Halaman 1 ISSN: 1579-4377 HUKUM LINGKUNGAN INTERNASIONAL: PENCEGAHAN POLUSI MINYAK DENGAN KAPAL Michinel-lvarez, MA Departemen Hukum Perdata. Universitas Vigo. Fakultas Hukum - Ourense / Sebagai Lagoas E-32004 (Spanyol) michinel@uvigo.es ABSTRAK Minyak adalah produk dasar yang paling diangkut di dunia terutama karena jarak antara produksi dan penerimaan tempat dan kebutuhan besar untuk perekonomian dan kehidupan biasa. Sebagai perdagangan minyak sangat kompetitif, untuk perusahaan minyak oleh karena itu sangat tidak diinginkan yang keselamatan transportasi akan menjadi dianggap penting, sejauh itu dapat secara dramatis kenaikan harga transportasi dan mengurangi keuntungan mereka. Namun konsekuensi yang timbul dari minyak kecelakaan tanker jauh lebih buruk daripada orang-orang keluar dari pengangkutan produk lainnya, khususnya karena biaya lingkungan. Pencegahan dan keselamatan kebijakan menghadapi pencemaran minyak oleh kapal-kapal harus mencapai keseimbangan yang tepat antara kedua kepentingan yang berlawanan. Makalah ini berkaitan dengan hukum mereka kerangka dari poin Internasional dan Eropa pandang. KATA KUNCI Minyak polusi, Kerusakan Lingkungan, Hukum Internasional, Maritim Tabungan, Hukum Laut. Halaman 2 Michinel-lvarez, MA dkk. EJEAFChe, 10 (7), 2011 [2586-2607] 2587 PENDAHULUAN Minyak adalah produk dasar yang paling diangkut di dunia dan mewakili lebih dari 35% dari semua barang dagangan yang dibawa oleh laut [1]. Hal ini terutama disebabkan oleh jarak geografis yang besar antara tempat-tempat produksi dan penerimaan dan kebutuhan besar minyak bumi atau denganproduk untuk perekonomian dan kehidupan biasa di setiap negara. Uni Eropa (UE) impor 27% dari produksi dunia; 90% dari jenis perdagangan maritim, 70% dari itu yang di Atlantik Samudra. Sebagai akibatnya, 1500 tanker minyak menavigasi perairan Eropa setiap tahun, meskipun mereka biasanya terdaftar di bawah bendera asing, Liberia, Panama, Bahama atau Malta yang paling umum (semua yang dikenal sebagai "flag of convenience" Serikat, yang menawarkan lebih

) lingkungan, keselamatan dan / atau undang-undang ketenagakerjaan kepada pemilik kapal permisif. Sebagai contoh, pada tahun 2002, sebelum kecelakaan dari "Prestige" di pantai barat laut Spanyol, usia rata-rata dari tanker minyak 18 tahun (dengan 40% dari mereka lebih tua dari 20 tahun). Tapi perdagangan minyak sangat kompetitif dan sangat penting karena itu untuk menemukan termurah tanker minyak untuk transportasi, dalam rangka untuk mendapatkan keuntungan lebih: tanker minyak tertua gunakan untuk menawarkan hubungan antara tonase terbaik dan harga transportasi. Untuk perusahaan-perusahaan minyak karena itu sangat diinginkan bahwa keselamatan transportasi akan menjadi dianggap sebagai faktor penting, karena sejauh secara dramatis dapat meningkatkan harga transportasi dan akibatnya mengurangi keuntungan mereka. Mencoba menghindari atau mengurangi kewajiban mereka, perusahaan minyak juga membagi armada mereka, menciptakan jaring kecil perusahaan, masing-masing memiliki satu kapal tua yang tergabung dalam surga pajak, sehingga membuatnya lebih sulit untuk tahu kepemilikan dalam rangka untuk mengklaim ganti rugi. Kecelakaan maritim selalu mungkin-sejauh seperti transportasi melalui laut selalu melibatkan risiko-tapi konsekuensi yang timbul dari sebuah kapal tanker minyak kecelakaan yang jauh lebih buruk daripada keluar dari pengangkutan produk lainnya, khususnya karena sifatnya biaya lingkungan. Semua faktor ini harus dipertimbangkan untuk memahami bagaimana kecelakaan itu mungkin-mungkin bahkan tidak dapat dihindari-dan apakah mereka akan dapat dihindari hari ini. KECELAKAAN DI DEPAN. Sebuah RE ATAS PERJANJIAN INTERNASIONAL UTAMA EFISIEN ? Konvensi PBB tentang Hukum Laut (UNCLOS). Konvensi PBB tentang Hukum Laut (UNCLOS) [2] adalah Perjanjian yang dihasilkan dari Konferensi Ketiga Bangsa Bangsa tentang Hukum Laut (1973-1982) dan mungkin adalah Perkembangan utama terbaru dalam hukum internasional yang mengatur lautan, menyediakan baru hukum yang universal kontrol untuk pengelolaan sumber daya alam kelautan dan juga kontrol polusi. Meskipun aspek-aspek ekonomi jelas berlaku, UNCLOS juga mencakup aturan tentang kapal polusi-pada dasarnya, dalam Bagian XII Konvensi [3] - dalam rangka membangun Amerika ' tugas dengan menyatakan kompetensi masing-masing, mencoba untuk menemukan keseimbangan yang tepat antara kebutuhan perlindungan lingkungan laut dan kebebasan prinsip navigasi, tapi akhirnya menyerah kepada kedua [4]. Konvensi ini menetapkan kewajiban umum untuk melindungi dan melestarikan lingkungan laut dan bagian pertama juga berisi ketentuan tentang

hak kedaulatan negara untuk mengeksploitasi sumber daya alam mereka, serta langkah-langkah untuk mencegah, mengurangi dan pengendalian pencemaran lingkungan laut, dan kewajiban tidak untuk mentransfer kerusakan atau bahaya atau mengubah satu jenis polusi ke lain dan untuk mengontrol penggunaan teknologi dan introduksi spesies asing atau baru [5]. Kesepakatan Bagian kedua dengan aturan tentang global dan daerah kerjasama seperti pemberitahuan kerusakan atau pertukaran studi dan penelitian. Dan bagian ketiga dan keempat berisi, masing-masing, ketentuan untuk bantuan teknis dan Halaman 3 Michinel-lvarez, MA dkk. EJEAFChe, 10 (7), 2011 [2586-2607] 2588 pemantauan dan penilaian lingkungan. Tapi aturan yang paling penting untuk tujuan ini adalah dalam bagian kelima dan keenam. Bagian kelima memberikan dasar bagi aturan-aturan internasional dan legislasi nasional untuk mencegah, mengurangi dan mengendalikan pencemaran lingkungan laut. Ini mencakup berbagai jenis polusi, tetapi hanya satu dalam artikel 211 ("polusi dari kapal") telah menarik di sini. Artikel ini menetapkan hak umum bagi Negara untuk membuat perjanjian di atas aturan internasional dan standar untuk mencegah, mengurangi dan mengendalikan pencemaran laut dari kapal. Ini membedakan antara bendera Amerika, Amerika pelabuhan dan pantai Amerika. Yang pertama "harus mengadopsi undangundang dan peraturan untuk pencegahan, pengurangan dan pengendalian pencemaran lingkungan laut dari kapal terbang mereka bendera atau registri mereka. Hukum dan peraturan sekurang-kurangnya memiliki efek yang sama seperti yang internasional yang diterima secara umum aturan dan standar yang ditetapkan melalui kompeten organisasi internasional atau konferensi diplomatik umum ". Adalah penting untuk menyadari bahwa mereka ketentuan nasional dapat lebih parah, tetapi tidak kurang dari peraturan-peraturan dan standar internasional, seperti yang dari organisasi-organisasi internasional seperti IMO atau ITO. Kedua, Amerika yang menetapkan persyaratan khusus dalam hal ini sebagai syarat untuk masuknya kapal asing ke pelabuhan atau perairan internal harus memberikan publisitas karena persyaratan tersebut dan akan berkomunikasi mereka untuk organisasi internasional yang kompeten. Akhirnya, Negara pantai dapat mengadopsi undang-undang, pertama di pelaksanaan kedaulatan mereka dalam laut teritorial mereka, untuk pencegahan, pengurangan dan

pengendalian pencemaran laut dari kapal-kapal asing, termasuk kapal yang melaksanakan Hak bersalah bagian (tapi tanpa menghambat bagian itu), dan kedua, menyangkut ekonomi mereka zona eksklusif, hukum untuk pencegahan, pengurangan dan pengendalian pencemaran dari kapal, sesuai dengan dan memberikan efek untuk aturan-aturan internasional yang diterima secara umum dan standar dibentuk melalui organisasi internasional yang kompeten atau konferensi diplomatik umum. Namun, untuk meningkatkan aturan dan standar internasional dianggap tidak memadai untuk daerah tertentu dari zona ekonomi eksklusif mereka, Negara pantai harus mengikuti aturan yang diberikan dalam ayat 6 pasal ini. Bagian keenam memberikan aturan penegakan dan juga membedakan antara bendera, pelabuhan dan pesisir Amerika. Amerika bendera harus menjamin: (i) kepatuhan internasional dan aturan internal dan standar oleh kapal-kapal terbang bendera mereka, terutama melarang berlayar sampai mereka dapat melanjutkan ke laut di bawah persyaratan-persyaratan; (ii) bahwa kapal-kapal membawa semua sertifikat yang dibutuhkan dan bahwa mereka secara berkala diperiksa untuk memverifikasi kesesuaian dari mereka sertifikat, dan (Iii) investigasi langsung pelanggaran yang dilakukan oleh kapal, meminta bantuan Negara lain jika perlu, atau atas permintaan tertulis Negara manapun, dan untuk proses lembaga di sehubungan dengan dugaan pelanggaran. Amerika port (i) dapat melakukan investigasi dan, jika dijamin, lembaga proses dalam hal untuk melepaskan apapun dari bahwa kapal luar internal perairan, laut teritorial atau zona ekonomi eksklusif negara itu, dan (ii) harus, sedapat mungkin, memenuhi permintaan dari negara manapun untuk investigasi pelanggaran debit dan dari bendera Negara untuk penyelidikan seperti pelanggaran terlepas dari mana itu terjadi. Dan pesisir Amerika (I) dapat institut proses sehubungan dengan pelanggaran hukum ketika telah terjadi di dalam nya teritorial laut atau zona ekonomi eksklusif, termasuk pemeriksaan fisik dan melakukan, saat bukti-bukti sehingga waran, bahkan penahanan kapal ketika menavigasi ke laut teritorialnya dan ada alasan yang jelas untuk memahami bahwa mereka telah melanggar undang-undang atau peraturan Negara yang dalam daerah itu; (ii) atau membutuhkan kapal untuk memberikan informasi ketika pelanggaran terjadi di dalam zona ekonomi eksklusif, dengan kemungkinan melakukan pemeriksaan fisik dalam kasus mereka menolak bahwa persyaratan dan bahkan lembaga pengadilan termasuk penahanan kapal. Namun, dalam kedua kasus setiap kali prosedur yang tepat telah ditetapkan (baik melalui organisasi internasional yang kompeten atau seperti yang telah disetujui), dimana sesuai dengan Halaman 4 Michinel-lvarez, MA dkk. EJEAFChe, 10 (7), 2011 [2586-2607] 2589

