Still a World of States! Transnational Social

Actors and International Trade Governance

© Chalmers Larose, Ph. D

Association canadienne de science politique, Winnipeg, Manitoba, 3-5 juin, 2004

Introduction

Since the 1980s, the end of the Cold War and the

globalization of capitalism stimulated a set of issues that

affect the course of world politics. With the creation of

the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994, which succeeded

the defunct General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),

the dynamics of trade negotiations have evolved

considerably, and trade has, more than ever before, become

a contentious issue in domestic as well as international

politics. The WTO followed in the footsteps of a reigning

neo-liberal economic paradigm that matured within corporate

organizations, government bureaucracies and academic think

tanks. These interrelated processes generated new issues for

social actors to confront. As a result, renewed scholarly

interests in the study of non-state actors in world

politics surfaced. Though more generally assumed than

thoroughly assessed, academic scholarship has thus attempted

to highlight the influence of NGOs, taken as “the shock

troops of civil society”, in the international arena.1

A primary task of this research is to discuss the impacts

and influence of transnational actors on international trade

governance, particularly the processes of trade

liberalization.2 Recent scholarly interpretations of

transnational activism established that, in the

globalization era, transnational civil society will

institutionalize normative structures that bypass state

power.3 Many transnational civil society pundits equally

foresee a world of citizens’ organisations and social

movements not only as counter-power to a world of states but

also as agents for domesticating ‘the international’. In

this article, I critically assess the power of transnational

civil society, in particular the contentious assertion that

transnational activists, in generating international norms,

can shape and redefine state interests.4

1

Indeed, the liberal variant of transnational advocacy

research views international activist organizations as

political actors acting ‘in their own right’5. It is

suggested that transnational civil society not only has

fundamentally an anti-state character but also engages in

practices that can possibly reshape the ‘architecture’ of

international politics by denying the primacy of states or

of their sovereign rights.6 For Richard Price, transnational

civil society not only exists as a community of political

engagement in world politics but is also able to teach

governments what is appropriate to pursue in politics.7 As

for K. Sikkink, transnational advocacy groups are crucial

for the creation of new norms and discourses and contribute

to restructuring world politics by altering the norm

structure of global governance.8

In order to address the liberal contention, this paper

critically explores, in a comparative historical

perspective, the influence of non governmental organizations

(NGOs) in countering, resisting, formulating and setting the

global trade policy agenda. I ask the following questions:

2

Is transnational civil society influential in the arena of

international trade governance? Has transnational civic

activism impacted on the outcome of trade liberalization

proposals that have been put forward since the advent of

economic globalization? I argue that global policy-making

1. By non-governmental organisation, I mean any

organisation which is not established by a government and

that provides links between state and market, and between

local and global levels. See Bas Arts, The Political Influence of

Global NGOs: Case Studies on the Climate Change and Biodiversity Conventions,

(Utrecht: International Books, 1998, p. 50); Leon Gordenker

and Thomas G. Weiss “Pluralizing Global Governance:

Analytical Approaches and Dimensions” in Leon Gordenker and

Thomas G. Weiss (eds.) NGOs, the UN and Global Governance,

(London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), p. 17-47;

SustainAbility, The 21st Century NGO: In the Market for Change,

(London: Second Edition, 2003).

2. For a conceptualization of transnational actors, refer to

Sydney Tarrow, “The New Transnational Contention:

Organizations, Coalitions, Mechanisms”, paper presented at

3

remains a product of interstate bargaining and is nurtured

by powerful state-corporate alliances. In the current state

of affairs, national states still hold the political

leverage to set up the legal and institutional framework for

globalization as well as for citizens’ participation in

the Annual Congress of the American Political Science

Association, (Chicago, 1 September 2002); Sydney S. Tarrow

« La contestation transnationale » Cultures et Conflits Sociologie

politique de l’international, No 38-39, (summer-fall, 2000).

3. See generally, Andrew Linklater « Citizenship and

Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian European State » in

Daniele Archibugi, David Held and Martin Köhler (eds.) Re-

imagining Political Community, (Stanford: Stanford University

Press, 1998); Ronnie D. Lipschutz, “Reconstructing World

Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society”, Millennium

Journal of International Studies, vol. 21, (no. 3, 1992, p. 389-420);

Susan Burgerman Moral Victories: How Activists Provoke Multilateral Action

(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); Anne-Marie Clark,

Elizabeth Friedman, and K. Hochstetler « The Sovereign

Limits of Global Civil Society: A Comparison of NGO

4

global politics9. Hence the influence of civil society

organizations in the area of international trade deserves to

be empirically assessed and systematically studied on a case

by case basis rather than thoroughly assumed. The relative

NGO ability for and success in deconstructing the dominant

Participation in UN World Conferences on the Environment,

Human Rights, and Women » World Politics (vol. 51, p. 1-35,

1998); Paul Wapner, “Politics beyond the State:

Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics”, World

Politics, (vol. 47, 1995, p. 311-340); Richard Price,

“Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World

Politics”, World Politics (vol 55, July 2003, p. 579-606.;

Richard Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational

Civil Society Targets Landmines”, International Organization (Vol.

52, No. 3, Summer 1998, pp. 613-644); Ann M. Florini and P.

J. Simmons, “What the World Needs to Know”, in A. M. Florini

and P. J. Simmons (eds.), The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational

Civil Society, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace, 2000); Margaret E. Keck Kathryn Sikkink Activists beyond

Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, (Ithaca: Cornell

5

discursive premises of economic liberalism and in building

transnational networks of anti free trade activists and

social protesters across issues and regions may not

ultimately lead to substantial changes in policy outcomes,

particularly in the area of free trade negotiations.

