1 THE DEEP HISTORICAL ROOTS OF MODERN CULTURE
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Transcript of 1 THE DEEP HISTORICAL ROOTS OF MODERN CULTURE
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THEDEEPHISTORICALROOTSOFMODERNCULTURE:ACOMPARATIVEPERSPECTIVE.*
BasedonKeynotelectureat2ndWorldCongressinComparativeEconomics,June2017.
RevisedDecember52019GerardRoland,UCBerkeley,CEPRandNBER
Keywords:comparativeeconomics,comparativehistory,institutionsinancienttimes,culture,individualism,collectivismJELcodes:N00,P40,P50Abstract:Thispaperpresentsevidenceshowingthattherehavebeensinceantiquitytwoopposedtypesofinstitutionalsystems:oneresemblingcentralplanningandpresentinancientChina,ancientEgypt,theIncaEmpireandotherterritorialstates,andanotheronewithstrongmarketinstitutions,protectionofpropertyrightspresentmostlyincity-states,notjustintheMediterraneanbutthroughouttheworld.Evidenceispresentedthattheseinstitutionaldifferencesdatingbacktotheantiquityareshapedbyspecialgeographicalconditions.Theseinstitutionaldifferencescanbeseentobeattherootofthetwoculturalsystemsintoday’sworld:individualismandcollectivism.Theseculturaldifferenceshaveeffectsoneconomicperformanceandinstitutionsintoday’sworld.*IamverygratefultoLiDuan,YunhaoZhang,YueMaandespeciallyShaoyuLiuforexcellentresearchassistance.
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1. IntroductionInrecentyears,avibrantnewliteraturehasdevelopedontheeconomicsof
culture.Alargepartofthatliteratureexaminestheeffectsofculturalvaluesandbeliefsoneconomicoutcomes(growth,institutions,fertilitychoices,femalelaborforceparticipation,….)Itismorechallengingtounderstandtheoriginsofdifferentcultures.Theexistingliteratureontheoriginsofcultureaimsatunderstandingtheroleofparticularhistoricalvariablesonparticularculturaltraits.AgoodexampleistheresearchbyAlesinaetal.(2011)onhowdifferencesinsoiltypesledtothechoiceofuseoftheploughorthehoeinworkingthefields,andhowthisaffectedgenderrolesandculturalnormsrelatedtogender(otherexamplesarediscussedbelow).Tothisday,therehasnotbeensystematicanalysisoftheroleofhistoricalinstitutionalsystemsonbroadculturalsystems.Thisiswhatwetrytodointhispaper.
Economistsinterestedincomparativeinstitutionalanalysistendto
emphasizeinstitutionaldifferencesfromtherecentpast(thesalientexamplebeingthedifferencebetweencapitalistandsocialisteconomicsystemsinthetwentiethcentury),andthereisoftenthepreconceptionthatpre-industrialeconomicsystemswereroughlysimilar,orthattheirdifferenceswerenotthatmarked.However,ifwegobackinhistory,asearlyaswhatJaspers(1951)callstheaxialage(betweenthe8thand3rdcenturyBC),wewillfindthatthereexistedverydifferentinstitutionalsystemsamongearlystates.Thephilosophiesandreligionsthatemergedduringtheaxialagewereareflectionoftheexistinginstitutionsofthetimeandonecanarguethattheirdifferencesreflectedinstitutionaldifferencesacrossthemajorexistingcivilizations.Surprisinglyandinterestingly,thephilosophiesandreligionsoftheaxialage(ancientGreekphilosophy,Hinduism,Bhuddism,Zoroastranism,Confucianism,Judaism,etc…)nearlyallstillplayanimportantroleinthemodernworld.Theyarethemaininspirationbehindmodernculturesandculturaldifferencesobservedintoday’sworld.
Lookingateconomicsystemsintheancientworld,wefindthatsomesystems
(Egypt,China,PeruundertheIncasandothers)weremorelikecentrallyplannedeconomies.Therewasnoprivatepropertyofland(thelandbelongedtotheEmperororruler),agriculturalgoodsandcraftgoodswereallocatedbythegovernment.Marketswerehardlydevelopedandforeigntradewasunderthecontrolofgovernment.Forlackofabetterwording,Iwillcallthemstatistsystems.Othereconomies,likeancientMesopotamia,Athens,theAztecsinMexico,theChampa(coveringroughlytoday’sSouthVietnam)weremoreclearlymarketeconomieswithprivatepropertyoflandanddevelopedmarkets,bothdomesticallyandinternationnally.Iwillcallthemmarketsystems.Manyothersystemswereinbetweenbothofthesesystems,asdocumentedbelow.
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Thesedifferenceshavebeennotedbefore.MaxWeber(1922)usedthetermofpatrimonialstatetocharacterizestateslikeAncientChinaandotherswheretheabsolutedominationofthefatherfigureinafamilyisprojectedontothestate.Privateandpublicpropertyarenotdifferentiatedinthepatrimonialstate.
Wittfogel(1957)theorizedaboutorientaldespotismandhypothesizedthat
theabsolutistruleinancientChinaandEgyptwasbasedonfactthattheabsolutistrulefacilitatedwhathecalledthehydraulicstatewherethestateorganizedlargescaleirrigationsystems,whichcreatedconditionsthatmadebureaucraticandgovernmentdespotisminevitable.
Polanyiandcoauthors(1954)documentedthelimitedroleofmarketswhere
privategoodswereexchangedinmanylocationsintheAntiquity.Trigger(2003)providesaveryinterestingclassificationofancientsocieties,
basedonarcheologicalevidence.Heemphasizesmostlythedifferencebetweenterritorialstatesandcity-statesbuthisclassificationisquitecomprehensiveandbasedonextensivescholarlyevidence.
Amongeconomists,GreifandTabellini(2017)analyzetherelative
importanceofclansinformationofcitiesinChinaandEurope.TheyfindthatinChinesehistory,thedevelopmentofcitieswasbasedonclansandclanorganization,whichhasplayedanextendedroleinChinesehistory.Incontrasts,citiesinWesternEuropedevelopedonthebasisofindividualcitizenship.Theytracethesedifferencestoculturaldifferences:generalizedmoralityinEuropeversuslimitedmoralitywithintheclaninChina.Theculturaldifferencestheyemphasizeareclosetothedifferencebetweenindividualismandcollectivismthatweputforwardinthisstudy.
BritishhistorianMacFarlane(1978)foundthatasearlyasthe13thcentury,
individualistculturewasmoreprevalentinGreatBritainthanontheEuropeancontinentandthathouseholdstendedtobemorenuclear,relyingmoreonthemarketineconomictransactionsthansocietieswherepeoplewereembeddedinlargerclans.
Maysharetal.(2017)emphasizetheroleoftransparencyinproduction.
Wheneveroutputcouldeasilybemeasured,peasantsworkeddirectlyforthestate,aswasthecaseinancientEgypt.Whenoutputwasinsteadlesstransparent,peasantshadpropertyrightsoverlandlikeinMesopotamia.
Inthispaper,IpresentadatabaseconstructedIthepastfewyearsbasedon
historicalandarcheologicalresearchtocharacterizethemajordifferencesbetweenstatistsystemsandmarketsystemsintheantiquity.Theevidencepresentedshowsclearlythatthesetwosystemsformdistinctinstitutionalclustersthatarecomparabletothedifferencebetweensocialismandcapitalisminthetwentiethcentury.Thesedifferentsystemsoperatedinmostlyruralsocietieswheremodern
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industrialtechnologywasabsentandwherelaborandlandwerethemajorfactorsofproduction.
Whydothesedifferencesmattertoday?Whystudythedifferencebetween
statistandmarketsystemsinthedistantpastexcepttosatisfyournaturalhistoricalcuriosity?Theargumentputforwardinthispaperisthattheseinstitutionaldifferencesfromthepastmatteralottounderstandtheworld’slongruneconomicandsocietaltrajectories.Indeed,followingBisinandVerdier’s(2001,2017)canonicalanalysisofthedynamicsofculturaltransmission,andespeciallythejointdynamicsofinstitutionsandculture,wecanhypothesizethatparticularearlyinstitutionshaveaffectedculturalvaluesandbeliefs,whichhasinturnhelpedconsolidateboththeseinstitutionsandtheunderlyingculture.GiventheinertiaofculturepredictedfromtheBisin-Verdiermodel(seealsoRoland,2004),institutionsmayhaveaffectedculturalvaluesandbeliefsthatarestillpresentintoday’sworld.
Themainculturaldivideintheworldtoday,accordingtocross-cultural
psychology,istheonebetweenindividualismandcollectivism(seeHeine,2008;seealsothesurveyinGorodnichenkoandRoland,2012).Individualistcultureplacestheindividualatthecenter,valuesindividualrightsandfreedom,opportunityandindividualsuccess.Collectivistcultureseesinsteadtheindividualasembeddedinacommunity(tribe,clan),emphasizesconformity,adaptationandharmony.
Theseculturaldifferenceshaveimportanteffectsintoday’sworld.In
GorodnichenkoandRoland(2017),itisshownthatindividualistcultureprovidesaboosttoinnovationandlongrungrowth.Individualismalsoaffectsinstitutionalchange.InGorodnichenkoandRoland(2015),individualismleadstoearlieradoptionofdemocracythancollectivism,andthelattermayleadtostableautocracy.Thedegreeofverticalintegrationinmulti-nationalcompaniesisalsoseentodependonculturaldifferences,especiallybetweenindividualismandcollecvitism(seeKukharskyyetal.2016).Manyothervariablescanbearguedtobeaffectedbytheseculturaldifferences(seeGorodnichenkoandRoland,2012).
Whileeconomistshaveincreasinglyrecognizedtheimportanceofculture,
alongsideinstitutions,oneconomicoutcomes,thereisalsoalargeliteraturetryingtoexplaintheoriginofculturaldifferences.Thisisnotaneasytopicbecauseitisdifficulttodisentangletheeffectsofculturefromtheircauses,andfilteringoutthecausesofcultureisimportanttobetterunderstanditseffects.
PsychologistsKashimaandKashima(1998)remarkedthatculturalvalues
couldbetracedbacktolinguisticdifferences.Totheextentthatthestructureofalanguagereflectsculturalvaluesandbeliefs,onecananalyzelinguisticandgrammaticalstructurestodiscoverculturaldifferences.KashimaandKashimapointedoutanimportantdifference:whetherornotalanguageprohibitstodropthepersonalpronouninasentence.ThisisforexampleprohibitedinFrench,GermanandEnglish,butnotinItalianorSpanish.Theideaisthataprohibitionwouldindicateamoreindividualistcultureasitinsistsondifferentiatingindividuals
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byaclearindicationofthepronounused(first,secondorthirdperson).Anotherdistinctioniswhetheralanguagehasornottwodifferentpronounsforthesecondperson(TuandVosinLatin)todifferentiatebetweenamoreinformalandamoreformalwayofaddressingaperson.Theexistenceoftwodistinctpronounsforthesecondpersonofthesingular(existinginFrenchandItalianbutnotinEnglishforexample)wouldindicateamorehierarchicandlessegalitarianculture.Similarly,theyalsosingleoutwhetherthereisasingleorseveralexpressionsforthefirstpronounofthesingular.Forexample,thereisonlyoneexpressioninEnglish(I),butseveralinotherlanguageslikeJapanese.Theideaisthatiftherearemultipleexpressions,languageemphasizesmorethesocialfunctionofthepersonwhereasifthereisonlyoneexpression,languageemphasizesmoretheindividuality.KashimaandKashima(1998)documentthestatisticalcorrelationbetweenthelinguisticmeasurestheyputforwardandmeasuresofculturesuchasHofstede’sindividualismscore.Someoftheirvariableshavebeenusedasinstrumentalvariablestoanalyzetheeffectofcultureoninstitutions(seee.g.Lichtetal.2003,Tabellini,2008).
Otherresearchershaveemphasizedtheroleofthedistributionofparticular
variantsofgenesindifferentcountriesinshapingculturalvalues.Forexample,ChiaoandBlizinsky(2009)analyzedtheroleofvariantsofgenes(calledallelesinlifesciences)thatleadmoreeasilytodepressionwhenfacedwithstressfulsituations.Similarly,WayandLiebermann(2010)analyzedtheroleofvariantsofgenesthatcreatemorepainfromsocialexclusion.Theseauthorsfoundthatahigherfrequencyofthosevariantsofgenesweremorepresentinsocietieswithcollectivistculture.Thebasicideaisthatthosesocietiesandcommunitieswithhigherfrequencyofthoseallelesthatdevelopedculturalvaluesandsocialnormstoprotectindividualsfromstressfulsituationsandsocialexclusionwouldfarebetterthanthosethatdidnotdevelopsuchvaluesandnorms.