persyaratan untuk ikatan atau jaminan keuangan lainnya yang sesuai telah meyakinkan, pantai Negara, jika terikat oleh prosedur tersebut, akan memungkinkan kapal untuk melanjutkan [6]. Pasal 235 (Bagian 9) juga menetapkan tanggung jawab dan kewajiban dari Negara untuk pemenuhan kewajiban internasional mereka mengenai perlindungan dan pelestarian lingkungan laut. Mereka akan bertanggung jawab sesuai dengan hukum internasional. Namun, seperti yang Kecelakaan prestise jelas menunjukkan, diragukan apakah sistem ini bekerja dengan baik. Utama Masalahnya adalah bahwa tanggung jawab tertinggi masih tetap dengan flag (Bahama, dalam kasus dari Prestige) untuk memberikan aturan yang lebih baik mengenai keamanan perdagangan maritim, sementara Perjanjian daun negara pantai dalam posisi lemah, tidak memungkinkan mereka untuk mengambil langkahlangkah efektif, bahkan jika mereka tahu sebelumnya bahwa kapal tidak memenuhi persyaratan hukum mereka [7]. Dan meskipun Lampiran VI Perjanjian menetapkan Pengadilan Internasional Hukum Laut (saat ini menetap di Hamburg), tidak ada Negara bendera kemudahan (yaitu mereka yang rendah standar regulasi manfaat pemilik kapal) telah digugat di Pengadilan ini sampai sekarang. Ini adalah mengapa anggota Pemerintah dari IMO menyadari bahwa Amerika lebih efektif 'port kontrol dapat dilakukan dengan menandatangani daerah perjanjian [8] dan akibatnya saat ini beberapa dari mereka yang berlaku [9]. Diharapkan bahwa ini jaringan perjanjian regional akan meningkatkan kontrol kapal, meskipun hanya persentase kapal akan dikendalikan oleh mereka, tidak setiap MOU memiliki tingkat yang sama tuntutan dan tidak setiap Negara memiliki kemampuan teknologi untuk menegakkan mereka [10]. Konvensi Internasional untuk Pencegahan Pencemaran dari Kapal (MARPOL). Pada tahun 1948 PBB yang diusulkan untuk menciptakan Organisasi Maritim Internasional Consulting (hari ini dikenal sebagai IMO). Konvensi yang dihasilkan mulai berlaku pada 17 Maret 1958. Namun dalam 1954 Inggris juga menyelenggarakan Konferensi Internasional tentang Polusi Maritim, yang berakhir dengan adopsi dari Konvensi Internasional untuk Pencegahan Pencemaran Laut oleh Minyak (OILPOL) [11]. Jadi, pada rekening dari entri berikutnya berlakunya IMO Konvensi, administrasi OILPOL itu dipindahkan dari Britania Raya Pemerintah IMO. Namun kurang dari sepuluh tahun kemudian, pada 1967, kapal tanker Torrey Canyon tenggelam di Inggris Channel, menumpahkan 120.000 ton minyak ke laut, insiden ekologi terburuk tercatat sampai saat itu. Ini adalah alasan utama untuk IMO untuk mengadakan internasional yang baru konferensi di 1973 (sementara juga mengamandemen OILPOL), sehingga dalam Konvensi Internasional untuk Pencegahan Pencemaran dari Kapal (MARPOL), Perjanjian internasional utama tentang pencemaran lingkungan laut oleh kapal-kapal sejauh ini. MARPOL adalah hasil dari

kombinasi dari dua Perjanjian yang berbeda yang diadopsi oleh IMO pada tanggal 2 November 1973 dan pada tanggal 17 Februari 1978 masing-masing [12]. Saat ini meliputi enam Lampiran teknis, tapi hanya yang pertama ('Peraturan untuk Pencegahan Pencemaran oleh Minyak') memiliki kepentingan di sini. Yang MARPOL Lampiran I telah kemudian telah diubah dan diperbarui, biasanya sebagai konsekuensi dari kecelakaan baru, seperti yang dari Prestige, dan evolusinya dapat diringkas sebagai berikut [13]: Konvensi 1973 menerapkan kondisi minyak yang sama habis didirikan pada yang OILPOL, memungkinkan debit operasional ketika: a) jumlah total minyak yang tanker mungkin debit dalam pelayaran sementara pemberat di bawah jalan tidak boleh melebihi 1 / 15, 000 dari total membawa kargo kapasitas kapal; b) tingkat di mana minyak mungkin akan habis tidak boleh melebihi 60 liter per mil perjalanan dengan kapal tersebut; dan c) tidak keluarnya minyak apapun harus dilakukan dari ruang kargo kapal tanker dalam 50 mil dari daratan terdekat. Hal ini juga diperlukan bahwa minyak buku catatan disimpan dan bahwa jumlah maksimum minyak diperbolehkan untuk dibuang dikurangi. Konvensi ini juga dikenakan LOT ("beban di atas") mencuci sistem untuk kapal tanker dan diakui tertentu "khusus bidang" sehingga rentan terhadap polusi yang pembuangan minyak benar-benar dilarang di sana. Protokol 1978 membuat sejumlah perubahan. Sebagai contoh, terpisah Halaman 5 Michinel-lvarez, MA dkk. EJEAFChe, 10 (7), 2011 [2586-2607] 2590 tangki ballast (SBT) yang diperlukan pada semua kapal tanker 20.000 dwt baru dan di atas (pada induknya SBTs konvensi hanya diperlukan pada kapal tanker baru 70.000 dwt dan atas) dan mereka harus ditempatkan di lokasi yang dilindungi. Protokol 1978 juga memperkenalkan KK tersebut ("minyak mentah mencuci "), sehingga tangki dicuci dengan kargo itu sendiri. Drainase dan debit pengaturan juga dimodifikasi dan peraturan untuk sistem pengupasan diperbaiki yang diperlukan bersama dengan ketat kriteria untuk survei dan sertifikasi kapal. Tahun 1992 amandemen Annex I berhasil wajib untuk kapal tanker minyak baru untuk memiliki lambung ganda dan itu dibawa dalam fasein jadwal untuk tanker yang ada agar sesuai dengan lambung ganda, direvisi pada tahun 2001 dan 2003 [14]. Amandemen lainnya diadopsi pada 15 Oktober 2004 [15], serta Peraturan 22 dan 23 [16] dan Resolusi MEPC.164 (56) [17].

Meskipun semua amandemen diadopsi, filosofi regulasi MARPOL tetap cukup kontroversial. Pertama, karena tampaknya bahwa aturan-aturan baru hanya diperkenalkan setelah baru kecelakaan. Dan kedua, meskipun terkait dengan yang pertama, MARPOL mencoba untuk menemukan keseimbangan yang tepat antara kepentingan yang bertentangan dasarnya, yaitu ekonomis dan lingkungan. Ini adalah alasan mengapa aturan MARPOL memiliki waktu telah ditolak oleh lingkungan kelompok dan sektor perdagangan maritim. Contoh utama dari situasi ini adalah peraturan dari pentahapan keluar dari kapal tanker lambung tunggal. Sementara mantan diklaim untuk percepatan fase yang berikut contoh Eropa [18], yang kedua menunjuk pada berbagai kemungkinan negatif konsekuensi dari langkah-langkah baru, karena mereka takut pasokan minyak akan terancam oleh yang baru aturan dan bahwa angka kapal tanker akan meningkat. Selain itu, mereka mengatakan beberapa kapal tanker lambung tunggal yang aman akan terkena keluar fase-tidak perlu [19]. Jelas, kapal tanker lambung ganda dapat menawarkan perlindungan yang lebih besar dari lingkungan dalam kasus jenis tertentu kecelakaan, tetapi lambung ganda tidak tidak menawarkan jaminan mutlak, karena jika tabrakan serius adalah mungkin bahwa kedua lambung akan akan tertusuk. Dan menghadapi kecelakaan seperti itu, ternyata ada alasan teknis yang akan membuatnya lebih mudah untuk menyelamatkan lambung tunggal daripada sebuah kapal lambung ganda [20]. Jadi kita dapat menyimpulkan bahwa persyaratan lambung ganda tidak harus mengesampingkan kebutuhan untuk lingkungan lainnya langkah-langkah perlindungan. Dan ini adalah cara bahwa reformasi masa depan MARPOL harus mengikuti. Kemungkinan termasuk pengakuan baru "daerah khusus" [21]; meningkatkan lalu lintas kapal pemantauan dan sistem informasi, khususnya di dalam ZEE [22]; mengintensifkan inspeksi semua kapal [23]; skema pemisah lalu lintas [24]; dan meningkatkan kondisi kerja, keterampilan dan kemampuan staf kapal. T DIA E UROPEAN P OLICIES . Erika I & II Paket. Pada 16 Maret 1978 dengan Amoco Cadiz-tenggelam oleh Northwest pantai Perancis dan tumpah 230.000 ton minyak, menyebabkan salah satu bencana lingkungan terbesar sampai saat itu. Para Dewan Eropa, didorong oleh opini publik, meminta proposal dari Eropa Komisi tentang pengendalian dan pengurangan polusi minyak. Tapi meskipun tekad umum awalnya, dalam menghadapi bencana, Anggota Amerika mundur dari mengambil efektif