University Press, 1998); Kathryn Sikkink, “Restructuring

World Politics: The Limits and Asymmetries of Soft Power” in

Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.)

Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Movements, Networks, and Norms,

(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002, p. 301-

317).

4. Price (1998), opcit.

5. Wapner (1995), opcit

6. Lipschutz (1992: 390), opcit

7. Price (1998: 639), opcit

8. Cf. Sikkink (2002: 302), opcit

9. Saskia Sassen, “The Participation of States and Citizens

in Global Governance”, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies (Vol

10, Issue 1, winter 2003, p. 5-28).

6

In the realm of international trade politics, the state-

corporation conglomerate prevails. Since NGOs operate in a

world of states, then their degree of influence will likely

vary in accordance with the characteristics of the issue and

the degree of permeability of the target. I further argue

nonetheless that, through pressure politics, NGOs and other

civil society allies have been very instrumental in, first,

raising awareness about the social and environmental impacts

of liberalizing trade and, second, in derailing important

steps undertaken by free trade proponents at the

multilateral as well as bilateral level in order to secure

free market objectives. In support of my arguments, I study

the impacts of NGOs’ actions and strategies on the policy

processes and outcomes of selected trade liberalization

agreements.

The first section points to the potential of transnational

civic activism in world politics by unveiling the concept of

political influence. Here, I focus mainly on the growing

role played by non state actors in international politics

and the current interplay between NGOs and international

7

trade. Then I present NGOs’ responses in relation to four

selected free trade or trade-related initiatives, namely:

the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSTFA), the North

American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the initiative in

favour of the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment

(MAI), and the WTO Doha Development trade agenda. Finally, I

draw some critical reflections on the sovereign limits of

NGOs’ activism in changing the outcomes of free trade

negotiations and explore issues for further research.

Transnational Actors and Policy Influence: An

issue-orientated approach

Contemporary international relations are inconceivable

without the study of input provided by transnational actors.

As Richard Price rightfully states, “we cannot understand

some key outcomes in world politics without taking account

of the influence of TCS actors”.10 Theoretically, influence

is generally understood as “the modification of one actor’s

behaviour by that of another”11. A player exercises

8

political influence if his presence, thoughts or actions

cause a political decision-maker to meet his interest or

objectives. According to Bas Arts, influence is the

achievement of one’s policy goal with regard to an outcome

in treaty formation and implementation12. Political

influence presupposes a causal linkage between specific

outcomes on the one hand and specific player interventions

on the other. Hence the degree of influence of an actor in a

given policy process remains the necessary observable

component to measure its success and achievement in

relations to policy outcomes.

The issue as to when and why transnational campaigns succeed

or fail has not yet been systematically worked out by

transnationalists. What are the intervening variables that

explain variations in policy successes and outcomes? Are

there ‘necessary conditions’ to achieve influence? In

10 . See Price (2003: 591), opcit.

11 . Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson (eds.) The Anatomy of

Influence, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973, p. 3).

12 . Bas Arts, opcit, p. 58.

9

addressing those questions, Susan Sell and A. Prakash

suggest that success or failure to achieve a desired outcome

critically depend on how effectively a network is able to

shape a given agenda.13 Success in influencing policy

processes, they argue, lies not in claimed moral superiority

of the agenda but in the network’s superior abilities to

create and make the most of political opportunities by

exploiting a crisis, constructing a problem, mobilizing a

coalition, and grafting its agenda onto policy debates”.

Since civil society barely has access to material power,

thus transnational activists rely mostly on moral authority

as a prime factor of influence.

Indeed, it has been amply demonstrated through recent

research conducted in the area of human rights and

environmental activism that positive results have been

13. Susan K. Sell and Amesh Prakash, “Using Ideas

Strategically: The Contest between Business and NGO Networks

in Intellectual Property Rights”, International Studies Quarterly

(2004) 48, p. 143-175.

10

achieved by transnational human rights groups in changing

the behaviour of governments on human rights issues.14

However it has also long been proven that moral authority

does not work in a vacuum and that a set of prerequisites

remain indispensable in the process of influencing political

outcomes. As proposed by Susan Burgerman, transnational

actors may achieve the kind of policy influence desired to

the extent that the following parameters can be reckoned

with: the existence of relevant international norms and

transnational activists; the existence of elites in the

target state that have control over the armed forces and

that have concern about their country’s international

reputation; and the existence of organized domestic groups

linking up with transnational activists.15

In another respect, numerous scholars also point out that if

economic and security interests in the target state collide

with the normative objectives pursued by transnational

activists, this can inhibit the enforcement of human rights

principles and agreements. A well entrenched proposition

suggests that state preferences matter and great powers

11

still enjoy the ability and capacity of affecting outcomes

in world politics. In that sense, domestic conditions become

instrumental in explaining the variations in transnational

actors’ policy influence. Domestic structures, as Thomas

Risse-Kapen observes, “mediate, filter and refract the

efforts by transnational actors and alliances to influence

policies in the various issue-areas”.16 In order to affect

policies, he says, transnational actors “have to gain access

to the political system of their target state” and must

generate “winning policy coalitions in order to change

decisions towards the desired direction”.17

In addition, NGOs’ capacity to gain influential access

inside global trade institutions and within free trade

14. See, for example, Keck and Sikkink (1998), opcit; Martha

Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics

and Political Change” International Organization (vol. 52, No 4,

1998, p. 887-917); Thomas Princen and Mathias Finger,

Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the Local and the Global,

(London: Routledge, 1994); Paul Wapner 1995, opcit).