Asimilarlogicisfoundwiththehistoricalpresenceofparticularpathogens.
Fincheretal.(2008)andMurrayandSchaller(2010)findthatcountrieswheretherewasastrongpresenceofpathogensbeforethe20thcenturydevelopedmorecollectivistcultures.Again,theideaisthatinareaswithhighpresenceofpathogens,thosecommunitiesthatdevelopedmorecollectivistnorms,restrictingindividualbehaviorandshowingalessopenattitudetowardsforeignerswouldbemorelikelytosurvivebetter.
Otherexplanationsfortheoriginofindividualismversuscollectivisminvolve
thehigherfrequencyofricecropsoverotherwheatcropssincericeismorelabor-intensiveandrequiresbettercoordination(Thalhelmetal.,2014)orahigherpresenceofirrigation(Buggle,2015),inthespiritofWittfogel(1957).Ontheotherhand,Knudsen(2017)findsthatahigherrelianceonfishingforone’slivelihoodinhistoryismoreassociatedtoindividualism.
Theseareallinterestingexplanations,andmostofthosevariableshavebeen
usedasinstrumentalvariablesforindividualismandcollectivism.Nevertheless,itis
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relativelyeasytoseethattheseexplanationsarepartialatbest.Giventheimportanteffectsofcultureoninstitutionsandeconomicperformance,onewouldgainfromcomingupwithamorecomprehensivehistoricalexplanationoftheemergenceofculturaldifferences.Inparticular,wefinditusefultodothiswithinaconceptualframeworkofcoevolutionofinstitutionsandculture.Thisispreciselyourgoalinthispaper.Wehavegatheredanumberofvariablesthatcharacterizeinstitutionaldifferencesintheancientpastaswellasgeographicalvariablesthatmayexplaintheseearlyinstitutionaldifferences.
Insection2,weprovidesomenarrativesfromtheantiquitytoillustratethe
institutionaldifferencesinancientsocietiesthatwefocuson.Onthatbasis,wedevelopinsection3aclassificationofvariablesthatshouldmattertounderstandtheseinstitutionalclustersofthepast,theiroriginandtheircoevolutionwithculturalvaluesystems.Insection4,wedescribethedatabasewehavebeenbuildingtomeasurethosevariables.Insection5,wegivesomepreliminarydescriptiveregressionresultsbasedonthisnewdataset.Section6concludes.
2. StatistversusMarketSystems:SomeNarrativesfromtheAntiquity.
ItisusefultostartwithanarrativecomparisonofancientEgyptandancientMesopotamiatoillustratetheinstitutionaldifferenceswehaveinmind.
Egyptwasaterritorialstate.ThePharaohhadauthorityovertheextentof
Egypt’sterritory.Theareaaroundthe800kmlongNilewasofexceptionalfertility.SeasonalfloodingdepositedmineralsonbothsidesoftheNile,makingtheearthveryfertileforgrainlikebarleyandwheat.WhatisimportantforourpurposeisthattheproductionconditionsalongthesidesoftheNileweregeographicallyrathersimilar,creatinghomogeneousconditionsofproductionontheproductivepartsoftheterritory.ThismeansthattherewerenogreatbenefitsintradinggrainfromoneregionoftheNilewithanotherregion.Becauseofthehomogeneityinconditionsofproduction,insteadthereweregreatadvantagesincoordinationandspecializationproducingsuchgreatmonumentsasthepyramids,butalsovariousspecializedcraftwork(Trigger,1993).InancientEgypt,resourceswereingeneralallocatedbythegovernment.Internalmarketswerelimitedandforeigntradewascarriedoutbythegovernment(Trigger,2003,p.351).Ordinarypeasantsdidnothaveprivatepropertyoverland.Theywereworkingthelandandthegovernmentinstructedthemhowmuchgraintodelivertothegovernment(Trigger,2003,p.320).NotealsothatwhileslaverywaswidespreadinEgyptlikeintherestoftheancientworld,slaveswereingeneralpropertyofthegovernment,notofprivatehouseholds.Ineffect,householdsdidnot,asarule,ownprivateslaves(Trigger2003,p.160).LawsthatwerecodifiedinEgyptweremainlyaboutregulatingattitudesandbehaviorofordinaryEgyptianstowardsthePharaohandtherulingelite(Trigger,2003,p.228-233).IncontrasttoMesopotamia,therewasnoformallegalcoderegulatingrelationsbetweencitizens,butprovincialofficialshadrightsoflifeanddeathovertheirsubjects.Thereweredetailedregulationsdefining
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punishmentsincaseoftheftofstateproperty,evasionofcorvée,dutytowardsthegovernment,theftsfromtemples,royaltombrobberies,conspiraciesagainsttheking.Socialstratificationinsocietywasratherlow.Therewasrelativeequalitybetweenordinarycitizens.Theywerenotslavesbutweremostlyunfreeastheylackedanybasicrights.TheEgyptiangovernmentadministrationfunctionedinarelativelymeritocraticway.Highlevelofficialsenjoyedhighprestigeandbecomingahighlevelofficialwasthemostimportantaspirationamongordinarycitizens(Trigger,2003,p.627).
Onmostoftheseaspects,Mesopotamia,locatedalongtheTigrisand
Euphratesriver,nottoofarfromEgypt,wascompletelydifferent.Mesopotamiawascomposedofcity-statesforalargepartofitshistorystartingfromtheSumeriancity-states.IncontrasttotheNilewhereconditionsofproductionwerequitesimilarandhomogenous,thereweremarkeddifferencesbetweenNorthernandSouthernMesopotamia.SouthernMesopotamiawasquiterichinagriculturalgoodsbuthadfewothernaturalresources.TheNorthinsteadhadlotsofstone,timber,bronzeandproducedluxurygoods.Becauseofthisgeographicalheterogeneityinconditionsofproduction,therewasalotoftradebetweencitiesofNorthernandSouthernMesopotamia(Finer,1997,p.106).TradeinsidecitieswaslessdevelopedasnotedinPolanyietal.(1954).PrivatemerchantshadanimportantroleinMesopotamiasincetradewasquitedevelopedandorganizedtoalargeextentbytheseprivatemerchants(Trigger,p.343).Craftworkwasalsomostlydonebyprivatecraftsmen(Trigger,p.364).Marketsforlandwerehighlydeveloped,incontrasttoEgypt(Trigger,p.333),andmarketsforprivateslaveswerethriving(Trigger,p.158).AlsoincontrasttoEgypt,thelawcodifiedrelationsbetweencitizens,inparticularregardingconflictsoverprivateproperty.Oneofthebiggestaspirationsinsocietyforcitizenswastobecomeanowneroflargetractsofprivateland(Trigger,2003,p.333).
Ifwelookatotherancientcivilizations,wefindthatancientChinahadmany
similaritieswithancientEgypt.Fromwhatweknowevenabouttheearliestdynasties,theShangdynasty(1600-1046BCE)andtheZhoudynasty(1046-256BCE),thesesimilaritiesarealreadyquitestriking.ThesedynastiesdevelopedaroundtheYellowRiver.LikeinEgypt,conditionsofproductionwerequitehomogenous,mostlypropitiousforgrowingwheat(Keightley,2014).Thereisevidenceofstrongspecializationanddivisionoflaborincraftworkinimperialworkshops(Trigger2003,p.371-373).FarmersdidnothaveprivatepropertyoverlandasalllandbelongedformallytotheEmperor(Trigger,p.325-26).LawsweredesignedtoregulaterelationsbetweentheEmperorandhissubjects,specifyingpunishmentsassociatedtobreachofobligationsofsubjectstowardstheEmperor.WhenChinawasunifiedforthefirsttimebytheFounderoftheQindynasty(221-206BC),thedoctrineof“legalism”statedthattheEmperorshouldusethetooloftheLawtoexercisehispowerovercitizens.TheLawisthusseenasaninstrumentofoppressiontofurthertheinterestsoftheruler.ThisisstillthecaseinmodernChina.MaoZedongwasanadmirerofthefounderoftheQindynasty,YingZheng,subsequentlynamedQinShiHuangDi.WhenpresidentXiJinpingmentionsthe
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RuleofLaw,hehastheChineselegalisttraditioninmind.LikeinEgypt,therewerenoprivateslavesinancientChina,onlypublicslavesworkingfortheEmperor,forexampleintheconstructionoftheGreatWall.Prisonersofwarwereusuallykilledinsteadofbeingtakenasslaves.OnedifferencebetweenancientEgyptandChinaisthatclansplayedamuchlargerroleinChina.ClanswereregroupedincitiesandtheEmperormanagedrelationswithhissubjectsviatheheadsofclans(Finer,p.450;seealsoGreifandTabellini,2017).AnimportantadministrativeinnovationinancientChinaistheestablishmentofpopulationregistriestocontrolthemovementofpopulations.IncontrasttomedievalEurope,peopleneededanofficialpermittoliveinaparticularplace.ThemodernHukouthusalreadyexistedthousandsofyearsbeforetheCommunistRegime,putativelyalreadysincetheXiadynastyandthelegendaryYutheGreat.Interestingly,theMongolstookovertheinstitutionofpopulationregistryfromtheChineseinotherterritoriesthattheycontrolled,inparticularinRussiawhenitwasunderTatarcontrol,andtheRussianstookitoverintheirturnafterthecollapseoftheMongolEmpireandtheEstablishmentoftheRussiantsaristregimeoutoftheGrandDuchyofMoscowandkeptitundercommunismasthefamouspropiska,whichhelpedlimitfreedomofmovementofSovietcitizens.
OtherancientcivilizationslookedmuchmorelikeMesopotamia.Thiswas
verymuchthecaseforAssyria(growingoutofNorthernMesopotamiatotheWest,ancientGreece(coveringmodernGreecebutalsoAsiaMinorandtheSeainbetween)orancientPhenicia(locatedroughlyintheterritoryoftoday’sLebanon).Thesecivilizationswereabletobenefithighlyfromtradeandhadquitedevelopedforeignaswellasdomestictrade.Theyalsohadstrongsocialstratificationwithononehandfreecitizensenjoyinghereditarystatus,citizenshipandpoliticalparticipationrights,andontheotherhandpeoplewithoutrightsandfreedom,suchasslaves,butalsointermediatecategories.AncientGreeceinparticularwasdifficulttoconquerbecauseofitsgeography,alternatingmountainousterrainswithproximitytothesea,bothimportantobstaclestoexternalconquest.Proximitytotheseamadealsotaxationdifficultasmerchantscouldsmugglegoodsviatheseaandevadecustoms.
Thesedifferencesinancientcivilizationscouldbeobservedondifferent
continents.Everywherewherestateshadformed,somecountrieshadinstitutionsclosertoEgyptandChina,whileothershadinstitutionsclosertoMesopotamiaandancientGreece.
TheIncaEmpireinPeruandtheAndesregionwasforexampleverymuch
likeEgyptandChina.Tradewasverylimitedandproductionwasorganizedbythestateinwhatwascalled“verticalarchipelagos”(Murra,1968).TheAztecEmpireinCentralMexicoandtheMayasinSouthernMexicowereinsteadmoreorganizedascity-stateswheretherewasalargerolefortradeandmarkets(Trigger,pp.114-16).
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3. InstitutionalclustersintheAncientWorldandtheireffectsonmodernculture.
Thenarrativeoftheprevioussectiongiveusasenseofthekindofvariables
thatmaymatterindescribingancientsystemsaseitherstatistsystemsormarketsystems.
