Building Democracry on the Sand

8/2/2019 Building Democracry on the Sand

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2008Demos

Reportfromthe2ndDemosNationalExpertSurvey

[

DEMOCRACY

BUILDINGONTHESAND]AdvancesandSetbacksinIndonesia


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Title : DEMOCRACYBUILDINGONTHESAND

AdvancesandSetbacksinIndonesia

Editor : WillyPurnaSamadhiandNicolaasWarouw

Design/layout : SusantiJohana

Publishedby : Demos(Jakarta)andPCDPress(Yogyakarta).

Firstedition : December2008.


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TableOfContent

i

TableofContentTable

of

Content

Preface

Chapter1

Indonesias Held Back Democracy and Beyond Introduction and Executive

Briefing

OlleTrnquist

Chapter2

Approaching Democracy Some Brief Introductory Notes on Concepts and

Methods

OlleTrnquistandNicolaasWarouw

Chapter3

ADecadeofReformasi:TheFragilityofDemocracy

WillyPurnaSamadhiandSofianMunawarAsgart

Chapter4

ARoughRoadtoPoliticalCitizenship:UndertheShadowofCommunalism

WillyPurnaSamadhi

Chapter5

TowardstheConsolidationofPowerfulEliteDemocracy

NurImanSubonoandWillyPurnaSamadhi

Chapter6

PopulistShortcuttoProgress?

SyafaatunKaryadi

Chapter7

CraftingRepresentation

AttiaNur


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TableOfContent

ii

Chapter8

Summary

DEMOSteam

Chapter9

TheModelofPoliticalBloc

ArisArifMundayatandA.E.Priyono

Bibliography

Appendix


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Preface

iii

PrefaceThe year of 2008 marked the tenth anniversary of Indonesian

reformasi, which was enacted after the fall of Suhartoled New Order regime

throughprotestactionsbackedbyuniversity students.For tenyears,wehave

witnessed some promising changes. Yet, such a span of time is not sufficient

enoughtosolidifythefundamentalsofdemocracyandhumanrightspromotion.

Indonesiandemocracyremainedunsteady!

SowasthegeneraldescriptionofDemos2007SurveyonProblemsand

Options of Indonesian Democratisation. The Survey was the second one,

following the first conducted in 2003. Indeed, there had not been much

improvementduringthespanoftime,butweareconvincedthattheprocessof

democratisation cannot be left behind or stopped, as Demos surveys also

revealed some existing options that should be used to achieve a better,

meaningfuldemocracy.

This survey is based on the assesment of 903 informants from 13

frontlines inallprovinces in Indonesia, fromAcehtoPapua. Inordertogather

information from the informants, Demos gained incredible support from key

informants and research assistants in 33 provinces. Demos research team

involved in thissurveywereSyafaatunKariadi (coordinator),AEPriyono,AttiaNur, Nur Iman Subono and Sofian Munawar Asgart. Willy Purna Samadhi,

DemosDeputy forResearch,conducted internalsupervision.Contributionwas

also given by Antonio Pradjasto, Melanie Tampubolon, Gilang Desti Parahita,

DebbiePrabawati, InggridSilitonga,AmiPriwardhani,ChristinaDwiSusantiand

LaksmiPratiwi.

TheexecutivesummaryofthissurveywaspresentedinJakartaonMay

2008. The more regional based results were also presented in six cities in

Indonesia, namely Ambon, Palu, Mataram, Banjarmasin, Bandung andPalembang. We are glad and grateful at the same time, that the forums had

contributedusefulcomments,criticismandsuggestionstoimproveouranalysis

towardourempiricaldata.

This book is the result of cooperation between Demos and Gadjah

Mada University, in this case Center for Social and South East Asian Studies

(CESSAS). The cooperation is expected to produce a more critical empirical

studiesthatatthesametimealsomeetacademicstandard.

We are grateful to Professor Mohtar Masoed, Dr. Pratikno, Cornelis

Lay, M.A, Budi Irawanto, M.A, who have been playing great role to the

establishmentofDemosUGMcooperation.Theyhadalsocontributedimportant

comments, criticisms, and suggestions to this book. We are also especially


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Preface

iv

thankfultoDr.NicolaasWarouwthatprovidedhispreciousenergyandtimeto

becometheeditorforthisbook.

Also,wewould like to thankDr.OlleTrnquist,ProfessorofPolitical

andDevelopmentScience fromUniversityofOslo,Norway,whohasbeenvery

enthusiasticandconsistentingivingallhisattentiontothecooperation.

Also to theEmbassyofNorway for Indonesia,TheNorwegianAgency

for Development Cooperation (NORAD), and Swedish Development Aid

Authority (Sida), we are grateful for supporting our scientific integrity and

independenceinpromotingdemocracyinIndonesia.

Thesurveyresultdiscussedinthisbookdidrevealthatthesituationof

democracy in Indonesia remained critical. Yet, the fact that prodemocracy

actorsnowbelievedthatengagement inpoliticalprocesswasoneof importantwaystoattainpopularsovereignty isonepointworthofconsideration.Several

political attempts were promoted to strengthen democratic consolidation by

using the emerging of several national political communities. Unfortunately,

some prodemocracy actors took populist shortcut with somejustification to

their options; which called for harder work of prodemocracy actors to

strengthen consolidation among themselves. This became more important as

theelitesalsoconsolidatedthemselvesbyusingexistingdemocraticinstruments

butrefusingtopromotethem.Therefore,webelievethatthisbookwouldgiveimportantcontributiontothepromotionofIndonesiandemocracy.

Weinvitesuggestionsandcommentsforthisbook.

Yogyakarta,December2008

AsmaraNababan Dr.ArisArifMundayat

DemosExecutiveDirector CESSASUGMDirector


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IndonesiasHeldBackDemocracyandBeyond

1

ChapterOneIndonesiasHeldBackDemocracyandBeyond

IntroductionandExecutiveBriefing:

Advances,setbacksandoptions,20032007

OlleTrnquist(UniversityofOslo)

Thisbook isproducedjointlybyDemos researchers,coordinatedby

WillyP.SamadhiandateamofseniordemocracyscholarsatUniversitasGadjah

Mada (UGM) coordinated by Dr. Nicolaas Warouw, in cooperation with this

author.Itisdedicatedtotheendofthebeginningofthreeprocesses.

First,ismarkstheendofthebeginningofattemptstorebuildfruitful

relations between public academia and civil society. The book is rooted in

collective work in the early 1990s between scholars and activists on

democratisation;collectiveworkwhichsoonhowevermusttakerescue incivic

organisations because of the lack of academic freedom. The first book,Aktor

Demokrasi,(BudimanandTrnquist2001)wasresearchedandspreadindrafted

versionsduringthedismantlingoftheSoehartoregime.Thesecondbookonthe

PostSoeharto Democracy Movement (Priyono, Prasetyo and Trnquist 2003)

drewattentiontotheparadoxicalmarginalisationofprodemocrats inthethen

buildingofdemocracy.Thustheresultscalledformorecomprehensiveanalysis

ofthepoliticaldynamics.Thiswouldbetogeneratebetterknowledgeasabasis

for deliberation and improvement. The Organisation Demos was formed to

facilitate the work. The aim was to generate researchbased democracypromotionthroughparticipatorysurveys.Participatorysurveysofhowsome900

experiencedactivistsalongthefrontlinesofallcrucialeffortsatdemocracyinall

provincesassessed theproblemsandoptions.A rigorousanalytical framework

withhundredsoftheoreticallymotivatedquestionswasdevelopedandapplied.

However, while it is true that support was always there from a handful of

scholars,itisonlythejointworkwiththecurrentbookthatmarksthesuccessful

conclusionofafirstroundofbroaderandclosercooperation.Fortunately,the

writingofthebookhasthusalsoenabledthetransformationofthisauthorsco

direction and capacity building of Demos into more equal partnership. The

continuous academic guidance is now shouldered by a team of Indonesian

scholarswiththisauthorasasenioradvisoronly.


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2

Second, the book is also dedicated to the end of the beginning of

attemptstoestablishbothatheoreticallyandempiricallysolidbasisforanalysis

of Indonesian democracy. Most assessments of democracy are driven by the

needofgovernmentofficesandforeignsupporterstoprepareandevaluatetheir

policies and projects. The democracy movement, however, in addition to any

seriousscholarandstudent,needsmore theoreticallyandempirically inclusive

and impartialassessments.This istomake itpossibletoconsidertheprosand

cons of a wider spectrum of arguments as well as to extend the sources of

information beyond the established elite to the experienced democrats in the

field. While such a more solid foundation has now been generated through

Demossurveys, thisbookalso introducesaneffort toaddcrucial results from

scatteredbutalreadyexistingstudiesaswellasnewresearchofmajorproblems.Much of this work is conducted within a new international education and

research programme on Power Conflict and Democracy in theoretical and

comparative perspective. The founding partners are UGM with Demos,

UniversityofColomboandUniversityofOslo(UiO).Butothersarewelcometo

link up too including in the newelectronicpublication programme, the PCD

Press;theprimepublisherofthisbook.TheaimofthePCDPressistofosterthe

localneedsandprioritiesofstudentsandscholarsinSouth andSoutheastAsia

andtheirclosepartners. Inthefuture,finally,theacademicnodewithUGM incooperationwithDemosmayalsobetheimpartialandlegitimatepublicsphere

thatisneededtoalsodiscussandshareinatransparentwayresultsfromdonor

andgovernmentdrivenassessmentsofdemocraticchallenges;assessmentthat

maybothaddcrucialinsightsandbenefitfromindependentanalyses.