langkah-langkah pada skala Eropa, yang jauh lebih sulit pada waktu itu karena kebutuhan kebulatan suara. Hal itu perlu untuk menunggu sampai tahun sembilan puluhan untuk Dewan untuk mengadopsi, dengan memenuhi syarat mayoritas, empat elemen utama dari kebijakan keselamatan maritim otentik Eropa yang umum sampai dengan bahwa tanggal: Dewan Directive 95/21/EC [25]; Petunjuk Dewan 94/57/EC [26]; Dewan Petunjuk 93/75/EEC [27]; dan Peraturan Dewan (EC) No 2978/94 [28]. Tapi meskipun semua aturan-aturan, pada 12 Desember 1999 di depan pantai Bretagne di Northwest Perancis, dengan Erika tenggelam dan menumpahkan lebih dari 10.000 ton kargo. Jadi Komisi yang diusulkan Halaman 6 Michinel-lvarez, MA dkk. EJEAFChe, 10 (7), 2011 [2586-2607] 2591 langkah-langkah baru dengan maksud untuk mengubah dasar perdagangan transportasi minyak maritim di Eropa. Langkah-langkah ini diadopsi pada 21 Maret dan 6 Desember 2000 dan mereka juga dikenal sebagai paket I & II Erika masing-masing. Erika I & II paket menangani lima isu utama: (a) Kapal inspeksi dan survei organisasi: pada tanggal 19 Desember 2001 Directive 2001/105/EC Parlemen Eropa dan Dewan diadopsi mengubah Council Directive 94/57/EC [29], karena sejak penerapan Petunjuk 94/57/EC beberapa perkembangan telah terjadi dalam undang-undang yang relevan di Community dan tingkat internasional yang mengharuskan penyesuaian lebih lanjut akan dibuat [30]. (B) Pengendalian kapal ke Komunitas port: dengan 2001/106/EC Directive dari Parlemen Eropa dan Dewan 19 Desember 2001 diubah Council Directive 95/21/EC, mengingat bahwa beberapa kapal yang diajukan risiko nyata untuk keselamatan maritim dan lingkungan laut karena kondisi mereka yang buruk, bendera dan sejarah dan karena itu mereka harus ditolak akses ke port Masyarakat, beberapa pedoman harus ditetapkan menetapkan prosedur yang berlaku [31]. (C) Pentahapan keluar tanker lambung tunggal: Peraturan (EC) No 417/2002 Parlemen Eropa dan Dewan dari 18 Februari 2002 tentang percepatan pentahapan-di lambung ganda atau desain setara persyaratan untuk tanker minyak lambung tunggal mencabut Peraturan Dewan (EC) 2978/94 Tidak, untuk mendirikan dipercepat pentahapan-dalam skema untuk aplikasi lambung ganda atau setara desain persyaratan Konvensi MARPOL 73/78 untuk tanker minyak lambung tunggal [32]. (D) komunitas kapal dan sistem pemantauan lalu lintas informasi: Directive 2002/59/EC dari Parlemen Eropa dan Dewan 27 Juni 2002 membangun lalu lintas kapal Masyarakat pemantauan dan sistem informasi mencabut Council Directive 93/75/EEC, dengan maksud untuk meningkatkan keselamatan dan efisiensi lalu lintas maritim, meningkatkan respon pihak berwenang untuk

insiden, kecelakaan atau situasi yang berpotensi berbahaya di laut, termasuk pencarian dan penyelamatan operasi, dan memberikan kontribusi untuk pencegahan lebih baik dan deteksi polusi oleh kapalkapal [33]. (E) Pembentukan Badan Keselamatan Maritim Eropa (EMSA) dan Komite Aman Laut dan Pencegahan Pencemaran dari Kapal (collateral): Peraturan (EC) No 1406/2002 dari 27 Juni 2002 mendirikan Badan Keselamatan Maritim Eropa dan Peraturan (EC) No 2099/2002 dari Parlemen Eropa dan Dewan membentuk Komite Aman Laut dan Pencegahan Pencemaran dari Kapal (collateral) dan juga diubah Peraturan maritim keselamatan dan pencegahan polusi dari kapal [34]. Paket Ketiga langkah-langkah dan perkembangannya. Terlepas dari semua aturan, minggu ketiga bulan November 2002 adalah tentu yang hitam untuk indah pantai Galicia di barat laut Spanyol. Sebuah dua puluh enam tahun dan 42.820 ton tanker minyak kotor ironisnya disebut "Prestige" pada waktu itu 30 mil dari Cape Finisterre (Galicia, Spanyol) dalam perjalanan dari Ventspils (Latvia) ke Singapura. Kapal itu Liberia, terdaftar di Bahama, dikelola di Yunani dan disewa oleh sebuah perusahaan di Swiss nama seorang pedagang minyak Rusia, dan itu merapat selama lima tahun terakhir di pelabuhan Eropa [35]. Dia juga telah diperiksa empat kali di AS tanpa ditahan, dan disurvei di Dubai pada tahun 2002 di bawah naungan Biro Amerika Pengiriman (ABS, sebuah kapal klasifikasi masyarakat yang telah digugat di New York oleh Pemerintah Spanyol). Namun di 14 November 2002 dia menderita kerusakan struktural di laut berat untuk alasan yang masih tetap tidak pasti dan melayang ke dalam lima mil dari pantai Galicia, di mana ia mulai daftar dan bocor bahan bakarnya minyak berat kargo. Permintaan dilakukan oleh salvors untuk membawa kapal ke tempat berlindung ditolak oleh otoritas Spanyol, memerintahkan dia ditarik menjauh dari pantai. Pada 19 kapal akhirnya pecah jadi dua 160 mil jauhnya dari barat Vigo (Spanyol) dan tenggelam dalam kedalaman sekitar 3.500 meter dari air, melepaskan, secara total, lebih dari 60.000 dari 77.000 ton yang Halaman 7 Michinel-lvarez, MA dkk. EJEAFChe, 10 (7), 2011 [2586-2607] 2592 kargo. Pantai barat Galicia (suatu wilayah dengan industri perikanan penting) adalah sangat terkontaminasi dan minyak akhirnya pindah ke Teluk Biscay mempengaruhi pantai utara Spanyol dan barat daya Perancis, serta pantai utara Portugal. Rasanya akibatnya perlu untuk mengubah instrumen utama dari kebijakan keselamatan maritim Eropa, berikut ini rekomendasi dari paket ketiga langkah-langkah legislatif pada keamanan maritim di Uni Eropa, dari

pada 23 November 2005 [36], yang dirancang untuk meningkatkan keselamatan di laut, dengan meningkatkan pada saya Erika & Paket II, sementara pada saat yang sama berusaha untuk memperkuat daya saing bendera Eropa [37]. A. Kapal Inspeksi dan Organisasi Survei Masalah ini telah diperintah oleh Directive 2009/15/EC dari Parlemen Eropa dan Dewan aturan umum dan standar untuk inspeksi kapal dan organisasi survei dan untuk kegiatan yang relevan dari administrasi maritim 23 April 2009 [38], dan juga oleh Regulasi (EC) No 391/2009 Parlemen Eropa dan Dewan 23 April 2009 pada umum aturan dan standar untuk inspeksi kapal dan organisasi survei [39]. Mereka dimaksudkan untuk reformasi sistem untuk pengakuan masyarakat klasifikasi oleh Komunitas didirikan oleh Petunjuk 94/57/EC [40]. Prinsip-prinsip umum pada dasarnya mereka adalah orang-orang berikut: (i) reformasi kriteria pengakuan [41]. (Ii) Untuk memperkuat kewajiban organisasi yang diakui [42]. (Iii) Negara-negara Anggota dapat mengotorisasi atau mengandalkan organisasi untuk melakukan sepenuhnya atau sebagian inspeksi dan survei berkaitan dengan sertifikat perundang-undangan, dengan menetapkan sebuah "hubungan kerja" antara administrasi yang kompeten mereka dan organisasi yang bertindak atas nama mereka [43]. (Iv) reformasi sistem hukuman, yang melibatkan dua kali lipat tindakan: membangun sistem denda dan periodik penalti pembayaran, dan meramalkan untuk menarik pengakuan organisasi dalam kasus-kasus tertentu [44]. (Iv) Untuk detail tugas-tugas bahwa penilaian kualitas dan badan sertifikasi harus membawa [45]. B. Pengawasan Kapal ke Pelabuhan Masyarakat. Ada tiga mekanisme yang penting dikembangkan untuk meningkatkan daerah ini kebijakan keselamatan di EC. (I) Yang pertama adalah Peraturan (EC) No 725/2004 Parlemen Eropa dan Dewan dari 31 Maret 2004 [46] di atas kapal dan pelabuhan meningkatkan fasilitas keamanan [47]: mengandung langkah-langkah khusus tentang komunikasi informasi [48], khususnya tentang penyediaan keamanan informasi sebelum masuk ke port dari suatu Negara Anggota [49]; pemeriksaan keamanan di Anggota Amerika port [50]; aturan tentang pelaksanaan dan kesesuaian memeriksa [51] dan kerahasiaan pemeriksaan [52]; dan juga mencoba untuk mengkoordinasikan upaya-upaya Eropa dalam hal ini daerah dengan yang internasional, aturan mendirikan tentang keamanan alternatif atau setara perjanjian dan integrasi amandemen instrumen internasional [53]. (Ii) kedua peraturan-peraturan Directive 2005/65/EC adalah Parlemen Eropa dan Dewan tanggal 26 Oktober 2006 tentang keamanan pelabuhan meningkatkan [54], menjamin keamanan bahwa langkah yang diambil sesuai dengan Peraturan (EC) No 725/2004 dari manfaat keamanan yang ditingkatkan di bidang pelabuhan

