Post on 21-Jan-2023
Retreats and Withdrawals in Republican Roman
Warfare Daniel Morgan, BA (Hons) (Newcastle)
May 2020
This research was supported by an Australian Government Research Training
Program (RTP) Scholarship
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Ancient
History and Classical Langugages
Retreats and Withdrawals in Republican Roman Warfare 2020
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Statement of Originality
I hereby certify that the work embodied in the thesis is my own work, conducted under
normal supervision. The thesis contains no material which has been accepted, or is being
examined, for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary
institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously
published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made. I give
consent to the final version of my thesis being made available worldwide when deposited in
the University’s Digital Repository, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968 and
any approved embargo.
Signature: D. Morgan Date: 5 May 2020
Daniel Morgan
University of Newcastle
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Acknowledgements
I would first and foremost like to thank my primary supervisor, Dr. Jane Bellemore, for her
direction and assistance during all stages of my studies, and especially for her assistance with
this thesis. I wish I had a sestertius for each gratuitous or ill-considered question I bombarded
her with. Even so, I received a considered and useful response to each and every one. She has
given me a great deal of feedback on numerous drafts of this thesis, and I would not have
been able to do it without her guidance. I also wish to extend my sincerest thanks to Dr.
Elizabeth Baynham, who has been my co-supervisor for the latter stages of my work. She has
also given me valuable feedback that has significantly improved this thesis. I further wish to
extend my thanks to the many other History and Ancient History staff that I have had fruitful
discussions with over the years. Finally, I wish to express my gratitude towards the
University of Newcastle itself, where I have been studying since 2011. The University has
been very supportive throughout my studies and I owe this instititution a significant debt of
gratitude.
Naturally, any remaining errors in this work are entirely my own responsibility.
Sincerely,
Daniel Morgan
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Table of Contents
Abstract.......................................................................................................................................
Introduction: How Battles and Campaigns Ended in Roman Republican Warfare....................
Preamble............................................................... ........................................................
Recent Developments in the Study of Roman Battles and Tactics...............................
Modern Views on How Battles and Campaigns Ended................................................
What are Retrograde Manoeuvres, Retreats and Withdrawals? .................................
How Often Retreats and Withdrawals Occurred.................................. ......................
Overview of Key Sources.................................. ..........................................................
Terminology and Complications in Identifying and Distinguishing Types of
Retrograde Manoeuvres.................................. ................................... .........................
Purpose and Scope of the Thesis.................................. ..............................................
Thesis Structure............................. .................................. ...........................................
Method.................................. ............................. ........................................................
Translations............................ .................................. ..................................................
Conclusion............................. .................................. ...................................................
Chapter One: Retreat and Withdrawal: Why and Where To? ..................................................
Introduction............................ .................................. ..................................................
Part A: Why Armies Retreated.................................... ................................................
Retreats Due to Defeat in Battle.......................................................................
Retirements from Indecisive Battles................................................................
Disengagements at Nightfall.................................. ........................................
Disengagements Due to Poor Weather.............................................................
Feigned Retreats.................................. .................................. .........................
Summary of Part A.................................. ........................................................
Part B: Where Armies Sought Refuge.................................. .......................................
High Ground.................................. ..................................................................
Camps.................................. .................................. .........................................
Walled Settlements.................................. ........................................................
Summary of Part B.................................. ........................................................
Part C: Retrograde Movements over Longer Distances.................................... ..........
Summary of Part C.................................. ........................................................
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Conclusion................................................................ ...................................................
Chapter Two: The Impact of Pursuit on Retreating or Withdrawing Forces...........................
Introduction............................ .................................. ..............................................
Types of Pursuits.................................. .................................. ..........................
How Pursuit Could Produce Disorder.................................. ........................................
Considerations Against Pursuit.................................. ............................................
Conclusion.................................. .................................. .................................. ...........
Chapter Three: Roman Retreat Tactics, Part I: Ratio and Combined Arms.............................
Introduction............................ .................................. ...................................................
Factors of Success in Retreats and Withdrawals...........................................................
Physical Order in Retrograde Movements.................................. ..............................
Legionary Training, Tactics and Reserve Lines..........................................................
The Roles of Subordinate Officers.................................. ...........................................
Equites, Velites et Auxilia.................................. .................................. ......................
Conclusion.................................. .................................. ...........................................
Chapter Four: Roman Retreat Tactics, Part II: Virtus, Consilium and Scientia Rei
Militaris..................................................................................................................................,
Introduction.................................. ..................................
The Roman Imperator.............................. ..................................
The General’s Tactical Duties..................................
Generalship in Retreats from the Battleline and Into a Fortified Position
Generalship During Retirement From a Fortified Position and On the March
Conclusion..................................
Chapter Five: The Development of Roman Retreat Tactics from the Middle to Late Republic
(218-46 BC)
Introduction............................ ..................................
Retreats in the Punic and Macedonian Wars (218-168 BC)
Retreat Tactics from 149 to 102 BC..................................
Retreat Tactics in the Late Republic............................
Conclusion
Chapter Six: Disastrous Withdrawals in the Late Republic and Early Empire.......................
Introduction.................................. ..................................
The Battle of Carrhae, 53 BC
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Marcus Antonius’ Parthian Campaign, 36 BC...............................................................
The Clades Variana, AD 9.................................. .....................................................
Conclusion.................................. .................................. .......................... ................
Conclusion: Retreats and Withdrawals in Roman Warfare.................................................
Summary of the Thesis.................................. ............................. .......................
The Relationship of Retreats and Withdrawals to Roman Tactics and Strategy....
Retreats and Empire.................................. ............................ .................................
Suggestions for Further Study....................................................................................
Appendix A: Table of Basic References to Retreats and Withdrawals...............................
Appendix B: Table of Retreats and Withdrawals According to Tactical Context................
Appendix C: Table of Routs and Flights from Battle..........................................................
Appendix D: Detailed References to Retreats and Withdrawals by Chronology, Location
and Result
Reference List.........................................................................................................................
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Abstract
Roman battles and campaigns have been studied for centuries, but one aspect of the subject
that has received less attention than others is the fate of defeated armies. Accounts of major
disasters in which enormous numbers of men died are, of course, well known, and these have
received the most attention from modern scholars examining the outcome of defeat in ancient
battles. However, there is significant evidence in the ancient sources that many armies which
were defeated in battle were not destroyed, but were able to escape their enemies relatively
intact. Such orderly retreats and withdrawals, and the role they played in ancient warfare,
have yet to be examined in detail.
This thesis will examine retreats and withdrawals in various battles and campaigns, and
analyse how they affected the tactics and strategies of Roman armies in the Middle to Late
Republic. Subjects for examination will include the prevalence of these manoeuvres, the
reasons they were carried out, the manner in which they were conducted, and their impact on
Roman military success and failure. It will be demonstrated that retreats and withdrawals
occurred commonly enough to have had a major impact on the outcomes of battles and
campaigns, and that the conduct of these manoeuvres, as well as planning for them,
significantly shaped Roman tactics and strategies. The Romans deliberately trained and
prepared for retreats and withdrawals, and they developed the sophistication and complexity
of their tactics for these manoeuvres until they could carry them out with unparalleled
organisation and skill. By the first century BC, this was a significant factor in their military
success. It will thus be shown that even a heavily defeated army was not necessarily doomed
to slaughter, and that a major aspect of Roman tactics and strategy has been overlooked in
modern studies.
Retreats and Withdrawals in Republican Roman Warfare 2020
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The principles of strategy and tactics, and the logistics of war are really absurdly simple: it is
the actualities that make war so complicated and so difficult, and are usually neglected by
historians.
(Field Marshall Lord Wavell)
Introduction
How Battles and Campaigns Ended in Roman Republican
Warfare
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Preamble
On 24 June 1812, l'Empereur des Français Napoleon I invaded the Russian Empire with an
army of 685,000 men. Napoleon preferred to avoid a long and costly campaign and sought to
destroy the Russian army in a decisive battle, and he aggressively manoeuvred the separate
divisions of his enormous army to create such an opportunity.1 He fought a major and
successful action at Smolensk in August, but the Russians successfully retreated, denying
l'empereur a decisive victory.2 As the French continued their advance, the Russians continued
to withdraw, extending Napoleon’s campaign into the winter months.3 On September 7th,
Napoleon brought the Russians to battle at Borodino. The French were victorious in the
exceptionally bloody engagement that followed, but the Russians successfully retreated
again, continuing to avoid decisive defeat.4 There was some tension in the Russian leadership
over this strategy of withdrawal, but events would soon vindicate its exponents.5
Napoleon reached Moscow, but the Russians did not offer peace as he expected, and he
hesitated.6 On October 19th, with the onset of winter and no apparent prospect of decisive
victory, the French began their long withdrawal from Russia.7 In the following weeks, lack of
supplies, harsh weather, and incessant Russian attacks caused the collapse of Napoleon’s
army. The French remnants reached safety in late November, but of the gargantuan forces that
invaded the Russian Empire in June, less than 20,000 would ever fight for Napoleon again.8
Napoleon’s first Grande Armée, the most experienced he would ever command, had been
destroyed.9
1 Lieven, 2016, 131, 173, 215. 2 Ibid., 166-70. 3 Ibid., 172. 4 Ibid., 209-14. 5 Ibid., 133-6, 209-11, 525-6. 6 Ibid., 251-2. 7 Ibid., 256-7. 8 Ibid., 282. 9 Ibid., 3, 527.
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Napoleon hereafter commanded less experienced troops, and his power was broken the next
year in the Battle of Leipzig.10 Although his ultimate defeat was a close-run thing, the
successful withdrawals carried out by the Russian army in 1812, and the impact of
Napoleon’s own catastrophic retreat, were significant historical events.11 Perhaps retreats and
withdrawals are less exciting than glorious cavalry charges, gruelling sieges and major
conquests, but the Napoleonic campaign of 1812 demonstrates that in the right circumstances,
such manoeuvres could be of decisive military, and historical, importance.
Differences in scale notwithstanding, if one tries to think of a comparable story from the
ancient world, few examples may come to mind. Perhaps one would be the famous March of
the Ten Thousand. This event, in which Xenophon led a contingent of mercenaries from the
heart of the Persian Empire in 401 BC, to safety on the western shores on Anatolia in 399 BC,
was recorded in detail in Xenophon’s Anabasis. The achievements of Xenophon and his
soldiers, and their memorable cry ‘θάλαττα! θάλαττα!’ (The Sea! The Sea!) are rightly
famous (Xen. Anab. 4.7.24). Even so, the long–term political consequences of this event were
not momentous. Did retreats and withdrawals ever assume significant importance in ancient
warfare and history? If ever they did, one would expect to find evidence of such in the
extensive and well–known military history of Rome.
Consider the Battle of Carrhae, 53 BC. In this engagement, a Parthian army using novel
tactics crushed seven legions led by Marcus Licinius Crassus, who was one of Rome’s great
men at the time (cf. Plut. Crass. 23-27.4). Following the battle, the Roman army attempted to
withdraw to Armenia, but disintegrated en-route (Crass. 27.5-31.7). Crassus himself died in
this chaos (31.5) and overall, 30,000 men were lost (31.7). These events brought about a
lapse of Roman dominion in the east and inititated decades of violent competition between
Rome and Parthia for control of the region.12 It also upset the fragile balance of Roman
politics, indirectly leading to the final round of civil wars that destroyed the Republic.13
10 Ibid. 527. 11 Ibid., 527. 12 Sampson, 2015, 169-72. 13 Goldsworthy, Caesar, 379, 451
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As Sampson has pointed out, it was in the failed withdrawal from the stricken battlefield at
Carrhae that defeat turned to catastrophe.14 The failed withdrawal at Carrhae thus assumes
major significance. Of course, Carrhae is well known as a major Roman defeat, yet it is the
battle itself that one thinks of first, and not the disastrous withdrawal that followed. This is
only one example of how the role of retreats and withdrawals has been overlooked in
Republican Roman warfare. There are many others. The following thesis will seek to correct
this imbalance.
Recent Developments in the Study of Roman Battles and Tactics
The analysis of ancient battles and campaigns is an old scholarly field, but although the
mechanics of ancient combat are well studied, one can ask whether all aspects of this subject
been examined with equal weight. Traditionally, there has been a great deal of focus on
Roman tactics by orthodox, military historians such as Delbrück who pioneered a method
known as Sachkritik to analyse battles.15 In this method, the known capabilities and practices
of modern armies were applied to counterbalance the exaggerations of ancient sources.
Comparative analysis is useful in studying battles and campaigns, but not all of its exponents
have utilised the same finesse as Delbrück, and this approach fell out of favour.16
Over the past few decades and partly in response to the perceived stagnation of the traditional
approach to battle studies, there has been a great deal of new work on Roman battles and
campaigns, particularly as a result of the introduction of John Keegan's (1976) ‘face–of–
battle’ approach to battle analysis into the field of ancient warfare.17 This approach utilises
knowledge of ancient weapons and armour and modern human psychology to examine the
experience of participants in battle, and thereby draw out details that are not explicitly stated
in the sources.18 This approach has since been applied by numerous experts to ancient history
and the study of Roman warfare.19 One of the first ‘face–of–battle’ analyses in the field of
Roman military history was MacMullen’s ‘The Legion as a Society’, published in Historia in
1984, which utilised modern studies of combatant psychology to draw inferences about the
14 Sampson, 2015, 147. Sampson (17) states that the withdrawal was a greater disaster than the battle itself. 15 Wheeler, 2001, 171. Cf. Delbrück, 1920. 16 Wheeler, 2001, 171. 17 See Gilliver, 2007, 130–6; Cagniart, 2011, 92–3. 18 Kagan, 2006, 15, 17–8 19 Eg. Goldsworthy, 1996; Sabin, 2000, 2007; McCall, 2001; Daly, 2002; Cagniart, 2011; Anders, 2015, etc.
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motivations of Roman soldiers in battle, arguing in particular that combatants were motivated
mainly by concern for their close comrades, as well as by the fear of the enemy, just as
argued by Keegan.20 However it was not until 1996 that Keegan’s ideas were fully introduced
to the study of Roman warfare by authors such as Lee and Goldsworthy.21 Lee examined the
motivations of Roman soldiers in combat, and Goldsworthy’s significant work, The Roman
Army at War: 100 BC – AD200, combined a traditional, tactics–based analysis of Roman
warfare with Keegan’s ideas on combat motivation and psychology. The resulting shift in
emphasis away from a fixation on large–scale manoeuvres and tactics towards the
psychological and smaller scale aspects of battle has generally been a positive development.22
Several important further works have been produced from this new school of Roman military
study, including Sabin’s profound article ‘The Face of Roman Battle’ in 2000, McCall’s
excellent analysis of Roman and Italian cavalry in 2001, Daly’s detailed study of Cannae in
2002, and Levithan’s brilliant study of siege warfare in 2013.23 In particular, Sabin’s article in
2000 gave a new perspective on Roman combat, providing a mechanical explanation for the
length of most Roman battles by pointing out that men needed to rest regularly, both
physically and psychologically, between short bouts of intense fighting.24
However, there has been just as much excellent work on Roman battles and warfare that has
not relied upon the ‘face–of–battle’ approach. One example is Lendon’s thought–provoking
analysis of Roman infantry tactics and psychology in Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of
Battle in Classical Antiquity.25 Another is Phang’s 2008 book, Roman Military Service:
Ideologies of Discipline in the Late Republic and Early Principate, which analyses and
explains disciplina militaris that was characteristic of the Roman army. In terms of battle
mechanics, Zhmodikov published an article in 2000 that, along with Goldsworthy’s The
Roman Army at War, helped to inform Sabin’s groundbreaking article of the same year.26
Zhmodikov convincingly argued that Roman legionaries spent as much or more time
engaging in missile combat than they did in hand–to–hand fighting. He thus provided a
20 MacMullen, 1984. This article relies upon Marshall (1947) and Shils & Janowitz (1948) to make his psychological arguments. As will be touched on below, these are unstable foundations. 21 Cf. Goldsworthy, 1996; Lee, 1996. 22 Wheeler, 2007, 187. 23 Cf. Sabin, 2000; McCall, 2001; Daly, 2002; Levithan, 2013. 24 Sabin, 2000, 17. 25 Lendon, 2005, 312-5. 26 Cf. Sabin, 2000, 11–2.
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purely tactical and source–based explanation for the long duration and lulls of Roman battles,
without reliance upon the psychologically–oriented ‘face–of–battle’ approach. Slavik built
again on this idea in 2018, by elaborating that it was not legionaries who performed most of
the missile combat, but light infantry such as the velites. This also offered a new explanation
for the poorly–understood Roman line–relief system that historians have been debating since
the field’s inception.27
There has also been direct criticism of the ‘face–of–battle’ approach. Everett Wheeler, for
instance, published a convincing article in 2001 arguing against the foundations of the
approach. Wheeler rightly points out that the World War Two–era studies of Marshall and
Shils & Janowitz are scientifically unsound and cannot be used as a basis for understanding
the psychology of Roman soldiers in battle.28 Wheeler finds Marcus Junkelmann’s alternative
reconstruction of early Imperial Roman battle mechanics to be more compelling than the
better known model of Goldsworthy.29 Also, Kimberly Kaga has argued convincingly against
relying entirely on a Keegan–esque soldier’s point of view in analysing battles. She advocates
a more holistic approach combining the combatant’s view with that of the traditional
commander’s point of view, taking into account not only the importance of the combatant’s
fear of enemy weapons, but also tactics and manoeuvres, in shaping the motivations of
combatants and courses of battles.30 An emphasis on the individual experience has perhaps
overlooked the nuances of group behaviour in battle, or what is referred to by Wheeler as the
‘automaton’ approach.31 As such, there is still ample space for the study of tactics and
manoeuvre in shaping the outcomes of battles and campaigns.
27 Slavik, 2018, 168. Direct evidence from the sources regarding line–relief is limited (Sabin, 2007, 431). A recent re–assessment of line–relief has been carried out by Taylor (2014, 320–2). There is extensive debate over how this system worked (eg. Junkelmann, 1986, 242–3; Daly, 2002, 60–3; Lendon, 2005, 181; Cagniart, 2007, 92–3; Sage, 2008, 69–76; Koon, 2010, 85–6; Taylor, 2014, 320). 28 Wheeler, 2001, 173. On Marshall, cf. Spiller (1988). On Shils & Janowitz, cf. Bartov (1992) and Rush (2001) which provide alternative explanations for the sources of small group morale in World War Two. 29 Wheeler, 2001, 171. Cf. Junkelmann, 1983, 236–46; Goldsworthy, 1996, 12–38, 116–247. 30 Kagan, 2006, 19–22, 107–8, 189–91, 200. 31 Wheeler, 2001, 170, 174.
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Modern Views on How Battles Ended
While the application of the ‘face–of–battle’ approach to the study of ancient warfare has
brought a new emphasis on the experience of soldiers and small units in battle, most battle
analyses still place greater emphasis on the course of the battle than on what happened to
combatants once the battle was over.32 In Greco–Roman culture, control of the battlefield was
considered the mark of a victory.33 This is well–recognised, but what of manner in which the
enemy removed themselves, or were removed from the battlefield?
The approach of ‘face–of–battle’ analyses is to divide battle into distinct ‘phases’, and the
terminal phase of battle under this schema is the rout, in which the defeated army's line is
broken and many or all of the defeated soldiers turn and flee, often suffering heavy casualties
in the process.34 A prominent example of this emphasis on the rout as the usual end to an
battle is found in The Roman Army At War, where Goldsworthy briefly mentions the
possibility that battles could end indecisively (ie. with retreats), but assumes that most battles
ended with a catastrophic breakdown by one side.35 Thus, while the ‘face–of–battle’ approach
has brought some new attention to the matter of how battles ended, the subject has not been
examined in extended detail but only as part of broader analyses on how battles worked.
When the subject has been dealt with, it has been assumed that routs are the usual way in
32 Eg. Goldsworthy, 1996, 222–7; Sabin, 2000, 11–13, 17, 2007, 413–6; McCall, 2001, 16–9, 53–79; Daly, 2002, 196–200, passim; Cagniart, 2011, 92–3; Anders, 2015, 293–298. The vast majority of pages in these analyses are dedicated to the battle itself, with much less space dedicated to how battles ended. This trend is not necessarily specific to 'face–of–battle' studies (eg. Hoyos, 2011, 71–2). As another example, the promisingly named How Fighting Ends: A History of Surrender (2012), with a chapter on Ancient Rome by Loretana de Libero (29–38), does not examine retreats or routs, but focuses specifically on surrender. 33 Control of the battlefield, which for the Greeks would include erecting a trophy, and for the Romans would at least involve a count of the bodies, was also a literary convention that usually marked the end of a battle account (Lendon, 2017, 155). 34 Division of battle into phases: Keegan pioneered this approach, and it has been utilised in slightly different forms by numerous Roman military scholars (Goldsworthy, 1996, 171–247; McCall, 2001, 53–77; Daly, 2002, 166–202; Anders, 2015, 268–291; etc). Too schematic: Kagan, 2006, 22, 198. In the introduction to The Roman Army at War Goldsworthy (1996, 5) outlined the flaws of attempting to impose a ‘neat order’ onto the ‘chaos’ of battle, as an argument for using the ‘face–of–battle’ approach as opposed to traditional tactics–focused accounts, and yet at times 'face–of–battle' proponents can be just as guilty of attempting to impose order onto chaos (also see Cagniart, 2011, 92). Thus, while this method has been criticised as too schematic, it has stimulated some interest in the matter of what happened to soldiers when their army was defeated. Face–of–battle studies emphasising the rout: Goldsworthy, 1996, 222–7, 2011, 184–5; Daly, 2002, 198–201; Sabin, 2007, 413–6; Cagniart, 2011, 92–3. 35 Indecisive victories: Goldsworthy, 1996, 224, 245. Routs: Goldsworthy, 1996, 205–6, 222. Goldsworthy's newer works continue to emphasise the rout as the main way in which Roman–era battles ended (2011, 184–5).
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which battles ended.
A brief overview of this is given by Philip Sabin: 36
The usual outcome of major land battles in [the Republic] was that one side suffered a
clear (and often overwhelming) defeat. The first priority of troops in the losing army
was to escape their vulnerability to one–sided slaughter ... Even if they had a line of
retreat, infantry in particular would be desperately exposed to pursuing cavalry in open
terrain. The only way for a broken army to escape such a catastrophe was to seek
shelter within a nearby fortified camp ...
Sabin says no more of retreats, but continues to examine the disproportionate casualty
numbers of victorious and vanquished armies in the sources, making the following
assessment:37
... the overall picture that emerges from the sources is one in which the victors usually
get off far more lightly than the vanquished ...
The impression is given that (organised) retreats, in which the defeated army did not suffer
heavy casualties, were unusual and when they did occur, they were only made towards a
fortified camp. This assessment by Sabin is not unusual.38 Gilliver states in a similar fashion
that the ultimate purpose of facing an enemy in a line of battle was to force them to turn and
flee, and then continues:39
... this was when the majority of casualties occurred ... For Roman troops on the
defensive this should have been the point at which, if they were able, they made for
their camp or a nearby defended city, or retreated to high ground in a close formation.
36 Sabin, 2007, 413–4. 37 Ibid., 416. 38 See Van Wees, 2004, 191; Southern, 2006, 196–7; Sabin, 2007, 430–2; Wheeler, 2007, 211–2; Cagniart, 2010, 92–3; Hoyos, 2011, 72–3; Anders, 2015, 295. 39 Gilliver, 2007, 138.
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Elsewhere, Catherine Gilliver has given more weight to the possibility of retreat as a way in
which battle could end:40
It was when the ranks had been broken up that retreat and flight were most likely ...
Ordered retreat was possible for disciplined troops, and they might be pushed into
renewing the fight, even successfully, by strong leadership. But retreat could swiftly
turn into flight, and panic and wholesale flight rather than withdrawal in formation
were more likely for both Roman and non–Roman troops.
As can be seen, however, Gilliver emphasises that while ‘ordered retreat’ was possible in the
event of defeat, ‘panic and wholesale flight ... were more likely ...’41 Other scholars ,
including Sabin and Goldsworthy, have also inferred that significant ‘retrograde manoeuvres’
could be made by ancient armies, but this is generally depicted as part of the normal ebb–
and–flow of battle.42 Gilliver goes further by pointing out that an orderly retreat was one way
(other than a rout) that a battle could be brought to an end. She points out that Roman troops
‘on the defensive’ could retreat ‘to their camp or a nearby defended city’ or ‘to high ground in
a close formation’.43 This idea occasionally appears in the work of other scholars. For
example, in Daly’s analysis of the Battle of Cannae, he mentions that the Carthaginian centre
conducted a ‘controlled withdrawal’ under Roman pressure, and Anglim et al. mention that a
Roman commander could withdraw from battle, if possible, but these manoeuvres have not
been explained in detail.44 Some scholars of other periods and places have also touched upon
the possibility of retreat from battle.45 Modern accounts of Roman battles occasionally
mention fighting retreats but they are never examined in any depth.46 Even Gilliver states that
40 Ibid., 134. 41 Ibid., 134. Gilliver provides the following references for the assertion that flight was likely than withdrawal: Caes. BCiv. 3.94; Tac. Ann. 2.17, Agr. 37; Dio 75.7. 42 Sabin, 2007, 412. Sabin explains that infantry battle–lines could withdraw significant distances without being decisively defeated, but he does not examine the prevalence of these manoeuvres nor their central role in many battles. Goldsworthy (1996, 224, 226–7) points out that the losing side in close combat could retreat and armies could mutually separate, but nonetheless emphasises the rout as the normal manner in which a battle ended 43 Gilliver, 2007, 138, cf. BAfr. 85, B Hisp. 31, BAlex. 40. 44 Daly, 2002, 190–1; Anglim et al., 2013, 52. 45 For example, the disastrous fighting withdrawal conducted by the Byzantine army at Manzikert in AD 1071 examined by Haldon (2008, 178–80). Hanson (1989, 35–6) has also mentioned the possibility of a ‘fighting withdrawal’ in hoplite battle. 46 Fighting withdrawals mentioned: Hammond, 1984, 46; Goldsworthy, Fall of Carthage, 210, 283; Sampson, 2015, 147. Not mentioned: Goldsworthy, Fall of Carthage, 243, contra Livy 30.18; Goldsworthy, 2011, 183, contra App. B Civ. 2.80; Keppie's brief sketch (1984, 43) of the Battle of Pydna overlooks the Roman
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retreats from battles occurred only rarely, and that chaos and mass flight were the usual
products of an army’s battlefield defeat.
Analysing warfare is, of course, not only the study of battles. An examination of the
manoeuvrings during Caesar's Ilerdan campaign of 49 BC (Caes. BCiv. 1.61–84)
demonstrates that a campaign could be won decisively through manoeuvre instead of
fighting, particularly by cutting off supply lines.47 As will be argued, both tactical retreats and
strategic withdrawals were a major part of this Ilerdan campaign.48 As such, focusing on
battles while ignoring the role of grand manoeuvre and supply lines cannot sufficiently
explain the outcome of engagements between armies. Withdrawals outside of battle, in
addition to retreats from battle, must thus also be considered to gain a full picture of the
reasons for the success of an army in Roman warfare.
Given this state of affairs, there are numerous questions about retreats and withdrawals in
ancient warfare that need to be asked. Is it true that a vanquished army would almost always
suffer disproportionately in the event of defeat? If not, how was such a disastrous scenario
avoided? When armies did retreat, did they only do so towards a fortified camp, as Sabin and
others have described? How were these manoeuvres performed, and how did they shape the
outcomes of battles and campaigns? To answer these questions, and provide a more balanced
view of how battles (and campaigns) ended in Republican Roman warfare, it is necessary to
carry out a dedicated study of Roman retreats and withdrawals. A detailed study of this topic
has not been done before, and so the opportunity exists to gain new insights into Roman
tactics and warfare by doing so.
withdrawal completely. 47 Roth, 1999, 333. 48 See Ch. 5, 168–72.
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What are Retrograde Manoeuvres, Retreats and Withdrawals?
In modern (United States) military parlance, a retreat is a type of ‘retrograde operation’,
broadly defined as ‘an organised movement to the rear of or away from the enemy’ which
‘can be forced by enemy action or executed voluntarily’.49 A retrograde operation ‘can be
used to avoid decisive combat under unfavourable conditions, or to save forces for decisive
action elsewhere’, and the main reason for conducting such an operation is ‘to improve a
tactical situation or to prevent a worse one from occurring.’50 For reasons of style, throughout
this thesis I will mainly use the terms ‘retrograde movement’ or ‘retrograde manoeuvre’,
rather than ‘retrograde operation’. Either of the former terms will utilise the above definition,
and thus refer to a movement away from the enemy, for some tactical or strategic purpose.
These two terms will be used interchangeably and as umbrella terms for retreats and
withdrawals as a whole.
It is also necessary to distinguish between retreats and withdrawals, because, as will become
clear, these two types of retrograde manoeuvres often occurred under differing circumstances
and had somewhat distinct characteristics. Retreats will be loosely defined as retrograde
movements in which an army moved a short distance directly away from an enemy army,
usually as an immediate defensive reaction to tactical defeat or the threat of such (eg. the
Romans retreated from the battle). Withdrawals were retrograde movements over a longer
distance, often taking the form of a march from one defensible position to another, or to
another area of operations entirely (e.g. Hannibal withdrew from Latium). The distinctions
between the two will become clearer throughout the thesis, but the reader must also maintain
a certain flexibility of mind in distinguishing between retreats and withdrawals, for they also
shared similar characteristics and are not always easily distinguished.
I will occasionally use other terms for the purposes of variety. I will at times use ‘retire’ as a
synonym to describe either a deliberate retreat or withdrawal, and ‘disengage’ as a general
synonym for a retreat from battle. On a case–by–case basis, I will refer to some disorderly
retrograde movements simply as flights or routs. Most importantly, I will utilise the phrase
49 Field Manual 7–20, The Infantry Battalion, Chapter 5: Retrograde Operations. Retrieved 5 Mar 17 from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/7–20/Ch5.htm. Note that in this particular document, the withdrawal is referred to as a ‘retrograde operation’, but I will utilise the term ‘withdrawal’. 50 Ibid.
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‘retreat tactics’ throughout the thesis, particularly in later chapters, as a general term to
describe the methods by which armies carried out successful retreats and withdrawals.51
How Often Retreats and Withdrawals Occurred
Of the questions posed above, perhaps the easiest to answer is, how often did retreats and
withdrawals occur? The question is an important one, as it determines the relative importance
of retrograde manoeuvres in studying Roman battles. It is also relatively straightforward to
answer in a broad sense, by identifying and counting the examples of retrograde manoeuvres
found in the ancient sources.
As both Sabin and Gilliver have said, the usual result of a battle is understood to have been a
clear defeat for one side, followed by a panicked rout.52 Comparing the quantity of source
references of routs to retrograde movements does not necessarily provide evidence to dispute
this view. For instance, there are approximately 60 examples of Roman retrograde
movements that will be examined or analysed throughout this thesis, and these are by no
means all of the examples to be found.53 Depending on how one defines a retreat or
withdrawal, more examples could no doubt be found.54 However, for the purposes of a rough
comparison, the terms fuga and receptus respectively appear 617 and 24 times in Livy, and
113 and 14 times in the Caesarian corpus.55 Evidently, there are many more references to
routs than to orderly retrograde movements.
There are, however, literary factors that likely shaped this disproportionate number of
references to routs and flights following battles. First, it is not unlikely that ancient writers
preferred to describe battles or skirmishes that ended with routs rather than retreats, because
the latter were more decisive, more exciting, and more entertaining for the intended readers.
51 I will not use the term ‘withdrawal tactics’ or anything similar, but in the interests of brevity and simplicity, I will combine discussion of the tactics of retreats and withdrawals under the one term. As will be seen, there were also a number of general similarities in the methods by which the Romans safely retreated and withdrew, so that a single term for the variety of tactics used in retrograde movements is not wholly inappropriate. 52 Gilliver, 2007, 134; Sabin, 2007, 413–4. 53 See App. A. More examples can be found in accounts of Classical and Hellenistic Greek battles (cf. Conclusion, fn. 827). 54 For instance, the phrases e castra/castris and ex castra/castris, describing an army moving out of their camp, appear hundreds of times in Livy and other authors. Some number of these would likely qualify as withdrawals. 55 These numbers are drawn from the PHI Latin Database.
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Also, Roman military narratives were often structured to ultimately end in Roman victory.56
This could have produced a bias against reporting all Roman defeats that actually occurred,
or downplaying the extent of certain defeats, while emphasising the chaos of non–Roman
defeats.57 Further, the Roman literary trope of disorderliness among non–Roman armies may
also have factored into the presentation of their defeats.58 Of course, it is impossible to know
what writers did not include in their histories. But the possibility must be considered that
retreats, withdrawals, and a variety of uneventful disengagements occurred more often than
recorded by the ancient authors.
There are enough examples of retreats and withdrawals to state that they were not uncommon
in Republican Roman warfare, although they no doubt occurred less often than routs. Even if
a retrograde manoeuvre did not always occur during or following a battle, a knowledgeable
general will surely have considered the possibility of such. Therefore, even when retreats or
withdrawals did not occur they must often have shaped tactics and strategy in some way. The
modern consensus that battles usually concluded with a rout rather than by a retreat is thus
technically correct, but retreats and withdrawals certainly occurred commonly enough to have
been a significant factor in generalship and tactics.
Overview of Key Sources
Literary evidence will be the main evidence utilised throughout the thesis. To discuss in any
detail how retreats and withdrawals are described by ancient authors, it is first necessary to
examine these authors and their aims, style and authenticity. I will utilise contemporary or
near–contemporary writers of military experience whenever they are available, but this is not
always possible. Other sources of information, such as archaeological evidence or inferences
drawn from military equipment, will very occasionally be utilised where appropriate.
However, detailed literary sources are central to developing an understanding of retrograde
manoeuvres and their role in ancient battle. The main sources I will utilise in this thesis are
Polybius, Caesar, Sallust, Livy, Plutarch and Appian.
56 Clark, 2014, 210, 213. 57 Clark (2017, 192, 207–8) has also argued that Roman authors such as Livy used defeats as a narrative technique to create drama, as easy victories were less entertaining, but they also minimised the scale of defeats, or paired them with later (not always authentic) victories. 58 Riggsby, 2006, 102–3, 105.
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Polybius is the only detailed contemporary source for military affairs in the Middle Republic,
and most fortunately, he was a formidable analyst and was well experienced in military
affairs.59 Citing his own experience, he considered personal research and political/military
experience to be essential prerequisites for the reliable presentation of history, and held a
scientific and factual approach to historical enquiry.60 He is one of the most important
historians for the Republican Roman army.61 His work is, of course, not free from (pro–
Roman) bias. For instance, his work is slanted in the favour of his Roman patrons, the
Scipios, and he had an ulterior motive in his work of discouraging Greek states from rebelling
against Rome.62 In effect, Polybius became uncritical when writing about the Scipios, and
attempted to paint the Roman army as near–invincible.63 He also had a tendency to overwrite
otherwise logical accounts of cause–and–effect with an air of inevitability.64 However,
Polybius demonstrates a genuine interest in the arrangements and movements of armies in
battle, and goes out of his way to describe matters of deployment, terrain and manoeuvre.65
He certainly records a number of Roman defeats.66 Due his biases, the possibility must be
considered that Polybius exaggerated the orderliness of some retrograde movements he
describes, but there is nothing in his style or purposes that suggest such movements would
have been totally fabricated.67 His accounts of retreats and withdrawals may therefore be
trusted.
59 Hoyos, 2005, 215–6. 60 Polybius explains much about his own approach to history in Book XII (4c–5, 12.1–3, 22.6, 25b, 25e, 25g). That said, Polybius was also a firm supporter of traditional heroic values such as courage, honour and glory, and would assess historical figures according to these qualities (Eckstein, 1995, 54). 61 Sage, 2008, 2. 62 On Polybius’ purposes, see; Walbank, 2009, 277; Seager, 2013, 247–8; Sommer, 2013, 317–8; Thornton, 2013, 214. Cf. Polyb. 1.1–2. Relationship with the Scipiones: Southern, 2006, 20. Dissuade rebellion: Erskine, 2013, 245. 63 Davidson, 2009, 126–7. On his presentation of the Roman army, see Erskine, 2013, 231, 234–5, 242–5. 64 Davidson, 2009, 133–4. 65 Lendon, 1999, 284. Cf. Polyb. 11.22–3, 18.28–32. Polybius has a particular interest in the general’s ability to impose order over the chaotic forces of battle (Eckstein, 1995, 193), which will be useful in later chapters for assessing individual cases of generalship. 66 Polybius studiously records the numerous Roman defeats at the hands of Hannibal: cf. Polyb. 3.72–4, 3.83–4, 3.105, 3.113–6. 67 Walbank’s commentary will be of particular importance for interpreting Polybius (cf. Gibson and Harrison, 2013, 1–2).
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For the Late Republican period, Caesar is an important contemporaneous source. Caesar was
a witness and participant in most of the campaigns detailed in his commentaries, and wrote
on military matters in unusual detail.68 As he wrote his books yearly, his memory of the
events he describes will still have been relatively fresh.69 Despite some criticism that he
presented events in a manner favourable to himself, considering that Caesar wrote of
contemporary events for an experienced audience, it would have been difficult for him to
falsify many military details and he is surprisingly honest about his own failings.70 Caesar
does have a tendency to depict his opponents as less capable than himself and his men, but
these depictions are not outside the realm of possibility.71 He does minimise the role of his
subordinate officers in accordance with his literary aim of self–publicisation.72 However, he
also provides valuable detail on the tactical roles of centuriones, who often feature in his
battle narratives.73 In battle accounts, Caesar viewed morale factors (ie. virtus and animus) as
more important than the mere arrangement of forces in deciding the outcome, and so he is
vaguer about matters of terrain than Polybius.74 With that said, Caesar was a far more
experienced general than was Polybius, and so Caesar’s emphasis on psychology in battle
must be seen as providing valuable and unique insight into Roman battle mechanics.75 As
Lendon has said, Caesar is ‘uniquely suited’ for the study of battle accounts and
understanding the reasons for the success of Roman tactics.76 Considering the
contemporaneousness of his writings, his own extensive military experience, his relatively
realistic style, and the fact that he describes a significant number of retreats and withdrawals,
68 Lendon, 1999, 276. Like other authors, Caesar’s popular purposes forestalled the need to give technical explanations of military matters (Edwards, 1917, xvii), but Caesar’s extensive military knowledge and personal presence at events he describes still leave us with some uniquely descriptive accounts of Roman battle tactics: for instance, Caesar’s description of a planned retreat at Dyrrhachium (BCiv. 3.45–6), or of the withdrawal of Afranius and Petreius’ army at Ilerda (BCiv. 1.64) 69 Kagan, 2006, 111. 70 Fuller, 1965, 55. 71 For instance, the Gauls are always depicted as inferior to the Romans in virtus (Riggsby, 2006, 101–3). Note that Caesar attributes the superior virtus of his troops to his own superior qualities as a general (Riggsby, 104). Also, Caesar’s depiction of Pompey as an incompetent at Pharsalus (Caes. BCiv. 3.94) also seems unlikely in light of the latter’s experience, but it would be hard to argue that Pompey had actually led well (Goldsworthy, 2007, 523). 72 Welch, 1998, 85–7; Kagan, 2006, 193; Goldsworthy, 2007, 7. Note also that Caesar excuses reverses suffered by his army: for example, at Gergovia, Caesar blames the heavy casualties on the failure of his men to retreat as ordered (BGall. 7.51). However, it is not implausible that this actually occurred (Gilliver, 2005, 70). 73 Welch, 1998, 85–7. 74 Lendon, 1999, 324–5. 75 Ibid., 323, 325–6. 76 Ibid., 276.
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Caesar must be considered as the most detailed and useful source for the purposes of this
thesis, if only for the first century BC.
It must be added that only two of the commentarii, the Bellum Gallicum and Bellum Civile,
were actually authored by Caesar. Nonetheless, the author(s) of Bellum Alexandrinum,
Hispaniense, and Africum were still experienced officers if not necessarily eyewitnesses to
the events they described, and they utilised Caesar and other eyewitness participants as
sources for their narrative.77 These sources certainly contain a number of detailed accounts of
battles, featuring several retreats and withdrawals.78 Also, the Bellum Hispaniense appears to
have originally been written by a relatively junior officer, and possesses a unique focus on the
experience of common soldiers in battle.79 These sources are, therefore, still of significant
use, even if their reliability must be considered less than that of the genuine writings of
Caesar.
Sallust was a Late Republican writer, expounding a theme of steady Roman moral decline
since the defeat of Rome’s great enemy, Carthage.80 One particular work of his, the Bellum
Jugurthinum, provides a detailed account of a Roman retreat through Numidia in 106 BC
(Sall. Jug. 97–8), which will be of central interest to this thesis. In assessing the reliability of
this account, it can be noted that Sallust was an experienced politician and observer of
political events from the time of Sulla to that of Caesar, and as his battle accounts are
generally detailed, it reasonable to presume that he depicted battle and tactics in a realistic
manner.81 His military career was neither long nor distinguished, but he will have been
knowledgeable enough on Roman tactics to describe them with basic accuracy.82 On the other
hand, he was not a participant in the Jugurthine War, for he wrote in the triumviral period and
77 Gaertner (2017, 275–6) has argued that the composer of Bellum Alexandrinum, Bellum Hispaniense and Bellum Africum was none other than Aulus Hirtius, author of Book VIII of the Bellum Gallicum, utilising the notes and writings of Caesar and other participants. An authorship verification system has also convincingly shown that the author of the Bellum Alexandrinum.was probably Aulus Hirtius (Kestemont et al, 2016, 93–95). 78 BAlex.40, 76; BAfr. 15–8; BHisp. 31. 79 There is extensive debate over who wrote this book (Milne, 2009, 125–40), even if Aulus Hirtius may have composed it (Gaertner 2017, 275–6). However, it can be argued that it gives a soldiers’ eye view of events. 80 Connolly, 2009, 183; Roller, 2009, 218. Sallust wished to expose the corruption of Rome’s traditional aristocracy and the degradation of Rome’s adversarial political system (Jug. 5.1–2). 81 Batstone, 2010, xi–xix. 82 On his short military career, see Paul, 1984, 1. Sallust will have at least received the militaristic upbringing of any aristocrat (Goldsworthy, 1996, 169–70)
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he had few sources available for the military narrative he provided.83 It is likely that he
personally contributed a number of details to his military narratives.84 In regard to Marius
and Sulla (the key Roman figures in this battle), Sallust viewed neither with great favour due
to their alleged lust for power.85 However, my analysis of this battle account will focus on the
tactics and military decisions of the generals rather than their characterisation, and Sallust’s
personal disapproval does not appear to have significantly tainted the account in this regard.86
All said, Sallust had the knowledge to depict Roman tactics authentically. As he provides the
only detailed example of a fighting retreat from the period of the Jugurthine War, he is vital to
understanding the development of Roman retreat tactics from the second to the first centuries
BC.
Livy wrote much of his work in the Augustan period, and provides the fullest account of the
Republic’s political and military history.87 His key purpose, particularly in his presentation of
the Second Punic War, was to demonstrate the importance of morality in Roman history,
emphasising the impact of ethics and character on the outcome of events.88 This approach
appears less scientific than, for instance, Polybius’ analytical approach. Even so, throughout
Livy’s battle accounts, his keen interest in the motivation and psychology of participants in
events causes him to provide insightful and authentic assessments of the morale of
combatants in battle.89 He had a less scientific but also less schematic view of tactics than
Polybius.90 In this regard, Livy’s explanations of Roman tactics are closer to those of Caesar,
and are not invalid simply because his approach differs to that of Polybius.91
83 Paul, 1984, 2. His was perhaps the first detailed treatment of the war, but he may have had the memoirs of at least two participants, P. Rutilius Rufus and Sulla, to draw upon (Paul, 1984, 3–5). Considering Sallust’s glowing and frequent depiction of Sulla as a soldier (Jug. 96, 100.2, 101.4–9, etc.), it seems likely that Sulla was at least one of his sources. 84 Paul, 1984, 4–5. 85 Connolly, 2009, 190. 86 Marius and Sulla are depicted favourably throughout the battle itself (Sall. Jug. 97–9). 87 Cf. Hoyos, 2005, 217–8: Livy wrote 142 books over a period of about 45 years, covering Roman history from the founding of the city to the death of Drusus I in 9 BC. 88 Levene, 2010, 391–2. 89 Walsh, 1961, 168, 172. 90 Levene, 2010, 311–16. 91 Cf. Lendon, 1999, 323, 325–6.
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However, despite the historical breadth of his work and the fact that he was a Republican
author, the quality of his history, particularly the accuracy of his military accounts, has been
sharply criticised.92 Walsh argues that Livy was not always critical in his use of sources, he
often utilised one source only for a particular event, and he is argued to have had a poor
understanding of tactics, resulting in some confused narratives.93 Livy was also content to
fabricate military detail for literary effect, with the result that many of his battle accounts are
riddled with tropes.94 Walsh judges that, while Livy did make some efforts to present a
truthful narrative, he was fundamentally a writer first, and an historian second.95 With that
said, others take a more forgiving view. According to Koon, Although Livy has a tendency to
produce clichéd battle accounts, the sheer volume of these among his enormous work
provides a good overview of what was generally considered to have been usual in Republican
battles.96 Hoyos points out that Livy transmits an enormous amount of otherwise–lost
material from annalistic sources.97 Hoyos also states, contra Walsh, that Livy did not rely
only on a single source, but created his own narrative blend based on at least two accounts.98
Lendon also argues (again contra Walsh) that Livy was certainly an historian, not a
rhetorician, and was read as such.99 These views credit Livy with far more industria in his
work that does Walsh.
Therefore, Livy remains a valuable source, but several things must be kept in mind when
relying on his narrative. It must be noted that there is no evidence of Livy possessing military
experience, despite the constant wars during his lifetime.100 On this account, Polybius and
Caesar’s depictions of Roman tactics might be considered more trustworthy. However, Livy
is essential to this thesis particularly for the sheer number of retreats and withdrawals he
describes.101 In assessing these, one must of course be critical. For instance, some retreats or
92 Walsh, 1961, 157–8, 168, 198–201. 93 Ibid., 142, 144–5, 157–8. Walsh (109) further argues that Livy was capable of distorting or suppressing facts to create certain impressions of individuals that suited his literary and moral purposes. 94 Ibid., 218. 95 Ibid., 287. 96 Koon, 2010, 86. 97 Hoyos, 2005, 217. 98 Ibid., 217. 99 Lendon, 2010, 57–8. 100 Walsh 1961, 4; Hoyos, 2005, 217–8. 101 Considering his literary purposes and flexible historical techniques, one might wonder if he had a tendency to report battles with clearer outcomes, thereby excluding accounts of indecisive battles that might have qualified for study in this thesis. Then again, one cannot be too upset by the great volume of material he does provide.
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withdrawals that Livy describes could have been tropes to fill gaps in his sources or explain
indecisive battles. One must also keep in mind how Livy’s drive to establish morality as a
central explanation for Roman success could impact on his narratives.102 In general, Livy
adhered closely to the military details of his sources, and so the reliability of his presentations
of tactics much depended on those original sources.103 For periods covered by Polybius
(particularly the Second Punic War and Macedonian Wars) he is extremely useful, as he may
be read in comparison with Polybius.104 Several of the Livian accounts utilised throughout
this thesis fall into this category. Where no comparative account is available, however, I will
take the view of Koon, that even where a battle account does not appear to be based on a
reliable source or even accurately presented, the tactics that Livy describes are still indicative
of standard procedures in battles of the Augustan period.105 This approach can be used even
with battle accounts that cannot have had reliable sources, such as those describing events in
the Early Republic.106
Plutarch’s Lives are also a central source of information in latter chapters of this thesis. In
particular, the Lives of Aemilius, Crassus and Antony will be utilised heavily in Chapters Five
and Six. In general, Plutarch was non–contemporary to the events he describes, writing in the
late first and early second centuries AD. He was a biographer rather than an historian, and
thus focused more on anecdotes and events that revealed facets of his subject’s character,
rather than focusing on great events themselves.107 As he did not always possess reliable
biographical information to draw upon, he was not averse to drawing out or making up the
necessary details to complete his narrative.108 However, where his sources can be determined,
he does appear to have used the work of a variety of historians, and particularly valued high
quality sources such as Thucydides and Polybius.109
102 Cf. Connolly, 186, 188–9. 103 Erdkamp, 2006, 538–9. 104 Hoyos, 2005, 218. 105 Koon, 2010, 86. 106 Eg. Livy 4.39.4–9, 6.24. 107 Geiger, 2014, 293; Schettino, 2014, 417. 108 Geiger, 2014, 300. 109 Schettino, 2014, 425–6, 429.
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The Lives mentioned above describe key battles that will be subjects of case studies in
Chapters Five and Six, and so it is mainly necessary to determine Plutarch’s reliability in
these specific accounts. Regarding Aemilius, Plutarch must be utilised to assess retreat tactics
at the Battle of Pydna, 168 BC, as several key sections are missing from Livy’s account, so
that Plutarch provides the only full account.110 Plutarch evidently consulted Polybius, as well
as the eyewitness Scipio Nasica (cos. 138) to compose his account of Pydna, which is a good
sign towards the reliability of Plutarch’s depiction of tactics during the battle.111 Plutarch is
likewise a key source for the Parthian campaigns of Crassus and Antonius, and while his own
sources for these campaigns are unknown, there were some to draw upon and so it was not
necessary for him to fabricate these accounts.112 Plutarch’s account of the Battle of Carrhae,
53 BC, appears preferable to that of Cassius Dio, which was written later and appears less
logical at points.113 Regarding Plutarch’s interpretation of events, an emphasis on personal
virtues is clear in Antony, so that he presents Antonius quite favourably throughout the
account of the latter’s retreat through Media in 36 BC.114 Conversely, bias against Crassus
stands out in Plutarch’s account of Carrhae, perhaps a product of the malign influence of
Cassius.115 Plutarch depicts Crassus tragically, as a victim of fortuna and the treachery of
easterners.116 In Plutarch’s view, this was a result of Crassus’ greed and ambition.117
Plutarch’s moralistic and biographical aims are thus evident in Antony and especially in
Crassus. That said, in assessing Crassus and Antony, Tarn thought quite highly of Plutarch as
an historian.118 Evidently, it is necessary to examine Plutarch’s battle accounts closely for
110 Regarding Livy, the Latin cuts off at postremo omnes, et cum praesidio ... omitting important parts of the battle (44.40–1). 111 Polybius’ narrative is lost, but Plutarch had evidently read it (Plut. Aem. 19.4). He also utilised Poseidonius, who claimed to be an eyewitness (Aem. 19.7). Of course, in using Polybius, Plutarch will be transmitting a highly favourable view of Aemilius Paulus Macedonicus, who was closely associated with Polybius’ Roman patrons, the Scipios, and was actually the father of Scipio Aemilianus. Cf. Davidson, 2009, 126–7. 112 Tarn (1951, 50), argues that an unnamed Mesopotamian Greek was probably Plutarch’s source for both Crassus and Antony. However, Pelling (1988, 221) argues that Quintus Dellius is Plutarch’s main source for Antony. 113 Sampson, 2015, 122–3. 114 Pelling, 1988, 221; Geiger, 2014, 297–8. 115 Cf. Ward, 1977, 1–3. Whether Plutarch viewed a protagonist favourably or unfavourably was influenced by his sources (Schettino, 2014, 427–8). Cassius’ possible influence over Plutarch’s narrative of Carrhae will be explained in more detail in Chapter Six (‘The Battle of Carrhae, 53 BC’), but suffice to say that Cassius was the most senior survivor of this disaster, and so any account of events he gave will have been influential, even though he abandoned his general to die (Plut. Crass. 29.4). 116 Geiger, 2014, 293. See Plut. Crass. 29.5, 30.3. 117 Schettino, 2014, 425. 118 Tarn, 1951, 51.
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evidence of moralistic and biographical details shaping the tactical narrative, but he is still an
important source for the battles in question, and in fact preferable to the available
alternatives.119
Appian was a Greek historian and a man of significant practical experience who wrote in the
second century AD.120 His enormous Roman History was divided into twenty–four books,
organised both chronologically and according to the names of the peoples whom the Romans
were fighting at a given time.121 Within the surviving works, he provides a number of
accounts of retreats and withdrawals.122 However, there are conflicting views on his
reliability. According to Carter, Appian was more judicious in his use of sources than was
Livy, not simply relying on one source but taking a more critical approach and including his
own assessments of events.123 On the other hand, Hoyos considers his work to be of highly
uneven quality.124 Appian stands out as notably ignorant in regards to geography, which raises
questions about his credibility in tactical matters.125 For some reason, Appian’s account of the
Second Punic War appears to have utilised neither Polybius nor Livy (perhaps in favour of
uncritically–utilised annalistic sources), and is riddled with errors and incredible details.126
Fortunately, Appian is more reliable on the wars of the second and first century: he appears to
have utilised Polybius to create a believable account of the Third Punic War, and his account
of the Iberian wars is coherent.127 Indeed, he is the main surviving source for the Iberian wars
in the second century.128 Further, Appian’s account of the Battle of Magnesia, 190 BC is
actually preferable to Livy’s more confused account.129 In this thesis, the majority of
references to Appian are from this more reliable second and first century period. These
accounts may thus be viewed with some basic credence, and assessed with the usual amount
119 A more detailed analysis of Plutarch’s depiction of Crassus and Antonius will appear in Chapter Six (198–9, 208–9). 120 Carter, 1996, ix–x; Richardson, 2000, 1–2. Appian’s personal life is not well understood but he appears to have had a reasonably successful political career in Alexandria and to have later been an important Imperial official, possibly advocatus fisci, and potentially later a procurator. It is at least clear that Appian was experienced in politics. 121 Richardson, 2000, 2–3. 122 App. Hann. 41, Syr. 6.35, Pun. 103, Hisp. 82, 88, BCiv. 1.90, 2.80, 3.69, 4.128. 123 Carter, 1996, xxxii–xxxiii. 124 Hoyos, 2005, 218. 125 Richardson, 2000, 6; Hoyos, 2005, 218. 126 Richardson, 2000, 4; Hoyos, 2005, 220. 127 Richardson, 2000, 1, 5; Hoyos, 2005, 218. 128 Richardson, 2000, 1. 129 Appian probably relied upon Polybius for his account (Walsh, 1961, 161–2).
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of scepticism. As will be seen, Appian’s accounts of retreats and withdrawals in the second
century are the only such accounts of any detail for this period. They are therefore invaluable
for the purposes of examining the development of Roman tactics between the well
documented Second Punic War, and the various civil and foreign wars of the first century BC.
The Imperial era saw the production of several extant military manuals, including the Latin
Strategemata (Stratagems) of Frontinus, and the Greek Strategikos (the General) of
Onasander. These manuals are not highly technical, but fall into the broad category of general
advice on strategy and tactics with frequent citation of historical examples and
illustrations.130 Both date to the early Empire, with Onasander dedicating his work to Quintus
Veranius, a consul in AD 49, and Frontinus serving as suffect consul c. 73 AD and again in 93
AD.131 Frontinus has provided us with the only surviving Latin military manual from this
period, and fortunately, his work includes a short chapter (Strat. 2.13) on retreats entitled ‘On
Retreating’ (De Effugiendo). That said, Frontinus’ work is not intended to be a definitive art
of war, but rather a catalogue of examples.132 It is therefore mainly of use as a source of
examples, rather than as a detailed source on the mechanics of retreats and withdrawals.133
The extent to which the advice contained in the Strategemata and Strategikos was really used
by Roman generals may be debated, but it must at least be noted that Frontinus was a man of
military experience.134 As for Onasander, his work was as much one of philosophy as
tactics.135 Like Frontinus, he is a useful source for drawing out general precepts of Roman
tactics in early Empire, and showing what the Romans (or at least the authors) considered to
be good sense. Even so, neither these nor any other manual provide a basis for detailed case
studies, and so they are not heavily relied upon in this thesis.136
130 Campbell, 1987, 13. 131 Ibid., 13–4. 132 Formisano, 2017, 130. 133 Campbell, 1987, 14–5. 134 Ibid., 27–8. He was not, however, immune to errors and anachronisms (Bell, 1965, 407). 135 Campbell, 1987, 13–4; Formisano, 2017, 145. 136 It would be remiss not to mention Vegetius, a well-known Late Imperial source, whose De Re Militari is referenced below on a very few occasions, but not in support of any key arguments. He is simply too late a source to fall within the scope of this thesis and, like Frontinus and Onasander, does not provide the narrative material that would support a detailed case study.
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The vast majority of this thesis will focus on the Middle to Late Republican periods, using
the above sources. I will only occasionally use other sources to give supporting or contrasting
evidence. However, Chapter Six will conclude with a case study of the clades Variana, which
occurred in AD 9. The Conclusion will also incorporate a brief discussion of Roman retreat
tactics and their further development in the Imperial period. For these purposes, I will later
make some use of key sources for the principate, particularly Tacitus and Cassius Dio, but
also Velleius Paterculus and Josephus. These sources naturally have differing strengths and
weaknesses, and I will touch on them as necessary in Chapter Six and the Conclusion.
Terminology and Complications in Identifying and Distinguishing Types of Retrograde
Manoeuvres
There are many references to retrograde movements in the ancient sources.137 Having
examined the differing styles and experiences of the writers themselves, we may turn to these
accounts, and examine how different authors presented retrograde manoeuvres. The key
question for the purposes of this thesis is, how can retrograde manoeuvres be consistently
identified and distinguished?
Latin sources utilised a variety of terms to describe retreats and withdrawals. Such terms
included recipere (regain, recover) or se recipere, se convertere (to turn back, reverse) referre
(bear back, bring back), abire (go away, depart), discedere (divide, separate), subducere (to
lead away, withdraw), abscedo (move away, withdraw) and digredi (separate, go apart).138
Frontinus also used a variety of terms.139 The crux of the matter, however, is how
systematically these terms were utilised in the narrative sources. To throw light on this
subject, the writings of Polybius, Caesar and Livy will be contrasted and compared.
137 See App. A. 138 There are many examples, and more will be considered below. A handful of such now follow. recipere: Caes. BCiv. 1.46 (facilis est nostris receptus datus ... ac tutiorem nostris receptum dat), 3.45–6 (recepissent ... receptui); BAlex 40 (pugnans in orbem se recepit). Se recipere and se convertere: Caes. BCiv 1.46. Referre: Caes. BGall. 1.25 (pedem referre); Livy 30.18.12 (gradum sensim referentes ordines et tenorem). Abire: Sall. Jug. 98.5.2. Discedere: Caes. BCiv. 3.41 (discessisse). Subducere: Livy 25.36.2 (subducit); Tac. Ann. 2.46 (subduxisset). Abscedo: Tac. Ann. 12.33 (abscessus). Digredi: Livy 10.35.2 (digredientes). 139 Frontinus uses several different verbs to describe retreats, including abire (2.13.3) digredi (2.13.7), evadere (2.13.4), effugere (2.13.1–2) and recipere (2.13.7). He also uses the term regressus (Strat. 3.10). That said, as Frontinus’ work is a catalogue of examples rather than a technical military manual (Formisano, 2017, 130), it is not a decisive indicator of how military men described retrograde manoeuvres.
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To begin, let us consider Polybius. As mentioned, Polybius was technical and precise in his
presentation of military matters, and as he was utilised by Livy as a key source, he provides a
good point of comparison.140 It is therefore worth examining how consistently he applied
terminology for retreats and withdrawals. As an example, Polybius’ description (18.25.4–7)
of the ebb–and–flow of the battle at Cynoscephalae in 197 BC is easy to interpret:
Flamininus, seeing that…his left was being forced back, some of them having already
perished and others retreating slowly (ἀναχώρησιν), his only hope of safety lay in
his right, hastened to place himself in command there ... The Macedonians now,
having no one to give them orders and being unable to adopt the formation proper to
the phalanx… did not even wait until they were at close quarters with the Romans, but
gave way thrown into confusion and broken up (διασπασθέντες ἐνέκλιναν) by the
elephants alone.141
Polybius’ description is relatively straightforward. He distinguishes clearly between the
orderly retreat (ἀναχώρησιν) of the Romans being pressed by the phalanx, and the
confusion of the Macedonians (διασπασθέντες ἐνέκλιναν) when attacked by the
elephants. The direct description of the positions and movements of elements of the opposing
armies makes it relatively easy to visualise what was happening. This clear description is
typical of Polybian battle descriptions.142 In regards to terminology, Polybius repeatedly uses
the terms ἀναχώρησις, ὑποχωρέω or ἀποχώρησις to describe retreats from battle.143
These appear, therefore, to be technical terms.144
140 Cf. Lendon, 1999, 284; Hoyos, 2005, 217–8. 141 Trans. W. R. Paton, 1922–7. 142 Recall Polybius’ overriding interest in the imposition of order over the chaos of battle (Eckstein, 1995, 193). 143 Polyb. 1.19.4 (ὑπεχώρουν), 1.27.8 (ὑπεχώρουν), 2.68.4 (ὑποχωρεῖν), 2.68.8 (ἀναχώρησιν), 2.68.9 (ἀναχώρησιν), 2.68.10 (ἀναχώρησιν), 5.86.3 (ἀποχώρησιν). 144 Onasander (Strat. 27) also uses ὑποχωρέω to describe retreats. This work was as much one of philosophy as
tactics (Formisano, 2017, 145), but it is still reasonable to assume this was a common Greek term for retreat.