Third, the book is of course dedicated to what one may hope is the

endofthebeginningofIndonesiastransitionfromauthoritariantomeaningful

democraticrule.Tenyearsago,SoehartosNewOrderbegantobereplacedby

the worlds largest New Democracy. It is time to evaluate advances and

setbacks,andtoidentifyoptionsforthefuture.

Inthepresentbook,theresultsfromtheallIndonesiaresurveywhich

wascarriedout in2007,areanalysed inviewofthedata from the firstsurvey

which was conducted in two rounds in 2003/2004 and which are available inPriyonoet.al

(2007

).Beinganewdemocracyinconstanttransformation,Indonesiacalls

forresurveysoftheproblemsandoptionsasfrequentlyasthegeneralelections.

The approach and framework is presented and discussed in detail in chapter

two. Ithasalsobeensubjecttoaseparateacademicallycriticalselfevaluation.

(Trnquist2008b).The fullquestionnaire isavailable in theappendix.The leadsponsors in addition to major sections of the democracy movement and

scholars at the UiO and UGM with associates is the Norwegian Ministry of

Foreign Affairs through its embassy to Indonesia, with Sida (the Swedish


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3

InternationalDevelopmentCooperationAgency)andotherpartners, including

Ford Foundation. The commitment and support of the Scandinavian sponsors

butalsotheirpolicyofnoninterventionisminacademicmattershasbeencrucial

tothesuccess.

In brief, the resurvey and supplementary research reveal that in

between 2003/04 and 2007 Indonesia has developed into a consolidated top

downdemocracydominatedby itspowerfulelite.Thestandardofgovernance

related instruments of democracy (such as ruleof law, anticorruption and

accountability) has improved though from very low levels. A countrywide

politicalcommunity isevolvingasasubstitutefor thecrumblingJakartadriven

nationstate thoughthenewpolityremainsconstrainedbyelitistandlocalised

identitypolitics

and

economic

globalisation.

The

military

ison

the

retreat

from

politics,andamajorityofthewidenedandlocalisedestablishmentmakesuseof

formallydemocraticrulesofthegame thoughclearlytotheirownbenefitand

only at times infavour of the aims of democracy. Much of the comparatively

successfuldemocracybuildingisthusbuiltonloosefoundations.Ascomparedto

four years earlier, most of the relatively impressivefreedoms and rights are

stagnating and backsliding. The sections of thepowerful elite that rarely win

electionsseemtobe interested inapartialreturntotheold ideaofpromoting

stabilityand

economic

growth

ahead

of

popular

freedoms

and

sovereignty.

This

wasoncelabelledpoliticsoforder(Huntington1965)andusedtolegitimisethe

rise of the New Order. Now it is baptised sequencing democracy (e.g.

Mansfield and Snyder 2005). Most seriously, however, organised politics is

exclusionary. Most people are not integrated from below, only, at best,

incorporatedfromabove.Inspiteofattemptsbyprodemocratstothecontrary,

there is a lack of representation bypeople themselves and of basic issuesand

interests related to middle classes, women, labour,peasants andfisherfolks,

urbanpoorandindigenouspopulations.Whilevotingisfree,runninginelections

is

onlyfor

the

well

endowed

and

powerful.

Hence

the

worlds

largest

new

democracy isheldback.Andsincethepartysystem isclosedforactorswithout

economic and cohesivepower, and sincepopular organisation remains weak,

there isaneedforpopularandcivicorganisationstoformDemocraticPolitical

Blocks behind basicplatforms on local and central levels, to thusfoster and

control leastworstcandidateswhocanfacilitatemoremeaningfuldemocracy

bywhichpeoplecanimprovetheirsocialrelationsandstandardofliving.


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DesignversusStructure

The generally accepted meaning of democracy is popular control of

public affairs on the basis of political equality. How far has Indonesia moved

towardsthis ideal?Andhowmuch furtherwill itnowgo?Putdifferently:how

much of the old Soehartoera oligarchy remains in place, still governing, but

doing so via formally democratic elections? What, if any, are the chances to

advance towards more meaningful democracy, in terms of sufficiently

favourable means and capacities of ordinary people to really control public

affairsandthuspromotedevelopmentinaccordancewiththeirownpriorities?

There are two predominant and rather extreme kinds of answers to

these questions. The first comes from the designers. Beginning in the globalthird wave of democracy, from the late 1970s onwards, some concerned

scholarsandpractitionersplacedtheirfaithinthedesignofalimitednumberof

institutions.Getthe institutionsrights,suchpeopleargued,anddemocracywill

flourish.Theinstitutionstheyhadinmindrelatetocivilandpoliticalliberties,the

ruleof law, freeand fairelections,and goodgovernance. Internationally this

trend began with the eliteled transitions from authoritarian rule in southern

Europeinthe1970s,withSpainastheparadigmaticexample.Itthentravelledto

LatinAmerica,iteffectedthetransformationofSouthAfricaanditwasexportedto the rest of Africa south of the Sahara in addition to Eastern Europe. (E.g.

ODonnellandSchmitter1986,LintzandStepan1996,Grugel2002). Finally it

wastakenaboard inpartsofAsiatoo;andwiththeendgame inJakarta itwas

introducedtoIndonesiabyscholarssuchasBillLiddle(2001).Atpresent,much

ofthese ideasareapplied in internationalagencies fordemocracybuilding like

the National Democratic Institute and International IDEA. In this view and by

international standards among new but often poorly advancing democracies,

Indonesia isdoingfine,especiallygiventhetraumatichistoryoftheelimination

of the popular movements in 196566, and the more than thirty years of

militarised capitalism that followed. Hence, the achievements may testify to

whatispossibleevenunderharshconditions.

It is true that the designers acknowledge that the system poorly

representstherealneedsofordinarypeople,buttheybelievethatthisproblem

too can be improved through better institutional design. The measures they

propose include more direct elections of government executives, and

simplificationofthepoliticalpartysystem.Thelatterstepwouldresultinafew

major parties that, although topdriven, would at least be able to developpolicies,pickupdemandsfromsociety,recruitpeopleforgovernmentjobsand

supervise theexecutive.The designers think thatpopular representation from

belowisunrealisticandthattopdowndemocracydominatedbypowerfulelites


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willhavetodo. Inthisview, deepeningdemocracy is instead limitedtodirect

participationbyresponsiblecitizensincivilsociety,usually,defacto,excluding

themasses.(E.g.Catn2007)

Thesecondanswercomesfromstructuralistsonboththeleftandthe

right of the political spectrum. The structuralists use a similarly narrow

definition of democracy but are much more pessimistic. They say that the

structuralconditionsdonotpermitdecentdemocracy.Asaresult,theoligarchs

have retained their power and ordinary people their poverty. From a radical

political economy position, this is most forcefully argued by Vedi Hadiz and

RichardRobison(2004)andrecentlybyMaxLane(2008),advocatingtheneedto

return to extra parliamentary actions. According to some structuralists,

freedoms and elections have even generated worse identity politics, conflictsandcorruption,andlesseconomicgrowth(e.g.MansfieldandSnyder2005).

Thus, there is a new emerging international thesis: that enlightened

groups should sequence democracy. While major parts of the left focus on

fightingglobalneoliberalism,sayingitblocksrealdemocracy,therightwantsto

buildsolidinstitutions,goodgovernance,growthalliancesandorganisationsof

responsible citizens, before entrusting the masses with even the limited

freedom of electing topdown parties dominated by powerful elites. This

position is gaining ground in, for instance, many ministries for foreign affairs,conservativethink tanksanddevelopmentbodiessuchastheWorldBank.(C.f.

thereviewbyCarothers2007a,b)

AlternativeFocusonUniversalFactorsinContextualProcesses

Boththeseargumentsaretheoreticallyandpoliticallydubious.Thefirst

assumes that once the elites have agreed to the establishment of a few

democratic institutions, democracy has been achieved. This is, of course, as

nave as stating that basic capitalist or socialist institutions always generate

prosperity.Yet,mostdesigners,whomasalreadymentionedwereintroducedto

IndonesiabyscholarssuchasBillLiddle,haveat leastheldontotheirbelief in

democracy.

That is not always the case with the structuralists. They insist that

rather narrowly defined democracy is meaningful only if certain prerequisites

have already been met. For the conventional left, this usually means greater

social and economic equality, workers or the poor having strong bargaining

power,andthelike.Fortheright,itmeansstronginstitutions,goodgovernance,associations of responsible citizens and economic growth. As a result, the

structuralists by definition exclude the possibility of creating such conditions

through improved democracy. Instead, they become pessimistic about the


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promiseofdemocracy,orargueorindicate likereportedlyvicepresidentJusuf

Kalla (e.g. Suwarni 2007, Simamora 2008) that it should be limited or even

postponed.

In between the two extremes (both applying a narrow definition of

democracybutoneengineeringelite institutions,theotherwaitingformassive

social change) democracy can be understood instead as a contextualprocess

where universal dimensions and intrinsic democratic institutions can only be

analysedinviewofcontendingactorsdemocraticwillandtheirpoliticalcapacity

touseandpromotetheinstitutionsovertime.