3.1. ClassifyinginstitutionsoftheAncientworld.
Thebasicforcesatplayleadingearlysocietiesintheancientworldtobeeither
statistormarketsystemscanbecharacterizedintermsoftwoofthemostimportant,arguablyeventhetwomostimportantprinciplesineconomics:thebenefitsfromtradeversusthebenefitsfromdivisionoflaborortaskspecialization.ThetheoryofcomparativeadvantagecreatedbyRicardoexplainshowtradecanmakeeverybodybetteroff.OnedoesnotevenneedRicardo’sideaaboutspecializinginone’scomparativeadvantagetounderstandthebenefitsfromtrade.TheCoasetheoremalreadyexplainshowtrademakeseverybodybetteroff.ThetheoryofdivisionoflaborcreatedbyAdamSmith,andhisexampleofthepinfactory,explainshowtaskspecializationcanspectacularlyexpandproductivity.Thesetwoprinciples1)thebenefitsfromtrade,2)thebenefitsfromdivisionoflaborcandeliverthekeyinsightsforwhywecouldobservethetwosystemsintheantiquity:marketsystemsversusstatistsystems.
Thesetwoprincipleshaveusuallybeenputforwardinthecontextof
industrialization.Notethattheforceoftheseprinciplesisequallyvalidinsocietieswherecapitalandtechnologywerelessdeveloped.Indeed,benefitsfromtradeareuniversallyvalid,buttheybecomestrongerwhenthecostsfromtradearebroughtdownviareductionintransportcostsmadepossiblebytechnologicalprogress.Similarly,thebenefitsfromspecializationcanbereapedwithoutmachines.Allthatisneededisadivisionoflaborandtaskstoproduceacertainkindofoutput.Ofcourse,machineshelpincreasethebenefitsfromthedivisionoflabor,buttheyarenotapreconditiontoenjoyitsbenefits.
Differentsocietiesfaceddifferentinitialconditions.Somewerefacing
heterogeneousconditionsofproductionintheirgeographicalsurroundings.Thiscreatedstrongpotentialbenefitsfromtrade,therebyencouragingtheformationofmarketsandaclassofmerchants,aswellasdemandforprotectionofprivatepropertyrights.Conversely,insocietieswhereconditionsofproductionweremorehomogeneousandwherepotentialbenefitsfromtradeweresmaller,itwaspossibleinsteadtoenjoylargerbenefitsfromdivisionoflaborbyhavingalargernumberofpeopleparticipateinproductionsoastoestablishamuchfinerdivisionoflaborandspecializationoftasks.Inthosesocieties,strongstatesdevelopedthatexercisedcontroloverallofsociety,withthemeansavailabletothematthetime.
Othergeographicalvariablescouldaffectthebenefitsoftraderelativetothe
benefitsofspecialization.Afirstoneiseasinessoftransport.Lowercostsof
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transportmadeitpossibletoengageintradeoverlargerdistances,makingitmorelikelytofindlargerbenefitsfromtrade.Geographicalclosenesstoahottradingzonewouldsimilarlyaffectthebenefitsfromtrade.
Geographymayalsohaveaffectedtheeasinessoftaxation,whichwould
favorthedevelopmentofthestate.Traderoutesoverlandmadeiteasiertopostcustomsofficerstotaxmerchantstravelingfromoneplacetoanother.Maritimetraderoutesontheotherhandmadeiteasiertosmugglegoods,especiallyifcommoditiescouldbeloadedandunloadedatdifferentplacesalongthecoast.
Geographicalvariablesmayalsoaffecttheeasinesswithwhichaterritory
couldbeinvaded,whichwouldalsofavorthedevelopmentofaterritorialstate.Plainsarethemostvulnerable.Mountainousareasoffermoreprotectionfrominvaders,aswellasbeingsurroundedbythesea.
Afewclarificationsareinorderhere.First,wheneconomistshear"task
specialization",theythink"gainsfromtrade".ThewaywethinkoftaskspecializationinantiquesocietiesisnotintheRicardiansenseofsectoralspecialization.ItismoreintheSmithiansense,asexplainedabove.Whenmorepeopleareinvolvedintheproductionofsomegood,itispossibletoorganizethedivisionoflaborbyallocatingspecializedtaskstoindividualssoastoenjoyproductivitygains.Somecoordinationisneededtodothat,andstatesabletoorganizethiscoordinationmayusetheirpowerforthispurpose.Second,onemaythinkthatproductivitygainsfromdivisionoflaborwereinexistentinancientsocieties.Theywereobviouslymorelimitedthaninindustrialsocieties,buttheywerenotinexistent.Weknowthatdivisionoflaborinplantationsviathe"gangsystem"helpedimproveagriculturalproductivity.Centralizedtransportmayhelpreducetransportcosts,taskspecializationinoperationsafterharvesting(threshing,drying,storing)canalsoimproveproductivity,etc..Asimilarreasoningcanbemadeforcraftworkinceramics,bronzeandthelike.
Thedifferenceinbenefitsoftraderelativetobenefitsofdivisionoflaborled
toacertainnumberofsharpinstitutionaldifferences.Thefirstrelatestopropertyrightsandthelaw.Statistsystemsdidnothaveprivatepropertyoralegalsystemtoprotectprivatepropertyrights.Onecanseethistypicallyforlandandslaves.Intheantiquity,landandslavelaborweretwoimportantfactorsofproduction;landbecauseoutputwasmostlycomposedofagriculturalproducts,andslavesbecausetheirlaborforcecouldcontributetoallsortsofproductsandservices.Instatistsystems,peasantswerenotowneroftheirland,whichbelongedtotheruler.SlaveswereputtoworkongovernmentprojectsliketheGreatWall,ofChinabuttherewasnoprivatemarketwherehouseholdscouldbuyandsellslaves.
Legalsystemswouldbedifferentinstatistandmarketsystems.Inmarket
systems,theroleofthelawwouldbetoprotectprivatepropertyrightsandtherightsoftheminorityoffreemenandwomen.Inotherwords,thelawwouldprotectcitizensfromboththestateaswellasfromothercitizensencroachingontheir
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rights.Instatistsystemsinstead,thelawisseenasaninstrumentusedbytherulertoensureobedienceofhissubjects.Thisis“rulebylaw”insteadof“ruleoflaw”.Inthiscase,thelawspecifiesthedutiesofsubjectstowardstheruleraswellasthepunishmentsassociatedtobreachoflaw.Thelawisthusmoreaninstrumentofoppressionthananinstrumentofprotection.Thebestexampleforthisisthe“legalist”doctrineinChinaintroducedbythefirstEmperorwhounifiedthecountryQinShiHuang,thefounderoftheQindynasty.
Differencesinpropertyrightsandlegalpropertyrightprotectionwould
translateintodifferencesindevelopmentofmarkets,bothdomesticandforeign.Marketsystemswouldhavedevelopedprivatemarkets.Privatemerchantswouldplayanimportantroleintrade,andtheirroleinsocietywouldbeimportant.Instatistsystems,domesticmarketswouldbelessdeveloped,foreigntradewouldbeconductedmostlyfortherulerorviagovernmentchannels.Privatemerchantswouldbemoremarginalizedinsociety.
Similarly,citieswouldplayamoreimportantroleinmarketsystems
comparedtostatistsystemssincemarketdevelopmentisassociatedtothedevelopmentofcities.Incontrast,instatistsystems,onewouldtendtoobservemorethedevelopmentofterritorialstatessinceastronggovernmentwouldbeabletocoordinateproductionoversufficientlylargeterritories.Statistterritorialstateswouldthusalsobemorecentralizedwhilemarketsystemswouldhavemoredecentralizedformsofgovernment.
Statistsystemswouldtendtobelesstoleranttowardsforeignerswhereas
marketsystemswouldbemoretolerant.Indeed,ahighleveloftradeisassociatedwithhighlevelofethnicdiversityasmerchantstravelinandoutofcountries.Instead,statistsystemswouldbewaryoftoleratingtoomanyforeignersonitsterritoryasitislesseasytoexercisecontroloverforeignersthanoverlocalsubjects.1
Similarly,weakclansystemswouldbemorefavorabletomarket
developmentwhereasstrongclansystemswouldbeassociatedwithnonmarketallocationofresourceswithintheclan.Whetherclanswerestrongorweakdependedmuchonexistingkinshipsystems.Manykinshipsystemsintheworldareunilineal,meaningthatsomeone’sdescendanceistracedthrougheitherthefather(patrilinealsystem)orthroughthemother(matrilinealsystem).Unilinealoragnaticsystemsaremorefavorableforclandevelopmentassomebody’smembershipofaclaniseasilytraceabletomaleorfemaleancestors.Livinginlargeclansmeansallocationofresourceswithintheclan,thuswithoutusingmarkettransactions.OtherkinshipsystemslikethebilinealorcognatickinshipsystemthathasbeenprevalentinNorthernEuropethroughouthistoryforexamplemeanthatone’sancestorsshouldbetracedthroughbothone’sfatherandmother.Withbilineal1SeetheveryinterestingarticlebyMichalopoulos(2012)onthegeographicaloriginsofethnicalandlinguisticdiversityintoday'sworld.
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systems,thereisnomoreaclearcutmembershipofaparticularclan.Householdstendtobemorenuclearfamilieswithlessextensivetiestootherfamilymembers.Asaconsequence,membersofnuclearfamilieshavetomakemoreuseofthemarketbyexchanginggoodsandserviceswithpeopleoutsidetheirfamily.Bilinealkinshipsystemswouldthustendtobeassociatedwithstrongerdevelopmentofmarketsandpropertyrights,whereasunilinealkinshipsystemswouldbeassociatedwithstrongclansandasmallerdevelopmentofmarkets(ontheeffectsofkinship,seetherecentpaperbyEnke,2017).AswasthecaseinancientChinaforexampleintheShangdynasty,theEmperorwouldruleoverhisterritoryviarelationswithclanheads,whereclanswerelivinginurbanconcentrations.
Onewouldalsoexpecttoseestrongersocialstratificationinmarketsystems
comparedtostatistsystems.Indeed,thisisimpliedbythecombinationofprivatemarketsforslavesaswellaslawsprotectingpropertyrightsofcitizens.InAthensforexample,freecitizensenjoyedthemostrightsastheycouldholdpoliticalofficesandvote.Metics,residentaliens,werefreebutdidnothavepoliticalrights.Finally,slaveshadnorightsatall.ThecastesysteminIndiaorhereditaryaristocracyinfeudalEuropeareillustrationsofstrongsocialstratification.Socialstratificationtendedtobelowerinstatistsystemsasmostpeoplewereunfreeandsharedthislackoffreedominaratheregalitarianway.
Table1summarizesourdiscussionofthecomparisonbetweenstatistand
marketsystems.Roland(2018)alsocontainsadetaileddiscussionofthiscomparison.
INSERTTABLE13.2. Theeffectofancientinstitutionsonmodernculture.Wenowdiscusstheeffectsofstatistandmarketsystemsonculture.Our
conceptualframeworkisverysimilartothecanonicalmodelofBisinandVerdier(2017)aboutthejointdynamicofinstitutionsandculture.Weindeedasktowhatextentthedifferentinstitutionalsystemsoftheancientworldaffectedsubsequentculturalvaluesandbeliefs.Wemakeseveralargumentstothatextent.Giventhefactthatthesedifferentinstitutionalsystemsexistedforaverylongtime,culturalsystemshadthetimetoemergeinaconsistentway.Giventheinertiaofculture(seeinparticularRoland,2004),itisplausibletothinkthatculturaldifferencesintheworldtodayare,atleasttoapartialextent,thelegaciesoftheculturalsystemsthatformedintheancientworld.
Firstofall,socialstratificationmayhaveworkedasapowerfulforceforthe
emergenceofindividualistculture.Indeed,animportantcharacteristicofindividualistcultureisthesocialprestigerewardfromstandingout.Socialstratificationleadsthoseatthetopofthesocialhierarchy(freecitizensinAthens,BrahmincastemembersinIndia,DukesandCountsinfeudalEurope)tostandout.Sincetheeliteplaysanimportantroleinelaboratinganddiffusingculturalvalues,
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onecanunderstandhowsocialstratificationleadstovaluesglorifyingsuchstratification.
Atthesametime,privatepropertyisalsoafactorleadingtothedevelopment
ofindividualistvalues.Theextentofprivatepropertymaybeseenasdefiningsomebody’sintrinsicvalue.Thelargerthesizeofone’sproperty,themoreonestandsoutandthehigherone’ssocialstatus.