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However, Polybius also uses ἀναχώρησις and ἀποχώρησις to describe withdrawals, over
longer distances and in marching formation.145 For example, in describing the aftermath of
the Battle of Raphia in 217 BC, Polybius uses one term (ἀναχωρήσας) to describe
Ptolemy’s retirement from the pursuit into his own camp (5.86.1), and a different term
(ἀποχώρησιν) for both Antiochus’ flight from battle and his long–distance withdrawal from
Syria entire (5.86.8). The consistency of Polybius’ terminology for describing retreats and
withdrawals demonstrates that he did not distinguish between these types of retrograde
manoeuvres. Conversely, throughout this thesis, a distinction is made between retreat and
withdrawal, and so this distinction cannot be made purely by relying on terminology as
utilised by Polybius.
If Polybius is relatively clear in his own method of describing retrograde manoeuvres, Livy
presents different challenges. Consider his description (Livy 27.2.8–10) of a battle fought
between Hannibal and Marcellus in 210 BC, near Numistro.146
A new battle and fierce suddenly flamed out of a conflict now grown spiritless,
for the combatants were now fresh in spirit and in body. But night parted them
(diremit pugnantes) with victory undecided. On the next day the Romans stood in
line from sunrise until late in the day. When none of the enemy came out against
them, they gathered spoils at their leisure, carried corpses of their men into one
place and burned them. On the following night Hannibal broke camp (mouit
castra) silently and marched away (abiit) into Apulia.147
There are several distinct manoeuvres described here. The first is a mutual retreat when night
fell over the battlefield (diremit pugnantes), the second is Hannibal’s movement from his
camp (mouit castra), and another is Hannibal’s withdrawal into Apulia (in Apuliam abiit).
These manoeuvres are stated matter–of–factly, with no description whatsoever of any of the
distinct movements.148 And yet the manner by which the armies retreated from the battlefield,
145 Polyb. 3.74.6 (ἀπεχώρησαν), 3.84.13 (ἀπεχώρησαν), 11.24.7 (ἀναχώρησιν). 146 It must be noted here that this battle was likely not historical, but an annalistic embellishment (Erdkamp, 2006, 549–51). For examining Livy’s use of terminology, however, it is not necessary that this event occurred at all. 147 Trans. Frank Gardner Moore, 1943. 148 This is typical of many battle narratives: see Goldsworthy, 1996, 171; Sabin, 2007, 399–400.
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and by which Hannibal withdrew from camp into Apulia, must surely have differed in each
case. Certainly the fact that Hannibal abandoned spoils on the battlefield (Livy 27.2.8)
implies that his was the beaten army, yet Livy does not describe any difference, relative to the
Romans, in the manner of his retreat from the field. In retreating, each army must have
maintained some sort of order or formation. Then, Hannibal must have organised his army
into a marching formation and withdrawn from the camp in some orderly manner. Finally, for
the march into Apulia, he must have made dispositions in case the Romans attacked him, as
shown later when the pursuing Romans caught up with him (Livy 27.2.11–2). In this one
short extract, Livy describes different movements, occurring from the battleline into a camp
by day and then from the camp to more distant territory by night. Thus, Livy demonstrates
that retreats and withdrawals occurred under differing circumstances, but he also utilises a
variety of terms to describe these manoeuvres.
When describing retreats from battle, Livy uses multiple phrases, particularly se recipere,
signum recipere and referre pedem, among a handful of others.149 When describing
withdrawals over longer distances, however, Livy uses verbs of movement such as abire,
movere, subducere and redire.150 The distinction is not always clear, such as in Livy’s usage
of another term, subducere, which could describe either a retreat or a withdrawal.151 For the
most part, however, Livy does distinguish between short retreats from battle and tactical
movements over longer distances.
It is instructive to compare Livy with Polybius. Livy at times utilised Polybius as his main
source for battle descriptions, and according to Erdkamp, he generally adhered faithfully to
Polybius’ terminology and technical details.152 For example, consider Polybius and Livy’s
accounts of Cynoscephalae and Cannae. In the former case, Polybius (18.25.4) uses the term
ἀναχώρησιν to describe the retreat of the Roman left flank, while Livy (33.9.6) uses the
149 Livy 4.39.6 (se reciperent), 6.24.1 (pedem rettuluit), 6.24.3 (inclinavit aciem), 6.24.4 (non recipebat se), 25.19.5 (signum receptui, reducti), 28.13 (turmatim abibant), 28.15.6 (rettulere pedem), 28.15.9 (se reciperent), 30.18.12 (referentes), 32.12.2–3 (recipere se, ad receptum), 33.15.11 (rettulere pedem), 33.18.18 (vertunt), 33.18.19 (receperunt sese in castra), 37.38 (recipere se), 38.25.12 (cedere sensim), 42.59 (cedentes sensim), 44.42.2 (excessit), 44.42.3 (abibant). 150 Livy 25.19.6 (abit), 25.19.8 (redit), 27.49 (abire), 32.12.9 (agmine petunt), 28.15.16 (castra movet), 33.18.18 (vertunt). 151 Eg. Livy 23.26.10, 25.36.1–2, 29.1.14, 44.37.2. 152 Livy did make changes to his source material, but it was the ‘drama and psychology’ of the account that interested him, not the technical details (Erdkamp, 2006, 531, 534, 538–9).
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phrase pedem referentes to describe the same phenomenon. At Cannae, when the
Carthaginian centre fell back under the weight of a massive Roman attack, Polybius (3.115.5)
described this retrograde movement with the term ὑπεχώρουν, while Livy (22.47.6) again
used a variation of referre (referentibus). It thus appears that referre is at least one term that
Livy utilises as a technical term for retreat. Of course, as seen above, he uses several other
terms. Overall, Livy is more varied with his terminology than Polybius, which creates greater
ambiguity, but he also appears to distinguish more clearly between verbs that describe
retreats, and verbs of marching and movement for withdrawals. For the purposes of this
thesis, Livy’s style is more helpful than a strict adherence to a small number of specific
technical terms that do not distinguish between short retreats from battle, and longer
withdrawals.
Caesar, for his concise Latin and extensive military experience, might be expected to have
been particularly clear in describing retreats and withdrawals. Consider then his description
of how his men escaped a battle on unfavourable ground at Ilerda, in 49 BC (Caes. BCiv.
1.46):
When they [Caesar’s cohorts] had fought in this way continuously for five hours, and
our men were being grievously harassed by superior numbers, having spent all their
missiles, they draw their swords and, breasting the hill, charge the cohorts
[Pompeians], and after laying a few low, they force the rest to retreat (sese
convertere). When the [Pompeian] cohorts were thus pushed close up to the wall, and
to some extent driven by terror to enter the town, an easy withdrawal was allowed our
men (facilis est nostris receptus datus). Our cavalry, however, on each flank, though it
had been stationed on low–lying ground at the foot of the cliff, yet forces its way with
the utmost valour to the ridge, and, riding between the two lines of battle, allows our
men a more convenient and safer withdrawal (commodiorem ac tutiorem nostris
receptum dat).153
153 Trans. A. G. Peskett, 1914.
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Caesar describes two different retrograde movements. The first is an involuntary retreat (se
convertere) by the Pompeians after the charge by Caesar’s men, with some chaos implied by
the fact that the former could no longer pressure Caesar’s own men. Caesar then describes
more controlled retreats by his own men, and twice uses the same verb (recipere) to describe
them.154 It is far from certain from Caesar’s account that the Pompeians did not maintain
some semblance of order themselves, even if they were reluctant to re–engage. As such, in
this instance, there is no clear practical distinction between se convertere and recipere. All
that is clear is that these terms both describe relatively short–distance retrograde movements,
or retreats. Caesar, therefore, could utilise a variety of terms to describe similar or even
identical movements, as did Livy.
That said, Caesar, like Polybius, had a tendency to utilise the same terms repeatedly to
describe retreats, particularly recipere or se recipere.155 Much less commonly he also utilised
signa inferre, reducere, and pedem referre (among other phrases) to describe retreats from
battle.156 When describing withdrawals over longer distances, Caesar did utilise verbs of
movement such as proficiscere and educere.157 However, he also applied the term se recipere
to organised long–distance retrograde movements that, for the purposes of this thesis, are
classified as withdrawals.158 Thus, Caesar goes even further than Polybius in having a single
favoured term for retrograde movements (se recipere), and applies this term to retrograde
movements over both short and long distances. A semblance of this terminology is visible in
Livy, who also uses se recipere, but amongst a larger variety of phrases. As such, se recipere
is clearly a quasi–technical term for an organised retreat, but despite his use of relatively
consistent terminology, Caesar’s use of such terminology does not always clearly distinguish
between short–distance retreat and long–distance withdrawal.
154 A. G. Peskett has translated se convertere as ‘retreat’, and recipere as ‘withdrawal’, perhaps with the implication that the term ‘retreat’ implies an involuntary retrograde movement, while ‘withdrawal’ is a more controlled manoeuvre. 155 Caes. BGall., 6.40 (se recipere), BCiv.. 1.45–6, 2.25 (se receperunt), BCiv. 2.41–2 (se recipiunt), 3.46 (receptui, se recipientibus, ad recipiendum, se receperunt) 3.94–5 (receptus and recipere), BAfr. 17 (recipere), 18 (recipientes, se reciperent, se recipiunt); BAlex.40 (se recepit). 156 Caes. BGall. 1.25 (pedem referre), BCiv. 2.41–2 (signa inferri, sese conferunt), 3.46 (reduci, reducti); BAfr. 18 (se contulerunt). 157 Caes. BGall. 5.27 (eductos ex hibernis), 5.31 (ex castris proficiscuntur), BCiv. 1.78 (ex castris proficiscuntur). 158 Caes. BGall. 5.37 (se recipient), BCiv. 3.97 (se recipere). Caesar does the same with subducere (BGall. 1.22.3, 24.1).
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As is evident, clearly distinguishing between retreats and withdrawals through the use of
terminology is not straightforward. Polybius, Caesar and Livy all use specific terminology for
describing retreats from battle, although Livy uses a wider variety of phrases. This is not so
surprising, considering his intention to create dramatic battle narratives as opposed to more
concise and technical ones. Polybius and Caesar are similar to one another in that they use a
smaller pool of terms to describe retreats and withdrawals, but Caesar has a single term (se
recipere) that he overwhelming prefers. Caesar and Livy both differ from Polybius in that
they usually distinguish between retreats from battle and movements over longer distance,
although Livy is actually more consistent in his application of different types of verbs for
retreat and withdrawal. Unsurprisingly, Caesar and Livy share some terms, particularly se
recipere and pedem referre, demonstrating that the Romans did have a small pool of quasi–
technical phrases to describe retreat from battle. This was not so much the case, however,
with long–distance withdrawals, to describe which Caesar and Livy use a variety of verbs of
movement. This may have been a general pattern in Latin sources.159
There are two further issues. First, if an account leaves a retreat assumed but unstated, such
as in the case of stalemate, or the retreat is not clearly distinguished from a flight, what is to
be made of it? There were clearly a variety of ways in which battles could end. For example,
Livy (27.2.8–10) might describe a series of different retrograde movements in the one
incident, and Caesar (BGall. 7.51) might describe a combination of retreat and flight,
particularly if a retreat broke down under pressure. Caesar (BGall. 1.24–7) could also
describe a flight in which the vanquished troops rallied and counterattacked, and yet Livy
(27.2.8–10) might recount a retreat in which troops attempted to make a stand, but were
beaten and forced into flight. Finally, as seen above (Livy 27.2.8–10), if a battle was a
stalemate, then the armies must have effected a retreat from their fighting positions, but this
is usually not stated clearly and is certainly not often described.160 It is thus not always
straightforward to determine how exactly an army moves from the sources. For the purposes
of this thesis, it is necessary to simply assume that, where a battle is described to have ended
with a stalemate, one or both armies retreated from the location of the fighting.
159 In describing withdrawals, Frontinus also uses phrases that describe marching, or returning to a march, but which in this context imply withdrawal or to continue a withdrawal (cf. Front. Strat. 2.13.6–7). 160 Other accounts of battles being broken up by night or weather show the same lack of description regarding how the armies separated (Caes. BGall. 1.50, Livy 4.39, 8.1, 9.23, 32, 10.12, 27.2, 28.15, 38.40, 44.4; App. Hisp. 82).
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The second matter is the question of whether the battle tactic of feigned retirement, which
was a deliberate retrograde movement to set up a surprise counterattack, should be included
in the discussion of this thesis. There are several examples of Roman forces carrying out such
manoeuvres.161 In the sense that a feigned retirement was an orderly retrograde movement in
relatively close proximity to the enemy, even if it gave the appearance of flight (Caes. BGall.
6.8), it was in fact a retreat. However, feigned retreats were pre–meditated battle tactics
carried out with the intention of continuing battle or launching an ambush.162 Even so, as
noted above, just as some examples of unplanned retreats ended in flight, some resulted in an
army standing its ground in a better physical position and some ended in active
counterattacks.163 Some retreats were also less orderly than others, and retrograde
manoeuvres that might best be described as genuine flights could also end with the fleeing
troops standing their ground once more or counterattacking.164 Thus, while the intention
behind feigned retreats may have been different to that of an involuntary retreat, the outcome
was sometimes the same. There is precious little to distinguish a feigned retreat from a
voluntary retreat made to improve an army’s physical position. If the physical movements
were similar, then distinguishing between them carries little meaning. As such, although they
fit uneasily into the definition retrograde movements due to the potential appearance of
disorder and their pre–meditated nature, feigned retreats will be examined as a form of
retreat.
To summarise the preceding discussion, Greek or Latin terminology cannot be purely relied
upon to define a retreat or withdrawal, and so the determination of whether an account
describes a retreat or withdrawal will be made on a case by case basis. Withdrawals will be
mainly distinguished from retreats according to their physical characteristics, including the
distance moved by the army and whether or not a marching formation was adopted. Orderly
retrograde manoeuvres will be generally identified as distinct from flights or other similar
phenomena according to their evident or implied levels of orderliness, direction and
command, on a case by case basis. Stalemates will generally be assumed to have ended with
retreats from battle, even where this is not stated. Feigned retreats will also be considered,
161 Eg. Caes. BGall. 6.7-8; Sall. Jug. 50; Livy 6.24, 29.34; Onas. Strat. 21.9. 162 One of few Roman examples of such tactics is Titus’ Labienus’ use of a feigned retreat in Gaul, 53 (Caes. BGall. 6.7–8). This case will be explored in detail in Chapter One (56–8). 163 See Ch. 1, 60, 80–1. 164 See App. B.
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even where they gave the appearance of flight. Above all, it is important for the reader to
keep an open mind when considering the use of the terms ‘retreat’ and ‘withdrawal’ in the
following study. Only when examining specific examples in context does it become possible
to distinguish clearly between different kinds of retrograde manoeuvres, but based on the
information available from the sources, it is not always possible to draw such a neat
distinction.
Purpose and Scope of the Thesis
Since retreats and withdrawals have not received due attention in modern scholarship, this
thesis will primarily explore how the conduct of retrograde manoeuvres affected the tactics of
soldiers, officers and generals, and vice versa. This will shed light on what was generally to
have been considered good tactical practice and good generalship. The purpose of this thesis
is to study retreats, withdrawals and their associated tactics in Republican Roman warfare, in
order to determine the overall impact of these things on Roman tactics and generalship and
thereby to provide a more nuanced overall view of the role played by retrograde movements
in terminating battles and campaigns.
The scope of the thesis will be limited in several ways. Firstly, while there were many
scenarios in which armies might have retired with or without fighting, only retrograde
movements in proximity to the enemy will be examined. In contrast, strategic movements in
which armies manoeuvred for advantage, without tactical considerations regarding a nearby
enemy army, will not. The main focus of the thesis is retrograde movements as a method for
ending battles, or for re–establishing an army in a better position for future fighting. These
distinctions will be made clearer in Chapter One. In terms of chronology, the thesis will
adhere mostly to the Middle and Late Republican period, when the Roman army was active
in major wars and battles, and for which a multitude of sources exist to describe these events.
Finally, although the Romans are the main subjects of the thesis, there will be some analysis
of how non–Roman armies behaved in similar circumstances. In essence, however, the thesis
will endeavour to answer one central question: how did retreats and withdrawals impact on
the tactics and strategies used by the Romans during the Middle and Late Republic?
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Thesis Structure
The overall structure of the thesis is intended to firstly outline the most general observations
that might be made of retreats and withdrawals, and then gradually to elaborate upon the
more detailed specifics of how these worked and their relevance to Roman Republican
warfare and tactics. Chapter One of the thesis is entitled ‘Retreat and Withdrawal: Why and
Where To?’ The main purpose of this chapter is to establish the contexts in which retreats and
withdrawals were carried out, so that the two different types of retrograde manoeuvres may
be more easily distinguished and also so that their impact on military strategies and tactics
may be examined in more detail in following chapters. I will firstly examine the reasons that
armies usually retreated, including defeat in battle, stalemates, the onset of darkness, and
other scenarios. I will then examine where Roman armies generally aimed to seek refuge
when carrying out a retreat, including fortified camps, high ground and walled settlements,
comparing and contrasting the value of these different types of refuge in order to explain why
the Romans chose one over the other in varying scenarios. Finally, I will examine why and
how withdrawals, which were retrograde movements but carried out over longer distances,
were conducted in order to demonstrate the similarities with and differences from retreats. In
the conclusion I will summarise the typical scenarios in which Roman armies retreated or
withdrew, where they preferred to retreat or withdraw to, and the salient differences and
similarities between retreats and withdrawals.
In Chapter Two, ‘The Impact of Pursuit on Retreating or Withdrawing Forces’, the issue of
retreats and withdrawals will be considered from the perspective of the victors. The varying
reactions of armies when their enemies retreated will be examined, particularly in cases
wherein the victors mounted a pursuit or attack, in order to establish the impact of enemy
action of the success or failure of retreats. Firstly, different types of pursuit will be examined,
in order to establish what usually happened when one side retreated. I will then explain how
pursuit could turn an orderly retreat into a disorderly flight in differing circumstances,
including short retreats from battle toward a place of refuge, and longer withdrawals when
immediate refuge was unavailable. Finally, I will assess the reasons that one army might have
decided against pursuing another. I will then conclude by summarising what usually occurred
when an army retreated or withdrew, and how this affected the conduct of these retrograde
movements.
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Chapter Three, ‘Roman Retreat Tactics, Part I: Ratio and Combined Arms’, is the first of two
chapters analysing the methods by which the Romans retreated or withdrew successfully, and
focuses on the training, organisation and (junior) leadership of the Republican Roman army.
The chapter will open with a brief examination of two accounts of successful retreats,
showing some common factors. Some of these factors will already have been identified in
Chapters One and Two, but others will be examined in more detail. It will be argued that
‘order’ was an important factor, and I will provide a detailed discussion of what order was,
and how Roman training, tactics and leadership contributed to maintaining order. In terms of
leadership, I will focus on the roles of senior soldiers and certain types of officers, including
centuriones, principales, veterani, and more senior officers such as tribuni and quaestores.
Finally, the tactical roles of light infantry and cavalry will be considered in order to give a full
picture of the Roman army’s use of combined arms during retrograde manoeuvres. The
conclusion will summarise the characteristics of successful retreats and give an outline of the
methods and tactics that Roman forces could use to retreat successfully.
Chapter Four, 'Roman Retreat Tactics, Part II: Virtus, Consilium and Scientia Rei Militaris'
considers the role of the general in a retreat or withdrawal. First, a brief and general overview
of the role and responsibilities of the Roman general prior to and during battle will be given.
Following this, the role of the general will be examined in circumstances more specific to
retreats, including retreats from the battleline and into a fortified position, retreats out of
fortified positions, and marching withdrawals over longer distances. The chapter will then
conclude by summarising the discussion and outlining the relationship between generalship
and the tactics of successful retreats.
Chapter Five, ‘The Development of Roman Retreat Tactics from the Middle to the Late
Republic (218–46 BC)’ is an in–depth analysis of how the Roman army changed and
improved its retreat tactics over time. The chapter will examine these developments
throughout three general periods: the late third to mid second century BC, the mid to late
second century, and finally the first century BC. Numerous examples from each period will
be utilised along with a handful of detailed case studies to demonstrate the tactics that the
Romans utilised to carry out successful fighting retreats in each period. The relationship
between gradual changes in the Roman army’s organisation and tactics during these periods
and the Romans’ conduct of retreats will be explained, culminating in the highly sophisticated
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retreat tactics utilised during the campaigns of Caesar and others in the mid–first century BC.
Having assessed these developments by the mid first century BC, the final chapter,
‘Disastrous Withdrawals in the Late Republic and Early Empire’, will examine how even the
most advanced Roman retreat tactics failed under certain conditions. The chapter features
three extended case studies. The Roman withdrawal following the defeat of Crassus at
Carrhae in 53 BC, Antonius’ withdrawal during his Parthian campaign of 36 BC, and the
movements of the Roman army in the clades Variana of AD 9 will all be examined in detail.
The relative success of Antonius’ withdrawal from Parthia in 36 BC will be juxtaposed with
Crassus' retrograde movements following the Battle of Carrhae in 53 BC. The complex
evidence for the clades Variana will then be analysed, and the event characterised as a
withdrawal ‘gone wrong’. Further discussion of these and other events will throw light on the
tactical and strategic limitations of even the most sophisticated retreat tactics.
The Conclusion will summarise and draw together the preceding analyses and arguments to
demonstrate the role played by retreats in Republican–era warfare, as well as the impact of
retreats and withdrawals on contemporary tactics and generalship. I will then be able to give a
clear assessment of the role played by retrograde movements in terminating battles and
campaigns in Republican Roman warfare. Following this the continuing role of retreats in the
Imperial period will be briefly examined and the thesis brought to an end with an outline of
the relevance of this thesis to current scholarship and suggestions for further study.
Method
As a result of limitations in applying the ‘face–of–battle’ approach to this thesis, and due to
the limited evidence for combatant experiences in ancient warfare, my key methodology will
be re–examination of the ancient evidence for retreats and withdrawals, looking for common
factors as well as differences in tactics.165 I will begin with the selection of a number of
typical and relatively detailed examples, and the context and content of each will be
considered in order to make salient deductions that will contribute to the overall argument.
This approach will be mainly utilised in Chapters One to Four, where a large number of
examples and accounts are considered in turn. By the end of Chapter Four, a general picture
will have emerged of what tactical and leadership factors contributed to the success or
165 Cf. Wheeler, 2001, 170–4; Lendon, 2004, 443, 447.
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otherwise of a retrograde manoeuvre.
In Chapters Five and Six there are several larger case studies. There I will utilise a similar but
deeper type of analysis, in which I attempt to explain in detail why specific retreats turned out
the way they did, even where this is not necessarily clear from the sources. I will consider in
more detail the context and content of the sources in order to answer questions that had been
raised by the success or failure of these retreats, and the sources’ depiction of such. I will
carry out these case studies with reference to the factors that contributed to successful
retreats, as identified throughout Chapters One to Four.
I will borrow from the ‘face–of–battle’ approach the general emphasis on the importance of
combatant psychology in determining the course and outcome of battle, incorporating the use
of examples, but I will avoid taking a combatant’s eye–view of affairs. Modern studies of
combatant psychology, a feature of the ‘face–of–battle’ approach, will be utilised in a very
limited fashion, with the main evidence for matters of morale and motivation being drawn
from the ancient sources.166 In line with the approaches of Wheeler and Kagan, the
importance of tactics and manoeuvre will be emphasised in determining the outcome of
battles, rather than only the combatants’ fear of their opponents’ weapons.167 In the detailed
case studies, I will utilise a more traditional approach to military history, emphasising the
analysis of terrain and the manoeuvre of units, in conjunction with the matters of morale in
the ‘face–of–battle’ approach, to avoid overemphasising the perspectives of either the
individual or the commander. However, the nature of the evidence, written as it was by the
officer class for a similar audience, will necessitate a slightly greater emphasis throughout the
thesis on the roles of generals, and their decisions as to how and why retreats should have
been carried out.
166 The limitations of applying Keegan’s approach to ancient warfare have already been considered, but as pointed out by A.B. Lloyd (1996, 194), the psychological reactions of ancient combatants were perhaps not very different to their modern equivalents. 167 See Keegan, 1976, 87. Cf. Wheeler, 2001, 170, 174 and Kagan, 2006, 19–22, 189–91.
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Translations
All original Latin and Greek is drawn from Loeb Classical Library editions, sometimes in
hard–copy but mostly from where I have had access to them online. Translations, if not my
own, are credited to the translators. This material is almost entirely drawn from either
lacuscurtius.edu or perseus.edu. For the most part, the translations of Polybius, Caesar,
Sallust and Plutarch are taken from lacuscurtius, courtesy of Bill Thayer, and Livy from
perseus, courtesy of the site editor Gregory Crane and his staff.
Conclusion
In this chapter, it has been argued that retrograde movements have been overlooked by
modern scholars as a factor in ending battles and shaping tactics in ancient warfare. Modern
scholars have assumed that ordered retreats were carried out only occasionally, and that when
they did occur, they were directed towards fortified camps or some other safe location, but
there has been no detailed study of how often, or by what means retreats were carried out, let
alone how they affected the strategies and tactics of armies in the Middle to Late Republic.
Withdrawals have received just as little attention, or perhaps even less. As such, the purpose
of this thesis is to study retreats, and the tactics associated with the successful conduct of
retreats, to shed new light on contemporary Roman tactics and generalship. The
argumentation of the thesis will aim to answer one primary question: how did retreats and
withdrawals impact on the tactics and strategies used by armies during the Middle and Late
Roman Republic? The following chapters will seek to answer this question systematically.
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But seeing that both their flanks had been forced off the field, they despaired of giving help
there and of returning to their camp ... They kept, however, in close order and retired on
Placentia, being not less than ten thousand in number.
(Polyb. 3.74.5–6)
Chapter One
Retreat and Withdrawal: Why and Where To?
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Introduction
On the bank of the river Trebia in 218 BC, a Roman army suffered a crushing defeat to
Hannibal Barca. Much of the Roman army was killed or scattered in panic, but even while
this was occurring, the Roman centre had broken through their Carthaginian opposites and
pressed forward to relative safety. These ten thousand men were able to make an orderly
withdrawal to the nearby town of Placentia (Polyb. 3.74). Why did they do this, and what else
could they have done?
The first step to analysing retreats and withdrawals in detail is to contextualise their place in
military operations, tactically and strategically. To do this, it is necessary to explain when and
why they occurred, and to place them into a physical context by identifying and examining
the various places to which armies retreated and withdrew. It has been pointed out in the
Introduction that retreats are assumed to have been carried out usually towards camps, or
sometimes towards high ground or cities, but this aspect has not been studied in detail.168 It
has also been mentioned that retreats will generally be distinguished from withdrawals
according to the distance moved and the formation adopted by the army. This chapter will
seek to expand upon these matters by examining the reasons why armies retreated or
withdrew, where they sought refuge, and elaborating on the distinctions between retreats and
withdrawals.
The main purpose of this chapter is to establish the contexts in which retreats and
withdrawals were carried out, and to clarify how different types of refuge, and the distance
from such refuge, affected an army’s retrograde manoeuvres. The analysis will be made in
three parts. In Part A, I will examine several different reasons for why armies carried out
retreats. I will begin with the most obvious scenario, retreats from battle as a result of tactical
defeat. I will next consider more varied circumstances that caused armies to desist from battle
or to retreat, such as stalemates, nightfall and poor weather. Finally, I will examine feigned
retreats, and their use by the Romans. Then, in Part B I will analyse a number of accounts to
show the various types of refuges to which armies could retreat, particularly high ground,
camps and walled towns or cities. Finally, in Part C I will examine scenarios in which an 168 While Sabin (2007, 413–4) only mentions camps, Gilliver (2007, 138) is more detailed, pointing out that armies could retreat towards camps, high ground, or cities. However, she only gives a handful of sources for this statement (cf. BAfr. 85; BHisp. 31; BAlex. 40).
Retreats and Withdrawals in Republican Roman Warfare 2020
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army needed to withdraw a longer distance in search of a safer position, and distinguish
between such manoeuvres and retreats. In the conclusion, I will establish how the Romans
generally carried out retreats and withdrawals in response to particular situations, and the
reasons that they chose particular places of refuge. This discussion will ultimately aid in
defining retrograde manoeuvres and clarify the differences between retreat and withdrawal.
Part A: Why Armies Retreated
Retreats Due to Defeat in Battle
I have argued that battles commonly ended with retreats, in particular, as battle usually ended
with a victor and a loser, it is straightforward to imagine that one side might retreat after
having been defeated and forced back from its battleline. Sabin sums up the matter as
follows:169
The first priority of troops in the losing army was to escape their vulnerability to one–
sided slaughter ...
Sabin also points out that there was some natural ebb and flow in the way the lines pushed
each other back and forth during a battle, but what he describes above is a complete
retirement from the battlefield as the defeated army sought to escape its enemies.170 The
ramifications of defeat on the battlefield could be bloody for the losing side, and so armies
tried to avoid this fate by retreating if defeat seemed likely or assured.171 Consider the
following extract from Appian’s account (BCiv. 4.128) of the Second Battle of Philippi, 42
BC, as the legions of Brutus fought a losing battle against the Caesarians:
169 Sabin, 2007, 413. 170 Ibid., 412. 171 Ibid., 413, 416. The majority of accounts of retreats paint this scenario, in which an army is clearly beaten on the battlefield and deliberately attempts to move away from the enemy (see App. B).
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Finally, the soldiers of Octavian ... pushed back the enemy's line (τὴν φάλαγγα
τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐκίνουν) as though they were turning round a very heavy machine
(ὥσπερ τι μηχάνημα τῶν βαρυτάτων ἀνατρέποντες). The latter were driven
back step by step, slowly at first and without loss of courage (τὸ ὀπίσω βάδην ἔτι
καὶ μετὰ φρονήματος). Presently their ranks broke and they retreated more rapidly
(ὀξύτερον ὑπεχώρουν), and then the second and third ranks in the rear retreated
with them (συνυποχωρούντων), all mingled together in disorder (ἀκόσμως),
crowded by each other and by the enemy, who pressed upon them without ceasing
until it became plainly a flight (ἔφευγον).172
As Appian describes, the initial retreat by Brutus’ men was gradual and orderly, but became
more disorganised as the infantry attempted to move more quickly and the lines intermingled,
until they were clearly in flight. Appian describes the breakdown of this retreat as a gradual
process rather than a sudden implosion of morale or order. This account makes clear that
Roman forces in this period were capable of conducting orderly retreats, even as victorious
enemies continued to press upon them. Although the forces of Brutus were driven into their
camp thoroughly beaten, and later surrendered en masse (App. B Civ. 4.128), they were not
broken and slaughtered in the field. Their retreat, therefore, gave them the chance of survival,
and so was to some extent a success. However, it was by no means a voluntary manoeuvre,
but was forced by the pressure of the victors, and it must also be observed that even such an
orderly retreat could still collapse quickly.
Did an involuntary retreat always signify the end of a battle?173 In Caesar’s account of the
Battle of Ilerda, 49 BC (BCiv. 1.45), he describes how his men were repulsed in fighting on
high ground near the strategic town of Ilerda:
172 Trans. Horace White, 1899. 173 In some cases it obviously could, such as in the example above. The Spartans were heavily beaten when forced to retreat from a hill by the infantry of Antigonus III at Sellasia in 222 BC (Polyb. 2.68). The Ptolemiac general Nicolaus was also defeated at the pass of Porphyrion c.218 BC due to losing control of the high ground (Polyb. 5.69).
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... Caesar exhorts his men and leads the Ninth Legion to their support. He checks the
foe who are pursuing our men with insolent daring, and compels them again to turn
and retreat to the town of Ilerda and halt beneath the walls (rursusque terga vertere
seque ad oppidum Ilerdam recipere et sub muro consistere cogit). But the men of the
Ninth Legion, carried away by zeal in their desire to repair the loss received, rashly
pursuing the flying foe too far, get into unfavourable ground (temere insecuti longius
fugientes in locum iniquum) and approach close under the hill on which the town of
Ilerda was situated. When our men wished to retreat (recipere) from this position, the
enemy in turn kept pressing them hard (ex loco superiore nostros premebant) from the
higher ground.174
The Pompeians were repulsed from one position, but established a new fighting line on the
slope leading up to Ilerda. The fact that the Pompeians were able to reform their battleline
implies that there was time and space for them to do so, further implying that Caesar’s men
were not pursuing so closely that the former were unable to manoeuvre and reform. The
Pompeians may have been able to retreat into the town itself if they so wished.175 As such,
their retreat from one hill to another appears to have been a tactical decision, carried out with
the deliberate intent of continuing the battle. In this case, the Pompeians clearly did not
retreat voluntarily (rursusque terga vertere seque ... recipere), and yet their retrograde
movement allowed them to continue fighting with genuine success.
As such, involuntary retreats in response to the advance of a stronger army certainly
occurred, just as Sabin and others have described. However, it is also evident that an
involuntary yet orderly retreat from the battleline could not only prevent mass slaughter, but
could even present the opportunity for a beaten army to renew the fighting. The chance of
avoiding a rout or slaughter, and perhaps even of re–engaging successfully, is evidently the
main reason that an army would retreat from battle. Defeat in battle was by far the most
common reason for a retreat, and such incidents will be examined in greater detail in the
following chapters.
174 Trans. A. G. Peskett, 1914. 175 Standing and fighting in front of fortifications could actually make it more difficult to retreat into the camp if it became necessary (cf. App. Mith. 42–4).
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Retirements from Indecisive Battles
A retreat might occur if one army was defeated in battle, or if an army wished to improve its
tactical position, but what happened when a battle was indecisive or interrupted by natural
phenomena, such as darkness or weather?176 In the case of an indecisive battle, both armies
had to retreat from their fighting positions at some stage.177 However, it is less obvious
whether both armies withdrew simultaneously, or one before another. Also, the reasons for
retreat in the case of a stalemate cannot be fully explained without establishing why the battle
reached a stalemate in the first place. To clarify these matters, two examples of stalemated
battles ending in retreats will be examined.
In Livy’s account (10.35.1–3) of a battle in Apulia during the Third Samnite War, 294 BC, he
describes action between a Roman army led by Marcus Atilius and a Samnite force that was
besieging the Apulian town of Luceria:
The ... consul, Marcus Atilius ... was marching, at the head of his legions, towards
Luceria, which he had heard was being besieged by the Samnites, when the enemy
met him at the Lucerine frontier. On this occasion rage made their strength as great as
his, and the battle was one of shifting fortunes and doubtful issue
(proelium uarium et anceps fuit), yet its outcome was more discouraging to the
Romans, both as having been unaccustomed to defeat, and because, as they were
retiring (digredientes) from the field, they could see, even better than during the actual
engagement, how much their side had got the worst of it in killed and wounded.178
176 Darkness: Caes. BGall 1.50; Livy 4.39, 9.23, 32, 10.12, 27.2, 38.40, 44.4; Plut. Crass. 27.3, 28.1; App. Hisp. 82 Weather: Livy 8.1, 28.15. It should be noted here that battles did not always take place even after armies drew up their acies, as armies would commonly face each other as a form of demonstration, then withdraw without fighting, eg. Livy 28.14, 37.38. Goldsworthy (2011, 175) discusses this phenomenon briefly. However, retreats following such non–engagements will not be discussed below. 177 In circumstances of great tension, armies could remain in battle positions overnight. The Persians did exactly this at Gaugamela in 331 BC (Arr. Anab. 3.11). As Arrian points out, this will have fatigued the soldiers greatly and so armies must have generally have avoided doing such a thing. 178 Trans. B. O. Foster, 1926.
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As pointed out by Oakley, this account of the indecisive fight is sparse, the only real detail
being that the Romans came off worse.179 Livy does not describe it as a retreat as such, but
his use of the verb digredi suggests that he considered it somewhat organised and not a flight.
This is suggested further by the fact that the battle was indecisive (uarium et anceps), giving
the Romans no reason for flight. Why there was a stalemate is not clear, but Livy mentions
(10.35.3–4) that after retreating the Romans spent an anxious night in their camp, leaving
open the possibility that the battle was left undecided due to encroaching darkness or that the
battle was of long duration and that the combatants were tired. Both armies appear to have
been psychologically exhausted in its aftermath and were reluctant to continue fighting the
next day (10.35.3–36.4). Casualties seem to have been heavy.180 Thus, the reason for the
stalemate appears to have had something to do with the battle having been particularly
arduous and extended, so that both armies retreated in a state of exhaustion without
interrupting one another. Whether due to exhaustion, casualties, the time of day or a
combination of these things, the apparent reluctance of the combatants to continue fighting
was the clearest reason for the retreat.
It is easy to imagine embattled and stressed soldiers would often have wanted to retreat from
fighting, but the decisions of generals must also have played some role in the outcome. For
example, consider Livy’s account (25.19.1–8) of a battle fought at Capua between Hannibal
and the Roman consuls of 212 BC. The Romans had been ravaging the Campanian region
when Hannibal arrived (25.18.1), and the latter drew his army up with the intention of beating
the Romans decisively (25.19.1–2). Hannibal ordered a cavalry attack against the Roman
infantry, which was then being hard–pressed by missiles, but the Romans counterattacked
with their own cavalry, so that the cavalry of both sides were engaged (ita equestre proelium
erat), while, presumably, the infantry were left unengaged (25.19.3–4). However, an
unidentified Roman army then made an appearance (29.19.4–5):
... the distant sight of the Sempronian army, commanded by Gnaeus Cornelius, the
quaestor, inspired in both armies the same fear (parem metum) that fresh enemies
(hostes novi) were approaching. As if by agreement (velut ex composito) the signal for
recall (signum receptui datum) was given on both sides, and marching back to the 179 Oakley, 2005, 362. Livy builds the account more around the fear each side had of each other in the aftermath and the divine intervention that brought final victory to the Romans (Livy 36.11–12). 180 Livy 10.35.2, 10.35.7.
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camp (reductique in castra) they separated on almost even terms.181
It is clearly stated by Livy that both sides retreated at the same time. A signal for the retreat
was evidently given by both armies. This must have been ordered by the respective generals.
There is no suggestion that the retreat was anything but orderly, no doubt helped by the fact
that the infantry appears to have been unengaged, and it must have occurred quickly, before
the approaching Sempronian army was identifiable. The reason for the retreat according to
Livy was that both armies (or rather their commanders) feared that the unidentified army
could attack them while they were otherwise engaged, and so they called off the battle rather
than gamble that the newcomers were friendly. It is clear from this example that in some
circumstances generals could call off a battle already in progress, and that this could happen
almost by mutual consent when the opposing commanders shared the same fears.182
Disengagements at Nightfall
According to Sabin, fighting could be ‘ended indecisively by nightfall’, and although this
occurred ‘rarely’ as battles seldom lasted so long, armies would typically disengage upon the
onset of darkness.183 According to Gilliver; ‘If flight were not impeded, it would normally be
continued for as long as possible, until natural obstacles or nightfall made further pursuit
impossible.’184 These two scholars thus express the view that battles usually ended at
nightfall and that darkness prevented pursuit, but we still need to examine the questions of
when, why and how armies retreated at night.
181 Trans. Frank Gardner Moore, 1949. 182 For a similar example, see Polyb. 3.103–5. 183 Sabin, 2007, 399–400, 413. Also see Polyb. 35.1. Battles did often last several hours (Goldsworthy, 2011, 184), and so must have typically started earlier in the day (eg. Caes. BGall. 5.35). In 58 BC, the German king Ariovistus attacked Caesar's camp for several hours, and withdrew easily at nightfall as there was apparently no threat of pursuit from the Romans (Caes. BGall. 1.50). 184 Gilliver, 2007, 138.
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A detailed example is found in Sallust’s account of a Romano-Numidian battle fought in 106
BC.185 This battle was fought between Gaius Marius and the African kings, Jugurtha and
Bocchus. The Africans had caught the Romans by surprise near nightfall while the latter were
on the march.186 Sallust describes the battle as follows (Jug. 98.1–5):
Marius was neither frightened nor less confident than before, but with his bodyguard
of cavalry ... he went from place to place, now succouring those of his men who were
in difficulty (laborantibus suis succurrere), now charging (invadere) the enemy where
they were pressing on in greatest numbers. He directed the soldiers by gestures (manu
consulere), since in the general confusion his orders could not be heard. And now the
day was spent, yet the barbarians did not at all relax their efforts, but thinking that
darkness would favour them, as the kings had declared, they attacked with greater
vigour. Then Marius, adapting his tactics to the situation and wishing to provide a
place of refuge for his men (atque uti suis receptui locus esset), took possession (inter
se occupant) of two neighbouring hills ... he himself gradually rallied his scattered
forces and the enemy were in no less disorder, and then led them all at the double
quick to the hill. Thus the kings were compelled by the strength of his position to
cease from battle.187
Marius managed to organise his forces and retreat to higher ground from which his army
could better defend themselves (Sall. Jug. 98.1–2), but the process of organising this
withdrawal was seriously hindered by the darkness and the scattered dispositions of Marius'
army, and it took him some time to carry out the retreat (Jug. 98.4). Marius was assisted by
the fact that the Africans were also in confusion due to the darkness (98.4), and he
successfully retreated to improve his tactical position, and after this the Africans withdrew
from the fight. It is striking that the Africans, who chose to attack at night and were familiar
185 Sall. Jug. 97–8. Sallust is not clear on the site of the battle, only pointing out it was not far from Cirta (Sall. Jug. 101.1, 102.2). 186 Sall. Jug. 97.3. Attacking so close to nightfall was clearly a calculated risk on the part of the Africans, as the confusion caused by darkness affected the Africans as much as it did the Romans (Jug. 98.4). Paradoxically, in taking possession of strong positions on nearby hills, it was Marius that made better use of the ground (98.3). However, it is important to note that Jugurtha apparently gave battle just before nightfall with the intention that his army could escape more easily if the battle went awry (Front. Str. 2.1.13). It is also striking that the Romans were marching so late in the evening, which Paul (1984, 239) was a deliberate attempt to avoid the heat of the day. 187 Trans. John C. Rolfe, 1931.
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with the ground, still fell into disorder.188 Even though Marius was a very capable general, it
took him significant time and effort to organise his army and move it onto the nearby hills
(98.1–4). The process of reconnoitring the hills for water, forming a plan, ordering the
cavalry into a reserve position nearby, and gradually gathering his forces could have taken
hours, as Marius had no control over the bulk of his army but was forced to move between
groups of men and personally instruct and lead them (98.1). The Romans experienced all of
these difficulties even though part of the battle was carried out in light of dusk.189 It can be
observed that, although it was evidently not impossible, fighting at night was difficult and
managing an organised retreat in such circumstances was a hard task, even for a good
commander with experienced troops.190
Consider too Livy’s account (4.39.4–9) of the Battle of Verrugo allegedly fought in Latium in
423 BC between the Romans under Gaius Sempronius Atratinus, and the Volsci.191 A long
and difficult battle between the Romans and Volsci had escalated to the point that some
Roman equites had dismounted to fight as pedites (4.38.2–5). The dismounted troopers,
commanded by a decurion named Tempanius, ended up separated from the legions (39.1–3),
and were forced to withdraw to a hill and defend themselves there.192 Meanwhile the main
Roman and Volscian armies continued to fight until darkness fell:
The battle did not end till nightfall. Neither did the consul relax his efforts anywhere,
but kept the enemy engaged (hostem tenuit) as long as there was any light. Darkness
put a stop to the indecisive struggle (nox incertos diremit), and the terror in each camp
was such, in consequence of men's ignorance of the outcome, that both armies,
abandoning their wounded (relictis sauciis) and a good part of their baggage, retreated 188 Sall. Jug. 98.4. Fighting at night was evidently disorientating (Goldsworthy, 1996, 159–60), even if one was familiar with the ground. 189 Marius could not have given signals by gestures (manu consulere) if there was not some light (Sall. Jug. 98.1). 190 Not all of the Roman troops were experienced, but some are said to have been veterans, while the recruits appear to have conducted themselves well (Sall. Jug. 98.5: Denique Romani veteres novique ... et ob ea scientes belli, si quos locus aut casus coniunxerat, orbis facere ... ) 191 According to Ogilvie (1965, 592), the bare facts of this defeat could be grounded in fact but the story of the battle and the specific roles of Sempronius and Tempanius are grounded in family legend. Themes have been borrowed from the defeat of a later Sempronius at Trebia in 218 BC (cf. Livy 21.52–4), and the dismounting of the cavalry is from Cannae (22.49.3). The retreat of the dismounted cavalry to a hill is another trope, but it is exactly so because it is logical behaviour for men in retreat, as will be shown below. 192 Livy 4.39.5. Ogilvie (1965, 593–4) suggests the real name of the cavalry commander should be Tampanius. There is memorial evidence of his existence (Ogilvie, 1965, 592).
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to the nearest hills (se in montes proximos reciperent), as though defeated.
Nevertheless the mound was besieged till after midnight. But when word was brought
to the besiegers that their camp was abandoned, they too supposed that their side had
been defeated, and every man fled (fugerunt) where his panic led him in the
darkness.193
Livy does not describe a retreat from battlefield to camp, leaving it to be assumed that this
occurred. He does, however, distinguish between the retreat (se ... recipere) of both armies
from their camp to nearby hills, and the flight (fugere) of the Volscians still attacking
Tempanius and his men. The most striking feature of this account is the confusion in which
both the Romans and Volsci operated. Both armies, having retreated to their camp in the usual
manner, then withdrew to nearby high ground, believing themselves defeated. Although Livy
uses recipere to describe the withdrawal, it was evidently a disorganised and panicked affair,
as the Romans even abandoned equipment and wounded in their camp (4.39.9). It was not
until daylight that anybody, in this case Tempanius and his cavalrymen, could make sense of
what had occurred. As such, darkness created such uncertainty for all involved that the level
of danger an army was in at any time was not clear, which could easily stimulate panic, and a
retreat or withdrawal by night could evidently lead to equipment and men being abandoned.
Retreating or withdrawing in darkness was, therefore, dangerous and many commanders will
have been reluctant to give orders to do so.
Simply put, it appears to be true that battles were rarely long enough to still be continuing by
nightfall, and that only a minority of battles ended due to the onset of darkness, as reported
by Sabin. The onset of night usually did end any extended battles, probably because armies
easily became disordered at night and commanders will have sought to minimise the risk of
panic.194 Night was dangerous to both victors and vanquished, and so it is also true that an
army retreating at night would not always be pursued, as Gilliver has said.195 However, the
Romans appear to have been driven by practical considerations in deciding whether or not to
193 Livy 4.39.5–7. Trans. B. O. Foster, 1922. Valerius Maximus (3.2.8) also provides an account of this battle, which supports the broad point that the armies withdrew (abierunt) after nightfall ended the battle (nocte dirimente), with victory not clearly decided. 194 Cf. Caes. BCiv. 1.67. Caesar even discourages foraging at night (BCiv. 1.59). 195 Gilliver, 2007, 138. Note the Parthian fear of operating by night (Plut. Crass. 28.1; Dio 40.24.2). They did not pursue the broken Roman army after the Battle of Carrhae, 53 BC, until daylight returned (Plut. Crass. 28.1).
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operate at night, for, contra Gilliver, there are numerous examples of such occurring.196
Frontinus (Strat. 2.10) recommended using night to one's advantage, for instance by attacking
an enemy camp while the enemy celebrated a victory. It must be noted that most examples of
Romans attacking, pursuing or retreating by night are from the Late Republic, when Roman
armies and generals were generally more efficient than their Middle Republican
predecessors.197 Of course, even in cases where operating at night was advantageous, there
was significant risk involved. Regardless of the period, then, armies will have been reluctant
either to retreat or pursue by night, although skilled generals with more experienced troops
were more likely to attempt such things. Armies retreated at night only because they had to,
fearing a greater disorder by continuing to fight in darkness than might be caused by
escaping.
Disengagements Due to Poor Weather
Finally, there are a handful of accounts of battles being affected by especially poor
weather.198 According to Livy (28.15.11) in 206 BC at Ilipa, after the Carthaginians had been
forced into their camp and the Romans began to attack it, battle ceased because of a
downpour so heavy that the Romans struggled to return to their own camp (vix in castra sua
receperint se). Livy also records (8.1.4) that a still–undecided battle between the Romans and
Volsci in 341 BC was broken up by a storm (cum tempestas eos neutro inclinata spe
dimicantes diremisset), but he goes into little further detail. In his account of the clades
Variana in AD 9, Dio (56.20.3, 21.3) states that heavy rain and wind made it difficult for the
Roman legionaries to stand or to move securely, or to use their weapons effectively. On the
other hand, bad weather was a literary trope that could be used by authors for several
196 Eg. Caes. BGall. 1.26, 7.81–2, 88, BCiv. 1.51; BHisp. 9; Sall. Jug. 99; Livy 25.23, 30.6; Plut. Crass. 27.2–8; App. B Civ. 1.92–3. It has been suggested that the Romans disdained night fighting, as they did not consider it honourable (Gilliver, 2007, 138; Dawson, 1996, 144.). However, Caesar's pursuit of the broken Gauls at Alesia as late as midnight (Caes. BGall. 7.88) shows that the Romans could launch pursuits at night if they wished. There are other examples of fighting continuing past nightfall, such as Caesar's attack on the Helvetian camp at Bibracte in 58 BC (Caes. BGall. 1.26), or Sulla's attack on the Marians at the Colline Gate in 82 BC (App. B Civ. 1.92–3). In both cases, the fighting was carried on because it was advantageous to the attackers and a decisive result was within reach. There are several further examples of the Romans conducting attacks by night (Caes. BGall. 7.81–2, BC 1.51, BHisp. 9; Livy 25.23, 30.6). Fundamentally, the Romans in this period appear to have held pragmatic attitudes towards night fighting even after difficult battles in that it was to be avoided in general, but might be done if it was practical and advantageous. 197 Cf. Goldsworthy, 2011, 48. 198 Livy 8.1.4, 28.15.11; Dio 56.20.3, 21.3.
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purposes and may not have necessarily represented the real reason that a battle was ended.199
Östenberg has argued that the Romans could see natural events such as bad weather to be
active antagonists of the Roman military, which could contribute to or cause defeat.200
However, as Östenberg points out, weather is not an adequate lone explanation for any given
defeat.201 The evidence on the subject is limited, but it is not hard to imagine that the
decreased stability and visibility in bad weather could have increased the risk of an army
becoming disordered. In the light of Roman literary techniques, the evidence is not sufficient
to state that rain or wind could physically stop combatants from fighting, but it could
certainly hinder them, as at Kalkriese (Dio 56.21.3–4), and thus contribute to a calculated
decision by the commander to retreat.
Feigned Retreats
As touched on previously, feigned retirements fit uneasily into the definition of a retrograde
movement, as they were a pre–meditated battle tactic rather than a method of escaping
unfavourable engagement, and they could appear to be disordered even if they were not.
However, by virtue of the fact they were carried out deliberately, it can be argued that they
were organised retrograde manoeuvres, as distinct from a genuine rout. As they could appear
so similar to other retreats from battle and produce similar outcomes, the following
discussion will briefly examine the Roman use of these tactics.
A detailed example is given by Caesar, who recounts a feigned retirement by his legate Titus
Labienus in Gaul, 53 BC (BGall. 6.7–8). Labienus had been attacked by a significant force of
Treveri while isolated with only a single legion (6.6–7). Labienus responded by carrying out
by marching his army out of its camp and away from the enemy, mimicking the uproar of a
panicking army (6.7–8):
199Walsh, 1961, 200–1; Murdoch, 2008, 107; Östenberg, 2017, 253–9. For example, in the case of Ilipa, the weather could have been a patriotic addition by Polybius (11.24.7–9), who was probably Livy’s source, to explain Scipio’s failure to decisively beat Hasdrubal Gisco on the battlefield. 200 Östenberg, 2017, 253–9. 201 Ibid., 259.
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The rear of the column had scarcely moved clear of the entrenchment when the Gauls
... proceeded to cross the river without hesitation and to engage on unfavourable
ground. Labienus had surmised that this would happen, and to entice them all to his
side of the river he pretended to march as before ... He sent the baggage a little
forward and packed it on some rising ground ... he commanded the troops to wheel
towards the enemy and deploy into line, and, detaching a few troops of cavalry to act
as baggage–guard, he disposed the rest of the cavalry on the flanks … When [the
enemy] unexpectedly saw men whom they believed to be in retreat (fugere) advancing
against them in attack formation, they could not even sustain the assault, and at the
first charge they were put to rout and sought the nearest woods.202
As Labienus faced the prospect of fighting a battle against significant enemy forces (magnis
copiis) and only had a single legion with him (cum una legion), he carried out a feigned
retreat in order to improve his tactical position, with the deliberate intent of fighting a
successful action from that better position (Caes. BGall. 6.7). The manoeuvre was pre–
planned and highly organised, featuring deceptive measures such as feigned confusion
(strepitu et tumultu) in breaking up the camp and giving the appearance of flight (fugae
similem).203 The Romans fought only once they reached a stronger position from which to do
so.204 Evidently, this Roman strategy was highly successful. This case thus demonstrates the
potential utility of carrying out a deliberate retreat to allow an army to fight from a stronger
position. The fact that the retreat was not forced by the enemy’s physical attacks, but was
already planned, gave greater opportunity for the Romans to re–establish themselves in a
better position relative to the enemy. However, Labienus had the luxury that he had not yet
engaged in battle. This deliberate retreat, or more specifically, feigned retreat, was therefore a
premeditated tactic rather than a reaction to enemy success in battle.
202 Caes. BGall. 6.8.1–7. Trans. H. J. Edwards, 1917. 203 Caes. BGall. 6.7.8, 6.8.1. 204 Caes. BGall. 6.8: Labienus counterattacked once the Gauls had reached unfavourable ground (... flumen transire et iniquo loco committere proelium ...)
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Were feigned flights effective battle tactics? Roman literature shows that the Romans were
certainly well aware of such tactics and the threat they could pose to disorderly pursuers.205
The effectiveness of the tactic was a product of the combination of the physical disorder of
pursuing troops, and the psychological shock of a counterattack by an enemy that the
pursuers believed had been defeated.206 These manoeuvres appear to have been a particular
specialty of peoples who had an affinity with mounted warfare.207 Cavalry were most
effective at carrying out these manoeuvres as they could outpace pursuing infantry easily, and
so it was possible for cavalry to disperse in flight (rather than retire gradually) and reform in
time to counterattack a disorganised pursuer, just as the Numidians did to Roman infantry at
the Battle of the Muthul in 108 BC (Sall. Jug. 50). Highly–skilled cavalry could even perform
this manoeuvre against enemy cavalry, such as Scipio and Masinissa did against the
Carthaginians at Utica in 203 BC (Livy 29.34). Feigned retreats were, therefore, very
effective with cavalry, and so were more readily utilised by peoples such as the Numidians
and Parthians than by the more infantry–focused Romans.
The most important question is whether or not the Romans used such tactics with any
regularity. Frontinus (Strat. 3.11) provides several examples drawn from the Greeks of how,
through guile and trickery, an infantry force could make a feigned retreat work, and
Onasander (Strat. 11) emphasises that any major retreat by an enemy, particularly in
unknown country or on disadvantageous ground, should be held suspect. It was, therefore,
not unknown for infantry–based forces to use such tactics.208 The Romans, however, could be
dismissive of such tactics, considering them unmanly.209
Further, there are no Roman examples, even including that of Labienus given above,
describing infantry making a feigned retreat directly from battle, then turning and counter–
attacking their pursuers, as cavalry could do. In fact, in the case of Labienus, he will have
required quite significant distance between himself and the Gauls to depart his camp, put
205 Sall. Jug 50; Livy 6.24, 29.34; Onas. Strat. 21.9. 206 Effects of disorder: Lendon, 1999, 282–5. Shock: Onas. Strat. 21.9, cf. Strat. 29.34. 207 For instance, the Numidians (Sall. Jug. 50; Livy 29.34) and Parthians (Goldsworthy, 1996, 64–5). 208 It could be argued that the centre of Hannibal's army conducted a sort feigned withdrawal at Cannae in 216 BC (Polyb. 3.115). 209 Dawson, 1996, 144. When withdrawing from Gergovia in 52 BC, Caesar was keen to ensure his escape did not resemble a flight (ne … similis fugae videretur: Caes. BGall. 7.43.6). Also see Livy 5.27.5–8.
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aside the baggage, and reform a battleline.210 The presence of a steep river between himself
and the enemy army (Caes. BGall. 6.7) will have been a significant factor in giving the time
and space needed to complete these tasks.
Why was this so? The danger of a feigned retreat was that it had to give the appearance of
disorder, or even flight, for an enemy to pursue quickly and rashly, which could create the
sort of disorder among the enemy that a counterattack could capitalise on. It was one thing
for an army to retire prior to engaging in battle, and return to surprise a relaxed enemy (Onas.
Strat. 11). However, when in very close proximity to the enemy during a regular engagement,
there will have been little to distinguish feigned disorder among retreating troops from real
disorder, particularly if a strong pursuit was made. This is yet one more reason that an
infantry force, such as that of Labienus in Gaul, will have required a good amount of space
between themselves and the enemy in order to perform a feigned retreat as a deliberate
stratagem.
There is little evidence then that Roman armies performed these types of retreats regularly. If
an army had sufficient time and space to retire and reorganise itself prior to engaging the
enemy, there could be some opportunity for a pre–battle retreat, or a feigned flight. However,
feigned retreats were more easily and safely performed by cavalry than by infantry, and they
did not suit the measured and orderly tactics of the Roman legions. For infantry the dangers
of retreat, unless it were absolutely necessary, were significant. It will have been safer for a
Roman army in a battleline to stand its ground or, if necessary, to conduct a conventional,
orderly retreat to a safe position, and at any rate it will have been viewed as more honourable
to defeat an enemy in battle without resort to trickery.
210 Cf. Caes. BGall. 6.7–8. How long it took the Gauls to marshal their relatively decentralised forces, approach the river, and then cross it, is unknown but it was clearly long enough for Labienus to march a short distance, move his entire baggage train onto a nearby hill, and rapidly redeploy his army as the Gauls approached. Perhaps the Gauls slowed their pursuit once they saw the Romans reforming, or perhaps Labienus had cut his timing very finely, but as the Romans were able to raise a shout, throw pilum, and advance, the Gauls must have been very close.
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Summary of Part A
There were several main reasons that retreats could occur. The most common was as a result
of defeat in battle. Such retreats may not have been voluntary, but were a deliberate attempt
to avoid the chaos and mass casualties of a rout, and could even allow an army to re–engage
with greater success. In the case of an indecisive battle, whether this was a result of
exhaustion, casualties, or the caution of the general, one or both armies might also have
retreated. Such retreats could occur simultaneously if opposing commanders shared similar
fears, and tired and fearful combatants on both sides may have been relieved to desist from
further fighting. Also the onset of nightfall, when it occasionally occurred during an ongoing
battle, was another trigger for retreat. Fighting at night could create chaos and panic, and so
the typical reaction of both armies upon nightfall was to retire from combat. Even so, the
Romans did occasionally use night as an opportunity for successful action, particularly if the
army and its general were confident and skilled. Even more rarely, poor weather could also
motivate one or both armies to retreat, as decreased stability and visibility increased the risk
of chaos and panic. Finally, it was possible for a Roman army to perform a feigned retreat or
simulated flight as a battle tactic to lure the enemy into a weak physical position, from where
they could be defeated in a counterattack. However, this was dangerous for an infantry–based
army, as a simulated flight could easily become a real one under enemy pressure, and at any
rate, some generals may not have viewed such tactics as honourable. As such, feigned retreats
were not commonly performed by Roman forces. In general, the Romans would retreat only
when they were forced to by the enemy, or due to the fear of disorder if fighting were to
continue.
Part B: Where Armies Sought Refuge
High Ground
As pointed out by Sabin, the first priority for a beaten army ‘was to escape their vulnerability
to one–sided slaughter’, and that the only way for a ‘broken army to escape…was to seek
shelter within a nearby fortified camp ...’211 Gilliver is slightly more expansive, stating of
Roman soldiers in retreat, ‘if they were able…made for their camp or a nearby defended city,
211 Sabin, 2007, 413.
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or retreated to high ground in a close formation.’212 Was reaching high ground, a camp, or a
nearby city therefore the standard objective of a fighting retreat? How did these sorts of
positions help a retreating army, and what factors contributed to an army’s choice of one
place over another?
As noted, one option for a beaten army or one that feared defeat was to retreat and renew
battle from a better position, and higher ground could provide just such a position.213 There
are numerous examples of retreating armies using high ground to protect themselves from
pursuit or to continue fighting from a stronger position.214 A handful of these examples will
be examined below in order to show the value of high ground to a retreating army.