15. Susan Bergerman (2001: 4-5), opcit

12

negotiating apparatuses may also be affected by external as

well as internal impediments. Among the external factors are

issues related to the escalating power and influence of

transnational corporations, the presence of like-minded but

dominant states and their pre-eminent role in the structure

of governance, and the complexities inherent in the

formation of trade negotiating blocks. Internal impediments

are associated with issues of representation,

accountability, legitimacy, transparency and the growing

asymmetry of power within networks.18 All these interrelated

factors help frame NGOs’ momentum when it comes to

propelling their agenda onto the trade policy process and

getting substantial political outcomes.

16. Thomas Risse-Kapen, “Introduction: Bringing

Transnational Relations Back in” in Thomas Risse-Kapen (ed.)

Bringing Transnational Relations Back in: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures

and International Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1995, p. 25).

17. Ibid, p. 25

13

Notwithstanding these structural constraints, transnational

NGOs hold enormous political leverage that is often

exercised in the form of ‘soft power’. This may take the

form of information politics, symbolic politics,

accountability politics or leverage politics.19 In that

regard, they propose, question, criticize and publicize.

Most importantly, they continuously serve - in some specific

issue-areas such as development, the environment, aid and

humanitarian relief etc. - as the linking arm between civil

society, the state and international institutions. In some

cases, their regular access to policy-making is generally

provided by international governance structures (the UN

agencies being a case in point) as constituted by states.20

18. See P. J. Nelson, “Agendas, Accountability, and

Legitimacy among Transnational Networks Lobbying the World

Bank” in Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker and Kathryn Sikkink

(eds.) Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Movements, Networks, and

Norms, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002,

p. 131-154).

14

This ultimately enables transnational actors to influence

multilateral negotiations to the extent that those actors

adopt such strategies as lobbying activities in the domestic

societies of powerful states, coalitions with international

organizations and coalition-building with smaller states.21

To a certain extent, the 1990s - largely praised as the

‘decade of the ‘transnational’ - have been marked by a

certain number of events that have helped nurse the claims

made by liberal transnational activists, and have given

impetus to the optimistic rhetoric that actually resonates

in the transnational politics scholarship. Indeed, the 1997

Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to a coalition of NGOs for

their participation in the campaign to ban landmines.

19. Cf. Sikkink, (2002: 304), opcit

20. For a review, see Clark et al. (1998), opcit; Tarrow

(2000), opcit.

21. Thomas Risse, “Transnational Actors and World Politics”

in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds.)

Handbook of International Relations (London : Sage Publications,

2002, p. 255-274), p. 265.

15

Likewise the defeat of the OECD Multilateral Agreement on

Investment (MAI) in 1998 was largely viewed as being

orchestrated by transnational NGOs. NGOs have also had their

share of input in the climate talks that led to the adoption

of the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997. There were equally

the 1990s boycotts of rainforest timber, organised globally

by groups like Friends of the Earth. It is also worth

mentioning that pacifist NGOs, geared toward the defence of

moral and civil rights, have intensely lobbied for the

adoption of a nuclear test ban treaty in 1996.

According to J. Matthews, such path-breaking examples are

evidence that “increasingly NGOs are able to push around

even the largest governments”.22 To the extent that national

governments are now sharing power with businesses, with

international organizations, and with a multitude of

citizens and groups, liberal transnationalists contend that

the steady concentration of power in the hands of states

that began in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia may be

16

over.23 As a result, a post-Westphalian state, whose primary

function is to mediate between the different political

loyalties, identities and authorities, is said to be on its

way to replace the nation-state.24

In all, those scholarly writings echoed the power and

influence of transnational actors in world politics. They

have been empirically tested in a wide range of issues,

ranging from the low politics of human rights and the

environment to the high politics of international security,

the transnational efforts to ban antipersonnel land mines

being a hard case in point. Such findings have thus lent

22. Cf. Jessica T. Matthews, « Power Shift », Foreign Affairs

(January/February 1997, p. 50-66)

23. Linklater (1998: 114)

24. For a critique, refer to Mustapha Kemal Pacha and David

Blaney, “Elusive Paradise: The Promise and Peril of Global

Civil Society”, Alternatives, (vol. 23, 1998, p. 417-450); James

Fulcher, “Globalization, the nation-state and global

society”, The Sociological Review (vol. 48, No. 4, 2000, p. 522-

543)

17

support for an overarching view in the study of

transnational politics: the capacity of non-state actors to

contribute to restructuring world politics. However, as I

argue, international trade still represents the missing link

in this overall optimist equation. One of the key findings

of this study is that the very nature of international trade

policy has not changed since the inception of the World

Trade Organization and the more aggressive pattern of

mobilisation endorsed by civil society actors. As we

contend, it has not yet been empirically demonstrated the

extent to which the agendas pursued by NGOs have actually

influenced the outcome of international negotiations in the

realm of trade. Transnational actions taken in relation to

issues related to trade liberalization have not successfully

impacted on policy outcomes arising out of international

trade negotiations.