Onecanalsounderstandhowstatistsystemswouldhavefosteredcollectivist
values.Firstofall,insidelargeclans,somedivisionoftasksexistedbetweenmembersoftheclan.Fulfillingone’spositionandfittinginthelifeofthecollectivity,whateverone’sposition,wouldberewardedbysocialprestige.Asimilarlogiccanbeseentoapplyoutsidetheclanandinsocietyatlarge,inparticularforthosehavingapositioninthegovernmentadministration.BeingaloyalservantoftheEmperorandfulfillingone’sdutieswouldberewardedbypromotion,butalsobysocialprestige.
Theseargumentsmayseemsomewhatabstractbutacomparisonofsomeof
themainphilosophiesandreligionsthatemergedintheAncientworldcanmaketheseideasmoreconcrete.Confucianistphilosophyisagoodexampleofacollectivistphilosophy.IthasbeenarguedthatthesuccessofConfucianistphilosophyatthetimeoftheZhoudynastywasduetothefactthatitcodifiedexistingsocialnormsandculturalvalues.WithoutexplainingindetailConfucianistphilosophy,itisquitestrikingthatitinsistsonpeopleholdingtheirrankinsocietyandfulfillingthedutiesoftheirrank.Thus,ayoungerbrotheristoshowrespecttowardsolderbrothers,asontohisfather,thelivingtotheirancestors,subjectstowardstheEmperor.Stabilityandorderrequirethatpeopleadheretoandobservethenormofbehaviorassociatedtotheirrankinsidethefamilyandwithinsociety.Similarly,underConfucianism,fatherswereobligedtotreattheirsonsfairly,andtheEmperorhadthedutyofbehavinginabenevolentwaytowardshissubjects,orelsehewouldrisklosingthe“MandateofHeaven”.Buddhistphilosophyalsohasstrongelementsofcollectivism.Buddhismdoesnotencourageindividualstostandout,butareinsteadencouragedtolosetheirindividuality,abstractfromtheirdesiresandmergewiththesurroundinguniverse.TheseEasternphilosophiesstandincontrastwithGreekphilosophyaswellasJudeo-Christianreligion(andlaterIslam),thataremoreindividualist.Greekphilosophyencouragesindividualstoexcel,beitasasoldier,aphilosopher,apoliticianoramerchant,andconsiderscompetitionashealthymeanstoexcellence.ChristianreligionemphasizessalvationoftheindividualandtherelationbetweentheindividualandGod.TheseaspectsofChristianreligionwerereinforcedlaterwiththedifferentvariantsofProtestantism.
Ifourhypothesesarevalid,thenweshouldseeanempiricallinkbetween
variablescharacterizingstatistsystemsandcollectivismononehand,andvariablescharacterizingmarketsystemsandindividualismontheotherhand.Itisnotthefirsttimesuchhypotheseshavebeenformulated,butIamnotawareofany
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historicaldatacollection,similartowhatwepresentinthispaper,withthepurposeofinvestigatingwhetherthesehypothesesholdwater.
4. AdatabaseonComparativeHistoricalInstitutions
Usingextensivehistoricalandarcheologicalsources,wecollecteddataon
thevariableslistedinTable1for97countries.Thecountrylistisnotexhaustive.WerestrictedourselvestothelistofcountriesforwhichwehaveHofstedeindividualism/collectivismscores,sincetheprimaryaimofourresearchistounderstandhowancientinstitutionalsystemsstillaffectmodernculture,i.e.valuesandbeliefs.
Thisfirstdatacollectionisbaseduniquelyonthereadingofhistoricaland
archeologicalscholarlysourcesonthetopic.Needlesstosay,thisinvolvesahugeeffortinthecollectionofhistoricalinformation.Indoingthisdatacollection,wehadtomakeseveralchoices.
Afirstchoicewehadtomakewasontheexacttimeperiodtofocusonfor
eachcountryforthedatacollection.Thebasicchoicewemadewastochoosetheoldestperiodofearlycivilizationforwhichwehavehistoricalandarcheologicalsources,andwhichcoincideswithancientstateformation,butnotalways.2Sincethereisarelativeinvarianceininstitutionalcharacteristics,especiallyatthetimeoftheformationofancientcivilizations,wecanbeconfidenttomeasurevariablesthathadacertaindegreeofpersistence.Thereisofcoursenoabsolutetimeinvarianceonallvariables,butitisneverthelessquitestrongwhenweconsiderallvariablestogether.Thistimechoicewasrelativelystraightforwardinmostcases,astheseancientcivilizationsaffectedfuturehistoricaldevelopments.ThisisobviousforexampleinthecaseofChina,ancientRomeorancientGreece.ItisnotobviousatallforancientEgypt,thelongestlastingancientcivilization,thatwasnotonlywipedouttwothousandyearsago,butthatdoesnotseemtohaveleftmanytracesincontemporaryEgypt.Onemightargueinthatcasethatlaterperiodsmightbemorerelevant.Itwould,inourview,howeverbearbitrarytodothingsthisway,andthiskindofdataselectionwouldbiasourdatacollectiontowardsfindingstrongpersistenceofearlyinstitutions.Wethinkitismoretransparenttolookasfaraspossibleinhistorytounderstandtheemergenceofparticularinstitutionalclustersandtheirhistoricalimpact.Ontheotherhand,insomecases,notonlyhaveancientcivilizationsdisappeared,buttheirancientpopulationswerereplacedbynewandcompletelydifferentpopulations.ThisisthecaseforexamplewithBritishcoloniesintheUnitedStates,Australia,CanadaandNewZealandwhereimmigrationandthequasi-eliminationofindigenouspopulationsbythenewmigrantsprofoundlytransformedthosecountries.Forthosecountries,wesimplyusedtheinstitutionaldatawehavefortheUKsincethisisthelargestorigin2Forexample,thePhilippinesdidnotreallyhavestateformationbeforeSpanishcolonization.ThisisalsothecaseforsomeAfricantribes.
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ofthemigrants.Similarly,forSingapore,weusedthedatafromChina.Wemadesimilaradjustmentsinsomeothercasestoreflectlastinginvasionsandimportantpopulationmovements.Countrycompositionofmigrantsthusplayedanimportantroleinourchoiceoftimeperiodforacountry.Achoicethatispotentiallymorecontroversialisthechoiceofthepost-TatarDuchyofMuscowyforRussia.RussianhistoriographyalwaysemphasizesKievanRusasthecradleofRussiancivilization,butthishasbecomemoreandmorecontroversialovertime.WethinkourchoiceisreasonablesincetsaristRussiareallystartedtodeveloponlyaftertheeliminationoftheTataryoke,andourdatacollectionshowsthattheTatarsleftadeepinfluenceonRussia’sinstitutions.
Asecondissuehastodowiththeabsenceofoverlapbetweencurrent
countryboundariesandancientboundaries.Ifancientboundariesarelargerthanthecurrentones,thereisnoproblem.Theproblemariseswhenancientboundariesweresmallerthanthecurrentones.Thisismostlythecaseforsomebigcountries.ThemostobviouscaseisIndia.Here,wecollecteddataontheinstitutionsofthreeancientempires/kingdoms:theMauryanEmpire(322BCE-185BCE)thatcoveredmostlyNorthernIndiabutexpandedmosttotheSouthunderEmperorAshoka;theBengalKingdomthatstraddledcurrentBanglaDeshandcurrentWestBengalinIndia,aswellastheTamilkingdoms.Similarly,thecurrentterritoryofSouthVietnamwascoveredforaverylongtimebytheChampaEmpire(27BCE-1453CE),whileNorthVietnamwaspartofChinaformorethanthousandyears.
Athirdissuehastodowiththefactthatinsomecases,therehavebeen
multipleinfluences.Wetriedtoavoidasmuchaspossibletochoosemultipletimeperiodsinhistory,butinsomecasesitwasimpossibletodootherwise.ThemostobviouscaseisthatofLatinAmerica.Ononehand,importantancientcivilizationshaddevelopedthere,whichareimpossibletoignore:theIncaintheAndesregion,theAztecinCentralMexicoandtheMayaaroundtheYucatanpeninsula.Ontheotherhand,Spanishcolonizationlastedmorethan400yearsandhadanenormousinfluenceonLatinAmerica.Insomecases,theinfluenceoftheSpanishwaspredominantastheyoccupiedterritoriesinhabitedbytribesthathadnotyetreachedstatehood,thatdiedoutorwerequasi-exterminated,andforwhichwehaveverylittleinformation.Againthepopulationcriterionplayedanimportantroleinourchoices.ThePhilippinetribeshadnotyetreachedstatehoodbythetimeofSpanishcolonization,buttheautochtonouspopulationremainedverylarge,sowetooktheirinfluenceintoaccount.AchoicethatmayappearcontroversialisthatwedidnottakeintoaccountanycolonialinfluenceinAfrica,exceptforSouthAfricacolonizedbytheBoers.Indeed,thecolonialerainAfricahasbeenmuchshorter(roughly100years)thaninLatinAmericaandonecanarguethatcolonialpowersinAfricadidnotleaveanimprintasbigastheSpanish(orthePortuguese)leftinLatinAmerica.
TableA1inAppendixAshowsthemappingbetweenmoderncountriesand
ancientfoundingcivilizations.
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Wescoredmostofthevariableswecollectedwithnumbersfrom1to10,usingparticularcriteriaforourscoring.Insomecases,weconstructedvariablesassumofparticularsub-indicators.Thepurposeistocaptureasmuchaspossiblecontinuityinmeasurementofvariables.Othervariableswerebynecessitycodedasdummyvariables.Thisisthecaseforkinshipvariables(unilinealvsbilineal)aswellaswhethertheancientcountrieswerecity-statesorterritorialstates.Theappendixcontainsthescoringcriteriausedforeachofthevariablesforwhichwecollectedinformation.A500pagelongwebappendixisavailablethatcontainsnotonlythescoresbutalsothesupportinghistoricalevidence.AppendixBcontainsthescoringrulesweusedforthemostimportantvariablesforwhichwecollecteddata.Manyofthesevariablescanbebettermeasured,especiallythosedeterminedtoalargeextentbygeography,somethingwhichwearedeterminedtodoinacomprehensivewayinfuturework.
Thedisadvantageofourmethodisthatwecanbeaccusedofarbitrarinessin
thescoring.Thisiswhywewanttomakethedataavailableinatransparentwaysoastocorrectpossiblemistakesofjudgment.
5. Preliminarydataanalysis
Westartbyshowingthecorrelationmatrixbetweenthevariableswe
collected.ThisisshowninTable2.Aswecanseefromsignificancelevels,manyofthevariablesarestronglycorrelated,whichisnotsurprisinggivenourexpectationsofobservinginstitutionalclusters.
INSERTTABLE25.1.Institutionalclustersinancienttimes.Toputsomeorderinourdescriptiveanalysis,westartbylookingatthe
relationbetweenexogenousvariablesandinstitutionalvariables.InTables3and4,welookattheeffectofgeographicalvariablesontheintensityoftradeinancienttimes.InTables5to10,welookatinstitutionalandsocialeffectsassociatedtohigherlevelsoftrade,andinTable11,welookatlongtermeffectsofearlyinstitutionsonculture.InTable12,welookattheeffectsofadifferentsetofgeographicalvariables,basedonobjectivemeasurement,showingthedirectionofsomeofourfuturework.
Table3looksattherelationbetweenheterogeneityofproduction
conditions,easeoftransportation,easinessoftaxationandclosenesstoahottradingzoneonintensityofdomestictrade,intensityofforeigntradeaswellasontheimportanceofmerchantsinsociety.NotethateasinessofconquestwasnotsignificantlycorrelatedwiththosevariablesandweomitteditintheTable.Thevariableshavetherightsignandaremostlysignificant.
INSERTTABLE3
17
Table4looksattheimportanceofcitiesinancienttimesasafunctionofthe
samevariablesandtheresultsareroughlysimilar.Notethateasinessoftaxationandeasinessofconquestarenotsignificant.Thelattereffectissomewhatsurprising.Citieswereusuallynotonlyhubsforcommerce,butalsoplacesofprotectionofcitizensfromoutsideaggression.Bettermeasurementisneededtobetterunderstandtheissueofeasinessofconquest.