Firstly, as Plutarch’s account (Aem. 20.5–6) of the Battle of Pydna in 168 BC reveals, when
the Roman army was initially repulsed by the Macedonian phalanx, it retreated uphill directly
away from the phalanx towards their own camp.215 The pursuing phalanx followed, until
eventually the Macedonian infantry was drawn onto uneven ground and became disordered,
allowing the Romans to make a decisive counterattack (20.7–10). The Romans had only
needed to retreat a short distance before the hill and uneven ground disrupted the phalanx.216
The hindering effect of the slope on their pursuers allowed the Romans to reform a fighting
line and counterattack. In this case, the socii in the front line were retreating involuntarily and
the yet–to–be–engaged legions were deliberately withdrawing along with them, but all the
lines of the army used the high ground to support themselves in retreat. The retreat to high
ground, perhaps inadvertently, was a decisive factor in the eventual Roman victory.
The Romans were not the only ones who could use high ground to even the odds. In 58 BC,
the Helvetii faced Caesar’s army at Bibracte (Caes. BGall. 1.23–6) Caesar’s army was first
deployed on high ground, and the Helvetii were thrown back from their attack lower down
the slope, but the Celts then retired to high ground (1.25), turning the tables on the Romans
who were then forced to attack uphill themselves, which Caesar implied was very difficult.217
212 Gilliver, 2007, 138. 213 Eg. Caes. BGall. 6.7–8, BCiv. 1.45; Sall. Jug. 98.1–2; Livy 4.39.5. 214 Saving an army from pursuit or destruction: Polyb. 3.40, 3.86, 11.24; Caes. BGall. 1.25; BAlex 40; Livy 27.41–2, 28.15.8–11; Sall. Jug. 51, 98; App. B Civ. 1.90. Re–engaging: Xen. Hell. 3.5.19–20; Caes. BGall. 2.23, BCiv. 1.45. 215 Hammond, 1984, 40. 216 Ibid., 40. 217 Caes. BGall. 1.25–6. The length of the battle betrays its hard–fought nature: Nam hoc toto proelio, cum ab hora septima ad vesperum pugnatum sit, aversum hostem videre nemo potuit (BGall. 1.26).
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When a Pontic army rushed uphill at Caesar’s forces at Zela in 47 BC, the imperator and his
men were caught totally by surprise, yet they repelled the attack decisively (BAlex. 74–6).
High ground could thus confer a major tactical advantage to the defenders.
As a consequence, many armies will have been reluctant to attack uphill for fear of this
occurring, even in pursuit of a retreating enemy.218 High ground was advantageous to
retreating troops for several reasons. Fighting from high ground made things more physically
difficult for the attackers, as they had to move against gravity and fight taller opponents. The
slope also had a double psychological impact, making the defenders more confident while
intimidating the attackers.219 There was, however, the potential drawback that an army
retreating to higher ground could be surrounded and besieged, forcing those on the hill either
to fight their way out or to surrender.220 Even so, high ground gave reasonable hope of
success to an army situated there, and conversely, potential attackers would think twice
before attacking or pursuing uphill. As a result, high ground was a logical place for a
retreating army to seek refuge, and was commonly utilised as such.
Camps
It was also possible that a retreating army would retire to its camp.221 This is not surprising,
as in this period camps were habitually positioned, by the Romans and others, near
battlefields.222 It is worth considering if it was more or less preferable for an army to retreat
to a camp, or to high ground, and under which circumstances one might be more appropriate
than the other. Also, while it is well known that the Romans routinely constructed camps
while on campaign, it is an open question whether these were specifically positioned for the
purposes of protecting an army in retreat. The following discussion will consider these
matters, and examine the role of camps in Roman retreat tactics.
218 BAlex. 40. In Sallust (Jug. 98), when Marius managed to withdraw his army onto higher ground, the enemy refused to engage further (Ita reges loci difficultate coacti proelio deterrentur). 219 These things are routinely emphasised in battle accounts by both Greek and Latin sources: see Xen. Anab. 4.8.10–4, 6.5.12–20, Hell. 3.5.19–20, 5.4.42–5; Polyb. 11.22, 18.22, 25; Caes. BGall. 2.23, 5.35, 6.40, 7.51, BCiv. 1.44–5; BAlex. 40; Livy 5.38, 27.18, 28.2, 32.12, 38.21, 39.31; Sall. Jug. 50–1. 220 Polyb. 3.86; Caes. BGall. 6.40, BCiv. 3.95–8; App. Hisp. 88. 221 Eg. Livy 4.39.5–6, 29.19.4–5; App. B Civ. 4.128. The Romans at Pydna did withdraw uphill, but also directly towards their camp (Plut. Aem. 20.5–6, cf. Hammond, 1984, 40). 222 Sabin, 2007, 414.
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To answer the given questions, the defensive value of a camp must first be considered. It has
been suggested that the Roman–style marching camp was not designed to act as a defensive
position.223 However, they did have some defensive value and could at any rate be further
fortified.224 In particular, it has been argued that some extra fortification was a normal
procedure for Roman battle camps, as opposed to marching camps that were not necessarily
intended for defence.225 Roman siege camps, such as those excavated at Numantia,
demonstrate a formidable combination of natural and constructed defences.226 Hellenistic
armies, for their part, did use their camps as defensive positions when necessary.227 The
positioning and fortification of a camp was subject to an individual general’s inclinations, so
that some camps will have been better protected than others.228 Their size and layout will also
have varied according to the local topography and composition of the army.229 However, a
well–fortified camp was an exceptional defensive position, as demonstrated by the ability of a
few Roman survivors of the disaster at Atuatuca in 54 BC to fend off the enemy once they
had fled back into their hiberna (Caes. BGall. 5.37). Considering that camps could offer such
protection to a retreating army, and that camps were usually positioned near battlefields, it is
unsurprising that there are many examples of armies using camps as safe havens in the event
of defeat.230 Under what circumstances then, were camps more or less preferable to high
ground, and what was the conventional Roman preference when retreating?231
223 Southern, 2006, 193–4. 224 Goldsworthy, 1996, 112. Caesar (BGall. 5.40) describes the fortification of a Roman camp. To elaborate, Roman camps were generally surrounded by a trench with the soil piled up to form a ‘low rampart’ that was topped with palisades (Keppie, 1984, 37–8; Sage, 2008, 135–7). To further fortify such a camp was relatively simple, though labour–intensive: the trench could be deepened, the rampart could be made higher and reinforced, and towers could be constructed (Keppie, 1984, plate 9). 225 Goldsworthy, 2011, 33; Southern, 2006, 193–4. This was probably more common in the Republican era (Southern, 2006, 192). Vegetius (3.8) specifically recommends that stationary camps (as opposed to briefly occupied marching camps) should be well–fortified. 226 Dobson, 2008, 400–5. 227 Polyb. 11.22, 24; Livy 32.12, 37.43; App. Mith. 44. 228 Note the multiple instances where Carthaginians (Polyb. 11.24; Livy 25.13–4, 39, 28.15) or Hellenistic armies (Polyb. 5.73; BAlex 30–1, 76; Livy 31.41; App. Mith. 42–4, 50) were forced to defend their camps, though with mixed successes. Philip V in particular appears to have made a habit of building very defensible camps on steep ground (Polyb. 18. 20; Livy 32.12). One might be tempted to conclude Roman camps were generally better constructed and defended than those of their opponents (Keppie, 1984, 37–8), and a good Roman general might go to some effort to place their camps in a strong location if there was an enemy nearby (Caes. BGall. 2.17–8). However, evidence of certain debacles (eg. Livy 41.3) shows that the Roman camp did not always prevent disaster. Some generals may not have fortified at all (Sage 135–6). 229 Dobson, 2008, 121. 230 Polyb. 1.57, 18.19; Caes. BGall. 6.40; Livy 10.20, 23.46, 25.37, 27.42, 28.15, 29.26, 37.21, 42, 39.30. 231 Where the destination of an army retreating from battle is specified, there are a similar number of examples of retreats to camps and hills (see App. B).
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To address this question, the defensive value of camps and high ground must be compared.
Consider the fate of the Romans under Gnaeus Scipio Calvus (cos. 222) at Ilorca, 211 BC.
Prior to this battle, the Carthaginians under Hasdrubal Gisco had destroyed a Roman army
under Publius Scipio (cos. 218), and Gnaeus was in retreat to avoid a similar fate (Livy
25.34–5). Unable to escape pursuing cavalry, Gnaeus chose to withdraw his army (subducit)
to a hill (in tumulum) that, according to Livy, was not high enough to provide significant
protection (non quidem satis tutum) and was sine munimentum (25.36.1–2, 4). Gnaeus
attempted to fortify the hill with a makeshift rampart of baggage, but after some initial
hesitation, the Carthaginians cleared away the baggage and stormed the hill, annihilating the
Roman army.232 Livy emphasises that Gnaeus found the position unsuitable for defence as the
ground was too hard and bare for making any sort of trench or rampart and was not elevated
enough to significantly hinder the enemy ascent (25.36.4–7). Even though Livy refers
(25.36.11) to the Roman position as a camp (castra), it was barely worthy of the name. It is
therefore clear that high ground only offered a strong defensive position if it was high enough
to hinder the enemy’s ascent, or could at least be fortified by a trench and rampart. A fortified
camp thus provided a much stronger defensive position than a hill such as the Romans
attempted to defend at Ilorca.
However, in comparing camps and hills as places of refuge, it must be emphasised that some
examples of higher ground were much more impressive than others and could offer
advantages over a camp. As discussed above, a battleline drawn up on a very steep hill was so
intimidating that most armies would refuse to attack it at all, and if they did, they would
almost certainly be soundly defeated.233 Further, retreating onto a hill was a simple act of an
army moving backwards up the hill, while maintaining its battleline. Conversely, for an army
to enter a walled camp while under attack could be very difficult, because the army might
have to squeeze through relatively narrow entrances, while under attack.234 An army that
retreated to its camp but wished to avoid being attacked at its entrance could choose to stand
and fight outside the ramparts, but if they were beaten in such a place they could be trapped
and annihilated, just as occurred to a Pontic army at Charonaea in 86 BC.235 Finally, an army
232 Makeshift rampart: Livy 25.36.4–7. Appian (Hisp. 16) reports a tower, but his account is so dissimilar as to be discounted. Initial hesitation: Livy 25.36.8. Clearing away the baggage and taking the hill: Livy 25.36.9–11. 233 Eg. Caes. BGall. 1.25; BAlex. 75–6. 234 Pol 14.4–6; Livy 25.39; App. Mith. 44. 235Appian heavily criticised the Pontic general, Archalaus for forcing his men to fight outside the camp after a
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could be cut off from its camp by enemy forces during battle, or the camp could even be
taken while its parent army was in the field. In such situations it would be more logical for an
army to retreat towards an undefended hill, in contrast to fighting to reach or retake its
camp.236 Therefore, there were situations in which a steep hill that offered significant
defensive value could be a safer option for a retreating army than its camp.
There were other potential issues with retreating into a camp. Even once a retreating army
was inside, an army battered by defeat in the field could still struggle to defend its camp, as
many defenders could be wounded or demoralised, and the attackers, energised by the
promise of a decisive victory.237 Perhaps for these reasons, camps could be (and in many
cases were) taken by storm, potentially leading to slaughter among the soldiers trapped inside
their own fortifications.238 Even an army that was inside its camp might be enticed to leave,
retreating elsewhere, so rendering them vulnerable to attack once more.239 Finally, for
‘barbarian’ armies that populated their camps with civilians, so as not to expose their families
to danger by retreating to such a camp, they might retreat elsewhere.240 Considering these
issues, it is questionable whether camps were always superior to high ground as places of
refuge.
defeat, disastrously trapping them between the enemy and the wall of the camp, as opposed to sheltering in the camp itself (App. Mith. 42–4). 236 Cut off: Caes. BCiv. 2.42. Lost to the enemy: BCiv. 3.95; Livy 32.12; App. Hann. 41. When the Romans were defeated in the Battle of Nicopolis, 48 BC, they retreated to the nearby hills (BAlex. 40), even though there was a camp somewhere nearby (BAlex. 39). The Romans, being surrounded, may not have been able to retreat towards the camp, and the hills also offered a complete retreat from the enemy rather than the possibility of being trapped inside a camp. 237 Sabin, 2007, 414. Note the inability of the Seleucids at Magnesia to defend their camp from Roman attack, despite fierce resistance, after their overwhelming defeat in the line of battle (Livy 37.43). In the Battle of the Nile in 47 BC, Caesar managed to storm the well–defended Ptolemiac camp (BAlex. 31). Also see Caes. BCiv. 3.67, 95; BAlex. 76; Livy 31.41, 33.15, 38.23, 238 Polyb. 5.73, 14.4–6; Caes. BCiv. 3.67, 95; BAlex. 76; Sall. Jug. 99; Livy 24.16, 25.14, 39, 31.41, 33.15, 37.43, 38.22–3, 40.31; App. Mith. 44, 50. 239 Sall. Jug. 38; Caes. BCiv. 3.97–8; B. Afr. 85. According to Appian (Hann. 41), at one point Hannibal used a stratagem wherein he attacked a Roman camp with a small (but very loud) force and had some of his men yell orders in Latin to compel a Roman army to leave their camp and take refuge on a nearby hill, allowing him to attack them as they withdrew from the camp. The Roman general Fulvius Flaccus (cos. 211 BC) saw through the deception (Hann. 42) and managed to keep his army in the camp, defeating Hannibal's attack. An army retreating on the march, whether from a camp or in other circumstances, was particularly vulnerable (see Ch 2, 86–7). 240 At Bibracte in 58 BC, after the Helvetii retreated from their initial assault on Caesar, they retreated to a hill (Caes. BGall. 1.25) even though there was an encampment close by (BGall. 1.26). This encampment, however, was filled with their families (1.29). The sheer size of this encampment probably also prevented the Helvetii from putting it on a hill or fortifying it properly, or perhaps they did not have time.
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That said, even if it were accepted that steep hills were better destinations of retreat, such a
position had to be readily accessible. A camp could be constructed and fortified in virtually
any location that had access to building material, including in the plains of Mesopotamia, but
finding a hill was not always possible.241 Conversely, camps were routinely positioned in the
vicinity of a battlefield by the Romans and many others in this period, and so were likely
more commonly available as a place of safety than steep hills.242
Further, it was not uncommon for camps to be positioned on hills, whether to provide a good
view of the surroundings or specifically to increase the camp’s defensibility.243 An army
could, therefore, retreat towards its camp while also gaining the advantages of higher ground
as it did so, just as the Romans did at Pydna.244 At any rate, it is reasonable to assume that a
fortified camp in a place that was already naturally fortified (such as a steep hill) was more
difficult to assault than the hill alone.245 For example, Livy (23.26.9–11) records that in 216
BC the Carthaginian general Hasdrubal Barca, while positioning a camp in Spain, halted on a
steep hill (in collem satis arduum) that was even naturally defended by a river
(flumine etiam obiecto), and yet he considered neither the incline nor the river to be sufficient
defence, and so constructed an earthwork (nec aut colli aut flumini satis fidens, castra vallo
permunit). Unsurprisingly, it is evident that a fortified camp on a hill was a stronger defensive
position that either a bare hill or a camp on flat ground. A good general will surely have
positioned his camp on a hill as a matter of habit.246
In comparing camps and hills as places of retreat, there are further examples worth
considering. Caesar (BGall. 6.32–41) records an incident in 53 BC in which one of his
legates, Quintus Tullius Cicero, having been left in command of a single legion to guard the
army’s baggage in a camp (6.32), was attacked unexpectedly by Germans (6.37) while a large
group of men was out foraging (6.36). These foragers, perhaps numbering around two
241 Plut. Ant. 38.3, 39.6. On the wood in that area cf. Ant. 38.2. 242 Sabin, 2007, 414. 243 Xen. Hell. 3.5.19–20; Polyb. 11.24; BAlex. 76; Livy 28.17, 32.12, 38.21, 26–7. Also see Dobson, 2008, 15, Fig. 9; Bellón et al., 2016, 104. High ground also gave a good view of the surroundings. Vegetius (3.8) specifically makes the recommendation that camps be situated on high ground. Also see Southern, 2006, 191. 244 Plut. Aem. 20.5–6. On the terrain and position of the Roman camp at Pydna, see Hammond, 1984, 40. 245 Polyb. 18. 20; Caes. BGall. 2.17–8; Livy 32.12. 246 Caes. BGall. 2.18. In excavations of the potential battle site of Baecula, 208 BC (cf. Polyb. 10.39; Livy 27.18), Spanish archaeologists have found that the Romans and Carthaginians both constructed camps at different times on a strategic piece of high ground in the area (Bellón et al., 2016, 73, 104).
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thousand legionaries with numerous (magna ... multitudo) camp followers (calones), were cut
off from their camp by the Germans.247 The camp was still nearby, but even closer was a hill
that was not blocked by Germans (6.40). The calones immediately attempted to seek refuge
on this hill (in proximum tumulum procurrunt), but were thrown back by a German attack and
so joined up with the heavy infantry (6.40). As follows:
Some of [the legionaries] proposed to form a wedge and break through speedily, as
the camp was so near at hand, feeling confident that if some part were surrounded and
slain, yet the remainder could be saved. Others proposed to take post on the ridge
(alii, ut in iugo consistant) and all face the same risk together. This course was not
approved by the veterans ... [who] broke through the midst of the enemy and came
into camp (in castra perveniunt) all safe to a man. Close behind them in the same
onrush came the camp–followers and the cavalry, who were saved by the valour of
soldiers. But the party which had taken post on the ridge, still utterly untutored in the
practice of war, had proved unable either to abide in the place they had approved and
defend themselves on higher ground, or to imitate the vigour and the speed which
they had seen to be of assistance to others; indeed, in the attempt to retire into camp
(in castra recipere) they came down to unfavourable ground ... Part of the soldiers ...
arrived, though they did not expect it, safe in camp; part were surrounded by the
natives and perished.248
The veteran component of the soldiers immediately chose to make for the camp, and this
group and those who followed them were successful. Those who retired to the hill were
forced to abandon this position and rush for the camp regardless, and many died doing so. It
is clearly Caesar’s judgement, through the medium of the veteres ... milites, that this was the
ideal course of action. That there was serious risk in this course of action is clearly admitted
by the veterans (et si pars aliqua circumventa ceciderit, at reliquos servari posse confidunt).
However, the alternative course of action, fighting from the hill, is shown by Caesar to have
been a mistake not only through the course of events, but through the fact that it is the
calones and inexperienced men (nullo etiam nunc usu rei militaris) who recommended it. It is
striking that the veterans recommended the first course of action, and not the easier route of 247 Numbers of men: Caes. BGall. 6.36. The Roman cohorts, being in the midst of a hard campaign, were probably not at full strength. Cut off by Germans: BGall. 6.39. 248 Trans. H. J. Edwards, 1914.
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fighting from the hill, which was readily accessible and was clearly more defensible than the
flat ground (iniquum ... locum). It is thus the judgement of Caesar that soldiers who were in
danger should have striven to reach their camp, even if they had to fight their way through a
ring of enemies to get there.
Was Caesar’s view that the camp was the ideal place of retreat for a beaten army
representative of conventional Roman military wisdom? In his fictionalised account of the
Battle of the Allia, Livy (5.38.1) specifically criticised the Roman officers for not setting up a
camp or fortified position in the case of retreat:
There the tribunes of the soldiers, without having selected a place for a camp or
fortified a position to which they might retreat (… non loco, castris ante capto, non
praemunito vallo quo receptus esset) … drew up their line with the wings extended to
prevent being outflanked by the numbers of the enemy; yet could not stretch their
front as wide as his, though they thinned it till the centre was weak and scarce held
together. There was a little eminence on the right which they decided to occupy with
their reserves, a measure which, though it was the beginning of their panic and flight,
was also the sole salvation of the fugitives.249
Debate about Livy’s military credentials aside, and he was certainly not a military expert in
any way comparable to Caesar, but even so Livy (or his source) considered the positioning of
a camp, or the fortification of some position for retreat, to be a standard procedure in
preparation for a battle and castigates the tribunes for not having done so.250 Note that Livy
comments on the presence of high ground near the Roman battleline, but does not suggest
that this should necessarily have been the location for the camp. He approves of the decision
to post reserves there, because the strength of that position gave relief to the rest of the army,
even though the latter simply used the opportunity to flee (5.38.3–7). Livy thus suggests that
it was common knowledge that a general should construct a camp near a battlefield
specifically for the purpose of giving a place of refuge in the case of retreat.
249 Trans. B. O. Foster, 1924. 250 On Livy as a military authority, Walsh (1965, 4, 157–8) considers Livy to completely lack military experience or nous, whereas Koon (2010, 23–6) considers him sensible and perhaps even experienced. Either way, he can provide some insight into what was considered contemporary good sense.
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Tacitus also provides a telling account (Ann. 2.46) of a battle between the German leaders
Arminius and Maroboduus in 17 AD. The two armies fought a battle with an unclear outcome
and separated, so that although another battle was expected (sperabaturque rursum pugna),
Maroboduus withdrew his camp to some nearby hills (castra in collis subduxisset), and this
apparently demonstrated his defeat (id signum perculsi fuit). Tacitus (Ann. 2.46) also implies
that this move was cowardly (id signum perculsi fuit), as Maraboduus’ men abandoned him
soon after this. According to Tacitus then, moving one’s camp away from its position near the
battleline, to higher ground, signified defeat. He thereby implies that the camp was the proper
place to retreat after a reversal, and that high ground was a secondary option.251
One last example will further illustrate this point. At the Battle of Thapsus, fought in 46 BC
between Caesar and a Pompeian faction led by Metellus Scipio (cos. 52), there is a detailed
account of the flight of Scipio’s army after its total defeat by Caesar’s forces (BAfr. 85.3–5):
Meanwhile Scipio's forces, now thrown into utter confusion, were in wholesale retreat
(toto campo fugientibus) in every sector of the field, and Caesar's legions promptly
pursued (consequi) them without giving them any respite in which to pull themselves
together (colligendi). When the fugitives reached the camp they were making for
(perfugerunt), with the object of making a recovery there and defending themselves
once more, and of trying to find someone to lead them – someone to look up to, under
whose authority and command they could carry on the fight; when they got there and
perceived that there was nobody guarding it, they forthwith discarded their armour
and beat a hasty retreat to the royal camp (in regia castra fugere contendunt). This too
on their arrival they saw to be in the hands of the Julians. Abandoning all hope of
salvation, they now halted on a hill (in quodam colle consistent) and gave the military
salute by lowering their arms.252
As can be seen, when Scipio’s forces were beaten and were forced from the battlefield, they
immediately fled to a camp, but they found that it was undefended (or perhaps even
occupied). Discarding their armour (but not yet their weapons), thereby demonstrating that
they had little intention of engaging in further offensive action, they chose to flee to another
251 In the Second Battle of Philippi, Brutus also retreated first to a camp and then, once his defeat was abundantly clear, he occupied a nearby hill (App. B Civ. 4.128–9). 252 Trans. A. G. Way, 1955.
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camp, apparently perceiving this to be their best hope of refuge. When they found this camp
occupied, only then did they make their way to some nearby high ground, and from there they
attempted to surrender. It is thus abundantly clear in this case that the Romans preferred the
defence of camps over high ground.
In addition to the views of the elite, it is also worth considering the motivations of milites.
Naturally a man in danger would want to seek safety wherever it seemed best, hence the
debate between veterans and novi milites that Caesar described above (BGall. 6.40). Shame
may have been a motivator for beaten soldiers to return to camp, for as demonstrated by the
case of Maroboduus in AD 17 (Tac. Ann. 2.46), abandoning one’s camp to the enemy was a
sign of decisive defeat. Importantly, camps contained an army’s baggage, including soldiers’
personal possessions and the army’s plunder, not to mention military equipment, medical
supplies and food.253 The desperation with which soldiers could act to protect their plunder
and possessions is recorded by both Caesar (BGall. 5.33) and Livy (10.36.12–5). Thus,
soldiers will have often been intensely motivated to return to their camps and defend them
after a defeat in the field, rather than abandon their valued belongings and plunder to the
enemy.
Livy (44.39.1–5) transmits a speech by Aemilius Paulus that is particularly revealing of
Roman attitudes towards the military camp. Just prior to the Battle of Pydna, 168 BC,
Aemilius Paulus gave the following justification to his consilium for taking time to establish a
camp before giving battle:
Oh yes, you say, we should have had a battle-line undeployed and disorderly; but our
camp was fortified, our water-supply found, the way to it secured by placing guards,
and reconnaissance made all around. Or did our men have nothing but the bare ground
on which to fight . . .? Your ancestors regarded a fortified camp (castra munita) as a
haven (portum) against all the mischances of an army, whence they might go out to
fight, and whither they might find shelter from the storm of battle. Therefore when
they had walled in their camp with fortifications, they used also to strengthen it with a
powerful garrison, because one who had been stripped of his camp, even though he
had won the battle, would be considered the loser. Camp is the shelter of the
253 Roth, 1999, 79–84.
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conqueror, the refuge of the conquered. How many armies meeting with none too
favourable fortune in battle, after being driven (compulsi) within their rampart (intra
vallum), have in their own good time, sometimes after only a moment, sallied forth
and routed the victorious enemy? This abode is a second home (patria altera) for the
soldier, its rampart takes the place of city walls (moenibus) and his own tent
(tentorium suum) is the soldier's dwelling and hearthside (domus ac penates). Should
we have fought like nomads with no abode, so that, whether conquered or conquerors,
we might return (reciperimus) —where?254
Two key themes are evident in Livy’s rhetoric. First, the camp provided an important tactical
function in providing refuge to a beaten army, sheltering the army as it recovered its strength
for a renewed attack, or providing a safe haven for the victors to recuperate. Second, the
camp held psychological significance to the miles, who viewed the camp as his country
(patria), and his tent (tentorium) as home (domus). The latter theme is significant. Although
the idea is transmitted through the medium of Livian rhetoric, in the absence of the soldier’s
point of view, it may be taken to represent a conventional soldier’s view. It has already been
shown that a Roman soldier would balk, even panic, at the prospect of losing his possessions
to the enemy (Caes. BGall. 5.33). In the context of a campaign away from country, home and
family, it is not difficult to believe that Livy conveys a fundamental truth about the emotional
attachment of Roman soldiers to their camp. If given the option, soldiers would surely have
preferred to return to their tent and belongings than a bare hill.
Thus, while there were certainly a variety of situations in which a steep hill was a better place
for an army to retreat to than a camp, it appears that at least for the Romans, the standard
procedure in the event of a battlefield defeat was to retreat to a camp rather than an
unfortified hill. Caesar, Livy and Tacitus all imply that a beaten army should retreat to its
camp if possible, and that while high ground could provide refuge if necessary, it should not
have been the first choice for retreating troops.255 Indeed, Livy directly states that it was
common sense for a camp to be constructed specifically for the purposes of giving refuge to
an army in the event of retreat (5.38.1). In general, Roman armies would retreat to hills only
254 Trans. Alfred C. Schlesinger, 1951. 255 Camps were at any rate often constructed on higher ground (see Dobson, 2008, 15, Fig. 9; Bellón et al., 2016, 104). Cf. Xen. Hell. 3.5.19–20; Polyb. 11.24; BAlex. 76; Livy 28.17, 32.12, 38.21, 26–7.
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when they did not have a camp or could not reach it.256 Otherwise, most Roman armies will
have retreated to their camp if defeated, unless prevented by some other factor such as being
cut off by the enemy (BAfr. 85.3–5), or due to confusion at night (Livy 4.39.4–9).
Walled Settlements
For the Gauls fighting against Caesar, who did not have the Roman habit of building fortified
camps near battlefields, retreating to the oppida that dotted the landscape was not uncommon
after battlefield defeats.257 Greek and Hellenistic armies did the same when necessary, for, as
Polybius (4.12) points out in his account of the Battle of Caphyae in 220 BC, a defeated army
was much better off retreating to nearby towns than fleeing in open ground.258 It was,
therefore, possible for an army to retreat into a walled settlement after defeat in battle.
In the case of the Romans, at Ilerda in 49 BC, the Pompeian army was driven back by an
enemy charge and retreated into the town of Ilerda itself although they also had a fortified
camp nearby (Caes. BCiv. 1.42, 46–7). Also consider the Battle of Munda, fought in 45 BC
between Caesar and some leading Pompeian generals (BHisp. 31). After the Pompeians had
marched out from Munda, a fortified town, they encamped in a strong position on high
ground, either adjacent to or inside the town itself (28). Facing Caesar with a regular line of
battle, they were defeated and put to flight, and fled directly into the town (31-2). Even if the
Pompeian camp was inside Munda, it is evident that it was the town itself, rather than the
camp or higher ground, that provided the most significant protection to the beaten army.259
The defensive value of a walled town or city implied by this situation is a strong argument in
favour of an army deciding to retreat to such a position. And so it appears to have been
commonly true that a retreating or fleeing army, if unable to seek refuge on a nearby camp or
256 A large group of Roman cavalry did so after the catastrophic ambush at Trasimene, 217 BC, wherein the Romans had not established a camp because they were attacked on the march (Polyb. 3.86). Also see Polyb. 2.34, Sall. Jug. 98; App. Pun. 103. At Bibracte in 58 BC, Caesar had intended to seize a particular hill prior to battle, but was informed that the Helvetii reached it first, so Caesar retired (subducit) to the nearest height and drew up his battleline (Caes. BGall. 1.22.3). However, this was only an emergency expedient, and Caesar established a new camp as soon as it was practical (BGall. 1.22.4). 257 Eg. Caes. BGall. 2.12, 7.68. Also note the frequent Gallic sallies from these places: BGall. 7.22, 24, 47–51, 80–5. 258 For another example the Spartans, when defeated at Olynthus in 381 BC, fled in multiple directions to nearby cities (Xen. Hell. 5.33). 259 Ita ipsis Liberalibus fusi fugatique non superfuissent, nisi in eum locum confugissent ex quo erant egressi ... ex fuga hac qui oppidum Mundam sibi constituissent praesidium ... (BHisp. 31–2).
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hill, would go towards a defensible town or city.
Other than following a defeat in a regular battle, there was one more scenario in which a
walled settlement featured, that is when an army being besieged in a town or city could sally
out to attack its enemy and then return within the walls.260 In the Battle of Thapsus, for
example, the garrison of Thapsus sallied out to assist the Pompeians during the battle (BAfr.
85). Livy (2.48.5–6) similarly claims that the legendary Veientes, besieged by the early
Romans, did exactly this c. 479 BC. The Gauls too, fighting against Caesar in 52 BC,
habitually sallied out from their oppida to fight besieging enemy forces: at Avaricum (Caes.
BGall. 7.22, 24), Gergovia (BGall. 7.47–51) and Alesia (7.80–5), after which they retreated
back behind the walls when beaten. As such, armies routinely retreated back into a city or
town if they had sallied out to fight besiegers.
Finally, there are a number of accounts that do not explicitly state that retreating armies made
their way either to high ground or to any sort of defensive position.261 In most of these
examples, however, the authors simply leave the place of retreat unstated. The reader of these
accounts will have been expected to infer the place to which armies retreated, to a camp or a
hill, or failing that, a walled settlement, in the event of defeat.262
Nevertheless, Appian (Hisp. 88) describes a skirmish near Pallantia in 134 BC, in which he
specifically records that a retreat was made by some Roman cavalry to flat ground, with no
further information given:
Scipio ordered Rutilius Rufus, a military tribune … to take four troops of horse and
drive back the assailants. Rufus followed them too sharply when they retreated and
darted up the hill with the fugitives. When he discovered [an enemy ambush hidden
behind the hill] he ordered his troops not to pursue or attack … but to stand on the
260 Levithan, 2013, 219 261 Polyb. 11.17, 18.25; Livy 30.18, 37.38, 42.59, 44.42; App. Hisp. 82, 88. 262 For example, Polybius (18.25) mentions a retreat by part of the Roman army at Cynoschephalae, 197 BC, but gives little further detail. However, the Roman camp was in the area (Polyb. 21.4), their retreat must have been in that direction. Livy’s account (30.18.12–4) account of the defeat of Mago Barca in 203 BC does not mention a camp or hill to which the Carthaginian army retreated after being beaten, and yet the army was able to remain safe overnight (30.19.1), implying that the army did have safe place (either a camp or hill) to remain in this interval.
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defensive with their spears presented to the enemy and merely ward off their attack.
Straightway Scipio, seeing that Rufus had exceeded his orders, and fearing for his
safety, followed with all haste. When he discovered the ambush he divided his horse
into two bodies and ordered them to charge the enemy on either side alternately,
hurling their javelins all together and then retiring, not to the same spot from which
they had advanced, but a little further back each time. In this way the horsemen were
brought in safety to the plain.263
It is not clear which cavalry Scipio ordered to split into two bodies: his own, Rufus’ or both?
Scipio presumably gave visual orders to the beleaguered troopers on the hill, but he will have
more easily given complex orders to men actually accompanying him, and so it is more likely
that Scipio brought and used his own cavalry with which to effect the fighting retreat. As for
the question of why the cavalry merely retreated to flat ground, it must be considered that the
reason Scipio ordered a cavalry attack in the first place is because the enemy were harassing
Roman foragers, as there was a camp nearby (Hisp. 87–8). The cavalry could thus easily seek
refuge there once reaching flat ground.
However, by virtue of their speed, as long as retreating cavalry could outpace their pursuers
there may have been no need to seek immediate refuge when in retreat. In another example,
Livy (37.38.1–4) records a retreat by some defeated Seleucid cavalry in 190 BC, in which
they attempted to use a river to delay their pursuers. This did not work particularly well,
precisely because they did not outpace their pursuers. Their final destination, which they
must have reached, is left unmentioned. As their parent army was four miles away (Livy
37.48.2), a relatively insignificant distance for cavalry, this is where they will almost
certainly have gone. Infantry caught in a similar position would certainly not have been able
to escape so easily.
Summary of Part B
It is evident that there were a number of places to which an army could seek refuge following
a retrograde movement. The common factor was that these places had to be defensible, so
that the retreating forces were either safe from or better able to resist further enemy attacks.
263 Trans. Horace White, 1913.
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There appears also to have been a simple hierarchy in the sorts of positions that retreating
armies preferred to seek out. As a general rule, whether or not the place to which an army
retired is specified by a writer, a retreating Roman army will have gone to their camp, or high
ground if they could not make the camp. If neither of these options were available and
suitable, a walled settlement could also serve. Armies could attack from such positions with
greater confidence, and retreat back into them when necessary.
Part C: Retrograde Movements over Longer Distances
What if there was no refuge particularly close by, or if an army's defensive position was not
sufficiently protective and a more distant position was needed? Let us consider scenarios in
which an army was required to withdraw over a longer distance to find a defensive position
or safe location.
An army cut off from its camp and any nearby defensive position would obviously have had
to seek shelter elsewhere, as occured after the Battle of the Trebia, 218 BC. After the two
armies engaged, an ambush by Hannibal caused both Roman flanks to collapse (Polyb.
3.74.1–2) while the Roman centre was able to break through the enemy line, but the legions
in the centre became separated from the rest of the army and cut off from their camp (Polyb.
3.74.3–9):
... those in the van ... despaired of ... returning to their camp, afraid as they were of
the very numerous cavalry and hindered by the river and the force and heaviness of
the rain which was pouring down on their heads. They kept, however, in close order
and retired on Placentia, being not less than ten thousand in number. Of the remainder
the greater part were killed near the river by the elephants and cavalry, but the few
infantry who escaped and most of the cavalry retreated to join the body I just
mentioned and with them got safely into Placentia. The Carthaginian army, after
pursuing the enemy as far as the river, being unable to advance further owing to the
storm, returned to their camp.264
264 Trans. H. J. Edwards, 1922–7.
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In this case, the beaten Roman army could not have merely moved its battleline a few
hundred metres to a camp or hill. Placentia was approximately 15 kilometres away from the
Roman battleline at the Trebia.265 It must be noted that the army will almost certainly have
needed to form a column to cover this distance, particularly as it probably had to go back
across the river Trebia to reach Placentia.266 There was some high ground to the south, yet not
only was the Carthaginian camp and army between the Romans and this terrain, but
considering the absolute superiority of Hannibal’s army after its massive victory it is likely
that the Carthaginians would have finished the Romans off if they had merely retreated to
high ground. Despite the distance to Placentia, it may well have been the closest defensible
position for the Roman army when withdrawing.267
There are two salient points to note from this example. First, as the Roman army was unable
to find safety nearby it had to withdraw a significant distance to do so. Second, the distance
the Romans had to move will have necessitated a change in formation. An army retreating
directly from battle may have only needed to move a few hundred metres to reach safety, and
they could have done this by simply moving their battleline (acies) backwards.268 For the
Romans at the Trebia to most easily reach a destination that was several kilometres away, it
will have been necessary to organise themselves into a less unwieldy marching formation
(agmen). There are numerous examples of Roman armies behaving in the same way.269 For
instance, after the Pompeian army was heavily defeated at Pharsalus in 49 BC, some officers
planned to withdraw the army to a town many kilometres away.270 The two observations
drawn above can therefore be applied to Roman armies in a number of other situations.
265 Walbank, 1957, 398. 266 Ibid., 407. According to Livy (21.56.2), this group of Romans had been forced into a square formation (in orbem) before their withdrawal, but considering they had to cross the river (which Livy overlooks: 21.56.3–4) and then march a significant distance to Placentia, it is unlikely they remained in this formation once away from the main enemy force. Even if they did, a square formation was still better suited to moving long distances than a battleline. 267 A few survivors made it back to the camp, according to Livy (21.56.5), but no significant forces were apparently able to do so. According to Appian (Hann. 7), survivors made their way to both Placentia and Cremona. 268 For example, the Roman battleline at Pydna (168 BC) met the Macedonian phalanx only 400 metres from the Roman camp (Plut. Aem. 18.9), although Plutarch implies that this was fairly close. 269 Eg. Caes. BCiv. 1.64, 79–80; Livy 28.15.16–16.3. 270 The Pompeians retreated first to their camp (Caes. BCiv. 1.94–5), but when this camp was stormed, they retreated again to nearby high ground (1.95. After this they finally made plans to withdraw to Larisa (1.97), which was about 30 kilometres away (Carter, 1993, 216). In the event, Caesar forced them to surrender before they could make this withdrawal (BCiv. 1.97–8).
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Even if the Romans had safely retreated from initial danger to the closest place of refuge,
other problems might have arisen. There are numerous examples of armies withdrawing from
camps as a result of enemy action.271 There were several reasons for this. A camp was not
necessarily proof against enemy attack, and if it was stormed it could spell disaster for those
sheltering inside, particularly if they could not withdraw elsewhere.272 A general might,
therefore, wish his army to escape a victorious enemy entirely.273 The reality or threat of the
arrival of superior enemy forces could also trigger a withdrawal from a previous defensible
position.274 A general could also have simply moved his camp to exercise the army and
maintain discipline (Onas. Strat. 9). Food and supply shortages were particularly serious
threats, as any army trapped in its camp for any reason would eventually face this
insurmountable problem, no matter how defensible the camp was. In general, a group of men
or an army that was unable to forage for water, fodder and firewood would run into severe
difficulties within a few days.275 As mentioned above, an army stranded on high ground could
run into the same difficulties.276 Even an army that had retreated or withdrawn into a larger
town or city could eventually suffer from supply shortage, although this would usually have
taken longer period of time.277 There are thus several scenarios in which an army might have
withdrawn from an otherwise defensible position, with logistical shortage (or the threat of
such) being a particularly straightforward motivation for doing so.278
271 Eg. Caes. BGall. 2.10–1, BCiv. 1.61–4, 2.43; BAlex. 31; BHisp. 6; Livy 22.16–7, Livy 28.15.12–16.8, 36.46.7. 272 Eg. Caes. BGall. 3.5, 25–6, 6.37–8; BAlex 76; Livy 32.12.1–7, 38.23. Also see Sabin, 2007, 414. 273 Livy 28.15.12–16.8, 36.46.7. 274 Caesar provides a debate on the wisdom or otherwise of retreat in such a scenario (BGall. 5.26–31). Also see Caes. BGall. 6.7–8. 275 An army needed water on a daily basis (Roth, 1999, 36, 155). When the Pompeian army at Ilerda had been cut off by Caesar from water, fodder and firewood, it surrendered within a few days (Caes. BCiv. 1.84.1). Also, horses and baggage animals could themselves only work for a few days without fodder (Roth, 198, 307) and required grazing every five to seven days (Engels, 1978, 154–155). An army could only operate further than 80 to 100 kilometres from a supply base by grazing their animals (Roth, 1999, 129, 198, 201), which would necessitate the army being able to safely leave its camp. 276 Eg. Polyb. 3.86; Caes. BGall. 6.40, BCiv. 3.95–8; App. Hisp. 88. 277 De Souza, 2007, 455–8. 278 Also note the surrender of a Spartan contingent on Sphacteria in 425 BC, which resolutely suffered heavy casualties for some time before surrendering, in part due to being exhausted by their lack of food (Thuc. 4.35–6).
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In many cases, Roman armies withdrew from within a fortified position.279 This is revealed
by the Pompeian army under Afranius and Petreius during the Ilerdan campaign of 49 BC
(Caes. BCiv. 1.61–84). Following a laborious engagement with Caesar’s forces, the
Pompeians had retreated into Ilerda (BCiv. 1.46–7). At some stage they then transferred to
their nearby camp (1.59.1), where Caesar was eventually able to cut them off from foraging,
prompting Afranius and Petreius to withdraw their forces from the region (1.59–61). The
Pompeians marched for around 12 hours before they were overtaken and forced to encamp,
albeit on higher ground, but over seven kilometres short of their intended destination (1.64–
5). Both Caesar and his opponents then departed from their positions to head for some
strategic ground nearby, which Caesar reached first, bringing the Pompeians’ march to a halt
(1.66–70). As the latter were still having trouble foraging in this new position they debated
marching to Tarraco around 100 km away (1.70), but they finally decided to return to Ilerda,
still over 30 km away.280 Caesar harassed them heavily as they marched, eventually forcing
the Pompeians to encamp in a position where they could not forage nor find water, and where
they eventually surrendered (1.80–4). From this, it is clear again that an army in withdrawal
might have had to move significant distances, and do so quickly. To do so the men would
have needed to move in a column. The relationship between withdrawals and shortage of
essential supplies is also made abundantly clear in the case of Ilerda, as the Pompeians were
willing to withdraw and march their armies as far as necessary to secure a position from
which they could forage and fight effectively. A short retreat from battle would not have
served their purposes.
Evidently, an army might have withdrawn more than once to find safety. After their defeat at
the Battle of Carrhae, 53 BC, the Romans were not safe in their camp and so they withdrew
by night to the nearby town of Carrhae (Plut. Crass. 27.5–6), a number of kilometres away.281
They were not even safe there, and so the bulk of the remaining Romans withdrew again
towards Armenia, although they did not do so successfully (Crass. 29–31). Over a century
later, in AD 66, Cestius Gallus launched an ill–prepared attack against Jerusalem in an
279 See App. B. As Roman armies typically remained in camps whenever they were static (Goldsworthy, 1996, 113), and a general might have withdrawn his army from a camp to march elsewhere for many reasons, it is no surprise that there are so many references to armies moving e castra/castris or ex castra/castris (the PHI Latin Database records hundreds of such). 280 Caes. BCiv. 1.78. On the distances see Carter, 1991, 193, 206. 281 Note that it took a small, fast group of 300 cavalrymen several hours to reach Carrhae from the battlefield (Plut. Crass. 27.2, 5–6).
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attempt to rapidly extinguish a Jewish rebellion, but supply shortages forced him to withdraw
first to a camp at Gabao, and then several kilometres further towards Beth–Horon, all the
while suffering heavy casualties.282 The Romans were not even secure in Beth–Horon, and so
they withdrew again by night to Syria, leaving behind a rearguard and their baggage (2.551–
4). Withdrawals, therefore, were utilised as many times as needed, and toward a variety of
destinations, for an army to reach safety.
Was it always absolutely necessary for a Roman army to withdraw towards high ground or a
fortified position? Appian (Hisp. 81–2) for example describes the retreat of a Roman army,
commanded by Aemilius Lepidus Porcina and Junius Brutus Callaicus, from Pallantia in
northern Spain in 136 BC. It became necessary for the army to withdraw from its siege of
Pallantia due to supply shortages, but the withdrawal was ordered suddenly and performed in
a disorderly manner (82). Seeing an opportunity, the Pallantines harassed the Romans on the
march and inflicted significant casualties until nightfall, when the Roman army became
halted out of sheer exhaustion, and the Pallantines retreated (82). Although there is no
indication here of the Romans’ destination, since the Pallantians were little threat to the army
in a direct engagement, the Romans only needed to go somewhere that remedied their supply
situation. In a scenario in which a Roman army did not fear the attack of an enemy, but only
suffered from supply problems, it will not have been necessary to seek out a strongly
defensive position, only to find a place where the army could replenish its supplies. It is thus
a striking difference between retreats and withdrawals that, while retreats had to be carried
out towards a specific place of refuge due to the proximity of the enemy, withdrawals could
have vaguer destinations, depending on the level of threat posed by the enemy and the
general's intentions.
Summary of Part C
There are several criteria that distinguish withdrawals from retreats. The first was that
withdrawals occurred over longer distances, necessitating a march in a column of some kind
rather than in an unwieldy battleline. A withdrawal also did not necessarily require as specific
a destination as a short retreat from the battlefield, although sometimes they did. An army
could also withdraw repeatedly over a variety of distances to various locations in order to
282 Joseph. BJ 2.544–50; Gichon, 1981, 57–9, 62.
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reach a satisfactory place of safety. Finally, withdrawals did not always follow battles, but
could occur for a wider variety of reasons beyond defeat in battle, such as supply shortage. A
withdrawal might follow a retreat, or take the place of one, if an army was unsafe, or
logistically or strategically handicapped, in an initial place of refuge.
Conclusion
An army might have retreated from the battlefield for a variety of reasons, defeat in battle
being the most common.283 Armies would also, in general, disengage if night fell during a
battle, if an engagement was indecisive, or if the weather were particularly poor, but these
were not particularly common scenarios. Armies could also simulate flight or a disorganised
retreat to lure their enemies into an ambush or surprise counterattack, but the time and space
required to reorganise an army after implementing such a tactic meant that this would be
difficult for infantry to do safely. Such practices were easier for cavalry than infantry, and
were not particularly favoured by the Romans. Also, retreats as a result of defeat in battle
could be either deliberate or involuntary, for the purposes of avoiding further fighting or
enabling re–engagement in a more favourable location.
In terms of where an army could retreat to, Gilliver is correct in her statement that an army in
retreat could move towards a camp, high ground or a city, but she has not fully explained that
these places did not necessarily hold equal defensive value, depending on the situation. The
general rule, at least for the Romans, was that an army defeated in battle would retreat to a
fortified camp or failing that to a nearby steep hill, and finally if such places were not
accessible, then an army might have tried to make its way to the closest defended
habitation.284 In choosing the location to which an army would move, the commander will
have also had to balance its defensibility with its accessibility. The proximity of a position
was obviously always an important factor, but an army retreating in order to re–initiate battle
in a more favourable position would have been best served by retreating onto higher ground
where it could maintain its battleline, rather than retire behind fortifications (Caes. BCiv.
1.45), yet an army wishing to avoid further fighting would seek the safety of fortifications
283 Gilliver, 2007, 134. 284 Cf. Gilliver, 2007, 134. There is no immediately apparent reason that Hellenistic or Carthaginian commanders, who also regularly built fortified camps near their chosen battlefields, should not also have followed this general rule.
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first and foremost (BAfr. 85). Several factors, including the tactical situation, the proximity of
different types of refuge, and the intentions of the retreating forces, thus determined the
destination.
A withdrawal had some different characteristics to a retreat due to the increased speed and
distance that the army moved as well as its formation, generally in a column (agmen) rather
than in a formed battleline (acies). In both retreat and withdrawal, an army would move
towards the closest defensible position, but if the initial position could not provide long–term
safety, an army would aim to withdraw to another defensible position, even if this was a
significant distance away. Tactically, while an army would usually retreat due to defeat in
battle, the reasons for an army to withdraw were more varied, with logistical shortage being
particularly common. This would force an army to prioritise a location with ample supply
rather than one that was simply the most defensible. However in the broadest sense, retreats
and withdrawals were variants of the same thing: a retrograde movement by an army in order
to improve its tactical or strategic situation, or to prevent a worse one from occurring. The
context of the retrograde movement, and the distance that it was necessary to retire, would
determine its character.
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But the men of the Ninth Legion, carried away by zeal in their desire to repair the loss
received, rashly pursuing the flying foe too far, get into unfavourable ground and approach
close under the hill on which the town of Ilerda was situated. When our men wished to retreat
from this position, the enemy in turn kept pressing them hard from the higher ground.
(Caes. BCiv. 1.45)
Chapter Two
The Impact of Pursuit on Retreating or Withdrawing
Forces
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Introduction
At the Battle of Ilerda in 49 BC, Gaius Julius Caesar clashed with a Pompeian army near the
eponymous town, which was well–fortified and situated on a steep hill (Caes. BCiv. 1.43–5).
Caesar’s men attacked and pushed forward up this hill, where their enemies stopped and
fought, so that the Caesarian soldiers found themselves fighting in a disadvantageous position
from which they could not safely retreat, as the enemy pressed forward aggressively when the
Caesarians attempted to do so (BCiv. 1.45). Why exactly were Caesar’s men unable to retreat
from this position, and what were the potential ramifications of retreat against such an
aggressive enemy?
The emphasis of the preceding chapter was on when and to where armies ideally retreated or
withdrew, but how did the behaviour of the opposing army shape the tactics, and chances of
success, of a retrograde movement? If it was logical for one army to need to retire, it would
surely be just as logical for its opponents to take advantage if possible. It is, therefore,
necessary to consider how enemy action could interfere with the conduct of retrograde
movements in order to develop a complete understanding of these manoeuvres.
In this chapter the reactions of armies when their enemies retreated or withdrew will be
examined, in particular any pursuit, since enemy action necessarily had an impact on the
success or failure of retreats. Firstly, different types of pursuit will be examined, in order to
establish what usually happened when one side retreated. I will then explain how pursuit
could turn an orderly retreat into a disorderly flight in differing circumstances, including
short retreats from battle toward a place of refuge, and longer withdrawals when immediate
refuge was unavailable. Finally, I will assess the reasons that one army might have decided
against pursuing another. I will then conclude by summarising what usually occurred in the
case of a retreat or withdrawal, and the burdens this placed upon the retiring army.
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Types of Pursuits
Pursuits occurred commonly, as displayed by the number of retrograde movements that failed
under enemy pressure.285 There were a variety of scenarios in which a victorious army, or
one in a position of advantage, could pursue its enemy. The most common scenario, in which
an army retreated directly from battle, would give the victors a clear opportunity to follow up
their success.286 Appian (BCiv. 4.128) depicts this in the Second Battle of Philippi, 42 BC. In
this scenario, the army of Brutus engaged with that of the Caesarians Octavian and Antonius,
and, after a hard–fought struggle, the former was pushed back (τὴν φάλαγγα τῶν ἐχθρῶν
ἐκίνουν). At first they retreated in an orderly manner (τὸ ὀπίσω βάδην ἔτι καὶ μετὰ
φρονήματος), but they were pursued by the Caesarians until the three lines of their triplex
acies became too compressed for order to be maintained, and under further pressure from the
Caesarians, they broke and fled (ἔφευγον), following which the Caesarians advanced even
to the gates of their camp. So, a retreating Roman army, even if it maintained good order,
might still be effectively pursued. The genuine importance of order in maintaining a
successful retreat will be touched on later, but suffice to say that it was not of itself proof
against pursuit.
Even if an army retreated successfully to a fortified camp, the actions of pursuers might still
have had an impact. At the Battle of Pharsalus, 48 BC, after the Pompeians had been routed
from the line of battle, they fled into their well–guarded camp (Caes. BCiv. 3.94), but
Caesar’s men attacked the camp, and, despite significant resistance by the camp’s defenders,
they drove the Pompeians from their ramparts and out of the camp entirely, forcing them to
retire again to some nearby hills (BCiv. 3.95). During the Battle of the Nile in 47 BC,
Caesar’s forces attacked the heavily fortified camp of Ptolemy XIII, were able to capture the
ramparts and begin killing those inside, causing such panic that large numbers of the enemy
threw themselves to their deaths from the rampart while others drowned in the Nile, including
Ptolemy himself (BAlex. 31). There are many other examples of camps being stormed by
excited victors.287 In essence, although armies commonly retreated into camps after a defeat,
285 See App. A. 286 Livy (10.36.3) even notes in instance in which two armies were afraid to retreat for fear that the enemy would advance. 287 Polyb. 5.73, 14.4–6; Caes. BCiv. 3.67, 95; BAlex. 76; Sall. Jug. 99; Livy 24.16, 25.14, 39, 31.41, 33.15,
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it was also not uncommon for armies to be forced to withdraw from camps as a result of
continuing enemy action.288
So, not only was an army also vulnerable to attack while retreating from the field and to its
camp, as was an army that halted its retreat at the walls of its camp, where it could be trapped
there and destroyed, but any army might find no refuge even inside its camp.289 In addition, a
retreat into or withdrawal out of walled settlements in the presence of the enemy might have
led to further difficulties. For example, after the defeat of the Demetrius at the Battle of Gaza,
312 BC, his army became stuck attempting to enter the city and in the confusion, the
victorious Ptolemiac troops were able to get into the city and take possession of it (Diod. Sic.
19.84–6–8). Two usual methods of seeking safety after a defeat in battle, retreat to a fortified
camp or town, could thus be disrupted by determined pursuers during every stage of the
necessary manoeuvres.
In the case that an army that was forced to withdraw out of a town or city due to an enemy
attack or siege, they will have had to contend with the attackers or besiegers.290 Caesar’s
account (BCiv. 1.25–8) of Pompey’s withdrawal from the port city of Brundisium in 49 BC
highlights several methods that a besieger could use to prevent easy withdrawal from a town
or city. To deny escape by sea, Caesar constructed piers and dams to narrow the waterway,
and placed rafts fastened by anchors as obstacles where the water was deeper, and
constructed causeways from which withdrawing ships could be attacked (1.25). Caesar also
surrounded the landward side of the city, where legionaries with siege ladders were ready to
enter the city if an attempt to withdraw by sea was undertaken (1.28). The construction of
extensive trench–works, ladders and siege towers was standard Roman conduct in a siege and
the Romans could build siege–works of huge scale when necessary.291 It will, therefore, have
been no easy matter to escape from such a situation. In the event, Pompey did escape, but
through equally elaborate preparations. He constructed fighting ships to deal with the
37.43, 38.22–3, 40.31; App. Mith. 44, 50. 288 Eg. Caes. BGall. 2.10–1, BCiv. 1.61–4, 2.43; BAlex. 31; BHisp. 6; Livy 22.16–7, 28.15.12–16.8, 36.46.7. Some of the reasons armies might have done such a thing have been touched on in Chapter One (77–8). 289 Vulnerable: Pol 14.4–6; Livy 25.39. Trapped and destroyed: App. Mith. 44. 290 At Cenabum in 52 BC, when the town’s Gallic defenders attempted to slip out at night to avoid Caesar, but were detected by the Romans, who then stormed the town and overtook the Gauls trying to escape (BGall. 7.11.6). Also see Caes, BCiv. 1.25–8; Sall Jug 76.1; Plut. Luc. 19. 291 Levithan, 2013, 6. Also see Caes. BGall. 7.68–9; BCiv. 3.42–5; Joseph. BJ 7.9.
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maritime fortifications, and on the land he built an array of obstacles and fortifications to
delay pursuers, after which he embarked his army in two stages, the bulk initially and in
silence and the rest quickly by night so that there was little time for Caesar’s men to react
(27–8). Pompey was able to do all of this with twenty cohorts, perhaps just enough men to
provide the necessary labour but not so many that the army was too unwieldy in the act of
escape. The efforts of Pompey to escape emphasises the fact that withdrawal out of a town or
city could be immensely difficult, if the enemy was engaged in preventing it.
If an army could not defend itself in a town or city, did not have the resources or ingenuity to
engineer an escape, and could not fight their way out, their situation could be desperate. In 72
BC, during Lucullus’ campaigns against Pontus, the Romans laid siege to Amisus and made a
surprise attack while the defenders were changing the guard on the ramparts (Plut. Luc. 19.1–
4). The defenders escaped only by setting fire to the city. More disastrously, in 108 BC when
Metellus Numidicius laid siege to a Numidian fortress at Thala, the Numidian king slipped
out of the city by night but the men of the garrison were unable to do the same, and so they
chose to retreat to their citadel and set it aflame, with themselves and much booty still inside
(Sall. Jug. 75–7). It is clear then that attacks on an army inside defended fortifications, and
pursuit if the enemy attempted to withdraw from their position, could make escape all but
impossible, or only achievable with drastic measures.
An army that did escape from a camp, town or city, given its need for speed, would form a
marching column (agmen) rather than move in a slow and unwieldy battleline (acies).292 One
advantage of withdrawing over open ground is that the marching army had enough space to
move in an orderly but rapid manner, but pursuers, particularly cavalry, will also have had
freedom of movement.293 During the Carthaginian withdrawal following their defeat at the
Battle of Ilipa, 206 BC, Hasdrubal Gisco decided to retire from the relative safety of his camp
to avoid being besieged and destroyed (Livy 28.15.12–6). The Carthaginians managed to slip
away during the night and moved as quickly as they could, but they were delayed by
harassment from Scipio’s cavalry, enabling the Romans to overtake them the next day, and
who proceeded to destroy the haggard and disordered Carthaginians.294 The impact of the
292 Eg. Caes. BCiv. 1.64, 79–80; Livy 28.15.16–16.3. 293 Diod. Sic. 19.84.6. Also see Gilliver, 2007, 138; Sabin, 2007, 413. 294 Livy 28.16.3–6. Livy expresses a tone of disapproval for Hasdrubal allowing his army to become disordered, so that it could not defend itself effectively when the legions arrived. This is probably the only place to
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Roman cavalry pursuit stands out in this episode.295 Cavalry played an important role too in
one of Rome’s greatest ever defeats, the Battle of Carrhae in 53 BC. The disaster featured
two withdrawals after the battle itself in which the slow Roman infantry took enormous
casualties from pursuing Parthian cavalry.296 An army withdrawing over long distance was
thus highly vulnerable to pursuit, most especially from cavalry.
The importance of cavalry in pursuing a withdrawing enemy cannot be overemphasised. At
the Battle of Ilorca in 211 BC, the Romans were attempting to withdraw away from
victorious Carthaginian forces (Livy 25.34–5) but were unable to disengage from pursuing
cavalry (25.35.8–9). As the Romans were heavily delayed, by the time night fell they had not
gone far and were forced to halt in a weak defensive position (25.36.1–4). They attempted to
fortify and defend this position but were totally overrun (25.36.5–13). Leading up to this
event, the Romans were intent on retiring they were unable to do so due to the delay caused
by enemy pursuit. Similarly at Ilerda in 49 BC, when the Pompeian forces were withdrawing
they were so delayed and even disrupted by pursuing Caesarian cavalry that they were forced
to encamp in a sub–optimal position far from water supplies, which at length forced them to
surrender (Caes. BCiv. 1.81–5). In this second case, persistent attacks by cavalry during a
withdrawal threw a powerful army into serious disorder, even in the face of serious attempts
to counter the pursuing cavalry (BCiv.1.79.5–80.1). As such, it was not always possible for an
army to improve their tactical situation when withdrawing, whether by re–establishing a
fighting line, taking a strong defensive position or escaping their enemy entirely, if they could
not escape pursuers, and cavalry were particularly proficient at delaying and disrupting a
withdrawing army.
realistically find fault. On the other hand, having been defeated heavily in a major battle, and then suffered a number of desertions, there is no reason why offering battle to the Romans all over again, once the latter caught up, would have helped the Carthaginians in any way. Speed was therefore of the essence. 295 Scipio had a cavalry advantage, probably because he had defeated the Carthaginian cavalry during the main battle (Polyb. 11.21; Livy 28.13.6–10). Many of the cavalry may have deserted in the immediate aftermath of the defeat, however (Livy 28.15.14–5), which may explain the difficulty the Carthaginians subsequently had in covering their withdrawal against Scipio's cavalry and skirmishers. Cavalry pursuit also prevented the successful withdrawal of experienced Roman forces at Ilerda (Caes. BCiv. 1.79–80). 296 Plut. Crass. 28.1–2, 31.7. These withdrawals will be examined in detail in Chapter Six.