kegiatan [55]. Ini memberikan negara-negara anggota harus menunjuk otoritas keamanan pelabuhan untuk setiap port dicakup oleh Instruksi ini [56]; bahwa penilaian keamanan pelabuhan dilakukan untuk port tertutup oleh Instruksi ini [57], sebuah keamanan pelabuhan rencana yang memadai akan membahas kekhususan bagian yang berbeda dari port dan akan mengintegrasikan rencana keamanan untuk fasilitas pelabuhan dalam mereka batas-batas yang dibentuk berdasarkan Peraturan (EC) No 725/2004 [58], sebuah sistem tiga keamanan tingkat [59]; dan petugas keamanan port yang harus disetujui oleh Negara Anggota yang bersangkutan untuk setiap port [60]. (Iii) Dan instrumen ketiga adalah Directive 2009/16/EC dari Eropa Halaman 8 Michinel-lvarez, MA dkk. EJEAFChe, 10 (7), 2011 [2586-2607] 2593 Parlemen dan Dewan Negara pada kontrol pelabuhan 23 April 2009 [61], dengan tujuan membentuk kembali yang 95/21/EC Petunjuk tua. Tujuan umum adalah untuk memastikan aplikasi yang lebih efektif sistem kontrol di pelabuhan dan jangkar dari Uni Eropa, khususnya: memperkuat kewajiban laporan di pilot [62]; memperluas dan menyederhanakan langkah-langkah akses penolakan [63]; memperketat persyaratan mengenai administrasi bertanggung jawab untuk inspeksi dan kompetensi inspektur [64]; meningkatkan perencanaan, persiapan dan membawa keluar dari inspeksi [65]; meningkatkan rezim inspeksi diperluas [66]; memperketat ketentuan tentang unsur manusia [67]; kontrol meningkatkan mengenai keamanan [68]; langkah-langkah untuk lebih besar transparansi dan penyebaran informasi yang lebih luas pada kapal dan operator [69]; dan memfasilitasi pemantauan oleh Komisi Petunjuk pelaksanaan oleh Anggota Serikat [70]. C. Pentahapan keluar Tanker Hull Tunggal. Saat ini Peraturan Komisi (EC) No 2172/2004 tanggal 17 Desember 2004, mengubah Peraturan (EC) No 417/2002 [71]: (i) Yang pertama telah disediakan hanya untuk menyesuaikan referensi dalam Peraturan (EC) 417/2002 Tidak untuk Annex I Konvensi MARPOL karena harus diperbarui dalam terang amandemen dilakukan untuk itu. (Ii) Yang kedua adalah lebih penting, seperti menganggap bahwa, karena amandemen Annex I MARPOL 73/78 mulai berlaku pada tanggal 5 April 2005, undang-undang Komunitas mirip dengan standar internasional yang mengikat semua kapal, terlepas dari bendera mereka dan tujuan, tetapi ia meninggalkan pilihan terbuka untuk single-hull minyak

tanker mengibarkan bendera operasi luar Negara Anggota Uni Eropa port untuk mengambil keuntungan dari pembebasan dari Peraturan 13h (di atas n 16, 17). Komisi menganggap bahwa kemungkinan ini hukum tidak dapat diterima dari sudut pandang politik vis--vis negaranegara ketiga Para Pihak yang untuk MARPOL 73/78 mana Amerika Anggota Eropa Uni telah membuat komitmen formal tidak untuk menggunakan pengecualian ini. Harus ditekankan kemudian bahwa kapal-kapal yang mengibarkan bendera suatu negara ketiga tidak memiliki akses ke pelabuhan atau terminal lepas pantai bawah yurisdiksi Masyarakat jika mereka beroperasi di bawah pengecualian ini. Jadi Masyarakat standar yang memungkinkan kapal-kapal yang mengibarkan bendera Negara Anggota untuk menerapkan derogations luar Komunitas perairan yang tidak sejalan dengan posisi politik dan, sebagai hasilnya, Peraturan (EC) Tidak 417/2002 harus diubah baik untuk memastikan kepatuhan dengan komitmen politik yang dibuat oleh Negara anggota di tingkat internasional dan untuk memastikan bahwa kebijakan Masyarakat pada keselamatan maritim koheren [72]. D. Kapal Lalu Lintas dan Sistem Monitoring Informasi. Petunjuk 2009/17/EC dari Parlemen Eropa dan Dewan 23 April 2009 telah diubah Instruksi 2002/59/EC membangun Komunitas pemantauan lalu lintas kapal dan informasi sistem [73]. Untuk langkah-langkah yang ditetapkan oleh Directive 2002/59/EC untuk tetap efektif, yang sangat dekat menonton perlu disimpan pada mereka untuk memastikan bahwa mereka terus mengikuti operasional dan teknis kemajuan di dunia maritim. Oleh karena itu, beberapa ketentuan Petunjuk 2002/59/EC harus diubah: (i) Berkenaan dengan "tempat perlindungan" diatur dalam Pasal 20 dari Directive, rangkaian kunjungan inspeksi dan pertemuan yang diselenggarakan oleh Komisi dengan bantuan dari Badan Keselamatan Maritim Eropa (EMSA) disorot kriteria umum dan prinsip-prinsip pelaksanaan harmonis dan efektif Directive [74]. (Ii) Demikian pula, Proposal untuk memperkenalkan kewajiban untuk membawa sistem identifikasi otomatis (AIS) untuk memancing kapal lebih dari 15 meter merupakan respon terhadap sejumlah besar tabrakan yang melibatkan nelayan kapal yang jelas belum diidentifikasi oleh kapal komersial [75]. (Iii) Selain itu, Halaman 9 Michinel-lvarez, MA dkk. EJEAFChe, 10 (7), 2011 [2586-2607] 2594 harus diperiksa, sebagai upaya bersama antara Negara Anggota dan Komisi dan dengan

Bantuan EMSA, sampai sejauh mana itu akan mungkin untuk menggabungkan fungsi AIS dengan perikanan sistem pemantauan, terutama dengan tujuan untuk mengurangi jumlah peralatan di kapal [76]. E. EMSA dan collateral. (I) Pada tanggal 22 Juli 2003 Peraturan (EC) No 1644/2003 Parlemen Eropa dan Dewan telah diubah Peraturan (EC) 1406/2002 Tidak mendirikan Keselamatan Maritim Eropa Badan [77], hanya untuk membuat Peraturan (EC) 1049/2001 berlaku untuk Maritim Eropa Badan Keselamatan. (Ii) Tapi itu juga diubah pada tanggal 31 Maret 2004 oleh Peraturan (EC) No 724/2004 Parlemen Eropa dan Dewan mempengaruhi untuk artikel contoh 1 yang sekarang termasuk kewajiban untuk menyediakan Negara Anggota dengan bantuan teknis dan ilmiah 'dalam bidang pencemaran disengaja atau disengaja oleh kapal dan dukungan pada permintaan dengan sarana tambahan dengan cara yang efisien biaya mekanisme respon polusi Negara Anggota, tanpa mengurangi tanggung jawab negara pantai untuk memiliki mekanisme polusi respon yang tepat di tempat dan menghormati kerjasama yang ada antara Negara-negara Anggota dalam bidang ini '[78]. (Iii) Komisi Peraturan (EC) No 415/2004 dari 5 Maret 2004 diubah Peraturan (EC) No 2099/2002 dari European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Committee on Safe Seas and the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (COSS) [79], considering all the new regulations involving the COSS activity and therefore in order to include a reference to the Community acts conferring implementing powers on COSS that have entered into force following the adoption of that Regulation. (iv) For the purposes of implementing the new tasks of preventing and responding to pollution, the Administrative Board of the EMSA adopted on 22 October 2004 an Action Plan for Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response, which determines the Agency's oil pollution response activities and is aimed at optimum use of the financial resources available to the Agency. Dalam accordance with the Action Plan, the Agency is to play an active role in developing a centralised satellite imagery service for surveillance, the early detection of pollution and identification of the ships responsible. (v) Finally, Regulation (EC) No 1891/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 on multiannual funding for the action of the European Maritime Safety Agency in the field of response to pollution caused by ships, amended Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002, to provide for appropriate financial security for the funding of the tasks entrusted to the Agency, in the field of pollution response and other associated actions on the basis of a multiannual commitment [80]. DURING THE ACCIDENTS. T HE PROBLEM OF FINDING A PLACE OF REFUGE . The main question involved here is whether a vessel in distress has the right to enter a port of refuge or, in other words, whether a coastal State has the duty to offer a place of refuge. Para answers to this question vary from the absolute right of access for the ship, to the absolute right of refusal for the coastal State. The Spanish authorities refused to allow the Prestige to enter the Spanish ports. In principle, a coastal State exercises its rights of sovereignty over the internal

waters as well as over the territorial sea, being part of this right to keep foreign persons or vessels out, so an unconditioned exercise of this right of sovereignty would mean that a ship is not allowed to use the territorial sea of a foreign State. This is the main reasoning supporting the idea of an absolute right for the coastal States to refuse ships in distress [81]. But it seems possible to search for reasons limiting a State's sovereignty and therefore to find whether the existing Halaman 10 Michinel-lvarez, MA et al. EJEAFChe, 10(7), 2011 [2586-2607] 2595 international law creates a duty to offer a safe haven, although not under the so-called right of innocent passage, as described in Articles 17, 18 and 19 UNCLOS III [82]: indeed, ships in distress also enjoy this right for as long as they do not become a wreck [83], because under the UN Law of the Sea Convention, passage can only lose its non-innocent character when the active conduct of the ship falls under any of the non-innocent activities listed in the convention [84]. This right is an exception to the State's sovereignty in order to make maritime trade secure and economical, but it is indisputable that a huge tanker threatening to loose or already leaking thousands of tons of crude oil can not be called innocent [85]. Besides, the access to a place of refuge within the territorial sea in this case is not a temporary movement, as the right of innocent passage is described in article 18 UNCLOS. As International Law imposes on States an obligation to protect the marine environment [86], this may be seen as a legal basis for the duty to offer a place of refuge, better than the need for help [87], certainly an axiom of International Law [88], although too general and usually focused on seafarers to assist other vessels, but not on States. The practice apparently shows [89] that offering a place of refuge may be the better of two evils, under certain circumstances, regarding the environmental protection. But, for the same reason, it does not seem convenient to defend the idea of an absolute right to access for ships in distress [90]. It should be better to think of a third way, a solution taking into account the balancing of circumstances in every case, ie, the interests of the coastal State or the risks to which it is exposed, balanced with the States obligation to assist in the protection of persons and property aboard a vessel [91]. This theory may be improved by adding the principles of good decision making on the assumption that the access exists [92]. Because it is clear that if coastal States establish in advance a mechanism for objective decision making about the measures to be taken generally concerning salvage, protection, etc., it should help to facilitate the arrival of the ship in distress, using all the necessary safety measures and subject to the application of any special nautical instructions that may be imposed by the authority. Here, the case for one or a limited number of individuals who can make informed decisions on the basis of an objective assessment of all relevant factors and of the relative risks involved is a compelling one [93]. Anyway, it is obvious that rules regarding the liability of a State which always denies refuge to ships in distress are also necessary to complete that system, because where a State refuses entry to a place of refuge and that decision can be seen to have been made negligently, the State concerned will not only fail to recover all the damage which it sustains by reason of any ensuing pollution or other damage, but may be liable to compensate third parties who suffer damage [94].