INSERTTABLE4Table5looksatthedeterminantsoflegalsystems,i.e.whetherlegalsystems
were“citizentocitizen”protectingpropertyrights,orinstead“rulertosubject”regulatingthebehaviorofsubjectstowardstheirruler.Thisisthedistinctionbetween“ruleoflaw”and“rulebylaw”specifiedabove.Inthisrevisedversionofthepaper,weuseacompositelawindextomeasurethisasobjectivelyaspossible.Asdescribedintheappendix,thisvariableiscomposedofthreesub-variables:theextentoflawonprivateproperty,theextentofcontractlawanddevelopmentofprocedurallawinpubliclaw.Asonecansee,ahighervalueofourlawcompositeindexisassociatedwithahigherintensityofdomesticandinternationaltradeaswellastheimportanceofcitiesandmerchants.Itisalsoassociatedwithclosenesstoahottradingzone,which,asseeninTables3and4,affectedtheintensityoftrade.
INSERTTABLE5NotethatinTable5andallsubsequentTables,wedonotmakeanyclaims
ofcausality.OnlygeographicalvariablesusedinTables1and2sofarareplausiblyexogenous.Firstofall,causalchainsbetweenthevariableswearelookingatarearguablyquitecomplex.Forexample,intensityofprivatetrademayaffectdemandforlegalsystems,butprotectionofpropertyrightsshouldalsofosterintensityofprivatetrade.Similarremarkscanbemadeaboutalltheothervariableswearelookingat.Wedonotarguethatcausalityisnotimportant.Rather,inthisfirstexplorationofdate,wefinditextremelyusefultodocumentfirstsignificantandmeaningfulcorrelationsbetweenthevariableswecollected.Findingconvincingcausallinksbetweendifferentvariablesismoredemanding,andinsomecases,maybeoutofourreach,givendataavailability.Wearewellawareofthislimitationintheempiricalanalysispresentedinthispaper.
Table6looksattheextentoftheinstitutionofprivateslavery.Ourvariable
fortheextentofprivateslaveryisbasedonthesumoffoursub-indices:1)theprevalenceofprivateslavery,2)theextentofthelegalnormforprivateslavery,3)theextentofmarketsforslavesandslavetrade,4)therelativeimportanceoftheprivateslavepopulationinthetotalpopulation.RegressionresultsshowsimilareffectsasinTable5.Privateslavemarketsweremorepresentinplaceswheretherewashighintensityofdomesticandinternationaltradeandwheremerchantsandcitiesplayedamoreimportantrole.Itisalsocorrelatedwithgeographicalvariables
18
affectingtheintensityoftrade,inparticulartheeaseoftransportationandheterogeneityinconditionsofproduction.
INSERTTABLE6Table7looksattheextentofprivatepropertyofland.Theresultsarequite
similartothoseofTable6.Note,however,thatheterogeneityinconditionsofproductionisnotsignificanthere,whereasclosenesstoahottradingzoneis.ThisistheoppositeofwhatwehadinTable6.
INSERTTABLE7Table8looksattheextentofsocialstratificationinancienttimes.Aswecan
see,itispositivelycorrelatedwiththeimportanceofmarketsforprivateslaves,withthelawbeing“citizentocitizen”,withtheimportanceofmerchantsandwithprivatelandownership.Itisnotsignificantlyassociatedwithclanstrength.Itispositivelyassociatedwithheterogeneityinconditionsofproduction.Theseresultsarenotsurprisinggivenourabovediscussionthatmarketsystemstendtocreatemoresocialstratificationthanstatistsystems,wheremostpeoplearenotfree.
INSERTTABLE8Figures1and2lookattherelationshipbetweensomevariablesthattake
onlytwovalues.InFigure1,wecanseethatclanstrengthwasstrongerinunilinealkinshipsystemsrelativetobilinealkinshipsystems.Thisisnotsurprisinggivenourdiscussionofkinshipsystems.InFigure2,weseethatpropertyrightsoflandweremoredevelopedinplaceswithbilinealkinshipsystems,whichalsocorrespondstoouranalysisabove.
INSERTFIGURES1AND2Table9looksatclanstrength.Itisnegativelyassociatedwithvariables
relatedtothedevelopmentofmarkets,butwhenweincludeunilinealkinshipintheregression,mostofthesevariablesbecomenonsignificant,exceptfortheimportanceofmerchantsinsociety,withwhichitissignificantlynegativelycorrelated.
INSERTTABLE9Table10looksatthecorrelatesofpowercentralization.Thisisacomposite
variablethatcombinesthedegreeofconcentrationofpoweroftheexecutiveattheCenterandfiscalcentralization.Itissignificantlynegativelycorrelatedwithvariablesofmarketdevelopmentaswellaswitheaseoftransportation.
INSERTTABLE10
19
Fromthesedescriptiveregressions,wegetaprettygoodpictureofstatistversusmarketsystems.Statistsystemshadalowerintensityofdomesticandforeigntrade,citiesplayedlessofaroleandtheroleofmerchantswassmaller;legalsystemswerefocusedontherelationbetweenrulerandsubjectsratherthanrelationsbetweencitizens,theinstitutionofprivateslaverywaslesspresentandprivatelandownershipwaslessdeveloped;socialstratificationwasalsolessdevelopedandtherewasmorepowercentralization.Ourempiricalanalysisalsoshowsthatstatistsystemsweremorelikelytoemergeundergeographicalconditionswhereconditionsofproductionweremorehomogeneous,wheretransportwaslesseasybutwhereconditionsoftaxationwereeasier.Theseresultsareallconsistentwithourtheoreticaldiscussionfromsection3.
NotethatFenske(2014),followingBates(1983)showsempiricallythatin
pre-colonialAfrica,countrieswithhigherecologicaldiversity(whichcanbeinterpretedashigherheterogeneityofproduction),hadahighercentralizationofgovernmentinthesenseofMurdock'sEthnographicAtlas.Whilethisseemstobeincontradictiontothegeneralresultswefound,thisismostlyaboutwherestatesemergedversuswheretheydidnot.Thereisalargeliteratureonthequestionoftheconditionsofemergenceofstates,butthatisnotwhatisdiscussedinthispaper.OursampledoesnothavemanySub-Saharancountries,butthedatawecollecteddonotseemtocontradictourgeneralstory.Forexample,theYoruba(incurrentNigeria)haveahighindexinMurdock'scentralizationindex,butwereessentiallyorganizedalongcity-statesandhavealowgovernmentcentralizationindexinourdatabase,aswellasaveragescoresontradeandlegalvariables.
5.2.Ancientinstitutionsandmoderncultures.Wenowexaminetowhatextenttheseancientinstitutionalsystemsmay
haveaffectedmodernculture,aswehypothesizedinsection3.Inparticular,welookattheextenttowhichmarketsystemstendedtodevelopamoreindividualisticculture,whereasstatistsystemsdevelopedamorecollectivistculture.
First,weseeinFigure3thatindividualismscoresarehigherinplacesthat
usedtobeorganizedascity-statesratherthanasterritorialstates.Indeed,individualistcultureisassociatedwiththecultureofcitizenship,whichhasdeeperrootsinsocietiesthatwereorganizedascity-states.Figure4showsthatindividualismscoresarehigherinsocietiesthathadbilinealcomparedtounilinealkinshipsystems.Indeed,thelatterhadstrongerclansystems,whichismoreconducivetocollectivistculture.
INSERTFIGURES3AND4Table11looksattherelationbetweenacertainnumberofvariablesandthe
Hofstedeindividualismscores.Column1showsapositiveandsignificant
20
correlationbetweenprivateslaveryinantiquityandindividualism.Thiscanbeinterpretedasareducedformregressionasthelinkfromprivateslaverytoindividualismiscertainlynotdirect.Column2showsthesameforprivatepropertyofland.Column3showsthatancientlegalsystemsemphasizingrelationsbetweencitizensarepositivelyandsignificantlyassociatedwithindividualismscores.Column4showsanegativeandsignificantpositiveassociationwithclanstrength.Column5showsapositivebutnonsignificanteffectofsocialstratification.Column6showsthesameresultwithallthesefivevariablesinajointregression.Column7looksonlyatthegeographicalvariablesandshowsapositiveandsignificanteffectforeaseoftransportation.
INSERTTABLE11Wemustbecarefulininterpretingtheseresults.Theybynomeansprove
causalityfromancientinstitutionstomodernculture,buttheyaresuggestivethatthismightbethecase.Theseresultsareconsistentwithourviewthatancientmarketsystemsfosteredindividualistculturegivingsocialprestigetoindividualachievementwhereasstatistsystemsbredacollectivistcultureawardingsocialstatustoconformityandembeddedness.
5.3.Usinggeographicalregressors.Mostoftheresultsreportedinthispaperarebasedonscoringvariables
usinghistoricalandarcheologicalvariables.Inthissubsection,wereportsomeresultsusingmoderngeographicalvariables.Thejustificationisthatgeographydoesnotchangemuchovertimesothecorrelationsweareabletoreportbetweenthesegeographicalvariablesandourhistoricalvariables,whilenotaproofofcausality,shouldbeindicativeoftheforcesthathaveshapedinstitutionsandcultureovertime.Theresultswereportbelowshould,however,beseenonlyasaveryfirstexerciseinthisdirection.Wewouldneedamuchmorecomprehensivesetofgeographicalmeasurementsinordertofullycapturealltherelevantdatawecollectedfromthehistoricalandarcheologicalliterature.
Themostobviousvariablesrelatetotransportcosts.Distancetotheseais
measuredbythedistanceinkmtothecapitalofthepolityconsidered.Alowerdistanceshouldfacilitatetrade,duetothelowercostsoftradebysea.Itwouldthusmakeitpossibletoincreasethebenefitsfromtrade.RuggednessisavariablethathasbeenusedextensivelyinthedevelopmentliteraturestartingwithNunnandPuga(2012).Itcanplayaroleinmanyways.Highruggednessimplieshightransportcosts,andisthusnotbeneficialfortrade.Ontheotherhand,itmayprotectfromforeigninvadersandreduceeasinessofconquest,which,asarguedabove,shouldfavormarketsystems.Here,weuse100kmdistanceinalldirectionstomeasureruggednesscenteredaroundthecapitaltocountries'capital.3Weuse3Wealsolookedatruggednessat50kmdistance,withsimilarresultstothosewereporthere.
21
thelogofruggednessasadependentvariable.Wealsousethelogofthedistancetoacountry'scapitaltotheclosesthottradingzone,measuredhereinkms.Lowerdistanceshouldalsoincreasethebenefitsfromtrade.
Whileitisrelativelyeasytoconstructvariablesthataffecttransport(and
trade)costs,itismuchmoredifficulttocomeupwithcomprehensivegeographicalvariablesthatmeasurewelltheheterogeneityofconditionsofproduction.WeuseheresoilfractionalizationdatafromtheHarmonizedWorldSoildatabase.Soilfractionalizationcalculationsarecenteredaroundthecountries'ancientcapitals,usinga100kmradius.Thisisclearlyanimperfectmeasureasitonlycapturespotentialheterogeneityinagriculture,andisonlybasedonsoilconditions,notonactualcropsgrownintheantiquity.Infutureresearch,weshouldalsolookatthepresenceofnaturalresourcesandtheirgeographicaldistribution.
WeshowthemostrelevantregressionsusingthesevariablesinTable12.
Weuseaslefthandvariablesourtwomeasuresoftrade(domesticandinternational),thethreemainlegalinstitutionalvariables(privatepropertyrightsofslavesandoflandaswellasthelawcompositeindex)andsocialstratification.Thelastcolumnisareducedformregressionwhereindividualismisregressedonthefourgeographicalvariables.
INSERTTABLE12Theresultsarequiteencouraging.Weseethatdistancetotheseais
generallysignificant,andhastheexpected(negative)signfortradeandmarketinstitutions.Thesamethingistrueforthedistancetoahottradingzone.Therethusseemstobeacleareffectoftransportcostsontheformationofmarketsystems.Distancetotheseaisalsopositivelyrelatedtopowercentralization,whichisalsoconsistentwithwhatwewouldexpect.Theresultsaresomewhatmoremixed,intermsofsignificance,forruggednessandsoilfractionalization.Ruggednessalwayshastheexpectedsignifweinterpretitasrelatedtotransportcosts.Soilfractionalizationdoesnothavetheexpectedsignforforeigntrade,butisstronglynegativelycorrelatedwithpowercentralizationandpositivelyrelatedwithindividualism.Thereducedformforindividualismisparticularlyinterestingbecauseallcoefficientshavetherightsignandtheyareallsignificant,exceptfordistancetothesea.Whiletheseresultsareobviouslypreliminary,theytendtobeconsistentwiththeothertablesinthispaperaswellaswiththehypothesesformulated.