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These considerations would have weighed on a commander who was trying to decide
whether or not to abandon a fortified position. Caesar (BGall. 5.26–38) described a disaster
near Atuatuca in 54 BC, in which two of his legates, Sabinus and Cotta, had to make just
such a choice. At the beginning of Caesar’s account, the Romans were physically safe in a
well–fortified camp, but a secretly rebellious chieftain, Ambiorix, came to the Roman camp
in friendship and insidiously explained that they would be besieged and destroyed by
Germans if they remained there, with the intention that he would ambush them after they left
the fort (BGall. 5.27). Caesar describes a debate between the two legati and other officers on
whether they should take the advice of a Gaul and make a forced march from their hiberna,
or if they should remain behind the walls (28–31). Sabinus argued that to remain would risk
besiegement by superior forces, in which situation he thought that the army would perish
either by hunger or the sword (5.29), while Cotta and other officers countered that the
hiberna was proof against enemy attack and they held extensive food supplies, so that
remaining in place would be safer than risking attack in the open. Sabinus prevailed, and
Caesar relates that the army put his plan into action with the foreshadowing phrase,
longissimo agmine maximisque impedimentis (5.31). Events proved Sabinus fatally wrong,
unfortunately for the entire Roman force (5.32–7). Caesar thus provides arguments for and
against remaining in a camp and suffering siege, and forced march in the open.297 According
to Caesar, it was safer for an army to remain behind fortifications and risk starvation than to
march into a certain ambush. Such was the danger conceived by Caesar in being attacked
while on the march.
There are several examples of Roman columns in withdrawal suffering major defeats when
caught on unfavourable ground. The Romans allegedly lost 20,000 men in a Boian ambush in
216 BC.298 The famous clades Variana AD 9 saw a comparable number of Romans perish as
they attempted to march out of hostile territory in Germany (Vell. Pat. 2.117.1). And in AD
66, in a defile near the Judean town of Beth–Horon, a withdrawing Roman army was all but
destroyed by lightly–equipped Jewish rebels (Joseph. BJ 2.540–555). As such, an army
297 Caesar’s personal view on the best course of action can be identified with Cotta’s, as demonstrated by the fact that the latter is supported by the senior centurions (primisque ordinibus) in making his argument (Caes. BGall. 5.30). Note that a fragment of the army was able to make their way back to the camp, where despite their small numbers they were able to defend it from initial attacks (5.37). 298 Polyb. 3.118. This episode may not classify as a withdrawal, as Postumius was campaigning aggressively (cf. Livy 23.24.6–13; Front. Strat. 1.6.4) but the Roman formation was the same as if they were withdrawing: they were certainly not expecting to be attacked whilst in agmine.
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forced to withdraw over a long distance was highly vulnerable to a prepared enemy. For this
reason, armies sometimes attempted to move at night, when they were harder to detect and
potential pursuers caught unawares without time to follow.299 However, as seen in the case of
Ilipa (Livy 28.15.12–6), retiring by night did not guarantee escape, for night operations could
cause serious disorder among the withdrawing forces.300 The confusion of night operations,
evident in Sallust’s Romano-Numidian battle account (Jug. 97–8), will have been amplified
when armies were carrying out extended withdrawals. While there were numerous other
stratagems a general could attempt to deceive the enemy and allow a safe retreat or
withdrawal, nothing was necessarily proof against a vigilant enemy (Caes. BCiv. 1.65–6). It is
no wonder then that, in 54 BC, when rebellion flared up throughout Gaul and Caesar’s
hibernae were besieged by superior enemy forces, Caesar preferred that his legati stay put.301
Pursuit could thus take the form of an infantry advance, a cavalry attack, or a combination of
the two. An army in a losing engagement may have had no chance but to retreat, but as
shown, in doing so they became vulnerable at all stages of their retreat, particularly when
entering or leaving a fortified position. An army that has previously won an engagement
could wreak havoc on withdrawing enemies, for in open ground cavalry became a potent
weapon of pursuit, capable of causing harm in their own right and, even more decisively,
slowing a withdrawing army enough that the main body of the victorious army could arrive
and attack.
How Pursuit Could Cause Disorder
As observed, victors could and did attack retreating or withdrawing forces in a variety of
scenarios. A number of examples demonstrate that a particularly successful pursuit could
cause an orderly retrograde movement to disintegrate, such as occurred at Philippi in 42
BC.302 If an orderly retreat or withdrawal broke down, the only alternative was a disorderly
retreat or even flight, which were quite similar in practice (App. Hisp. 82). In the following
discussion, I will explore in greater detail how pursuit could cause an otherwise–orderly
299 Cf. Ch 1, 54–5. 300Also see Caes. BCiv. 1.67.4; Plut. Crass. 28.1–2. 301 The case of Sabinus and Cotta has been mentioned above. During the same uprising, when the legates (Quintus) Cicero and Titus Labienus faced with similar choices, they remained in their camps and successfully defended them (Caes. BGall. 5.40, 51–2, 57). 302 App. B Civ. 4.128. Cf. App. A.
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retrograde movement to break down into panic and flight, focusing mainly on retreats from
battle, where most routs occurred.303
The first matter to consider is what caused an army to physically recoil from its enemy in
battle. Caesar emphasised the importance of impetus, particularly the vis exerted by attacking
troops and also the ability of the 'receiving' troops to resist (sustinere or ferre) this force, or
pressure, in determining the outcome of an infantry battle.304 Sabin notes that armies could
‘push one another back over significant distances’ during battle,305 but it is unclear from the
sources whether the pushing or pressure applied was always physical, or metaphorical (that
is, psychological).306 It is, therefore, worth considering both the physical and psychological
impact of attack and pursuit on retreating soldiers. Caesar conceived pressure as a result of
physical forces, including missiles and the weight of superior numbers.307 To add to this
however, Sabin’s influential model of ancient battle argues that soldiers in combat
occasionally needed to establish a ‘safety distance’ to physically and psychologically recover
between bouts of intense fighting.308 It is in this context that the concept of ‘pressure’ makes
the most sense. As retreating troops will have been tired from previous fighting, and probably
demoralised (Xen. Anab. 6.5.15–17), they needed to be able to establish this safety distance
and yet attacks by an emboldened enemy could strip them of such, inflicting on them
increasing psychological and physical strain.
303 Cf. App. A. 304 Throughout this thesis, the phrase ‘pressure’ has been used repeatedly to describe the force of attacks on retreating retreats. It is a convenient phrase, utilised to translate the physical metaphors of weight and pressing that are commonly used by ancient authors to describe combat, particularly by Greek authors (Lendon, 1999, 281, 285–6, 289–90. Eg: Polyb. 11.24, 18.24; Livy 33.15). Latin tradition: Lendon, 1999, 285–6, 295–6, 316, 325–6. Balance between force and resistance: Lendon, 286–7. Caesar also emphasises other factors that would affect the vitality of combatants, such as wounds and exhaustion, which reduced the vis of combatants (Lendon, 287). 305 Sabin, 2000, 6. 306 Lendon, 1999, 281, 285. 307 Ibid., 286–7. Missile weapons: See Zhmodikov, 2000, cf. Slavik, 2018. Missile weapons exerted vis according to Caesar (Lendon, 1999, 286, cf. Caes. BGall. 5.43, BCiv. 2.6; BAlex. 20). 308‘Safety distance’ is a concept emphasised by Philip Sabin, who has persuasively argued that fighting in many battles of this period was more intermittent and took longer than had previously been supposed (Sabin, 2000, 14–5). Sabin argues that safety distance was a physical space that combatants needed to maintain between themselves and the enemy during stages of battle, in order to physically rest and psychologically recover from the stress of the fighting (Sabin, 14–6). Sabin also argues that the effectiveness of flank and rear attacks may have been partly due to the fact that the victims were crowded together, depriving combatants of this safety distance (16). This idea can be applied to the fighting retreat, in that combatants who must have been already demoralised by the events that had led to the need for them to retreat, not to mention the manoeuvre itself, continued to be attacked and prevented from establishing their safety distance when it was needed most.
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On the other hand, Thorne suggests that the pressure in battle accounts is figurative, or at
least psychological.309 The ‘face–of–battle’ approach has shown that psychology was central
in determining whether soldiers fled in battle.310 Goldsworthy, a leading face–of–battle
proponent, has observed that at a critical stage of battle, combatants are held in a tenuous
balance between advance and flight.311 Any sudden shock, such as the death of a general or a
flanking attack, could easily alter this balance and trigger a general flight.312 An army might
also have fled due to a gradual build–up of stressors, such as its suffering heavy casualties
and from exhaustion.313 Both modern and ancient evidence show that the flight of even a
handful of men could trigger a rout.314 Ancient writers, particularly Xenophon and Caesar,
repeatedly emphasise the importance of courage and confidence in determining whether or
not a rout would occur.315 It thus appears to have been a general rule of human psychology in
battle conditions that routs could occur easily and spread quickly. The psychological aspect is
thus central to explaining why a losing army would attempt to physically separate itself from
the enemy.
309 Thorne, 2007, 220. 310 Psychology is fundamental to the ‘face–of–battle’ approach, which argues that fear of the opponent’s weapons was the basic concern of soldiers in battle (Keegan 1976, 70, 100, 303; cf. Kagan, 2006, 15). This combatant–centric approach to explaining the results of battles has its critics (cf. Wheeler, 2001, 170–4; Lendon, 2004, 443, 447), but a fundamental argument of Keegan’s, that an army was in the end a mass of fearful individuals for whom the fear of death was a primary motivator, is an important one. According to A.B. Lloyd (1996, 194): ‘... we must not forget our common humanity with our ancient forebears. In many crises their psychological reactions were not particularly different from our own.’ 311 Goldsworthy, 1996, 280, 286. Also see Sabin, 1999, 13–4; 2007, 431. Certainly, ancient accounts of routs emphasise the suddenness with which armies could panic and flee (see App. C). Caesar observed this phenomenon on numerous occasions (see BGall. 6.8, 7.27–8, 51, BCiv. 2.34, 3.69; BAlex. 31). 312 According to Livy (10.29.1), for an army to lose their general was quae res terrori alias esse solet. Cf. Xen. Hell. 5.3.5–7; Livy 30.18.13; App. B Civ. 3.69. Also see Lee 1999 211; Sabin, 2007, 432. Even the perception of a disaster could have the same psychological effect as a real one (Livy 41.18; Plut. Pyrrh. 17). 313 Note the wavering of Caesar's right wing at the Sabis after it suffered heavy casualties (Caes. BGall. 2.25). In the Battle of Ilipa in 206 BC, Polybius (11.24) also emphasised the exhaustion of the Carthaginians. On the Battle of Zela in 47 BC, the author (BAlex. 76) also mentioned the heavy enemy casualties as they were pushed back. It is argued by Goldsworthy (1996, 224–7), however, that it was penetrating the enemy's fighting line rather than the accumulation of casualties that was key in triggering a rout, but it is easy to see how one could cause the other, whether in a pitched battle or a retreat. 314
Ancient evidence: Caes. BGall. 2.25, BCiv. 1.45; Joseph. BJ 5.2.5. Modern evidence: an American soldier present at the Battle of Camden, 1780, said of a sudden American rout: ‘The cause of [flight] I cannot tell, except that everyone I saw was about to do the same. It was instantaneous. There was no effort to rally, no encouragement to fight. Officers and men joined in the flight.’ (Garret Watts, quoted in Spring, 2008, 232). A study of American soldiers in action in 1944 has similarly shown that panic was highly contagious, so that the flight of even a single man could trigger a wider rout (Rush, 2001, 316). 315 Lendon, 1999, 290–5, 295–9, 301–3. Xenophon and Caesar agree on the irrationality of panic (Lendon, 295–7) and the importance of tactics in influencing morale (also see Kagan, 2006, 188–91), with Xenophon emphasising stratagems (Lendon, 293–4) while Caesar emphasises terrain (Lendon, 302–3).
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Armies in retreat will have been equally vulnerable to psychological shocks or accumulated
stress. Xenophon admits (Anab. 6.5.15–17) that retreat was inherently damaging to an army’s
morale, and so an army retreating from a defeat in battle would be actually more
psychologically vulnerable. Changes in the defeated army’s tactical situation, such as moving
over unfavourable ground or the closing of an intended escape route, could readily spark
panic.316 From the ‘face–of–battle’ view, the failure of retreats in these situations was due to
the fear that orderly retreat was no longer possible, and so men fled to avoid the weapons of
the enemy since their formations no longer appeared to offer sufficient protection. As soon as
even a few men believed that they were safer in flight than in formation and started to slip
away, others would follow and an orderly retreat would disintegrate into a rout.
To return to the physical aspect of the pressure experienced by a losing army, Koon has
argued that the gradual pushing back of lines, which Sabin believes to have occurred
naturally in ancient battles, was probably a result of the repeated re–establishment by
combatants of their ‘safety distance’.317 However, an army in retreat that was being heavily
pursued by emboldened enemies may not have been able to re–establish this ‘safety distance’
at any stage, and insufficient space to manoeuvre or some sort of physical disorder could
cause a withdrawal to become confused and turn into a rout.318 Battlefield manoeuvring was
difficult at the best of times, and this would be more difficult under the psychological strain
of defeat or imminent defeat, not to mention the need for physical self–defence against the
advancing enemy.319 During a retreat, the chances of a major psychological shock occurring,
such as the death of a senior officer, can only have increased if a safety distance could not be
established. Thus, by stopping beaten fighters from resting physically, pursuit also caused
psychological strain to build and increased the chances that the retreating army would suffer
some shock or fright that would spark a general rout.
316 At Mantinea (207 BC) when the mercenaries of Machanidas discovered their avenue of escape has been blocked, a rout ensued (Polyb. 11.17). The rout of the Spartans at Sellasia in 222 BC (Polyb. 2.68) was due to poor ground, but it was this poor ground that made their escape route untenable. Poor terrain, making escape difficult, also contributed to a rout of Macedonians in 198 BC (Livy 32.12). The rout of a Roman consular army c. 281 BC is described as being both due to locus iniquus and the attack of enemy reserves (Livy 6.24). 317 Koon, 2010, 85. 318 Livy 33.18; App. Syr. 6.35, BCiv. 4.128. Also note Polybius' criticism (2.33) of Flaminius' deployment with the back of his army to a river in 223 BC. Regarding this criticism by Polybius, cf. the discussion of 'safety distance' below (ref. Sabin, 2000, 14–6). 319 Goldsworthy, 1996, 25, 57, 176–77. Psychological strain: cf. Spring, 2008, 64–65.
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Considerations Against Pursuit
Considering the potential impact of pursuit on a retiring army, one could assume that a
victorious army would almost always pursue its enemy. However, there are numerous
examples of a defeated army retreating from the field with limited or even no pursuit by the
enemy.320 In the following discussion, examples in which victorious armies or generals chose
not to pursue will be analysed in order to draw out the reasons for doing so.
Chapter One has discussed several scenarios in which one or both armies retreated without
interference.321 On other occasions both armies might have retreated at the same time, or one
allowed another to retreat, as a precaution due to the looming advance of unknown forces
(Livy 25.19.3–4). At the Battle of Geronium, 217 BC, the Roman magister equitum,
Minucius (cos. 221), having advanced against Hannibal Barca, found himself the victim of a
Carthaginian ambush:
... the Roman light infantry were forced off the field by the numbers of the
Carthaginian horse, and, falling back on the legions, threw them into confusion, while
at the same time, on the signal being given to those [Carthaginian forces] lying in
ambush, they appeared from all directions and attacked, upon which not only the
Roman light infantry but their whole army found itself in a most perilous position. It
was now that Fabius, seeing the state of matters and seriously fearing a total disaster,
came up in haste with his own army to assist. On his approach the Romans again
plucked up courage, although they had now entirely broken their ranks, and collecting
round the standards retreated and took refuge under cover of Fabius' force after losing
many of their light–armed troops, but still more of the legionaries and the very best
men among them. Hannibal, being afraid of the legions, which, quite fresh and in
admirable order, had come to the help of their comrades, abandoned the pursuit and
brought the battle to a close.322
320 Xen. Anab. 6.5.25–32; Hell. 6.5.13–4, 7.5.24–5; Polyb. 3.74, 84; Caes. BGall. 7.51, BCiv. 1.44, 6; Sall. Jug. 103; Livy 25.37, 26.10–1, 27.49. 321 To recall, in the case of an indecisive battle, both armies might have disengaged without further fighting. Nightfall could not only break up an ongoing battle, but the darkness could prevent pursuit (Ch 1, 54–5). Particularly harsh weather could have a similar effect (Ch. 1, 54–5). 322 Polyb. 3.105.3–7. Trans. H. J. Edwards, 1922–7.
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In this case, there is a commonality in the reason for Minucius’ retreat and Hannibal’s
restraint of pursuit. That is, the Romans retreated because they were thrown into disorder, and
Hannibal refused to pursue because he saw that the reinforcing Romans were in good order. It
appears that Hannibal pressed the attack keenly while the Romans appeared confused, but
once he was faced with regular and orderly formations, he decided to desist from further
fighting. Polybius (3.105.8) relates the opinion that, had Fabius not arrived, the Romans
would have suffered a ‘total disaster’. As such, the opportunity for pursuit was presented by
the disorder of Minucius’ army, but the opportunity closed due to the Romans’ reinforcement
with ordered formations. Hannibal made the decision not to pursue because he feared that the
Roman reinforcements might counterattack if a pursuit was made.323 This decision had real
grounding, for there are various examples of pursuits ending badly for the attackers.324 A
fundamental risk of pursuit was that if pursuers became disordered the enemy could possibly
counterattack, and, therefore, some victorious generals deliberately restrained pursuit by their
excited soldiers.325 The presence of reserves was thus a key factor in a general’s decision to
avoid further fighting and allow a retreat, as occurred at Geronium.
Now consider again Livy’s description of the indecisive battle between Hannibal and the
Roman consuls of 212 BC, in which both armies retreated from fear of an unidentified army
appearing on the horizon.326 As the heavy infantry had yet to engage, there was nothing that
had thrown either side into disorder, and since there was nothing that indicated that one side
was victorious over the other, there was little physical opportunity or psychological
motivation for pursuit. In other words, in this case the presence of order among the retreating
enemy (or the absence of disorder) provided no opportunity for pursuit, and the threat (if not
the reality) of enemy reserves again proved an important factor in preventing interference
with the enemy retreat.
Consider again part of Caesar’s account (BCiv. 1.46) of his organised retreat at Battle of
Ilerda, 49 BC, after his forces had found themselves fighting on an uphill slope from which
they could not retreat safely:
323 Onas. Strat. 22.3. Also see Caes. BGall. 1.24.6. 324 Xen. Hell. 3.5.19–20, 4.2.22–3, 5.3.5; Caes. BGall. 8.12, BCiv. 3.46; App. Hisp. 58, Mith. 85. 325 Polyb. 10.31; Livy 25.37.13–5. Onasander (Strat.. 27) points out the dangers of disorder in pursuit. 326 Livy 29.19.4–5. Cf. Ch 1, 49–51.
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When they had fought in this way continuously for five hours, and our men were
being grievously harassed by superior numbers, having spent all their missiles, they
draw their swords and, breasting the hill, charge the cohorts, and after laying a few
low, they force the rest to retreat (reliquos sese convertere cogunt). When the cohorts
were thus pushed close up to the wall, and to some extent driven by terror to enter the
town, an easy withdrawal was allowed our men (facilis est nostris receptus datus).
Our cavalry, however, on each flank, though it had been stationed on low–lying
ground at the foot of the cliff, yet forces its way with the utmost valour to the ridge,
and, riding between the two lines of battle, allows our men a more convenient and
safer withdrawal (commodiorem ac tutiorem nostris receptum dat).327
In this case, the Pompeians did not pursue Caesar’s men from the slope in front of Ilerda even
though they themselves held the advantage of high ground. Evidently, they were
psychologically cowed (propter terrorem) by Caesar’s charge, and probably by the
exhaustion of a long struggle (pugnatum continenter horis quinque). Caesar’s cavalry also
loomed and so threatened any would–be pursuers. Thus, pursuit was prevented by both
psychological and tactical factors, especially the previous repulse suffered by the Pompeian
infantry, and the presence of Caesar’s cavalry, who were fresh reserves capable of
counterattacking any pursuers.
Other than fear of orderly formations and of the introduction of reserves, there were other
reasons why an army might have declined to pursue a retreating enemy. As noted, high
ground gave a physical and psychological advantage to a retreating force, and it was
physically difficult and even perilous for pursuers to attack uphill. As a result, a number of
victorious generals either did not pursue a defeated enemy uphill, or failed to do so
successfully.328 A defended camp might also have deterred pursuit.329 Thus, if a defeated
army was very close to its place of refuge, the victors perhaps refrained from pursuit, so as
not to risk casualties by engaging a retreating enemy close to a strong defensive position.
327 Trans. A. G. Peskett, 1914. 328 Eg. BAlex. 40, 74–6; Sall. Jug. 98; Plut. Aem. 20.5–10. Also see Xen. Anab. 4.8.10–4, 6.5.12–20, Hell. 3.5.19–20, 5.4.42–5; Polyb. 11.22, 18.22, 25; Caes. BGall. 2.23, 5.35, 6.40, 7.51, BCiv. 1.44–5, BAlex. 40; Livy 5.38, 27.18, 28.2, 32.12, 38.21, 39.31; Sall. Jug. 50–1. 329 Cf. Ch. 1, 62–72.
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At Trebia (Pol 3.74) and Trasimene (Polyb. 3.84), large numbers of Romans managed to
retreat and then withdraw unmolested because they had broken through the enemy battleline
and were no longer directly opposed by a large body of troops. In the retreat of the
argyraspides at Gabiene, as they had already routed their opposing phalanx and a formed
phalanx, they had little to fear from cavalry.330 At the Battle of Metaurus, 207 BC, the
victorious Marcus Livius Salinator chose to let some Carthaginian troops escape (Livy
27.49), allegedly because his men were exhausted, and he wished the broken enemy to spread
news of their defeat. Such examples show that the decision not to pursue might arise from
one or more reasons, or in the case of Trebia, that a victorious army may not be presented
with a clear opportunity for pursuit.
For all of these reasons against pursuit of a retreating enemy, it is hard to imagine that victors
in battle would easily remain passive and allow their enemies an easy escape. It is telling that
there are many examples of retreats and withdrawals beginning in an orderly fashion but then
breaking down into flights under enemy pressure.331 There were many reasons for pursuing a
retreating enemy, in particular to defeat them decisively.332 In addition, the sense of imminent
victory will have stimulated the victors, and the impact of this was sharpened by the fact that
retreat had a demoralising effect on those doing the retreating.333 Since confidence was often
more important for intimidating the enemy than actual strength, even an army that was
physically superior could invite attack by retreating.334 Caesar (BGall. 6.8.1), in describing
the motivations of the Gauls choosing to follow Labienus’ feigned retreat in 53 BC, states
330 Diod. Sic. 19.43.1–5. They were also experienced and elite troops (Bosworth, 2002, 138–40). 331 See App. A. 332 Firstly, there were material advantages to a decisive victory, for if more enemy combatants were killed, more plunder and trophies would be available for the victors (Harris, 1979, 103–4; Hoyos, 2007, 67; Eckstein, 2009, 85–9). The victors also achieved greater 'bragging rights' for participating in a more decisive victory (eg. Sall. Jug. 53. Also see Lendon, 2005, 185–91; McDonnell, 2006, 70–1). There may also have been a fear that a retreating army could escape to fight again another time (cf. Onas. Strat. 22.3: ‘ ... or anticipating some greater misfortune than they are about to suffer, soldiers regard the future with greater fear.’) Finally, a decisive victory would free soldiers from the rigors of campaigning. Presumably, the longer the campaign, and the more important other factors such the need of a soldier to return to farmland, (de Ligt, 2012, 172), the availability of otherwise of booty (De Ligt, 124) or attend other private affairs (cf. Japanese bushi: Friday, 2004, 119), the more intense this desire to 'get it over with' might have been. Probably for such reasons, it was not unheard of for Roman soldiers to pressure, or attempt to pressure, their commanders into fighting (Caes. BGall. 7.19, 7.47, 52, BCiv. 1.64, 71, 3.74; Livy 25.14, 37, 33.8, 44.36). 333 Bloodlust: Pol 18.26; Caesar BCiv. 31; Livy 25.37, 37.43). Sense of imminent victory: Xen. Hell. 6.2.20–3; Caes. BGall. 2.27, BHisp. 31; Livy 10.38, Livy 15.7, 28.15, 33.36, 35.5; App. Mith. 44). 334 Goldsworthy, 1996, 285–6. When Sabin (2007, 413, 6) states that an army in retreat was usually pursued, he may do so with some justification.
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that the Gauls would have felt themselves cowardly if they did not attack the retreating
Romans. Others in their position could easily have felt the same.
To summarise, victorious armies not uncommonly decided against pursuit for fear of
becoming disordered against an enemy that was still dangerous, or possessed fresh troops in
reserve, and thereby becoming vulnerable to counterattack. The enemy’s proximity to high
ground or a strong defensive position could also cause potential pursuers to reconsider an
attack. For all of the tactical reasons against pursuit, however, the desire to attack will have
remained strong. It was thus probably the natural reaction of most soldiers, and armies, to
pursue a retreating or withdrawing enemy.
Conclusion
There is plenty of evidence to suggest that if there was an opportunity for decisive victory
against a retiring army, a pursuit would be mounted. Pursuit might have taken the form of a
victorious battleline simply pressing forward, or a cavalry attack. A cavalry pursuit severely
delayed retreating forces and could throw them into serious disorder (Livy 28.16.3–5), even
forcing them to abort a withdrawal and halt in an unfavourable position (Caes. BCiv. 1.79–
81). Cavalry pursuit was thus an ideal method of countering a retreat or withdrawal.
In the case of retreat from battle, the continuing advance of a victorious battleline could
easily cause a total rout if any shock occurred among the retreating troops (Livy 30.18.13).
The morale of a retreating army will probably have been tenuous, and the movement itself
could be physically difficult when combined with fighting off advancing enemies, so that an
orderly retreat from battle could, and often did, break down into flight. Even if an army found
refuge in a camp or a walled settlement, it could be forced out of this location and need to
withdraw further. In this situation (or whenever an army retired over a long distance) the
army will have needed to adopt a columnar marching formation and will thus have been
further exposed to cavalry pursuit, which could cause delay and disorder and even allow
following heavy infantry to catch up and make a full–scale attack.335 An army in retreat or
withdrawal while under pursuit will not have been able to rest physically or mentally, and this
enemy pressure and increasing psychological strain could easily stimulate despair or panic.
335 Livy 28.16–1–7; Sabin, 2007, 413.
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Due to the difficulties in making a successful and orderly retreat from battle, Sabin argues
correctly that the general trend was for a defeated army to suffer disproportionate casualties
as it attempted to escape.336
The weight of examples suggests that more often than not, an army retreating directly from
defeat in battle will have been pursued in some way, but there are also numerous reasons that
victors may not have pursued a retreating enemy.337 Foremost among these reasons were the
appearance of order and strength among the retreating men, who thereby showed little
physical or psychological weakness for pursuers to capitalise on, the presence of hostile
reserves, and proximity to high ground or a fortified position. The essential fear for a
victorious general must have been that his forces would fall into disorder during pursuit,
potentially exposing the victors to a reversal of fortunes if there was some counterattack.
To summarise, an army in retreat or withdrawal will have needed to take some action to
prevent or counter enemy pursuit if it wanted to maximise its chances of successful
disengagement or escape. In particular, it was important to take action that preyed on the
victors’ fears of becoming disordered and suffering a counterattack. The tactics that the
Romans could use to achieve these things will be the subject of the following two chapters.
336 Sabin, 2007, 413, 416. 337 See App. A.
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Antonius covered not only his rear, but also both his flanks, with numerous javelineers and
slingers, led his army in the form of a hollow square, and gave orders to his horsemen to rout
the enemy when they attacked, but after routing them not to pursue them further.
(Plut. Ant. 42.1)
Chapter Three
Roman Retreat Tactics, Part I: Ratio and Combined Arms
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Introduction
In 36 BC, the imperator Marcus Antonius led an enormous army into Parthia to avenge the
crushing defeat of Marcus Licinius Crassus in 53 BC.338 The campaign went awry, and after
losing his baggage train and failing to force the Parthians into a decisive battle, Antonius was
forced to begin a long withdrawal back to Armenia (Plut. Ant. 38–40). During this withdrawal
the Romans were attacked by the Parthians, who harassed the Romans with massed archery
and threatened them with a defeat reminiscent of Crassus.339 Antonius made a number of
tactical responses, including organising his infantry into mobile squares, counterattacking
with cavalry, and supporting the soldiers with javelineers and slingers (Ant. 42.1). Were these
tactics typical of the Roman army in general, and were there other factors and techniques that
the Romans could rely upon to secure their retrograde manoeuvres?
The consequences of a failed retreat or withdrawal could be dire.340 An army would have
striven to avoid this scenario at all costs. However, I have argued that pursuit and attacks by
victorious armies often caused retrograde movements to fail, whether they were carried out
from battle, out of an encampment or city, or over a longer march. How then, did armies act
to prevent their retreats from failing in the face of an active enemy pursuit? In this chapter,
the training, tactics and junior leadership practices of the Republican Roman army will be
examined in the context of the conduct of retreats and withdrawals. Although there will be
more in–depth discussion of retreats than of withdrawals, the latter will be examined. This is
for the reason that the evidence for the tactics associated with retreats from battle is more
detailed, while withdrawals often took the form of marches, which are well understood. Also,
the focus of this chapter is on the mechanics of Roman retreat tactics rather than generalship.
The importance of the general will be touched upon in the opening discussion below,
particularly in relation to the commitment of reserves to support a retreat, but this will not be
explored in detail until the following chapter.
338 Syme, 2002, 263. 339 Plut. Ant. 41, cf. Plut. Crass. 24. 340 Sabin, 2007, 413.
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I will begin with a brief examination of two accounts of successful retreats, showing some of
their common factors. One major factor, the maintenance of order among the infantry, will
then be examined in detail, beginning with an explanation of what ‘order’ actually entailed.
Two other factors, the use of high ground and reserves, have been touched on already, but I
will expand further in the following discussion. Following the discussion of order, the
training and tactics of Roman armies, particularly of the milites that formed the bulk of the
legions, will be analysed in reference to the conduct of retreats and withdrawals, and the
maintenance of order. The manner in which legionary reserves were used to support a retreat
will be examined in detail here. Following this, the roles of subordinate officers in a retreat or
withdrawal will be analysed, beginning with the principales, centuriones, and then others
such as tribuni. Finally, the tactical roles of light infantry and cavalry will be considered to
give a full picture of the Roman army’s combined–arms approach to retrograde manoeuvres.
The roles of light infantry and cavalry as reserves in support of a retreat will also be
discussed here. The conclusion will summarise the characteristics of successful retreats and
withdrawals and give an outline of the methods and tactics that Roman forces could use to
retreat or withdraw successfully.
Factors of Success in Retreats and Withdrawals
When an army retreated from battle, pursuit could easily cause it to break down, but the
presence of nearby refuge, such as a camp, steep hill, or a town or city, could reduce the
chance of significant disorder. An enemy would be less likely to pursue retreating forces that
maintained order in their formations, and if the retreating army had maintained some reserve
force that could counter any pursuit.341 Were there other factors that generally contributed to
a successful retreat? I will consider two examples below in which retreating forces
successfully fought their way to safety in order to draw out these key factors.
First, an example from the Bellum Alexandrinum (40), which describes the Battle of
Nicopolis in 48 BC between the Caesarian army of Gnaeus Domitius Calvus and the Pontic
army of Pharnaces II. The majority of the Roman army was overwhelmed by the pike–armed
Pontic infantry and routed, leaving the more experienced Legio XXXVI (34) the only force
341 The importance of order has been touched upon previously, particularly in regard to the Roman retreats at Geronium, 217 BC (Polyb. 3.105.3–7) and Ilerda, 49 BC (Caes. BCiv. 1.46).
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remaining on the field:
Consequently the king's forces, victorious on their own right wing and in the
centre of the line, now turned upon the Thirty–Sixth legion. The latter,
nevertheless, bore up bravely under the victors' attack and, though surrounded
by large enemy forces, yet with consummate presence of mind formed a circle
and so made a fighting withdrawal to the foothills, where Pharnaces was loth to
pursue it owing to the hilly nature of the ground. And so ... the Thirty–Sixth
legion retired to higher ground with losses not exceeding 250 men.342
As the author of the Bellum Alexandrinum reveals, the Legio XXXVI (unlike the rest of the
army), resisted the enemy attack (fortiter vincentium impetum sustinuit), changed formation
(in orbem), and conducted a fighting retreat to nearby high ground (pugnans ... se recepit ad
radices montium), which it reached safely.343 The Pontic king was reluctant to continue his
pursuit on ground where the Roman legion would have a tactical advantage (propter
iniquitatem loci), and so the battle ended.
Several features stand out in this account. Since the Roman legion fought in close order (in
orbem), the legion changed its formation while still fighting (impetum sustinuit), and then it
moved in a specific direction (ad radices montium),344 it was almost certainly working under
the coordination of an overall leader (probably Calvus) who (along with other leaders)
ensured that the legion moved gradually and in a controlled manner. As it was extremely
difficult for troops to manoeuvre in close formation on the battlefield, even if well–trained, to
be able to conduct this manoeuvre under enemy pressure the men of Legio XXXVI must have
had some relevant training.345 The use of terrain played a decisive role, as it was only when
the Romans reached higher ground that the victorious Pontic army was discouraged from
further pursuit.346 The maintenance of good order and clear direction toward a place of
342 Trans. A. G. Way, 1955. 343In orbem may also be taken to mean a 'square' formation (see Caes. BGall. 5.33). The phrase is used several times in the Caesarian corpus (Caes. BGall. 5.33; BAfr. 15), and it certainly refers to a formation in which the Romans were defending themselves on all sides. 344 This phrase also appears in other texts (eg. Livy 22.17.2, 37.20.3, 40.22.1), and in each instance highlights the central role such terrain played in infantry manoeuvre. 345 Goldsworthy, 1996, 176–77. 346 This was not timidity on the part of Pharnaces, but typical caution by ancient commanders (e.g. Livy 28.15.11; Caes. BGall. 7.51). Also see Gilliver, 2007, 138.
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refuge, the former a product of the army’s discipline and the latter a function of good
leadership, were therefore key features of this successful retreat.
Turning to a second example, in the case of Caesar’s retreat from the slope of Ilerda in 49
BC, recall that some of his men rashly pursued their enemies onto the slope in front of the
town of Ilerda, where the latter had rallied and for five hours prevented Caesar’s men from
retreating by charging them whenever they attempted to do so (Caes. BCiv. 1.45.2–4). Finally,
Caesar’s men in turn charged the enemy and drove them back, eventually into the town
(BCiv. 1.46.1–2), thus cowing them (nonnulla parte propter terrorem in oppidum). Caesar’s
cavalry came forward and interposed itself between the retreating infantry and the
Pompeians, providing the opportunity for retreat (tutiorem nostris receptum dat: 1.46.3).
Clearly, the manner in which Caesar’s men moved was organised and orderly, for, so far from
moving quickly or rashly they had actually remained in the same position for five hours until
they were able to secure their retreat (1.46.1). Both sides received constant reinforcements
(1.45.7–8) but this did not break the deadlock. While the enemy held the high ground, and
Caesar’s cavalry was separated from the infantry (1.46.3), Caesar’s legionaries could not
retreat, but when they did the Pompeians declined to pursue them for two reasons: the
effectiveness of their counterattack and the presence of Caesar’s cavalry.
In this case, several factors are evident. Caesar’s troops moved in an orderly manner. His
infantry was evidently very well organised, as it continued fighting in a locus iniquus for a
long time while infantrymen were shifted in and out of the fight. This must be a reflection of
the discipline of the troops as well as of the organised leadership of Caesar and his officers.347
In addition, infantry reserves were required to be constantly fed into the battle by both sides
to prevent the men from becoming exhausted (Caes. BCiv. 1.45.7–8). The presence of cavalry
reserves facilitated the final retreat, and of course, Caesar had a camp nearby (BCiv. 1.43), to
which his army certainly withdrew. As such, key features of this successful retreat were once
again the discipline of the milites in maintaining order and Caesar’s use of infantry and
cavalry reserves to prevent a premature retreat and to stop enemy pursuit, not to mention the
proximity of a fortified camp.
347 One of Caesar’s legions that participated in the battle was the Ninth, a veteran formation (cf. Keppie, 1984, 208).
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While pursuits commonly occurred in response to a retreat directly from the line of battle, the
observation to be drawn from most accounts of successful retreats is that the retiring armies
were eventually able to dissuade continued pursuits or attacks through the maintenance of
order among the infantry, and other tactics such as seeking refuge on higher ground or in a
camp, counterattacks, and the presence and use of reserves.348 Some of these aspects of
retreat tactics have already been discussed (eg. high ground, camps), and some will be
explored further below, while the role of the general, in tying these factors together to ensure
a safe retreat, will be explored in more detail in the next chapter. The definition and
importance of order in retreats will be addressed first, followed by an exploration of several
factors that contributed to the maintenance of order and prevention of enemy pursuit,
including training, signalling, infantry reserve lines, junior leadership, and the use of light
infantry and cavalry.
Physical Order in Retrograde Movements
Greek writers are thought to have had a generalised conception of battle tactics in which
disorder was fatal to infantry formations, and order was maintained primarily through well–
planned deployment and use of flat ground, and so this geometric and schematic view of
tactics, emphasising proper deployment and use of flat ground, was believed to be
appropriate to maintaining order in the phalanx, whether in advance or retreat.349 To elaborate
on this concept, we can turn briefly to the Macedonian–style phalanx, a formation that was
almost invulnerable to frontal attack as long as it was correctly arranged.350 This can be seen
both in the case of the retreat of the argyraspydes at Gabiene in 316 BC (Diod. Sic. 19.43.4–
5), who easily fended off pursuing cavalry, and the Seleucid phalanx’s attempt to retreat at
Magnesia (App. Syr. 35), during which large numbers of Roman legionaries were reluctant to
close with it. Appian (Syr. 6.35) states that the Romans feared the ‘discipline and solidity’
(ἐμπειρίαν τε καὶ πυκνότητα) of the enemy, and the Romans only made a successful
attack after the panic of a number of elephants trampled men and so disrupted the phalanx
(6.35). Diodorus Siculus (19.84.6–7) also notes that when Demetrius Poliorcetes retreated
after his defeat the battle of Gaza, 312 BC, the open ground allowed his troops to retreat in
348 Higher ground: BAlex. 40; Sall. Jug. 98. Counterattacks: Caes. BCiv. 1.79. Reserves: Polyb. 3.105; Caes. BGall. 1.25. 349 Lendon, 1999, 282–5. 350 Polyb. 18.30.11, 31.5.
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good order, making the enemy reluctant to pursue.
A phalanx that fell into disorder was a different matter. Polybius (2.65–9) describes such an
event in his account of the Battle of Sellasia, 222 BC. A Spartan phalanx of perioikoi and
other allies had been posted on a hill known as Euas (2.65), and at the height of the battle
they were attacked from by a force of Illyrians and Macedonian phalangites that advanced
uphill to meet them (2.68). Polybius criticises Eucleidas, the Spartan commander on Euas, for
squandering his superior position on high ground by waiting to meet the enemy attack,
arguing that he should have charged and disordered the Macedonian phalanx from their
higher position and driven it from the slope.351 The result was that they met the Macedonians
near the summit of the hill, so that after being pushed back they were, before long, fighting
desperately to retain control of the summit itself (2.68.7–8). They were then thrust back from
the summit and continued to retreat, but now downhill on the reverse slope of Euas (2.68.9).
In this position they were unable to reform, nor to break away from the enemy who was
following them aggressively, nor to push back the now advantageously–positioned enemy. As
Polybius puts it: ‘The consequence was that very soon they had to turn and take to a flight
(φυγῇ) which proved disastrous (ὀλεθρίῳ), as, for a long distance, it was over difficult and
precipitous ground (κρημνώδη καὶ δύσβατον) (Polyb. 2.68.10). In this case, the retreat
failed as a result of a combination of heavy pursuit and unfavourable terrain, the latter factor
brought on by the former. Conversely at Pydna, the pursuing Macedonian phalanx became
disordered from advancing uphill, and quickly fell victim to a counterattack (Plut. Aem. 20.7–
10). Evidently, the phalanx was as difficult to attack frontally in retreat as it was in advance,
as long as it maintained its proper formation. If the phalanx fell to disorder, however, it was
extremely vulnerable (Polyb. 18.28-9). Thus, in the case of a retreating phalanx, the extent to
which it suffered pursuit will, in most cases, have indeed been closely linked with the
orderliness it maintained in doing so.
351 Polyb. 2.68.3–5. It should be noted that the Spartans’ tactics were not totally without merit, as forcing the Macedonian phalanx to ascend the entire slope will have tired them out before the two lines clashed.
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Since the Romans did not utilise the phalanx, but looser and more mobile formations, what
was their view of order in retreat?352 Onasander (Strat. 27) gives the following advice on
order:
One should command both retreats (ὑποχωρήσεις) and pursuits (διώξεις) to be
made in formation (τάξει), so that, if defeated, the soldiers may suffer less injury,
when in their flight (φυγαῖς) they encounter the enemy, by not being scattered, man
by man, and, if successful, they may inflict greater injury on the enemy by keeping
their ranks and companies unbroken (τάξεις καὶ λόχους ἰσχυρότεροι), appearing
stronger to the fugitives, and moreover being safer themselves. For often the enemy,
observing their opponents advancing without order, by a concerted plan about–face,
form ranks once more and reverse the pursuit. In a word, the general should say that
nothing is more advantageous to his men than remaining in rank (μένειν ἐν τάξει),
and nothing more dangerous than breaking ranks.353
While clearly influenced by the Greek emphasis on order, Onasander wrote for a Roman
audience.354 He does not speak here of the rigorous emphasis on deployment and orderly
arrangement that eutaxis implied.355 He discusses the advantages of maintaining order in
retreat (or even ‘flight’) in more general terms, stating that it was easier for ordered
formations to defend themselves against pursuers, which also made them appear more
intimidating.356 It is unusual that Onasander does not distinguish between an orderly retreat
(ὑποχώρησις) and a flight (φυγή), and if anything this demonstrates that his use of
terminology was not precisely technical. However, he argues clearly that retreating soldiers
that retained their close formation were not only more able to fight off pursuers, but were less
likely to be pursued in the first place.
352 Phang, 2008, 50–1. 353 Trans. from the 1928 Loeb Edition transcribed on lacuscurtius.org by the ‘Illinois Greek Club’. 354 Campbell, 1987, 13. Also see Formisano, 2017, 145. 355 Cf. Polyb. 18.31–2. In Greek, maintaining physical order within heavy infantry formations was known as taxis (‘proper formation’) or eutaxis (‘good order’). See Lendon, 1999, 282. 356 Close formation was also comforting, and for this reason soldiers will naturally crowd together when afraid (Rush, 2001, 320). This was doubly important in the retreat, when the enemy might be emboldened by the possibility of imminent victory (Xen. Anab. 6.5.17). However, it is notable that for swordsmen this could become counterproductive if the ranks became so compressed for men to wield their weapons properly (Caes. BGall. 2.25).
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Latin sources give a great deal of further evidence on the Roman concept of order or ratio.357
The common use of the term servare ordines, to describe soldiers remaining in their proper
place in the ranks, demonstrates that the idea of staying in formation was straightforward for
Roman readers.358 The phrases conferti ordines (‘compact ranks’), in orbem (‘in a
circle/square’) and agmine quadrato (‘having formed a square’), also occur repeatedly,
especially in Livy, showing that legionaries regularly kept compact formations in battle.359 In
particular, the Roman concept of order emphasised keeping legionaries close to the manipular
standards, the signa, under any circumstances.360 The Roman general and writer Frontinus for
instance advocated decimation for men who abandoned their places in the line.361 Roman
soldiers also appeared to have remained facing the enemy while retreating (Caes. BCiv.
1.80.4), thereby showing they were ready to fight. In general then the Romans, whose
formations were more widely spaced than in the Macedonian phalanx, still considered
maintaining compact formations to be essential in battle.362 For retreating milites, being
combat–ready by remaining in somewhat close proximity to one another and their standards,
still facing the enemy, was evidently considered to be important and conventional.
So was ‘order’ simply the maintenance of a relatively close formation? Marcus Junkelmann
has provided a brief analysis of fighting retreats, and argued that retreating too quickly under
enemy pressure was basically impossible as deep formations would quickly become confused
and disintegrate.363 Yet he argues that as long as infantry maintained their formation and
357 For convenience, I will utilise the Latin term ratio as a synonym for military order throughout the thesis (cf. Caes. BGall. 2.19.1, 2.22.1, 3.14.4, 4.23.5; Livy 24.17.5.3, 24.28.9.2, 24.48.4.2, 27.15.12.1, etc) 358 Eg. Caes. BGall. 4.26.1.2, 7.23.5.3, BCiv. 1.71.3.5, 1.71.4.1, 2.41.6.5; Sall. Jug. 51.1, 80.2–3; Livy 8.34.10.4, 9.19.8.1, 24.48.12.1, 28.15.6.2, 30.18.12.4, 13.1, 42.64.10.3. Another term for order is ratio (‘tactics’, ‘calculation’, ‘method’), commonly used by Caesar (eg. BGall. 2.10.5, 2.19.1, 2.22.1, 3.14.4, 4.1.7, 7.1.6, 7.4.1, 7.6.3, BCiv. 1.44.3, 1.65.5, 2.18.6, 3.47.1, 3.74.2, 3.75.1). Ordinare is less common (cf. Livy 2.21.4, 34.14.6, 42.59.6; Front. Strat. 1.6.3). Of interest, according to Phang (2008, 51), disciplina militaris did not emphasise spatial order as did eutaxia. 359 Conferti ordines: Caes. BCiv. 1.71; Livy 31.43.3, 32.17.8, 42.59.5, 42.65.8. In orbem: Caes. BGall. 4.33.1, BAlex. 40.3, BAfr. 15.3; Livy 1.17.6, 4.39.4, 21.56.2, 23.27.7, 28.22.15, 28.33.15, 42.65.7. Agmine quadrato: Livy 2.6.6, 7.29.6, 10.14.7, 21.5.16, 21.32.1, 31.37.1, 35.3.2, 36.10.4, 39.30.9, 44.9.6. 360 Cf. Caes. BCiv. 1.44. The Romans went to great lengths to ensure men followed their signa (eg. Caes. BGall. 5.37.5; Phang, 2008, 65–6), even using them as a form of bait by throwing them into the enemy so that legionaries would attack more ferociously in order to recover them (Caes. BGall. 4.25–6; Livy 34.46.12; Plut. Aem. 20). 361 Front. Strat. 4.1.34. Also note the emphasis on order and holding ranks in the drill commands recorded in Maurice's Strategikon (12.14). 362 Polyb. 18.29.1–5, 18.29–31; Phang, 2008, 50–1. Also see Lendon, 1999, 285–287. 363 Junkelmann, 1986, 241.
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moved slowly, they could potentially withdraw safely even while under attack by the
enemy.364 Junkelmann thus echoes what has been discussed above, that retreating infantry
should maintain relatively close and ordered ranks, but he adds that a steady, gradual rate of
movement was also important. For example, consider the following part of Livy’s (42.59.4–
5) account of the Battle of Callinicus, 171 BC, which describes how a division of Thessalian
auxiliary cavalry retreated:
For, retreating gradually (cedentes enim sensim) with formation intact
(integris ordinibus), after they had joined the auxiliaries of Eumenes, with him they
both provided a safe retreat (receptum) between their units (inter ordines) for their
allies scattered in flight, and when the enemy pressed on in less close order (minus
conferti), they even risked advancing and met many of the fugitives half–way. Nor did
the king's men, now themselves scattered in a general pursuit (passim sequendo), dare
to close in battle with an enemy in formation and advancing steadily
(ordinatis et certo incedentibus gradu).365
It is true that this account describes a retreat by cavalry and not by infantry, but it still
demonstrates the importance of close order (integris ordinibus ... conferti) and gradual
movement (cedentes sensim ... gradu), specifically as pursuers were reluctant to engage with
troops that retained such order. There are several other accounts of infantry retreats, mostly
successful, in which a gradual ‘step by step’ rate of movement is also described.366 As such, it
appears that maintaining order in retreating infantry formations consisted of at least two
components: close formation and gradual movement.
What links these two factors? Since a fighting retreat was so taxing upon its participants, one
could wonder if it would not have been better for a losing army to get away as quickly as
possible, and so reduce the time that retiring troops were exposed to enemy pressure. In fact,
just as a desire to ‘get it over with’ might compel soldiers to attack impetuously, it is not
difficult to imagine that soldiers in retreat would want to increase their pace as their panic and
enemy pressure mounted.367 As Goldsworthy has pointed out, it was challenging for large
364 Ibid, 241. 365 Trans. Evan T. Sage and Alfred C. Schlesinger, 1938. 366 Xen. Anab. 5.2.32; Polyb. 11.24; App. Syr. 35, BCiv. 2.80, 3.69, 4.128. Also note Livy 42.59.4–6. 367 Desire to get it over with: Goldsworthy, 1996, 191–2. Soldiers increasing their pace under pressure: see
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bodies of troops to manoeuvre on the battlefield, and orderly movement could easily degrade
into confusion, but he has also noted that a rapid pace in an advance could be a symptom of
fear, and that such haste could lead to great disorder in a formation.368 Junkelmann echoes
this point, but applies it specifically to the fighting retreat.369 So, it is specifically to manage
these difficulties that close formation and gradual movement went hand–in–hand: infantry
needed to maintain close formation to resist enemy attacks and dissuade pursuers by showing
a solid line of armed men, and they also needed to move at a gradual pace so that they could
carefully maintain this close formation. Close formation and gradual rate of movement were
therefore both necessary to preserve order, servare ordines, during a retreat.370
Legionary Training, Tactics and Reserve Lines
It is clear that maniples and cohorts, and even cavalry units, had to maintain close formation
and a gradual pace in order to retreat or withdraw in an orderly manner, but this would have
been difficult under enemy pressure. The management of order and pace cannot always have
been simple in the relatively complex Roman triplex acies, consisting as it did of many
separate manipuli and cohortes divided into separate lines. Were the soldiers specifically
trained to retire in an orderly manner? And how did the lines of the triplex acies, and sub–
units of the legion (maniples and cohorts) interact in retreat? The answers to these questions
are limited by a lack of evidence and are also partly interlinked, but I will attempt to show
how Roman heavy infantry maintained order and countered pursuit during retreat or
withdrawal.371
Appian's account (BCiv. 1.128) of the retreat of Brutus' infantry at Philippi, in 42 BC. 368 Goldsworthy, 1996, 176–7, 194, 197. Even in a victorious pursuit, maintaining a gradual rate of movement remained important for excited troops (Xen. Anab. 8.19). Also see Xenophon (Hell. 6.2.20–3) for the difficulty of changing formation with a phalanx during combat. 369 Junkelmann, 1986, 241. 370 Despite withdrawals being carried out in different marching formations, these same factors will have applied to some extent, as marching infantry could be highly exposed to enemy marauders due to the increased distance and duration of the movement (cf. Caes. BCiv. 1.78–80). 371 These questions are not simple to answer, as the sources usually do not systematically discuss the specifics of training practices, manipular tactics (Goldsworthy, 1996, 171–2) or signalling (Southern, 2006, 199–200, 203). Also see Sabin, 2007, 399–400.
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In terms of training practices, the Roman army always stood out from most of its
contemporaries for its disciplined attitude.372 However, due to the fact that Middle
Republican armies were raised yearly, they would not necessarily be trained over the long
term, with the exception of armies that remained in service for longer periods and so
accumulated more training and experience.373 Training outside the yearly cycle of active
campaigning may have taken the form of military exercises performed by young men on the
campus Martius, or instruction at home by family members.374 As units became longer
serving in the Late Republic and Empire, training thus became more systematic.375 Polybius
(10.20) provides an account of Scipio training his soldiers c. 209 BC, and this is the earliest
extant reference to an organised Roman training regime. Scipio exercised his troops for an
extended period in four day cycles, with a forced march on the first day, the second day being
dedicated to equipment maintenance, the third to rest, then sword and javelin practice on the
fourth day. A different training regime may be found in accounts of Scipio Aemilianus’
Iberian campaign (Livy 26.51.4). Livy (34.13) also describes another training regime that was
carried out by Cato the Elder in 195 BC, in which Cato would combine practice marches with
active campaigning and fighting to harden his men.
There are few other direct references to Middle Republican training methods. Among the
handful of Middle Republican references, given the prominence of the Scipiones originating
from Polybius, one could assume that the Scipiones were unusual in applying such systematic
training methods, although it is also possible that these training methods were not so unusual
and that Polybius simply emphasised their application to glorify his patrons.376 Evidently, an
organised system of training was considered good practice. However, these references to
training do not mention practice of battlefield manoeuvres. A partial exception was the
apparent prominence of forced marches in which men might have walked in columns, but
more emphasis was evidently placed on individual fighting skills.377 It should be noted that
the Mid–Republican army had minimal need for precise formation drill as the Macedonian
372 Keppie, 1984, 55. 373 Southern 2006, 133, 135. How Roman armies became more efficient over time: Sage, 2008, 160; Goldsworthy, 2011, 48. 374 Cic. Cael. 11; McDonnell, 2006, 181–4. 375 By the mid–first century BC the Roman army, particularly that of Caesar and his successors, had become more regularised in its organisation and training practices (Keppie, 1984, 61–7, 76–7, 132–3; Goldsworthy, Fall of Carthage, 361–2; Potter, 2014, 69–70). 376 Southern, 2006, 135. 377 Phang, 2006, 50, 57–61; Southern 2006, 135–6.
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phalanx did, due to the more open ranks of sword–armed legionaries.378 Nevertheless, Roman
soldiers will surely have understood the importance of moving in an orderly manner during a
retreat.379 It is striking that in one of the oaths sworn by legionaries, the coniuratio, a soldier
stated that they would ‘not abandon their ranks for flight or fear, but only to take up or seek a
weapon, either to smite an enemy or to save a fellow citizen’ (Livy 22.38.2–5). This is
evidence that Middle Republican legionaries were formally indoctrinated into staying within
their ranks, as Onasander later recommended. Although training methods were still left to the
inclination of individual generals, it is at least clear that the Romans did appreciate the
importance of an organised training regime, and this surely included some practice in
battlefield movement (such as retreat) even if the Middle Republican evidence does not
specifically refer to it.380
The evidence is better for the Late Republic. In 105 BC, Rutilius Rufus instituted a legionary
training system based on that of gladiators, which was replicated by Gaius Marius and
became standard across the legions, incorporating individual weapon’s practice, forced
marches, running and jumping.381 In 46 BC, Caesar re–trained his men in response to new
enemy tactics non ut imperator exercitum veteranum victorem ... sed ut lanista tirones
gladiatores condocefacere, by instructing them exact distances to retreat and manoeuvre
when ordered as well as practising feigned retreats and counterattacks (BAfr. 71). Caesar
implies that the gladiatorial methods more commonly adopted by the Romans in the first
century BC included specific instruction on how milites should retreat in formation.
378 More open ranks: Lendon, 2005, 179–82; Rawlings, 2007, 58; Phang, 2008, 50, 57–61. 379 One can recall the Imperial–era advice of Onasander (Strat. 27), in which he recommends that soldiers must remain in rank during retreat. 380 Individual inclination: Southern, 2006, 135. Scipio: App. Hisp. 86. Cato: Livy 34.13. Also see Goldsworthy, 1996, 180–1. 381 Val. Max. 2.3.2; Plut. Mar. 13.1; Southern, 2006, 135.
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Another way of looking at the problem is by considering Roman field signals. A general or
other officer could give simple orders by flag or more likely by bucina, cornu or tuba.382 All
legions possessed some number of bucinatores, tubicines and cornicines.383 As shown at the
Battle of Thapsus in 46 BC, in which an over–eager musician signalled a general advance
without Caesar’s approval (BAfr. 82), legionaries were in the habit of following musical
orders. The key question is whether or not there was a generally recognised signal for a
retreat. According to Southern, the tuba was typically used to signal advance and also
retreat.384 At Gergovia in 52 BC, Caesar ordered a retreat to be sounded (receptui cani iussit)
by tubae (Caes. BGall. 7.47.1). In his account of the indecisive fight between Hannibal and
the Roman consuls of 212 BC, Livy (29.19.5) states utrimque signum receptui datum,
although he does not specify the method by which this was done. Livy gives several other
examples of signals for retreats.385 The two phrases given above, receptui cani and signum
receptui, appear elsewhere.386 Further, during both the battles of Gergovia, 52 BC (Caes.
BGall. 7.51.3) and Ruspina, 46 BC (BAfr. 18.3), the signal for retreating legionaries to stop
and fight was turning the standards towards the enemy, implying that in retreat, they were
turned away from the enemy. As such, it is clear that there was at least one regular signal for
retreat used among the Roman legions, certainly in the Late Republic and probably earlier,
which in turn implies that retreats were a regular manoeuvre in Roman tactics. It stands to
reason also that if soldiers habitually retreated in response to a signal, whether it was a horn
blast or the turning of the standards, that they knew what to do, and so must also have
practised retreating.
382 Southern, 2006, 204. Flag: eg. Caes. BCiv. 3.89. Bucina: eg. Livy 3.22.6. A variety of signals could have been used, including hand signals (Lee, 1996, 201, ref. Amm. Marc. 24.6.13) and written orders (Southern, 2006, 203–4), but the latter were less suitable for a simple, but time sensitive order for a retreat, and the former would have taken longer to transmit across the army than the blow of a horn. Of course they were not a perfect method of signalling, as in the din of battle, soldiers might not hear the horn (Caes. BGall. 7.47.1). 383 Southern, 2006, 159; Sage, 2008, 19. 384 Southern, 2006, 159; cf. BAfr. 82. 385 Livy 2.62.2, 2.64.8, 4.31.3. 386 Receptui cani: Caes. BGall. 7.47.1; Livy 26.6.7, 31.42.1, 35.29.7, 37.32.6, 44.35.20. Signum receptum datum: Livy 9.32.10, 26.45.4, 29.19.5.
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Even though there is no description of such training, the Romans were well known for
advancing on the enemy with impressive orderliness, for which they must have practised, and
given that retreat was an advance in reverse, they surely practised such movements also.387
Further, as a withdrawal often took the form of a regular march in column, the Romans could
apply the same training that allowed them to march forwards in an orderly manner. Such
training will have been simple and was perhaps too mundane to be described by the sources,
but if it was done on varying kinds of terrain and practised under some pressure, this skill will
surely have been very useful to retreating soldiers.
Perhaps even more distinctive than Roman training practices was their unique triple–line
deployment, the triplex acies, which was used regularly throughout the Middle Republic.388
Since a Roman army was generally deployed in three lines, how did these lines move during
a retreat? Note that Polybius (2.33.7–8) criticises the battle deployment of the consul Gaius
Flaminius (c. 223 BC) because of the general’s failure to prepare for retrograde movement:
... the Consul ... mismanaged the battle by deploying his force at the very edge
of the river–bank and thus rendering impossible a tactical movement peculiar to
the Romans, as he left the lines (σπείραις) no room to fall back gradually. For
had the troops been even in the slightest degree pushed back from their ground
during the battle, they would have had to throw themselves into the river, all
owing to their general's blunder.389
According to Polybius, if a Roman army deployed correctly, it was capable of carrying out
short, temporary retreats as a regular feature of their battle tactics. However, it is not clear
exactly what Polybius means. At a glance, he emphasises that the movement in question is
‘peculiar’ to the Romans, one imagines that he is referring in some way to the functioning of
triplex acies, which was also unique to the Romans. In general, Roman manipular tactics
required room to manoeuvre in all directions, but Polybius particularly emphasises space
387 Goldsworthy, 1996, 193–7. Also see Plut. Ant. 39.4. 388 The triplex acies was in regular use by the third century BC (Keppie, 1984, 20–2). With the exception of Hannibal mimicking the Roman three–line deployment at Zama (Polyb. 15.11), nobody appears to have followed this Roman practice. 389 Trans. W. R. Paton, 1922–7. The anti–Flaminian tone of this extract is typical of Polybius (Walbank, 1957, 208).
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towards the rear.390 The amount of space Polybius refers to will probably have been at least
half a kilometre of depth, as there could be 100–200 metres between each of the three lines,
and Polybius implies that more space was also needed behind the rear line.391
There are two possibilities to explain what manoeuvre Polybius refers to, and why space
behind the army was so important. He either describes a straightforward retrograde
movement (ie. a short or temporary retreat), or something more complicated, such as the
‘line–relief’ system. With regard to the former, Lendon has argued that Polybius means a
uniquely Roman fighting style premised on ‘successive, calm withdrawals under enemy
pressure,’ by which he means that a Roman battleline could flex and give ground on the
battlefield, then regain its solidity.392 The ability of Roman battlelines to flex under enemy
pressure is shown in the Second Battle of Philippi (App. B Civ. 4.128) when a Roman army
deployed in triplex acies was forced to retreat, and initially did so in good order. At length
this retreat did collapse into flight, because the lines of the triplex acies became intermingled,
which combined with enemy pressure to produce disorder and a rout. Such a disaster could
clearly occur even to experienced and properly–trained legionaries.393 It is thus clear that for
any retreat to be successfully carried out by a Roman army deployed in triplex acies, it was
necessary that space was maintained behind the lines, as Polybius has described above.394
The matter of the triplex acies raises a second possibility that Polybius refers to the
nebulously–understood Roman ‘line–relief’ system, by which units from the rear lines or
units relieved those in the forward lines or units, and thus allowed fresh troops to join the
battle.395 Although line–relief is not well described in the sources, understanding the system
390 Walbank, 1957, 209. 391 Caesar (BCiv. 1.82), in describing the deployment of his own army and that of his opponents near Ilerda in 49 BC, states that each army took up a space of over 600 paces (approx. 450 metres) in depth. On the other hand, in Polybius' (15.11) description of Hannibal's triple–line deployment at Zama, he states that Hannibal placed his third line ‘more than a stade’ (approx. 200 metres) from the front line. The distances between lines in the triplex acies probably also varied according to circumstances and terrain. 392 Lendon, 2005, 182. Lendon uses the term ‘withdrawal’ to describe a short retrograde movement, which I would describe as a retreat. 393 The army of the liberatores at Philippi had a large core of ‘first–rate legions’ (App. B Civ. 4.59). 394 See Daly, 2002, 62–3. 395 There is extensive debate over how this system worked (Junkelmann, 1986, 242–3; Daly, 2002, 60–3; Lendon, 2005, 181; Cagniart, 2007, 92–3; Sage, 2008, 69–76, etc). However, the relief of forward units by units from the reserve lines does appear to have been achievable during the intermittent lulls in fighting that are now believed to have occurred in extended battles (Goldsworthy, 1996, 208; Sabin, 2007, 428–9). This gave the Romans the unique advantage of allowing the replacement of tired units in the front line with fresh ones (Caes.
