from Sartre's position above that there is needfor human solidarityirrespectiveof our differences. Likewisewhenwe look at the ethnic configuration of most African states, weeasily discern the need for symbiotism since no ethnic grouppossesses all it takes to be self-sufficient. In Nigeria, for instance,the ethnic region where oil resources abound, does not producehydro-electrical resources. Hence, the need for interdependencyat various levels.

Taking off from a psycho-analytic perspective, MauriceMerleau-Ponty (1908-196]) talks about the unification of the"phenomenal field"in interpersonalrelationship (Low, 1996: 382).It is this phenomenal field that enables an individual to unify hisexperiences with that of the others. The reason for this is thatthere is a unity In the phenomenal field to which both the worldand the individual's lived body contribute. We can use this as thebasis for addressing the problem of agreement and consensusamong various ethnic groups on the basis that rational agreementis based on our ontological attachment to the world.

According to Merleau-Ponty:

Rational agreement is possible for human beingsbecause their experiences open to and interesectin a shared phenomenal field. Rationality is nothingother than this blending of lived bodily profiles, ofmine within me as I actively open uponthe worldtogether(Low, 1996:382).

The import of the above, according to Ponty, is that thepossibility of rational agreement, which is necessary in ethnic

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thing is not that one makes the other. his object, but the fact thathe is not fully able to do so" (Buber, 1980: 351).

It is therefore only in partnership that my being can beperceived as an existingwhole. This lineofthinking is co-terminouswith that ofHeidegger's Dasein, Sartre's Pour-soi and Merleau- Ponty's phenomenal field.

In order to establish his thesis of the interhuman, Buberrecognizes two major forms of relationship in society. These arethe "J Thou' relation and the "J - if' relation. The latter "J - if'relation isunholy and depersonalising as it treats other individuals,apart from the 1,as mere objects or means to be used in achievingone's life goal. It is an instrumentalist relationship. The J - Thourelationship, on the other hand, is a relationship that is mutuallyaffirming. It upholds reciprocity and respect for others as againstthe J - it relationship, which aims at degradation, manipulationand exploitation (Rader, 1980:365). The J - Thou relationshipupholds the belief that a person is fullya person in relation to otherpersons. In this light you are not a real person so far as you regardothers as mere things or as mere objects or implements. Bubernotes that the real meeting between person and person comesabout only when each regards the other as an end.

Buber's position is instructive here because it appropriatelydescribes the nature of the relationship among ethnic groups inAfrica - between the Hutus and the Tutsi, the Ijaws, Itsekiri andUrhobo, Hausa and Igbo, Yoruba and Igbo, to mention fewinstances in Africa. Granted then that we msut embrace the I -Thou relationship, what are the necessary ingredients for theattainment of this? According to Buber, at the sphere of theinterhuman, the actual happenings between men must be whollymutual or must be tending to grow towards mutual relations. Thisis because "the participation of both partners is in principleindispensable" (Buber, 1980:351). This then reveals to us that thesphere of the interhuman is one inwhich a person is confronted by

the other and its unfolding is referred to as the dialogical (Buber,1980:351).

There is thus a connection between Buberand Kant oninterpersonal relationship. For Kant had expressed one of theessential principles in relationship that one's fellow must never atany time be thought of and treated merely as a me~s but ratheras an independent end. According to Buber, the Kantian view isexpressed as an 'ought' which is sustained by the idea of humandignity. The element of the interhuman is close to Kant's principlebecause:

40

It is concerned with the presuppositions of theinterhuman. Man exists anthropologicallynot in hisisolation, but in the completeness of the relationbetween man and.man; what humanity is can beproperly grasped only in vital reciprocity (Buber,1980:358).

Furthermore,If genuine dialogue is to arise, everyonewho takes ,part in it must be willing on each occasion to saywhat is really in his mind about the subject ofconversation (Buber, 1980:358-359). •

We can thus see in Buber the need for us, irrespective of ourethnic affiliation, to break away from our narrow individualism tointerpersonal fellowship. The elements of the interhuman spellsout the fundamental basis of the J and Thou relationship. 'It doesstress that the completeness or wholeness of man is not in the solevirtue ofa relation to himself but it embodies the virtue of hisrelation to others. We see then such elementsasmutuality,everyoneas an end, interpersonal fellowship and dialogue- genuine dialogue- as those elements lacking or in short supplyininterethnic relationsin most African states. .

We should also note that embracing these elements does noteven reduce ones authenticity; rather, it is throughthem that we

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can achieve the cardinalgoal of existentialism,which is authenticitythrough genuine human relationship. Buber's element of theinterhuinan then goes beyond narrow individualismand oppressivecolectivism because, according to him, "the essentialhuman realityis neither one of them" (Buber, 1980:366).