6. Conclusions.Wehaveputtogetheranewdatabaserelativetoinstitutionsinancient
history.Wefindthatsomesocietieswereorganizedasstatistsystemswithresourceallocationdonebythestate,underdevelopmentofpropertyrightsandlegalsystems
22
focusingonenforcingthepoweroftheruler.Othersocietiesweremoremarketoriented,withabigrolefortrade,bothdomesticallyandinternationally.Thesesocietieshadlegalsystemsfocusingmoreonconflictsbetweencitizens,suchasconflictsoverproperty.
Itappearsthatgeographymayhaveplayedanimportantroleindetermining
whetherancientsocietiesbecamestatistormarketsystems.Oneimportantvariablerelatestoheterogeneityorhomogeneityofconditionsofproduction.Heterogeneitycreatedlargebenefitsfromtrade,whichmayhaveledtotheemergenceofmarketsystems,whereasgreaterhomogeneitymayhavegeneratedbenefitsfromdivisionoflabor,whichmayhaveledtotheformationofstatistsystems.
Wehaveshownthatcountriesthatusedtoberuledbystatistsystemstend
todaytohaveamorecollectivistculture,whilecountrieswheremarketsystemsdevelopedinthepast,tendtohaveamoreindividualisticculture.
Thisresearchisonlyinitsbeginningandmanyquestionsareraisedrelative
tothedeeperreasonsbehindtheemergenceofthesetwodifferentsystemsintheantiquity.Forexample,howtoexplainwhycouldthebenefitsfromtradenotbereapedviacentralizedresourceallocation?
Amajorweaknessofthecurrentpaperisthatitdoesnothaveatheoretical
modeltoformulatehypothesesabouttherelationsbetweenthedifferentvariablesforwhichdatawerecollected.
Thedatacollectionneedstobemuchimproved.Inparticular,manyofthe
geographicalvariablesusedtoexplaindifferentinstitutionscancertainlybebettermeasured.Amorecompletesetofgeographicaldataaccountingfortheheterogeneityofconditionsofproductionindifferentpartsoftheworldwouldinparticularbemuchneeded.Giventhattheinstitutionaldatahavebeencollectedandscoredviaexistinghistoricalscholarship,onemayalsobeconcernedofpotentialbiasesindatacollection.Wewillputonlinenotonlyourscoresforparticularvariables,butalsoliteraturenotestojustifyparticularscores.
Finally,itisimportanttodisentanglerelationshipsbetweenmanyofthe
variablesintroducedhere.Wearewellawarethatthecurrentpaperdoesnotgobeyondbroadquantitativedescription.Nevertheless,giventhenoveltyofthedataandtheapproach,wethinkthisdescriptiveexerciseisanimportantfirststep.
23
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26
TABLES TABLE 1. Statist and Market Systems Compared.
market institutions statist institutions
Comparative advantage of trade heterogeneity of production conditions strong weak
easyness of transport strong weak closeness to hot trading zone strong weak Other geographical variables
easyness of taxation weak strong easyness of conquest weak strong strength of property rights
Legal system citizen-citizen Ruler-subject Land ownership Private and public Public Right to own slaves private and public public only Development of markets
internal markets strong weak, central allocation foreign trade private for the ruler role of merchants strong weak Importance of cities large weak Government and society
type of state city-state territorial state government decentralization strong weak tolerance to foreigners strong weak ethnic diversity strong weak social stratification strong weak strength of clan weak strong kinship bilineal unilineal
28
TABLE3:PotentialbenefitsofTradeandintensityofTradeinAncientTimes (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)VARIABLES tradewithin
politytradewithinpolity
tradeacrosspolities
tradewithinpolity
importanceofmerchants
importanceofmerchants
Easeoftransportation 0.333*** 0.284** 0.091 (0.105) (0.113) (0.103)Hetero.cond.production 0.473*** 0.308*** 0.439*** 0.328*** 0.282*** 0.167* (0.095) (0.103) (0.090) (0.091) (0.096) (0.100)Closetohottradingzone 0.232** 0.272** 0.322*** (0.103) (0.108) (0.104)Easinessoftaxation -0.293*** -0.227*** -0.414*** -0.242*** -0.407*** -0.330*** (0.082) (0.072) (0.087) (0.081) (0.069) (0.079) Observations 95 83 95 83 95 83R-squared 0.230 0.510 0.316 0.600 0.251 0.426Notes:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
29
Table4.Importanceofcitiesinancienttimes(commercialcities+urbanization) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)VARIABLES importanceofcities importanceofcities importanceof
citiesimportanceofcities
importanceofcities
Easeoftransportation 0.431*** 0.435*** 0.433*** (0.132) (0.125) (0.130)Hetero.cond.production 0.408*** 0.372*** 0.406*** 0.369*** 0.370*** (0.135) (0.112) (0.131) (0.111) (0.112)Closetohottradingzone 0.156 0.162 0.159 (0.127) (0.133) (0.131)Easinessoftaxation -0.160 -0.025 -0.022 (0.100) (0.096) (0.093)Easinessofconquest 0.137 -0.018 -0.012 (0.110) (0.094) (0.090) Observations 95 83 92 83 83R-squared 0.124 0.410 0.115 0.410 0.411Notes:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
30
Table5.InstitutionaleffectsonlawcompositeindexVARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Tradewithinpolity 0.505*** -0.008 (0.086) (0.146) Tradeacrosspolities 0.536*** 0.043 (0.083) (0.187) Roleofmerchants 0.751*** 0.731*** (0.067) (0.129) Importanceofcities 0.362*** -0.014 (0.092) (0.096) Easeoftransportation 0.059 (0.149)Hetero.cond.production 0.154 (0.136)Closetohottradingzone 0.317** (0.158) Observations 93 93 93 93 93 81R-squared 0.249 0.264 0.455 0.132 0.455 0.201Notes:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
31
Table6.Institutionaleffects.Privateownershipofslaves.VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Tradewithinpolity 0.396*** -0.126 (0.072) (0.130) Tradeacrosspolities 0.500*** 0.321** (0.069) (0.160) Roleofmerchants 0.528*** 0.350*** (0.074) (0.116) Importanceofcities 0.334*** 0.062 (0.071) (0.096) Easeoftransportation 0.370*** 0.266** (0.067) (0.105)Hetero.cond.Prod. 0.249** 0.283*** (0.110) (0.100)Closetohottradingz. 0.068 (0.105) Observations 95 95 95 95 95 95 83R-squared 0.238 0.352 0.359 0.180 0.422 0.284 0.298Notes:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
32
Table7.Institutionaleffects.PrivateOwnershipoflandVARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Tradewithinpolity 0.709*** 0.105 (0.075) (0.125) Tradeacrosspolities 0.787*** 0.518*** (0.066) (0.142) Roleofmerchants 0.833*** 0.479*** (0.055) (0.121) Importanceofcities 0.339*** -0.230*** (0.108) (0.078) Easeoftransportation 0.539*** 0.263** (0.083) (0.127)Hetero.cond.Prod. 0.183 0.061 (0.128) (0.129)Closetohottradingz. 0.323** (0.130) Observations 95 95 95 95 95 95 84R-squared 0.474 0.538 0.563 0.117 0.669 0.323 0.330Notes:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
33
Table8.Institutionaleffects.Socialstratificationinancienttimes.VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Privateslavery 0.190* -0.172 (0.096) (0.143) Lawcomposite 0.241*** 0.237** (0.078) (0.117) Roleofmerchants 0.269*** 0.365*** (0.074) (0.129) Privateland 0.147* -0.147 (0.076) (0.122) Strengthofclan -0.097 0.018 (0.066) (0.069) Easeoftransportation -0.077 (0.080)Hetero.cond.production
0.183**
(0.090)Closetohottradingz. 0.157** (0.079) Observations 95 93 96 95 96 91 84R-squared 0.052 0.128 0.134 0.050 0.031 0.222 0.122Notes:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
34
Table9.ClanstrengthVARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Tradewithinpolity -0.300** -0.043 0.462*** (0.122) (0.114) (0.173) Tradeacrosspolities -0.342** -0.174 -0.232 (0.133) (0.112) (0.228) Roleofmerchants -
0.562***-0.297** -0.432**
(0.116) (0.130) (0.191) Importanceofcities -0.049 (0.122) Unilinealkinship 3.605*** 3.514*** 3.120*** 3.590*** (0.617) (0.588) (0.657) (0.691) Easeoftransportation -
0.358***-0.133
(0.113) (0.186)Hetero.cond.production
-0.077 -0.002
(0.154) (0.153)Closetohottradingz. -0.248 (0.182) Observations 96 90 96 90 96 90 90 96 84R-squared 0.060 0.323 0.073 0.340 0.180 0.365 0.403 0.096 0.106Notes:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
35
Table10.PowercentralizationVARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Tradewithinpolity -0.243*** -0.214 (0.078) (0.146) Tradeacrosspolities -0.236*** -0.206 (0.079) (0.156) Roleofmerchants -0.162* 0.099 (0.092) (0.134) Importanceofcities -0.062 0.123 (0.079) (0.084) Easeoftransportation -0.251** (0.103)Hetero.cond.production
-0.193
(0.118)Closetohottradingz. 0.168* (0.097) Observations 93 93 93 93 93 82R-squared 0.095 0.084 0.036 0.007 0.121 0.069Notes:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
36
Table11.Longruneffectsofearlyinstitutionsonindividualism.VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Privateslavery 4.227*** -0.176 (0.927) (1.330) Privateland 5.885*** 7.641*** (0.552) (0.974) Lawcomposite 3.328*** -3.343*** (0.600) (0.960) Strengthofclan -2.952*** -1.450** (0.575) (0.593) Socialstratification 0.949 0.020 (1.047) (0.771) Easeoftransportation 4.082*** (1.032)Hetero.cond.Prod. 0.098 (0.952)Closetohottradingz. -0.038 (1.038) Observations 94 94 92 95 95 90 83R-squared 0.169 0.532 0.166 0.192 0.006 0.598 0.274Notes:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
37
Table12.Usinggeographicalregressors.VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Trade
withinthepolity
Tradeacrossthepolity
Privateslavery
Privateland
Lawcompositeindex
Powercentralization
Socialstratification
Individualism
Distancetothesea -0.002 -0.003** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.002 0.003** -0.002** -0.014 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.010)Log(rugged.100km) -0.160 -0.098 -0.161 -0.164* -0.012 0.196** 0.129 -2.292*** (0.099) (0.092) (0.119) (0.086) (0.119) (0.085) (0.083) (0.762)Soilfractionalization -2.601 -6.239*** -0.280 1.178 2.028 -4.968** -2.606 54.300*** (2.505) (2.196) (3.315) (2.693) (3.210) (2.008) (1.848) (20.312)Log(distancehottrad.zone)
-0.903*** -1.154*** -1.593*** -1.121*** -1.077*** 0.008 -0.238 -6.379***
(0.252) (0.225) (0.301) (0.220) (0.303) (0.233) (0.164) (1.610) Observations 80 80 80 79 78 80 80 79R-squared 0.203 0.313 0.349 0.324 0.205 0.188 0.100 0.308Notes:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
40
Figure3
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
city-state territorialstate
EarlyStateTypeandaverageindividualismscores
42
APPENDIXA.