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is one key to validating infantry–level models of Roman combat.396 The issue is thus
important to understanding not only how Roman armies moved in battle, but also the role of
retrograde movement in the use of triplex acies. It has been argued that line–relief did not
occur at the level of individual soldiers.397 but rather occurred among larger units or even
entire lines of the triplex acies, although it is not clear whether gaps were maintained between
units during battle to allow rearward units to come forward.398 It is clear from ancient
evidence that rear lines were able to replace the front line when necessary, as occurred for
instance at Pharsalus (Caes. BCiv. 3.94.1). Since short retreats in battle were scarcely
‘peculiar’ to the Romans, it is hard to believe that these were the unique Roman movement
Polybius referred to.399 In fact, his emphasis on rearward movement suggests that, rather than
the reserve units coming forward to replace the forward units, the forward units withdrew to
the reserve units behind them.400 Livy (8.8) describes the line–relief system just so. If this is
the case, then short retrograde manoeuvres were a distinctive feature of the line–relief
system, and a fundamental part of Roman utilisation of triplex acies.
Overall then, what is the ‘tactical movement peculiar to the Romans’ (Polyb. 2.33.7)?
Polybius says that the triplex acies and the line–relief system (however it functioned) gave
the Romans a systematic advantage in battle.401 In particular, Polybius (18.32.2–6) argues
that the Roman use of reserve infantry lines was unique and a major component of Roman
tactical success against the phalanx. In regard to retreats, recall that maintaining a ‘safety
distance’ reduced the pressure on retreating troops, but also as long as space could be created
between the Roman army and the enemy, line–relief could be carried out, which was another
BCiv. 1.45, 3.94; Livy 8.8, 10), while the enemy would usually possess no such luxury. Also see Sabin, 2000, 7, 16; 2007, 413; Gilliver, 2007, 129–30. 396 Sabin, 2000, 7; 2007, 431. 397 Goldsworthy, 1996, 208. 398 Koon (2010, 85) argues line–relief could be done without filling the gaps between units, but Gilliver (2007, 129–30) has argued that it is unlikely legions fought with gaps between units in the front line. Taylor has argued the gaps were maintained but may have been partly filled by light troops (Taylor, 2014, 319–20). 399 Pol 2.33.7, cf. Sabin, 2007, 412. 400 This is the re–construction shown in Anglim et al. (2002, 52). On the other hand, see Caes. BCiv. 1.45: at Ilerda in 49 BC, Caesar could not withdraw his forward cohorts and had to bring reserves forward to replace them. However, this was a different period and a different army, and the situation was a product of a specific tactical quandary. This may not have been typical, hence why Caesar describes it in detail. 401 Polybius (18.31–2) considered that the legion's multiple–line deployment gave the Romans a major advantage over the phalanx, as it allowed the Roman reserve lines to conduct flanking manoeuvres against the advancing phalanx. In the context of Hannibal’s simulacrum of the triplex acies at Zama, Polybius also approved of the way it forced men in the front–line to fight (Polyb. 15.11).
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mechanism for reducing pressure through the replacement of tired troops with fresh ones.402
As has also been observed, reserves could provide a decisive physical and moral support to
infantry carrying out a fighting retreat in open ground, and so these could additionally
perform this function.403 Thus, two inferences can be drawn from Polybius’ statement that the
Roman army required space to the rear for its ‘peculiar’ manoeuvre. The entire army needed
space to move so that one or all of the three lines could advance or retreat as necessary in
response to enemy pressure without becoming too congested, and also, space was necessary
both to the front (ie. safety distance) and rear (for short retreats) so that sub–units or an entire
line could conduct line–relief. The success the Romans could achieve by performing a
tactical retreat followed by a well–timed advance was demonstrated at the Battle of Pydna in
168 BC (Plut. Aem. 20.4–8), and if necessary the Romans could also use the line–relief
system to prevent a retreat, as Caesar did at Ilerda (Caes. BCiv. 1.45). Thus, small retrograde
movements contributed to the adaptability of Roman manipular tactics.
One more characteristic of the Roman army was that it fielded regularly sized and
independent armies, legiones, which were made up of consistently sized and organised sub–
units, cohortes and manipuli.404 These sub–units were fundamental to the Roman army’s
flexibility in battle, as legions not only had multiple lines that could support the fighting line,
but individual maniples and cohorts could manoeuvre somewhat independently and conduct
flanking attacks.405 The importance of maintaining reserves in battle and during a retreat in
order to threaten pursuers has been discussed above. The triplex acies was advantageous for
this reason, as there were always reserve lines present to support the fighting line. Roman
sub–units could perform the same function, as Caesar demonstrated by using several cohorts
to protect the retreat of his forces at Gergovia in 52 BC (Caes. BGall. 7.51), and by rotating
cohorts in and out of the fighting at Ilerda in 49 BC to prevent his men from becoming
exhausted.406 The organised sub–division of Roman legions into multiple sub–units thus
402 Caes BCiv. 3.94.2; Livy 2.20.6, 8.10.4, 9.32.9. Also see Goldsworthy, 1996, 208; Sabin, 2007, 428–9. 403 This is in fitting with what Lendon (2005, 182) has argued, as mentioned above. 404 From the third century to the first century, the Romans phased out the use of maniples as the main sub–unit of the legion in favour of larger cohorts, although cohorts continued to consist of maniples (Keppie, 1984, 63–6; Goldsworthy, 1996, 34). The last recorded use of maniples as independent units in combat was in Africa in 109 BC (Sall. Jug. 49.6). However even into the Principate, signa were only possessed by maniples and not cohorts, suggesting that the former remained an essential focum for legionaries (Rankov, 2007, 32), even if not an independent combat unit. 405 Keppie, 1984, 43. 406 Caes. BCiv. 1.45. Also consider the example of Pydna, 168 BC (Plut. Aem. 20.4–8).
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provided another layer of reserves that the men of the fighting line could rely upon to support
them in retreat, whether through their mere presence, by line–relief, or by counterattack.
To summarise, Roman infantry training and tactics were suited to the conduct of retreats and
withdrawals in several ways. Milites received training in close order manoeuvre, and at least
in the Late Republic, a good general drilled them specifically in retreats and counterattacks.
The Romans appear to have had dedicated signals for retreat with both signa and tubae.
Further, the triplex acies system was suited to the conduct of retrograde movements because
it provided a reserve line that could support or relieve the fighting line when necessary.
Retrograde movements may even have been fundamental to the implementation of line–relief
system, assuming that it functioned through the retirement of the fighting line to be replaced
by a posterior line. Finally, the regular organisation of Roman armies meant that sub–
divisions of the Roman army could manoeuvre to support fighting units, assisting them in
retreat. Retrograde movements were thus a significant part of conventional Roman battle
tactics, and multiple factors contributed to the ability of Roman armies to maintain order
during a retreat.
The Roles of Subordinate Officers
One more factor to consider in the maintenance of order during retreats is the roles of the
various leadership figures in a Roman army who fought alongside the milites. These include
the various junior officers known collectively as principales, centuriones, the veteran
legionaries (veterani), the aristocratic tribuni, and other officers such as quaestores. The
details of how these various kinds of officers contributed to preparing soldiers and managing
them during retreat will be considered below.
The Imperial-era term principales describes various grades of junior officers below the
centurions, such as optiones, and others of lower rank including tesserarii, beneficarii,
signiferi and aquiliferi.407 These officers had the closest proximity to the milites, and so will
most likely have had important roles in the maintenance of ratio.408 It has been suggested that
the optiones, second in seniority to centuriones, were stationed at the rear of a maniple or 407 Southern, 2006, 333. 408 Phang (2008, 65–6) points out that close supervision was needed by officers to keep formations organised during battle.
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cohort and used their bladeless spear of office to coerce wavering soldiers.409 The more junior
tesserarii may also have stood to the rear and assisted the optiones in this task.410 Yet another
type of principalis, the beneficiarius, an assistant to a centurio, could again have performed a
similar function.411 Even so, there is no direct evidence for these practices.412 In sum, the
optiones and possibly other principales probably formed a coercive element in the rear
ranks.413 In a retreat, this function will have been essential to ensuring that sub–units moved
at a gradual pace and so maintained their ratio, as well as preventing waverers from fleeing
and triggering a greater flight.
The best understood and probably the most important junior officers were centuriones, front–
line leaders, whose duties included keeping soldiers with the standards and leading them by
example, and they were probably also key officers in charge of training legionaries.414 They
were the overall leaders of centuries and maniples and will have been key leaders in the
cohorts, and so the management of a retreat at the sub–unit level must have been primarily
their responsibility, though, as discussed above, they had various assistants in the form of
principales.415 The hands–on leadership role of centurions is demonstrated by the fact that
during routs and withdrawals, where numbers are given by the sources the centuriones
suffered disproportionate casualties relative to legionaries.416 Most importantly, the
centurions are specifically mentioned in the sources, along with tribunes, as key officers in
ordering and organising retreats (Caes. BGall. 3.95) or withdrawals (App. Hisp. 82). During a
409 Goldsworthy, 1996, 182, 2004, 185; Lendon, 2005, 185; Phang, 2008, 66. 410 On the tesserarius see Southern, 2006, 93, 100, 333; Goldsworthy, 2011, 68–9. For the possibility they assisted the optio see Junkelmann (1986, 242–3), who supposes they were deployed at the rear of their centuria along with their immediate superior, the optio, contra Southern (2006, 333), who describes the tesserarius as a ‘clerical post’ whose ‘main responsibilities concerned guard duties’ (100). This narrow definition of the duties of the tesserarii is owed to Polybius (Polyb. 6.35–6). However, Polybius simply did not describe the battlefield duties of the tesserarius, as he also did not for the optiones (see Polyb. 6.24–5, 36–7), so his restrictive description of their duties does not necessarily give the entire picture. 411 Goldsworthy, 1996, 124; Phang, 2008, 66. Also see Livy 34.15.4; Maur. Strat. 12B16. 412 It is striking that optiones were not mentioned by either Caesar or Livy. In Livy’s description (35.5.10) of a battle between Gauls and Romans c. 193 BC, he states that the Gauls placed officers at the rear of their line with spears to dissuade waverers. Was Livy implying that the Gauls were adopting a common Roman practice? 413 This was a practice as recently as World War Two, and Rush (2001, 316) suggests that any Roman soldier turning to flee may very well have come face to face with an officer such as an optio. 414 Sabin, 2000, 15–6; Cagniart, 2007, 93; Phang, 2008, 66; Training: Southern, 2006, 136. In the Imperial period, there were also several other types of officers known to have been responsible for training soldiers, including the campidoctor, the magister campi and exercitator (Southern, 2006, 136). 415 Southern, 2006, 332–3. Cf. Caes. BGall. 2.25, 6.39. 416 Caes. BGall. 2.25, 6.40, 7.51, BCiv. 3.71; BHisp. 23. Cf. Lee, 1996, 211; Kagan, 2006, 169. Presumably, centurions were also high–profile targets for the enemy.
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retreat, many centuriones likely remained in the front lines, providing an example to their
men, restraining them from flight and managing their pace of movement.417 To summarise,
while principales posted in rear lines will have supported a retreat by managing the pace of
movement and dissuading stragglers from flight, centuriones played the most apparent role,
providing charismatic leadership by sharing the dangers of the front line and ensuring that the
soldiers maintained order.
Standard bearers, such as the signiferi and the aquiliferi, could have also played a role. As
mentioned, reversing the standards may have been a signal for retreat.418 The Romans were
strict in ensuring that soldiers remained relatively close to their signa, which is to say, their
centuries or maniples.419 The signiferi could play a crucial role in halting routs, as well as in
motivating men to advance.420 Even more so the legionary standards, the aquilae, were of
themselves an intense focus for the attention of Roman soldiers, who would follow them into
great danger and go to great lengths to prevent their capture.421 Through a combination of this
devotion towards the signa or aquilae and their own courage, these principales could thus
have a disproportionate influence on the men around them.422 The signiferi might also have
been held to higher standards of discipline than the regular milites. For instance, after a
Caesarian rout at Dyrrhachium in 48 BC, Caesar specifically targeted several signiferi for
punishment, and in AD 16 when the rebel Tacfarinas attacked a Roman cohort in Africa, the
milites fled and their commander Decrius berated the standard bearers (signiferos) for letting
the men flee.423 Finally, the signiferi also played a role in transmitting orders between the
417 Note the prominent role of the centuriones in leading a breakout of trapped legionaries during a skirmish in Gaul (Caes. BGall. 6.40). 418 Cf. Caes. BGall. 7.51.3; BAfr. 18.3. 419 Sage, 2008, 123–4. Also see Caes. BCiv. 1.44. 420 Halting routs (Caes. BGall. 7.51). Motivating men to advance: Sabin, 2000, 15–6. That said, the signiferi appear to have generally remained close to the fighting (Junkelmann, 1986, 242–3; also see Livy 9.39; contra Sage, 2008, 72). 421 Livy (3.70, 4.19, 6.8, 26.5, 34.46) provides numerous examples of officers throwing standards into the enemy ranks to stimulate soldiers into retrieving them. Several such examples can be found in other sources (Lee, 1996, 208–9). There are also multiple accounts of the use of standards to lead troops forward (Caes. BGall. 4.25; Livy 10.36 21.36, 25.14, 27.14, 26.5, 39.31; App. Mith. 58). Note that in many of these examples, another officer has taken the standard from the signifer: perhaps the signiferi themselves were reluctant to throw or otherwise unnecessarily endanger the standard, but the key observation is that the standard itself was the focus of the soldiers, not necessarily the bearer. 422 Caes. BGall. 4.25. The milites also appear to have had high expectations of the standard bearers. According to Livy’s (3.27.8) fictionalised account of a campaign c. 458 BC, highly motivated legionaries urged on their standard bearer with the cry adcelera, signifer! To this they received the reply sequere miles! 423 Caes. BCiv. 3.69, 74; Tac. Ann. 3.20. Also see Goldsworthy, 1996, 163–4. In Appian's account (BCiv. 2.63) of
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general or his legati and milites.424 As such, the visibility and reputation of signiferi and
aquiliferi, in addition to the fact that Roman milites were trained to remain close to their
standards as a matter of course, meant that standard bearers must have been key figures in
retreats. They could signal a retreat and conversely, they could sometimes prevent retreat or
flight simply by standing their ground.
Veterani may have played a role in maintaining ratio. One relevant point in the use of the
maniple was the possible disposition of more experienced milites in the second and third
lines.425 In general it could be assumed that the bravest men, and those seeking recognition or
promotion, usually made their way to the front lines.426 It is tempting to speculate that, to
counter the possibility of a rout beginning in the rear, experienced men were also deliberately
posted in the rear to keep an eye on the less experienced men in front of them, as was
considered good practice by some Greeks.427 Since the triplex acies, by having more
experienced men in the second and third lines stimulated those in front to fight, the veterans
could have performed this same function during a retreat or withdrawal, compelling less
steady troops to maintain close order and a steady rate of movement.428 Conversely, if
veterans were posted in the front ranks (Plut. Marc. 26.1), they could prevent the front lines
from moving too quickly and personally resist enemy pursuers. They could thus be of use
regardless of whether they were in the front or rear, and would only have been of greater
service if they were posted to both positions.
the Battle of Dyrrhachium, soldiers blamed signiferi for a rout by claiming that the standards bearers fled first and the soldiers were bound to follow them. 424 For example, signa were used to give the signal for battle (Goldsworthy, 1996, 149–50). 425 Keppie, 1984, 64. Also see Polyb. 15.11. Unfortunately, no direct information exists on the placement of individual soldiers within Roman units (Gilliver, 2007, 130). Even the formation and spacing of Roman infantry within maniples and cohorts is an area of debate. Lendon's 'cloud theory' (Lendon, 2005, 179–82) is one of the more recent theories, but what this would mean for the idea that there was 'standard' spacing for legionaries and units is unclear (cf. Polyb. 18.30.5–8; Plut. Ant. 39.4; Goldsworthy, 1996, 179–81; Sabin, 2007, 426). 426 Gilliver, 2007, 130. 427 Routs beginning in the rear: Goldsworthy, 2011, 185. Experienced men at the rear: Goldsworthy, 1996, 178; Daly, 2002, 159, 200. According to Goldsworthy, the Greeks also thought it sensible practice to put brave men in the rear ranks to restrain or deter less determined men from fleeing (ref. Xen. Mem. 3.19; Ascl. Tac. 14.6). However, to extrapolate from Greek practice is no sure method of determining Roman practice. 428 Keppie, 1984, 64. Also see Lendon, 2005, 187–91. See Polyb. 15.11: Polybius mentions how Hannibal forced his less reliable troops to fight by deploying his veterans behind them.
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Finally, the functions of a legion's aristocratic subalterns, the tribuni and quaestores, are more
difficult to determine, for the evidence regarding the tactical functions of military tribunes is
less clear than it is for centuriones.429 The functions of quaestores are better known, and
these were more administrative than tactical.430 That said, it is striking that at the Battle of
Vosges, 58 BC, Caesar placed gave command of part of his army to a quaestor (Caes. BGall.
1.52). Evidently, some quaestors could be given senior tactical appointments if necessary.
Returning to tribuni, most of the evidence regarding their duties also concerns administrative
tasks, but scattered references to other duties such as organising the battle–line, performing
reconnaissance, commanding detachments, and advising and making reports to the general,
suggest that they could be employed in all sorts of military roles.431 Suolahti notes that,
unlike centurions, the tribuni ‘never functioned as tactical sub–commanders with fixed duties
to attend to’, but they were attached the general's staff and served as assistants in various
capacities.432 They could certainly assist the general in planning operations and deciding
tactics, and Caesar implies that they were, alongside centuriones, key leadership figures for
the milites.433 In the Pompeian rout after Pharsalus, Caesar states (BCiv. 3.95) that the fleeing
Pompeian soldiers followed the orders of centurions and tribunes (ducibus usi centurionibus
tribunisque).434 It is also evident from the high death rate of military tribunes in the Mid–
Republic that these officers often exposed themselves in battle, and so they must have been
generally prominent officers in action.435 During a retreat (or withdrawal), it appears clear
that the tribunes will not uncommonly have been active in leading the milites, along with the
centuriones, but their exact duties will have varied according to the situation and the
assignments of their imperator.
429 The Caesarian corpus, for instance, mentions centurions more often than tribunes (eg. BAlex. 40), Cf. Welch, 1998, 102–3. On the roles of tribunes also see: Suolahti, 1955, 43–51; Goldsworthy, 1996, 124–5; Roth, 1999, 277. 430 Roth 1999, 277. 431 Sage, 2008, 104–6. Also see Goldsworthy, 1996, 124–5; Suolahti, 1955, 43–51. 432 Suolahti, 1995, 47–50. 433 Caes. BGall. 6.39.2: perterritos ... ad tribunum militum centurionesque ora convertunt . Various duties: Caes. BGall. 4.23.5; BAfr. 54.1; Livy 25.14.2, 34.13.4. 434 Also note Appian's account (Hisp. 82) of the withdrawal of a Roman army from Pallantia in 136 BC, mentioning that both centurions and tribunes were responsible for organising the army. 435 Eckstein, 2009, 219.
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It was probably not easy to convince men who were keen to disengage from a victorious
enemy to move slowly.436 While Roman soldiers might be motivated to hold their ground by
discipline, coercion and comradeship, it was often the boldness and aggression of individual
leaders that motivated troops to assault and defeat the enemy.437 Charismatic leadership was
thus an essential component of motivating soldiers to act as desired by their commanders. It
seems clear that many figures in the army could have played such roles, and in general, the
potential flexibility of Roman command arrangements is striking.438 But as Caesar (BGall.
6.39.2) affirms, when soldiers were hard–pressed, it was generally the centuriones and tribuni
to whom they looked for leadership. These were, therefore, the most important officers for
transmitting instructions and maintaining order among the milites during a retrograde
movement.
Equites, Velites et Auxilia
The above discussion has focused on milites, but heavy infantry was not the only component
of a Roman army. Light infantry and cavalry were also major parts of Roman legions and,
later in the Republic, so too were auxiliary forces. In the Middle Republic, the average legion
consisted of 3000 legionaries, 300 equestrian cavalrymen, equites, and 1200 javelin–armed
light infantry, velites.439 By the third century BC, the legions were also typically accompanied
by equal or greater numbers of infantry and cavalry provided by the socii.440 From the time of
the Second Punic War, Roman armies began to be regularly supplemented by auxiliary
infantry, particularly by Greek archers, Greek and Balearic slingers, and Numidian, Iberian
436 Goldsworthy, 1996, 194. 437 Goldsworthy, 1996, 281. Caesar's Bellum Gallicum is full of examples of such actions by signiferi and centuriones (eg. 2.25, 4.25, 5.44, 7.47, 50). 438 Under certain circumstances, almost any officer could command significant forces. For instance, in the absence of a more senior commander, one or two tribunes could command a legion (Gilliver, 2007, 137; Rosenstein, 2011, 136), as could a quaestor (cf. Caes. BGall. 1.52) and in one exceptional case a lowly centurion led an entire army against Hannibal (Livy 25.19.9–10). 439 Polyb. 3.21; Keppie, 1984, 33–5. 440 Rawlings, 2011, 51. The alae fielded by the socii were probably organised differently to the legions in the fourth and third centuries BC, but the military units of the Romans, Latins and socii became more homogenous over time until they were relatively indistinguishable (Rawlings, 53). Cohorts of Latins and socii operated independently at times from the second century onward (Keppie, 1984, 64). The sources generally do not distinguish between legions and allies in battle accounts (Rawlings, 52), and so it may be assumed that in the tactical sense they were very similar. Drawing out and analyzing any tactical distinctions that did exist is outside the scope of this thesis, and so it will be assumed that the analysis of this thesis also applies to the infantry and cavalry of the Latins and socii.
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and later Gallic and German cavalry.441 In the Late Republic Roman armies could be highly
multi–ethnic, combined arms forces: Caesar’s army in 57 BC consisted of Roman and
Cisalpine Gallic milites, Treveran and Numidian cavalry, Cretan archers and Balearic
slingers, while the grand army that Marcus Antonius took into Parthia in 36 BC fielded tens
of thousands of non–Roman javelineers, slingers and cavalry.442 As such, any examination of
Roman retreat tactics in the Middle to Late Republic must not only consider the roles of
legionaries, but also of cavalry and light infantry, many of whom were foreign to Roman
military practices.
As noted, Roman cavalry (armed with sword and shield) were particularly useful as reserve
forces, threatening or counterattacking potential pursuers if necessary.443 The example of
Ilerda has already been discussed, in which Caesar’s cavalry threatened would–be enemy
pursuers to allow his infantry to retire (1.46.3). During Scipio Aemilianus’ Iberian campaign
of 134 BC, Appian (Hisp. 88) describes a fighting retreat by a Roman cavalry detachment
that had found itself in trouble after pursuing the enemy uphill to a position from which the
cavalry were unable to safely retreat. Scipio brought more cavalry to the rescue and split
them into two groups, who attacked both sides of the enemy and then withdrew further away
each time. In this way they gradually retreated to safer terrain while fighting off enemy
pursuers. During Antonius’ Parthian campaign of 36 BC, his cavalry were invaluable in
driving off Parthian archers so that his infantry could advance.444 Just as cavalry were a
potent weapon in pursuit, Roman cavalry were a powerful tool for supporting a retreat or
withdrawal.
The Romans also used a variety of auxiliary cavalry, armed differently to the Roman style.445
At the Battle of Callinicus in 171 BC, the Romans fielded a large number of Greek auxiliary
infantry and cavalry in a skirmish against their Macedonian equivalents, but after the Romans
were beaten back and began to retreat, the Thessalian auxiliary cavalry came to their rescue
441 Keppie, 1984, 78–9; Sekunda, 2007, 356–7. 442 Caesar’s army: cf. Caes. BGall. 2.7, 24. Caesar later made use of German cavalry as well (Caes. BGall. 1.80). Antonius’ army: Plut. Ant. 37.3, 41.4, 42.1. 443 Caes. BCiv. 1.46; Sall. Jug. 98.1; Plut. Ant. 41.5–42.1; App. Hisp. 88. By ‘Roman’ cavalry, I refer to those trained and armed in the Roman manner, including not only Italians but, later, also Iberians and Gauls (cf. Plut. Ant. 37.3). 444 Plut. Ant. 39.4, 42.1. 445 Depending on time and place, these included javelin–armed Numidians (Sabin, 2007, 422; Sekunda, 2007, 353), Thessalians (Livy 42.59.4–5) and eastern horse archers or cataphracts (Plut. Ant. 37.3).
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(Livy 42.59.4–5):
... the Thessalian cavalry, which had been in support (in subsidiis), away a short
distance from the left wing and beyond the melee, though at first spectators of the
conflict, were later, when the decision had been reached, of the greatest use. For,
retreating gradually with formation intact (cedentes enim sensim integris ordinibus),
after they had joined the auxiliaries of Eumenes, with him they both provided a safe
retreat (receptum) between their units (inter ordines) for their allies scattered in flight,
and when the enemy pressed on in less close order (minus conferti), they even risked
advancing and met many of the fugitives half–way. Nor did the king's men, now
themselves scattered in a general pursuit (passim sequendo), dare to close in battle
with an enemy in formation and advancing steadily (ordinatis et certo incedentibus
gradu).446
The Thessalian cavalry was effective in securing the retreat of the rest of the light infantry
and cavalry. In this instance, they maintained close order and gradual movement. Note,
however, that the Thessalians also alternated retreat with advance to further delay the enemy
and to take the fight to the pursuers, who were reluctant to engage because they themselves
were disordered in pursuit. The rationale for Onasander’s (Strat. 27) argument that units must
maintain close order whether in advance or retreat is well–demonstrated in this example. This
case makes clear the value of proficient, light–armed cavalry in the event of a retreat.
Cavalry were even faster than light infantry, even if the cavalrymen themselves were
relatively heavily equipped, and so they could more safely advance and retreat repeatedly. In
this way a reliable cavalry unit could provide support for the slower withdrawal of infantry
formations and even of other cavalry. Cavalrymen equipped with missile weapons were
perhaps even better suited to the conduct of fighting retreats, as they had great speed and
manoeuvrability and could engage in fire–and–retreat tactics that not only threatened enemy
pursuers, but inflicted casualties. Some of the auxiliary cavalry fielded by the Romans, such
as Numidians, were particularly well–suited to this style of fighting.447 Both Roman and
auxiliary cavalry could therefore serve well in defending retrograde movements by milites.
446 Trans. Evan T. Sage and Alfred C. Schlesinger, 1938. 447 Sabin, 2007, 422; Sekunda, 2007, 353.
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This is important to note, for the roles of Roman and auxiliary cavalry in supporting Roman
retreats has been overlooked in modern scholarship.448
The precise tactical roles of Roman light infantry (velites) are uncertain.449 The subject of
how the Romans used light infantry in battle has not traditionally been well studied, but it has
been suggested that light infantry skirmished at the start of a battle, sometimes for hours, and
then once they had exhausted their missiles they retired, playing no further part in battle.450 In
this schema of light infantry fighting, as they expended their missiles in the opening stages of
an engagement, they would have been of little assistance to the heavily–armed milites during
a retreat or withdrawal. However, significant work has been done recently on the importance
of missile combat by scholars such as Zhmodikov and Slavik.451 Essentially, Zhmodikov has
argued that fighting with missiles, in particular with pila, was heavy and ongoing throughout
Roman battles, and Sabin has incorporated this argument into his concept of ‘safety
distance’.452 Slavik has refined these arguments by considering the role of the velites, positing
that it was they and other skirmishers that did most of the ranged combat and not the
legionaries, who did hurl their pila (which were limited in supply) but then fought mostly
with swords, as had previously been generally recognised.453 Also, it has been noted that light
infantry frequently operated alongside cavalry in battle.454 Given this link, since cavalry was
used to support retrograde movements, the same logic should apply to light–armed infantry,
which surely also had a role in retreats and withdrawals.
448 For instance, this function of cavalry is not mentioned in McCall’s (2001, 53–77) detailed and considered analysis of Republican Roman cavalry tactics. Nor is it mentioned in the Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare (cf. Sabin, 2007, 422–5; Sekunda, 2007, 352–4).Cavalry could also protect infantry during routs (eg. Xen. Hell. 6.5.13–4, 7.5.24–5; Sall. Jug. 103). 449 Slavik, 2018, 154–6, 164. 450 Sabin, 2007, 409. 451 Zhmodikov, 2000 and Slavik, 2018. 452 Zhmodikov, 2000, 67–70, 78. Zhmodikov argues that it was the milites who did much of this type of fighting, by exchanging pila for extended periods instead of clashing hand–to–hand. Sabin has combined this idea with his own concept of the ‘safety distance’ to argue that periods of missile combat (again with pila) gave heavy infantry space and time to recover between bouts of hand–to–hand fighting (Sabin, 2000, 12). 453 Slavik, 2018, 165–8. Whether Slavik is more correct that Zhmodikov or not regarding the preponderance of pila in missile exchanges, both scholars show that missile combat was a more significant element of Roman battles than has always been recognised. 454 Sekunda, 2007, 353.
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It is possible that lightly equipped infantry could perform a similar function during a retreat
to the cavalry (Caes. BCiv. 1.79.1), but heavy infantrymen were probably too slow and
heavily burdened for such tactics. Indeed, enemy light infantry could pose great difficulties to
milites who found it difficult to catch them (BAfr. 71). Light infantry also had the freedom of
movement to carry more missile weapons and to move around the battlefield retrieving
weapons that had already been thrown, and so these velites could continue to engage in
missile combat for hours, if necessary.455 In terms of how light infantry worked alongside the
units of milites that formed the battleline, it has been suggested that if gaps were maintained
between Roman maniples or cohorts during battle, then light infantry could fill these gaps
and attack, retreat or support the milites as necessary.456 In particular, Slavik has argued that
light infantry remained in support throughout a battle and, as long as velites maintained their
supply of missiles, they could be used to hold the enemy in place to support manoeuvres by
the milites.457 Slavik points out that velites could thus be used to facilitate the conduct of
line–relief and, extending his logic, the same support could obviously be given to soldiers in
retreat.458 It should be noted that velites were gradually phased out of Roman armies from the
second to first centuries BC, but they were replaced with auxiliary light infantry of all kinds
that could skirmish in the same manner, who must have performed the same functions as the
velites had done in previous times.459 Thus, light infantry no doubt played an important role
in supporting retreats or withdrawals by Roman armies, throwing missiles and suppressing
potential pursuers as the milites disengaged, and perhaps cooperating with the cavalry to do
so.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that successful retrograde movements in the presence of the
enemy generally had two main features; they were orderly, and the retiring army fought off or
prevented close pursuit by the enemy. There are several components to these two features of
successful retrograde movements, and as I have discussed the use of camps and high ground
previously, in this chapter I have discussed other key factors, maintaining physical order and
455 Slavik, 2018, 168. 456 Taylor, 2007, 319–20, cf. Sall. Jug. 49.6. 457 Slavik, 2018, 168. Cf. Polyb. 3.110. 458 Slavik, 2018, 168. 459 Bell, 1965, 419–21. Cf. Caes. BGall. 2.10, 19, 24.
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using reserves. When it came to maintaining order, retiring heavy infantry maintained ratio
by combining close order with gradual movement, and retiring while still facing the enemy.
In this way, retreating troops could still appear formidable and thereby dissuade enemies
from pursuing them. Discipline was necessary to facilitate this orderliness, and was produced
by training and the leadership of veterans and officers, particularly centuriones and tribuni,
who provided coercion, inspiration and direction. Roman infantry received enough training in
battlefield manoeuvre from the Middle Republic onward to perform retrograde manoeuvres
in battle, and by the time of Caesar their training in retrograde manoeuvres was even more
sophisticated. The Romans also had formal signals for retreat and were well organised into
formal units and sub–units, allowing some milites to retreat while others supported them by
line–relief, maintaining the integrity of the battleline. The Romans habitually maintained
reserve infantry lines in the triplex acies, but they also utilised separate cavalry and light
infantry units which were particularly adept at protecting retreating infantry and fighting
pursuers. Light infantry could use their missiles and freedom of movement to support
retreating milites, while cavalry were particularly capable at intimidating or actively
countering enemy pursuers.
Thus, factors of training, formal organisation, leadership and combined arms composition of
Roman armies all united to make Roman armies well–suited to conducting orderly retreats
and withdrawals. In addition to the discipline and organisation of milites and their junior
leaders, because Roman armies included strong contingents of soldiers who had variety of
armaments and roles, such as javelineers, archers and cavalry, and maintained reserve
infantry lines, they had several tactical options for dissuading or beating back enemy
pursuers. Most Roman armies, therefore, had all the tools they needed to maintain order in
retreat or withdrawal and also to counteract enemy pursuit, and so to retire successfully.
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…when the vanguard was thrown into confusion the legion posted on that wing could not
stand its ground and withdrew to the nearest hill. Finding nearly the whole of his line panic–
stricken – an event as unusual as it was unexpected – Caesar exhorts his men and leads the
Ninth Legion to their support. He checks the foe who are pursuing our men with insolent
daring, and compels them again to turn and retreat to the town of Ilerda and halt beneath the
walls.
(Caes. BCiv. 1.44.4–45.1)
Chapter Four
Roman Retreat Tactics, Part II: Virtus, Consilium and
Scientia Rei Militaris
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Introduction
Recall that at Ilerda in 49 BC, Caesar’s men had pursued their foes up a hill upon which sat
the eponymous town, where they found themselves unable to retreat safely (Caes. BCiv.
1.45). Prior to this impetuous advance, his men had actually been driven into retreat from
another hill close to Ilerda, but Caesar had personally intervened with reinforcements and
hurled back the enemy, thereby giving his excited troops the opportunity to pursue the enemy
to that difficult position on the slope of Ilerda itself (1.44–5). Caesar’s intervention appears to
have been decisive in preventing that part of his army from suffering a rout. Could a general
typically have had such impact, and what other actions could they take to secure a safe retreat
or withdrawal?
As pointed out by Sabin, good generalship was perhaps the most important factor in any
army’s victory or defeat.460 It has been demonstrated that most Roman armies had all of the
tools they needed to conduct orderly retrograde manoeuvres, but the importance of a
general’s decisions and leadership are yet to be examined in detail. This chapter will consist
of a more detailed discussion of the latter subject. First, a brief and general overview of the
Roman concept of a general, and the roles and responsibilities of the general prior to and
during battle, will be given. Following this, the general’s role will be examined in
circumstances more specific to retreats, including retreats from the battleline and into a
fortified position, retreats out of fortified positions, and marching withdrawals over longer
distances. The chapter will then conclude by summarising the discussion, and outlining the
relationship between generalship and the tactics of successful retreats and withdrawals that
have already been discussed.
460 Sabin, 2007, 430.
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The Roman Imperator
The Romans had a variety of important officers, including legati, tribuni, quaestores and
centuriones. Under certain circumstances, any such officer could command significant
forces.461 However, a Roman general was usually a senior aristocrat, appointed by the senate
for a specific campaign, typically middle–aged and with some level of experience in military
matters.462 While the skill and experience of these men varied, the competitiveness of
command appointments meant that sooner or later, the Romans would oppose their enemies
with one or more capable commanders.463 Legati were of a similar background and held the
most responsibility next to the general himself, and so would most often lead the army in his
absence.464 For the purposes of this chapter then, the term ‘general’ will apply to these senior
men, whether imperator, legatus or otherwise, who commanded an entire Roman army.465
To begin with, how did the Romans themselves conceive of a good general? In his speech on
the Lex Manilia in 66 BC, Cicero listed a number of qualities that the ideal Roman general
should possess, namely ‘industry (labor) in business, fortitude (fortitudo) amid dangers,
energy (industria) in acting, rapidity (celeritas) in executing, wisdom (consilium) in
foreseeing’ (Cic. Leg. Man. 11.29). Several authors also use the phrase scientia rei militaris to
describe a general’s overall proficiency in military matters.466 Caesar, in his depiction of his
own actions at the Battle of Alesia, 52 BC, provides an exemplar for how such a general
might behave in action. Caesar, having trapped Vercingetorix and his army in Alesia and
circumvallated the town, predicted attacks from a Gallic relief army and so stockpiled large
amounts of supplies and built a second wall outside the existing wall (Caes. BGall. 7.74). At
461 Cf. Caes. BGall. 1.52; Livy 25.19.9–10; Gilliver, 2007, 137; Rosenstein, 2011, 136. 462 There were exceptions, particularly in periods of civil strife when the senate’s authority broke down. For instance, in 84 BC, at only 23 years of age, Pompey raised an own army from his own clients and went on campaign (Plut. Pomp. 6). Further, in the Late Republic onward, commanders were increasingly of non–aristocratic origin and the senate had less control over their appointment (Rosenstein, 2011, 144). Also see Campbell, 1987, 20–1. 463 Sabin, 2007, 433; Hoyos, 2011, 76. 464 For example, on occasions during his Gallic campaigns, Caesar left his legate Titus Labienus in command of several legions (Caes. BGall. 2.11, 4.38, 5.8). 465 Throughout the following discussion, I will utilise the term imperator as a synonym for a Roman general rather than as a specific descriptor for a general who had been acclaimed as such by his troops in the field (cf. Southern, 2007, 172). 466 Caes. BGall. 3.23.5, 7.57.3, BAlex. 31.1.9; Cic. Font. 43.6, Man. 28.3, 28.13, ad Fam. 13.57.1; Tac. Ann. 12.40.9, Front. Strat. 1.1. Cicero, again in his speech on the Lex Manilia (10.28), listed four key virtues of the good general as scientiam rei militaris, virtutem, auctoritatem, felicitatem.
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the climax of multiple Gallic attempts to breach these defences, Caesar moved to high ground
and personally observed the fighting (BGall. 7.85), despatched timely reinforcements to
trouble spots (7.86–7), and finally intervened personally, bolstering the morale of his men by
the sight of his red cloak (7.87). In his actions at Alesia, Caesar displayed all of Cicero’s five
qualities, and scientia rei militaris. Such dramatic leadership may not have been the norm,
and it might be noted that Caesar remained detached from the fighting for as long as possible,
but it may be seen that a combination of energy and good decision–making characterised a
good general.
Roman generals who trained and disciplined their troops rigorously were praised by Roman
writers, for example the Scipiones Africanus and Aemilianus, the vir militaris Gaius Marius,
and the Julio–Claudian general Gnaeus Domitius Corbulo.467 Maintaining disciplina militaris
was certainly considered to have been an important part of a general’s responsibilities,
although excessive severitas could be frowned upon and a good general might also show
solidarity with the soldiers by participating in labor himself.468 Cicero also spoke favourably
of Fabius Maximus Cunctator, in that the latter was well–read in military history (Cic. Sen.
11). However, a man of less education but greater experience could also make an argument
for being a good general, as did Gaius Marius when he compared the leadership of the
traditional aristocracy to a novus homo such as himself: he said quae illi litteris, ea ego
militando didici (Sall. Jug. 85.13). Despite Marius’ criticism however, competition and the
leadership of men in the public space had always been an inherent part of an aristocrat’s
upbringing, and such experience will have lent itself well to military command.469 Cicero
certainly admitted the importance of experience in addition to learning from textbooks and
exempla.470 A good general thus kept control of his men, who were of a lower class, and
whether through education or experience, or both, he was knowledgeable in military affairs.
467 Africanus: Polyb. 10.20. Aemilianus: Livy 26.51.4. Marius: Sall. Jug. 63. Corbulo: Tac. Ann. 13.35. 468 Phang, 2008, 76, 112–3. Even Caesar, who could be mild with his soldiers even in the face of serious disobedience (Caes. BGall. 7.52; BAfr. 85), would still administer punishments when necessary or expedient (BCiv. 3.74). 469 Rosenstein, 2010, 367–371, 381. 470 Campbell, 1987, 21.
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The Romans also had a variety of criticisms for generals whom they considered to be poor.
When Velleius Paterculus condemned the general Varus, who had been killed in the clades
Variana of AD 9, he said that Varus was a marcor ducis (Vell. Pat 2.119.2) who lacked spirit
for fighting (2.119.3) and judgement (120.5), while Suetonius said of the same general that he
had acted with temeritas and neglegentia (Suet. Tib. 18).471 In his account of the Battle of
Atuatuca in 54 BC, Caesar (BGall. 5.32–7) contrasts the behaviour of the two Roman
generals, Sabinus and Cotta. The former panicked and dashed around from cohort to cohort
aimlessly, spreading his own nervousness, while Cotta moved about encouraging men and
even led the milites in charging and fighting (5.33, 35). Evidently, a good general was
expected to be spirited, but also calm, decisive and effective in his actions.472
The Romans considered success in battle to be less a result of the general’s orderly
arrangement of forces in the Greek manner, and more due to his own display of virtus by
facilitating charges and showing personal charisma, and scientia rei militaris through
management of terrain.473 Good tactics had to be adapted to the situation, as even in a retreat
there was no strict doctrine that Roman generals would follow.474 Strict technical competence
was thus not a key Roman consideration for a good general. It is therefore clear that the
Romans thought of a good general’s military ability in terms of several key qualities,
particularly military knowledge (scientia rei militaris), courage (virtus) and wisdom
(consilium), which were products of his background, education and experience.475
471 On the fairness of these criticisms, cf. Ch. 6, 219–20. Temeritas was a criticism also levelled against Alexander the Great by Quintus Curtius (Alex. 5.11.10), but this was countered by Alexander’s exceptional fortuna (Baynham, 1998, 108). Varus was not so fortunate (cf. Tac. Ann. 1.61). Fortuna was thus also considered an important quality of a general that could counteract unfavourable qualities. 472 Indeed even a general who was defeated in battle was not necessarily looked down upon by his contemporaries, as long as he had displayed virtus. That is moral courage, in making and adhering to decisions, and also physical courage, by remaining near the front line to observe the fighting and encourage the milites. See Rosenstein, 1990, 151–2; Goldsworthy, 1996, 164–5, 169–70. 473 Lendon, 1999, 323–5. 474 Onasander’s discussion of the retreat simply states that a general should keep his troops in formation (Strat. 2.27). He does not prescribe how to do so. Frontinus (Strat. 1.5, 2.13) briefly lists a number of stratagems that a general might use to distract or deceive pursuers, but these will have been vague guidelines for a general in action. It was clearly up to the general to keep his troops in order, and perhaps deceive the enemy to allow a retreat, but the methods of doing so were very much left to the commander. 475 As mentioned, the Romans also considered luck important. Sulla, for example, made much of his fortuna, hence his agnomen Felix (Plut. Sull. 44).
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The General’s Tactical Duties
While the Romans conceived of a good general in terms of his personal qualities, this belies
the fact that there were indeed many technical tasks he had to perform to do his job
effectively. The general had much to do even before battle was joined, as it was difficult for
him to influence events once his unwieldy battleline clashed with the enemy’s, and so he had
to do as much as possible to give his own army the advantage prior to this point.476 Logistics
were a key factor, and a good general would extensively plan for how his army would receive
sufficient supplies during a campaign.477 He would probably be assisted in this by other
officers such as the quaestor.478 Training the army and earning the respect and confidence of
the soldiers was a primary objective for a general.479 Prior to any fighting, the first thing a
general might have done was to gather and interpret intelligence in order to decide on his next
movements.480 However, throughout the Republic and even into the Principate, neither the
Romans nor their opponents had any significant institutional intelligence capabilities.481 The
'blindness' with which operations were conducted meant that commanders were constantly
reacting to the movements of their opponents and could easily blunder into their opposition,
forcing a battle in a location that perhaps neither general anticipated nor desired.482 Even
Caesar, who had an excellent reputation for reconnaissance, still found himself fighting in
unfavourable positions on multiple occasions.483 Although Roman generals had a consilium,
there was no formal staff structure and so the burden fell completely on the general to
organise the collection and interpretation of intelligence.484
476 Sabin, 2007, 406. 477 Roth, 1999, 154–5, 276–7, 327–8, 331. 478 Ibid., 277. 479 Sabin, 2007, 432; Phang, 2008, 76, 112–3. 480 Sabin, 2007, 406. 481 Austin and Rankov, 1995, 108, 246; Sheldon, 2001, 26, 30. Personal reconnaissance by the general and/or his subordinates was the main source of information that a general could utilise to plan for the location of a battle, and there were therefore great differences in the level of information one commander might have access to relative to another (Austin & Rankov, 1995, 86, 107–8, 244). Some generals were more lax than others (Sage, 2008, 135–6), but even the best commanders could find themselves fighting on unfavourable ground (Goldsworthy, 1996, 128). 482 Stand–out examples of how such reactive movement could have enormous consequences for a battle's location and outcome include the rushed deployment of Philip V's army at Cynoscephalae, 190 BC (Polyb. 18.22) and the decisive cornering of Afranius and Petreius by Caesar near Ilerda in 49 BC, after extensive manoeuvring (Caes. BCiv. 1.61–84). 483 Goldsworthy, 1996, 128. 484 Eg Caes. BGall 1.39–40. See Sabin, 2007, 406–7.
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Having gathered some amount of intelligence and assuming the general’s army had not
blundered into the enemy, his next step was to decide whether a battle should be fought, and
to decide where and when to do so.485 A general might consult with his subordinates, and
perhaps even take into account the mood of the milites, in making such a decision.486 Ideally
a general would give this own army every possible advantage, fighting on terrain that suited
his army and disadvantaged the enemy’s.487 The general would then need to arrange his army
into an orderly and simple battleline that could be maintained during the chaos of battle, and
he might establish a specific reserve force to react to changing circumstances, although the
triplex acies itself meant that the Romans habitually deployed with reserve lines.488
A general would speak to his men, or as many as he could, to try and boost their morale.489
Generals could attempt to move units or men around to counter the enemy deployment and
pit strong units against weak ones, but this was laborious and probably not always
advisable.490 Scipio Africanus’ post–deployment manoeuvres at Ilipa in 206 BC constituted
an unusual case executed by a talented general with an unusually skilled army (Polyb. 11.23).
Following preparations, the two armies would likely engage one another.
Once battle was joined, the ways in which a general could influence matters were somewhat
limited due to the primitive methods of command and control in ancient armies.491 Roman
generals had a tendency to remain detached from front–line fighting so that they had a
broader view of events, unlike Alexander and his Hellenistic emulators.492 The general might
thus communicate by messengers or by musical and visual signals.493 His main duties during
the battle would be to inspire his men by his presence, and to commit reserve forces or his
485 Goldsworthy, 1996, 167. A general who had a strong enough advantage in intelligence could possibly even win a bloodless victory, as Caesar did at Ilerda, 49 BC, by manoeuvring the Pompeians into a position where they could not escape nor forage (Caes. BCiv. 1.73–84; Cagniart, 1995, 41–2). 486 Eg. Caes. BGall. 1.2, 1.52, 3.3; BCiv. 1.41, 1.72. 487 Sabin, 2007, 404, 406, 432. 488 Ibid., 404–5. Cf. Caes. BGall. 2.20; BAfr. 60. 489 Sabin, 2007, 406. 490 Ibid., 407. 491 Ibid., 403, 406. 492 Ibid., 408. Plutarch (Pyrr. 16) gives an idealized view of combining both the Alexandrian ideal of engaging in personal combat, while maintaining the presence of mind to manage the wider battle, but surely both fighting and managing the army was generally not possible. 493 Goldsworthy, 1996, 168.
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own personal guard at decisive points in the struggle.494 For example, when Tiberius attacked
a Dalmatian stronghold in AD 9, as his plan was a straightforward one and he had little to do,
he sat to watch the fighting in full view of the army, so that his men would fight to impress
him, and also so that he could see clearly when and where to commit reserves (Dio 56.13.3–
4). Flank attacks were a simple but highly effective tactic, and generals might strive to effect
them while the heavy infantry clashed in the centre.495 If necessary, some generals would
become involved in the fighting itself to bolster the morale of their troops, and a very few
even fought in the front line.496 Overall, as a general’s influence in battle was limited, the
main functions of the general were to observe the fighting, encourage their men where
necessary, and direct reserves as the situation required.497
Finally, it must be noted that a battleline could be too long, and visibility on a battlefield too
limited, for a single man to oversee the fighting in every place.498 For this reason, a Roman
general would also assign subordinate officers to other parts of the line to perform a similar
role to his own, that is to oversee the fighting, encourage the men, and possibly manoeuvre or
commit reserves.499 Such officers might have been tribunes, praetors, quaestors, co–consuls,
or legati.500 The flexibility of the Roman command structure meant that subordinates could
have significant latitude in their own tactics, as for instance a tribune commanded the
decisive Roman flanking attack at Cynoscphalae in 197 BC (Polyb. 18.26), and at the Battle
of the Sabis in 57, Caesar’s left flank under Titus Labienus defeated the enemies opposed to
them and stormed the enemy camp while the rest of the battleline remained relatively
stationary (Caes. BGall. 2.23, 26). However, even if an army had multiple commanders or
sub–commanders of senior rank, there was typically one man who was the general.501 The
494 Sabin, 2007, 408. 495 Ibid., 411, 413. 496 Goldsworthy, 1996, 168–9. There are several examples of such behaviour among Roman generals, particularly those viewed favourably by the sources such as Marius (Sall. Jug. 98), Sulla (App. Mith. 49), and Caesar (Caes. BGall. 2.25). 497 Goldsworthy, 1996, 165, 169; Sabin, 2007, 432. 498 Sabin, 2007, 408. 499 Goldsworthy, 1996, 168. At Cynoscephalae in 197 BC, the decisive flanking attack was led by a tribune (Polyb. 18.26.1–3. When preparing for a major battle, Caesar appears to have placed his legions under the command a variety of senior officers (Caes. BGall. 1.52, 2.11). Polybius also gives several examples of split command (cf. 3.114, 14.4, 15.12). 500 On the active role of military tribunes, cf. Eckstein, 2006, 219. For examples of delegation or split command, cf. Polyb. 3.114, 14.4, 15.12; Caes. BGall. 1.52, 2.11. 501 For instance, in the campaign of Cannae, 216 BC, the consuls Terentius Varro and Aemilius Paulus alternated their commands from day to day (cf. Polyb. 3.110–2–4, 112–113.1), and when it came to battle, their battleline
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difference between this man and the other senior commanders with similar roles is that he
could travel across the entire battlefield and intervene where he deemed necessary, as Caesar
did at the Battle of the Sabis, 57 BC (Caes. BGall. 2.25–6) and at Alesia in 52 (BGall. 7.86–
7), while subordinate commanders remained at their assigned part of the battleline.502 A
general also had the power to punish or reward his soldiers. For example, Caesar would
lecture his soldiers when they performed poorly, and punish certain individuals if necessary,
and a harsher disciplinarian, such as the Imperial general Gnaeus Domitius Corbulo, could
push his men to their physical limits and dispense brutal punishments, but also earn their
respect by displaying his own virtus.503 There was also occasionally the possibility of severe
exemplary punishment, such as decimation.504 As such, the general’s mere presence could be
a significant source of both motivation and coercion. Therefore, while in some cases there
were other senior officers who could encourage and lead the milites and even commit
reserves, the general’s presence had greater impact and the burden fell more heavily on him
to do these tasks in the correct time and place.
While the technical requirements of generalship in battle were rather simple, they required
very precise and calm judgement, which under the circumstances required significant
physical and moral bravery. As such, the Roman belief that a good general was primarily a
man of good character, possessing courage, knowledge and wisdom, accurately encapsulates
the personal qualities that a man will have needed to perform the various tasks and duties
tasks of a general well and under pressure.
Generalship in Retreats from the Battleline and Into a Fortified Position
In previous chapters, a variety of scenarios in which retreats were conducted have been
examined. The most prominent scenario concerns retreats directly from a battleline. In
addition, retreats into or out of fortified positions have been considered, as well as
withdrawals over longer distances. It has been shown that each situation was different and
required the use of different tactics and, therefore, different actions by a general. The roles
was split into a centre and two wings, with each consul commanding one wing and two consular legati commanding the centre (3.114), yet Terentius was clearly in overall command (3.113.1). 502 Goldsworthy, 1996, 168. 503 Caes. BGall. 7.52, BCiv. 3.73–4; Tac. Ann. 13.35–6. 504 Eg. Plut. Ant. 39.7. Decimation was uncommon in the Middle Republic, but came back into use during the civil strife of the Late Republic (Goldberg 2015, 158–9).
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played by generals in these distinct circumstances will be discussed below. First, however, let
us consider how a general could prepare for retreat from battle and what he might do to
facilitate the process.
A battle would ideally be fought on ground of a general’s choosing, so how did his choice of
battlefield impact upon the possibility of retreat?505 Assuming the terrain was not so hostile or
unknown as to prevent the Romans from fighting a pitched battle, it was not uncommon for
the Romans to fight battles near high ground to which they could retreat if necessary, as at
Nicopolis in 48 BC, or (perhaps inadvertently) at the Romano-Numidian battle of 106 BC.506
It is striking that Polybius (2.32–3) castigates the consul Gaius Flaminius for deploying his
army against the Insubres in 223 BC with the river Clusius to its back, a calculated risk that
left the Romans with ‘no room to fall back gradually’.507 Evidently, a general was expected to
leave his army some line of retreat when choosing a place for battle. The use of rivers as
tactical devices or defensive barriers in battle was also fairly common.508 Rivers could also
be used to delay enemy pursuers, as Labienus did in 53 BC.509 That said, a river provided
inferior defence to that of high ground or a properly fortified camp (Livy 23.26.10). A general
will therefore have looked for terrain that allowed the placement of a strong camp, or at least
offered the army some prospect of safe retreat to a hill or town.
505 Sabin, 2007, 403–4. 506 Nicopolis: Caes. B. Alex. 40. Romano-Numidian battle of 106: Sall. Jug. 98. The Numidian battle was not a planned engagement for the Romans, so the presence of nearby hills was perhaps better luck than management. In hostile and unknown terrain, however, such as at Carrhae in 53 BC (Plut. Crass. 23–7) or Kalkriese in AD 9 (Dio 56.18–22.2), the Romans might be forced to fight with no safe line of retreat, a nightmare scenario for the general and his men. 507 Polyb. 2.32–3. Note that the consul Tiberius Sempronius Longus made a similar calculated risk at the Trebia in 218 BC (Polyb. 3.72), and the only part of his army to survive was the centre, which broke through the enemy and conducted a fighting withdrawal (Polyb. 3.74), while the rest of the army was destroyed with their backs to the river. 508 There are a few examples from our period of rivers being used as defensive obstacles, or otherwise interfering with the movement of combatants: Polyb. 2.33–4; Caes. BGall. 1.53, 2.23, 4.15, BCiv. 3.71; Livy 39.31; App. Pun. 102. Note also the predilection of the Achaemenid Persians for using rivers in such a way, such as at the Granicus in 334 BC (Arr. Anab. 1.13) and Issus in 333 (2.10), to reinforce their battlelines against Alexander III’s Macedonians. 509 Caes. BGall. 6.7–8. Also see Livy 37.38.1–4.
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If the terrain was not favourable, the Romans could use other tactics to secure a retrograde
movement in open ground. In a retreat carried out at Dyrrhachium in 48 BC, Caesar utilised
several kinds of ad hoc obstacles, including ditches and hurdles, to delay pursuing troops
(Caes. BCiv. 3.46). In 211 BC, Gnaeus Scipio was withdrawing in an attempt to evade
Carthaginian forces that had recently destroyed his brother’s army, but was brought to battle
at Ilorca and forced to halt his army on a hill that was not steep enough to provide significant
defensive value (Livy 25.35–6). In this scenario, Scipio used sarcinae and other baggage to
create a makeshift rampart, somewhat hindering the enemy, although the Romans were still
overwhelmed (25.36.1–13). However, there are overall few examples of the use of obstacles
to assist fighting retreats in open ground. This is probably because there must have generally
been little time to organise or plan the use of obstacles to assist such a retreat.510 In general,
rather than rely on such tactics, the Romans fought in a location where the army had access to
a place of refuge in the event of defeat.511
Aside from preparing for the event, the personal actions a general could take to assist his
army during a retreat are revealed in a number of illustrative examples. Sallust's account of
the Romano-Numidian battle in 106 BC (Jug. 97–8) emphasises the role of Marius in
organising a safe retreat in an unfavourable situation. When his army was thrown into
confusion by a surprise attack, Marius intervened with his personal guard of cavalry, assisting
the hard–pressed groups of milites, charging the enemy, giving orders by hand gestures, and
generally rallying his forces so that he could withdraw them to a nearby hill (98.1–4).
Caesar’s accounts of his own battles demonstrate that, in the event his men had to retreat, he
would manoeuvre reserves to intimidate pursuers.512 At Dyrrhachium, 49 BC, he deployed
archers both to construct obstacles and to protect a retreating legion from pursuers (Caes.
BCiv. 3.46). Caesar clearly kept a close watch on what was happening at all times and would
personally intervene to encourage or reinforce his men if absolutely necessary.513 Caesar
implies, in his account of the Battle of Atuatuca, 53 BC, that a good general verbally
encouraged his men as they fought (Caes. BGall. 5.35.5). The fact that a general's death or
510 Much could be done with more time to prepare, such as Pompey’s elaborate preparations at Brundisium (Caes. BCiv. 1.27–8). 511 Higher ground: Polyb. 2.68, 3.86, 11.22; Caes. BCiv. 1.79, 2.41–2, 3.46, 3.95, BAlex. 40; Sall. Jug. 98; Livy 5.38, 32.12; App. Hann. 41, Pun. 103. The Romans usually had a camp near their chosen battlefields (Caes. BGall. 7.49–51; BCiv. 1.45–6; Sabin, 2007, 414). 512 Caes. BGall. 7.49; BCiv. 1.45. 513 Caes. BGall. 2.25–6, 7.87–8, BCiv. 3.65.
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flight during battle could easily trigger a rout shows his importance in motivating the army,
even in retreat, as is shown by the reaction of the Carthaginian army when their general Mago
Barca fell during a retreat in 203 BC.514 Clearly, the importance of a general’s personal
presence during a retreat cannot be overstated, and a good imperator, such as Marius or
Caesar, was highly visible during a retreat.