To the extent that transnational organizations are also

embedded in market-based institutions driven by material

interests and characterized by organizational insecurity,

competitive pressures, and fiscal uncertainty, attempts to

18

reconcile material pressures with normative motivations may

produce outcomes dramatically at odds with liberal

expectations.25 As stated by John Keane, “markets are an

intrinsic empirical feature, a functionally intertwined

prerequisite, of the social relations of actually existing

global civil society”.26 We may well live in a world in

which civil society actors are geared toward normative and

virtuous objectives, but we are still framed by a world of

states and corporations tailored by instrumental concerns.

Although NGO pressures have had tremendous impacts in some

specific governance issues, structural issues concerning

space and time, as well as context and opportunities, still

preclude any attempts at universalisation.

25. A. Cooley and J. Ron « The NGO Scramble: Organizational

Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational

Action » International Security (Vol. 27, No 1, summer 2002), pp.

5-39.

26. John Keane, Global Civil Society? (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2003, p. 78.

19

In short, there is little systematic evidence to sustain

claims that the ‘transnational society world’ has somehow

overtaken the ‘state world’.27 As suggested by Clark,

Friedman and Hochstetler, in order to properly measure the

degree of NGOs’ influence on a given global policy area, one

needs to look at their quality of access and their proximity

to global forms of governance.28 Hence the factors that

intervene in the relationship between transnational actors

and trade must be properly appreciated.

Transnational activism in the Global Free Trade

Arena

To a large extent, trade seems to entertain a complex

relationship with civil society.29 Up until the early 1980s,

consumer and environmental organizations did not actively

27. See Risse (2002: 255)

28. Cf. Clark et al. (1998).

29. For an account, see Edward M. Graham, Fighting the Wrong

Enemy: Antiglobal Activists and Multinational Enterprises, (Washington,

D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2000).

20

engage in trade activism. Looking back to the early

development of commercial capitalism in Europe, one can note

that the Anti Corn Law League in Britain represents the

first civil society movement on a trade issue.30 As a matter

of fact, in contemporary times the evolution of civil

society activism in trade followed two broadly interrelated

events.

First, one has to refer to the crisis of the Keynesian

economic paradigm which ended the post-war equilibrium

between a liberal world market and the domestic

responsibilities of states.31 During early 1980s, in order

to tackle the recessionist and inflationist spiral, neo-

classical economists pleaded in for a paradigm shift and a

30. Y. Said and M. Desai “Trade and Global Civil Society: The

Anti-Capitalist Movement Revisited” in Mary Kaldor, Helmut

Anheier and Marlies Glasius (eds.) Global Civil Society 2003,

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Susan Ariel

Aaronson, Taking Trade to the streets: The Lost History of Public Efforts to

Shape Globalization, (Ann Harbour: The University of Michigan

Press, 2001).

21

retreat from the Keynesian “Grand Compromise”. Instead, it

was proposed a return to a new form of economic liberalism

that embodied the pre-eminence of a self-regulated market

based on, among other things, the free movement of goods,

capital and investments. In other words, as Neera Chandhoke

argues, the ability of the market to regulate itself, as

well as to provide for both growth and well-being, was

legitimized32. The State had to be rolled back both to

encourage the unhindered flow of capital and to enable the

market to display its dynamics.

Second, and in conjunction with the neo-liberal assault from

above, there has been a surge in information and

communication technologies which instilled a process of

empowerment from below and stimulated networks of activists.

The informational revolution increased the capacity of

activists to collect, collate, select, and publicise

information on a variety of specialized issues. It allowed

organisations to network across the world through fax,

email, the Internet, teleconferencing, etc. The birth of

cyberspace activism enabled transnational activists to

22

engage in strategic alliances, information exchange, and

mobilizing practices on shared issues and common values.

Engaging North American Free Trade

The events surrounding the conclusion of the Canada-US Free

Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) in 1989 greatly symbolized the

inception of modern trade activism in the universe of social

protest in advanced capitalist states. When the Canadian

government in the mid-1980s, proposed to liberalize trade

with the United States, the decision sparked a lot

31. See John Gerrard Ruggie, “International Regimes,

Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar

Economic Order” International Organization (Vol. 36 (1982), p. 379-

415). See also, Andrew Glyn et al. “The Rise and Fall of the

Golden Age” in Stephen A. Marglin and Juliet B. Shor (eds.)

The Golden Age of Capitalism: Reinterpreting the Postwar Experience (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 1990).

32 . Neera Chandhoke, “The Limits of Global Civil Society” in

Global Civil Society Yearbook 2002, (London School of Economics: The

Center for the Study of Global Governance, 2002).

23

controversy within Canadian society.33 Canadian social

groups voiced their immediate concerns with regard to the

neo-liberal path taken by the then Tory government. The

boldest reaction came however from labour unions. Headed by

the Canadian Labour Congress (CTC), unions vindicated that

free trade with the United States was part of a neo-liberal

corporate offensive and therefore would lead to a

significant loss of jobs in the short term and to an

imminent sovereignty deficit.34 The anti-free trade camp

grew rapidly and included such like-minded actors as the

Council of Canadians and the National Action Committee for

the Status of Women. This culminated in the creation of the

Action Canada Network whose aim was to forge consensus among

social groups, establish mobilizing strategies and

coordinate the Canadian anti-free trade campaign.35

On the other hand, Canadian environmental activists entered

the anti-free trade locomotive as late comers.36 The

structural links between trade and the environment were not

yet fully documented and assessed. Though the spread of a

global environmental consciousness tends to stimulate the

24

attachment to ecological values, the nexus between global

commercial activities and their concrete environmental

repercussions did not otherwise constitute a systematic

concern for environmental advocates from both sides of the

border. Whereas in Canada some environmental researchers and

activists kept a certain level of interest in the trade

debate, American environmentalists remained however passive,

indifferent and much less preoccupied.37

Two major factors bolstered that newfound interest and

commitment. First, during the course of 1987 the World

Commission on the Environment issued a report entitled Our

Common Future that called for reconciling economic growth

with policies sustaining the environment. Second, in 1991, a

GATT dispute settlement panel sided with the government of

Mexico in a dispute between Mexico and the US over a ban

adopted by the latter on tuna fishing in accordance with the

1972 Marine Mammal Protection Act.38 Mexico appealed to the

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), where the

panel ruled in its favor. That GATT panel held that the US

law violated GATT Article III on national treatment.