Let us note that in a situation of exploitation of some ethnicgroups by others, marginalised groups have consistently agitatedfor national self-determination as recently witnessed in Somalia,Ivory Coast, Sudan, and Democratic Republic of Congo. Theattendant marginalisation by the dominating group is oftenaccompanied by large-scale corruption, injustice and wantompoverty and disease among the people. However, when the [-Thou relationship is used as the basis for co-existence amongethnic groups it would then be easy to address the problem ofjustice, equality, peace, security and development. The AfricanUnion (AU) and other African sub-regional bodies should actuallysee that allAfricans are Africans qua Afucans and should acceptthemselves not as means to satisfy their own ends, but as ends inthemselves.

Although Gabriel Marcel (1889 - 1973) focused his analysisof the human situation mainlyon how the individual grapples with'being and having' as well as on 'problem and mystery', henevertheless accommodated social relations in his existentialism,According to him, man is the only being that can make promises.Being able to make promise inevitably places one into a uniquerelationship between himselfand another. In doing this he invokesthe concept offidelity. One's being can only be affirmed thereforethrough fidelity insofar as one responds to a world that makesdemands and in which one assumes responsibilities(Stumpf, 1989:495).

In Marcel's existentialism, we see a philosophy of inter-subjectivity in which man is not only related to the world but toothers as well. And because man has to grapple with the problemand mystery of existence, he has to take adequate cognizance of

42

other beings. The central notion of participation and relatednessin existence therefore forms the basis of cordial and mutualrelationship, which as it were can be a recipe for harmonious co-existence at various levels. When Marcel talks about communionrather than just physical communication, he means that every manshould make himself available to others in such a way that wouldfoster the attainment of the goals of life and the unraveling of themystery of being.

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participatory rights within the context of liberalconstitutionalismthat guarantees citizenshipas thedominant identity,political and economicfreedomsof action. And, as long as those rights are notconstitutionally guaranteed and protected, the typeof regime in power will not assuage the merp.oriesand sources of agitations (Kalu, 2005: 31- 32).

The above only suggests that no ethnic group in any statemust be marginalised in the sharing of power and resources of thestate. Also, no group should be accorded preferential treatmentin reward and punishment. For instance, a corrupt case by amember of one ethnic group should receive similar sanction ifanother member from another ethnic group is involved.

Furthermore, we should also learn to allign our privateinterests with the common good. This is important because:

Wherever a person or society lives fromthe maximof consequent self-interest devoid of any regardfor the common good, it soon finds itself in anartificial state of war and terror. Many modemAfrican states find themselves in this type ofartificial state of war in areas of business, pdlitics,administration and mutual co-existence (Asouzu, .2004: 22).

While we cannot say that communalism functioned perfectlyintraditionalAfiican societies,considerable attention was stillgivento common welfare. Perhaps, this is what forced Mbiti to link'personhood to the community when he wrote: "We are, thereforeI am" (Mbiti, 1969). What the traditional African societies forcedon the individual was the notion ofjoint survival which modemsocieties have neglected due to agitations for power and economicresources. Our ability in Africa to reposition ourself fordevelopment and to contribute meaningfully to the world "largely

45

MANAGEMENT OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS FORSUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

1'1

Our pre-occupation in this work has largelybeen devotedto the existentialistattempt to reconcile the selfwith the

other in managing ethnic conflicts in Africa. This work does notrule out the possibilityof conflictsinspiteof our suggestions.Neitherare we saying that conflicts can be avoided. Our focus has indeedbeen on how the notion ofinter-subjectivity, construed in variousways by the existentialist thinkers we have identified, can be usedto resolve, manage and ameliorate ethnic conflicts,thereby helpingto preserve human lives, and property and promote sustainabledevelopment in a continent that is in urgent need of human andmaterial development.

The existentialistapproach, as suitable as it may be, stillneedsto be predicated on certain democratic values such as the rule oflaw, justice, equality, fairness, and freedom ofthe necessary kindswhich are garmane to the sustenance of a modem state.Interestingly, too, these democratic values can only have meaningin a context of the interhuman where one ethnic group accepts theother not only as an end in itselfbut also a partner in the quest forsurvival. For instance, participation in and sharing of power byethnic groups in African countries should not just end at thetheoretical constitutional level, they must be seen to obtain in theactual operation of government. This is significant, according toKalu, because:

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While democracy as a mechanism of governanceis not mutually exclusive with such ideologies asliberalism,authoritarianismand/or otherideologicalvariants, most agitation's in Nigeria are about

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depends on our ability to acquire an accommodatingcomprehensive mindset that is in tune with the demands of theprinciple of complementarity" (Asouzu, 2004: 24).

To move Africa forward in the 21st century and beyond, weneed to findways of effectivelymanaging our ethnic differences.But we can only start to do this if we realise that allparticipantsare important and that the' selfmust be reconciled with the other' .

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