A framework for such an analysis was developed and applied in our

two national surveys of Indonesias democracy. At each point of time Demos

askedsome900experiencedcampaignerscumexpertsondemocratisationinallprovincesabouttheextenttowhichtheexistinginstitutionsandthethreeactors

that they found to most powerful and the three alternative actors that they

deemed to be most important in their own contexts really supported the

universallyacceptedaimsandmeansofdemocracy.Thetheoreticalframework

and method are presented and discussed in detail in Chapter 2, but the first

focus was thus on the performance, spread and substance of the 32 intrinsic

instruments to promote and apply democracy that we had identified in

accordance with mainstream theories. (These instruments included the majordimensionsofequalcitizenship,internationallawandhumanrightsconventions,

ruleof lawandjustice,civilandpoliticalrights,economicandsocialrights,free

and fair elections, good political representation, democratic and accountable

government, freedomofmedia,pressandacademic freedoms,additionalcivic

participation, direct participation). Second, questions were asked about the

extent to which the most important actors that the informants had identified

actuallypromoted,usedorabusedandevenavoidedtheintrinsicinstrumentsof

democracy. Third, attention was directed at the capacity of the actors to

promoteandusethe instruments.Themajordimension inthisrespectwasthe

extenttowhichtheactors(a)wereincludedorexcluded inpoliticsat large;(b)

hadrelevantsourcesofpowerandabilitytotransformthem intoauthorityand

legitimacy; (c)wereable toput theirmain issuesand interestson theagenda

(i.e. politicise them), (d) could organise and mobilise collective action in

democratic ways, and (e) had the capacity to approach decision making and

executiveinstitutionsofgovernance,directlyandorbymeansofrepresentation.

Thecombinedresultsfrombothsurveysmakeitclearthattheextreme

institutionalist and structuralist arguments are notjust theoretically but alsoempiricallymistaken.Letusturntoageneraloutlineofthefindings.


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EightMajorConclusions

(1)DeterioratingFreedom

A first conclusion from these surveys is that while many civil and

political rights are being upheld which is in contrast to most other new

democracies the advances have somewhat deteriorated since 2003/04. By

thenthegeneralstandardofthefreedomswereoutstandingascomparedtothe

other institutionaldimensionsofdemocracy. Informantssaythat inadditionto

majorproblemsofthefreedomtoformpartiesonthenationalorlocallevel(or

teamsof independentcandidates)thatcanrecruitmembers,andparticipate in

electionstowhichweshallreturn thefreedomsofreligion,belief,language

and culture, freedomof speech,assemblyandorganisation, freedomof thepress,artandacademicworld,citizensparticipationinextensiveindependent

civil associations and public access to and the reflection of different views

within media, art and the academic world have also backslided. (For an

overviewofthedetails,seetheindexinChapter3.)

(2)ImprovedGovernance

Thesecondconclusion is that therehasbeenageneral improvement

since 2003/04 in topdown efforts by government institutions to improve themiserableperformanceoftheruleoflaw,particularlythecontrolofcorruption.

These improvements are particularly noticeable with regard to the

subordination of the government and public officials to the rule of law, the

equality before the law, the transparency and accountability of elected

government and the executive, governments independence from strong

interestgroupsandcapacity toeliminatecorruptionandabuseofpower,and

the capacity of thegovernment to combatparamilitarygroups,hoodlumsand

organisedcrime.It istruethatthe improvementsarefromvery low levelsand

that most of these crucial problems remain, but the advances remain

commendable.

(3)CountryWidePoliticalCommunity

Third, thedisintegrationof the centralisticNewOrderhasnot led to

thebalkanisation,characterisedbyseparatismandethnicandreligiouscleansing

thatmanyobserversandpoliticianshadpredicted.Whathasemergedinsteadis

a unitary political (rather than ethnonationalist) community with extensive

spaceforlocalpolitics.Itistruethatthisspaceimplieshugeinequalitiesamongthe provinces and regions, and that it has often been occupied by powerful

groups.Theattemptstodevelopdemocraticpoliticsonthebasisofreal issues

andinterestsonthegroundareunderthethreatbyelitistandlocalisedidentity


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politicsandeconomicglobalisation.But inAceh,where foreigndonorshaveso

farcontainedthemilitaryandbigbusinessandwhereseparatistshavebeenable

to substitute political participation for armed struggle, decentralisation also

paved the way for peace and potentially fruitful democracy. This part of the

frameworkfordemocratictransition isnowatstakeandweshallreturntothe

challenges.

(4)TheRelativeStabilityofDemocracyRestsWithElitistInclusionofPeople

Atthesametime,politics ingeneralcontinuetobedominatedbythe

powerful elite. Yet, the dominant elite groups are more broadlybased, more

localised and less militarized than under Soeharto. Hence the surveys and

associatedresearchqualifiesthegeneralthesisthatthepowerfulelitefromtheNew Order has simply captured democracy. (C.f. Robison and Hadiz 2002)

Remarkably, it is rather an extended elite that have adjusted to the new

institutions that are supposed to promote democracy. This is not to say that

there are no abuses, but decentralisation and elections have enabled more

diversesectionsofIndonesiaselitetomobilisepopularsupport.Ofcourse,elites

oftenmobilisesuchsupportbymakinguseof theirclientelisticnetworks,their

privileged control of public resources and their alliances with business and

communal leaders.Yet, the interestof suchelitegroups inelections isbothacrucialbasisoftheactuallyexistingdemocracyanditsmajordrawback.Without

thiselitesupport, Indonesiandemocracywouldnotsurvive;with thepowerful

elite support, it becomes the domain of rotten politicians who prosper and

entrenchthemselvesthroughcorruption.(TheresearchprogramsRenegotiating

Boundaries and In Search of Middle Indonesia at the KITLV institute in the

Netherlands(www.kitlv.nl)andCenterforLocalPoliticsandRegionalAutonomy

StudiesatGadjahMadaUniversityareprovidingcomprehensivecasestudies in

thisarea.)

In short,beyonda numberof freedoms,democratic institutionsand

peoplescapacitiesremainweak.Yet,muchoftherequiredinfrastructureisnow

inplace,andinspiteoftheirweaknessesandbiases,Indonesiasinstitutionsare

solidenoughtoaccommodatepowerfulactorsand,atleastpartially,alternative

actors as well. Theoretically, this is the bottom line. It is the reason why

Indonesiamaybecalledanemergingdemocracy.Inalltheserespects,Indonesia

maythusbegintoresembleIndia,themoststabledemocracyintheglobalSouth

which is dominated primarily by politically oriented powerful elites that

incorporatevulnerablepeople intopolitics,winelectionsandofcoursebenefitin various ways from the powers thus gained and therefore also sustaining

certainprocedural fundamentalsofdemocracy whilethemore modernand

cosmopolitanaffluentmiddleclassesincreasinglyoftenoptforprivatesolutions


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totheirproblems.(e.g.CSDS2007,Chatterjee 2004,HarrissandCorbridge2000,

HarrissWhite2003)

(5)Monopolisation

of

Representation

Sowhatwould ittaketomakethemostofthisdemocraticpotential?

The major problem as compared to India is that Indonesias system of

representationandelectionsisnotevenopenenoughforthepossibleinclusion

of major interests among the people at large and also erects high barriers to

participation by independent players. Indonesiasdemocracy is thusheld back

even inaverybasicandproceduralsense.Civicandpopularorganisationsare

preventedfromgetting intoorganisedpolitics.Moreover,andtoa largeextent

due to decades of repression and the continuous monopolisation ofrepresentation but also because their own mistakes, these groups remain

hamperedbytheirownfragmentationandweakmassorganisation.Moreover,

supplementary research indicate clearly that these weaknesses in turn are

relatedtoproblemsofrepresentation,eveninbasictermsofbeingresponsiveto

theprimedailyproblemsandaspirationsofpeopleonthegroundindeveloping

policiesandstrategies. Inthisrespect Indonesiastillseriously lagsbehind.This

underdevelopmentofdemocracyisthuswithregardtoboththepeopleandthe

issuesandintereststhatareexcluded.First, thesurvey reveals that thepowerfulactors insocietydominate

politics and the political economy. Politics (including the executive) and good

contacts are their primary sources of power; pure economic bases are less

crucial.Alliancesaremainlywithinthesepowerfulsectionsoftheeliteinabroad

senseoftheword(thusalso implying ifcoursethattherearealsootherelites,

alternativepolitical, cultural intellectual with less powers). Legitimacy of the

powerful elite is mainly related to the ability to connect people and gain

authoritativepositions.Themajor issueson theagenda includehard issuesof

governance and economic development. Ordinary people are brought into

politics primarily through clientelism and populism; and in this context the

controlanduseofmassmediaisgettingincreasinglyimportant.Comprehensive

organisation, however, including several levels and issues towards aggregated

agendas, remains insignificant; and attempts to build from below are the

weakestofall.

Second, theeverresourcefulelitespreventordinarypeopleand their

smallparties(butnotthepettypartiesoftheresourceful)fromenteringpolitics.

Independent localpartiesareonlyallowedandfunctionalinAceh.Participationin elections in other parts of the country (even of local parliaments) calls for

nationalpresencewithbranchofficesvirtuallyalloverthecountry.Hence,itis

almost impossible to build more representative parties from below without


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10

havingaccess tohuge funds. (For thosewith such funds,however, it is rather

easy tosetupaneligiblepartyandget represented, thuscausingproblemsof

efficient governance among squabbling elite politicians with special vested

interests.) Further, only big parties or extensive coalitions may nominate

candidatesforelectionsofgovernors,mayorsanddistrictheads.Asidefromthe

elections of individual representatives from the provinces to an insignificant

nationalassembly (DPD), independent candidateshavebeenprohibited and

thenewlyannouncedopeningscallagainforhugeresourcesonthepartofthe

candidates.Inaddition,candidatestovariouspositionsmusthavecomparatively

advanced formal schooling, thus excluding leaders from the labouring classes.

Those running in village elections usually even have to share the substantial

administrativecosts.Similarly,therearenoefficientmeasurestocountervestedinterestsandprivatepoliticalfinancingortopromoteinternalpartydemocracy,

and theguidelines to fosterequalgender representationhavegenerated little

result.