25

Incidentally, transnational encounters of anti trade

activists spread incrementally across North America. Many

observers note that the debate over NAFTA was a catalyst for

the formation of unprecedented alliances, cross-border

coalitions and transnational networks among previously

disconnected individuals and groups in North America.39 A

33. Cf. Chalmers Larose, Militantisme transnational: Syndicats et

écologistes devant les accords de libre-échange nord-américain, (Ph. D

dissertation, Université de Montréal, 2000).

34. “Submission to the Parliament Joint Special Committee on

International Relations of Canada concerning bilateral trade

with the United States”, Canadian Labor Congress, (Ottawa, 18

July 1985); equally, Canadian Labor Congress, Social Dimensions

of North American Economic Integration: Impacts on Working People and

Emerging Economic Responses, (Report prepared for the Human

Resource Development Department, Ottawa, 1996).

35. See Peter Blyer, “Coalitions of Social Movements as

Agencies for Social Change: The Action Canada Network” in

William K. Carroll (ed.) Organizing Dissent: Contemporary Social

Movements in Theory and Practice. (Toronto: Garmond Press, 1992).

26

significant number of domestic interests groups then met with

their direct counterparts in the NAFTA countries. For

example, in late 1991, an international meeting was held in

Zacatecas, Mexico, between social activists of the three

countries in order to discuss the social dimensions of trade

liberalization. The participants adopted the Zacatecas

Declaration condemning NAFTA and proposing to replace it by a

continental development pact.40 A significant number of NGOs

also met with their direct counterparts in the NAFTA

countries. They set up strategies aimed at cross-border

organizing and engaged in talks that debated such actions as

transnational organizing, transnational

solidarity/networking, tri-national exchanges, etc.

36. Janine Ferreti, former executive director of Pollution

Probe, (Interview, Montreal, 10 April 1997).

37. John Audley, former Sierra Club and National Wildlife

Federation (NWF), environmental and trade consultant

(Interview, Washington D.C., 21 January 1998).

38. Cf. Edward Graham (2000), opcit

27

In many instances, labor and environmental groups have been

able to raise social awareness across North America with

regard to the nature of the corporate free trade

initiatives. They have also been very instrumental in

denouncing the human costs of the maquiladoras along the US-

Mexican border and in accompanying the social awakening of

the Mexican poor. However, by 1992, on the eve of the

American presidential election, the negotiating parties

responded to the criticisms launched by social actors. They

signed two controversial side agreements, one related to the

environment (the North American Agreement on Environmental

Cooperation) and the other, designed to take up labour

39. David Ronfeldt and Cathryn L. Thorup, “NGOs, Civil

Society Networks and the Future of North America” in Rod

Dobell and Michael Neufeld (eds.) Transborder Citizens: Networks

and Institutions in North America. (British Colombia: Oolichan Books,

North American Institute, 1994, p. 31).

40. See “Joint Declaration of Zacatecas” in Memorias de

Zacatecas, (Red Mexicana de Accion Frente al Libre Comercio,

México D.F., 1991).

28

standards (the North American Agreement on Labour

Cooperation). They also agreed that these agreements would

not be incorporated within the main body of the trade

agreement, stirring widespread anger and outrage.

Many NGOs quickly became very disillusioned with the NAFTA

outcome and their confidence and effervescence at the start

rapidly shifted into a “siege mentality”, a feeling of

growing powerlessness and disinterest in the process.

Indeed, as far as the basic grievances of NGOs were

concerned, the side agreements remained an empty vessel. Not

only did they fail to address NGOs’ critics with regard to

the unjust nature of free trade, but also they fell short of

acting as a defence mechanism against the anticipated social

effects of free trade. In other words, free trade

negotiators in alliance with corporate interests used the

side agreements as an appeasing mechanism and a counter-

mobilization strategy in order to water down the anti free

trade atmosphere that was progressively emerging from part

of the American unions and environmental groups on the eve

of the 1992 elections.

29

From the outside-in: the MAI, Seattle and the Doha

Development Agenda

With the signing of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round in

Marrakech, Morocco, on 15 April 1994, and the establishment

of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Geneva, on 1

January 1995, the dynamic between transnational social

actors and trade evolved considerably. As the free trade

political agenda shifted from a regional to a global focus,

NGOs thus started to pay closer attention to the functioning

of international economic institutions and to challenge the

state-centric structure of international trade governance.

The announcement of negotiations for an OECD-led

Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) inaugurated a new

political opportunity structure that contributed to

energizing the anti free trade mobilizing artillery.