Once the army was in retreat, it will commonly have withdrawn into its camp or a fortified
position, but such a manoeuvre was dangerous, perhaps impossible, if the enemy could not be
kept at arm’s length while the army moved into or out of a camp or town.515 Although
retreating armies were vulnerable when retreating into a fortified place, this did not mean
pursuers always had free rein. Consider Caesar’s account of the later stages of the Battle of
Pharsalus, 48 BC, after Caesar’s men had driven the Pompeians from the field towards their
camp, with Pompeius himself arriving first (Caes. BCiv. 3.94–6):
Pompeius ... left the field and straightway rode off to the camp. To the centurions
whom he had placed on duty at the praetorian gate he exclaimed in a loud voice that
the troops might hear: ‘Protect the camp and defend it carefully (castra et defendite
diligenter) if anything goes amiss. I am going round the other gates and encouraging
the guards of the camp ...’ Having said this, he betook himself to the general's
headquarters, mistrusting his fortunes and yet waiting to see the issue ... the camp was
being zealously defended (industrie defendebantur) by the cohorts which had been
left there on guard, and much more keenly still (multo etiam acrius) by the Thracians
and barbaric auxiliaries. For the soldiers who had fled from the battlefield (qui acie
refugerant milites) panic–stricken in spirit and exhausted by fatigue, many of them
having thrown away their arms and their military standards, were thinking more of
further flight than of the defence of the camp. Nor could those who had planted
themselves on the rampart stand up any longer against the multitude of javelins, but,
worn out by wounds, quitted their position (sed confecti vulneribus locum
reliquerunt), and forthwith all, following the guidance of centurions and military
tribunes, fled for refuge (confugerunt) to some very lofty hills that stretched up to the
514 Livy 30.18.12–4; Sabin, 2007, 432. 515 Cf. Pol 14.4–6; Livy 25.39; App. Mith. 44. See Ch 2, 84–6.
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camp.516
As is clear, specific preparations had been made prior to the battle for the defence of the
camp in the event it was attacked or, presumably, if the Pompeians were forced to retreat into
the camp. There were centuriones on duty at the praetoria porta and evidently the other gates
were guarded too (... reliquas portas ... et castrorum praesidia confirmo). There were some
number of cohorts (ie. legionaries) left on guard–duty in the camp during the battle, in
addition to number of Thracians and other auxiliaries, who all were supposed to defend the
camp strongly (industrie defendebantur). In the event, the disorganised and demoralised men
who had fled from the battlefield were of little assistance, and Caesar’s army was able to
overwhelm the other defenders. However, the key point is that although Pompey’s army was
no longer fit for battle, his camp was well–defended enough by other, fresh troops that it
could make a strong effort at holding off an enemy attack. Posting soldiers specifically to
defend a camp during battle was probably a routine procedure by attentive generals.517 These
men thus provided a final line of defence against pursuers in the event that an army was
driven from the battlefield and was able to return to camp.518
Aside from having assigned these men to guard the camp in the first place, a general might
also do a circuit of the camp to ensure that everybody was in place to defend it, and give
encouragement to his men (Caes. BCiv. 3.94). However, Pompey himself withdrew to his
headquarters (se in praetorium contulit) instead of overseeing the defence (Caes. BCiv. 3.94),
and, when the camp was taken, he fled, stripping off his general’s insignia (3.96). In essence,
Caesar is accusing Pompey of not doing his duty as a general by not remaining to oversee the
actual fighting.519 According to Caesar then, a Roman general should have left all the gates
guarded and assigned reliable men to defend the camp in the event that the army was
516 Trans. A. G. Peskett, 1914. 517 At Magnesia (190 BC), Appian specifically points out (Syr. 6.36) that the Romans had not left any cavalry or light troops to defend their camp, as the general expected that a nearby river provided enough defence, and conversely that the Seleucids did indeed have men guarding their own camp. Appian thus implies that it was actually unusual for the Romans to have done this. 518 Livy (7.7.1–5) describes an engagement between the Romans and Hernici in 362 BC, in which the Romans sheltered in a camp, having previously been defeated, but when their enemy attempted to storm the camp the Romans defeated them and threw them back in confusion. 519 Note that Pompey had also previously left his men during the battle itself to withdraw to the camp (Caes. BCiv. 3.94). Whether or not Pompey truly behaved in a manner so uncharacteristic of such an experienced general, Caesar infers what his responsibilities should have been.
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defeated. He should have encouraged the men and remained present during the fighting, and
as the camp fell, he should have withdrawn his soldiers to another defensible position, just as
Pompey’s subordinates did (3.95).
Other examples demonstrate better conduct by generals who found themselves in dire straits.
One might compare Pompey’s alleged behaviour at Pharsalus to the conduct of Aulus
Caecina Severus in Germany in AD 15. Caecina and his men, having been ambushed and
forced to encamp, and expecting a major enemy attack, were in low spirits (Tac. Ann. 1.65).
Confusion arose in the camp and in their panic the soldiers attempted to flee from the
fortifications, when Caecina intervened to stop his men and even threw himself down in the
gateway to prevent the men passing over him (Ann. 1.66). By a combination of the general’s
efforts and the entreaties of the tribunes and centurions, the men were brought back to order
and the army saved (1.66–8). A good general would thus personally intervene to prevent
premature retreat or flight into or out of a camp.520 If all attempts at retreat or withdrawal
failed, a general could always surrender to save his men. At Ilerda in 49 BC, after the
Pompeians failed to withdraw and were trapped by Caesar’s army, the Pompeian general
Afranius surrendered to Caesar, motivated by the plight of his suffering milites (Caes. BCiv.
1.84). Caesar, who was otherwise critical of Afranius (BCiv. 1.75) did not fault him in this
instance (1.85). And if neither retreat nor surrender were possible, a courageous general
would die with his men, as did Aemilius Paulus at Cannae (Polyb. 3.116), Aurunculeius Cotta
at Atuatuca in 54 BC (Caes. BGall. 5.37), and Quinctilius Varus at Kalkriese in AD 9 (Dio
56.21.5).
During a retreat from battle then, the Roman general needed to plan effectively by choosing a
battle site and camp location that offered refuge to retreating men, he had to deploy his army
in such a way that it could fall back if necessary, to boost the morale of the soldiers by
maintaining a presence and, if necessary, displaying his fighting qualities, and to make
decisions under pressure regarding matters such as when and where to retreat, and how to
utilise reserves.
520 Also note Livy 10.36.6–8.
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Generalship During Retirement From a Fortified Position and On the March
In the event that an army had to depart from a fortified position near a watchful enemy, it will
have been a danger that the withdrawing army could be attacked while leaving its position, or
outmanoeuvred and entrapped.521 As such, the general had to devise tactics or stratagems to
avoid this scenario. The stratagems and tactics that a general could use to secure escape from
a fortified position, and to defend the army while it marched in the open, will be considered
below.
In AD 66, Cestius Gallus campaigned against Jerusalem in an attempt to put down a Jewish
rebellion, but was forced to raise his siege due to logistical troubles.522 The army made a
chaotic withdrawal to Gabao, where Cestius rested his army for two days and gave the enemy
time to strengthen their forces.523 The Romans then withdrew further, taking heavy casualties
along the way, and they just barely found refuge behind the walls of Beth–Horon.524 Here the
Romans became entrapped, but Cestius devised a stratagem wherein he left a small part of his
garrison behind to give the impression that the army had not moved, allowing most of the
men to withdraw unharmed (Joseph. BJ 2.551–3). Despite the errors that had led him to that
point, Cestius thus saved his army.525 Evidently, withdrawal from one defensible position to
another was hazardous enough, but even once an army reached refuge, if the enemy was
watchful then some stratagem was needed to secure escape.
There were a variety of such stratagems. At Brundisium in 49 BC, Pompeius Magnus was
trapped in the town and needed to organise a withdrawal, but the besieging forces of Julius
Caesar were well–prepared for this event (Caes. BCiv. 1.25). Pompey took various actions to
secure his escape, including dismantling some of Caesar’s obstacles, establishing obstacles of
his own to delay pursuers, and embarking a large part of his army silently during the day then
the rest (presumably the rearguard) hurriedly by night (BCiv. 1.27–8). In 45 BC, near Munda,
521 Sall Jug 76.1; Caes BGall. 7.11.6, BCiv. 1.25–8; Plut. Luc. 19. 522 Cestius had lost part of his baggage train to a Jewish attack (Joseph. BJ 2.517–22, cf. Gichon, 1981, 54–5). Josephus expresses confusion at Cestius’ decision to withdraw, while Gichon (56) argues that, despite Cestius’ sound tactical decision making during the siege itself, he had good reason to feel uneasy about continuing the siege with winter approaching and active enemy forces to his rear. 523 Joseph. BJ 2.544–5. Cf. Gichon, 1981, 57. 524 Joseph. BJ 2.546–50. Cf. Gichon, 1981, 57–9. 525 Gichon, 1981, 60.
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Gnaeus Pompeius (son of the triumvir) set fire to the town of Ucubi to cover the retreat of a
garrison he had posted there (BHisp. 27.4). Rome’s enemies also used fire to secure escape
from towns, as did the Numidians at Thala in 108 BC, and Pontic soldiers at Amisus in 72
BC.526 Frontinus records numerous cases in which generals secured safe withdrawals by
various methods of deceiving or distracting the enemy, by setting fire to buildings or other
flammable objects to distract the enemy and mask movement, and even by feats of
engineering to create a new escape route.527 Finally, there are several examples of armies
using nightfall to cover withdrawals from camps or towns, including the Carthaginians at
Ilipa in 206 BC (Livy 28.16.3–6), the Gauls at Cenabum in 52 BC (Caes. BGall. 7.11), and
the Romans at Ilerda in 49 BC (Caes. BCiv. 1.67).
To summarise, there were a number of stratagems a general could use to give his army to
time to move out from a fortified position without harassment, including setting buildings
aflame, moving by night, and deceiving or distracting the enemy by various methods, such as
simulating movement or the lack thereof. However, in these circumstances the advantage
remained on the side of the pursuers, as they were in the physical position of advantage, and
no stratagem was necessarily proof against vigilant opposition (Caes. BCiv. 1.65–6). The
general will have had to use his creativity, decide what approach was best for the situation,
keep good control of his forces, and trust to fortune.
An army on the march (whether withdrawing or not) was vulnerable to attack, especially by
cavalry, or to ambush, and so a general also had to avoid or counter these dangers.528 To
begin with, the army’s ratio agminis will have been a primary consideration. There were of
course numerous ways of organising the army’s order of march. A general could assign
picked troops, such as the elite extraordinarii of the Italian socii, to form part of the column
that was most likely to be attacked (Polyb. 6.40). A general could assign various units of
infantry or cavalry to particular parts of a column to scout ahead or protect against enemy
attack, depending on his personal preferences and the circumstances.529 It was possible for an
army to march in a triple column (Caes. BCiv. 41.1), which would allow it to make a ninety–
526 Thala: Sall. Jug. 75–7. Amisus: Plut. Luc. 19. 527 Front. Strat. 1.5.2–5, 8–13, 16–9, 22. 528 Cavalry pursuit: Caes. BCiv. 1.79–81; Livy 28.16.3–5. Ambush: Polyb. 3.118; Vell. Pat. 2.117.1; Joseph. BJ 2.540–555. 529 Goldsworthy, 1996, 105–9.
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degree turn and thus be standing ready to fight in the triplex acies.530 Fundamentally, an army
usually marched in a column, which made the army far more mobile, but more vulnerable to
being attacked and delayed.531
A key factor in determining an army’s marching formation was the presence of the baggage
train, the aptly–named impedimenta, which for an army of several legions and auxiliary units
might consist of thousands of pack animals, hundreds of wagons, and several thousand
military servants.532 The baggage train carried the soldiers’ food, armour, missiles and other
equipment, and may have consisted of around 175 metric tons of supplies for only a single
legion.533 This baggage was crucial to the army’s effective operation but the train was heavy
and its rate of movement was slow, rendering it vulnerable. Roman generals could assign
large forces to escort the baggage, as for instance Caesar did when he assigned two full
legions to this task prior to the Battle of the Sabis in 57 BC (Caes. BGall. 2.18). Marcus
Antonius too assigned at least two legions to guard his baggage at the outset of the Parthian
campaign in 36 BC (Plut. Ant. 38.2–3). Evidently, the defence of the baggage was held to be
extremely important. For this reason, when an army was advancing through hostile territory,
the Romans would often place the baggage inside a hollow square formation, although a
columnar formation could still flank the baggage train.534 However a general approached the
problem, in considering an army’s ratio agminis, whether in advance or withdrawal a general
needed to both defend the baggage and arrange the army in such a way that it could defend
itself if attacked.
What of the actual route of march? The crushing defeats of withdrawing Roman armies at
Carrhae in 53 BC (Plut. Crass. 29–31), Kalkriese in AD 9 (Dio 56.19–21), and Beth–Horon
in AD 66 (Joseph. BJ 2.546–552) demonstrate how marching through locus iniquus could
bring disaster. The army’s route will naturally have been the general’s responsibility (Caes.
BGall. 1.40.10–1), but will have depended on the intelligence available to him. As
mentioned, during this period the Roman army lacked professional intelligence gathering or a
530 Carter (1991, 190) states that this was a formation used for dangerous marches. Caesar used it repeatedly
(Caes. BGall. 1.49.1–2, 1.51.1–2, 4.14.1, etc). 531 Goldsworthy, 1996, 109. 532 Roth, 1999, 114–5. 533 Roth, 1999, 79–84. 534 Goldsworthy, 1996, 105, 109.
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staff apparatus for this purpose.535 When operating in hostile territory then, generals were
often dependent on local information.536 Such information could be reliable, as it apparently
was for Caesar in Gaul and Marcus Antonius in Parthia, but treachery could also lead a
general into terrain where his army would be disadvantaged, as occurred in the cases of
Sabinus, Crassus and Varus.537 In essence, while the gathering and processing of intelligence
was almost entirely the general’s responsibility, and the effectiveness with which he used this
information to choose a path of withdrawal could be decisive, the limitations of Roman
intelligence gathering in this period meant that a general could not always have chosen the
perfect marching route, just as he could not have always chosen the perfect battlefield.
The baggage train significantly slowed an army, but what could a general do if his army
needed to withdraw more quickly? Consider the following extract from Dio’s account
(56.21.1) of the clades Variana of AD 9:
Accordingly they encamped on the spot, after securing a suitable place, so far
as that was possible on a wooded mountain; and afterwards they either burned
or abandoned most of their wagons and everything else that was not absolutely
necessary to them. The next day they advanced in a little better order.538
Evidently, Varus abandoned his baggage to prevent it from hindering his forces as they
continued their march (Dio 56.20.5). This is a description of a procedure for which numerous
parallels can be found. In 56 BC, in Gaul, Caesar’s legate Sulpicius Galba was advised that,
being trapped by the enemy in the Swiss Alps, he should consider abandoning the baggage
and march for safety (Caes. BGall. 3.3). In Gaul two years later, the legate Titurius Sabinus,
when ambushed in a defile near Atuatuca, ordered the abandonment of baggage to form a
better fighting formation.539 After Crassus’ defeat near Carrhae in 53 BC, it can be assumed
that, along with 4000 wounded, much of the baggage was abandoned in the retreat from the
535 Austin & Rankov, 1995, 29–30. 536 Pol 9.14.2–4. Also note Caes. BGall. 1.41.4; Plut. Crass. 21; Ant.46, 48.1–2. 537 Reliable: Caes. BGall. 1.41.4; Plut. Ant. 40.1–5, 46.2–48.1, 49.2.Treachery: Caes. BGall 5.33; Plut. Crass. 21; Dio 56.19. 538 Trans. Earnest Cary, 1924. 539 Caes. BGall. 5.33. Although Caesar criticises Sabinus’ tactics, he states that abandoning the baggage to form a square formation was appropriate in an emergency. Likewise, Dio evocatively describes (56.20.5) the impediment that Varus’ baggage allegedly created in the initial fighting, hence the need to retrench much of the baggage and depart in better order (56.21.1).
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stricken battlefield.540 Livy mentions several instances of armies, Roman and otherwise,
abandoning their baggage temporarily or permanently to gain an advantage, as a result of
defeat.541 In his withdrawal from Jerusalem in AD 66, having already lost much of his
baggage train, Cestius Gallus entrenched his army and destroyed most of his beasts of
burden, except those required for carrying missiles and war machines, before setting out once
more.542 In AD 15, Caecina did not destroy his own baggage, but appears to have lost most of
it in the fighting (Tac. Ann. 1.65). Therefore, at least in the Late Republic and Early Empire,
there appears to be a Roman practice of abandoning baggage–temporarily or permanently–as
a standard procedure when withdrawing.
The two possible justifications for the abandonment of baggage were that the discarded
baggage might offer a tempting target for enemy plunderers and facilitate the army’s escape
or the army would be rendered lighter and faster.543 If Varus abandoned the baggage, it was to
render his army more mobile and effective in battle, considering the trouble caused by the
impedimenta during the initial attack (Dio 56.20.5). If the enemy were distracted by
plundering this baggage, so much the better. Thus, the abandonment of baggage was a
sensible and regular response to the need for rapid movement and increased short–term
fighting capability, such as in the case of retreating or withdrawing out of an ambush, but the
obvious supply problems this caused for the army meant it was an option of last resort.
How did a general protect his marching column from enemy pursuers and marauders? A
square formation allowed the army to defend itself from all directions and protect the
baggage inside the square, but this did not render the army proof from attack. This problem
and various solutions to it are demonstrated in Plutarch’s account of Marcus Antonius’ 540 Plut. Crass. 28.1. Surely thousands of wounded legionaries would not have been left behind if the army had retained the capacity to carry them, as the army appears to have carried those it could (cf. Crass. 27.6). 541 Temporarily: Livy 3.28.1. Permanently: Livy 4.39.6; 8.1.5–6. Although Livy’s descriptions of the tactics in these early Republican battles are probably invented, he can only have drawn upon his knowledge of contemporary military practices to fill in the blanks (cf. Oakley, 1997, 351). As such, these were probably genuine Late Republican practices. 542 Joseph. BJ 2.544–546. As Dio implies (56.21.1), Varus must have kept some of his baggage. For one reason: he needed to carry his wounded (Rost, 2016, 561). Recent archaeological finds imply the presence of a ballista in the Senke, which suggests that Varus might also have kept some of his war machines (Stark, 2016). 543 Cestius Gallus left his baggage behind in AD 66, although unwillingly, and as a result his enemies were distracted from their pursuit (Joseph. BJ 2.553–554). The ambush of the Nervii and their allies on Caesar’s army in 57 BC appeared to have been targeted towards the baggage (Caes. BGall. 2.17), as did the attack of the Thracians on Manlius Vulso in 188 BC (Livy 38.40.9–15). Also see Tac. Ann. 1.65. More mobile: Engels, 1978, 131–132, 153–156.
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laborious withdrawal from Parthia in 36 BC (Ant. 40–50). Although the imperator formed his
army into a hollow square, he and the men were still regularly attacked by the following
Parthians (42.1). To fend off these attacks, he utilised large numbers of missile troops to
counter the withering fire of Parthian archers.544 He also used both cavalry and infantry to
counterattack and drive back aggressive pursuers, giving space for his army to continue
retiring under less pressure (41.5–42.4). He avoided the open plains where his slow–moving
force would be most exposed to the enemy’s massed cavalry and instead adhered to higher
ground on his march (46–7). He also encamped to recover the order of his forces when
necessary (47.4, 48.5).
There are parallels to all of these mitigating actions. As mentioned, in 48 BC Caesar also used
missile troops to cover the retreat of a legion at Dyrrhachium (Caes. BCiv. 3.46.1). The
Pompeian army, when withdrawing during the Ilerda campaign of 49 BC, used lightly armed
legionaries (expedites cohortes) to fight and counterattack pursuing cavalry (BCiv. 1.79). The
Pompeians also attempted to control the high ground along their path of withdrawal, using it
to fight pursuers from a position of strength and also denying control of these positions to the
enemy (1.79–80). Crassus also attempted to use high ground to his advantage in his
withdrawal from Carrhae, 53 BC (Plut. Crass. 29.5–6). Finally, halting a march and
entrenching the army in a camp or behind city walls, to recover the army’s order or as a last
resort if the army was unable to move successfully, was a technique used by various Roman
generals in comparable situations.545
To summarise, a general who had to withdraw his army out of a fortified position, or
withdraw over open ground, had first to deceive the enemy or manoeuvre in such a way that
he could bring his army safely into the open. He then had to organise his marching column so
that the army could move quickly but also fight off pursuers and protect the vulnerable
baggage train. He had to select an appropriate route for the army, and use terrain to his
advantage or change tactics if the terrain or tactical situation were unfavourable, for instance
by changing the army’s formation, abandoning the baggage train, or making counterattacks,
in order to throw off pursuers and bring his army safely to another place of refuge.
544 Plut. Ant. 42.1, cf. 37.3 on Antonius’ numbers of troops. 545 Caes. BCiv. 1.80–1; Joseph. BJ 2.550–2; Tac. Ann. 1.63; Dio 56.21.1.
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Conclusion
The general was central in ensuring that a retreat or withdrawal was carried out with
appropriate methods and tactics. Before a battle, he gathered and interpreted intelligence,
conferred with his consilium, and chose a location for battle that ideally had nearby high
ground, a camp or a fortified position to which a retreat could be made. He then deployed his
battleline, incorporating reserve units that could protect retreating infantry. A general had
two main functions during a battle, and also during a retreat if he saw fit to order one (Caes.
BGall. 7.47.1), particularly if the retreat was challenged by pursuers. The first was to
demonstrate virtus, by keeping a close eye on the fighting, exhorting and inspiring his
soldiers. The second was utilising consilium by dispatching reserves or even his personal
guards where necessary to bolster wavering men and threaten enemy attackers or pursuers. If
an army had to retire into or out of a fortified position, whether forced to or volunteering to
do so, the general had firstly to ensure the ramparts or walls were adequately manned, and if
necessary exhort and inspire the defenders, then plan and execute the army’s march out from
the position in such a way that, preferably, they were not attacked while doing so. Deceptive
stratagems or withdrawing by night were two ways to achieve this. During the march, the
general had to ensure there was an adequate rearguard and forces suitable for
counterattacking any pursuers, establish ratio agminis that protected the army’s baggage and
flanks, defend the baggage during the army’s movement, order counterattacks if necessary,
maintain the army’s direction and use high ground to advantage if possible, and finally halt
the army or encamp if necessary. Without the general performing all of these functions
adequately, orderliness among the heavy infantry would not necessarily ensure a successful
retrograde movement, particularly in more complex situations and over longer distances. In
essence, a general had to be both visible and mindful of the situation, displaying himself to
the soldiers where necessary but also making broader decisions when necessary. These tasks
were simple but will have required tactical knowledge and fine judgement, scientia rei
militaris and consilium, as well as physical and moral bravery, virtus, to apply effectively.
As can be seen the two main features of successful retreats and withdrawals, the maintenance
of order and the management or prevention of enemy pursuit, were the responsibility of all
parts of the Roman army. Soldiers and their immediate leaders, particularly the centuriones
and tribuni, were mostly responsible for maintaining the correct infantry formations and
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ensuring that they moved at a gradual pace while fighting off enemy pursuers. The general
assisted the maintenance of order through his selection of the battlefield and drawing up the
battleline, by posting and committing reserves to reduce the pressure on retreating troops, and
by exhorting and inspiring his men. The soldiers and junior officers could contribute to the
task of managing enemy pursuit by maintaining their order, as an orderly body of soldiers
was itself intimidating to pursuers. However, a number of the factors that contributed to
ensuring a safe retreat, including nearby high ground or fortified positions, the presence and
commitment of reserves and the allocation of men to guard camps, baggage or marching
columns were all the down to the general’s decisions. Even the effectiveness of the milites
and officers were to some extent the general’s responsibility, for he was oversaw the army’s
training and had some influence over the assignment and competence of his subordinates.
Defects in the ability of milites, centuriones and tribuni in maintaining order during a
retirement could potentially be repaired over time by an attentive and disciplinarian general.
But the army as a whole could be in the greatest danger if a general put them in a
disadvantageous position and had made insufficient preparations for a safe retirement, as
occurred at Geronium in 217 BC, or at Beth–Horon in AD 66. A successful retreat, therefore,
was due to the scientia rei militaris, consilium and virtus of the general, qualities developed
through a lifetime of education and experience, and which ideally he drew upon to calmly
and effectively lead his men and adapt his tactics to the situation.
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When [the Gauls] unexpectedly saw men whom they believed to be in retreat advancing
against them in attack formation, they could not even sustain the assault, and at the first
charge they were put to rout and sought the nearest woods.
(Caes. BGall. 6.8)
Chapter Five
The Development of Roman Retreat Tactics from the
Middle to Late Republic (218–46 BC)
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Introduction
In 53 BC, Titus Labienus was encamped in Gaul, when he was warned of the advance of a
formidable enemy army that he feared would overrun his small force (Caes. BGall. 6.7).
Labienus decided to withdraw from his position, with the hope that the enemy would advance
recklessly and give him some opportunity for a successful action (6.7). This is precisely what
happened, and as the enemy pressed forward in a disorderly manner, Labienus quickly drew
up a line of battle and counter–attacked, throwing the surprised Gauls into chaos and routing
them (6.8). In this manner, a single legion used retreat tactics to defeat a much larger enemy
force. Such was the efficiency with which these Romans could retreat, reform a battleline,
and counterattack. Was this efficiency typical for that period, and if so, how did the Romans
develop to that point?
In the preceding chapters, it has been established that the Roman army was well–suited to the
conduct of retrograde movements due to the ability of milites to maintain ratio during retreat
or withdrawal through training, efficient organisation and active junior leadership. In this way
they intimidated potential pursuers and retained their fighting ability even in defeat. Also, the
habitual Roman use of reserve infantry lines and the presence of light infantry and cavalry
could also be used to dissuade or even fight off enemy pursuers, thus preventing enemy
pursuers from applying too much pressure to retreating troops. The most important figure in
the successful conduct of a retreat or withdrawal was, however, the general, who trained the
army, chose many of his officers, chose the battlefield, drew up his army with a safe line of
retreat, managed the use of reserves, exhorted the soldiers, and generally reacted to the
developing situation.
However, it must be recognised that the Roman army was not a monolithic institution, but
one that changed significantly over time. There were several catalysts of change to the
Roman army during the Middle to Late Republic. First, the Roman army suffered some
significant challenges in foreign and civil wars that necessitated changes to the organisation
and tactics that had proven so successful in the Second Punic War.546 The poor performance
546 Although Rome had a period of spectacular success in its rapid conquest of much of the Mediterranean by the mid–second century BC (Polyb. 1.1.5), it thereafter had difficulties in various theatres over a broad space of time, including the surrender of Hostilius Mancinus at Numantia in 136 BC, reverses against Jugurtha in Numidia, the epic defeat at Arausio in 105 BC, the Mithridatic, Servile and Social Wars in the early to mid first
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of the Roman army during the mid to late second century was a stimulus to military reform,
with the challenge taken up by generals such as Scipio Aemilianus and Gaius Marius.547
Second, the military, political and fiscal crises that contributed to the fall of the Republic also
stimulated change in the Roman army and culminated in the permanent establishment by
Augustus of a new, manageably sized, and more structured army.548 Overall, the Roman
army’s organisational changes (eg. use of cohorts, regularisation of training practices and
command appointments) appear to have been gradual. Changes to its tactics were surely
gradual also. Fortunately, because most sources for this period concern Roman military
matters, and the Roman army was the dominant Mediterranean military force for so long, the
development of Roman retreat tactics over time may be examined in detail.
In this chapter, an examination will be made of the development of Roman retreat tactics
from the late third century BC, when the Roman army first emerges into clear view thanks to
Polybius, to the mid–first century BC, when Caesar provides highly detailed accounts of
several contemporary wars. The purpose of the chapter is to examine the links between the
tactical and organisational development of the Roman army itself, the differing tactics of
certain generals, and observable changes in how the Romans conducted retreats over time.
The chapter will be split into three sections. The first will examine retreat tactics in the
Middle Republic (218–168 BC), with a particular emphasis on the Battle of Pydna (168 BC).
This will provide an example of the sort of fighting retreat that the Mid–Republican Roman
army was capable of, and demonstrate how retreat tactics shaped the course of that battle. The
second part will focus on the period between the Middle and the Late Republic (149–102
BC). Here, the Battle of Nepheris (149 BC) and the Romano-Numidian battle of Sallust (106
BC) will be the foci for much of the analysis, as they display the potential flexibility of
Roman infantry and cavalry tactics. Finally, the third section will examine the tactics of the
Late Republic, particularly in the campaigns and various major battles detailed by Caesar, to
show changes in retreat tactics. The conclusion will identify the key factors and explain the
most significant changes in the Roman army’s retreat tactics over time.
century, and defeats against the Parthians in 53 and 36 BC (cf. Hoyos, 2007, 76). 547 Cagniart, 2007, 81–2; Hoyos, 2007, 76. 548 Keppie, 1984, 145–9; Eck, 2007, 114–22.
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Retreats in The Punic and Macedonian Wars (218–168 BC)
There were many instances in which the Romans were hard–pressed or defeated during the
Second Punic War and the Macedonian Wars, and as such, there are half a dozen clear
examples of the Romans utilising retreat tactics in battle during this period. To begin with, in
218 BC in Cisalpine Gaul a Roman force under the praetor Lucius Manlius, after suffering a
heavy ambush at the hands of the Boii, fled from the carnage but rallied on high ground and
retreated in a more orderly manner from there (Polyb. 3.40.11–3). During Hannibal’s
overwhelming victory at the river Trebia the same year, the vanguard of the Roman army was
able to push through the centre of the Carthaginian battleline and withdraw in close order to a
nearby colony, where they were later joined by other survivors (Polyb. 3.74.3–6). In 217,
when the Romans were heavily defeated again at Lake Trasimene, a large body of soldiers
was able to force its way through to high ground and make an orderly retreat from that
position (Polyb. 3.84.11–3). Also in 217, when the rash attack of the magister equitium
Minucius was stopped by Hannibal and the Romans found themselves nearly surrounded, a
counterattack by the dictator Fabius Maximus was able to check the Carthaginian advance
and allow the Romans to retreat (Polyb. 3.104–5). In 211 BC, when Gnaeus Scipio was
confronted by the combined Carthaginian armies of Spain, after they had defeated his brother,
he attempted a fighting retreat under heavy harassment by Numidian cavalry until he was
forced to stand and fight, taking possession of higher ground for this purpose (Livy 25.35.7–
36.3). Finally, Polybius (18.25.4) notes that, early in the Battle of Cynoscephalae in 197 BC,
when the Roman left wing struggled to sustain the Macedonian phalanx as it advanced
downhill, the Romans retreated slowly, resisting the urge to flee.
As can be seen, the Romans applied retreat tactics on a number of recorded occasions, and
they generally used high ground to secure their retreats. The Romans routinely deployed their
forces in the triplex acies, and in battle the three lines advanced and retreated short distances,
individually or together as necessary.549 That said, in only two examples of retreats from this
period (Cynoscephalae and Pydna) did the Romans successfully carry out fighting retreats
under pressure from enemy heavy infantry. It was not always easy for the Romans to do so.550
549 See Ch. 3, 113–6. 550 The chaos at Geronium in 217 BC comes to mind, in which the Roman army of Minucius (cos. 221) was thrown into disorderly retreat, and might have been destroyed if not for the intervention of Fabius Maximus’ fresh legions (Polyb. 3.105).
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Therefore, while there are numerous examples of Roman armies or detachments retreating in
battle during the Middle Republic, they could not do so easily if the enemy responded
aggressively. How effective were Roman retreat tactics in this period then, and how did they
develop?
Roman retreat tactics of this period are most clearly demonstrated in the case of the Battle of
Pydna, 168 BC. This was one of the last recorded major Mid–Republican battles fought by
Rome against an adversary that could offer her a serious challenge in a pitched battle. The
narrative of the battle is engaging drama. That year, on a plain south of the Greek city of
Pydna, a Roman army under the consul Aemilius Paulus met the royal host of Perseus, king
of Macedon, in the climactic battle of the Third Macedonian War. Perseus had scored a
victory against the Romans in 171 BC at Callinicus, and the first onset of the phalanx at
Pydna gave Paulus little reason for confidence (Plut. Aem. 19.2), but he bolstered the courage
of his men (19.3) who attacked with great élan, both sides suffering heavy losses (20.1–4).
The Roman front line was, nonetheless, beaten and gave way before the advance of the
phalanx, as did the rest of the Roman army, which could find no way to successfully
penetrate the wall of sarissae (20.4–6). However, as the phalanx advanced uphill against the
retreating Roman army, it encountered difficult ground that rendered its advance uneven,
breaking up its impenetrable line (20.7). Aemilius saw this opportunity and ordered his
maniples to attack gaps in the phalanx (20.7–8), because of which the Romans were able to
penetrate the phalanx and surround it in multiple places (20.9–10). When the sarissae had
been bypassed and the phalanx disordered by the terrain and the targeted Roman attacks, the
phalangites were easily overwhelmed (20.9–10) and most were killed in flight (21.6).
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This battle has been presented as a straightforward example of one that was decided primarily
by superiority in Roman equipment and manipular tactics, but the Roman retreat has not
received significant attention as a turning point in the battle.551 Since Plutarch’s account
raises a number of difficult questions,552 which make it particularly difficult to reconstruct the
Macedonian battle plan,553 and other accounts are of no more help,554 it has been stated that
the battle cannot be reconstructed.555 Nonetheless, Plutarch’s account is not devoid of value.
For a start, it is one of the only major battle accounts from the period, and there is no decisive
551 Cf. Plut. Aem. 20.4–6. On the traditional presentation of Pydna as a victory showcasing the superiority of Roman equipment and formations over the Macedonian–style phalanx, as argued by Polybius (18.28–32), see, for instance: Fuller, 1965, 89; Hammond, 1984, 46; Goldsworthy, 2004, 104; Waterfield, 2014, 190. It is argued in particular that the more close–ranged equipment and fighting style of the Romans gave them a decisive advantage once the phalanx was penetrated (Lendon, 1999, 284; Goldsworthy, 2004, 103; Quesada Sanz, 2006, 21). The retreat during the battle is mentioned in passing by some experts. Hammond (1984, 46) states: ‘... it is apparent (though the sources do not say so) that the legionaries gave way and withdrew’. Goldsworthy (2004, 101) says that the Italians, when repulsed by the phalanx, ‘drew back and withdrew up slope towards their camp.’ However, Goldsworthy says nothing of whether or not the citizen legions retreated along with the socii,
as Polybius implies with the phrase ‘turning away’ (διατρεπομένων), but rather says that the attack of the
First Legion halted the phalanx’s advance. Nonetheless, these brief remarks are all that passes for an examination of the Roman army’s use of retreat tactics at Pydna. 552 Issues arise over the depiction of the alleged fragility of the phalanx and the lopsided casualty figures. For a start, almost any army that was disordered and surrounded would collapse: this was not a unique flaw of the phalanx (Sabin 2007, 412, 432). Plutarch’s account of the battle lionises the Roman army and its fighting style, and the ostentatiously low Roman casualties (Aem. 21.7) are suspicious (Sabin, 2007, 416). 553 The absence of Perseus from the account is strange, leaving open the question of who actually commanded the phalanx, and what happened to the Macedonian heavy cavalry. Perseus and his heavy cavalry had played a decisive role in the Battle of Callinicus, 171 BC (Livy 42.59.3), and apparently this impressive force withdrew intact from the battlefield at Pydna, accompanying Perseus (Plut. Aem. 23.1–2). It seems hard to believe that a man who had led his cavalry with great élan at Callinicus should have fled the battle as soon as it began, as Polybius stated (Plut. Aem. 19.3). Livy (44.42) claims, equally strangely, that Perseus fled with his companions, and that the remaining heavy cavalry simply retreated without fighting when the phalanx was beaten. Plutarch (Aem. 7–10) transmits an alternative explanation for this, attributed to Poseidonius, in which Perseus withdrew from the battle because he had been wounded fighting with the phalanx. This is also problematic, for why should Perseus have fought with the phalanx in the first place, and why take all his cavalry with him when he left the field, severely weakening the phalanx? It is also possible that Perseus simply bungled the battle, but the truth will remain unknown (Hammond, 1984, 47). 554 Cf. Hammond, 1984, 33, 38. Polybius evidently described the battle (Plut. Aem. 19.4), but his narrative is lost. Regarding Livy, his account unfortunately suffers from a lacuna of two pages, omitting the retreat (Hammond, 1984, 39). It is thus of little use. 555 Wheeler, 2006, 306. Wheeler does not explain his position here, but could have had several issues in mind, not only those mentioned above but also the non–presence of Roman elephants in Plutarch's account (cf. Livy 44.41.3–4) and the differing sequences of events leading to the Macedonian rout in Livy and Plutarch (cf. Livy 44.41.3–5 and Plut. Aem. 20.9–10). The similarities in the accounts of Livy and Plutarch are product of common source material, likely including Polybius (Hammond, 1984, 33, ref. Plut. Aem. 19.4; for Livy, cf. Erdkamp, 2006, 539–40). At best, the differences in the accounts probably reflect selective approaches to Polybius' account, whose own account, as the above discussion of casualties shows, would raise its own questions, even if it had come down to the present day.
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reason not to trust the broad strokes of his narrative. The major movements by both armies
and, most importantly, the initial Roman retreat when forced back by the phalanx on flat
ground, are credible. The following analysis will, therefore, utilise Plutarch’s account of the
Battle of Pydna and focus on two particular aspects of the battle’s course: the retreat of the
Romans as they were initially repulsed by the phalanx (Plut. Aem. 20.4–6), and the disruption
of the Macedonian phalanx as it followed the Romans over the uneven ground (Plut. Aem.
20.7). This retreat, coupled with the adverse impact of the terrain on the phalanx as it
advanced, was a turning point in the fight. Focusing on this will allow a better understanding
of how retreat tactics shaped the course of the battle and demonstrate what the Roman army
was capable of in this period.
Plutarch (Aem. 20.5–6) thus describes the retreat of the Romans who first confronted the
phalanx:
When the first line had thus been cut to pieces, those arrayed behind them were
beaten back; and though there was no flight (φυγὴ ... οὐκ ἦν), still they retired
(ἀναχώρησις) towards the mountain called Olocrus so that even Aemilius, as
Poseidonius tells us, when he saw it, rent his garments. For this part of his army
was retreating, and the rest of the Romans were turning aside from the phalanx,
which gave them no access to it, but confronted them as it were with a dense
barricade of long spears, and was everywhere unassailable.556
It is not easy to visualise exactly what Plutarch describes. He states (Aem. 20.5) that there
was a retrograde movement (ἀναχώρησις) but emphasises that ‘there was no flight’ by the
Romans. It was only ‘part of the army’ (20.6) that was retreating at this point, namely the
forward units of Italian allies that had first engaged the phalanx (19.1–2, 4), but Plutarch also
makes it clear that the rest of the army also retreated (20.5). The Italians evidently formed the
first of a double or triple line, which would imply that ‘the rest of the Romans’ comprised the
principes of the second line and (perhaps) the third line, and that they were all retreating in
the approximate direction of the Roman camp (20.5).
556 Trans. Bernadotte Perrin, 1918. Note that I am following the LCL numeration from lacuscurtius.org.
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There are few details with which to analyse the character of this retreat, but there are enough
to make several observations. First, it appears that only the socii, specifically the Paeligni and
Marrucini, were engaged in the initial clash with the phalanx, while the citizen legions came
up behind them later.557 Secondly, there is a suggestion from Frontinus (Strat. 2.3.20) that,
once Paulus had arrived with the Roman legions, the entire Roman army carried out a feigned
retreat in order to draw the phalanx onto broken ground, but Plutarch is clear that the Roman
retreat was genuine.558 One way or the other, the Roman general clearly maintained some
control of the troops, for he was able to reorganise and direct the cohorts for a counterattack
as soon as he saw the opportunity.559 Thus, Plutarch (Aem. 20.5) should be believed when he
says that there was no chaotic flight, but an orderly retreat. Further, as Hammond's analysis of
the terrain shows, the Macedonians had to advance around 100–200 metres before the
phalanx reached the most uneven ground, and so this is probably the approximate distance of
the Roman retreat, presumably towards the Roman camp that was only 400 metres from the
initial clash.560 The retreat probably took place at a steady pace, as the Macedonian–style
phalanx, in very close order and many ranks deep, could not in any case have advanced
quickly. The Roman army thus maintained its ratio even in this involuntary retreat.
Although in terms of discipline and training this Roman army was experienced, it does not
appear to have been an exceptionally efficient force,561 and Paulus did not appear to have
complete control of the army (Plut. Aem. 20.5–6), so one may ask why this retreat was so
successful. Plutarch does explicitly attribute the Roman counterattack to Paulus (Aem. 20.8),
and so he must have taken rapid control of the situation. Perhaps most importantly, Paulus’
instructions were transmitted quickly and efficiently to his subordinate officers, and in turn
again to the milites (20.8–9). The Roman army at Pydna was a sum of its parts, with some 557 Plut. Aem. 20.4, 6, 8. Also see Goldsworthy, 2004, 101. 558 Given Aemilius’ fear at the sight of the phalanx (Plut. Aem. 19.2) and his dramatic reaction when the socii were forced back (Aem. 20.6). 559 Plut. Aem. 20.8. Whether one adopts Plutarch’s account (Aem. 20.5–6) of an involuntary retreat, or Frontinus’ account (Strat. 2.3.20) of a deliberately feigned retreat, the effect was the same. The Roman army was able to effectively disengage from a disadvantageous fight and quickly re–engage when the tactical circumstances were more favourable. 560 Plut. Aem. 18.9; Hammond, 1984, 40, 46. 561 As the war had been ongoing for several years, and the Romans possessed a significant body of veterans (Livy 42.33–5, cf. Goldsworthy, 2004, 85), the army was reasonably experienced. Even so, Paulus had to whip the army into shape. The army’s discipline and effectiveness prior to Paulus’ arrival is criticised by both Livy (44.32.4–11) and Plutarch (Aem. 13.6). Paulus spent a short time training and readjusting his army on arrival, though it is possible his impact on the army has been exaggerated by favourable sources (Goldsworthy, 2004, 93).
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highly motivated troops (20.2–4), efficient officers (20.9), and a reasonably decisive general
(20.8). It was a combination of these factors that allowed the army to retreat and then
counterattack successfully. However, as the retreat occurred before Paulus’ intervention, the
discipline and skill of the milites must surely have been the most important factor on this
occasion, which suggests that Roman troops were already well–trained and experienced in
carrying out simple retrograde manoeuvres in the Middle Republic.
Another important reason for the smooth conduct of the retreat was the terrain. The Roman
camp was situated on a hill, and the army drawn up on the flat ground at the base of this
hill.562 A standard explanation for the result of the battle (by both ancient and modern
commentators) was the break–up of the phalanx as it pursued the Romans over uneven
ground leading up to the Roman camp, after which the disordered phalanx quickly fell victim
to Roman sword–work.563 However, it should also be noted that the terrain assisted the
Roman retreat by slowing the advance of the phalanx and giving the retreating troops the
advantage of fighting from high ground, with the added confidence of having the camp
nearby. This was particularly helpful because, after the Romans’ initial repulse by the
Macedonians, the short distance between the Roman battleline and their camp meant that they
had little time and space in which to counterattack before being forced back into their
camp.564 However, the phalanx could not advance far before the terrain began to impact upon
it.565 The uneven ground rendered the advance of the phalanx uneven, making it less of a
threat to the retreating Romans, and providing Aemilius with his chance to counterattack.566
There were thus several ways in which the terrain assisted the Romans.
562 Hammond, 1984, 40. 563 Plut. Aem. 20.9–10; Lendon, 1999, 284; Goldsworthy, 2004, 103; Quesada Sanz, 2006, 21. Also see Polyb. 18.28–32. 564 At the first clash between the socii and the phalanx, the Macedonian army was only about 400 metres from the Roman camp (Plut. Aem. 18.9). 565 The contour lines of Hammond's map show that the ground became relatively uneven within approx. 100–200m of the phalanx's initial position, particularly in the centre–right of the phalanx's line, while to the left of the phalanx was a riverbed, roughly perpendicular to the Macedonian axis of advance, to contend with (Hammond, 1984, 40). 566 Though elements of the phalanx evidently moved too quickly to maintain their dressing (Plut. Aem. 20.7). Counterattack: Plut. Aem. 20.7–8.
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How did ratio and generalship factor in? The Romans’ organisational advantages in
conducting retreats (the systematic use of reserve infantry lines, flexible sub–units and semi–
independent junior officers) were on full display in this battle.567 It is also true, as has often
been observed, that the superiority of the legion over the phalanx in manoeuvring on uneven
ground gave them a key advantage on the right terrain, but the battle had not begun on such
terrain, so when the Romans had been beaten on the flat ground, the conduct of an orderly
retreat allowed them to begin the battle anew on terrain that suited them. As such, while the
oft–observed (relative) inflexibility of the phalanx certainly was an important factor in the
battle’s result, it is particularly striking that the Roman formations could so much more easily
maintain their order while retreating over uneven ground.568 Aemilius also made an important
contribution by positioning the camp in a strong defensive position, to which a retreat could
readily be made. Conversely, it is also possible that the disastrous Macedonian uphill attack
was intentional, an attempt to press the Romans and storm their camp and thereby to win a
decisive victory. The quick advance of the phalanx and the relatively short distance between
the Roman line and their camp support this idea (Plut. Aem. 18.9). Perhaps the idea was not
without merit, but in practice it was a catastrophe, and Aemilius’ conventional, defensive
tactics secured his army’s retreat and set the stage for the decisive counterattack. Thus, the
successful retreat at Pydna was due to the superior ability of Roman formations to maintain
their order while moving over uneven ground, and the active and flexible, but conservative,
generalship of Aemilius Paulus.
In this period, the Romans were evidently capable of effectively using retreat tactics under
pressure from enemy infantry, but the retreat tactics at Pydna were simple: the beaten socii
and the legions behind them retired gradually up the slope of the hill to their rear, where the
general had secured a path of retreat by placing a fortified camp on the hill. The ensuing
counterattack required more flexibility, which the army inherently possessed in its ability to
subdivide into maniples, but the conditions for the counterattack were still created by the
retreat. No examples of Roman retreats in this period show any more sophistication than was
shown at Pydna: bodies of troops moved directly away from the enemy, towards the closest
defensible position, supported by reserve infantry lines and perhaps by cavalry and velites or
567 The legions come up to support the first line of socii: Plut. Aem. 20.6. Good conduct by officers: Aem. 20.1, 20.9. 568 Cf. Bell, 1965, 410.
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auxiliary light infantry.569 The counterattack at Pydna was a product of the unique manipular
system, but its overwhelming success was due at least as much to the disorder of the enemy
as to the effectiveness of the Romans’ tactics. The Roman retreat tactics at Pydna were
effective under the circumstances, but not overly complex.
Roman tactics were relatively conventional in this period. The Roman army at this time was
still organised into the classic divisions of hastati, principes, triarii, velites, equites and socii,
as described by Polybius (6.21–6). As mentioned, new kinds of light infantry and cavalry
auxiliaries, such as Greek archers and Numidian horsemen, began to be incorporated into
Roman armies from the time of the Second Punic War onward,570 but there is no particular
reason that the gradual introduction of new types of auxiliaries carrying different missiles
should have brought any sudden changes to Roman tactics.571 The introduction of new kinds
of cavalry, however, might be a slightly different matter. For instance, Thessalian cavalry at
the Battle of Callinicus, 171 BC, did an exceptional job of supporting retreating Roman
troops (Livy 42.59.4–5), and the Numidians whom Romans began to utilise were particularly
adept in flexible advance–and–retreat tactics (Polyb. 3.116). This is not to say that the Italian
cavalry was no longer effective,572 but expert light cavalry, such as Thessalians and
Numidians, may have added a new flexibility to Roman retreat tactics, as these highly
manoeuvrable forces were better equipped for skirmishing with and thereby delaying
pursuers, and so assisting the retreat of infantry. That said, the examples of major retreats
examined above do not show any obvious evolution in retreat tactics from the Second Punic
War to the Battle of Pydna. One might note that the retreat tactics used by the Carthaginians
in the Second Punic War were in fact fairly similar to those of the Romans.573 Perhaps the
Romans had adapted their techniques from the Carthaginians. Whether they did or not, as the
success of the Roman retreat at Pydna shows, the battles Rome fought in the east following
the defeat of Hannibal presented no new challenges that necessitated further changes to the
Roman army’s retreat tactics.574
569 Cf. Polyb. 3.84.11–3, 18.25.4; Livy 25.35.7–36.3. 570 Keppie, 1984, 78–9; Sekunda, 2007, 356–7. 571 Cf. Slavik, 2018, 168. Also note Bell, 1965, 419–21; Quesada Sanz, 2006, 2–3. 572 McCall, 2002, 99. 573 Polyb. 11.21, 24; Livy 25.37.15, 28.13–5, 30.18, possibly also Hannibal's front–line at Zama (Polyb. 15.13). 574 Cf. Hoyos, 2007, 76.
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Retreat Tactics from 149 BC to 102 BC
The period between the Battle of Pydna and the beginning of Caesar’s campaigns in Gaul
saw a great deal of warfare, and so it stands to reason that the Roman army developed its
practices in this period, but the details and timing are not clear. Fundamentally, the problem is
that there is no surviving contemporary source that describes military matters in significant
detail after the time of Polybius (c. 146 BC) until Caesar (58 BC).575 It is, therefore,
necessary to rely entirely upon non–contemporary sources for this period. There were, at any
rate, few large–scale battles in this period.576 These problems somewhat limit any analysis of
Roman tactical development in this period,577 but I will examine the few outstanding battle
accounts and look for features that separate Roman retreats in this period from those of the
preceding century.
One detailed example of a retreat from this period comes from Appian (Pun. 102–3), who
describes a fighting retreat by the Roman army at the Battle of Nepheris (149 BC) in the
Third Punic War against a formidable Carthaginian field army. According to Appian, the
Roman army led by the consul Manius Manilius advanced across a river to attack the
Carthaginians against the advice of a particular military tribune, Scipio Aemilianus, and after
a sharp fight the Carthaginians retreated to the safety of a fortified camp (Pun. 102). The
Romans became trapped between the unassailable Carthaginian position and the river they
had just crossed, and so were forced to retreat, which they commenced in an orderly fashion.
However, upon reaching the river, the army was constrained by the narrowness of the few
crossings and was unable to maintain its close order, stimulating the observant Carthaginian
general to attack while the Romans were disorganised, who then suffered heavy casualties
while attempting to flee the Carthaginian attack (102). In response to this situation Scipio
took 300 javelin–armed cavalry that he had in his immediate presence and collected as many
more as he could, and he made repeated hit–and–run attacks on the enemy to relieve the
575 While Polybius’ work covered events until 146 BC, it is highly fragmentary, and Livy’s books are totally lost after 167 BC, their contents known only through the Periochae. 576 From 146 BC until the Cimbrian Wars (113–101 BC), including the Jugurthine War (112–106 BC), most of Rome’s wars were against Gallic and Iberian tribes and mini–states that struggled to challenge large Roman armies in the field (Goldsworthy, 1996, 45–7). 577 There are two reasons for this. First, the limited sources do not allow the minutiae of Roman army’s development to be precisely tracked, and there are few detailed accounts of retreats or withdrawals that could be examined that might shed light more specifically on the development of retreat tactics in this period.
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pressure on the infantry, allowing most of the army to cross the river successfully (103).
Meanwhile, a detachment of four cohorts had become separated from the rest of the Roman
army and still remained on the Carthaginian side of the river, but they were able to defend
themselves on high ground (103). To rescue these men, Scipio again selected a number of
cavalry, and took control of a hill that threatened the enemy, who fled to avoid being trapped
by two Roman forces on high ground (103). Similar themes can be seen in this account as in
Sallust’s Romano-Numidian battle account.578 Decisive intervention by an officer
accompanied by cavalry was able to relieve the pressure on the infantry and allow a
successful retreat, while some cohorts, even separated from the rest of the army, were able to
defend themselves against significant numbers of the enemy, essentially acting independently.
As usual, in the absence of a fortified position, high ground was the natural place for
beleaguered troops to withdraw to.
Another retreat recounted by Appian (Hisp. 88), during Scipio Aemilianus’ Iberian campaign
of 134 BC, describes a fighting retreat by a Roman cavalry detachment that had got itself into
trouble by pursuing the enemy uphill, from where it was unable to safely retreat due to the
presence of the enemy on higher ground. Scipio brought more cavalry to the rescue and split
them into two groups. These alternately withdrew and threw javelins, but they gradually
made their way back to safer terrain while still fighting off enemy pursuers. It is not clear
whether the cavalry accompanied auxiliaries or not, but the tactics are reminiscent of the
cavalry Scipio had earlier used in Africa (App. Pun. 102–3). Since the Romans occasionally
utilised javelin–armed Numidian auxiliaries that were highly adept in fire–and–retreat tactics
in the second century,579 it was probably javelin–armed auxiliaries (such as Numidians) that
Scipio led on both occasions. What becomes clear is that the increasing use of auxiliary
cavalry gave the Romans a broader array of options, not only in carrying out cavalry retreats,
but in using cavalry to support retreating or besieged infantry.
578 Sall. Jug. 98. Cf. Ch. 1, 52–3 and Ch. 5, 159–60. 579 Sabin, 2007, 422; Sekunda, 2007, 353.
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An even more detailed account of a retreat is to be found in Sallust’s description of the
Romano-Numidian battle in 106 BC, when the army of Gaius Marius was ambushed by
significant enemy forces on the verge of nightfall, just as the Romans were going in hiberna
(Sall. Jug. 97.3). The Roman army was thrown into confusion and the battle broke up into
numerous scattered fights and skirmishes, where differing groups of milites retreated, stood
their ground or charged as necessary, until eventually they formed into a defensive circle
(orbis fecere) and fought the enemy in that formation.580 Marius himself personally
intervened with a hand–picked cavalry squadron (turma), attacking the enemy and bringing
relief to certain groups of infantry, and he was at length able to draw the army back together
and organise a retreat to a nearby hill (98.1–5).
Sallust’s account (Jug. 97.5) of the performance of the milites in this confusing situation is
fairly glowing, and the intervention of Marius and his handpicked cavalry is emphasised as
the key factor in the Roman recovery (98.1). As discussed, this battle presented a highly
chaotic situation and a formidable tactical challenge.581 The Numidians had judged that
nightfall would hinder the Romans (97.3), particularly given the Romans’ unfamiliarity with
the terrain and their flank–and–rear attacks caused much disruption (97.3–5). Perhaps the
Africans expected that an orderly Roman retreat would not be possible. They might thus have
expected a decisive victory, but the Romans performed coolly under these pressing
circumstances. Two pertinent observations reveal, first, the ability of Roman infantrymen to
reorganise themselves into defensive formations, much like a phalanx (Sall. Jug. 97.5), and,
secondly, the decisive reserve role played by Marius’ handpicked cavalry in the absence of
the orderly reserve lines of the triplex acies (98.1). The milites manoeuvred themselves into
defensive formations on their own initiative and so were evidently well–trained and
experienced.582 The cavalry, which almost single–handedly restored the battle, must also have
been well–trained. It seems that these infantry and cavalry tactics were advances from earlier
practices.
580 Sall. Jug. 97.4–5. The orbis was probably a tight circle of men rather than the sort of hollow square that Roman armies later used on the march (Paul, 1984, 240). Cf. Plut. Ant. 42.1. 581 Cf. Ch. 1, 50–2 582 Sallust (Jug. 97.5) calls a number of the men novi, but as Paul (1984, 239–40) explains, these infantry were at the end of their second campaign. Novi might refer to the cavalry who recently arrived with Sallust, or simply be a scribal interpolation (Ibid., 240).
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There are a handful of other less informative accounts of retreats. Appian (Hisp. 81–2)
describes the withdrawal of a Roman army, commanded by Aemilius Lepidus Porcina and
Junius Brutus Callaicus, from Pallantia in northern Spain, 136 BC. At the siege of Pallantia,
due to supply shortages, the Roman army was suddenly ordered to depart in the last watch of
the night, but the tribunes and centurions did not have time to organise the army properly,
with the result that the sick and wounded (and presumably supplies) were left behind (82). As
the army departed at dawn amidst this chaos, the Pallantines harassed the Romans and
inflicted significant casualties on them until night, when the Roman army became inert from
exhaustion and, counter–intuitively, the Pallantines withdrew (82).
The causes for this chaotic withdrawal are clearly explained by Appian: the generals gave the
orders at last watch, leaving only a couple of hours for the orders to be implemented before
daylight, and so the army was not properly organised when it retired.583 Presumably, the only
reason the army was able to continue withdrawing while the Pallantines attacked is because
the latter were vastly inferior in numbers. Appian’s description of the chaos of the
withdrawal, particularly the abandonment of the wounded and the disorder caused by the
latter begging the army not the leave them, is reminiscent of Plutarch’s description of the
disastrous Roman withdrawal after the Battle of Carrhae in 53 BC.584 This may be a trope,
but the abandonment of sick and wounded was clearly conceived by some Roman writers to
be the antithesis of an orderly retreat or withdrawal. It can be assumed then that a well–
devised retreat would include preparations for the sick and wounded, transport for the army’s
baggage, and much more extensive logistical preparations than occurred at Pallantia in 136
BC, though these precise details elude us. In this case it was only the vast tactical superiority
of the Roman army that preserved it from the ultimate fate that poor leadership nearly
brought.585 The main lesson here is that a withdrawal took more than a couple of hours to
organise, and that it was the responsibility of the general to plan for this and to allow the
tribunes and centurions time to make preparations.
583 Orosius (Adv. Pag. 5.5.13) has a less detailed but slightly different account, in which due to the flight the Romans lost six thousand men, their camp and their arms, but he also blames Aemilius for the disaster. 584 Plut. Crass. 27.5. As the two descriptions are so similar, they could be tropes regarding desertion of wounded soldiers. That said, there is nothing unbelievable about them in the circumstances. 585 The Roman army obviously maintained a reasonable level of ratio, for despite the casualties suffered, the army suffered no major collapse.
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In 102 BC a Roman army defending the river Atiso against the Cimbri, under the consul
Lutatius Catulus, panicked from fear of the aggressive enemy and, against their commander’s
orders, it withdrew in disorder (Plut. Mar. 23.2–5). Plutarch claims that, when Catulus could
not restrain the milites from abandoning their positions, he brought himself with his standard
to the head of the withdrawing troops, to give the appearance that the army was not fleeing,
but following its general in retreat (23.5). It could be observed from this incident that the
position of a general and his standard were important in determining the character of a
retrograde movement in the eyes of his men (and perhaps the enemy), and that even in this
later period of Republican history, it was important for a general or his standard to be visible
and prominent in a retreat or withdrawal. Catulus’ active leadership in this example stands in
implicit contrast to that of the consul Aemilius at Pallantia, as the latter was punished on his
return to Rome (App. Hisp. 83). From this brief example, we can determine that effective
management of a retirement by senior officers was crucial to its orderliness and thereby its
success.
Returning to the more detailed examples of Nepheris and the Numidian battle of 106, both
old and new observations can be made. Firstly, the importance of terrain to the success or
otherwise of a retrograde movement, as has repeatedly been raised throughout this thesis,
continues to be displayed in the preceding battle accounts. What appears to be new, however,
is the use of cavalry reserves, as evident in Scipio’s tactics at Nepheris (App. Pun. 103), as
well as Marius’ tactics in Numidia (Sall. Jug. 98.1).
At both Nepheris and in the battle of 106, relatively small numbers of cavalry under the
general’s direct command were used as a rapid reaction force.586 This is not the same as the
straightforward retreat tactics used at Pydna, as repeated manoeuvres and attacks by cavalry
along with the management of scattered infantry units in order to sustain a retreat, are more
complex tactics. It is true that, in the Mid–Republican period, both Romans and non–Romans
utilised cavalry to support infantry battlelines.587 And yet, examples of cavalry supporting the
retirement of infantry are few and far between, and there is no example of cavalry being used
586 Sall. Jug. 98.1; App. Pun. 10. 587 See Ch. 3, 122–5. Numidian cavalry in Carthaginian service were particularly efficient in the Second Punic War (eg. Polyb. 3.117), but they were not necessarily used to support retreating infantry (cf. Polyb. 11.21, 24; Livy 28.13–5, 30.18).
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with such flexibility as at Nepheris or the Numidian battle.588 Even in the Second Punic War,
cavalry were still mainly deployed as skirmishers or for major flanking manoeuvres.589 On
the other hand, the use of cavalry in counterattacks to support struggling infantry is more
common in battles of the later second century, but these tactics sometimes required a hands–
on leadership style: Scipio utilised his personal cavalry detachment at Nepheris, and Sallust
emphasises that Marius utilised handpicked cavalry as his reserve force at the battle of
106.590 The personal interventions of these generals with their bodyguards were decisive to
the Roman recovery in those battles. It may be that this more flexible and situational use of
cavalry reserves, under the direct control of the general or a senior officer, and particularly to
support retiring or fleeing infantry, was a development that began in earnest throughout the
mid to late second century.
It is worthy of note that in both battles, isolated infantry units were able to organise
themselves into defensive formations, such as a closed circle, on their own initiative and to
fight effectively.591 There is nothing complex about these actions, since they were merely
groups of men conglomerating as might be expected when they were surrounded by enemies,
but it was impressive that the Romans could fight effectively in such a situation, for
commonly soldiers who were isolated and surrounded in this way were defeated.592 Such
discipline could only be a product of experience in battle, as Roman training methods could
not prepare soldiers for such ad hoc manoeuvres.593 Throughout the second century, Roman
soldiers had a tendency to serve for longer periods and therefore accumulate more military
experience, but not necessarily in major battles.594 It may be that the low intensity, long
588 Cavalry could be used simply to threaten enemy pursuers by their presence (Polyb. 18.22; Caes. BCiv. 1.46; Livy 42.59), but the cavalry support organised by Scipio and Marius appears to have relied more on speed and moving from one specific point of the battlefield to another. The cavalry were therefore committed to specific parts of the battle with greater precision, whereas early examples tended to see the cavalry remaining in a large mass just as they were originally deployed. 589 Eg. Polyb. 3.72, 113, 115, 11.21, 14.8, 15.11–2. 590 Sall. Jug. 98.1; App. Pun. 103. Handpicked cavalry were also used by Caesar (Caes. BGall. 1.42). Caesar later utilised German mercenaries, finding them the most effective cavalry against the Gauls (BGall. 7.67, 70, 80; Keppie, 1984, 100). Both of these generals sought to utilise the most effective cavalry, regardless of their origin. 591 Sall. Jug. 97.5; App. Pun. 103. 592 Men fighting in a circle could be vulnerable if they became too compressed (Polyb. 3.116; Caes. BGall. 2.25; Livy 23.27.1). Livy usually describes such a formation as a product of desperation, foreshadowing the deaths of the beleaguered men (4.39.4–5, 6.4.10, 21.56.2, 23.27.6–7, 28.22.15, 28.33.15, 42.65.6–7). 593 Cf. Ch. 3, 110–113. 594 Serrati, 2007, 495. The armies of Scipio and Marius were experienced, though their discipline required some
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duration guerrilla warfare in Spain during this period taught Roman soldiers how to fight
better in isolated or ad hoc formations under more chaotic circumstances.595
There were several changes to the Roman army’s structure that also took place in this period.