Just in case it would be accepted the need to determine places of refuge in advance, it remains controversial if should such places be publicised or not. Misalnya, ada differing views among the member governments of the European Union on this issue, the Scandinavian countries tending to favour a published list, while the United Kingdom was concerned that such publicity would be harmful for their ports, and provoke hostile reactions from local interests in the places listed. This latter is likely to be an important factor, which probably tips the balance in favour of keeping confidential the location of governmentdesignated places of refuge [95] and it should be therefore taken into account when fixing compensations for the States of refuge, which in lack of effectiveness of the liability conventions [96] is more a matter of making the admission contingent on the basis of financial securities or insurance considerations [97]. All these problems should be important enough to prepare an international convention on places of refuge and ships in distress. But, until then, other possibilities may be suggested, like the improvement of reception facilities, in the form of large docks where the distressed ships may be directed and confined, thus confining at the same time leakages and risk of pollution: they Halaman 11 Michinel-lvarez, MA et al. EJEAFChe, 10(7), 2011 [2586-2607] 2596 would not only facilitate the decision making process, but also prevent the complex liability problem [98]. Funding arrangements should be made at the international level to finance this kind of measures, the shipping and the oil industry as well as coastal states being involved to share the costs [99]. T DIA S ALVAGE Sebuah GREEMENTS : DARI " NO CURE , NO PAY " ATAS SCOPIC C LAUSES

. Indeed, the Law of Salvage has its roots in antiquity. It is well known that the lex Rhodia de jactu (circa 500 BC to 300 BC) covered maritime matters in Greece and the surrounding Mediterranean, stating that if part of the cargo had to be jettisoned, the loss was to be borne by the ship owner and the owners of the cargo, and also granting voluntary salvors a reward for their layanan. But the law of salvage was not actually uniform until the beginning of the 20th Century. Following the preparation of a draft convention on 1905 by the Comite Maritime International (CMI), the Brussels Convention on Salvage was concluded on 1910. This Convention is a simple Treaty of just 19 articles, negotiated when only seven nations controlled 80 per cent of the world's maritime trade. And as half of that trade was registered in the British Empire, the text substantially reproduced the position of the English Law [100]. The main principle settled by the Brussels Convention is the so called no cure no pay, in its article two: Every act of assistance or salvage of which has had a useful result gives a right to equitable remuneration. Tidak ada remuneration is due if the services rendered have no beneficial result. In no case shall the sum to be paid exceed the value of the property salved. But the Brussels Convention was developed when the operation of ships and the occurrence of maritime casualties were on a smaller scale than today. Nowadays, when a serious incident occurs the professional salvors are needed, but they face the expenses of maintaining their equipment and expert crew. So, if they work under the no cure no pay principle they may receive little or no compensation at all, when the vessel is lost or has a low value. That happens quite frequently in the case of oil tankers in distress, although they remain a menace for the lingkungan. In the result, salvors would be inclined to refuse to attend casualties of this nature. To avoid the permanent threat of the disappearance of the professional salvage industry, but also to guarantee an adequate protection for the environment, it became necessary to establish exceptions to the no cure no pay rule [101]. The main ones were the Lloyd's Open Form (LOF) 1980 and the 1989 London Convention. LOF is the world's most successful and most often used salvage contract, kept under regular review by the Lloyd's Form Working Party which is made up of representatives from all sides of the shipping industry. Particularly after the sinking of the Amoco Cadiz in 1978, on one hand Lloyd's of London initiated a crucial change in salvage law also known as the safety net incorporated into the Lloyd's Open Form 1980, with the modification of the no cure no pay rule in relation to tankers laden with oil cargo. The safety net guaranteed the salvors his expenses and a fair rate for his crew in those cases when they had been unable to recover any or a sufficient salvage reward [102] without negligence on their part, this reward being payable only by the owner of the tanker. On the other hand, at a CMI meeting held in Montreal in 1981 representatives of hull and cargo insurers (more concerned with the effect of property salvage) and the P & I clubs (more concerned with the effect of environmental salvage) agreed two main points of principle [103]: the efforts in preventing damages should be one of the criteria for assessing salvage awards; a safety net system to compensate salvors for unsuccessful efforts that should be borne by the P & I Clubs. This agreement, also known as the Montreal Compromise, opened the doors to the Conference held in London from the 17th to the 28th of April 1989, which finished with the 1989

Halaman 12 Michinel-lvarez, MA et al. EJEAFChe, 10(7), 2011 [2586-2607] 2597 London International Convention on Salvage, in force from the 19th of July 1996. The 1989 Convention is a 34 articles Treaty divided in five Chapters [104] and it establishes a system known as special compensation in its article 14 [105]. The main differences between these rules and those of the safety net in the LOF 1980 can be summarized as follows [106]: a) special compensation was not limited to oil tankers, but applied to any type of vessel or cargo; b) the remedy was here dependent on a threat of damage to the environment; c) the remedy applied principally to services in coastal waters; d) the safety net established a 15% of the expenses discretionary increment, but under the Convention it is 30% (or even 100% in some instances); e) the safety net was just an adjunct to LOF, the special compensation applied to court proceedings. But the salvage of the environment through the special compensation is subordinated to the ordinary salvage of the property provided under article 13 [107] as article 8 (1) clearly shows [108], so the salvage of the environment without involving the salvage of marine property cannot be awarded special compensation [109]. And as article 13 (1) has been used both in the calculation of the salvage award and also the special compensation, whereas the top ceiling for the former is the salved value, it is logical to ask if the article 13 award should be raised to the salved value before the special compensation is assessed, the answer being found in the Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference, which provides that the tribunals are not in the obligation to do it this way, although they may do so [110]. If we also take into account the difficulties to distinguish between what should be covered by article 13 and by article 14 [111], it is understandable that a new instrument was needed to face these problems: the LOF 2000 and the SCOPIC Clause. LOF 2000 [112] is the result of a decision made to revise the current six page closely typed version, LOF95, and devise a more user friendly version. LOF 2000 is therefore a very much briefer and more straightforward contract than its predecessor, contained on two sides of a single page. The front page adopts the user-friendly BIMCO type box layout and it is the only part of the contract that needs to be completed by the parties, restricted to essential information relevant to the particular case; below the box lay-out and onto the reverse side of the document, there are twelve lettered clauses lettered A to L and two information notices [113], including provisions about the property liable for the payment of salvage, the currency of award, the duty to co-operate, the rights of termination or determining when the service is completed. Besides, on August 1999, an agreement made between the International Salvage Union and the International Group of P&I Clubs, known as the SCOPIC Clause, became available for use. SCOPIC was specifically designed by a sub committee of the Salvage Liaison Group to overcome the many problems experienced with the special compensation provisions of Article 14 of the 1989 Salvage Convention, and to address complaints by property and P&I insurers of the lack of information and their involvement in individual salvage cases. Since it was only introduced for a trial period, it was not considered appropriate to include more than a brief reference to it in LOF 2000, in

clause C [114] and D [115]. The SCOPIC Clause [116] contains the main terms of the agreement and the three Appendices attached are about the tariff rate of personnel, tugs and other craft and portable salvage equipment (A), the selection appointment and duties of ship owner casualty representatives on behalf of the ship owner beneficiairie (B) and the selection, appointment or duties of special representatives on behalf of the hull, machinery and cargo underwriters (C). Its main provisions are: a) Application: by giving of a written notice by the salvor to the salvage beneficiary of the adoption of SCOPIC, after some work has been done; it does not depend upon whether a threat to the marine environment can be established [117]. b) Supplementary nature: The SCOPIC Clause is contractual and not part of the general Law of the salvage, as a supplement to the main agreements on the terms of LOF 2000 [118]. c) Security: The ship owner Halaman 13 Michinel-lvarez, MA et al. EJEAFChe, 10(7), 2011 [2586-2607] 2598 needs to set up within two working days an amount of US $3 million in the form of a bank guarantee or a P & I Club letter [119]. d) Termination and Withdrawal: a salvor is entitled to terminate the operation if the total salvage costs exceed the value capable of being salved plus all sums of SCOPIC remuneration and he is also entitled to a five clear days' notice if the ship owner wishes to terminate the obligation to pay special compensation [120]. e) Tariffs and Rates: The SCOPIC remuneration is based on a schedule of tariff rates, the details of which appear on Appendix A (SCOPIC) to avoid arguments about what constitutes a fair rate [121], and they are subject to annual review [122]. f) Time of payment: if there is an article 13 award only 75 per cent of the amount exceeding its security will be paid within one month, the rest being ascertained and paid when the award has been assessed [123]. g) Relationship with the conventional property salvage: the special compensation under SCOPIC 2000 will only be payable by the ship owner beneficiary to the extent that its amount exceeds the award foreseen in article 13 of the 1989 Salvage Convention [124]. h) General environmental duties of salvors: they are similar to those provided for under Clause B LOF 2000 providing that while performing the salvage services the Contractors shall also make their best endeavours to prevent or minimise kerusakan lingkungan. i) Ship owner's Casualty Representative (SCR): SCOPIC makes provision for the ship owner to appoint a SCR attending the operation, with detailed provisions under Appendix B [125]. j) Disputes are subject to arbitration under the LOF procedure and a Code of Practice requires the contractor immediately to notify the P & I Club of a case in which SCOPIC may apply [126]. KESIMPULAN From the International Law point of view, preventing oil pollution by ships deals basically with two kinds of questions: on one hand, how to avoid ships accidents; on the other hand, how to minimize their results when they happen. Regarding the first question -before the accidents- two main points of interest should be analysed: firstly, the efficacy of the main International Law Treaties, ie, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL). Seperti yang telah shown, both of them should be urgently updated to face up all the issues related to the problem, although it seems difficult because of to the tension of interests in the international arena. Secondly, the European Union progressing integration process has also had consequences in this field, mainly due to the impact of several important accidents affecting the European coast lines. Therefore, different packages of measures that have been adopted to improve the safety of maritime trade, at the European scale, have been here analysed, focused on five main issues: Ship Inspection and Survey Organisations; Control of Ships into Community Ports; Phasing out the Single Hull Tankers; Vessels Traffic and Monitoring Information System; and the European Agen. The other set of questions -during the accidents- refers to the problem of finding a place of refuge and to the salvage agreements. The first one deals with whether a vessel in distress has the right to enter a port of refuge or, in other words, whether a coastal State has the duty to offer a place of refuge. The answers to this question vary from the absolute right of access for the ship, to the absolute right of refusal for the coastal State. The second one is an ancient problem -treated even by the Roman Law-. Today, a new tool has been developed to solve this kind of questions: the LOF 2000 and the SCOPIC Clause. Halaman 14 Michinel-lvarez, MA et al. EJEAFChe, 10(7), 2011 [2586-2607] 2599