The MAI negotiations brought to the collective memory large-

scale, street fighting opposition to a multilateral

commercial agreement.41 Technically, the MAI purported to

41. Cf. Graham (2000: 8), opcit

30

establish in the area of investment the non-discrimination

clause which requires countries to apply the same treatment

to all foreign investors. In addition, the agreement

proposed to grant governments as well as enterprises and

foreign investors the right to appeal decisions taken by

governments with regard to regulation of foreign

investments. NGOs perceived this proposal as reminiscent of

NAFTA chapter 11 and the dangerous precedence set by the

Ethyl Corporation case. For many, that case signaled that

environmentally motivated law or regulation could be

challenged in court by investors under NAFTA chapter 11 and

that the state could not act freely according to its will.42

Most of the Western NGOs, led by Multinational Monitor,

Oxfam International, Greenpeace, Public Citizen, ATTAC and

others, quickly established a nexus between free trade and

42. On NAFTA chapter 11, see Howard Mann and Konrad von

Moltke “NAFTA’s Chapter 11 and the Environment: Addressing

the Impacts of the Investor-State Process on the

Environment”, International Institute for Sustainable

Development (ISSD), Working Paper, 1999.

31

global investment deregulation as enshrined in the OECD

draft proposal. Hence, by 1997 demonstrations and rallies

in major European cities increased significantly. National

anti-MAI campaigns were established in almost every OECD

country from Europe to North America. On 12 February 1998,

an international coalition of NGOs launched an unprecedented

campaign against the MAI, stating that “the MAI would give

corporations unprecedented power to directly challenge

government’s environmental, health, labor and other

safeguards”.43 By the summer of 1998, representatives of

some NGOs posted themselves regularly near the OECD’s

offices in Paris, where they beat on drums and chanted anti-

MAI mantras.44 In the fall of 1998, the negotiating

authorities suspended the MAI talks. Officially, the parties

suggested that the MAI failed for reasons of “irreconcilable

disagreements” among the participating actors. Interested

observers, however, attributed the MAI ‘breakdown’ to

43. Cf. “Joint NGO Statement on the Multilateral Agreement on

Investment”, (Washington D.C., 12 February 1998).

44. Graham (2000: 40), opcit

32

mounting NGO criticisms and strategic pressures. According

to Jason Potts of the International Institute for

Sustainable Development (IISD) in Canada:

NGOs played a major role in defeating the MAI. In fact,

it fell apart because of NGOs. NGOs’ pressures actually

had an effective impact on trade policy although in

that case it was just on and off; it did not really end

up being a productive result. It was just a blocking

mechanism like a boycott”.45

As a matter of fact, as the views of the negotiating parties

clashed on issues concerning the relevance of a global

investment regime, NGOs showed a unified discursive rhetoric

and established a transnational pattern of mobilization.

Not only did the MAI debacle inspire the resurgence of NGO

activism in international trade governance but also it

demonstrated that a defying posture and consistent pressure

exercised from the outside-in may actually challenge state

expectations and distort pre-established outcomes.

45. Jason Potts, International Institute for Sustainable

Development (IISD), (Interview, Montreal, 5 March 2004).

33

To a certain extent whereas the anti-MAI mobilization did

not end up giving NGOs greater access and influence in the

shaping of a corporate-led global investment mechanism, it

certainly defied conventional wisdom by countering and

derailing a major international initiative backed by

powerful states. In this sense, the MAI opposition stands as

a clear step taken by NGOs in relation to their capacity to

manufacture resistance to the corporate-led free trade

architecture. The social protest against the MAI revealed

their status as agents of a burgeoning transnational civil

society as well as their growing step toward influencing the

dynamic of the international trade architecture.

The significance of Seattle

After meeting in Singapore in 1996 and in Geneva in 1998,

the WTO ministers of trade met again from 30 November to 3

December 1999, in Seattle. A two-tier strategy was put

forward by diverse institutionalized NGOs. On the one hand,

they resolved to amplify street mobilization and

denunciation with fellow anti-globalization activists. And,

34

on the other hand, transnational activists, in alliance with

a certain number of emerging and least developed countries,

put forward an ‘open door policy’ which aimed at voicing

their concerns within the more formal and official circles

in and around the Seattle forum of negotiations. It was in

this respect that, on the eve of the WTO meeting, on 29

November 1999, a cohort of institutionalized NGOs decided to

take part in the Seattle Symposium on International Trade Issues in the

First Decades of the next Century.46

In Seattle, the dialectics of confrontation quickly

prevailed over the rhetoric of cooperation. In Mary Kaldor’s

appreciation, Seattle reflected deep political cleavages

where, on one side, were the parochialists allied to the

liberal globalisers, foreshadowing a global system dominated

by corporate interests and the richest countries and, on the

other side, were the global civic networks.47 Not

46. For details, see “Summary Report of the Seattle Symposium

on International Trade Issues in the First Decade of the

Next Century”, Sustainable Development, (vol. 34, No 1, 1

December 1999).

35

surprisingly, NGOs and diverse civil society actors opted

for a blocking strategy and rallied with anger and

discontent. With continued demonstrations, rallies, heavy

clashes in the streets between protesters and the police

forces, an unworkable atmosphere eventually contributed to

disturbing and disrupting the course of the Third WTO

ministerial meeting. As a result, the participating states

failed to agree on an agenda for the negotiation round about

the further opening of trade borders.

In the end, the Seattle trade talks ended acrimoniously.