In the last decade of the second century, the legion of 30 maniples was formally replaced by a
legion of 10 cohorts, and skirmishers were integrated into the cohorts.596 These skirmishers
were no longer javelin–armed velites, which were formally removed from the legion, but
foreign auxiliaries, commonly armed with slings and bows.597 The evolution towards this
closer cooperation between light and heavy infantry is implied in one of the last literary
mentions of maniples being used in battle, at the Battle of the Muthul, 108 BC (Sall. Jug.
49.6). Metellus Numidicus reportedly deployed several lines of reserves, disposed slingers
and archers in the gaps between his maniples, and placed the cavalry on the wings as usual,
suggesting that the light infantry would fight in the battleline and cooperate closely with the
milites (Jug. 49.6). The recent work of Slavik has suggested that perhaps the velites could
have performed a similar function, but the formal integration of skirmishers into cohorts
suggests an even closer cooperation between light and heavy infantry.598 Also, Gaius Marius
reduced the Roman army’s impedimenta and enhanced the legionary training regime, a major
step towards standardising the quality and manoeuvrability of Roman armies.599 The
increasing use of auxiliary cavalry, and the corresponding increase in advance–and–retreat
tactics used by these cavalry, has been described.600 The changes in light and heavy infantry
equipment, training and organisation, however, surely meant that the legionary sub–units
were more capable of fighting and retreating independently, as they were larger and more
closely supported by light infantry and cavalry. Their increased capability was certainly
demonstrated at the Romano-Numidian battle of 106, and even earlier at Nepheris.
sharpening (Goldsworthy, 2004, 120–1, 139). 595 Cohorts: Bell, 1965, 416–8; Sekunda, 2007, 356. On the difficulties of the extended fighting in Spain, cf. Bell (1965, 410–2), Cagniart (2007, 81) and Hoyos (2007, 76). Roman legionaries evidently could adapt their fighting style to suit this kind of warfare (Caes. BCiv, 1.44; Potter, 2010, 328). It must be noted that if the Romans did learn from these experiences, most of Marius’ men at the battle of 106 BC can only have absorbed such lessons from institutional knowledge rather than personal experience. 596 Cagniart, 2007, 86. 597 Keppie, 1984, 78–9; Rankov, 2007, 32; Sekunda, 2007, 356–7. 598 Slavik, 2018, 168. 599 Cagniart, 2007, 26–7. 600 Cf. App. Pun. 102–3; Hisp. 88.
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That said, not all of the retreats and withdrawals mentioned above were necessarily
challenged by comparable or even disciplined bodies of troops, since the Roman army
usually displayed overwhelming superiority in open battle against its opponents in this
period.601 As such, effective tactics were not always necessary to save retreating Roman
armies. For example, the survival of the army at Pallantia (App. Hisp. 82) may be attributed
to overwhelming battlefield superiority, and probably also to superior numbers, while the
disordered withdrawal at the river Atiso in 102 BC was not effectively followed up by the
Cimbri, who were separated from the Romans by the river. The occasionally cavalier
performance of Roman forces in the same period also resulted in a number of avoidable
reverses.602 If the performance of the Roman army was uneven during the second century,
then so may have been its tactical development. Although some milites may have learned to
fight in isolated formations during this period, the intervention of commanders with cavalry
forces appeared to be the more important factor when facing defeat, in coming to the
infantry’s aid. Perhaps only particularly capable and active generals, such as Scipio and
Marius, utilised such tactics. It is significant that both of these generals had reputations for
military reform and thorough training practices.603 Conversely, poor leadership was the
reason the Romans suffered so much at Pallantia in 136, while good leadership preserved
some semblance of order at Atiso in 102. Therefore, the quality of an army’s leadership
remained a deciding factor in whether or not it utilised successful retreat tactics in this period.
Even considering the army’s gradual organisational change, most of the inherited institutional
knowledge that contributed to the successful retreats at Nepheris and in Numidia probably
occurred at the level of commanders and their officers, including centurions.604
601 Eg. Numidian indiscipline in 106 BC (Sall. Jug. 98.5–99) and the panic of the Carthaginians at Nepheris (App. Pun. 103). Cf. Gilliver, 2007, 156–7. 602 There are several examples of Roman indiscipline in this period, such as against the Germans (Plut. Mar. 23.2–5), Numidians (Sall. Jug. 44) and Carthaginians (App. Pun. 115–6). 603 Plut. Mar. 13.1–2, 25.1–2; App. Hisp. 86. Also see Bell, 1965, 415–7. 604 Note that Marius served with Scipio at Numantia, and so had the opportunity to learn his elder’s tactics (Plut. Mar. 3–4).
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Retreat Tactics in the Late Republic
There are many more examples of complex fighting retreats and withdrawals in the Late
Republic than in earlier periods. To some extent, this is a product of the plentiful sources that
discuss this period, including Caesar, Plutarch and Appian.605 However, it is also the case that
Rome fought an increasing number of major wars and battles in the final century of the
Republic and Roman armies were defeated with some regularity, particularly in the Civil
Wars. Roman armies were thus commonly forced to carry out retreats and withdrawals. The
commentarii of Caesar are the main contemporary source for the mid–first century BC, and
provide highly detailed accounts of Roman tactics.606 The following analysis will, therefore,
focus on various retreats and withdrawals described in the Caesarian corpus.607 In total, I will
examine five battles, those at Gergovia (52 BC), Ilerda (49 BC), Dyrrhachium (48 BC),
Nicopolis (48 BC) and Ruspina (46 BC).
Caesar’s army, by the time it had finished campaigning in Gaul and was engaged in the Civil
Wars, was exceptionally skilled and well–led. Even so, in two of the following case studies
(at Ilerda and Dyrrhachium), Caesar’s men were facing other experienced Roman armies, and
so the former did not hold the sort of decisive tactical advantage that, for instance, saved the
Roman forces at Pallantia in 136 BC.608 Further, in several of the following instances,
Caesar’s men had to retreat downhill, which was one of the worst situations a body of
infantry could find itself in.609 In particular, when Pompeius saw that Caesar’s men had to
retreat per declive at Dyrrhachium in 49 BC, he was allegedly confident that they would
suffer heavy casualties.610 Therefore, even if Caesar’s army was of superior quality, it still
605 Cf. Caes. BGall. 1.25, 1.79, 2.23, 2.41–2, 3.46, 3.95, 5.37, 6.40; BCiv. 1.45–6, 1.79, 2.41–2, 3.46; BAlex 40; Plut. Crass. 27.3–29.7; Ant. 40–50; App. B Civ. 2.80, 3.69, 4.128. 606 Southern, 2006, 21–3. 607 This includes the Bellum Alexandrinum and Bellum Africum. The composer of these books was probably Aulus Hirtius, who drew upon the writings of Caesar and other participants (Gaertner 2017, 275–6). 608 Ilerda: BCiv. 1.43–4. Also see Carter, 1993, 178, 181. Caesar describes Afranius and Petreius as highly experienced and skilled (BCiv. 3.73). Pompeius’s troops were not of the same quality as Caesar’s (Carter, 1993, 177), but Pompey’s own extensive experience and the ability of his army to outpace Caesar’s in the construction of fortifications at Dyrrhachium, for which Caesar makes excuses (BCiv. 3.44–5), show that the latter’s army was of respectable quality. 609 Caesar faced this problem at Gergovia (Caes. BGall. 7.51), Ilerda (BCiv. 1.45) and Dyrrhachium (BCiv. 3.45–6. A downhill pursuit was a great threat to a body of infantry: at the Battle of Sellasia, 222 BC, when a Spartan phalanx was forced from the summit of a hill on which it had taken position, the phalanx was forced to retreat downhill and so was broken by their pursuers with heavy casualties (Pol. 2.67.3-10). 610 Caes. BCiv. 3.45. As will be seen, if Caesar had not made significant preparations before withdrawing his
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faced great challenges, and so by examining Caesar’s campaigns it will be possible to
examine the tactics that a Late–Republican Roman army could use to retreat under the most
difficult circumstances, and to compare these tactics to those of other Roman armies in the
same period. It will then be possible to outline the differences between the most advanced
retreat tactics utilised by Republican Roman forces and those of earlier periods.
One of Caesar’s first reported fighting retreats occurred at the Gallic oppidum Gergovia in 52
BC. Caesar had ordered an attack against the Gauls encamped on the slope leading up to the
oppidum, and his troops carried this out successfully, but they then, allegedly against Caesar’s
wishes, pursued the Gauls all the way to the walls of Gergovia itself and made a botched
attempt to storm the town.611 This left the Romans exposed on the slope. The Gauls, with the
advantage of higher ground and the fortifications of Gergovia, checked the Roman advance,
and when the Romans allegedly mistook auxiliary cavalry riding around their flanks for the
enemy, the milites were forced back down the hill (deiecti sunt loco), and hundreds of
Romans were lost (Caes. BGall.7.51). It is striking that Caesar does not describe this as a
flight (fuga), but the fact that his soldiers appear to have turned away from the enemy to
escape suggests that it was a flight,612 albeit a limited one in which the soldiers were most
keen to escape the locus iniquus rather than the entire battle.
Although a downhill flight against a pursuing enemy was a worst–case scenario for an
ancient army, the Romans did not suffer catastrophic casualties because Caesar had taken
precautions and deployed two legions near the bottom of the slope, preventing the Gauls from
safely pursuing (Caes. BGall. 7.51). Thanks to this support, as soon as Caesar’s fleeing troops
reached level ground, they reformed their battleline, a display of order that itself would also
have discouraged pursuit (BCiv. 7.51). While cavalry could also have been useful in
threatening the pursuing Gauls, in this case, they had inadvertently triggered the rout due to
their barbarian appearance (7.50). Caesar was fortunate to have had large numbers of infantry
men (BCiv. 3.46), their fate would likely have been comparable to that of the Spartan phalanx at Sellasia (Polyb. 2.68.9–10). 611 Caes. BGall. 7.45–8. Caesar blames his men for not retreating when he ordered them to do so (BGall. 7.45, 47). It is also possible that Caesar's description of his battle plan intentionally concealed his own role in the defeat. Kagan (2006, 169–180) explores this event in detail, and finds it believable that Caesar’s plan was well–conceived, but that he lost control of it due to the actions of a small number of overly–aggressive soldiers. 612 Caes. BGall. 7.51: nb. infestis contra hostes signis constiterunt, suggesting that the soldiers had turned their backs. Cf. Kagan, 2006, 169.
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in reserve, as otherwise his retreating force may very well not have turned to face the enemy
once it reached flat ground. If the Gauls had continued their pursuit unimpeded, Roman
casualties could have been much higher, such was the danger of fighting on a slope. Caesar
did well to have kept significant reserve forces he could in reserve, which had the effect of
limiting the enemy pursuit, but the Roman action had been a far cry from an orderly retreat.
One can, therefore, see from the example of Gergovia how even an experienced army and
commander could suffer heavy casualties if they were beaten and unable to retreat in an
orderly manner. Fighting on a slope only worsened the situation.
Caesar faced a similar situation two years later at Ilerda. At the onset of the civil war in 49
BC, after Pompeius Magnus had withdrawn from Italy, Caesar went west to Spain in order to
deal with an experienced Pompeian army led by the viri militares Lucius Afranius and
Marcus Petreius.613 Caesar confronted the two generals and their five legions at Ilerda, in
north–eastern Spain. A back–and–forth series of clashes over strategic ground near the town
culminated in a pursuit of the Pompeians by a large part of Caesar’s infantry up to the walls
of Ilerda itself.614 The approach to Ilerda was a long and narrow incline, leaving no space for
manoeuvre and heavily exposing Caesar’s men to missiles.615 Caesar reports that only three
cohorts standing side–by–side could fit into this space (BCiv. 1.45.4). This prevented Caesar
from sending either cavalry to assist the trapped men or greater numbers of infantry, while
any attempt to retreat by Caesar’s men was punished by the enemy who were holding the
higher ground.616 Caesar’s men were thus obliged to stand and fight in this locus iniquus.
613 These generals were formidable opponents, experienced in military affairs and loyal to Pompeius (Syme, 2002, 31, 396). Caesar himself respected their scientia rei militaris (BCiv. 3.73), and their men were the most loyal and experienced Pompeian troops (Carter, 1991, 207). Petreius was the more experienced of the two, but it is unclear who was the senior commander (Goldsworthy, Caesar, 482–3). 614 Both sides had encamped in close proximity to the oppidum itself (Caes. BCiv. 1.41–2), which dominated the area from the top of a slope that extended for several hundred feet down to level ground (BCiv. 1.45.4–5). The Pompeians chose a hill near Ilerda for their camp, and Caesar entrenched himself on the low ground, close to the Pompeian camp (1.41). However, there was another, lesser hill between the Pompeian camp and Ilerda, which Caesar decided to seize in order to cut off the enemy's line of retreat, as well as their access to the supplies they held in the town (1.43). A battle developed around this hill as the Pompeians rushed to prevent Caesar from seizing the ground: Caesar was initially repulsed, but eventually having committed four legions to the action, he drove the enemy back, with the Ninth Legion recklessly pursuing the enemy to Ilerda itself, where they found themselves fighting on the uphill slope, unable to retreat safely (1.43–5). Not all of the action is clearly described by Caesar (Carter, 1991, 191), but the battle was evidently a fluid one. 615 Caes. BCiv. 1.45.4–6. Steep rock ridges flanked both sides of the slope up to the town, trapping Caesar's men between them (Carter, 1991, 192). 616 Of the first, failed, attempt at withdrawal, Caesar says only: Hinc se recipere cum vellent, rursus illi ex loco superiore nostros premebant (BCiv. 1.45). The space was narrow, perhaps only around 440m wide
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The Pompeians continually poured fresh milites into the battle, and, to prevent a rout Caesar
was forced to do the same, replacing exhausted troops with fresh men. Much of the fighting
was probably conducted at close range but not close quarters, as the Pompeians threw many
missiles but, after five hours had elapsed, Caesar’s troops finally ran out of missiles and drew
their swords.617 The Caesarians then made a charge, driving their enemies back to the walls
of Ilerda, where the ground flattened out, and cowing the Pompeians sufficiently that a
chance for retreat finally presented itself (Caes. BCiv. 1.46). At this time the cavalry was also
finally able to make its way forward, and by placing itself between the two armies (inter duas
acies), it allowed the milites to withdraw safely (BCiv. 1.46.3) The battle thus terminated
indecisively, but both sides claimed victory (1.47).
Several characteristics of a successful retrograde movement were displayed on the slope
beneath Ilerda. Both sides maintained ratio by fighting in close order, as they were boxed–in
by the terrain leading up to the oppidum.618 It is unclear whether or not Caesar’s soldiers,
when they eventually were able to retreat, moved at a gradual pace and thereby maintained
their formation, but it is fair to assume as much.619 The discipline of Caesar's highly–
experienced troops was unquestionably first–rate.620 The skill of the Pompeian troops is also
not to be denied.621 The Caesarians were well–led, demonstrated not least by Caesar's active
role in reinforcing wavering units and managing the movement of reserves (1.45), but Caesar
also sees fit to note the deaths of Caecilius, a courageous former centurion and a Pompeian
primipilus, hinting at the prominent role played by the opposing centurions in battle and
retreat.622 The casualties among senior centurions demonstrate that they managed the bulk of
(Goldsworthy, 1996, 138; cf. BCiv. 1.45.4). 617 Large numbers of missiles thrown by both sides: Caes. BCiv. 1.45–6. This may help to explain Caesar's comment on superior enemy numbers (BCiv. 1.46), as the slope of the ground allowed the men higher up to throw missiles into the action more effectively than those further down the slope could return fire (1.45), allowing more of the Pompeians to contribute to the action. 618 … tantum in latitudinem patebat, ut tres instructae cohortes eum locum explerent (BCiv. 1.45). An overly constricted fighting space could be a hindrance to swordsmen (Caes. BGall. 2.25), hence why no attempt was apparently made to squeeze more than three cohorts into the available space (BCiv. 1.45). 619 Caes. BCiv. 1.46.2: …facilis est nostris receptus datus. If the men were given an easy retreat, there was no need to rush, and Caesar is clear about the importance of maintaining formation (cf. BCiv. 1.44.3). 620 Note Caesar's emphasis on his men keeping to their ranks under pressure (BCiv. 1.44), and when his army began to waver as a result of the vanguard's initial repulse between the two camps, Caesar sees fit to describe this situation as ‘unusual’ (1.45). The stoicism with which Caesar's men fought from disadvantageous ground for hours (1.45–6) and the smooth operation of reinforcing the forward troops (1.45), are also notable. 621 Caes. BCiv. 1.43–4; Cagniart, 1995, 34. 622 Caes. BCiv. 1.46.4–5. According to Carter (1991, 192), the Caesarian ex–centurion (Q. Fulginius ex primo
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the hand–to–hand fighting, and Caesar maintained the traditional commander’s role of
organising reserves and perhaps exhorting his troops. These tactics and techniques were not
necessarily unique to this period, but the efficiency with which they were performed and the
retreat was managed, particularly the transfer of reserves, is striking.
Finally, terrain was crucial to the manner in which the battle unfolded. The spectre of the
Battle of Gergovia hung over the engagement at Ilerda.623 At Gergovia, Caesar had had the
opportunity to plan ahead, and so prevented a major disaster by his judicious placement of
reserve units to deter Gallic pursuit (Caes. BGall. 7.49–51). This was impossible at Ilerda, so
the fight was determinedly maintained by Caesar’s men on poor ground for hours with
reinforcements constantly being sent uphill and exhausted men being drawn back (BCiv.
1.45–6). The disadvantageous terrain meant that Caesar was forced to utilise reserves, in this
case cavalry, to support the retreat, but it was the final courageous charge by his infantry that
made it possible for the reserves to come forward in the enclosed space.
The comparison between Gergovia and Ilerda shows that when a body of troops found itself
fighting on disadvantageous ground, it was better for them to maintain the fight in situ until a
safe retreat could be organised, than to flee downhill, even toward a better position. It would
appear that Caesar and his men had learned this lesson from Gergovia, and had thus
sharpened their ability to retreat in difficult circumstances.624 One might note that Caesar
once again accuses his men of being overeager in advancing into such an unfavourable
position in the first place, just as he had at Gergovia.625 Perhaps he was simply absolving
himself of blame, or perhaps the men really were overly aggressive.626 Even if the latter, their
coolness once in a potentially disastrous situation was certainly much greater than it had been
at Gergovia. This was probably a reflection of their own experience in retreats, Caesar’s
hastato legionis xiiii) was a re–enlisted veteran, who was obviously well–known, rather than a currently serving centurio. Potter (2010, 321–5) discusses the increasing importance of the centurionate in tactics and advising commanders in this period. The Pompeians also lost four other centurions among over two hundred casualties (Caes. BCiv. 1.46), a rate of attrition that demonstrates their front–line leadership roles. 623 Lendon, 2005, 222–4. 624 Many of Caesar's legions, such as the Ninth that was first to push onto unfavourable ground at Ilerda, had been campaigning continuously with Caesar for years (Keppie, 1984, 132, 135, 142). These legionaries were thus in a position to recall and apply the lessons of past failures. 625 Cf. Caes. BGall. 7.45, 47 and BCiv. 1.45.2. 626 Cagniart (1995, 34) suggests that Caesar’s original plan to seize a hill near Ilerda (Caes. BCiv. 1. 43) was well conceived but poorly executed by the soldiers themselves, who were overly aggressive.
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careful management of reserves, and the usefulness of the Caesarian cavalry (Caes. BCiv.
1.46), in contrast to the mounted auxiliaries that had frightened the milites at Gergovia
(BGall. 7.50).
Caesar’s men were not the only ones who utilised retrograde manoeuvres during the Ilerda
campaign. Following the fighting around Ilerda itself, Afranius and Petreius decided to
withdraw (locis excedere) to another part of Spain (Caes. BCiv. 1.61.2). In the process they
found themselves in a race against Caesar to reach strategic ground with which they could
secure their escape (BCiv. 1.66, 1.69). While they marched, the Pompeian soldiers were
harassed by Caesar’s cavalry, and, being so delayed, they eventually found themselves cut off
from their intended avenue of escape, whereupon they decided to return to Ilerda.627 During
this second movement, Caesar’s cavalry again attacked the Pompeian army as it moved
(1.78.4), creating such difficulties that the latter were eventually forced to encamp on nearby
high ground (1.78–80). Caesar described the fighting withdrawal of the Pompeian rear–guard
in detail (1.79.5–80.1). He states that the Pompeians utilised lightly equipped legionaries
(expeditae cohortes) to form the rear–guard and that these routinely halted to protect the army
as it passed on flat ground (1.79.1), or if their parent army had to climb uphill, the rear–
guards would ascend high ground first and fight from there to protect their comrades as the
latter ascended (1.79.2). However, if the Pompeian army was forced to descend, and its
pursuers thereby were able to attack the rear–guard from higher ground, then the retiring
troops had great difficulty (1.79.3). Caesar (1.79.5–80.1) described the Pompeian tactics
under these difficult circumstances:
The only course left for them was, whenever they approached such places, to
order a halt of the legions and to repel the cavalry by a vigorous charge, and
when they had dislodged it, starting forward immediately at a run, to descend in
a body into the valleys, and so, after crossing them, again to halt on the higher
ground. For they were so far from being aided by their cavalry, of whom they
had a considerable number, that they actually received them for protection,
demoralized as they were by the previous battles, into the centre of their
column, and none of them could stray from the route without being caught by
Caesar's horse. Fighting in this way, men advance slowly and tentatively,
627 Caes. BCiv. 1.78. The cavalry harassment allowed Caesar's infantry to catch up (Carter, 1991, 202).
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frequently halting to support their comrades, and so it happened on this
occasion.628
There are several observations to be drawn. The first is that the Pompeians had an orderly
system for protecting the army as it withdrew, with specifically appointed and equipped
legionaries standing guard as the army passed, adapting their tactics according to the terrain.
The relationship between tactics and terrain was a close one. Unsurprisingly, whoever held
the high ground had the advantage. The Pompeians had a regularised response even where the
terrain did not allow them to continue withdrawing with their usual methods: they halted the
army, dispersed their pursuers, then moved forward and crossed the difficult ground as
quickly as possible. According to Fuller, the army probably marched in a square formation,
protecting it on all sides.629 Caesar implies that he has some experience seeing Roman troops
fight in this manner.630 It is also evident that, as the Pompeian cavalry was of no use, the
infantry had greater trouble fending off Caesar’s cavalry. In this scenario, a number of
centurions were again killed (Caes. BCiv. 1.80.5), demonstrating again the key leadership
roles of centurions during a withdrawal. To summarise, the above account shows once again
that terrain heavily shaped the chosen tactics in the course of a retreat, that the Romans relied
upon cavalry to most effectively carry out fighting retreats or withdrawals but could replace
them with legionaries if necessary.
In the year following the campaign at Ilerda, a Caesarian army was defeated by Pharnaces of
Pontus in the Battle of Nicopolis, 48 BC. This engagement, however, saw the fighting retreat
of a single legion, after the rest of the Roman army had been defeated (BAlex. 40). The Legio
XXXVI, alone on the field after the defeat of the other Roman forces, resisted enemy attacks
despite being surrounded (circumdata), formed a circle or square (in orbem) and carried out a
fighting retreat to the nearest high ground (pugnans ... se recepit ad radices montium),
thereby terminating the battle (BAlex. 40). There is no evidence of the use of reserves here,
and so these Romans were fortunate that high ground was located close by. However, they
were also well–served by their use of a closed, defensive formation while retreating or
628 Trans. A. G. Peskett, 1914. 629 Fuller, 1965, 204. This is implied by the fact that the cavalry could be hidden in the centre of the army (Caes. BCiv. 1.79.5: medium reciperent agmen). Although a square formation could be though too unwieldy for an advance of any speed, Antonius successfully moved in such a formation in the open spaces of Parthia (Plut. Ant. 42.1). 630 Caes. BCiv.1.80.1: Tali dum pugnatur modo ... ut tum accidit.
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withdrawing, just as was utilised at Ilerda by Afranius and Petreius (Caes. BCiv. 1.79.5) and
would be by Marcus Antonius in Parthia (Plut. Ant. 42.1). This is as such a standardised
Roman tactic in this period.
Returning to Caesar’s own campaigns, again in the year after Ilerda, Caesar fought an even
more complex battle near Dyrrhachium, this time against Pompeius himself. After having
withdrawn from Italy, Pompeius had stored his army's supplies and equipment in the town of
Dyrrhachium, which rendered it an ideal target for Caesar (Caes. BCiv. 3.41). After Caesar’s
arrival in the region, a variety of complex manoeuvres and counter–manoeuvres by the
opposing armies took place, culminating in the establishment of a convoluted series of
fortifications from which the two armies would frequently skirmish.631 One such skirmish
saw Pompeius press upon a hill recently occupied by Caesar’s men that had not yet been
properly fortified (BCiv. 3.45). This hill was defended by the Legio IX, which was one of the
legions that had fought on the slope of Ilerda the previous year.632 Pompeius sent forward a
detachment sufficient to harass this legion so thoroughly with missiles that Caesar, observing
the mounting casualties, ordered his legion to withdraw.633 However, as at Ilerda, the line of
retreat was per declive, and when Caesar's men attempted to withdraw, the Pompeians
attacked and prevented them from moving (3.45). At this juncture, Pompeius allegedly made
the remark that he would be a worthless general if he allowed Caesar’s men to retreat without
heavy loss.634 Evidently, Pompeius saw the Ninth's situation as all but irretrievable.
631 On his arrival, Caesar intended to cut Pompeius' army off from its supplies, just as he had attempted at Ilerda (Caes. BCiv. 1.43), and he managed to outmanoeuvre his opponents and encamp between the Pompeians and Dyrrhachium, which forced Pompeius to encamp on the coast of the Adriatic and keep himself supplied by sea (BCiv. 3.42). Caesar then began taking control of high ground around Pompeius's camp and occupying these hills with forts and garrisons, then constructing fortifications between these points, in order to entrap Pompeius (3.43). In response, Pompeius likewise fortified high points and constructed counter–fortifications to extend and secure his own perimeter (3.43–5). The result was a complex series of fortifications that loosely took the form of two (uneven) concentric lines, drawn along the hills possessed by one side or the other (see Keppie, 1984, 107). Pompeius decided to avoid a general engagement, and so he adopted a policy of attacking Caesar's men with light troops to harass and wound the Caesarians attempting to fortify certain hills (3.44). 632 Cf. Caes. BCiv. 3.45. The legion was commanded by the future triumvir Marcus Antonius. The courage and aggression shown by this legion, combined with the difficult situations they could find themselves in, bears all the hallmarks of Antonius’ skill and valour, as well as his impetuosity (Syme, 2002, 104). 633 Caesar, cum suos ex omnibus partibus vulnerari videret, recipere se iussit et loco excedere (Caes. BCiv. 3.45.4–5). Note that Caesar orders two different manoeuvres, recipere se and loco excedere. The implication is probably that they should give ground to the enemy (se recipere), and also remove themselves from the location entirely (loco excedere). 634 Caes. BCiv. 3.45.6: non recusare se, quin nullius usus imperator existimaretur, si sine maximo detrimento legiones Caesaris sese recepissent inde, quo temere essent progressae.
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Due to the highly diffused dispositions of his forces at Dyrrhachium, Caesar was unable to
deploy large numbers of reserves, as he had done at Gergovia or (with some difficulty) at
Ilerda.635 He now resorted to placing obstacles on the downhill slope that formed the path of
the Ninth Legion’s retreat, with a rapidly formed trench placed between these obstacles, so
that his troops would have defensive fortifications to assist them in their retreat and that the
pursuers would be disrupted (Caes. BCiv. 3.46). He also deployed slingers to support his
retreating men, and, having made all these preparations, he ordered the withdrawal (BCiv.
3.46). As expected, the Pompeians pursued Caesar’s retreating men closely and crossed the
makeshift fortifications Caesar had thrown in their path, so that Caesar, fearing that the
appearance of flight would invite a more serious attack (veritus, ne non reducti, sed reiecti
viderentur, maiusque detrimentum caperetur), ordered Marcus Antonius and the Ninth to
cease the retreat and counterattack their pursuers (3.46). Throwing their pila and charging
uphill, they put the surprised Pompeians to flight, after which the Caesarians quietissime se
receperunt (3.46).
This disengagement, while it was of a smaller scale than those at Gergovia and Ilerda,
occurred under particularly difficult circumstances. Pompeius's alleged boast makes it clear
that the expected result of a downhill retreat against aggressive pursuers was widespread
massacre of those retreating.636 Caesar and his army had experienced the challenges of a
downhill retreat in the past, in the debacle at Gergovia and more recently at Ilerda. The
difference between this incident and those previous retreats is that, in the former case, Caesar
could not prevent the enemy pursuit in any way. At Gergovia, Caesar had positioned the
Tenth Legion and cohorts from the Thirteenth in support of his retreating men (Caes. BGall.
7.51). At Ilerda, Caesar was able to maintain the battle in place for hours until circumstances
were more favourable for a withdrawal. Neither option was possible at Dyrrhachium, where
Caesar's forces were more thinly spread and the Ninth's accumulating casualties meant that he
could not delay.637 At both Gergovia and Ilerda, Caesar had not only extensive infantry
635 Pompeius's forces controlled a line of fifteen miles, and, as this was the interior line, Caesar's surrounding forces can only have been spread over an even greater distance (Caes. BCiv. 3.44). Gergovia: BGall. 7.49–51. Ilerda: BCiv. 1.46. 636 This insinuation seems clear, but it is also worth noting that Caesar included his offhand insult towards Pompeius’s generalship as an apology for what was actually a significant reverse for his own forces (Fuller, 1965, 221). Even so, Caesar (BCiv. 1.46.4) had apparently expected a worse outcome from this incident. 637 Caes. BCiv. 3.44–5. While Caesar only lost 5 men in the final clash (BCiv. 3.46.5), he emphasises that many had already been wounded (3.44.6: multi… ex nostris vulnerabantur).
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reserves at hand, but well–guarded camps.638 At Dyrrhachium, all Caesar had to support his
retreating men were some slingers and makeshift obstacles. The one saving grace was that the
men who pursued the legionaries were not themselves heavily armed, but light infantry,
hence their vulnerability to a stiff counterattack.639 Even so, this varied utilisation of light
infantry by both sides at Dyrrhachium has few precedents. At Dyrrhachium, Pompey used
light infantry to assault a position held by legionaries, and Caesar used his own light infantry
to support their retreat. Thus, the use of light infantry at Dyrrhachium shows that such
auxiliaries provided important defensive and offensive capabilities to a Roman general, and
could be assigned to specific tasks like a regular military unit.640 The velites and auxiliaries in
the Middle Republic do not appear to have been used with such flexibility. The case of
Dyrrhachium thereby shows the increasing important of light infantry in battle and
particularly in retreat, demonstrates the use of makeshift obstacles to support a retreat, and
emphasises the importance of counterattack in a difficult retreat or withdrawal.
In 46 BC, at Ruspina in Africa, the entirety of Caesar’s army again found itself forced to
retreat from an unfavourable action. While Caesar was fighting against the veteran Petreius
and his own erstwhile legate Titus Labienus, his army was surrounded and found itself
shaken by the novel cavalry tactics of the Pompeians (BAfr. 14–5). In response, Caesar
reorganised his line in an unconventional manner, in a battleline with alternating cohorts
facing forwards and backwards, from which formation his infantry counterattacked and
withdrew as necessary, while the cavalry cut off enemy forces from assisting each other (17).
After driving the enemy back in this manner, Caesar began to retreat to his camp in battle
formation.641 However, the enemy pursued heavily with large numbers of cavalry, forcing
Caesar to stop and fight in open ground (18). Harassed by the enemy’s skirmishing tactics
and unable to complete his retreat, Caesar launched a major counterattack and drove off the
enemy to a distance, then he took possession of some nearby high ground and gradually
completed his retirement while still maintaining battle formation.642
638 The camp at Gergovia: Caes. BGall. 7.35–6, 41. At Ilerda: BCiv. 1.41–2. 639 Carter, 1993, 180, cf. Caes. BCiv. 3.46. 640 Note also the light–armed legionaries that Afranius and Petreius used to support their withdrawal at Ilerda (Caes. BCiv. 1.79.1), and Antonius’ reliance on his missile–armed auxilia during his withdrawal from Parthia in 36 BC (Plut. Ant. 41.5–42.1). 641 BAfr. 17.2: ad sua praesidia sese, sicut erat instructus, recipere coepit. 642 BAfr. 18: ita uti erant instructi leniter se ad suas recipiunt munitiones. Appian (BCiv. 2.95) provides a different account of the battle’s end, stating that Petreius simply let Caesar go in order not to deprive his superior Scipio of the glory. Fuller (1965, 270) provides a rationalisation of this seemingly unlikely version of
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Caesar’s tactical creativity and the coolness of his men under pressure are again in evidence
here. In the first attempt at retreat, Caesar created the opportunity through the novel
dispositions of his battleline and the use of cavalry manoeuvres and infantry attacks. It is then
shown once more that cavalry superiority could be a decisive factor in a fighting retreat over
flat ground, for the relative weakness of Caesar’s cavalry caused this retreat to stall, and so
the infantry assisted the cavalry by also counterattacking.643 This counterattack created the
space Caesar needed to complete his retreat; during which he briefly took possession of
nearby high ground, but it was the enemy’s defeat rather than the terrain that proved most
beneficial.644 Without the disturbance of enemy pursuit, the retreat was performed in an
orderly manner, at a gradual pace and in battle order.645 As usual, terrain remained a factor,
and the effectiveness of Caesar’s cavalry was key. But more than these things, it is evident
that just as in numerous other cases the best way to guarantee a retreat in the face of heavy
pursuit was to counterattack, and Roman infantry and cavalry could support each other in
doing so with great effectiveness.646
Caesar’s retreat tactics at Ruspina were possibly unique, as there is no other extant example
of an army being arranged so that alternating cohorts in a battleline faced to the front and
rear. Caesar’s contemporaries usually used a circular or square formation, as did Afranius at
Ilerda (Caes. BCiv. 1.79.5), the Legio XXXVI at Nicopolis (BAlex. 40), and Marcus Antonius
nearly two decades later in Parthia (Plut. Ant. 42.1).647 Caesar actually found the compression
of his army in orbem at Ruspina to be a hindrance (BAfr. 15.3–5), and so he extended his line
to fight more easily.648 He had done a similar thing at the Battle of the Sabis in 57 BC (Caes.
BGall. 2.21). Evidently, it was important that an army and even individual soldiers
maintained a certain amount of space to move and fight properly. Even so, the use of square
events, but the Caesarian version appears more plausible. How could Petreius, who had been defeated by Caesar before and knew his quality, let the latter escape unharmed if the opportunity for a more decisive victory was present? Caesar certainly would have taken advantage of such an error. 643 BAfr. 18: ad insequendum hostem perseverandumque cursum tardiora ... Note that the Pompeians struggled to maintain their retreat at Ilerda for similar reasons (Caes. BCiv. 1.79.5). 644 BAfr. 18: adversarii male accepti tum demum se ad sua praesidia contulerunt. 645 BAfr. 18: ita uti erant instructi, leniter se ad suas recipiunt munitiones. 646 Dyrrhachium: Caes. BCiv. 3.46. Cf. Antonius’ tactics against Parthian pursuers in 36 BC (Plut. Ant. 41.4–5, 42.2–4, 41.5, 42.1. 647 Caesar: BAfr. 15 (in orbem), 18 (... circumdatis). Afranius: Caes. BCiv. 1.79.5. Legio XXXVI: BAlex. 40. Marcus Antonius: Plut. Ant. 42.1. 648 Perhaps the fact that Caesar had a relatively small force at Ruspina, and many raw recruits (BAfr. 16.4), rendered his usual tactics less effective.
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and circular formations by entire armies or legions, as well as the more creative arrangements
such as Caesar used at Ruspina, are Late Republican phenomena: no descriptions can be
found of such tactics attributed to earlier periods, at least with such large forces.649 Just as the
phalanx had difficulty manoeuvring on uneven ground, so Roman square formations could
have the same difficulty (Dio 56.13.5), but on open ground such a formation could give a
retreating or withdrawing army excellent protection (Plut. Ant. 42.1). By the mid–first
century BC, the Romans had absorbed this technique into their general military repertoire and
thus improved their ability to retire even while under attack. An army as experienced as
Caesar’s, with a commander such as he, was evidently capable of even more complex
defensive manoeuvres.
As usual, the terrain and the use of reserves were key factors in retreats. At Gergovia, Ilerda,
and Dyrrhachium, the slope in fact determined the course of the battle. At Ilerda it was an
effective system of reserves, command and control that allowed Caesar to replace exhausted
troops with fresh troops and helped his men to stand their ground, avoiding a repeat of
Gergovia. The cavalry was far better utilised at Ilerda. As soon as it could, it came forward to
cover the retreat (Caes. BGall. 1.46). Conversely, at Gergovia the sudden appearance of
Caesar’s auxiliary cavalry had frightened the legionaries and actually contributed to a partial
rout (BGall.7.50). Weak cavalry forces were a major disadvantage. This caused significant
problems for Afranius and Petreius at Ilerda, and for Caesar at Ruspina.650 However, good
infantry could pick up the slack. At Dyrrhachium, with no immediate cavalry reserves Caesar
utilised missile troops to support his retreating men, and manipulated the terrain through the
manufacture of obstacles. At Ilerda, the Pompeians utilised lightly equipped legionaries to
cover the heavy infantry, and at Ruspina Caesar used his regular cohorts in an unusual
formation to support the cavalry. By carrying out sharp counterattacks where enemy pursuit
could not be stifled by the presence of reserves, the Romans could even retire downhill,
something that would normally be disastrous for a hard–pressed body of infantry.651 Not only
could Caesar’s men do this, but so did Pompeian troops at Ilerda (Caes. BCiv. 1.79.5–80.1).
Caesar’s use of terrain and reserves to support his retreats was therefore often successful and
649 Livy repeatedly describes men fighting in orbem (4.39.4–5, 6.4.10, 21.56.2, 23.27.6–7, 28.22.15, 28.33.15, 42.65.6–7), but Livy usually describes such a formation as a reaction to desperate circumstances rather than an effective tactic. In the Late Republic, however, forming a circle or square is often a deliberate, calculated and effective response to enemy attacks, whether initiated by veteran soldiers or by officers. 650 Caes. BCiv. 1.79.5; BAfr. 18. 651 Polyb. 2.68; Caes. BGall. 7.51.
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well managed, but his practices were not out of keeping with the tactics of other
contemporary commanders.
There were several major changes in the Roman army’s structure and tactics that occurred
during the first century BC. The trend of utilising significant numbers of foreign light
infantry and cavalry continued apace, to the point that Marcus Antonius marched into Parthia
in 36 BC with nearly as many auxiliary light infantry and cavalry (including Iberians and
Gauls) as he had legionaries (Plut. Ant. 37.3). By this time Roman and Italian cavalry had
been totally phased out.652 The result of this total shift to use of foreign cavalry was that the
Romans could field large numbers of equestrians suited to a variety of tactics, such as the hit–
and–run style of Numidians and eastern light cavalry. More importantly, the close
cooperation of infantry and cavalry shows that the Roman ‘heavy’ cavalry (probably Iberians
and Gauls in most cases) lacked none of the fighting ability of Italian cavalry, but in line with
the army’s increasing professionalism, were even better trained and practised at cooperating
with infantry and supporting retrograde movements. The permanent establishment of
professional auxiliary units was a later development, but Caesar’s own cavalry lacked
nothing for its impact on the success of his retreats.653
Further, the experience and professionalism of both milites and imperatores continued to
evolve. Viri militares, such as Afranius and Petreius, Pompey, Caesar and Antonius had
military experience perhaps even greater than the most outstanding generals of previous
generations, such as Scipio Africanus, Gaius Marius, Sulla and Lucullus. The soldiers
themselves had, by the time of Caesar, evolved into professionals who fought for a living,
and for their general, rather than for the state.654 The incredible disciplina of this breed of
milites is evident in their conduct of complex fighting retreats at Ilerda, Ruspina, and other
instances detailed above.655 The tactical flexibility of these legionaries is also evident in their
ability to adopt tactics from their enemies (Caes. BCiv. 1.44). Indeed, legionaries could
evidently perform the functions of light infantry in this period, whether they were using
652 Cagniart, 2007, 87. On the reasons for this, see McCall, 2002, 110–23, 141. 653 Cagniart, 2007, 88. 654 Ibid., 93. 655 Cf. Caes. BCiv. 1.43–7; BAfr. 14–8. In the Battle of the Sabis, 57 BC, it is striking how when a Roman army was caught by surprise the milites quickly organised themselves into units without the involvement of their commander (Caes. BGall. 2.21). By this time, Roman soldiers were evidently highly skilled at organising themselves under pressure.
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Iberian–style skirmishing tactics or fighting alongside cavalry or outside regular formations
as antesignani.656 Roman legionaries had always shared similarities with Iberian fighting
styles, so the continued incorporation (or re–incorporation) of these fighting styles into
Roman infantry tactics demonstrates their continued flexibility in response to
circumstances.657 Thus, the Roman army’s retreat tactics were not only developing in one
direction, but they were in some state of flux depending on circumstances, with the main
underpinning factor being that their tactics became more complex over time.
As such, while terrain or the nearby presence of a fortified position have been shown as
decisive factors in the success or otherwise of a fighting retreat or withdrawal, by the mid
first century BC, Roman retreat tactics had become so effective that retrograde manoeuvres
could potentially be carried out with success not only in the absence of high ground, but even
in the presence of a decline, and in the face of enemy pursuit. The availability of reserves or a
rear–guard, whether these were legionaries, cavalry, or light infantry, and the general’s
utilisation of these troops through redeployment and counterattack, were the decisive factors
in the success or otherwise of a retrograde movement. The flexible and close cooperation of
light infantry, heavy infantry and cavalry in retreat and counterattack, and the flexible
adaptation of Roman tactics in general according to terrain and enemy, are probably the most
outstanding features of retreats and withdrawals in the Late Republic.
Conclusion
Roman retreat tactics developed over time. In the Middle Republic, such tactics were fairly
straightforward: the reserve lines of the triplex acies would support the front line if it was
repulsed, and cavalry posted on the flanks could threaten pursuers and allow a Roman army
to retreat in an orderly manner, usually towards high ground and/or a fortified position. For a
Roman army to retreat successfully in this period, opposing heavy infantry had to be
dissuaded from closely following the retreating troops, and ideally either high ground or a
fortified position needed to be located nearby. If these conditions were not met and the
Romans could not reduce or remove enemy pressure, it was difficult for a successful retreat
or withdrawal to be undertaken. 656 On Caesar’s antesignani¸see Carter, 1991, 191. On Roman adaptations to the hit-and-run tactics encountered in Spain, see Bell (1965, 416–9). 657 Cf. Livy 7.10.5; Quesada–Sanz, 2006, 20–1.
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Throughout the mid to late second century BC, Rome had few enemies powerful enough to
challenge her armies on the battlefield, although at times the Romans still had to carry out
retreats or withdrawals due to logistical or other tactical challenges. The most serious threats
that faced the Roman army in this period came from the engagements and sieges of the
Numantine war, the Third Punic War, the Jugurthan War and especially the Cimbrian War.
The weakness of sources in this period makes it difficult to conclude with certainty, but the
adaptive and charismatic leadership of Scipio Aemilianus at Nepheris and Gaius Marius in
Numidia, featuring the use of mobile cavalry reserves to support beleaguered and isolated
infantry units, hints at an emerging yet heterogeneous sophistication in retreat tactics
throughout this period. The presence of nearby high ground, or a camp, or some other
obstacle to enemy pursuit (such as the river at Nepheris), was still essential, but it seems that
from this period onward, particularly capable commanders could utilise an active leadership
style and highly mobile reserves to complete a successful fighting retreat even in the absence
of a fighting line, signifying some development from the more restrictive tactics of the triplex
acies. The reasons for this development can most likely be found in the dynamic conditions
of the skirmishes and small–scale battles that Roman soldiers mostly engaged in during this
period, the more specialised auxiliary cavalry that the Romans were fielding in increasing
numbers, as well as the emergence of a caste of semi–professional generals.
Regardless of the patchy and unclear evolution of retreat tactics in the second century, by the
mid–first century, these tactics emerge as clearly more sophisticated. The Romans’ use of
reserves was more complex, including not only the sort of cavalry support seen in the
previous century but also an increased use of light infantry, including archers and lightly
equipped legionaries. There is a clear difference in the Late Republic between the close
integration of missile–armed auxiliaries and legionary cohorts, and the separate divisions of
velites that marked the Polybian era. Legionaries themselves also showed increased
flexibility, adopting light infantry tactics where necessary. Cavalry certainly functioned in
closer support of retreating infantry than they had in the previous century and a half. The
increasingly long service periods and more regular battle experience of Roman soldiers in the
mid–first century meant that they became more experienced and skilled, showing their
discipline during the stress of a retreat. Experienced troops in this period could maintain
order and withdraw gradually or, if necessary, hold their ground and launch counterattacks
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even under intense pressure or on unfavourable terrain.658 They also demonstrated the ability
to form and maintain circular or square defensive formations during combat, either as
haphazard amalgamations of units or as an entire army.659 By using these various and
complex tactics, the Romans could retire on very unfavourable ground or over very long
distances.
Structural changes to the Roman army were a significant factor in this increased capability.
Particularly from the first century onward, the introduction of enhanced training regimes, the
formalisation of cohorts, the integration of missile–armed auxiliaries with heavy infantry
units, and increasing use of auxiliary cavalry increased the strength of Roman infantry units
while making the army more flexible as a whole. A general therefore had more options for
using light infantry and cavalry to protect the milites during a retrograde movement, while the
milites themselves, formed in greater numbers and trained more efficiently, were more
resilient to enemy pressure.
Although Roman retreat tactics became more sophisticated, old tactics and considerations
remained relevant. High ground and camps continued to be utilised as intermediate or
ultimate objectives for retreating and withdrawing troops. The use of multiple battles lines in
retreat was still wise, as seen when Caesar was saved by a reserve battleline at Gergovia.
Counterattacks following retreats were also not totally new tactics, as the Romans had, for
instance, counterattacked at Pydna.660 In general the changes in both Roman army
organisation, and more specifically in retreat tactics, were gradual and not necessarily linear,
as different armies fluctuated in quality throughout the second century and certain armies re–
adopted Iberian fighting styles due to specific campaign experiences.661 But the variety and
quality of Roman retreat tactics in this period was generally superior. Terrain, order and the
prevention of pursuit no longer dictated the success of a retrograde movement. The Romans
could utilise mobile reserves or a rear–guard, and counterattacks, to secure a retreat under
658 Eg. Ilerda (Caes. BCiv. 1.45–6), Nicopolis (BAlex. 40). 659 Eg. Numidia in 106 BC (Sall. Jug. 97.5), Nicopolis (BAlex. 40) and Antonius’ retreat from Media (Plut. Ant. 42.1). 660 Plut. Aem. 20.7–8. However, the counterattack at Pydna was not intended to facilitate the retreat, but to re–initiate the battle. Counterattacks to facilitate retreats were, on the other hand, fairly common by the mid first century: examples include Ilerda (Caes. BCiv 1.79), Dyrrhachium (BCiv. 3.46), Ruspina (BAfr. 18), and Antonius’ retreat from Parthia (Plut. Ant. 41.4–5, 42.1–4). 661 On Roman challenges in Spain, see Cagniart (2007, 81) and Hoyos (2007, 76). Legionary adaptations: Caes. BCiv, 1.44. Also see Potter, 2010, 328–9.
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almost any circumstances.
However, even the best soldiers could panic.662 As there were limits to what even highly
skilled men could achieve under unfavourable tactical circumstances, good decision–making
by generals to avoid such unfavourable circumstances was essential. The leadership of front–
line officers such as centurions was always important, but the personal intervention of a
commander who was trusted by his men could make a decisive impact.663 But more
importantly, generals chose the ground on which battles were fought, built camps in strategic
positions, and were in charge of the deployment and commitment of reserves.664 This was not
only the case in the Late Republic. At Pydna, Aemilus deployed his army on ground that
allowed a safe retreat, and in the second century Scipio and Marius, caught in difficult
situations, were able to use reserves and decisive action to manoeuvre their forces into more
favourable positions. But a general of the mid–first century BC had the army’s long term
organisational and tactical improvements detailed above to draw upon. A general of the mid–
first century could thus more reliably call upon effective reserves in the event of a retreat or
withdrawal, expect his troops to maintain ratio, and count on them to perform a counterattack
if safe retirement was otherwise difficult. On top of these factors, the generals of this period
were more experienced and therefore more skilled than most of their predecessors. The
Scipiones, Africanus and Aemilianus, and Gaius Marius, were early exemplars of a more
professional class of general. Yet they paled in experience next to Pompeius, Caesar, Afranius
and Antonius. Further, while certain generals or commanders, such as Marius and Caesar,
might appear to have marked milestones in the development of the army’s skill and
professionalism, they did not change the army so much as make the best use of the system
that already existed, and later generals drew upon the accumulated experience of their
predecessors.665 Thus, later generals such as Caesar and Antonius had more effective military
forces to draw upon in the first place. In effect Roman soldiers, officers such as centurions,
and generals all became institutionally more effective at maintaining order and managing
enemy pursuit during retreat or withdrawal.
662 Caes. BGall. 7.50; BCiv. 2.41–2. 663 Cf. Marcus Antonius’ interventions in Parthia, 36 BC (Plut. Ant. 42.1, 43.1–3, 47.4, 48.4). 664 Goldsworthy, 1996, 165–9. 665 Cagniart, 2007, 93; Potter, 2010, 328–9.
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All of these factors explain the exceptional success of Caesar in conducting retreats under
difficult circumstances. It is a fact that Caesar’s men were of superior discipline.666 But it
was Caesar who ensured the presence of infantry reserves and a nearby camp that supported
the fleeing legionaries at Gergovia, and of cavalry reserves and a proximal camp that saved
his men at Ilerda. Caesar organised the use of obstacles and support troops that allowed his
men to withdraw down a steep hill at Dyrrhachium, and he oversaw the redeployment of the
battleline and the repeated infantry and cavalry counterattacks that saved his army at Ruspina.
A less effective general may not have made these same preparations and decisions, and, in
any of these cases, even an army of such quality as Caesar’s could thus have suffered a
serious disaster. Perhaps it is the case that a more cautious general might not have found his
army in such unenviable situations in the first place. But counterattack was the best way to
support a retreat, and Caesar’s aggressive approach and spirited troops were more than equal
to such situations. As a result, in the conduct of withdrawals, Caesar outshone even Afranius,
Petreius and Marcus Antonius, who were in their own rights highly decisive commanders
when carrying out retrograde manoeuvres.
666 Note for instance the exceptional discipline of Caesar’s men when hard pressed at the Sabis (Caes. BGall. 2.27) on the slopes of Ilerda (BCiv. 1.46) or in the advance at Pharsalus (BCiv. 3.93).
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For so it is with human affairs; in time of victory the very cowards may brag, while defeat
discredits even the brave.
(Sall. Jug. 53.8)
Chapter Six
Disastrous Withdrawals in the Late Republic and Early
Empire
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Introduction
By the middle of the first century BC, the increased skill of Roman commanders, the
accumulated experience of soldiers embroiled in constant warfare, and general improvements
in the use of cavalry and light infantry meant that Roman forces could carry out successful
retreats and withdrawals in the most difficult of circumstances. In this period, Roman armies
demonstrated their skill in retreats at engagements such as Ilerda, Dyrrhachium, Nicopolis
and Ruspina. However, in the same period there were other Roman armies that suffered
significant casualties or even annihilation when attempting retreats from unsuccessful battles.
The total defeat of Crassus’ proconsular army at Carrhae in 53 BC (Plut. Cras. 27–31) and
the enormous casualties suffered in Marcus Antonius’ epic withdrawal from Media in 36 BC
(Plut. Ant. 41–50) are only two such examples.667 Even into the Principate, as the Roman
army became more professional, disasters still occurred when they attempted to escape
unsuccessful engagements. Perhaps the most famous of these was the Roman catastrophe at
Kalkriese in AD 9, the clades Variana.
As the preceding chapters have mainly focused on the success and evolution of Roman retreat
tactics, the question is now raised as to why it was that the Romans, who had become so
proficient at retrograde movements, could still suffer utter defeat in such scenarios? In
previous chapters it has been seen that a retreat or withdrawal could easily fail as a result of
enemy pursuit, but that as long as an army maintained ratio, was well–led and utilised terrain
or a nearby camp as a safe haven, or otherwise utilised reserves or support troops to
intimidate or hinder enemy pursuers, then a fighting retreat could be carried out under very
difficult conditions. By the mid–first century BC, the Romans had mastered these tactics, and
yet they still did not always succeed. Under what circumstances, then, were the Roman
army’s highly developed tactics ineffective?
The focus of the following analysis will be on three major Roman defeats in which
withdrawals were central to the course of events. The first case study will be the Battle of
Carrhae in 53 BC. The second will be Antonius’ strategic retreat from Media Atropatene in 36
BC. Finally, a study will be carried out of the clades Variana in AD 9. In the conclusion, the
failures of the Roman withdrawals at Carrhae and Kalkriese will be compared and contrasted
667 Another is the destruction of Gaius Scribonius Curio’s forces at Bagradas in 49 BC (Caes. BCiv. 2.42–3).
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to the relatively successful withdrawal from Media in 36 BC in order to demonstrate further
prerequisites for successful retreats and withdrawals that have not yet been identified.
The Battle of Carrhae, 53 BC
The Battle of Carrhae was probably the worst foreign defeat suffered by a Roman army in the
first century BC. The disaster began with a crushing battlefield defeat (Plut. Crass. 23–27.4)
and continued with the partial disintegration of the Roman army as it withdrew over the
following days (Crass. 27.5–29.4), until most of the remaining soldiers were trapped and
destroyed attempting to escape into Armenia (29.5–31.7). The main sources for the battle and
the surrounding events are Plutarch and Cassius Dio, but they give conflicting accounts.668 Of
the two, Plutarch is the more detailed and reliable source, and so the following analysis will
mostly utilise his account.669
The Roman general who presided over this defeat was Marcus Licinius Crassus, the triumvir,
by no means an inexperienced commander.670 Crassus had entered Syria in 54 BC as
proconsul in order to conduct a major campaign against the Parthians. For this purpose he
raised an army of seven legions, four thousand cavalry and a similar number of light
troops.671 Crassus led his army into the open desert to the east of his province and
encountered the Parthian army somewhere near Carrhae.672 Broadly, the Romans were caught
668 Plut. Crass. 18–31; Dio 40.16–30. Livy’s account of the battle is lost, and later accounts may have been based on his version (Sampson, 2015, 188). Brief references to the battle can be found in several sources, including Caesar (BCiv. 3.31.3), Velleius Paterculus (2.46.4) Appian (Syr. 9.1) and Orosius (Adv. Pag. 6.13) 669According to Tarn (1951, 50, cf. 51–3), an unnamed Mesopotamian Greek was probably Plutarch’s source for both Crassus and Antony. Tarn (51) considers the account of Carrhae to be better than those of most ancient battles. On the other hand, Dio’s account is much less contemporary and is very different to that of Plutarch (see Sampson, 2015, 122–3). Dio had a general tendency to recast battle narratives according to prevailing stereotypes (Pelling, 1988, 278). This suggests that Plutarch should be considered the more reliable account of the battle. Also see Sampson (2015, 122–3) on Dio’s weakness as a source for this battle. That said, the sources universally blamed Crassus for the defeat, rather than accept the limitations of Roman military power (Overtoom, 2018, 20–1). Plutarch is no exception to this (cf. Ward, 1977, 1–3), and this must be kept in mind when considering his account. 670 Plut. Crass. 6.6, 10.1–11.7; cf. Sampson, 2015, 79–80. 671 Crassus engineers his proconsular command: Plut. Crass. 14–5. Crassus' ambitions, perhaps overstated: Crass. 16.1–2, cf. Sampson, 2015, 98. Troop numbers: 20.1. Of the cavalry, many were Gauls sent by Caesar, and the light troops evidently included a significant number of archers (25.2). Also see Sampson, 2015, 114–5. The increased use of cavalry and light infantry in the Late Republic is evident in this army composition, though it would still prove insufficient for what was to come. 672 Modern Harran in south-east Turkey. Crassus allegedly neglected advice to march through Armenia and
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flat–footed in open terrain against a Parthian army, consisting only of cavalry archers and
some cataphracts, which parried all Roman counterattacks and subjected the legions to an
arrow barrage interspersed with cavalry charges for many hours, leaving the Roman army
broken and bloodied (Plut. Crass. 23.3–27.2). Of particular interest during the battle itself is
that, when Roman missile–armed infantry attempted to attack the Parthians, they were beaten
back by the enemy archery and sought refuge inside the formation of the milites (24.4). From
this it can be noted that the light infantry and milites did cooperate, but not effectively.
Crassus' son was killed during the action (Crass. 25.11–26.4). As a result of this and the sheer
scale of the defeat, the general allegedly suffered a nervous breakdown.673
The Romans then carried out a chaotic night retreat to Carrhae.674 This was probably
necessary, but it went poorly. Thousands more soldiers were killed as a result of being
abandoned in the camp or lost (Plut. Crass. 28.1–2). The Romans were able to reorganise
themselves at Carrhae, but they were forced to retire again to avoid being besieged (Crass.
29.1–3). Crassus and his remaining forces attempted to make their way back to Syria but
were outmanoeuvred and trapped on some high ground en route, where they fended off an
initial Parthian attack (29.6–7). Crassus was apparently compelled by his desperate soldiers to
parley with the Parthians, but shortly after doing so he was killed during a scuffle (30–1).
With the murder of their commander and several senior officers the Roman army’s spirit
collapsed. Some men surrendered, and at night the rest scattered in disorderly flight, but few
escaped (31.7). The remnants of the army that had withdrawn with Crassus and his legate
Octavius were thus totally destroyed.675 The defeat was total.676
avoid the very open terrain east of Syria (Plut. Crass. 19.1–3). Crassus’ initial advance: Crass. 20. Crassus allegedly took bad advice to change his course: 21–2. Encountering the Parthian army: 23. Nearby cities, including Carrhae: 25.11. Crassus’ neglect of apparently more sage wisdom may be a trope, foreshadowing his failure: note that, for reasons of supply, Alexander the Great took a very similar route to Crassus when he campaigned in the region (see Engels, 1978, 67–9, 121–2). Taking this route was not a blunder per se, but it was unquestionably difficult. 673 If Crassus succumbed to despair as Plutarch describes (Crass. 27.4–5), he did not do so immediately (cf. 26.5–6). 674 Plut. Crass. 27.3, 28.1. 675 Crassus had four cohorts of infantry, a few cavalry, and five lictors with him (Plut. Crass. 29.6), while Octavius led a detachment of about 5000 men (Crass. 29.5) 676 In numerical terms the defeat was a catastrophe, with around 30,000 soldiers lost (Plut. Crass. 31.7). It was also a strategic and diplomatic calamity, as Rome was humiliated by the loss of several legionary aquilae, Syria was exposed to extensive raiding, and Rome’s reputation in the east was damaged (Sampson, 2015, 169–72).
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While the Roman defeat on the battlefield near Carrhae had been the main event of this
disaster, the situation was significantly worsened in the withdrawals of the following days. If
20,000 men died in the entire debacle, nearly half of these (not to mention Crassus) may have
died during the manoeuvres following the battle.677 10,000 were also captured in the days
after the battle.678 It was, therefore, during the two withdrawals following the main battle that
the Roman army was truly destroyed, and so it is necessary to examine these manoeuvres and
what went wrong with them to fully explain the defeat.
Plutarch’s assessment of the army’s performance, beginning with the night march from the
battlefield to the army’s destruction, is far from glowing. A cavalry commander named
Ignatius abandoned the army, taking his horsemen with him (Plut. Crass. 27.6–7). During the
escape from Carrhae towards Syria, the quaestor (later liberator) Cassius made his way out
without supporting Crassus (Crass. 29.4). At the final confrontation, the soldiers themselves
coerced their general into making his fatal meeting with the enemy (30.5). However, there are
also several examples of spirited performance. When the legate Vargonteius was trapped on a
hill with four cohorts in the initial retirement, he and his men did not surrender but fought to
the death (28.2). The legionaries of Octavius who came to assist Crassus vigorously defended
him from attack (29.7). Even though these soldiers also forced Crassus to parley with the
Parthians, the army’s panic upon his death at least demonstrates that they had not planned to
sacrifice the general’s life for their own safety.679 When Crassus went to meet the enemy,
even though he was apparently expecting to be killed (30.5), he was accompanied by a
number of determined officers and soldiers, and he even had to dismiss his lictors (31.1). At
the last, when the Parthians attempted to kidnap Crassus, his comites intervened and a
number were killed, even though some of these were apparently unarmed (31.4–5). These
latter examples are promising reflections on the fides and virtus of at least part of the army.