Third, there are no substantive efforts to foster direct democratic

representation inpublicgovernance through local representativesandpopular

organisationsbasedoninterestandspecialknowledgesuchastradeunionsand

environmentalmovementsonlyprivilegedcontactsandtopdownselectionof

figures and groups. Hardly anywhere in Indonesia can we see substantiverepresentation of crucial interests and ideas of the liberal middle classes,

workers,peasants,theurbanpoor,women,orhumanrightsandenvironmental

activists.

Inshortsofar,Demossurveysandsupplementaryresearchrevealthat

the fundamental problem of Indonesian democracy is weak popular

representation. Many freedoms are at hand, and the rule of law and public

governance are at least improving. But democratic political relations between

stateandpeople remainpoor.Typically it isdifficult foractors and ideas that

reflectfundamentalsocialandeconomiccleavagestoengageinpublicaffairs.In

the absence of effective popular control over public affairs, economic and

political power rests instead with actors related to the state and private

businesses. The leverage of these dominant actors has increased with the

hollowing out of the public resources and institutional capacities that were

vestedwiththestate.

Inthiscontext,thepostcentralistandauthoritarianrelationsbetween

state and people (the demos) are instead increasingly mediated on the one

hand by market institutions and on the other by communal, patronage andnetwork based groups, including alternative patronage via civil associations.

Neitherofthesemediatorsissubjecttodemocraticcontrol,(Figure1).Inspiteof

rhetoriccompetition,moreover, the reductionof thepublicspace in favourof


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11

religious and ethnic communities is not incompatible with neoliberal

perspectives.Rather thecommunalperspectivesare in linewith thehollowing

outofpublicresources.Thereductionofpublicsocialsecurityandeducation,for

instance,generatebothprofitableprivatehospitalsandschools fortherichon

theonehandandmorecommunitariancharityandschoolsforthepoor,onthe

other;ironicallyattimesfosteringextremeidentitypolitics.

Figure1:Thechallengesofdemocraticpopularcontrolofpublicaffairs

(6)TheRisk:Returntopoliticsoforder

Thedefunct representation isnotonlybad fordemocracyas such. It

also undermines ordinary peoples chances to use it to foster their views andinterests and the possibilities to alter the unequal division of power that

preventsociallyandenvironmentallyresponsibledevelopment. Inaddition,the

monopolisationofrepresentationnourishesagenerallackoftrustindemocracy.

Most worrying, upper and middle class groups who rarely manage to win

elections may well use this discontent with powerfulelite democracy to gain

wide support for alternatives to democracy and to promote better

preconditions through politics of order. Supporters of middle class coups

typically

say

that

they

aim

to

prevent

disruptive

populist

rule

and

to

build

strongerpreconditions fordemocracy.Theirviews findanecho insomeofthe

previously mentioned international support for proper sequencing of

democracy.Indonesiahasbeendownthispathoncebefore,inthe1960s,andit


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12

gave rise to Soehartos New Order regime; and similar dynamics has more

recently been at work in the Thai metropolitan middle class who fail to win

broad popular support but take to the streets, call for rule of the educated

citizensand linkupwith theKingand thearmyagainstnodoubt corruptand

probably cheating but anyway politicians with wide electoral support. In

contemporary Indonesia, Vice President Jusuf Kallas statements on Poso and

similarlydisturbedareasarealsocasesinpoint.Themessagewasthattooearly

democratic elections were behind the conflicts and that profitable business

drivendevelopmentwouldbethebestwaytohandlethem.Other illustrations

includethequestforpresidentialismandstrongerexecutives,thestreamlining

of the party system towards a majoritarian twoparty system, and general

admiration for Singapore andChinas attempts to introduce,promote stabilityand economic growth ahead of excessive democracy. Meanwhile religious

activistsarguefortheneedtoreducethepublicsphere,butthistimeinfavour

ofreligiousvalues,communitiesandleaders.

The empirical evidence from Demos survey and supplementary

researchspeakquiteagainstthisthesisthatrootofIndonesiascurrentconflicts

andproblemsof corruptionaswell aseconomic development is the new civil

andpolitical freedoms.On thecontrary the resultsshow that it is thedefunct

instrumentsofdemocracy andespeciallythepoorpopularcapacitiestofosterthem thathavemade itdifficulttousethefreedomstoaltertherelationsof

power, prevent the abuse of them and thus improve law, policies and

governance. There is a shortage of institutionalised channels for interest and

issuegroupparticipation,beyondclientelismandgoodcontacts.Evenpopular

representationinformalgovernmentisheldbackbyelitistcontrolofparty and

electoralsystems.Theparty andelectionsystemssustainelitismonpartofthe

powerful. The separate issue and interest group representation is weak and

undemocratic;andsoisdirectpopularparticipation.

(7)TheChallenge:Overcomingtheconstraintsofpopularrepresentation

Itisimperative,therefore,thatcivicandpopularorganisationsbeable

toscaleuptheirideasandalliances.Byconnectingcommunitiesandworkplaces,

andlocalandcentrallevels,itispossibletochallengeelitecontroloverpolitics.

Demos survey and case studies suggest, however, that the scaling up into

organisedpolitics isnotonlyhamperedbyelitistmonopolisationofpoliticsbut

alsobycivicgroupsandpoliticalactiviststhemselves.

First, the surveyand supplementary studies reveal thateven ifmanyalternativeactorsnow try toenter intopolitics tonotjustbeconfined tocivil

society activities, many challenges still remain ahead. There are few decisive

improvements as compared to the first survey. One problem is the poor


19/201


13

presence within state, politics and business as well as in related workplaces.

Another is that the sources of power and the ways of gaining authority and

legitimacyremainfocusedonknowledgeandpublicdiscourseattheexpenseof

organisation,attemptstogainpublicmandatesandwinelections.Moreover,the

issues that are put on the agenda typically focus on specific rights and

complaints, neglecting broader perspectives of how to promote better

governance, developmentandpublicwelfare.Finallyand inspiteofadvances,

civic groups remain poorly connected to social movements and popular

organisations (and vice versa); collective action is mainly based on individual

networking, popular leaders or alternative patronage as against broad and

representative organisation; and attempts to approach elections, parliaments

and the executive remain primarily by way of media, NGOs and pressure andlobbygroups.

Second, comparative case studies show that the problems in these

respectsare typicallyaddressed insteadbyeitherbringing togetherpeopleon

the grassroots level or by topdown organising or by attempts to facilitate

issuespecificdirect connectionsbetweenpeopleand the executive or leading

politicians.Inmanyinstances,theseeffortsarequiteimpressiveandstimulating.

Tomentionbutone,thelocalpeasantsorganisationsinBatang inCentralJava,

haveralliedbehindbroaderagendasandwonanumberofvillageelections.Theynow wish to scale up to the regional level, but one problem is sufficiently

democraticselectionofcandidatesandofcoursethelackoffunds.However,so

far,theonlymajoropeninghasbeeninAceh,thankstotheuniquepossibilityof

buildingpartiesfrombelowandof launching independentcandidatesafterthe

peacetreaty.Yet,thesepartiesareshortofwellorganisedconstituentsbeyond

oldactivistgroups,activistnetworksandinfluentialleaders.

Moreover, the results point to a number of problems. Unity from

belowhasproveddifficultbecauseofthemyriadofspecific issues,approaches

and contending projects and leaders. Politics aiming at majorities behind

common platforms calls for ways of combining different specialisations and

interests, such as among peasants and plantation labourers. There must be

convincingagendasfornecessaryalliancesandequalcitizenbasedgovernance.

Loose networking and polycentric action the methods favoured by most

IndonesiasNGOsandprodemocracyactivistsarenotenough.

However,attemptstocompensateforthisbywayofsocialistorother

ideologies,centrally coordinatedneworestablishedorganisations (somewith

charismaticfiguresatthehelm),orsimplythecreationofajointpoliticalvehicleor individual candidates offering support in return for popular votes, tend to

preserve topdownstructuresandgeneratedivisionsamongsocialmovements

andpopularandcivicorganisations.


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14

Thealternativeattemptstobypassdirtypoliticsbyfacilitatingdirect

linkages between people and the executives (inspired by, for instance,

participatorybudgeting)arenodoubt importantsupplementsbuthave littleto

say on how to coordinate different sections of the people, scale up the

operationbeyondthelocalandfacilitatefairrepresentation.Elsewhere, infact,

thelatterhascalledfortopdownmeasuresthrough,forinstance,theofficeofa

governorormayor.

(8)TheRecommendation:DemocraticPoliticalBlocks

Hence, there are two major lessons: First, basic popular and civic

groupsmustcoordinateinsteadonanintermediatepoliticallevel,betweenthe

specific grassroots issues and the toplevel perspectives. This is in order todefine joint platforms, wide support and alliances, and control genuine

politicians rather than being the victim of fragmentation and dominated by

variouspartiesorpoliticalactors.Second,thismayalsobethelevelonwhichitis

possibletocombineparliamentaryandextraparliamentaryactivities,aswellas

representativeanddirectparticipation.

It is no news that both old and new democracy driven organisations

sufferfrominsufficientlinksbetweencivicandmorepopularorientedgroupson

theonehandandproblemsof relating toorganisedpoliticson theother.Thiswasmadequiteclearalreadybefore1998(c.f.Trnquist2002).Itwasexpanded

intheanalysisofthepostSoehartomovement(Priyono,PrasetyoandTrnquist

2003),where theblamecouldno longerbeputonexcessiveauthoritarianism.