REFERENSI 1 . In January 2010, there were 102,194 commercial ships in service, with a combined tonnage of 1,276,137 thousand dwt. Oil tankers accounted for 450 million dwt (35.3 per cent) and dry bulk carriers for 457 million dwt (35.8 per cent), representing annual increases of 7.6 and 9.1 per cent respectively (see UNCTAD, Ulasan dari Maritim Transport , 2010, hal 3, tersedia

di www.unctad.org/en/docs/rmt2010ch2_en.pdf). Although during 2009 global oil trade fell by 3.1% or 1.7 million b/d, a second consecutive decline and the largest since 1987 (see British Petroleum Statistical Review of Worlds Energy 2010 available at www.bp.com). 2 . It was signed in Montego Bay on 1982 and it entered in force on 16th November 1994. 3 . See articles 192 to 237 [although also, for example, articles 119 (VII) or 145 (XI)]. 4 . See the huge amount of competences granted to the flag States against the interests of the coastal States in article 94; also W. van der Velde, The Position of Coastal States and Casualty Ships in International Law, CMI Yearbook , 2003, pp. 479 y ss., p. 495. 5 . See articles 192 to 196. Particularly important here is the rule provided in the article 194.3 a) to minimize 'the release of toxic, harmful or noxious substances, especially those which are persistent from land-based sources from or through the atmosphere or by dumping'. 6 . These provisions apply in respect to national laws and regulations adopted pursuant to article 211.6. 7 . That was the main reason for Spain and France to sign a Treaty on 26th November 2002, allowing their authorities to control firmly vessels older than 15 years transporting petroleum or byproducts with a risk for the marine environment. Although this Treaty has no effects vis--vis third parties, it is important to notice that no State whose vessels have been deported from the Spanish or French EEZ has sued these States at the competent authorities. See J. Pueyo Losa, I. Lirola Delgado and JJ Urbina, En torno a la revisin del rgimen jurdico internacional de seguridad martima y proteccin del medio ambiente marino, a la luz del accidente del Prestige, Revista Espaola de Derecho Internacional , LV, 2003, pp. 42 y ss., p. 52. 8 .

IMO, Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the International Maritime Organisation , 2005, p. 48. 9 . Paris MOU, signed on January 26 1982; Via del Mar Treaty, signed on Chile, November 5 1992; Asian-Pacific MOU, signed in Tokyo, Japan, on December 1 1993; the Caribbean MOU, signed in Christchurch, Barbados, on February 9 1996; the Mediterranean MOU signed in Malta on July 11 1997; the Indic Ocean MOU, signed in Pretoria, South Africa, on June 5 1998; the Central and West African MOU, signed in Abuja, Nigeria, on October 22 1999; the Black Sea MOU, signed in Istanbul, Turkey, on April 7 2000. 10 . See X. Cachaldora Caldern, La evolucin legislativa internacional en materia de seguridad martima y proteccin del medio ambiente marino, El Prestige caso cerrado? (M. Michinel lvarez, ed.), SPUV, Vigo, 2006, p. 5 y ss. fn. 41. 11 . It entered into force on 26 July, 1958 and it was amended in 1962, 1969 and 1971. 12 . As the 1973 MARPOL Convention had not yet entered into force, the 1978 MARPOL Protocol absorbed the first one and entered into force on 2 of October, 1983. The 1973 Convention required ratification by 15 States, with a combined merchant fleet of not less than 50 percent of world shipping by gross tonnage, to enter into force. By 1976, it had only received three ratifications (Jordan, Kenya and Tunisia) representing less than 1% of the world's merchant shipping fleet (see http://www.imo.org). 13 . See also www.imo.org. 14 . The 2003 amendments to MARPOL Annex I Regulation 13G, prescribing further restrictions on the carriage of oil in single hull tankers, were adopted on 4 of December and came into force on 5 of April 2005, at the same time as new regulation 13 H, dealing with the carriage of heavy grades of oil. Di bawah

13G rule the very oldest single hull vessels are no longer allowed to carry oil, while a table details the phase out schedule for remaining single hull vessels, culminating in 2010 for vessels built in 1984 or later. Bawah the 13H rule single hull vessels of 5,000 tonnes DWT and above are no longer allowed to carry heavy grades of oil, subject to certain exemptions to be approved by the vessel's Flag state. There is provision under both regulations for Administrations to allow continued operation of individual vessels up to a maximum of 25 years after date of delivery, but coastal states can deny entry to vessels operating under keadaan seperti itu. 15 . They entered into force on 1 of January 2007, incorporating all the amendments since the entry into force of the Protocol in 1983, including the regulation 13G (regulation 20 in the revised annex) and Halaman 15 Michinel-lvarez, MA et al. EJEAFChe, 10(7), 2011 [2586-2607] 2600

regulation 13H (regulation 21 in the revised annex) on the phasing-in of double hull requirements for oil tanker. Now it is also separated, in different chapters, the construction and equipment provisions from the operational requirements and makes clear the distinctions between the requirements for new ships and those for existing ships. 16 . Respectively, pump-room bottom protection (on oil tankers of 5,000 tonnes deadweight and above constructed on or after 1 January 2007, the pump-room shall be provided with a double bottom) and accidental oil outflow performance (applicable to oil tankers delivered on or 1 January 2010). Lihat juga www.eagle.org/regulatory. 17

. The amendments to MARPOL Annex I (reception facilities outside Special Areas) and Annex IV (discharge of sewage) are adopted by this Resolution. The amendments were expected to be accepted on 1 Jun 08 and enter into force on 1 Dec 08. The amendment to Annex I adds reference to regulation 34 (Control of discharge of oil) in regulation 38.2.5 of Annex I of MARPOL 73/78. Under the amended text of regulation 38.2.5, reception facilities will be required to be provided in ports for oily bilge waters and other residues from tankers, which cannot be discharged in accordance with regulation 34. The amendments to Annex IV provide that the sewage originating from spaces containing living animals, should not be discharged instantaneously but at a moderate rate when the ship is en route and proceeding at not less than 4 knot. 18 . See below II.2.2 in this paper. 19 . See W. van der Velde, above fn. 4, hal 493, p. 495. 20 . See J. Labescat, Problmes Poss par la Double-coque en cas de Sauvetage de Naire Ptrolier, Rflexions sur les Doubles-coques , (F. Vallat, ed.), Paris, ATMA, 2004, p. 40. 21 . The Gulfs area waters Special Area under MARPOL Annex I was adopted as an amendment to MARPOL in 2006, and an MEPC 168(56) resolution was adopted in 2007 establishing 1 August 2008 as the date on which the discharge requirements take effect. The other special areas in Annex I are: Mediterranean Sea area; Baltic Sea area; Black Sea area; Red Sea area; Gulf of Aden area; Antarctic area; and North West European Waters. In the special areas, there are stricter controls on discharge of oily wastes. The IMOs Marine Environment Protection Committee [MARPOL, Annex V MEPC 172(57)] also decided that the Mediterranean Sea area become a Special Area under MARPOL Annex V from 1st of May 2009. 22 . See Resolution MSC.280(85) adopted on 1 December 2008, Amendments to the General Provisions on Ships Routeing [Resolution A 572(14) as amended], at http://www.imo.org. 23

. All ships falling under the scope of the MARPOL Annex IV and flying the flag of a Government which is a party to MARPOL Annex IV shall be certified by 27 September 2008. MARPOL Annex IV applies to ships engaged in international voyages: new ships over 400 Gross Tonnage and new ships of less than 400 Gross Tonnage, certified to carry more than 15 persons (crew and passengers). Untuk tujuan MARPOL Annex IV, a new ship is a ship which meets one of the following criteria: contracted for construction on/after 27 September 2003 or, in the absence of a construction contract, the keel is laid on/after 27 September 2003; or the ship is delivered on/after 27 September 2006. New ships under MARPOL Annex IV are bound to comply with applicable provisions as from 27. September 2003. Existing ships are bound to comply with applicable provisions and need to be certified no later than 27 September 2008 (5 years after entry into force of the Annex). 24 . It is foreseen in Rules 1 and 10 of the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREG) of 20 October 1972 (entry into force on 15 of July 1997). 25 . Of 19 June 1995, concerning the enforcement, in respect of shipping using Community ports and sailing in the waters under the jurisdiction of the Member States, of international standards for ship safety, pollution prevention and shipboard living and working conditions (port State control) OJ L 157, 7 July 1995, Directive as last amended by Commission Directive 1999/97/EC, OJ L 331, 23 December 1999. Ini established a system of port State control of shipping in the European Community based on uniform inspection and detention procedures. Halaman 16 Michinel-lvarez, MA et al. EJEAFChe, 10(7), 2011 [2586-2607] 2601

26

. Of 22 November 1994, on common rules and standards for ship inspection and survey organisations and for the relevant activities of maritime administrations, OJ L 319, 12 December 1994, Directive as amended by Commission Directive 97/58/EC, OJ L 274, 7.10.1997, p. 8. It established a system of Community-wide recognition of organisations that, in compliance with the international conventions, may be authorised to a various extent to inspect ships and issue the relevant safety certificates on behalf of the Member Status. 27 . Of 13 September 1993, concerning minimum requirements for vessels bound for or leaving Community ports and carrying dangerous or polluting goods OJ L 247, 5 October 1993, Directive as last amended by Commission Directive 98/74/EC, OJ L 276, 13.10.1998, p. 7. It introduced a system whereby the competent authorities receive information regarding ships bound for or leaving a Community port and carrying dangerous or polluting goods, and regarding incidents at sea. That Directive required the Commission to produce new proposals for the introduction of a fuller reporting system for the Community, possibly covering ships transiting along the coasts of Member Status. 28 . Of 21 November 1994, on the implementation of IMO Resolution A.747(18) on the application of tonnage measurement of ballast spaces in segregated ballast oil tankers, OJ L 319, 12 December 1994. 29 . OJ L 19, 22 of January 2002. In particular, for the purposes of Directive 94/57/EC, it was appropriate to apply the amendments to the international conventions together with the protocols and related codes of mandatory status, referred to in Article 2(d) of Directive 94/57/EC, which entered into force after the adoption of the Directive as well as the relevant International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Resolutions: 27 November 1997 IMO Resolution A.847(20) on guidelines to assist flag States in the implementation of IMO instruments; the International Safety Management (ISM) Code through IMO Assembly Resolution A.741(18) of 4 November 1993; 23 November 1995 IMO Resolution A.788(19) on guidelines on the