TableA1.Timeperiodchoicefortheanalysis.Country Time period(s) Albania Ottoman Albania (1385-1912) Angola
Pre-colonial kingdoms: Kongo Kingdom (1390-1857), Ndongo Kingdom, Matamba Kingdom
Argentina
Spanish colony early 16th century (1516)-1816
Australia British colony (1788-1850) Austria Germanic tribes (1st century to 6th century) Bangladesh Bengal (5th century BC- 6th century AD) Belgium
- Ancient Rome (22BC-5th century) - Independent cities (1100s-1600s)
Bhutan Pre-modern Bhutan Theocracy government (Early 17th century-1907)
Brazil Portuguese colony (16th century (1500)-1822) Bulgaria
- First Bulgarian Empire (618-1018) - Second Bulgarian Empire (1185-1396) - Ottoman Bulgaria (1396-1878)
Burkina Faso Pre-colonial Mossi States (16th century-1896) Canada English colony after 1763 Chile - Inca Empire (1438-1533)
- Spanish colony (1541-1810) China
Shang Dynasty (c. 1600 BC- c. 1046 BC) Western Zhou Dynasty (c. 1046 BC-771 BC)
Colombia
- Inca Empire (1438-1533) - Spanish Colony (early 16th century (1525)-1810)
Costa Rica
Spanish Colony (early 16th century (1524)-1810)
Croatia - Ancient Rome (1st century AD-476AD) - Duchy, Kingdom of Croatia (8th century-925-1102, Frankish vassal) - Republic of Ragusa (Dubrovnik, 13th-19th century)
Czech Republic Bohemia (Přemyslids) (867-1306) Denmark The Vikings (8th century-mid-11th century) Dominican Republic Spanish Colony (1492-1795) Ecuador Inca Empire (1438-1533), Incan Conquest of Ecuador,
1463-1500 Spanish colony (1534-1822)
Egypt Ancient Egypt (3150 BC-525 BC) El Salvador Spanish Colony (1525-1821) Estonia
Estonian tribes (8th century-13th century, before the Crusade)
Ethiopia Kingdom of Axum (c. 100- c.900) Fiji British Colony (1874-1970) Finland
Finn tribes (8th century-13th century, before Christianization)
France
- - Ancient Rome (509 BC-476 AD)
43
- - The Franks (3rd century AD-7th century AD) Germany Germanic tribes (1st century to 6th century AD) Greece Classical Greece (510BC-323BC) Ghana Ashanti Confederacy (mid-17th century-1902) Guatemala - Mayan city-states (c. 250 AD- 16th century)
- Spanish colony 1524-1821 Honduras - Maya city-states (c. 250 AD- 16th century)
- Spanish colony 1526-1821 Hungary Arpad Dynasty (c. 895-1301) Iceland Icelandic Free State (Vikings) (c. 930-1262) India
- Mauryan Empire (326 BC-180 BC) - Tamil kingdoms (4th century BC-5th century AD) - Bengal (5th century BC-6th century AD)
Indonesia Early Indianized Kingdoms (1st century AD -1377 AD, end of Srivijaya)
Iran Achaemenid Empire (550 BC-330 BC) Iraq Assyria, Mesopotamia (c. 3000 BC-539 BC) Ireland Irish Kingdoms (5th century-9th century) Israel
Ancient Israel (c. 1000 BC- 586 BC, end of Kingdom of Judah)
Italy Ancient Rome (509 BC-476 AD) Jamaica
Spanish Colony (1494-1655) British Colony (1655-1962)
Japan Yamato and Asuka Japan (c.250-710) Kenya
Swahili city-states (8th century or 9th century-16th century) Kikuyu tribes (3d-13th century)
Korea Old Choson (3rd century BC-108 BC) Kuwait Mesopotamia (c. 3000 BC-539 BC) Latvia
Medieval Livonia (Bishoprics, archbishopric of Livonia, Livonian Order, Municipal City of Riga) (13th century-16th century)
Lebanon Phoenicia (c. 1500BC- 539 BC) Libya Same as Saudi Arabia Lithuania Grand Duchy of Lithuania (c. 1236-1569) Luxembourg Germanic tribes (1st century to 6th century) Malawi Pre-colonial kingdoms (17th century-19th century) Malaysia
Early Indianized Kingdoms (1st century AD-1377 AD, end of Srivijaya)
Mexico
- Maya city-states (c. 800 BC-c. 1600 AD) - Aztec Empire (1428-1521) - Spanish colony (1521-1821)
Morocco
Berber Morocco Dynasties: Idrisid Dynasty (788-974) Almoravid Dynasty (1040-1147) Almohad Dynasty (1121-1269)
Mozambique Portuguese Colony (1498-1975) Namibia German colony (1884-1915) Nepal Licchavi Kingdom (c. 400AD -879 AD) Netherlands Germanic tribes (1st century to 6th century)
Independent cities (1100s-1600s) New Zealand British colony (1841-1907) Nigeria Yoruba states (1300s-1896) Norway Viking Age (8th century-mid-11th century)
44
Pakistan
Ghaznavid Empire 977-1186 Ghurid Empire 1186-1215
Panama Spanish Colony (1510-1821) Peru
- Inca Empire (1438-1533) - Spanish colony (1534-1821)
Philippines
- Pre-colonial Philippines (900-1565) - Spanish Colony (1565-1898)
Poland Piast Dynasty (c. 960-1370) Portugal Medieval Kingdom of Portugal (1139-15th century) Romania
Ancient Rome (Roman Dacia) (106 AD-271 AD) Medieval: Transylvania (Hungary), Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia ( in 14th century-16th century)
Russia Muscovy (1283-1584) Saudi Arabia Arab tribes (early 7th century), Rashidun Caliphate (632-
661), Umayyad Caliphate (661-750) Senegal
Pre-colonial states and kingdoms (Bundu and Gajaaga states, Wolof kingdoms, Fulani Futa Toro) (1600s-1885)
Serbia
Nemanjić dynasty (1166-1371) Ottoman Serbia (14th or 15th century-1817)
Sierra Leone
The Temne and the Mende states (17th century? –before the 20th century) British colony (1808-1961)
Singapore
- China - Malaysia
Slovakia Same as Hungary Slovenia Ancient Rome + Slav tribes South Africa Dutch Cape Colony (1652-1795) Spain - Reconquista Castile (1065)-Leon(910); Crown of
Castile (1230-1492) (1492: end of Reconquista) - Aragon (est. 1035) - Catalonia (12th century-15th century)
Sri Lanka
Ancient Sri Lanka (Anuradhapura Kingdom) (377BC-1017)
Sweden Viking Age (8th century-mid-11th century) Switzerland Germanic tribes Germanic tribes (1st century to 6th
century) Syria Assyria, Mesopotamia (c. 3000 BC-539 BC) Taiwan China Tanzania Swahili city-states (8th century or 9th century-16th century)
Sukuma tribes (14th -19th century) Thailand Dvaravati Kingdoms (6th century-13th century) Trinidad and Tobago Colony (1498-early 19th century)
Turkey Seljuk Rum Sultanate (1077-1308); Ottoman Empire
(c.1299-1922) Evidence from early Ottoman Empire. United Arab Emirates Arab tribes (early 7th century), Rashidun Caliphate (632-
661), Umayyad Caliphate (661-750) United Kingdom Anglo-Saxons (5th century- 11th century AD) United States British colony (17th century-1776) Uruguay Banda Oriental (Spanish Colony and Portuguese Colony)
(1624 (First permanent settlement founded Banda
45
Oriental (Spanish Colony and Portuguese Colony) by the Spanish; 1680 Colônia do Sacramento founded by the Portuguese)-c. 1830)
Venezuela Spanish Colony (1522-1811) Vietnam North Vietnam Chinese rule and domination (111BC-
938AD) Champa city-states (2nd century-1832)
Zambia Pre-colonial kingdoms (Lozi, Kazembe, Bemba, 18th -late 19th century)
Table A2. Mapping between modern countries and ancient or founding civilizations Albania Illyria France Franks Angola Kongo, Mbundu, … ancient Rome Argentina Spanish colony Germany Ancient Germanic tribes Australia English colony Ghana Ashanti Austria ancient Germanic tribes Greece Ancient Greece Bangladesh Bengal Guatemala Spanish colony Belgium independent cities Honduras Spanish colony Bhutan Bhutan Hungary Hungary Brazil Portuguese colony Iceland Viking Bulgaria Blakanic Bulgaria India Mauryan Empire Burkina Faso Mossi kingdoms Tamil states Canada British colony Bengal Chile Inca Indonesia Indonesian Islands Spanish colony Iran Ancient Persia
China Ancient China (Shang and later) Iraq Mesopotamia
Colombia Inca Assyria spanish colony Ireland Celtic Ireland Costa Rica Spanish colony Israel ancient Israel
Croatia Ancient Rome + Eastern Adriatic coast Italy Ancient Rome
Czech Rep. Bohemia Jamaica Spanish colony Denmark Viking Japan Ancient Japan Dominican Rep. Spanish colony Kenya Swahili kingdoms
Ecuador Inca Korea Ancient Korea (Gokuryo, Baekje, Silla)
spanish colony Kuwait Mesopotamia Egypt Ancient Egypt Latvia Livonia El Salvador Spanish colony Lebanon Phenicia Estonia estonian tribes Libya Arabia Ethiopia Aksum Lithuania Grand Duchy of Lithuania Fiji Fiji Luxembourg Germanic tribes Finland Finnish tribes (continued below)
46
Table 2 (continuation) Malawi Maravi South Africa Boers Malaysia Malaysia + Sumatra Spain reconquista Castille Mexico Aztec Catalonia Maya Aragon Spanish colonizer Sri Lanka Sri Lanka Morocco Morocco Sweden Viking
Mozambique Tonga, Makua, Maravi and Karanga Switzerland Germanic tribes
Namibia German colony Syria Mesopotamia Nepal Nepal Assyria Netherlands Independent cities Taiwan China New Zealand English colony Tanzania Swahili kingdoms Nigeria Yoruba Thailand Dvaravati Norway Viking Trinidad and Tobago Spanish colony Pakistan Ghaznavid Turkey Seljuk/Ottoman Panama Spanish colony Assyria Peru Inca United Arab Emirates Arabia Spanish colony United Kingdom Saxons Philippines Spanish colony United States English colony pre-colonial Uruguay Spanish colony Poland Piast dynasty Venezuela Spanish colony Portugal reconquista Portugal Vietnam Champa
Romania Balkanic region Vietnam
North Vietnam/Southwest China/Tonkin
Russia Russia post-Tatar (Muscowy) Zambia Bemba Kingdom
Saudi Arabia Arabia Serbia Balkan Sierra Leone Tribes of Sierra Leone Singapore China Slovakia Hungary
Slovenia Ancient Rome + Balkan
47
APPENDIXB.SCORINGCRITERIA.
Heterogeneityofproduction.1-2:Veryhomogeneousgeographicalenvironment,oneoronlyafewkindsofresources.Typically,barrenlandduetoclimateorothergeographicalconstraints;alluvialplainonlyforgrainproduction;plantationeconomy3-4:Afewkindsofresources/products,somedifferencesofenvironmentacrossthegeographicalsurroundings.5-7:Somediversityofnotableresources,adifferentiatedenvironmentacrossthegeographicalsurroundingsandclosenesstoplaceswithdifferentresources.8-10:Verydiversegeographicalenvironment,manykindsofresources.Typically,vibrantinterregionaltradeofnaturalresourcesTradewithinPolity1-2:Noprivatetrade.Mainlydistributionviathestateapparatus.Somebarter.3-4:Verylimitedprivatetrade.Distributionandsubsistenceproduction.5-6:Tradelimitedinscope(goodstraded),locationandtime.7-8:Activetradewithsomelimitsandsignificantnon-marketactivity.9-10:Intensiveinternaltradeanimportantengineoftheeconomy,possiblyinconjunctionwithintensiveinternationaltrade.TradeacrossPolities1-2:Mostlyautarkyorforeigntradeconductedonlybygovernmentemissaries.3-4:Foreigntradecontrolledbythegovernment,usingsomeprivatemerchants.5-6:Substantialprivateforeigntradebutoveralllimitedrelativetothesizeoftheeconomy.Significanttradebarriersandcontraband7-8:Largeforeigntradewithtradebarriersbutquitewidespreadsmuggling9-10:Intensiveinternationaltradeconductedbyprivatemerchantsplayingakeyrolefortheeconomy.RoleofMerchants1:Almostallexchangeisbasedonreciprocityorredistribution.Nomarketsandmerchantsinrealsenseexistintheeconomy.2:Mostexchangeismainlybasedonreciprocityorredistribution.Merchantsarefewinnumberandaregenerallyrulers’agents.Marketsbarelyexist.3:Mostmerchantsarerulers’agentsandworkfortheruler,orrulersthemselvesaremerchants.Marketsarelimited.