States were not able to reach consensus on the most

important issues and NGOs again claimed an epic victory over

states and corporations. The turn of events in Seattle

showed the internal discrepancies within the governance

infrastructure. For Fred Halliday, issues of dispute

management and deadlocks inside the conference reflected

long time opposition between diverging state interests.48 As

47. Mary Kaldor “Civilising Globalisation? The Implications

of the Battle in Seattle”, Millennium Journal of International Studies

(Vol. 29, No 1, 2000 pp.105-114), p. 113.

36

for Jan Art Scholte, “social movements of the kind

represented on the streets of Seattle have achieved only

marginal reforms of global economic governance”49. In our

view, the Seattle episode remains a cornerstone in

transnational activism. I agree with Halladay that “only the

future will tell whether Seattle marked a step towards a

more equitable and effective global governance, or another

stand-off between the proponents of feckless ruckus and of

hegemonic control”.50 But the fact remains that not only did

Seattle energize critics of economic liberalism but also it

became a rallying symbol among transnational activists in

view of the more turbulent rounds of talks which were

scheduled to come.

On the road to Cancun

The Seattle failure convinced pro free traders, governments

and WTO officials alike, to adapt to the new parameters of

the politics of global free trade. Selecting the venue and

dealing with street protests became the landmark of the new

approach. A new round of multilateral trade negotiations was

37

ultimately convened in Doha, Qatar, on November 2001. During

the Doha meeting, trade officials initiated a broad range of

issues known as the Doha Development Agenda. They resolved to

meet again for a fifth ministerial meeting in Cancún,

Mexico, in September 2003, in order to take stock of

progress made in the negotiations, and to discuss ways of

moving forward the Doha Development Agenda. However, during

the course of 2002, the European Union proposed to reopen

the Doha agenda of negotiations in order to include some

issues related to investments and competition, issues that

were previously paralyzed during the ill-fated MAI episode.

Better known as the “Singapour issues”, these issues include

48. Fred Halliday «Getting Real About Seattle» Millennium Journal

of International Studies (Vol. 29, No 1, 2000, pp. 123-129).

49. On this point, see Jan Aart Scholte “Cautionary

Reflections on Seattle” Millennium Journal of International Studies

(Vol. 29, No 1, 2000, pp.115-121).

50. Fred Halladay (2000 : 129), opcit

38

four areas: trade and investment, trade and competition

policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation.

In Cancún, transnational activists acted as political

entrepreneurs. They refined heir action repertoire, deployed

targeted political strategies, and provided information and

normative frames to like-minded social actors and state

allies. According to the French Magazine Le Nouvel Observateur,

non governmental organisations played a bridging role by

conducting a true “guerrilla war” in order to unite poor

countries against Europe and the United States. Oxfam

International took a very active role in this campaign and

emerged as a leading “counter-power”.51 Many Oxfam lobbyists

were in direct contact with several developing countries’

delegations, giving advice and perspectives in offering

their expertise, framing the issues and building the Cancun

“refusal front”.52 Intense lobbying efforts came also from

such influential NGOs as the consumer advocacy group Public

39

Citizen from the US, Greenpeace International, Third World

Network, Focus on the Global South, and the French-born

organization ATTAC.

As Europe and the United States, among others, showed strong

reluctance to reduce their agriculture subsidies, the WTO

Cancún talks reached a deadlock when some delegates from

Africa, the Caribbean and Asia (the ACP countries), backed

by the Group of 21, walked out, accusing the most developed

nations of failing to offer sufficient compromises and of

wanting instead to settle the Singapore issues. The

political impacts made by NGOs in relation to the Cancún

outcome have been differently interpreted. Most certainly,

NGOs provided technical assistance to some developing

countries and were instrumental in those countries’

51. Cf. Christian Losson “Oxfam: Force de frappe solidaire”,

Libération, 20 January, 2004.

52. Stephane Arteta “Les ONG au service des pays du Sud :

Comment Céline a monté le front du refus”, Le Nouvel

Observateur, 18 September 2003, No 2028,

http://www.nouvelobs.com/artciles/p2028/a215511.html.

40

technical assessment of the deal-making process that saw the

collapse of the Doha Development Agenda in Cancùn. During

the full five days of the Summit, NGOs gathered within the

global network Our world is not for sale and lobbied each and every

delegation from the South.53

However, as far as issues concerning success and achievement

were concerned, some NGOs downplayed the results that were

achieved in Cancùn and showed a great deal of cautiousness.

Whereas the organization Food First cited the Cancùn

collapse as the “victory of the people”, Oxfam indicated

that it took “no delight in this failure”, calling it a

“missed opportunity”. Oxfam’s campaign director, Adrian

Lovett, noted that in Cancun there was “an incredible sense

of unity among developing countries” but that “the

responsibility for the collapse of the summit lies mostly

with the USA and the European Union (EU) who failed to

deliver on their commitment to put development at the heart

53. See, Laurence Caramel “L’ampleur des désaccords Nord-Sud

met l’OMC en échec : L’influence grandissante des ONG anti-

OMC” Le Monde, 16 September 2003.

41

of the WTO talks”.54 By contrast, Public Citizen viewed the

Cancùn demise as “reminiscence of Seattle”, and claimed that

it was a “victory for global civil society and developing

countries”. Friends of the Earth International equally

stated that “despite intense pressure from the business

lobbies, and bullying by the European Union and the US,

developing countries have stood their ground”.