AnditwasconfirmedonagenerallevelinthefirstallIndonesiasurvey(Priyono,

SamadhiandTrnquist2007).However,themorerecentresultsforthesecond

surveyandespeciallysupplementaryresearch(c.f.Priyonoet.al2009,Trnquist

et.al2009)alsoidentifiesquiteclearlythatthecrucialproblemoffosteringsuch

linkagesrelatestodemocraticrepresentation,(Figure2).


21/201


15

Figure2:Thechallengesofpoliticisingthedemocracymovement

In other words, the major challenge along each of the axes is to

developimproveddemocraticrepresentation.Thisistoenablethescalingupof

issues,groups,communitiesandworkplaces.Sincestructuralconditionscannot

bealteredimmediately,peopleneedtogettogetherandactcollectively.Ifthis

shallbeattemptedatdemocratically, it calls for trustworthy representation in

terms of solid chains of popular sovereignty. This includes authorisation,

mandates,responsiveness,transparencyandaccountability.Andthisinrequires

clear definitions of what demos are supposed to control what parts of public

affairs toavoidpolycentricconfusionbetweenfactionsofthedemos.

To facilitate scaling up through democratic representation, Demos

recommendation is that democratic social movements, popular and civic

associationswishingtoengage inpoliticsshouldbuildcoordinatedDemocratic

PoliticalBlocksatlocalandcentrallevels.

Suchpoliticalblockscallforleadershipandcommitmenttothebuilding

of democracy through popular mandates and accountability, both within and

between organisations and in relation to elections. Unfortunately, many

democracy activists are unlikely to become involved in democratic

representation and electoral politics so long as it remains easier for them to

lobbyandnetwork.Similarly there isa recentargument thatoneshould recall

the tradition of the many scattered militant groups during the anticolonial

liberation struggle and prioritise extraparliamentary action in the streets. (Cf.

Lane2008)Organisingconstituenciesandwinningmajoritiesinelectionsimplieshardwork.Further,partypoliticalactivistsneedtorealisethattherewillnever

beonepartyonlyamongprodemocrats.Hence,theyneedtoavoiddominating

anddividingbasicsocialmovementsandpopularorganisations.Politiciansand

CivilAssociations

Organisedpolitics

Po ularor anisations

Counterbyscalingup

throughdemocratic

representation

Counterbyscalingup

throughdemocratic

representation

Counterbyscalingup


22/201


16

politicalgroupsmaywellparticipateinbuildingPoliticalBlocks,butpreferablyas

members of the movements and associations, and anyway not in dominant

positions. The negative international experiences from unfortunate party

politicisationofcivicandsocialmovementscannotbeoverstated.

While the task of building Democratic Political Blocks is thus next to

impossible there are options. Historically, of course, this was the way

Scandinavian popular and civic organisations build broad political movements,

parties and rights based economic development. At present, the Labour Party

with civic and popular organisations in Brazil has tried similar roadmaps,

includingbyfacilitatingparticipatorybudgeting.TheAcehneseevenprovedthat

some advances are feasible in spite of very poor conditions. The alternative

frameworkforchangewerethatthepartysystemwasdemonopolisedtoallowfor local parties and independent candidates, and that the civic and political

organisationswerewillingandsufficientlywellorganisedtowinvotesandthus

takeadvantageofthedemocraticopenings.Neitherofthisisathandelsewhere

inthecountry.ItistruethatAcehatpresentsuffersfromthelackoffirmlyand

democraticallyorganisedinterestandissuebasedmovementsthatcanputvital

issuesontheagendaandkeeppartiesand leadersaccountable.There isarisk,

therefore, that clientelist and populist means of political inclusion (and

associated favouritismandcorruption)willdominatewhile referring to specialneeds during a quite unspecified period of transition, which may rather take

Acehrightdownthesamedrainofprimitiveaccumulationofcapital(bywayof

coercivemeans)asmanyotherprovinces.Thismustbecounteredbycreating

broaddemandsfrombelowforpoliticalfacilitationbythenewlyelectedleaders

(andsupportivedonors)ofparticipatorydemocraticinstitutions.

Furthermore,itdeservestoberepeatedthusthatthesituationbeyond

Aceh is less favourable. The chances of building political representation from

below have been blocked. According to the recent legislation, participation in

elections in other parts of the country (even of local parliaments) calls for

national presence with branch offices in 60% of the provinces, 50% of the

districtsandmunicipalities,and25%ofthesubdistricts.Eventheheroicattempt

bysocialandpoliticalactivistsinPPR(PartaiPerserikatanRakyat)tomeasureup

tothedemandshasfailed.Andunfortunatelysomeoftheleadersnowthinkthat

there isnootherway toenter intopolitics than tosubordinate themselves to

bossesandretiredgeneralsinnewpartieswithhugeresourcesandintemporary

need of activists. Similarly, the demands on the mobilisation of signatures of

independentcandidates indirectelectionsare sohigh thatoneneeds tobealocalequivalentofItalysBerlusconitostandachance.Inaddition,women,still

tendtobesubordinatedandnoordinaryworkers,peasantsandfisher folkscan


23/201


17

run even in village elections because of lack of supposedly sufficient formal

educationanddemandstopayforthebasicadministrativecosts.

Conclusion

ThereisacommonexpressionamongdemocracybuildersinIndonesia

thatthe infrastructure isathandand thatmostactorsadjust totheserulesof

thegamebutthatitremainstobuildademocraticcultureandfostersocialand

economicgainswhichmaysatisfyordinarypeople.Thisismisleadingandpartly

wrong! It is true thatmostactorseven thepowerfuladjust to theactually

existing rules and regulations. But giving priority to the outcome and general

habits (culture) is to neglect that the democratic infrastructure is far fromsufficientandthattosomeextent it isnotevenexistent.A largeportionofthe

contextual rulesand regulationsdo not really support the32universalmeans

towards democracy. The alternative actors in particular are short of sufficient

capacitytouseandpromotethemeansofdemocracy.Organiseddemocracyand

especiallythesystemofrepresentationismonopolisedbythepowerfulelite.

Inshort,democracyisheldback.Itistruethatallpeopleareallowedto

vote, but women (who are not well connected) and poor and subordinated

people, especially migrant labourers, are defacto prevented from standing as

candidates and sometimes even from voting, thus trying to develop popular

representation. Basic issues of equal civic rights and political equality thus

representsasimilarchallengebutalsoopportunityasdidthemovementforthe

rightstovoteintheolddemocracies.

Hence the immediateneed todevelopwellorganisedandnonparty

dominated Political Blocks to foster independent popular influence within

organised politics inspite of elitist monopolisation; to enable, moreover,

ordinary people to use and promote democracy; to alter, thus, the current

relations of power through more popular representation and participation; to

improve,also,theefficiencyofdemocraticgovernance;andto increase,finally,

bargaining power to foster compromises towards rights based sustainable

development.


24/201

ApproachingDemocracy

18

ChapterTwoApproachingDemocracy:

Somebriefintroductorynotesofconceptsandmethods

OlleTornquist(UniversityofOslo)

With

NicolaasWarouw(GadjahMadaUniversity)

Democracyassessmentshavebecomenext toan industry,parallel to

that of measuring economic development in countries around the world.

InternationalIDEA,thehighprofileinternationalorganisationfordemocracyand

electoralassistance,saysthattherearesixmajorassessmentframeworks.(IDEA

2008)One framework focusesonmoreor lesscomprehensivehuman rights in

variouscountries. It istypicallycarriedoutbygovernmentssuchasthatofthe

United States and organisations and institutes like Amnesty and the Freedom

House. A second type gives priority to governance, including elections but

primarilytheruleoflawandaccountability.Thesestudiesareoftenpropelledbygovernments, aid agencies and their associates such as the Indonesian

PartnershipforGovernanceReformsinordertoevaluatesupportforinstitution

building. Third, the democracy indices generated by researchers who relate

democratic rights and elections to independent factors such as development

and conflict. Fourth, the socalled democracy audits. These have been carried

outbygovernments,academeandcivicorganisationsintheglobalNorthtofind

out and lay the foundation for public discussion about the strength and

weaknesses

of

various

dimensions

of

democracy.

Fifth,

the

economic

and

social

assessments by governments and international organisations to evaluate the

outcomeofdemocracyandguidesupportforbetterstructuralconditions.Sixth,

IDEAs own framework. This has been implemented by its associates among

governments,internationalorganisations,relatedNGOsandscholars.Theaimis

similartothatofthedemocraticauditsintheolddemocraciesbuttheambition

istofacilitateapplication intheglobalSouthtoo.Theprimefocushasbeento

assess the quality of the democratic institutions through expert panels and

various indicators and resources in addition to surveys of public opinions and

attitudes.Oneshouldalsoaddtheassessmentsbyassociationsandscholarsof

the democratic quality of civil society, social movements and socalled social

capitalintermsofinterpersonaltrusttofacilitatecollectiveaction.


25/201


19

Interestingly, our own alternative framework for participatory

researchbaseddemocracypromotionisalsonotacknowledged.Thisframework

is rooted in surveys with experienced expertpractitioners on the ground. It

focuses on political identity, the standard of institutions and actors will and

capacity to use and promote that infrastructure. It has been developed and

proved feasible since 2002 in cooperation between reflective activists and

scholars in the pilot case of Indonesia. Why was this perspective needed and

whatarethedetailsofthemajorcharacteristics?Thesimpleansweristhatmost

oftheotherframeworksdidnotseemtobeveryhelpfulasjudgedbytheneeds

of the concerned scholars and activists in this the worlds largest new

democracy.