implementation of the ISM Code by maritime administrations; IMO Resolution A.746(18) of 4 November 1993 on Survey Guidelines under the Harmonised System of Survey and Certification. 30 . Its main points of interest are: (i) The initial recognition to the organisations wishing to be authorised to work on behalf of the Member States is assessed in a harmonised and centralised manner by the Commission together with the Member States requesting the recognition. (ii) In addition to the authority of Member States to suspend the authorisation of an organisation working on their behalf, a similar authority should apply at Community level to suspend the recognition of an organisation for a maximum of satu tahun. (iii) The qualitative criteria to be met by the technical organisations in order to be recognised at Community level and to maintain such recognition should include provisions to ensure that only exclusive surveyors can carry out the inspections and surveys required by international conventions. (iv) When submitting their request for recognition, classification societies and their surveyors should give an undertaking in writing on an individual basis not to accept statutory work where there is a likelihood of a konflik kepentingan. (v) The recognised organisations should provide all relevant statutory information concerning the conditions of the ships in their class to the port State control authorities and make it available to the general public. 31 . OJ L 19, 22 of January 2002. Its main points are: (i) To increase the inspection of ships with a high target factor at Community ports of call. (ii) To make mandatory the guidelines for inspections, in order to achieve uniform practices within the Community. (iii) Member States are entitled to organise the mandatory inspections efficiently so as to achieve the highest value added from a strengthened inspection regime, taking into account the various operational conditions and making use of cooperation between ports and Negara anggota. (iv) The inspection report produced by the inspector on completion of an inspection, should state which parts of the ship have already been inspected; the inspector at the following port of call will thus

be able to decide to refrain from inspecting a part of the ship if no deficiency was detected during the previous inspection. (v) On-board equipment, which enables voyage data to be recorded (VDR system or "black boxes"), should be mandatory after a period of up to five years after the entry into force of this Directive for cargo ships built before 1 July 2002 calling at Community ports. (vi) The administration of the flag State of a ship inspected or the classification society concerned should be informed of the result of inspection in order to ensure more effective monitoring. 32 . OJ L 64, 7 of March 2002. This Regulation shall apply to oil tankers of 5000 tons deadweight and above entering into a port or offshore terminal under the jurisdiction of a Member State, irrespective of their flag, or flying the flag of a Member State (with the exceptions of article 2.2). Basically, no oil tanker shall be allowed to operate under the flag of a Member State, nor shall any oil tanker, irrespective of its flag, be Halaman 17 Michinel-lvarez, MA et al. EJEAFChe, 10(7), 2011 [2586-2607] 2602

allowed to enter into ports or offshore terminals under the jurisdiction of a Member State after the anniversary of the date of delivery of the ship in the year specified (article 4.1), unless such tanker is a double hull oil tanker. 33 . OJ L 208, 5 of August 2002. According to this Directive (i) the operator, agent or master of a ship bound for a port of a Member State shall notify the information required to the port authority at least twenty-four hours in advance; or at the latest, at the time the ship leaves the previous port, if the voyage time is less than twenty-four hours; or if the port of call is not known or it is changed during the voyage, as

soon as this information is available. (ii) Member States shall ensure that all ships entering the area of a mandatory ships' routing system adopted by the IMO use the system in accordance with the relevant guidelines and criteria developed by the IMO. (iii) Member States shall monitor and take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure that ships calling at a port of a Member State are fitted with a voyage data recorder (VDR) system. (iv) No dangerous or polluting goods may be offered for carriage or taken on board any ship, irrespective of its size, in a port of a Member State unless a declaration has been delivered to the master or operator containing the information listed in Annex I and specific duties on notification of dangerous or polluting goods carried on board are provided. (v) The obligation of reporting incidents and accidents for the master of a ship sailing within their search and rescue region/exclusive economic zone or setara. (vi) A set of measures to take in the event of exceptionally bad weather and relating incidents or accidents at the sea is also specified. 34 . OJ L 208, 5 August 2002 and OJ L 324, 29 November 2002 respectively. As it main tasks, the EMSA shall: (i) assist the Commission in the preparatory works for updating and developing Community legislation in the field of maritime safety and prevention of pollution by ships; (ii) assist the Commission in the effective implementation of Community legislation on maritime safety and prevention of pollution by ships throughout the Community; (iii) organise relevant training activities in fields which are the responsibility of the port State and flag State and develop technical solutions and provide technical assistance related to the implementation of Community legislation; (iv) promote cooperation between riparian States in the shipping areas concerned in the fields covered by the Directive 2002/59/CE; (v) facilitate cooperation between the Member States and the Commission in the development of a common methodology for investigating maritime accidents; (vi) provide the Commission and the Member States with objective, reliable and comparable information and data on maritime safety and on pollution by ships; (vii) and in the course of negotiations with States applying for accession the Agency may provide technical

assistance as regards the implementation of Community legislation in the field of maritime safety and prevention of pollution by chips. The role of COSS is to centralise the tasks of the committees set up under the Community legislation on maritime safety, the prevention of pollution from ships and the protection of shipboard living and working conditions and to assist and advise the Commission on all matters of maritime safety and prevention or reduction of pollution of the environment by shipping activities. 35 . Including Cork, Dunkirk, Kalamata, Rotterdam (where it was inspected by government agencies in September 1999) and Wilhelmshaven, as well as Algeciras and Las Palmas in Spain (where it was declared seaworthy!), Latvia and Singapore. See C. Tannock, Written Question to the European Commission: The Sinking of the Prestige and the inspection of ships, 29 November 2002, P-3484/02. 36 . COM(2005) 585 final - SEC(2005) 1496. 37 . It focuses on four main issues: (i) an EU action to promote competitive, safe and high-quality transportasi maritim. (ii) Efforts needed to enforce existing rules. (iii) The need to strengthen maritime safety and prevent pollution by ships. (iv) Good cooperation between the Community and the International Organisasi. 38 . OJ , L 131, of 25 May 2009. This Directive and Regulation 391/2009 repeal Directive 94/57/EC as from 17 June 2009. About inspection activities in particular, see also the Commission Regulation (EC) No 324/2008 of 9 April 2008, laying down revised procedures for conducting Commission inspections in the field of maritime security ( OJ , L 98 of 10 April 2008). 39 . OJ , L 131, of 25 May 2009. Halaman 18 Michinel-lvarez, MA et al. EJEAFChe, 10(7), 2011 [2586-2607]

2603

40 . In the Resolution adopted following the sinking of the Prestige, the European Parliament reiterated the need to establish, at international and Community level, exhaustive technical inspection mechanisms which provide reliable information about the real state of ships. See Doc. 2003/2066 (INI). 41 . The reform was intended to simplify the criteria for granting recognition and make them more legible, to amend those which are difficult to apply and to fill certain gaps. See Annex I, listing the minimum criteria. Minimum criteria for recognition of organisations should be laid down with a view to enhancing the safety of, and preventing pollution from, ships. The minimum criteria laid down in Directive 94/57/EC should therefore be strengthened (whereas 5 Regulation 391/2009). 42 . They are listed in articles 8-10 Regulation 391/2009. 43 . Article 5 2 Directive 2009/15 includes detailed provisions about the regulation of this working relationship, also concerning financial liability of the recognised organization. 44 . See article 6 and 7 of Regulation 391/2009. 45 . See article 11 of Regulation 391/2009: Recognised organisations shall set up by 17 June 2011 and maintain an independent quality assessment and certification entity in accordance with the applicable international quality standards where the relevant professional associations working in the shipping industry may participate in an advisory capacity. 46 . OJ L 129, 29 April 2004. Amended by Commission Decision of 23 January 2009, as far as the IMO Unique Company and Registered Owner Identification Number Scheme is concerned ( OJ L 29, 31

Januari 2009). 47 . This Regulation is limited in scope to security measures on board vessels and the immediate ship/port interface and its main objective is to introduce and implement Community measures aimed at enhancing the security of ships used in international trade and domestic shipping and associated port facilities in the face of threats of intentional unlawful acts (see article 1). 48 . See article 4. 49 . See article 6; see also exemptions in article 7. 50 . See article 8. 51 . See article 9. 52 . See article 13. 53 . See articles 5, 10 and Annexes I (amendments to the Annex to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, as amended Chapter XI-2 Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security) and III (Guidance Regarding the Provisions of Chapter XI-2 of the Annex to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 as amended). See also Annex II (International Code for the Security of Ships and of Port Facilities). 54 . OJ L 310, 25 November 2005. 55 . The measures laid down in this Directive shall apply to every port located in the territory of a Member State in which one or more port facilities covered by an approved port facility security plan pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 725/2004 is or are situated (art. 2.2). This Directive shall not apply to

military installations in ports. Member States shall define for each port the boundaries of the port for the purposes of this Directive, appropriately taking into account information resulting from the port security assessment (see article 2.3). 56 . See article 5. 57 . See article 6 and Annex I (Port Security Assessment). 58 . See article 7 and Annex II (Port Security Plan). 59 . Security level 1 means the level for which minimum appropriate protective security measures shall be maintained at all times; Security level 2 means the level for which appropriate additional protective security measures shall be maintained for a period of time as a result of a heightened risk of a security incident; Security level 3 means the level for which further specific protective security measures shall be maintained for a limited period of time when a security incident is probable or imminent, although it may not be possible to identify the specific target (see article 8.2). 60 . Each port shall, where practicable, have a different port security officer, but may, if appropriate, share a security officer (see article 9.1) 61 . OJ , L 131, of 25 May 2009. 62 . See article 23. 63 . See article 16 and Annex VIII. Halaman 19 Michinel-lvarez, MA et al. EJEAFChe, 10(7), 2011 [2586-2607] 2604

64 . See articles 4 and 13. 65 . See articles 11-13. 66 . See article 14. 67 . See article 20. 68 . See article 15. 69 . See article 26 and 27. 70 . See article 30 and 31. 71 . OJ L 371, 18 December 2004. Both were lightly amended by Regulation 457/2007 of 25 April 2007 ( OJ , L 113, 30 of April 2007). 72 . See for further explanations the Explanatory Memorandum of the proposal. 73 . OJ , L 131, of 25 May 2009. 74 . See article 1.10-11. 75 . See article 1.3, introducing a new article 6 a: use of automatic identification systems (AIS) by fishing vessels. 76 . See whereas 25 and article 1.3, introducing a new article 6 b: use of systems for the long-range identification and tracking of ships (LRIT). 77

. OJ L 245, of 29 September 2003. 78 . OJ L 129, of 29 April 2004. 79 . OJ L 68, of 6 March 2004. 80 . OJ L 394, of 30 December 2006. 81 . See especially E. Somers, Inleiding tot Het International Zeerecht, Antwerpen, Kluwer, 2005, p. 35. 82 . It is an exception to the rules of international customary law, which provides that, in normal circumstances, foreign ships have no right of access to ports; the coastal states may therefore close their ports to international traffic and they can make access dependent on compliance with standards relating to the safe condition of the ship. In normal circumstances and insofar municipal law gives them this power which is usually the case the authorities of the coastal state can refuse access to a port to a ship that constitutes a danger by reason of its damaged condition (E. van Hooydonk, The Obligation to Offer a Place of Refuge to a Ship on Distress, CMI Yearbook , 2003, pp. 403 y ss., p. 407). 83 . Lihat Seni. 17 LOSC. Also M. Shaw, International Law , 6th ed., Cambridge University Press, 2008, hal 507. 84 . For this reason a casualty ship navigating through the territorial sea cannot be said ipso facto to be non-innocent: see E. van Hooydonk above fn. 82, 422. 85 . UNCLOS III considers an act of wilful and serious pollution to be not innocent (see article 19 2 sub h UNCLOS III). 86 .