Cancùn departed from Seattle in the sense that well thought

out caution and wisdom replaced the killer instinct

inherent in the NGOs blocking approach in Seattle. Many NGOs

even dismissed the charges of being the ‘Cancùn killers’. As

noted by Jason Potts:

NGOs were happy with the Cancùn outcome because

developing countries stood up for their rights. But

they were not happy that it came to that….I suspect it

is going to lead to more bilateralism... That is also a

way of saying that NGOs might have failed in Cancùn to

54. Cf. “The WTO and global trade after Cancun”,

http//www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/tarde/interview_alo

vett.htm.

42

the extent that they have now instilled a situation

which is even less favourable to developing countries.

Oxfam equally displayed a positive reading of the steps made

in Cancùn and the future of the WTO in managing

international trade activities among nations:

Many groups were happy about the Cancùn failure and

prayed for the end of the WTO. On our side…. we are

happy to know that the negotiations will continue and

that this may produce a better result in a future

meeting. We believe that the negotiations should remain

in the framework of the WTO. It is better to have an

agreement that is not so satisfying than not to have an

agreement at all.55

Ultimately, this position reinforces the view that the

question of NGOs’ achievements in relation to the trade

liberalization scheme cannot be measured by focusing on

short-term outcomes like Seattle or Cancun. Success still

remains inescapable from the long-term goal of reducing the

55. Justine Lesage, Oxfam Quebec communication director.

Interviewed by the author, 16 February 2004, Montreal

43

North-South divide. Some NGOs, like Greenpeace for example,

are of the view that achievement should be measured in light

of establishing connections between the trade liberalization

model and the impacts on the lives of ordinary people and

the planet.56 By any measure, NGOs actions in Cancùn have

yet to be followed by concrete responses from governments

that would help unveil new WTO rules or agreements on issues

that would facilitate poor countries’ abilities to develop

and, at the same time, modify the dynamic of international

trade relations.

Conclusion

This article has discussed the influence of non state actors

in the area of international trade. It has shown that NGOs

face enormous challenges when it comes to impacting on

56. Jo Dufay, Executive director of Greenpeace Canada

(Interview, Montreal, 10 March 2004)

44

policy outcomes of free trade negotiations and to exerting

regulatory influence in the World Trade Organization and

regional trade organisations. The successive waves of

transnational civic activism that have targeted the global

trading system have yet to substantially impact on treaty

formation. Indeed, the free trade paradigm remains the core

ideological reference and policy prescriptions for most of

international trade relations and the impact of the World

Trade Organisation is being felt directly as the new

foundation for international economics.57 As a consensus-

based organisation with diverse membership, consisting of

representatives largely from national trade ministries, and

a national mandate of trade liberalization, the WTO has not

yet managed to build up institutional mechanisms for a

concrete participation of non-state actors in the global

trade governance machinery. Transnational activism against

57. See J. Cameron and K. Campbell, “A Reluctant Global

Policy-Maker” in Richard E. Steinberg (eds.) The Greening of

World Trade Law: international trade organizations and environmental issues,

(Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2002).

45

trade liberalization illustrates that NGOs operate in a

world of states and are still at the margins of

international trade governance.

Despite these structural challenges, non-state actors have

established themselves as global players and informed agents

in a world increasingly mapped by multiple transnational

social ties. In the course of the last decade, anti free

trade and development NGOs - by virtue of their outside-in

mobilizing practices - have contributed to de-constructing

the founding premises of the neo-liberal free trade

initiatives. Through shock tactics and communicative skills,

they have also shown a talent for promoting an alternative

trade discourse. They have also shown a talent for

derailing as well as disrupting selected trade or trade-

related negotiating processes in targeted institutional

forums at the regional or global level, as the fall out of

the MAI, Seattle and Cancun processes have amply

demonstrated. As a result, it is no longer accidental for

trade policy-makers to engage in consultative dialogue with

46

civil society actors as a step toward responding to demands

for greater governance of international trade.

Our analytical survey confirms that the question of NGOs’

achievement in transnational policy processes needs to be

interpreted as issue-specific and can not be apprehended as

a definite propensity of such actors to impact on all issue-

areas of transnational politics. Policy outcomes vary in

accordance with the issue (i.e. international trade) and the

target (states, corporations and international

institutions). Since trade remains a premiere instrument of

statecraft and a powerful attribute of economic dominance,

trade policy choices and international trade negotiations

will likely reflect established state interests and

preferences. Furthermore, notwithstanding the degree of

autonomy of international organizations and their political

leverage, international institutions are created by states

and remain subjected to a state-based system of

international negotiation. As a result, it is exceptionally

difficult for such institutions to open up to non-state

participation at any meaningful level.58

47

Transnational actors have posed in concrete terms the issue

of the future of global trade governance. And transnational

actions - whether in the framework of the FTA, NAFTA, the

MAI, and the WTO rounds of negotiations - have challenged

the ability of the current interstate system, and the

international institutions that states create, to open up to

citizens’ participation in global governance and be

effectively democratic and accountable. Would NGOs have

exerted policy influence and outcomes in free trade

negotiations had they been full participants in the global

trade negotiating machinery? The answer to that hypothetical

question remains open-ended. What is paramount, however, is

that the impact of non state actors is fast being felt in a

quite number of issues relating to global governance. As

this study unveils, states no longer absorb the overall

magnitude of the global public sphere and transnational

58 . Cf. Michael Edwards, « Introduction » in Michael

Edwards and John Gaventa (eds.) Global Citizen Action, (Boulder:

Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001).

48

actors are transforming world politics by pointing to new

avenues to address global concerns.

49

Notes

50