Basicallyprodemocratswerenothappytoworkwithframeworksthatreflectedthepreconceivedvalues,politicalinterestsanddevelopmentpriorities

ofthedonorsandtheircloseassociates.There isofcoursenothingwrongwith

donors needs to evaluate their democracy support (which many democrats

were anyway dependent on). Similarly, the politicalpatronsof the democracy

support must be able to identify and foster likeminded partners; that is the

basicsofinternationalrelations.Andrelatedscholarsshouldtestandfostertheir

theoriesand recommendations.But what the Indonesiandemocratsasked for

was an instrument to evaluate their problems and options and related

arguments. Actually, they were confused and divided and wanted tojudge to

whatextentdifferenttheoriesandrecommendationsmademoreor lesssense,

notjustoneortheotherfavouriteargumentbythisorthatdonororscholaror

activist. In addition they were in large need of more reliable data and

information. Academically critical research after decades of authoritarianism

remained weak, the various case studies were scattered and the rapidly

expanding opinion surveys were driven by political and commercial interests.

Also, the prodemocrats were quite rightly disturbed by the preoccupation in

mostexistingassessmentswithstaticdescriptionsof thequalitiesof rulesand

regulations without payingmuch attention to dynamic relations of power and

strategiesamongvariousactors.Moreoversomealsorealisedthattheopposite

obsessionwithstructures,culture,rights,civicactivismandpopularmovements

was not related to the new democratic institutions including parties and

elections. Inaddition theprodemocratsasked concerned scholars to consider

theinsightsoftheactivistsonthegroundandtocommunicateexperiencesfrom

otherpartsof theworld. In fact,while the Indonesianactivistshad fought for

democracy since several years, the powerful elite and experts that suddenlydominatedtheassessmentsofdemocracyhadusuallybeenquite indifferentor

evenontheothersideofthe frontline.Similarly,the internationalexpertshad

mainly brought in elitist donor perspectives on crafting of institutions and


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20

consensusamongthepowerfulactors.Meanwhiletheexperiencesand insights

oftheprodemocrats in Indonesiaandelsewherehad largelybeen ignoredand

theythemselveshadnotfoundtimetowriteuptheirstoriesandfindings.Finally

severaldemocratsdidnotliketojustwritereportsandtalkinseminarsbutalso

wantedtogofromfindingstorecommendationsandconsortedeffortstofoster

implementationofthem.

In order to develop an alternative framework we added therefore

theseexplicitneeds to the coreelements in the theoreticallymost convincing

andflexiblepartsofthemainstreamframeworks,primarilytobefoundamong

the democratic audits and International IDEAs conceptual apparatus.

Meanwhile,however,wealsohadtokeepinmindthatsuchanalternativemust

bepossibletoimplementquiteswiftly(sincethedemocraticoptionswerefadingaway) and without access to huge funds (since that would have called for

compromises).

BasicDefinitionsandVariables

Onecrucialpointofdeparturewassimilar to thatof themainstream

audits and IDEAs framework: the separation of the aims and the means of

democracy. This made it possible to focus on the extent to which the means

reallypromotedtheaims.Moreover,asDavidBeethamhadarguedconvincingly,

thedisagreementsondemocracywereprimarilyaboutthemeansofdemocracy

while there seemed to be general agreement on the aim in terms ofpopular

controlofpublicaffairsonthebasisofpoliticalequality.(Beetham1999).

That said, one had to ask what people (demos) that would control

publicaffairs?Whowouldbe the citizens?Would thedemosbebasedon for

instancereligiousorethnicorpolitical identity?Whilenotbeingabletogo into

thedetailsofhowsuchidentitieshadbeenformed,onemustbeabletodiscuss

if and how they could be combined, especially in a multi cultural society like

Indonesia.

Second,whatconstitutesthepublicaffairsthatpeopleshouldcontrol

and what is rather deemed to be private matters to be handled within the

family,variousnetworks,onthemarketorbyreligiousorethniccommunities?

Again, indepth analyses of the construction of public affairs would be

impossible,butonehadtoanalysethesubstanceofdemocracyintermsofwhat

matterswereincludedandwhatweresetaside.

Third,what ismeantby controland politicalequalityandhowcantheybeachieved?FollowingBeethamand IDEA(2002),thefollowingprinciples

are intrinsic: the right and ability toparticipate and authorise representatives

and their executives; representatives (and their executives) who in turn shall


27/201


21

representthemaincurrentsofpopularopinionandthesocialcompositionofthe

people, be responsive to peoples opinions and interests and accountable to

peopleforwhattheydowhichcallsfortransparencyandsolidarity.Inaddition,

while it isobviousthattheprinciplespresupposeHumanRights(includingcivil,

politicalsocial,economicandcultural rights), theshapingandpracticingofthe

Rights in turn are also vested with the implementation of the democratic

principles.

What would be the necessary means, then, to enable and promote

democraticconstitutionof thedemosand thepublicaffairsaswellas thejust

mentioned principles to foster popular control and political equality? IDEAs

frameworkandmostauditsfocusondemocratic institutionsandrelatedvalues

among people at large. While this was in accordance with standard politicalscienceofdemocracyanddemocracybuilding,andtheviewsofmostdonors,it

was insufficient to the Indonesiandemocrats.First, theywanted tobeable to

evaluateawidersetoftheoriesandargumentsaboutthenecessarymeans,to

thusdiscuss inamorefruitfulwaywhatseemedtobemostvalid in Indonesia.

Further, theyneeded togobeyondassessmentsof fixed rulesand regulations

towards a more dynamic perspective. Hence they wanted to consider the

possibilitiesofchangebyalsoincludinginformalinstitutionsandpowerrelations

among various actors in politics, the political economy, civic associations and

socialmovements.Third,itwasobviouslyunfruitfultoonlycomeupwithsome

kind of national assessment in a country where despotic central rule was

dismantled and politics was becoming increasingly localised. Similarly, the

definitionofthedemosaswellasofpublicaffairscalledforadditionalindicators.

Hence the conclusion that one had to go beyond previous perspectives by

consideringthreebasicmeansofdemocracy.

TheBasicMeansofDemocracy:Institutions,willandcapacity

The first major type of democratic means were of course the

conventional focus on the standard of a number of democratic institutions

related to (a) constitutionalism (citizenship, law and rights), (b) popular

sovereignty (elections, political representation and the responsiveness and

accountability of public governance) and (c) civic participation (through

associations, media, academic life and direct participation). However, by

contrast tootherassessment schemesone shouldnotonlyask for formalbut

also informal institutions.Furtheronemustsupplement theassessmentof theperformancebyaddingspecificquestionsaboutthegeographicalspreadandthe

thematicsubstanceofthe institutions(i.e.howmanymattersthatwerewithin

thedemocratic frameworkandhowmuchwasbeingprivatised).Whileadding


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22

these crucial concerns, Demos framework has begun by drawing on IDEAs

ratherwidelyacknowledgedthoughextensivelistofinstitutions.Thishasbeena

pointofdepartureforrelevantrevisionsandsimplifications.Forthedetails,see

Box1.

Thesemeansareuniversallyvalid.Thisisbecausetheyaretheoretically

derivedbyaskingwhatmeansarenecessary topromote theequallygenerally

valid aim of democracy. The specific rules and regulations, however, vary of

coursewithcontextualfactors.Hence,themajorpointistoassesstheextentto

which such contextual formal and informal rules and regulations promote the

institutionalfoundationsofdemocracy.Indoingso,thefundamentaldimension

ofcivicandpoliticalidentityisseparatedfromtheothersasthelatterhavebeen

possibleto include inan indexonthequalityofdemocratic institutions.Outof100 index points, the relative importance of formal as compared to informal

institutions isestimatedtobe70versus30.Further,therelative importanceof

performanceascomparedtospreadandsubstanceisestimatedtobe50,25and

25respectively.(Withinthe50pointsforformal institutions,the importanceof

positivescoresisofcoursereducedifinformantsdeemsomeoftheinstitutions

to hardly even exist.) All attempt to weight however the various intrinsic

institutions (whichusually restanywaywithsomekindofexpertestimate)are

howeversetasideinfavouroftransparentdiscussionofvarioustheories.


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23

Box1:Basicinstitutionsofdemocracy.

Towhatextentaretheyeffective,wellspreadandinclusive(inclusiveofvitalmattersinsociety)?

Institutionsoutsidetheindex

The People (demos): the constitution of the demos through political/civic, ethnic and/or religious

identityandengagementregardingpublicissues.

Institutionsconsideredinindex

1 Citizenship (Equalstatecitizenship;Therightsofminorities,migrantsandrefugees,Reconciliationof

horizontalconflicts)

2 GovernmentsupportofinternationallawandUNhumanrights

3 Subordinationofthegovernmentandpublicofficialstotheruleoflaw

4 Theequalitybeforethelaw(Equalandsecureaccesstojustice;Theintegrityandindependence ofthe

judiciary)

5 Freedomfromphysicalviolenceandthefearofit

6

Freedom

of

speech,

assembly

and

organisation

7 Freedomtocarryouttradeunionactivity

8 Freedomofreligion,belief;languageandculture

9 Genderequalityandemancipation

10 Therightsofchildren

11 Therighttoemployment,socialsecurityandotherbasicneeds

12 Therighttobasiceducation,includingcitizensrightsandduties

13 Goodcorporategovernance

14 Freeandfairgeneralelections(Freeandfairgeneralelectionsatcentral,regionalandlocallevel;Free

andfairseparateelectionsofe.g.governors,mayorsandvillageheads)

15 Freedomtoformpartiesonthenationalor locallevel(orteamsofindependentcandidates)thatcan

recruitmembers,andparticipateinelections

16 Reflectionofvitalissuesandinterestsamongpeoplebypoliticalpartiesandorcandidates

17 Abstentionfromabusingreligiousorethnicsentiments,symbolsanddoctrinesbypoliticalpartiesand

orcandidates.