48
4:Merchantsaregenerallyrulers’agentsbutalsoparticipateinprivatetrade.Thestatehasstrongmonopolyandregulationintheeconomy.Marketsarelimited.5:Privatemerchantsparticipateinastrictlyregulatedmarketsubjecttostateinterference.Somemerchantsmaybestateagents.Merchantsaresubjecttoclosesupervision,regulationandpredationfromthestate.Thestatemayhavemonopoliesinmanyindustries.Marketsexist.6:Privatemerchantsparticipateinastrictlyregulatedmarketsubjecttostateinterference.Merchantsaresubjecttosupervision,regulationorpredationfromthestate.Thestatemonopolizescertainindustries.Marketsexist.7:Privatemerchantsparticipateinaregulatedmarket.Merchantsaresubjecttocertainregulation,monopolyorpredationfromthestate.Marketsexist.8:Privatemerchantsparticipateinapartlyfreemarket.Merchantsaresubjecttocertainregulation,monopolyorpredationfromthestate.Largemarketsexist.9:Privatemerchantsparticipateinamostlyfreemarket.Largeandnumerousmarketsexist.10:Privatemerchantsparticipateinafree,developedmarket;largeandnumerousmarketsexist.
ImportanceofCitiesEstimatedurbanizationrate(U)0:completelyrural1:thepolityhasonlyafewsettlements/towns,citiesintherealsensedonotexist;verylowurbanpopulation.==0%2:thepolityhasafewtownsorlargesettlements;relativelylowurbanpopulation.<5%3:thepolityhasanumberoftownsorcities,mediumlevelurbanpopulation.5%-10%4:thepolityhasanotablenumberoftownsandcities;urbanpopulationisrelativelyhigh.10%-15%5:thepolityishighlyurbanized.Urbanpopulationisveryhigh.>15%CommercialFunctionofcities(C)1:almostallcitiesareadministrative/ceremonial/militarycenters;citiesarenotcommercialcenters2:citiesmostlyareadministrative/ceremonial/militarycenters;somecommercialfunction3:citiescombinedthefunctionofadministrationandcommerce4:citiesareprimarilycommercialandmanufacturingcenters5:citiesarecommercialandmanufacturingcentersTotalscore:Adding(U)and(C)LandOwnership
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1:Noevidenceofprivateownership,alllandpropertybelongstothestateortheruler.2:Noevidenceofprivateownershipinsociety,stateownershipandinstitutionalownership.3:Noevidenceofprivateownership,communalownershipdominates.Landexchangeisverylimited(mayonlyexistbetweentribes,villagesorcommunitiesunderveryspecificconditions)4:Privateownershipislimited,andcoexistswithcommunalorinstitutionalownership.Landisinheritablewithinthefamily.Landtransactionisrare.5:Privateownershipcoexistswithcommunalorinstitutionalownership.Landisconditionallyinheritable.Landtransaction(leasing,purchaseandsale)ispresentbutconditional,limitedorrestricted.6:Privatelandownershipdominates.Landisconditionallyinheritable.Landtransactionisveryrare.7:Privatelandownershipdominates.Landisinheritable.Landtransactionisrare.8:Mostlyprivatelandownershipbyindividual.Landisinheritable.Someevidenceoflandtransaction(leasing,purchaseandsale)9:Mostlyprivatelandownershipbyindividual.Landcanbeinherited,rent,orsoldanddisposedattheowner’sownwill.Landtransactioniscommon.10:Mostlyprivatelandownershipbyindividual.Landcanbeinherited,rent,orsoldanddisposedattheowner’sownwill.Landtransactionisverycommonandlandmarketexists.PrivateslaveryFoursubvariablesA)prevalenceofprivateslaveryB)legalorsocialnormofslaveryC)PresenceofSlavetradeandslavemarketD)(private)slavepopulationA:Prevalenceofprivateslavery:1:Almostallunfreelaborsareownedaspublicslavesworkingfortheruler,thestateorpublicinstitutions(temples,armies,etc.);noprivateslavery2:Mostunfreelaborsarepublicslaves3:Privateslavesandothertypesofunfreedependentlaborsuchasserfscoexist4:Mostunfreelaborareprivateslaves5:PredominantmostunfreelaborsareownedasprivateslavesB:Legalorsocialnormofslavery:1:Slavesarenotrecognizedaspropertybutusuallybeingregardedasservantsordependentsoftheruler.Slavescannotbemortgaged,boughtorsold;ornoslaves2:Slavesarenotdefinedaspropertybutusuallybeingregardedasservantsordependentsoftherulerormaster.Slavescanrarelybetransferredormortgagedunderspecialconditions3:Slavesarenotdefinedaspropertybutretaincertainrightsasperson.Slavesareboundedtolandorclansandgenerallycannotbebought,mortgagedorsoldconditionally(debtbondage,limitedserviceslavery,etc.)
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4:Slavesarenotdefinedasfullprivatepropertybutonlypartiallyorconditionallyortheyretaincertainrightsasperson.Slavescanbemortgaged,boughtorsold5:Slavesaredefinedinlaworcustomasfullprivateproperty,andtheycanbemortgaged,boughtorsoldattheowner’swillC:PresenceofSlavetradeandslavemarket:1:absenceornearabsenceofslavemarketorslavetrade2:slavemarketsandslavetradeexistsbutlimitedinscale3:slavemarketandslavetradeexist4:activeslavetradeandslavemarket;largenumberofslavesaretraded.5:veryactiveprivateslavetradeandprivateslavemarket;verylargenumberofslavestradedinmarketsD:Privateslavepopulation1:No(private)slavepopulation2:Privateslavesconstituteaverysmallportionoftotalpopulation3:Privateslavesconstituteaportionoftotalpopulation4:Privateslavesconstitutealargeportionoftotalpopulation5:PrivateslavesconstituteaverylargeportionoftotalpopulationLawSumofthreevariables:propertylaw,contractlawandformalpubliclaw.A.Propertylaw0:Nomentionofprivatepropertynoritsprotectionornoconceptofprivateproperty.Strongemphasisagainsttransgressionagainststateproperty.1:Nomentionofprivatepropertynoritsprotection,ornoconceptofprivateproperty2:Noexplicitmentionofprotectionofprivateproperty,butwrittencodesontransferofproperty,inheritanceofpropertyofindividualsandhowtosolvedisputesonproperty.3:writtencodesontransferofproperty,inheritanceofpropertyofindividualsandhowtosolvedisputesonpropertyandthelawalsoexplicitlymentionsprotectionofprivatepropertyagainstpotentialexpropriation.B.Contractlaw0:nomentionofcontractinlaws(theexistenceofCommercialLawusuallysuggestscontractlaw)1:unwrittenorcustomarylawthathascasesrelatedtocontract2:writtencontractlawmentioningcasesofcontractandenforcement3:writtencontractlawthathasdetailedconditionsonregulationandenforcementofcontract
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C.ComparisononPubliclaw0:Noprocedurallaw,usuallynospecificprocedureisfollowed1:Procedurebutlittleprotection2:Someformalizedwayofprocedure4:Writtenprocedurallaw*Customarylaw=0or1ImportanceofClanScoresarebasedonthesumofscoresofthefollowing5variables.A:familytype(nuclearfamilyvsextendedfamily)(2)0:nuclearfamilyisthemostcommonfamilytype1:mixed(stemfamiliesormixednuclearandextendedfamily)2:extendedlargefamily/compoundisthemostcommonfamilytypeB:importanceofunilinealdescentgroupinsociety(2)0:nounilinealdescentgroup1:unilinealdescentgrouponlyexistsinparticularsocialgroups(e.g.onlyimportantinnobility)2:unilinealdescentgroupisprevalentinallpartsofsocialgroupsC:localizedvs.nonlocalizeddescentgroup(2)0:thedescentgroupisdispersed.Unilineallyorbilaterallyrelatedindividualsarenotlocalizedinoneparticulararea.1:mixed2:thedescentgroupislocalized.Unilineallyrelatedindividualsliveinproximity(withinavillage,settlement,community,etc.)D:cooperationwithindescentgroup(2)0:thedescentgroupisnoncorporate.Individualreliesmoreonkindreds,networksofrelativesandfriends.1:thedescentgroupisaneconomicorpoliticalcorporationtosomeextent,butitsroleinsustainingcooperationislimited.2:thedescentgroup,actingasaneconomicandpoliticalcorporation,sustainscooperationwithinthegroupbyprovidingmemberspublicgoodsandsocialsafetynets,includingeducation,defenseandprotection,rituals,commoneconomicactivities,regulationofmarriage,ormutualassistance,etc.E:conflictresolution(2)0:authoritiesofthedescentgrouphasnoformalpowertoresolvedisputebetweenindividuals1:mixed
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2:authoritiesofthedescentgrouphavesupremepowertoresolvedisputesbetweenindividualswithinthegroup.Thewholedescentgrouphascollectiveresponsibilitywhileinconflictwithoutsiders.Socialstratification1:societyisnotstratified.Statusisnothereditary.Typicallyseeninpre-statesorintribes,clansbasedonkinship2:Fewdistinguishablesocialstrataexistedinsociety.Statusisnothereditaryforthemostcasesandwidespreadmobilitybetweendifferentsocialstrata3:Societyhasafewsocialstrata.Statusisnotstrictlyhereditaryandverticalmobilityispossiblethroughmeritocracy,individualskill,valor,pietyorwisdom4:Societyhasafewsocialstrata.Somestrataarehereditarywhilethereismobilityintheothers.(Example:Hereditaryfreemenandslaves.Lackedhereditaryaristocracywithinfreemen.theverticalmobilitywithinthegroupoffreemenispossibleandprevalent)5,6:Societyhasmanysocialstrata.Somestrataarehereditarywhilethereismobilityintheothers.(Example:Hereditaryfreemenandslaves.Weakhereditaryaristocracywithinfreemen.theverticalmobilitywithinthegroupoffreemenispossible)7:Societyhasmanysocialstrata.Moststrataarehereditary;limitedverticalmobilitybetweenstrata.Example:hereditaryfreemenandslaves.Withinthefreemengroup,therewerethedistinctionsbetweenhereditaryaristocraticgroupsandcommoners/peasants/serfs8:Societyishighlystratified.Casteexistsinmostsocialclasses/groups.Anindividual’sstatusisalmosthereditary.Limitedverticalmobilityamongdifferentstratainthehierarchy9:Societyishighlystratified.Casteexistsinmostsocialclasses/groups.Anindividual’sstatusisalmoststrictlyhereditary.Limitedverticalmobilityamongdifferentstratainthehierarchy10:Societyishighlystratified.Strongcastedistinctioninalmostallclasses/groups.Anindividual’sstatusisstrictlyhereditary.VerylimitedverticalmobilityamongdifferentstratainthehierarchyGovernmentcentralizationSumoftwovariables(concentrationofpoweranddegreeofcentralization)Concentrationofpowerinexecutiveinthecentralgovernment1-51:Theruler’sexecutivepowerisgreatlylimitedbylegislatureandjudiciaryinstitutions.Therulerissubjecttochangesmadebyelectionsorassemblydisapproval.2:therulerhaslargepowerintheexecutiverealmbutislimitedinothers.3:Therulerhaslargepowerinlegislature,executiveandjudiciaryrealmsbuthispowerconstrainedbyotherorganizationsorinstitutions(termlimits,assemblyconsent,legalconstraintsetc.)
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4:Therulerhaslargepowerinlegislature,executiveandjudiciaryrealmsbuthispowerispotentiallyconstrained.5:Therulerhasunlimitedpowerinlegislature,executiveandjudiciaryrealms.Therulergenerallyrulesforlife.Relationshipbetweencentralandlocalgovernment1-51:decentralized.Thelocalgovernmentisindependentfromthecenter.Thecentralgovernmenthasnopowerinappointinglocalofficialsorinterveninglocaladministration.2:decentralized.Thelocalgovernmentisdefactoautonomousfromthecenter.Thecentralgovernmenthaslimitedpowerinappointinglocalofficialsorinterveninglocaladministration.3:centralizeddelegationalsystem.Thelocalgovernmentisadministeredbyhereditarylocalrulers,andthecentralgovernmentcannotreplacelocalofficialsatwill.Noseparationofdifferentaspectsoflocaladministration.4:centralizedbureaucracy.Thelocalgovernmentisdirectlyappointedbyandresponsibletothecentralgovernment.Theseparationofpowersandregulartransferoflocalofficialsarenotinstitutionalizedornotexecuted5:centralizedbureaucracy.Thelocalgovernmentisadministeredbyseparateofficialswhoaredirectlyappointedbyandresponsibletothecentralgovernment.Localofficialscannotappointlower-levelofficialsatwill,andtheyaretransferredatregularintervals*Atotalscoreof1ifnopoliticalauthoritybeyondcommunity(e.g.,autonomousbandsandvillages)