See above the UNCLOS provisions in title II.A.1 87 . See W. van der Velde above fn. 4, 482-483. 88 . See E. van Hooydonk, Some Remarks on Financial Securities Imposed by Public Authorities on Casualty Ships as a Condition for Entry into Ports, Marine Insurance at the Turn of the Millennium, vol.2, 2000, hal 117. 89 . The Sea Empress, tanker of 147,273 tons deadweight, laden with a cargo of 130,018 tonnes of light crude oil, ran aground off the port of Milford Haven, UK on 15th February 1996. In the course of salvage operations it was decided by the salvors to lighten the vessel by pressurising her cargo tanks with compressed air, even though it was accepted that the inevitable result of this would be to drive out through her damaged bottom a certain quantity of the oil cargo. The final decision was taken to bring the vessel into Milford Haven where she was moored at a jetty and her remaining cargo removed safely. In spite of some reluctance on the part of the Milford Haven Port Authority to allow a severely damaged tanker into the port, the decision was proved to be the right one (R. Shaw, Places of Refuge: International Law in the Making?, CMI Yearbook , 2003, pp. 329 y ss., p. 334). Halaman 20 Michinel-lvarez, MA et al. EJEAFChe, 10(7), 2011 [2586-2607] 2605

90 . That is the main stream according to E. van Hooydonk, above fn. 82, pp. 406-407. 91 . This is the view applied in Long Lin [Raad van State (the Netherlands), 10 April 1995, m/v Long Lin, Schip en schade , 1995, 391, n. 95] and Toledo [High Court (Admiralty) (Ireland), 7 February 1995,

m/v Toledo, ILRM, 1995, 30] and also supported by L. Hydeman and W. Berman, International Control of Nuclear Maritime Activities , 1960, 157-158, who contended that the entry could be refused if the coastal state has reasonable grounds for concluding that the potential hazard to its safety outweighs the risk to life and property if entry is accepted. 92 . See E. van Hooydonk, above fn. 82, 432. 93 . R. Shaw, Designation of Places of Refuge and Mechanism of Decision Making, CMI Yearbook , 2003, pp. 446 y ss., p. 449. 94 . S. Hetherington, 'Prestige Can the Law Assist?', CMI Yearbook , 2003, pp. 361 y ss., p. 369. 95 . R. Shaw, above fn. 92, 448 96 . See below titles IV A and C. 97 . Although E. van Hooydonk, above fn. 82, 438-439 is critic with the former because he understands that there is often no legal basis for demanding such securities in the national law of the state concerned and it undermines the prohibition on making the passage of the territorial sea dependent on authorization. 98 . G. Timagenis, Reception Facilities for Ships in Distress, CMI Yearbook , 2003, pp. 470 y ss., p. 471. 99 . Ibid , 473. 100 . See W. Reynardson, Unification of International Maritime Law the Work of the Comite Maritime International, A Miscellania of Maritime Law: Demetrios Markianos in Memoriam , Athens, Greek Maritime Law Association, 1988, pp. 313 y ss., p. 317.

101 . See Semco Salvage & Marine Pte. Ltd. vs. Lancer Navigation Co. Ltd. (The Nagasaki Sprit) [1997] Lloyd's Rep. 323 HL, p. 327, where Lord Mustill explained the need for such an exception: (a) salvor who might perform a valuable service to the community in the course of an attempted salvage, by for example moving the vessel to a place where the escape of oil would be less armful, would recover nothing or only very little, if in the end the ship was lost or greatly damaged. Something more was required to induce professional salvors, upon whom the community must rely for protection, to keep in existence and on call the fleets necessary for the protection of natural resources in peril. Some new form of remuneration must be devised. 102 . See LOF 1980, reprinted in G. Brice, Maritime Law of Salvage , 2nd ed., 1993, p. 867. 103 . See M. Kerr, The International Convention on Salvage 1989 How it came to be, International and Comparative Law Quarterly , 39, 1990, pp. 530 y ss., p. 538. 104 . Chapter I: General Provisions (arts. 1-7); Chapter II: Performance of Salvage Operations (arts. 8-11); Chapter III: Rights of Salvors (arts. 12-19); Chapter IV: Claims and Actions (arts. 20-27); and Chapter V: Final Provisions (arts. 28-34). 105 . 1. If the salvor has carried out salvage operations in respect of a vessel which by itself or its cargo threatened damage to the environment and has failed to earn a reward under article 13 at least equivalent to the special compensation assessable in accordance with this article, he shall be entitled to special compensation from the owner of that vessel equivalent to his expenses as herein defined 2. Jika, dalam circumstances set out in paragraph 1, the salvor by his salvage operations has prevented or minimized damage to the environment, the special compensation payable by the owner to the salvor under paragraph 1 may be increased up to a maximum of 30% of the expenses incurred by the salvor. However, the tribunal, if

it deems it fair and just to do so and bearing in mind the relevant criteria set out in article 13, paragraph 1, may increase such special compensation further, but in no event shall the total increase be more than 100% of the expenses incurred by the salvor. 3. Salvor's expenses for the purpose of paragraphs 1 and 2 means the out-of-pocket expenses reasonably incurred by the salvor in the salvage operation and a fair rate for equipment and personnel actually and reasonably used in the salvage operation, taking into consideration the criteria set out in article 13, paragraph 1 (h), (i) and (j). 4. The total special compensation under this article shall be paid only if and to the extent that such compensation is greater than any reward recoverable by the salvor under article 13. 5. If the salvor has been negligent and has thereby failed to prevent or Halaman 21 Michinel-lvarez, MA et al. EJEAFChe, 10(7), 2011 [2586-2607] 2606

minimize damage to the environment, he may be deprived of the whole or part of any special compensation due under this article. 6. Nothing in this article shall affect any right of recourse on the part the owner of the kapal. 106 . G. Brice, The Law of Salvage: a time for Change? No Cure No Pay No Good?, Tulane Law Review , 73, 1999, pp. 1831 y ss., p. 1837. 107 . 1. The reward shall be fixed with a view to encouraging salvage operations, taking into account the following criteria without regard to the order in which they are presented below: (a) the salved value of the vessel and other property; (b) the skill and efforts of the salvors in preventing or minimizing damage to the environment; (c) the measure of success obtained by the salvor; (d) the nature and degree of the danger; (e)

the skill and efforts of the salvors in salving the vessel, other property and life; (f) the time used and expenses and losses incurred by the salvors; (g) the risk of liability and other risks run by the salvors or their equipment (h) the promptness of the services rendered; (i) the availability and use of vessels or other equipment intended for salvage operations; (j) the state of readiness and efficiency of the salvor's equipment and the value thereof. 2. Payment of a reward fixed according to paragraph 1 shall be made by all of the vessel and other property interests in proportion to their respective salved values. However, a State Party may in its national law provide that the payment of a reward has to be made by one of these interests, subject to a right of recourse of this interest against the other interests for their respective shares. Tidak ada di this article shall prevent any right of defence. 3. The rewards, exclusive of any interest and recoverable legal costs that may be payable thereon, shall not exceed the salved value of the vessel and other property. 108 . The salvor shall owe a duty to the owner of the vessel or other property in danger: (a) to carry out the salvage operations with due care; (b) in performing the duty specified in subparagraph (a), to exercise due care to prevent or minimize damage to the environment. 109 . L. Chen, Salvage Recent Developments in the Law of Salvage of the Marine Environment, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law , 16, 2001, pp. 686 y ss., p. 688. 110 . Ibid., p. 688. 111 . Ibid, hlm. 689-690. 112 . Tersedia di http://www.lloyds.com/The-Market/Tools-and-Resources/Lloyds-AgencyDepartment/ Salvage-Arbitration-Branch/Lloyds-Open-Form-LOF 113 .

This shortening of the form has been achieved by removing all provisions of a procedural or administrative nature. These will be consigned to a set of standard clauses to be known as the Lloyd's Standard Salvage and Arbitration (or LSSA) Clauses which, together with the Lloyd's Procedural Rules which govern the conduct of Lloyd's salvage arbitrations, will be incorporated into LOF 2000 by reference. 114 . Unless the word No in Box 7 has been deleted, this agreement shall be deemed to have been made on the basis that the Scopic Clause is not incorporated and forms no part of this agreement. Jika word No is deleted in Box 7 this shall not of itself be construed as a notice invoking the Scopic Clause within the meaning of sub-clause 2 thereof. 115 . Effect of other remedies : Subject to the provisions of the International Convention on Salvage 1989 as incorporated into English law (the Convention) relating to special compensation and to the Scopic Clause if incorporated the Contractors' services shall be rendered and accepted as salvage services upon the principle of no cure - no pay and any salvage remuneration to which the Contractors become entitled shall not be diminished by reason of the exception to the principle of no cure - no pay in the form of special compensation or remuneration payable to the Contractors under a Scopic Clause. 116 . Terakhir version, SCOPIC 2011, tersedia di www.lloyds.com/The-Market/Tools-andResources/Lloyds-Agency-Department/Salvage-Arbitration-Branch/SCOPIC 117 . See Clause 2. 118 . See Clause 1. 119 .

See Clause 3 (i). Halaman 22 Michinel-lvarez, MA et al. EJEAFChe, 10(7), 2011 [2586-2607] 2607

120 . See Clauses 9 (i) and (ii). However, the SCOPIC remuneration due up to the time of termination shall still be payable. See Clause 4 about withdrawal provisions. 121 . See Clause 5 (ii). 122 . SCOPIC remuneration is not general average expenses and not recoverable from hull and machinery underwriters, but recoverable from the P & I Club (see Clause 15) 123 . See Clause 5. 124 . See Clause 6 (i) although with the exception foreseen in Clause 7. 125 . See Clause 12. Appendix B establishes a close working relationship and consultation between the SCR and the salvors with a system of daily reporting by the latter and a system of recording dissents by the mantan. 126 . See Clauses 16 and 3 respectively.