18 Independenceofmoneypoliticsandpowerfulvestedinterestsbypoliticalpartiesandorcandidates

19 Membershipbasedcontrolofparties,andresponsivenessandaccountabilityofpartiesandorpolitical

candidatestotheirconstituencies

20 Partiesandorcandidatesabilitytoformandrungovernment

21 Democraticdecentralisationofgovernmentofallmattersthatdonotneedtobehandledoncentral

levels.

22 Thetransparencyandaccountability ofelectedgovernment,theexecutive,(bureaucracies),atalllevels

23 Thetransparencyandaccountability ofthemilitaryandpolicetoelectedgovernmentandthepublic

24 Thecapacityofthegovernmenttocombatparamilitarygroups,hoodlumsandorganisedcrime25 Government independence from foreign intervention (except UN conventions and applicable

internationallaw)

26 Governments independence from strong interest groups and capacity to eliminate corruption and

abuseofpower

27 Freedomofthepress,artandacademicworld

28 Publicaccesstoandthereflectionofdifferentviewswithinmedia,artandtheacademicworld

29 Citizensparticipationinextensiveindependentcivilassociations

30 Transparency,accountabilityanddemocracywithincivilorganisations

31 Allsocialgroupsincludingmarginalisedgroupsextensiveaccesstoandparticipationinpubliclife

32 Direct participation (Peoples direct access and contact with the public services and governments

consultationofpeopleandwhenpossible facilitationofdirectparticipation inpolicymakingandthe

executionofpublicdecisions)


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24

Second and in addition to most other frameworks one should add a

dynamic perspective by identifying main actors and then ask if and how they

relatetothemoreorlessdemocraticinstitutions.Twocrucialstepsareinvolved.

Thefirstisthespecificationofthemainactors.Allactorscannotbeincludedina

viableassessment.Given the localisationofpolitics thisshouldprimarilybeon

the provincial level. Further, one needs to include powerful actors as well as

crucial alternative ones. In the alternative assessment framework, the local

informants are asked to identify the three most powerful and the three most

important alternative actors in their context. A number of problems are of

courseassociatedwiththeidentificationoftheseactorsbutthestumblingblocks

restmainlywith the identificationandthequalityofthe informants,whichwe

shall return to.The second step is toenquire then into ifand how theactorsrelatetothedemocraticinstitutions.Dotheinstitutionsmakesensetothem?To

whatextentisdemocracytheonlygameintown? Moreprecisely withregard

toeachtypeof institution:dotheactorspromoteandusethe institutions?Do

theyonlyusethem?Ordotheyuseandabuseorevenavoidthem?

Low figures mean that democracy is not meaningful because the

standardof the institutions is too lowand/orthecapacityoftheactors touse

andpromote them (whichweshall return toshortly) is insufficient.Additional

negative conditions are set aside. This is not because such conditions are

unimportant but because of a crucial assumption about the minimum

requirementsofdemocracy.Thealternativeframeworkrefutesargumentsthat

democracy calls for extensive social and economic rights, equality,

modernisation, prodemocratic culture etc. Actually the framework only calls

forsufficientlymeaningfulinstrumentsaslistedaboveandforsufficientcapacity

oftheactorstouseandpromotetheinstitutions(whichweshallsoondiscussin

more detail). Given that these conditions are present, the actors can use

emergingdemocracytopromotemoresocialandeconomicrights,amongother

things.Ofcourse, firmjudicial institutions,economicmodernisationand social

andeconomicequalityare likely tocontribute tohighscoreson the indicesof

democracy. But if more rights, equality, modernisation, favourable culture etc

were included as necessary conditions for democracy, they would have to be

createdbynondemocraticmeans.This isnotnecessary. Ithasprovedpossible

tocreatethembywayofgradually improveddemocracy.Therearedegreesof

democracy;anddemocracyisaprocess.

Hencetheargumentthatthere isaneedto sequencedemocracyby

somehowintroducingfavourable institutionsaheadofpopularsovereignty(e.g.Mansfield/Snyder 2005) as well as Samuel Huntingtons (1965) old thesis that

strong institutionsmustbeathand topreventmodernisation fromgenerating

popularupheavalsarerefuted.(AsmanyIndonesiansknow,thelatterargument


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wasusedtolegitimisetheeliminationofpopularmovementsin1965/66aswell

as the rise and existence of the New Order regime.) The same applies for a

number of related theses too. One is that a certain level of economic

development isamust;another istheoldextreme leftthesisthatequalityand

radicallydifferentpowerrelationsmustbecreatedbymoreorlessrevolutionary

meansaheadofpeoplesdemocracy.Itistruethattheoftenratherdepressing

fateoftheglobalthirdwaveofdemocracythroughtopdowninstitutionbuilding

and elitist compromises is rather depressing. But given that nondemocratic

introduction of favourable structural conditions is not necessary, the crucial

matter is insteadwhatkindofspecificandconcretepoliticsofdemocratisation

thatvariousactorsandtheirinternationalsupportersoptfor.

If this is accepted, the growing critique of the liberal democraticemphasisoncraftingthe institutionalproceduresofdemocracyonthebasisof

agreementsbetweenalreadydominantactorsdoesnot implythatalldesigning

ofdemocraticinstitutionsisinvane.Theimplicationisonlythatpriorityshould

be given to institutions that open up for enhanced capacity among ordinary

people to foster additional institutions for more political equality and popular

control.Ifthepredominanttrendsofarhasbeeninfavourofliberaldemocracy,

thisconclusionseemstopointthusinasocialdemocraticdirection.

Thethirdmeansofdemocracyisthattheactorsarenotjustwillingbut

also capable of promoting the institutional infrastructure. Consequently the

alternativeassessmentframeworkconsidersanumberofkeyfactorsrelatedto

power,resourcesandmovement.However,this isonlydonetotheextentthat

suchfactorsarecrucialforthepeoplescapacitytoactasdemocraticcitizensin

civil as well as politic society. Hence we have combined three analytical

approaches:one that focuseson institutions,asecond thatdrawsattention to

theactorsandathirdthataddressespowerincollectiveaction.

It ismorecomplicatedtooperationaliseactorspoliticalcapacitythan

democratic institutions. Previous studies and theories about political power,

movements and other actors point to five clusters of parameters. These have

been discussed elsewhere in more detail (Trnquist 2002, Harriss et.al. 2004,

Trnquist2008,Trnquist,StokkeandWebster2009).Thefirstvariablesareto

indicate iftheactorsarepresentratherthanmarginalisedoncentraland local

levelsandinpartsofthepoliticallandscapesuchasthebusinesssector,interest

and issue groups, self management (including cooperatives), parties,

parliaments,andexecutivepublicinstitutions.Theseindicatorsrelatetotheories

about exclusion and inclusion, differences between new and old movements,sectoral fragmentation,centreversusperiphery,and theopportunitystructure

in terms of the relative openness and closeness of politics in general.

Alternatively one may analyse similar factors by drawing on Pierre Bourdieus


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(Wacquant 2005, Stokke 2002, Stokke and Selboe 2009) concept of fields of

interrelatedactorsandrelationsofpower.

A second cluster of variables relate more exclusively to Bourdieus

focusonhowtheactorswithinthejustmentionedfieldsareabletotransform

theirdifferentsourcesofpowerintermsofeconomic,socialandculturalcapital1

into legitimacy and authority to thus gain symbolic power and political

influence(ibid).

Thethirdtypeof indicators istoanalysewhetherandhowactorsare

abletopoliticisethoseoftheirconcernsandaspirationsthatarenotpersonal,

i.e. to put their issues, interests and ideologies on the political agenda. This

relates to theories inspired by for instance Jrgen Habermas about the public

sphere, Antonio Gramsci about hegemony, Pierre Bourdieu about habitus(internalisednorms,understandingsandpatterns)and thegeneral importance

of culture. But the same indicators connect also to analyses of increasingly

fragmentedprioritiesandagendas,especiallyamongactors incivilsocietyand

relateddifficulties togeneratecommonplatforms (e.g.Trnquist2002,2008a,

Trnquist,TharakanandQuimpo2009)

The fourth cluster of parameters is to capturewhetherand how the

actors are able to organise and mobilise support. This is directly linked to

theoriesofpower,politicsandmovementssuchasadvocatedbyNicosMouzelis

(1986) and Sydney Tarrow (1994), distinguishing between incorporation into

politicsbywayofelitistpopulism,clientelismandalternativepatronageand

related political financing or more integrated by way of networks and or

comprehensiveorganisationfrombelow.But itrelatesalsotoanalysessuchas

byMahmoodMamdani(1996),ParthaChatterjee(2004),Houtzageret.al(2007)

and Harriss (2006) of different inclusion of citizens, subjects and denizens

withoutcapacitytousemostotherrightsthanthattorallybehindandvotefor

oragainstleadingpoliticians.

Fifththeroadmapstoanalysewhetherandhowtheactorsareableto

approachvariousgovernanceinstitutions.Themajorsourceofinspirationisthe

growing consensus that the key problem of democracy in the global South in

particularisthedominanceofpowerfulelitesandthepoorstandardofpopular

representationinspiteofexcitingattemptstoinitiatenewroutes.Thiswasalso

1

While

the

meaning

of

economic

capital

may

be

self

evident

(and

may

well

be

expanded

by

more

qualified

analysisof thepoliticaleconomybetweenneoliberalismand state sponsoredbusinessunderglobalisation;

seee.g.HarrissWhite2003,Kohli2004andKhan2005),socialcapital inmainlyaboutgoodcontacts,and

culturalcapitalinvolvesinformationandknowledge.InDemossurveyyetanothercategoryhasbeenaddedto

cover the power by wayof coercion, including bymilitary force but alsomass demonstrations such as the

peoplepowerphenomenoninthePhilippines.


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aprime result fromDemos firstallIndonesia survey.Hence there isa special

needforcloserstudieswithinthisfield.

TheFundamentalProblemofRepresentation

Suchanalysesinturncallforfruitfulanalyticaltools.Representationis

acomplexandcontentedconcept.Thealternativeframeworkdrawsonarecent

attempttodevelopaninclusiveperspectiveonthebasisoftheoryandempirical

studies of efforts to counter the demise of popular politics (Trnquist, Stokke

andWebster2009).

As outlined by Pitkin (1967), representation presupposes a

representative, the represented, something that is being represented and apolitical context. The dynamics is primarily about authorisation and

accountability,whichpresuppose transparencyandresponsiveness.Thatwhich

is represented may be substantive, descriptive and/or symbolic. Substantive

representation is when the representative acts for the represented, for

instancealeaderadvancingtheinterestsofworkers.Descriptiverepresentation

iswhenanactor stands fortherepresentedbybeing objectivelysimilar.For

instance,awomanrepresentswomenandaresidentinavillagerepresentsthe

othervillagers.Symbolicrepresentation,finally,iswhenanactorisperceivedby

therepresentedtoonceagainstandforthem,butnow,forinstance,interms

ofsharedcultureandidentities.However,symbolicrepresentationmayalsobe

understood with authors like Bourdieu (Wacquant 2005, Stokke 2002) and

Anderson(1983) inthewidersenseofconstructingthedemos,thegroupsand

the interests that are being represented and claiming to be a legitimate

authorityasarepresentative.

Therearetwomajorapproaches.Thefirstmaybecalledthechainof

popularsovereigntyapproach. It is typicallyadhered tobystudentsofpolitical

institutions, focusing on formally regulated politics, government and public

administration. The second is what will be labelled the directdemocracy

approach.Thisismorecommonamongpoliticalsociologists,anthropologistsand

students of rights and law. They emphasise the importance of informal

arrangements and the need for alternative participation through popular

movements and lobby groups as well as civic action in for instance

neighbourhoodgroupsandassociationsforselfmanagement.

Therearetworelatedtendenciestowardsdeterioratedrepresentation

withinthechainofpopularsovereignty.Oneisthatpublicmattersandresourceshave been reduced and fragmented under neoliberalism and globalisation

beyonddemocraticrepresentation.Theothertendency isthatalmostallofthe

links in the chain itself are tarnished. This is especially with regard to the


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intermediary representative institutions from civic organisation to political

parties.Massbased interestorganisationshavebeenradicallyweakened,most

severely those based on class. While public resources and capacities are

shrinking, politicians and political parties lose firm and independent popular

roots. The privatisation, informalisation, depoliticisation and weakening of the

intermediarypolitical institutionsgenerate furtherdistrust in theauthorisation

of representatives and their mandates. Representative politics is often looked

upon as a particularly dirty business characterised by money and personality

oriented politics, nonprogrammatic organisational machines and crooked

politicians. This in turn has generated alternative routes. But the various

supplementary forms of democracy by taking matters to court and to

institutions in civil society for self financed self management and directparticipation, pressure and informal contacts are largely detached from the

chainofpopularsovereignty.Thecivicorganisationsandactiviststhemselvesare

rarelysubjecttobasicprinciplesofdemocraticrepresentation,authorisationand

accountability.Moreover, communalethnicand religiousorganisationsaswell

as families and clans cater to an increasing number of popular worries and

needs,typicallyamongsttheweakersectionsofthepopulationwithinsufficient

capacitiestomakeuseofcivicrights.Whennotclaimingequalcivic,politicaland

socioeconomic rights for all but specific communal privileges, these

organisations and solidarities tend to fragment the demos and to undermine

democracy.

Whiletheadvantageofthechainsofpopularsovereigntyapproach is

precision and conceptual consistency in relation to democratic theory, one

drawback isthatpracticesoutsidetheformallyrecognisedchaintendtobeset

aside such as attempts at participatory governance and struggles over public

affairsthathavebeenprivatisedorinformalised.

Unfortunately however the directdemocracy approach does not

provideagoodalternativebut rather focuson theneglectedothersideof the

coin. Interestingly, this isdone from twodirections,onewhich ismoremarket

oriented, supportedbye.g. theWorldBank (1997)and in favourofuser and

consumer participation (rather than citizenship and popular sovereignty);

another advocated by critics of globalisation like Michael Hardt and Antonio

Negri (2000) who argue that state and power has been so dispersed and

localised that there isno decisiveunit left to fight and that increasinglymany

producersareregulatingsocialrelationsthemselves,sothatstrongpartiesand

representativedemocracyareunnecessaryandeven irrelevant.Bothpositionssupport thus the position of Robert Putnam (1993) and others that the real

demosdevelopsorganicallyfrombelowamongselfmanagingandcooperating

citizens (thereby developing social capital), not in relation to ideologies,


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institutions and political engagement. Hence, representation becomes

redundant since the people act directly through the same contacts and

associations thathave constituted thepeople in the firstplace. In theprocess

almostwhatevercivicorganisationbecomespartsofthepeople itself.Hence

thereisnoneedtoanalyse,forinstance,differencesbetweenorganisationsthat

relate to rightsbearing citizens and people who lack sufficient capacity to

promotetheirownrights.Further,onedoesnotneedtodiscusstheimportance

of intermediary variables such as politics and ideology. The fact that

Scandinavian democracy and welfare states as well as contemporary

participatory budgeting, for instance, have all been politically facilitated and

thensustainedisconvenientlyforgotten.

However,manycivilsocietyactivistsarenowmoreanxiousthanbeforeto legitimate their work in terms of whom they try to represent (Houtzager

2007). Moreover, the new institutions for direct participation such as

participatory planning are (just like previous Scandinavian experiences of

combining liberal political democracy and interest based representation and

cooperationbetweengovernmentandassociations)attempts to initiateanew

layerofrepresentationbetweenelectoralchainsofpopularsovereigntyonthe

onehandandassociational lifeandpopulismon theother. (C.f.Avritzer2002,

Baiocchi2005,EspingAndersen1985,Berman2006)Yet,anumberofquestions

remain to be answered such as how to guarantee authorisation and

accountability,andevenmoredifficult,howtoidentifyandagreeonwhatparts

of the demos should control what sections of public affairs on the basis of

politicalequality.

Against thisbackdrop, the finaldimensionofactorspoliticalcapacity

that isconsidered in thealternativeassessment frameworkdrawsona recent

attempt to develop a conceptual model to combine the two approaches, one

focusing on the chainsof popularsovereignty and the other on direct

democracy.Thekey

is

to

apply

theprimacy

of

popular

sovereignty

also

within

collectiveeffortstowidendemocracybeyondtheformalpublic institutions.This

may be done by situating political practices in formal public as well as other

institutions within a comprehensive conceptual frame where it is possible to

mapandanalysehowactorsrelatetoeachotherandtotheinstitutionsinview

ofthebasicprinciplesofdemocraticrepresentation.

Ifthisisacceptedtherearethreebasicpillars:(1)thepeople(demos),

(2) the public matters, and (3) the different intermediary ways of exercising

popular control of the input as well as output sides of democracy; i.e.policymaking and implementation. Democratic policy making (input) and

implementation(output)needtoberepresentativeby,first,beingbasedonthe

principles of political equality and impartiality and, second, subject to


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authorisation with mandate and to accountability with transparency and

responsiveness. The actual content of what is thus being decided and

implemented is due to the will of the demos but must not be up against the

principles of democracy and the absolutely necessary means to develop and

applythem.Figure1presentsapreliminaryintegratedframeworkforthestudy

ofdemocraticrepresentation.

Figure1.Amodelforthestudyofdemocracyorientedrepresentation

A number of crucial problems may be addressed within this model.

(Trnquist2009)Inthealternativeassessmentschemeweshallalsobenefitfrom

relatedresearchintheserespects(PCD2008),buttheverysurveyfocusesonthe

actors strategies in the political system and related forms of representation.

First,towhatgovernanceinstitutionsdothemostimportantactorsturnatfirsthand? Second, how do the most important actors reach and affect the

governanceinstitutions? Directand/orbywayofsomemediatinginstitutions?


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Therearetwoparticularlysignificantclustersofproblemsthatmaybe

analysedinviewofthesequestions.

The first cluster relates to the general tendencies of less public and

more polycentric governance,a particularly crucial issueare theprospects for

democratic regulation of more or less privatised institutions of governance

ratherthanreclaiming these institutions,whichmaynotbe feasible.Along the

top row in Figure 1, privatised collective transportation, schools, or health

services,forinstance,wouldthusbesubjecttodemocraticallydecidedrulesand

regulations.2Another basic question is whether or not democratic governance

would be conducive to fight corruption and promote environmentally and

socially responsible economic growth. There is an urgent need to analyse

democratic alternatives to the resurgence of the thesis about the need topromote firm institutions, rule of law and economic development ahead of

popular sovereignty by supposedly enlightened authoritarian rule. The same

holdstruefordemocraticalternativestoaccommodaterebelslikethoseinAceh,

ratherthanbydivisiveclientelismandspecialfavours.(Trnquistet.al2009a)In

the figure on representation,

Building Democracry on the Sand

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