However, the fact that Plutarch gives several examples of extreme indiscipline, particularly of
677 Twenty thousand: Plut. Crass. 31.7. Four thousand killed in the camp: Crass. 28.1. Four cohorts destroyed under Vargonteius: 28.2. Also see Sampson, 2015, 138. Up to five thousand may have died during the final collapse after Crassus' death (cf. Crass. 29.4–7). 678 Plutarch does not explain this figure, but he does mention that the Parthians took a number of lost legionaries prisoner in the morning after the initial withdrawal from the battlefield (Plut. Crass. 28.1), and a number of men surrendered when Crassus was killed (Crass. 31.7). Considering that the Parthians killed everyone they found in the abandoned Roman camp near the battlefield, it is likely that most of these prisoners were taken after the first night. 679 Plut. Crass. 30–1. The legionaries’ stalwart defence of their general when under open attack shortly beforehand also demonstrates their continued willingness to defend Crassus.
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the flight of the cavalry and of the milites threatening their general, demonstrates that it was
difficult for Plutarch to heap unqualified praise on Crassus’ army. There was too much
evidence of licentia and ignavia.
It is worth looking at the army’s experience and training to help explain its apparent
indiscipline. Sampson claims that, based on Crassus' previous experience with disciplining
and hardening raw recruits in the revolt of Spartacus, and on the fact that, by the time of
Carrhae, Crassus' recruits had been under arms for at least a year and had accrued some battle
experience, Crassus' army was ‘up to the expected Roman standard.’680 However, a year of
such experience with no major battles paled relative to the experience and skill of veteran
armies, such as those of Caesar and Petreius.681 A year or so under arms and a small amount
of campaign experience could in no way have prepared the army for its harrowing experience
on the field at Carrhae and the chaos and terror of the ensuing withdrawal. The instances
already given of the flight of cavalry and insubordination of legionaries, not to mention the
army’s total breakdown upon Crassus’ death, are evidence that, even if the army had been of
a reasonable standard prior to the battle near Carrhae, it was on the verge of disintegration
following its defeat in the field.
However, the army itself cannot be blamed without considering the role of its leadership. The
key officers named by Plutarch (Crassus aside) are the quaestor Gaius Cassius Longinus and
the legati Octavius and Vargonteius.682 As the general, Crassus dominates the account, but
Plutarch is critical of his performance. He alleges that, following the battlefield defeat, an
exhausted Crassus (not only defeated but having lost his son) lay in his tent after the
Parthians withdrew and could not be roused to action by his officers.683 Even if Plutarch
exaggerated Crassus' despair, he gives little evidence of Crassus' leadership during the initial
retirement. Plutarch contrasts Crassus’ alleged lethargy with several examples of energetic
action by other Roman officers: with Octavius and Cassius who apparently organised the
680 See Sampson, 2015, 115. Hardening troops against Spartacus: Plut. Crass. 10. Battle experience prior to Cannae: Dio 40.12.2 681 Afranius and Petreius: Caes. BCiv. 3.73. The Pompeian troops at Ilerda were the most loyal and experienced (Carter, 1991, 207). Caesar's men were of exceptional discipline (Caes. BCiv. 3.93.1). 682 Cassius: Plut. Crass. 18.4–29.4, passim. This Cassius is the future liberator. Octavius: Crass. 27.5, 29.5–7, 30.5–31.5. Vargonteius: 28.2. The praenomina or cognomina of Octavius and Vargonteius are not given. A tribune by the name of Petronius is mentioned (30.5, 31.4–6), as well as a craven cavalry leader named Ignatius (27.6–7) and the commander of the Roman garrison at Carrhae is named as Coponius (27.7–8). 683 Plut. Crass. 27.4–5. Plutarch also criticised Crassus’ deployment for the battle in the first place (Crass. 23.3).
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withdrawal to Carrhae themselves (27.5); the garrison commander at Carrhae, Coponius, who
left the safety of the town to locate the army and guide it back safely (Plut. Crass. 27.6–8);
and the officers Petronius, Vargonteius and Octavius who are generally singled out for their
selfless loyalty and courage.684 Crassus apparently recovered himself at Carrhae and once
again took command of the army, but he is depicted as having almost totally lost control of
events.685 If Plutarch’s account of Crassus leadership is accurate, it is the most obvious
explanation for the failure of the army’s withdrawal from Mesopotamia.
On the other hand, there are also hints of questionable conduct by some of Crassus’
subordinates. Of primary concern is the bias of Plutarch’s account towards Cassius, who is
mentioned repeatedly, invariably favourably, and often as an opposing voice to the tactics of
Crassus.686 The impression given is that Cassius was the army’s more competent co–
commander.687 It is implausible that Cassius should have been making important decisions
such as agreeing to parley with the Parthians, even in Crassus’ presence (Plut. Crass. 28.4–5),
but then took the cavalry with him to Syria and left Crassus to face the Parthians alone
(Crass. 29.4). Plutarch blames the trickery of local guides for this, but this is not
convincing.688 There was already tension between Cassius and the imperator before the
defeat at Carrhae, and this relationship can only have soured further under the
circumstances.689 Treachery is a central theme of Plutarch’s account, and yet he never accuses
Cassius of what appears to be desertion.690 At least one other officer, Ignatius, certainly
deserted with his troops (27.6). It is probably no coincidence that Ignatius and his detachment
comprised cavalry, as did Cassius’ force that fled to Syria (29.5), not to mention the fact that
Crassus’ cavalry numbers were at any rate much-reduced following the disastrous battle
(20.1). Mounted men were far more able to flee the Parthian advance than were the pedites,
who were probably also burdened with wounded men. One might also doubt that, in the final
684 Plut. Crass. 28.2, 29.5–7, 31.4–6. 685 Plut. Crass. 28.3–5, 29.2, 5–6, 30.2–31.5. 686 Cassius himself was probably one of Plutarch’s sources (Ward, 1977, 295). Cassius was seen by some writers as a better general than Crassus (cf. App. B Civ. 4.59), even though he was never in full command. 687 Plut. Crass. 20.2, 22.4, 23.3, 23.3–4, 27.5, 28.3–5, 29.1. Note that during the battle, Cassius commands one wing, while Crassus’ son Publius commands the other, suggesting that these two were of roughly equal seniority, but certainly subordinate to Crassus, who remained in the centre (Crass. 23.4). 688 Plut. Crass. 29.4. The traitorous guide or the turncoat dooming the army of the protagonists is a recurring theme in Greek literature (Hdt. 7.213.1, contra Plut. Ant. 41.1–4, 46.2 in which the guides were trustworthy). 689 Cf. Plut. Crass. 22.4, 23.3. 690 Treachery: Plut. Crass. 21.1–5, 7, 22.1–2, 27.6–7, 29.2–5, and possibly 31.3–4.
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withdrawal from the town of Carrhae, Crassus commanded only a small detachment of troops
while his remaining legate, Octavius, had a much larger force (29.5–6), and Cassius had most
of the cavalry (29.4). It would seem unlikely too that the army was deliberately split into
several divisions in the withdrawal from Carrhae, but Plutarch again explains this
conveniently by emphasising the unreliability of the local guides (29.2–6).
In light of these issues, two possibilities must be considered. The first is that, as the account is
overwhelmingly pro–Cassius, Crassus is deliberately presented in such a way that he
shoulders all blame for the defeat while Cassius is vindicated for his involvement. The
second possibility is that Crassus was, due to injury or stress, unable to command the army
effectively, which is why his subordinates made important decisions and commanded major
divisions of the army in the withdrawal from Carrhae. It should be noted, however, that
physical wounds are mentioned by neither Plutarch nor Dio, and Dio does not even mention
the general’s mental breakdown immediately following the defeat.691 However, Plutarch’s
account of the withdrawal does not dwell on details other than to reveal more about the
character of Crassus, who is clearly depicted in this case as a victim of fortuna and the
treachery of easterners.692 In light of the pro–Cassius bias of Plutarch’s account, it is not
necessary to believe that Crassus was actually incapacitated. Even if he was, he quickly re–
assumed command in the withdrawal from the battlefield (Plut. Crass. 27.8). However, he
was probably shaken by events and so became more reliant upon the advice of his most
senior officers, Cassius and Octavius.693 It is impossible to know why Crassus and Octavius
agreed to leave Cassius in charge of most of the cavalry. Perhaps it was Cassius’ doing, or
perhaps the cavalry who were not suited to the terrain along Crassus and Octavius’ path.694
That Cassius did not do his duty is clear, and his sole influence over Crassus is probably also
exaggerated, considering that Octavius was himself entrusted with a large group of soldiers
(29.5). Crassus was, therefore, probably undermined by his most senior subordinate, with the
effect that he was deprived of cavalry that was desperately needed to secure his own
withdrawal. Therefore, Plutarch was unfair to have blamed the debacle almost solely on
691 Plut. Crass. 27.4–5; Dio 40.25.1. Orosius (Adv. Pag. 6.13) also does not mention the breakdown. 692 Plut. Crass. 29.5, 30.3; Geiger, 2014, 293. 693 We cannot really know who ordered the departure towards Carrhae while leaving behind thousands of wounded. Perhaps abandoning these men was not a conscious decision, if the Roman army abandoned baggage to move more quickly but then did not have enough wagons to carry the wounded. 694 Marshes and hills feature along Crassus’ route (Plut. Crass. 29.5–7).
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Crassus’ generalship.695
The combination of the army’s fragile cohesion after its defeat, poor leadership, and the
separation of the infantry and the remaining cavalry, had a drastic impact on the quality of the
army’s retreat tactics. First, the fact that the army did not stay together in the initial retirement
from the battlefield to Carrhae had dire results.696 The army’s disorder and fear of attack
resulted in a halting, concertina–like movement away from the battlefield, creating
unnecessary delay and giving pursuers time to catch stragglers (Plut. Crass. 27.6). Perhaps if
the Romans had marched at a steadier pace, they might have reached Carrhae at an earlier
hour and with more order, allowing them to send out men to help recover some of the
stragglers (Crass. 28.1–2). Crassus' advance guard of cavalry, which deserted upon reaching
Carrhae, could have been of great assistance in this matter (27.6–7). In the second withdrawal
from Carrhae, the army became divided into at least three divisions, with even more dire
results: the infantry was overtaken by the mounted Parthian army and came to the fate
described above, while much of the cavalry fled to Syria with Cassius (29.5). Therefore, the
withdrawals were poorly executed, but the reasons why, and who was responsible, are not
immediately apparent.
As argued in previous chapters, it was important for a retiring army to move towards
defensible positions where necessary, to maintain ratio, and to manage enemy pursuit. It must
therefore be noted that the repeated Roman use of night marches to escape was perfectly
logical in light of the fact that the Parthians were unlikely to pursue by night, and the Romans
were unable to confront them on open ground.697 Marching by night was therefore one way
of managing enemy pursuit. The actual direction of withdrawal was also logical. Carrhae was
the nearest defensible position to the battlefield, as were the hills that Octavius and Crassus
reached in the second withdrawal. The separation of the army, particularly Cassius’ cavalry
from the bulk of the infantry was also, as mentioned, due to treachery (Plut. Crass. 29.2–6)
and not a deliberate decision by Crassus. The Romans’ use of terrain was also not without
merit. The route that Crassus took in the second withdrawal was probably the correct one, as
695 Plutarch inherited the aristocratic disdain for Crassus and his new wealth, and so held a bias against Crassus (Ward, 1977, 1–3) even aside from the fact that Cassius himself was probably one of his sources (Ward, 295). 696 There was the mass killing of 4000 wounded in the Roman camp, and a significant force under Vargonteius was cut off and destroyed (Plut. Crass. 28.1–2). 697 Night marches: Plut. Crass. 27.5–6, 29.2–3. Parthian dislike of night operations: Crass. 29.3.
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there was high ground to the north that could protect him from the Parthian cavalry (Crass.
30.1). It is striking that Octavius actually reached a position of safety, but then returned to
protect Crassus (29.5). In 36 BC, Marcus Antonius was also able to escape Parthian pursuit
through the hills towards Armenia (Ant. 41, 49). According to Plutarch and Dio, this outcome
is exactly what the Parthian commander Surenas feared.698 When Crassus was trapped by the
Parthians, Octavius’ charge to his defence was able to sweep the Parthian cavalry from the
hill and somewhat demoralise the enemy (Crass. 29.7–30.1). The possibility for some
successful fighting thus existed as long as terrain was on the Romans’ side (30.1), and so the
decision of Crassus and Octavius to attempt a retirement to the north was tactically sound.
Indeed, much of Crassus’ decision making appears to have been reasonable, so what went
wrong?
Crassus’ position was highly precarious. The use of high ground did not guarantee an army’s
safety, as seen in the case of Vargonteius (Plut. Crass. 28.2), but when Crassus was caught by
the Parthian vanguard, with the assistance of Octavius his forces were able to resist Parthian
attack, just as Antonius’ men later did in 36 BC.699 At this stage, the Romans needed to
continue their march for another two kilometres to reach safety (Crass. 29.5–6), but for this
to be possible, a force that could act as a rear–guard and carry out counterattacks was
required.700 However, the loss of almost all of the army’s cavalry and light troops left the
Roman army devoid of forces that were suitable for this task.701 If the Roman army had kept
its forces together after leaving Carrhae, including Cassius’ 500 cavalry, it would have been
in a stronger position, and may have been able to attempt a fighting withdrawal against the
Parthian vanguard to reach safer ground. Without a sizeable force of cavalry, this was
difficult, but it must be noted that Crassus specifically argued for waiting on the hill until
night and then continuing the march into the foothills, when he was aggressively overruled by
the panicked milites (30.4). At this critical juncture, Crassus’ tactical judgement was sound,
but he was prevented from effective action by the indiscipline of his men.
698 Plut. Crass. 30.1; Dio 40.25.4–26.1. 699 Plut. Crass.29.6–7–30.1, cf. Plut. Ant. 45.1–3. 700 Cf. Plut. Ant. 42.1. 701 Many light troops and apparently most of the cavalry perished in the main battle (Plut. Crass. 20.1, 25.2–12), several hundred cavalry fled with Ignatius (Crass. 27.6–7), and 500 more fled with Cassius (29.4).
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With all of this said, we must reckon with the central fact that the army had suffered
enormous casualties in battle. Even if Crassus were incapacitated in the initial night
withdrawal, which contributed to the chaos, the fact that the Roman army left thousands of
wounded behind in the camp had nothing to do with poor leadership or undisciplined troops
(Plut. Crass. 28.1). This was a result of the simple fact that the Roman army had suffered too
many casualties in battle, especially among the valuable light troops and cavalry that were so
important for fighting off the Parthian cavalry, and will have been carrying large numbers of
wounded.702 It is also true that the lack of cavalry could have had an impact on Crassus’ and
Octavius’ tactical options once they were trapped in the second withdrawal, but the reason
that men were deserting was because of the psychological impact of the battlefield defeat;
since they believed themselves beaten and so tried to save their own lives. Again, losses of
cavalry and light troops, vital to supporting heavy infantry in retrograde movements, were
greater during the main battle near Carrhae than the number lost to desertion during the
withdrawal. The Romans also lost enormous numbers of heavy infantry in the main battle.
Certainly by the time Crassus and Octavius were confronted by Surenas north of Carrhae, the
Roman army was something like a quarter of its former size.703
The performance of the Parthians cannot be ignored in explaining the Roman failure in 53
BC. Of course, Surena’s battle plan was an ingenious counter to Rome’s predominantly
infantry–based tactics (Plut. Crass. 24, 27). With their superiority in cavalry, it was natural
that the Parthians overtook the beaten Roman army in the open terrain of Mesopotamia, and it
was apparently Surena’s plan to trap the fleeing Romans before they reached the more
mountainous terrain to the north (Crass. 30.1). However, the fact that the Parthians did not
pursue at night gave the Romans a major opportunity to escape (29.3). Even with the delays
caused by the betrayal of Crassus’ guides (29.5–6), Crassus was very close to safety when he
was brought to a halt by the Parthians (29.5–6). If his men had listened to him and continued
the withdrawal, they might well have escaped. Thus, although the Parthians did pursue as
they ought to have done, they did not do so with exceptional efficiency. The performance of
the Parthians cannot be given as the main explanation for the failure of the Roman
withdrawals.
702 Cf. Plut. Ant. 42.1. The fate of the light troops is not mentioned, but many probably died during the battle (cf. Plut. Crass. 24.4, 25.2., 25.12). Regarding the cavalry, of the approximately 4,000 that Crassus had in the first place (Crass. 20.1), he only had a handful with him in his final confrontation with the Parthians (29.6). 703 Cf. Plut. Crass. 20.1, 29.5–6.
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It would be unfair to place total blame on the tactics of Crassus (and on whoever was in
charge immediately following the main battle) for the failure of this withdrawal. Crassus was
a competent tactician.704 Escaping to Carrhae, which was the closest defensible position, was
the sensible decision. Withdrawing out of Mesopotamia using the high ground to the north
was also sensible. Moving at night also nullified much of the Parthian pursuit, and was the
only way the diminished Roman forces could have done so. However, the army did not
maintain ratio, but continuously became separated and was plagued by desertion and mutiny.
This confusion and indiscipline were inevitable products of the decisive defeat and enormous
casualties suffered in the main battle.705 Perhaps when Crassus’ army was finally trapped by
the Parthians, if they had lost fewer light infantry, cavalry and legionaries during the previous
marches, they could have continued a fighting withdrawal utilising the high ground along
Crassus’ chosen path. Waiting until night and then attempting a retreat into the Armenian
foothills was no doubt the only remaining possibility for a successful withdrawal. But the
corrosive effects of the army’s total defeat, the misfortunes that led to the army’s separation,
and the collapse of the army’s nerve in their final argument with Crassus, doomed them all.
Marcus Antonius’ Parthian Campaign, 36 BC
In 36 BC Marcus Antonius, the triumvir, made a major military expedition into the Parthian
Empire. It was his intention, among other aims, to avenge Crassus and his legions and re–
establish Roman dominance in the east.706 The campaign did not go as planned, and the
Roman army was forced to retire from Mesopotamia after several reverses, but despite heavy
pursuit the Romans were able to extricate themselves. Once again, Plutarch is the main
source for these events, and he provides enough detail to analyse the Roman army's tactical
performance during this campaign.707 A comparison of Antonius’ performance with the
704 Ward, 1977, 289, 295. 705 For a modern study of the corrosive effect of heavy casualties on the cohesion, tactical efficiency and morale of soldiers, particularly due to disproportionate casualties among veterans and junior officers (such as centuriones: cf. Caes. BGall. 7.51; BCiv. 3.71), see Rush (2001, 323–4, 333–5, 343). 706 Syme, 2002, 263. 707 As mentioned, Tarn argues that the same man, an unknown Mesopotamian Greek, was the main source for both Crassus and Antony. It is certainly evident that there are similarities in the two accounts, for instance the abandonment of the Armenian allies causing problems for both generals (Plut. Crass. 22.2–4; Ant. 39.1, 50.2), and the appearance of foreign guides, with very different results for each general (cf. Plut. Crass. 21.1–5, 7, 22.1–2 29.2–5; Ant. 41.1–4, 46.2). However, Pelling (1988, 221) argues that Quintus Dellius is Plutarch’s main source for Antony, and that some of the criticism of Antonius’ decision–making originates with him (cf. Plut. Ant. 37.5–38.1). On the other hand, the emphasis on Antonius’ ‘military brilliance is likely to be [Plutarch’s]
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disastrous withdrawal from Carrhae will demonstrate what, if anything, Antonius and his
army had learned from their counterparts at Carrhae, or how the circumstances differed to
allow the Romans to withdraw successfully on the later occasion.
Antonius’ campaign began with an advance from Armenia into Media Atropatene, where he
eventually laid siege to the Parthian royal city of Phraata (Plut. Ant. 38.1–3). However, in the
meantime Antonius’ baggage train was destroyed and he was abandoned by his Armenian
allies and their six thousand cavalry.708 Antonius was able to trick the Parthians, led by their
king Phraates IV (Ant. 40.1) into fighting a pitched battle (39.3–4), and the Romans were
successful in this main engagement (39.4–5) but despite launching an extended pursuit,
Antonius was unable to inflict significant casualties on the enemy, and the Parthian army
escaped mostly unharmed (39.2–5). As the Romans retreated to their camp the Parthians
regrouped and attacked them, forcing the Romans to fight them off as they retired (39.6). The
Roman camp itself came under attack but it was successfully defended (39.7). Unable either
to conduct the siege of Phraata without sufficient supplies or heavy equipment, or to force the
fast–moving Parthians into a decisive battle, a dejected Antonius began to withdraw back
towards Armenia under a truce (40.1–4).
In spite of this, the Parthians attacked Antonius on the march (Plut. Ant. 41.3–5). Perhaps the
truce was a stratagem to force the Romans to march out into the open where they would be
vulnerable. However, in defending his marching army Antonius succeeded where Crassus had
failed, since he was able to utilise combined arms to good effect by inflicting casualties with
massed javelineers and slingers and then scattering the enemy with his Gallic cavalry (Ant.
41.4–5). Antonius continued his withdrawal in a square formation, repeating these tactics
when challenged, and after several minor reversals over a period of four days, the Parthians
were dissuaded from further attacks (42.1). However, on the fifth day of the withdrawal
Flavius Gallus, one of Antonius’ legates, was authorised to engage the Parthians in a more
decisive fight (42.2). He was outmanoeuvred and Antonius’ other legates only reinforced him
own’ (Pelling, 1988, 221). Cassius Dio (49.24–33) gives the only other detailed account of this campaign, and it is relatively consistent with Plutarch’s, but Plutarch gives far more detail on the withdrawal from Phraata (cf. Plut. Ant. 41–9 and Dio 49.28–31.2) and so he is the better source for our purposes. 708 The baggage train had consisted of two legions with the entire army’s impedimenta and was commanded by Oppius Statianus, but was totally destroyed (Plut. Ant. 38.3). The desertion of the Armenians: Ant. 39.1, cf. 37.3. Also see Syme, 1960, 264. The abandonment of the Armenians could also have contributed to the disastrous loss of the baggage train (Dio 49.25.5; Pelling, 1988, 226).
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haphazardly, throwing the entire army into turmoil so that Antonius had to personally
intervene (42.3–4). The debacle resulted in thousands of casualties, but Antonius displayed
his leadership qualities and successfully encouraged further efforts (43). When the Parthians
attempted to overwhelm the Romans the next day, they were firmly resisted and beaten back,
and this pattern was repeated for several days (45.1–3), even as the Roman army began to
suffer from famine (45.4–6).
Plutarch mentions at this point that the Romans had abandoned some equipment, as many
mules or oxen had died and wagons were needed to carry wounded (45.4). This implies that
Antonius was also adopting the typical Roman practice of lightening the baggage as
necessary.709 Of particular note during this stage of the withdrawal were the tactics Antonius
used to fight off the repeated enemy attacks: the milites would enclose the lightly armoured
auxilia within their formations, defending them from arrows with their shields; and, when the
Parthians approached very close the legionaries would charge and, using their pila as spears,
rout the enemy (45.1–3). Intimate cooperation between light infantry and milites is evident
here.
Continuing his withdrawal, Antonius had to choose between two routes, one being on plains
where his army was vulnerable to attack, and the other along a safer, mountainous route,
which had little water.710 Antonius chose the latter, wisely using high ground to protect his
forces, but taking the calculated risk of withdrawing by night.711 During the march, a brawl
allegedly began in the rear–guard and escalated to the point where the army threatened to
disintegrate, forcing the general to encamp and restore order.712 In the morning, with Roman
discipline restored, the Parthians made a final attack (Plut. Ant. 49.1). Antonius confronted
this attack by having the milites continue to withdraw under the cover of their shields, while
the missile–armed infantry fought the enemy archers (Ant. 49.1). The Romans were thus able
to reach the river despite Parthian pursuit, at which point the latter finally gave up (49.2).
709 Cf. Ch. 4, 145–6. 710 The Parthians, just as they had at Carrhae (Plut. Crass. 28–30), had attempted to lull Antonius into complacency, but a friendly Parthian named Mithridates informed Antonius that his enemies would ambush him if possible (Plut. Ant. 46.2–4). The guide recommended that he should therefore avoid the plains (Ant. 47.1). 711 On the dangers of night withdrawals, cf. Ch. 1, 51–5. 712 Antonius chooses his route: Plut. Ant. 47.2. Disorder in the army: Ant. 48.1–3. The army encamps: 48.5. Plutarch alleges that Antonius, thinking his army had been attacked and defeated, had first considered suicide but was dissuaded (48.3–4). This may be a literary flourish foreshadowing his eventual fate after Actium (76–7).
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After crossing into Armenia, Antonius found that he had lost around 20,000 infantry and
4,000 cavalry.713 Despite this, the campaign has been described by Syme as ‘a defeat, but not
a rout or a disaster’.714 Antonius had successfully withdrawn most of a very large army from
hostile territory, under intense pursuit, through a gruelling twenty–seven day march (Plut.
Ant. 50.2). His achievement compares favourably with the disintegration of Crassus’ army
during the failed withdrawals of 53 BC. At Carrhae, heavy casualties resulting from the
battlefield defeat had made it difficult for the army to escape successfully, but Antonius’ army
also suffered very heavy casualties. Why, then, was Antonius more successful than Crassus?
Antonius’ army fought numerous battles during the withdrawal, but was never decisively
defeated.715 The army moved slowly while under attack, and stopped entirely when
necessary.716 The Romans maintained close order and a gradual rate of movement when
moving in the presence of the enemy, and this orderliness helps to explain their general
success in fending off Parthian attacks.717 Antonius’ retreat tactics were also aggressive when
necessary. On several occasions his army stopped and fought, or even advanced towards the
enemy.718According to Plutarch (Ant. 42.1), Antonius organised the army into a hollow
square (πλαισίῳ) for much of the march, with his flanks and rear protected by looser
formations of light troops, and instructed that cavalry only pursue the enemy for short
distances.719 This was apparently highly effective (42.1). The Romans also formed a testudo
under missile fire, the milites defending the light infantry, and were in close enough
formation when charged by Parthian cavalry that they repelled the latter by wielding their
713 Plut. Ant. 50.1, cf. Syme, 2002, 264–5. Livy (Per. 130) provides a lower casualty estimate at two legions lost (with Statianus) and 8000 men lost on the retreat. Evidently, the casualties were significant. 714 Syme, 2002, 264. 715 Antonius’ army suffered only one defeat worthy of mention, but even here Plutarch gives no reason to assume the Romans became seriously disordered, as the legionaries’ casualties may be attributed to their becoming surrounded by horse archers whilst other Roman officers reacted indecisively in reinforcing them (Plut. Ant. 42.2–4). Antonius, nonetheless, successfully drove off the Parthians and extricated his army (Ant. 42.4). 716 Slow movement while under attack: Plut. Ant. 45.2, 49.1–2. Army stops to fight: Ant. 41.4–5, 42.2–4, 45.2–3. 717 Plut. Ant. 39.4, 41.4–5, 45.1–3, 49.1–2. This is marked contrast to the disorganisation of retreating Roman forces after the defeat at Carrhae, with the exception of Octavius’ counterattack in the final confrontation (Plut. Crass. 27.5–7, 29.3–6, 29.7–30.1). 718 Stopped and fought: Plut. Ant. 41.4–5, 45.3. Advanced towards enemy: Ant. 42.2–4. According to Plutarch (50.1), Antonius was victorious in eighteen separate engagements during the retreat from Atropatene. 719 During Tiberius’ campaign against the Dalmatians, AD 9, he also used a mobile square formation, but in an attack through more difficult terrain (Dio 56.13–4). This may be evidence of the further refinement of the tactics Antonius used at 36 BC.
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pila as spears (45.2–3). The Romans also utilised a square formation and formed testudines at
Carrhae, but Parthian cataphracts were able to attack the legionaries with some success.720
Further, while Antonius was able to successfully counterattack and inflict casualties by using
light armed troops and cavalry (42.1), similar tactics at Carrhae were defeated by Parthian
archery (Crass. 24.4). Antonius’ battle tactics were therefore more effective than those of his
predecessor in 53 BC. What is striking is how varied Antonius’ tactics were. Whether the
Parthians attempted to batter the Romans with missiles, or charge them with spears, both of
which were effective modes of attack at Carrhae (Crass. 27.1–2), Antonius had an effective
tactical response.
Was there some difference between the Parthian army and tactics in 36 BC, and those of the
victors at Carrhae? The distinctive tactics of the Parthian general in 53 BC, Surena, were
marked in particular by the abnormally extensive stores of arrows carried by a large force of
camels (Plut. Crass. 25.1), and by the successful ambush of Publius Crassus when he pursued
too far from the main army (25.1–6). However, it is striking that Antonius never put his army
in a position to be bombarded by arrows for such a period of time, as he had very numerous
forces and always ordered charges or advances to drive the Parthians off when they
approached.721 He also never allowed his pursuing forces to chase the enemy too far away
from his main column (Ant. 42.1), thus avoiding the error of Publius Crassus. As such,
although Plutarch does not say if the unnamed Parthian commander of 36 BC had attempted
to replicate the effective tactics of Surena, Antonius at any rate never gave him the
opportunity to do so. That is not to say the Parthians were ineffective. There is certainly
plentiful evidence that the Parthians regularly utilised the mass archery that had been so
effective at Carrhae, as well as a variety of other tactics.722 That they were not successful,
however, must be explained by the Roman response, and the effectiveness with which
Antonius countered their tactics was certainly a leading factor.
720 Plut. Crass. 24.3, 27.1–2. The testudo does not appear until the mid–second century BC (eg. Livy 44.9.8), but by the mid–first century appears to have been in regular use (cf. Caes. BCiv. 1.97.5; BAlex. 40; Plut. Ant. 42.1). 721 Plut. Ant. 39.3–4, 41.5, 42.1, 42.4, 45.3. 722 Archery: Plut. Ant. 41.5, 42.4, 49.1. The Parthians also used mass charges (Ant. 45.3) and attempted to gain advantages through trickery and stratagem (40.3–4, 41.3–4, 46.1).
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In comparing Roman tactics in 53 and 36 BC, the close cooperation between light and heavy
infantry in 36 BC stands out (Plut. Ant. 45.1–3). Although Crassus had also utilised light
infantry, milites and cavalry in combination, he did so in smaller groups rather than with the
entire army (Plut. Crass. 25.2). The quantity of Antonius’ auxilia is also striking. Whereas
Crassus had fielded about 4000 light troops and a similar number of cavalry, Antonius’ army
upon entering Armenia included at least double these numbers and perhaps significantly
more.723 Antonius’ heavy cavalry performed particularly well (Ant. 41.5), and it might be
noted that they were mostly Gauls and Iberians (37.3), just as Crassus’ cavalry in 53 BC
comprised mostly Gauls (Crass. 25.6–9). While the Gallic cavalry were defeated in 53 BC,
Plutarch explains that they chiefly struggled with the heat (25.9), and even so fought
extremely well. In contrast, since it was close to winter during Antonius’ campaign (Ant.
40.3), it is unsurprising that his much more numerous cavalry performed well.724 Plutarch
explains nothing about the composition of the auxiliary cavalry, and but it might be assumed
that among these were lighter cavalry types that would be suitable for skirmishing.
The Parthian archery was certainly not ineffective, as Plutarch (41.5) states that when
Antonius’ light troops sallied out they suffered many wounds, but in a pitched battle the
Roman firepower was actually superior.725 Antonius’ slingers actually shot further than the
Parthian archers and gave them significant trouble (Dio 49.26.2). As such, with a very strong
cavalry arm and an enormous number of troops the Roman army was more formidable than
had been Crassus’ in 53 BC, and this is undoubtedly a key reason as to why Antonius’ battle
tactics appear to have been generally successful.726 Antonius’ more complex and adaptive
tactics, and the significantly increased numbers of missile–armed infantry and cavalry in his
army, strongly suggest that he had thought seriously about how to counter the Parthian tactics
that were so successful at Carrhae, and from a tactical standpoint he was almost completely
723 Cf. Plut. Crass. 20.1 and Plut. Ant. 37.3. Plutarch states that Antonius had 10,000 Gallic and Iberian cavalry and 30,000 other auxiliaries, these being cavalry and light–armed troops, but Plutarch does not go into further detail. This enormous latter number probably includes the large Armenian force that abandoned Antonius prior to actually fighting the Parthian army (Plut. Ant. 37.3, cf. 39.1). 724 In the battle near Phraata, the Gallic cavalry were able to charge, fight an engagement, and pursue for 30 kilometres (Plut. Ant. 39.4–5). The heat was evidently not too much for them, although perhaps this pursuit occurred later in the day. 725 Plut. Ant. 41.5. Evidently, the loss of the Roman baggage train under Statianus (cf. Ant. 38.3) did not include all of the Roman supply of missiles. Perhaps the baggage that was lost consisted in large part of the siege train, but not all the infantry’s supplies (cf. Roth, 1999, 91). 726 Plut. Crass. 50.1. The failed Roman counterattack on the fifth day of the retreat is an exception to this (42.2–43.1).
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successful.
Quantity was one thing, but the quality of the army must also be considered. When Antonius'
army first encountered the Parthians, the Romans demonstrated their discipline by marching
steadily and silently (ἀθορύβως καὶ σιωπῇ), in equidistant formations (εν διαστήμασιν
ἴσοις), all in the looming presence of the Parthian army (Plut. Ant. 39.4). Such orderliness
was to be expected of well–trained Late Republican legions. The army displayed the same
order and discipline while fighting and withdrawing on numerous occasions (Ant. 45.1–3).
On the other hand, after the blow to Roman morale caused by the loss of Statianus' legions
and the baggage, a depressingly indecisive victory outside Phraata, and a difficult retreat back
to the camp, some legionaries had fled from the ramparts of their own camp when attacked
by the Parthians, provoking Antonius to decimate them.727 This demonstrates the importance
of Antonius himself in maintaining the army’s discipline, as the incident of decimation (39.7)
demonstrated that he was both a stern and inspiring leader (43.1–2).
However, near the end of the extended march from Media, Plutarch records (Ant. 48.2–3) an
incident of great indiscipline during a night march, in which isolated thefts of gold and silver
escalated into attacks on Antonius’ personal baggage and brought the army, fearing it had
been attacked and defeated, into a critical state of confusion. Antonius allegedly reacted by
bringing the army into encampment so that he could re–establish discipline, and by the next
morning the army was steadier in spirit and cohesion (49.1), and performed correctly under
Parthian pressure (49.1–2). However it is difficult to believe that in hostile territory, closely
pursued by an enemy army, Roman troops should have chosen to fight each other and plunder
their own baggage, especially considering the same army’s respectable performance in battle
prior to and immediately following this alleged incident.728 It is perhaps more likely that
Plutarch has exaggerated a relatively minor crisis so that he could present Antonius as
727 Loss of baggage: Plut. Ant. 39.1. Indecisive victory: Ant. 39.5. Difficult retreat: 39.6. Flight and decimation: 39.7. The use of decimation had fallen out of use in the Middle Republic but had become more common again in the period of civil wars, as unmotivated men were forced to conduct seemingly endless campaigns (Goldberg 2015, 158–9). If Plutarch is to be believed on this point, and there is no good reason he should not be, this is evidence of a weakness in Roman morale at this stage. Also see Pelling, 1988, 227. 728 Pelling (1988, 237–8) notes that the inclusion of this crisis at the point of the narrative immediately preceding the Roman’s final salvation is a conventional storytelling technique, but does not doubt that this particular incident occurred.
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considering suicide (Ant. 48.3), foreshadowing what would actually occur in 31 BC.729 As a
result, while there was an isolated incident of panic early in the campaign (39.7), and the
Armenian contingent was certainly unreliable, it was Plutarch’s overall assessment that
Antonius’ army in 36 BC was of excellent quality (43.2), and for the most part this is borne
out by its tactical performance.
The army’s leadership must also be considered. It has already been explained that Antonius
himself was a decisive commander who was well–prepared for the Parthian king’s distinctive
tactics.730 Plutarch gives a few details on Antonius’ key subordinates during the withdrawal,
naming Flavius Gallus (Ant. 42.2) and Publius Canidius Crassus (42.4) as senior legates,
Marcus Titius (42.3) as a quaestor, and Domitius Ahenobarbus as another senior officer
(40.5).731 The two legati are only featured in light of their alleged tactical errors, perhaps as
an attempt by Plutarch to absolve Antonius from blame for Gallus’ failed counterattack.732
The quaestor Titius appears as a foil to Gallus, briefly attempting to halt the ill–fated
counterattack, then he disappears from the narrative (42.3). As regards Gallus, even whilst
criticising his judgement, Plutarch emphasises his military experience, courage, and virtuous
death.733 For the most part, Plutarch’s narrative focuses on Antonius, as expected of a
biography, and Antonius’ charisma and tactical judgement are repeatedly praised.734 The
entire account is clearly crafted to praise Antonius for his leadership qualities in
difficultatibus, but there is no reason not to give the general some credit for the success of the
729 Plut. Ant. 76–7; Pelling, 1988, 238. 730 Antonius was also highly experienced by this stage of his career, having led an army successfully in Egypt in 58 BC (Plut. Ant. 3.1–6), distinguished himself in Caesar’s service (Ant. 7–8) and proved to be the most capable general of the civil wars that followed the Ides of March at Mutina (App. B Civ. 3.67–72) and Philippi (Plut. Ant. 22.1–4). 731 Canidius Crassus was consul in 40 BC. Marcus Titius was consul suffectus in 31. This Domitius Ahenobarbus was the son of the consul of the same name in 54 BC. Flavius Gallus is not otherwise known (Pelling, 1988, 231). 732 Plut. Ant. 42.2–4. Even so, it was Antonius that allocated extra troops to Gallus for the purposes of fighting a heavier engagement, and so he bears some share of responsibility for the affair, even if it was his intervention that put an end to the unfavourable fighting (Ant. 42.4). Also see Pelling, 1988, 231–2. 733 Plut. Ant. 42.2–3, 43.1. 734 Plutarch directly attributes the good order of the Roman army on the march to Antonius’ leadership (Ant. 42.1). Antonius intervened to rescue Gallus, assiduously restoring the spirits of his men after that reversal (43.1), and he appears to have been greatly respected by the milites for, among other things, sharing in the army’s labours (43.2–3). When the army was later passing through mountainous terrain, via a route bereft of potable water and suffering from Parthian harassment, Antonius’ encouragement again proved essential to maintaining the army’s animus (47.4). Finally, Antonius brought his army safely to the river Aras, and oversaw a careful and successful crossing in the presence of the enemy (49.1–3). See Pelling, 1988, 220–1.
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withdrawal. Even so, it must not be ignored that Antonius was ultimately responsible for the
loss of his siege train and thus the failure of his campaign (Plut. Ant. 38.2–3). While the
judgement of the army’s leaders was imperfect at times, Antonius and his subordinates were
experienced and for the most part effective, and so they will have contributed to maintaining
the army’s order and discipline during the long and taxing withdrawal.
As imperator, Antonius was the ultimate arbiter of the Roman army’s direction of march and,
therefore, the terrain it encountered along its path. In general, the army adhered to undulating
terrain and avoided open plains wherever possible, and Antonius appears to have wisely
followed local advice in this regard.735 At one point the Parthians attempted to attack the
Romans whilst the latter were descending a hill, and on other occasions they made attempts
to divert the Romans into more open ground so as to utilise their cavalry and archery more
effectively.736 Such scenarios were grave dangers to the slower Roman army, which could not
escape quickly if it was heavily defeated. However, Antonius did manage to avoid these traps.
In the case of the one significant defeat the army suffered, Antonius was still able to drive the
enemy off and organise an orderly withdrawal.737 There was, therefore, no point at which the
Parthians were able to threaten the Roman army so greatly that the latter was forced to stand
and fight, as the detachments led by Crassus and Octavius in 53 BC were. As such, aside
from the fact that the Roman army was very formidable on its own account, Antonius’ use of
terrain was cautious and appropriate to circumstances, giving the Parthians little opportunity
to utilise their horse archery in ideal circumstances as they had at Carrhae.
If we were to compare the withdrawals of 53 and 36 BC, we might then conclude that
Antonius’ officers and soldiers were of superior quality and that Antonius was simply a better
general than Crassus. It must be noted that Antonius was a younger man, and did not have to
contend with the intense psychological blow that Crassus suffered when his son was killed.738
735 Plut. Ant. 41.1–2, 45.2, 47.1–2. Antonius’ sage use of local advice compares favourably with Plutarch’s depiction of Crassus, who allegedly rejected the sober analysis of Cassius in favour of a route chosen by a duplicitous Arab chieftain (Plut. Crass. 20–2). Antonius’ choice nonetheless turned out to be correct: Xenophon also profitably utilised a local guide during the March of the Ten Thousand (Xen. Anab. 4.19–27). This connection was not lost on Plutarch (Ant. 45.6). On the connection with Xenophon, also see Pelling, 1988, 221. 736 Attacking on a reverse slope: Plut. Ant. 45.2. Attempts to divert the Romans: Ant. 41.3, 46. 737 Plut. Ant. 42.4. The Roman army was evidently able to take care of its thousands of casualties following this reverse (Ant. 43.1), showing it retained its organisation and logistical apparatus. 738 Plut. Crass. 26.3, 27.4–5. Crassus had been approximately 60 when he died, while in 36 BC Antonius was 47, still in his prime as a commander. That said, this may not have been a hindrance at all, considering for
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However, there were three important differences between Crassus and Antonius’ armies and
the circumstances under which they retired.
The first was Antonius’ army. It was at least twice the size of Crassus’, had more than double
the cavalry and light troops, and possibly ten times as many heavy cavalry.739 It thus had
superior firepower to combat the deadly Parthian archery (Plut. Ant. 41.5), and such numbers
of cavalry that it could not be isolated and destroyed as Publius’ 1300 horsemen had been at
Carrhae (Plut. Crass. 25.2–12). Secondly, as a result of the size and strength of Antonius’
army and his own cautious generalship, the Roman army in 36 BC had not been decisively
beaten in battle.740 The destruction of Antonius’ rear–guard and the defeat of Gallus’
counterattack were very costly in men, and by the end of Antonius’ campaign, 20,000
infantry and 4,000 cavalry had allegedly perished, but more than half by disease.741 However,
even if these casualty figures are to be accepted, Crassus’ army also suffered similar
casualties in the fighting at Carrhae and in the withdrawal immediately following, but this
was in an army half the size and that already lacked sufficient light troops and cavalry.742
Finally, the fatal weakening of the Roman army at Carrhae due to heavy casualties and
desertion meant that the Romans marched by night in order to avoid fighting the Parthians,
and due to the army’s battered state, unfamiliarity with the country and the inherent difficulty
of night withdrawals, this only increased the confusion and led to further casualties.743
Conversely, Antonius’ army, which was perfectly capable of facing the Parthians in open
confrontation, marched mostly during the day, and so Antonius could more easily maintain
instance that Antigonus Monopthalamus was 80 when he died fighting at the Battle of Ipsus (Plut. Dem. 29.4–5). 739 Cf. Plut. Crass. 20.1 and Plut. Ant. 37.3. Of Crassus’ cavalry, only 1000 were Gallic cavalry, and even these were not heavily armoured (Plut. Crass. 25.2, 7–9), whereas Antonius had 10,000 Iberian and Gallic cavalry (Plut. Ant. 37.3). 740 While the casualties during Gallus’ failed attack were very heavy (3000 dead and 5000 wounded), the Roman army was able to take control of the battlefield and take all of its wounded to safety, showing that the army was still completely functional (Plut. Ant. 42.4–43.1). The destruction of Antonius’ baggage under Statianus saw the loss of two entire legions (Plut. Ant. 38.3), but this was only a part of the army. 741 Cf. Plut. Ant. 50.1. Note that the source for this figure was probably Dellius (Pelling, 1984, 239), who later betrayed Antonius and so was not a wholly sympathetic source (cf. Pelling, 1984, 221) who might have been inclined to exaggerate the scale of Antonius’ failure. 742 Plut. Crass. 31.7, cf. 27.6–7, 28.1–2, 29.4–6. Also see Sampson, 2015, 146. 743 Crassus’ army retreats by night and becomes confused and separated: Plut. Crass. 27.5. 4000 men killed in the Roman camp: 28.1. Vargonteius gets lost and is killed with four cohorts: 28.2.
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control of his forces.744 The one time that Antonius’ army did march by night, it fell into
confusion (Plut. Ant. 48.2–5). While one might think that marching by day was actually more
dangerous, as the Parthians did not tend to pursue at night (Plut. Crass.28.1) the fact that
winter was approaching (Plut. Ant. 40.3) probably meant that the temperature was more
bearable during the day, while the army’s hunger also meant that the Romans could not afford
the delay of moving slowly at night (45.4). Withdrawal by night would therefore have
probably been a greater hindrance than a help, and so Antonius’ decision to withdraw during
the day was correct, but it was only made possible by the ability of his army to fight off any
Parthian attack.
As such, the Roman withdrawal from Parthia in 36 BC must be considered a success, because
the majority of the army escaped over a very long distance despite close pursuit by a
formidable enemy. The key factor was that Antonius’ army was much larger and better
equipped to face the Parthians than Crassus’ had been. The strength of Antonius’ army meant
that the Parthians could not decisively defeat it in battle and could not inflict crippling
casualties, so that Antonius’ army retained its order and cohesion and was not forced to carry
out any desperate high–risk manoeuvres such as withdrawal by night. In addition to this, the
fortitude of the soldiers who endured nearly a month of skirmishes and forced marches was
praiseworthy. Their military skill in utilising varying formations, such as hollow squares and
the testudo, and counterattacking and retreating as ordered, is just another example of what
properly trained Late Republican legions were capable. The cooperation between missile–
armed light infantry and milites was much more effective in 36 BC (Plut. Ant. 45.1–3) than it
had been in 53 (Plut. Crass. 24.4), because Antonius’ army actually possessed firepower that
could rival its enemies.
The army’s leadership, particularly Antonius, deserves some praise. While Antonius must
ultimately shoulder the blame for the campaign’s failure in the first place, his leadership
during the withdrawal was cautious and orderly, utilising high ground as much as possible
and avoiding unnecessary engagement, but featuring aggressive counterattacks and
charismatic personal interventions when necessary.745 Antonius’ leadership during the
744 Plutarch (Ant. 47.1–2) emphasises the one occasion in which Antonius did retreat at night, pointing out that the Parthians usually did not pursue at night. This suggests that much of Antonius’ retreat, and the many battles fought with the pursuing Parthians (50.1), occurred during daylight hours. 745 Plutarch’s criticism (Ant. 37.5–38.1) of Antonius’ campaign timing is rejected by Pelling (1988, 221, 224),
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withdrawal from Media was deliberately portrayed in glowing terms by Plutarch, but the
effectiveness of his tactics cannot be denied.746 The general fielded the correct balance of
missile–armed infantry, cavalry and legionaries, he used high ground and night marches to
avoid unfavourable confrontations, and a variety of combined arms–tactics, particularly
counterattacks, were utilised to fight off the enemy. The main way that this lengthy
withdrawal could have failed, considering the strength of Antonius’ forces, was for the
general to have blundered into an extended and very costly engagement. However, Antonius
had much better intelligence than Crassus had had in 53 BC.747 He took advantage of this,
and whatever the criticisms of Antonius’ rashness in other scenarios, his generalship was too
cautious to give the Parthians any real opportunity for a decisive victory.748
The Clades Variana, AD 9
The clades Variana was a major Roman defeat, occurring over three days in September, AD
9.749 In brief, Publius Quinctilius Varus was the governor of Germany and commanded a
significant army of three legions and several units of cavalry and professional auxiliaries
(Vell. Pat. 2.117.1). While en route to put down a rebellion, perhaps intending to encamp
closer to the Rhine over the winter, Varus and his army were ambushed by a force of
Germans, primarily Cherusci, led by their chieftain Arminius, who was also a Roman
auxiliary officer and perhaps a member of Varus’ consilium.750 The clades was not an
ordinary battle, but a series of ambushes, skirmishes and small battles that took place over an
and the main event leading to the campaign’s failure, the loss of Statianus and the baggage (Plut. Ant. 38.3) was not all Antonius’ fault: Antonius was close enough that Statianus could allegedly send for help (Dio 49.26.1), even if the former arrived too late. Dio (49.25.5) also claims that the Armenians could have assisted Statianus but neglected to do so. See Pelling, 1988, 225–6. It is possible that Antonius actually made very few mistakes after all: the formidable geographical challenges of campaigning in this region were probably the main factor in the campaign’s failure (see Engels, 1978, 67–9, 121–2). 746 Plut. Ant. 42.1; Pelling, 1988, 221, 231–3. The overall theme of Plutarch’s account of the Parthian campaign is to foreshadow Actium with several parallels, firstly a strategic blunder blamed on Antonius’ relationship with Cleopatra, followed by Antonius’ shame, then attempts (successful in Parthia) to repair the situation through inspiring leadership (Pelling, 220–1). While Plutarch criticised the influence of Cleopatra (221), we can gather that Plutarch genuinely considered Antonius to have been an excellent general. 747 Where Crassus was betrayed by his guide (Plut. Crass. 29.4), Antonius received valuable information on Parthian intentions (Plut. Ant. 46.2–4). 748 Plut. Ant. 38.1–3; Syme, 2002, 104. 749 Three days: Schlüter, 1999, 154. September: Schlüter, 1993, 45. 750 Varus’ intentions: Schlüter 1993, 45. The role of the Cherusci: Wolters, 2008, 119–121. Arminius: Vell. Pat. 2.118–119.
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area of at least 50 square kilometres.751 The Roman army appears to have attempted to fight
its way free but, at some stage during the second and third days of fighting, was defeated
decisively, after which its remnants were scattered, destroyed or forced to surrender.752 The
defeat came as a great shock to Rome and has been viewed as a major strategic setback for
the empire.753 Meanwhile the Roman general, Varus, has received the lion’s share of blame
for the defeat.754
However, is it really fair to blame Varus’ decisions for what went wrong? What does this
defeat say, if anything, about the limitations of Roman retreat tactics in this period? The
argument will be made below that the clades, in large part, was a withdrawal that failed. The
following analysis will thus briefly analyse the complex evidence for the clades in order to
establish a general sequence of events, and then an argument will be made that Varus’ plan in
response to the initial attacks was to withdraw. The Romans’ tactics in this scenario, and the
factors leading to the Romans’ defeat, will then be assessed in order to provide an assessment
of Varus’ generalship and the Romans’ application of retreat tactics in this situation.
Among the literary sources on the clades, Cassius Dio (56.18–22.2) is the most detailed.755
Although Dio wrote over two centuries later, it is generally agreed that he had reliable
contemporary sources at his disposal and that most aspects of his version of events are
credible.756 He provides the most analytical account of the battle, focusing, not on the
character of Varus, but on factors that contributed to Roman defeat, such as terrain (56.20.1,
21.2), weather (56.20.3, 21.3) and disruption by the baggage train (20.2–5). He portrays the
751 Sheldon, 2001, 23–24; Wolters, 2012, 11. 752 See Dio 56.21. Some escaped to lead the Roman general, Germanicus, back to the site of the battle several years later (Tac. Ann. 1.61). According to Tacitus (Ann. 12.27), some Roman captives were liberated only decades later, but most of the men that surrendered were probably killed in the immediate aftermath of the battle (Vell. Pat. 2.119.4; Tac. Ann. 1.61). 753 Suet. Aug. 23: paene exitiabilem. Also Dio 56.23–24. In modern scholarship, it has been argued that it was a major setback (e.g. von Schnurbein, 2003, 105), although it has also been suggested that the effect of the clades on Roman policy has been exaggerated: cf. Heather, 2010, 5–6; Wolters, 2012, 13; Winkler, 2016, 50–51. 754 See Vell. Pat. 2.117–119; Florus 2.30.31; Dio 56.18–19: the worst criticisms began with Velleius Paterculus (Timpe, 1970, 123). Suetonius claimed that his defeat was ‘nearly fatal’ to the empire (Aug. 23) and sharply criticised Varus’ temeritas et neglegentia (Tib. 18). Tacitus (Ann. 1.61) was less critical, describing Varus as ‘ill–fated’, but naive (1.55). Aside from incompetence, the disaster was also attributed to divine anger (Winkler, 2016, 37). Modern critics: Benario, 1986, 402; Sheldon, 2001, 30; Baltrusch, 2012, 131. More sympathetic views: Syme, 2002, 511; Wolters, 2012, 10. 755 Manuwald, 2007, 431. 756 Wolters, 2012, 11; cf. Manuwald, 2007, 438.
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Roman army as helpless.757 However, his emphasis on poor weather could be a literary
device.758 More critically, the discovery of the battle site at Kalkriese has invalidated Dio’s
characterisation of the terrain. In specific, Dio describes deep ravines and thick forests which
he alleges severely limited the manoeuvrability of Roman forces (Dio 56.20.1, 21.2).
However, the site at Kalkriese, particularly in the defile known as the Kalkrieser–Niewedder
Senke (Kalkriese–Niewedde depression) where the majority of Roman finds have been
unearthed, does not (and never did) have such landmarks.759 As such, Dio’s description of the
terrain at Kalkriese is wrong.760 This has ramifications for the accuracy of his description of
the fighting, as he relates the tactics used by the Romans to this incorrect description of the
terrain.761 As a result, the tactical details of the fighting in Dio’s narrative are not entirely
trustworthy.
That said, archaeological evidence provides some support for aspects of Dio’s narrative. The
size of the excavated battlefield (at least 30 square kilometres) is consistent with the duration
of the battle, which comprised a slow, halting advance by the Romans over several days.762
There is some support for Dio’s emphasis on the difficulties presented by Varus’ large
baggage train, which allegedly included a significant number of women, children and
servants and too many wagons and pack animals,763 as remnants of wagons have been found,
confirming their presence.764 According to Dio, the baggage train was a major factor in
757 Dio 56.20.5, 21.3–4. Manuwald, 2007, 440, 442. 758 See Dio 56.24.2–5; Manuwald, 2007, 446. Östenberg (2017, 253–9) has argued that Roman writers could perceive weather and terrain as intertwined with the divine in opposition to the Roman army. Conversely, such weather was fairly typical in that area and at that time of year (Murdoch, 2008, 107). 759 Schlüter, 1999, 128–131. It is possible that there was some earlier fighting further south and south–east, in which the ground was undulating and more heavily forested, which might partly explain Dio’s confused characterisation of the terrain. 760 Swan, 2004, 261. 761 See Dio 56.20–21. Dio does not mention the marshy, waterlogged ground. Perhaps he described the terrain from further south–east where the fighting could have started. Tac. Ann. 1.63–4 is much closer to the reality. 762 Schlüter, 1999, 154. The battlefield was at least 30 square kilometres, according to Rost/Wilbers–Rost, 2010, 118, contra Sheldon (2001, 23) who states it was approximately 50 square kilometres. However, Sheldon’s source for this is unclear. For comparison, note the case of Cestius Gallus in the defile of Beth–Horon in AD 66 (Joseph. BJ 2.546–551). On the third day of his retreat, Gallus' hard–pressed forces advanced at around half their normal speed (Gichon, 1981, 50, 59, 61–2). At Kalkriese, the Roman army was attacked over a distance of at least 15 kilometres, running east to west (Rost/Wilbers–Rost, 2010, 133). Tacitus’ mention (Ann. 1.60–61) of multiple camps discovered at the site of the clades also suggests multiple days of fighting, although squaring this temporally and spatially with Dio’s account is not straightforward (Swan, 2004, 264). 763 Dio 56.20.2. There is evidence for the presence of some women in the Roman train (Moosbauer/Wilbers–Rost, 2007, 33). 764 Their number cannot be known, or whether they were two or four–wheeled carts Rost, 2016, 563. The
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Roman disorganisation during the initial ambush (56.20.5). Dio also states that the Romans
reorganised themselves into better order after an initial setback (56.21.1). Further, although
the presence of women was unusual for a military campaign, it is probable that Varus
intended to take up winter quarters after a brief campaign against the insurgents, which would
explain why his baggage train may have been larger than necessary.765 However, the presence
of thousands of military servants and a significant number of wagons was routine in Roman
military operations.766 Dio (56.21.5) also mentions that Varus was wounded during the
fighting and later committed suicide. Velleius (2.119.3) and Tacitus (Ann. 1.61) support his
account.767 As noted, Dio’s claims of Roman counterattacks being interrupted by thick
forests, but with no mention of the marshes or entrenchments that hindered them, conveys a
sense that, at some stage during the battle (perhaps at its climax) the Romans were unable to
utilise their formations and tactics effectively.768 Overall, one cannot disagree with Swan’s
claim that Dio’s account is reliable in some respects but ‘poor in details’.769
The archaeological evidence has not illuminated the matter of whether the Romans encamped
during the battle. Tacitus and Dio mention that the Romans encamped at least once during the
fighting, but no Roman camps have (yet) been definitively identified at Kalkriese.770 Dio
(56.21.1) mentions that the Romans made a camp to reorganise after the first day’s fighting
and they departed in the morning before the worst phase of the battle, which might be
identified with the fighting in the Senke. Dio explicitly mentions only one camp, whereas
Tacitus (Ann. 1.61) states that most Roman casualties were suffered between the first and
second Roman camps. The camp that Dio mentions (21.2) may be the first, well–laid camp
that Tacitus mentions (Ann. 1.61). The second camp of Tacitus (1.61) might then be identified
with the desperate fighting at the end of Dio’s account (21.3–5). While Tacitus does not make
the sequence of events clear, his second, ramshackle camp is not incompatible with Dio’s
archaeological finds from these carts are fragmentary (ibid., 561). On two and four–wheeled carts, see Roth (1999, 211–212): both two and four–wheeled variants were pulled by only two animals. The four–wheeled cart’s carrying capacity was not drastically higher than that of the two–wheeler, so it is not necessary to believe that Varus’ army had both types. 765 Dio 56.19.3–4; Schlüter, 1993, 45. The baggage train probably was a major hindrance during the fighting, but there was little else Varus could do about it aside from his reorganisation after the initial ambush (Dio 56.21.1). 766 Roth, 1999, 114, 211. 767 Also see Swan, 2004, 266. 768 Dio. 56.21.2; cf. Swan, 2004, 265. Also see Schlüter, 1999, 46–47; Großkopf/Rost/Wilbers–Rost, 2012, 102–103. 769 Swan, 2004, 250. 770 Wilbers–Rost, 2016, 575 and Crossland, 2017. Cf. Tac. Ann. 1.61; Dio 56.21.1.
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account even if the latter does not explicitly mention both camps.771 It was, however, routine
for a Roman army to encamp if attacked on the march.772 Tacitus (1.63) depicts Caecina
doing this under similar circumstances in AD 15. Therefore, it is reasonable to accept Dio’s
description of the first camp, and to keep in mind that a second desperate fortification might
have been constructed during the most intense fighting.773
From the literary sources, it may be determined that the events and planning took place as
follows: the army of Varus with a significant baggage train, after departing the main Roman
camp near the Weser, moved northwest through the territory of the Cherusci towards a
rumoured rebellion, when it was attacked by Arminius in hitherto friendly territory.774 Varus’
original plan was most likely to intimidate the rebels into submission by his mere presence,
and perhaps to perform any actual fighting with auxiliaries, then to go into winter quarters
closer to the Rhine, hence the presence of so many civilians.775 The betrayal by Arminius
forced him to change his plans. Having survived the initial attacks and encamped, Varus
reorganised the baggage train and changed direction westward, in the direction of the Rhine
where greater Roman forces were concentrated.776 Varus likely expected that his experienced
army would stand up to further attacks and allow him to break out. However, the terrain and
the German attacks wore down his army so much that he was unable to escape the ambush.
Over a day or two of heavy fighting, including at least one major failed Roman counterattack,
the Roman army was reduced to a fragment of its former size (Dio 56.21.2–4). Varus
despaired and committed suicide, triggering a general sauve qui peut, and most of the army
was killed (56.21.5–22.2).
771 Cf. Goodyear, 1981, 96; Grethlein, 2013, 136. 772 Note, in particular, the reaction of Antonius when his army became disordered during a night march through the foothills of Armenia in 36 BC (Plut. Ant. 48.5). Also see Cestius Gallus’ retreat to a series of camps when attacked between Jerusalem and Beth–Horon in AD 66 (Joseph. BJ 2.541–252, 544–545). 773 Grethlein, 2013, 136. 774 Dio 56.19.4–5, 20.1–2. The place from which Varus departed is not known. Murdoch (2008, 99) suggests the camp was at Minden. Anreppen is another possibility. As for the location of the rumoured rebellion, the Angrivarii appear likely candidates considering Varus’ northerly direction of march (Murdoch, 2008, 103). 775 Schlüter, 1993, 45. On Roman tactics against rebellions, see Goldsworthy (1996, 90–95). The unsettled nature of Germania may have required the civilians to be brought into winter quarters with the army for their protection. On the fighting role of auxiliaries see Lendon, 2005, 242. 776 Dio 56.21.1. Varus was presumably heading towards the Rhine and the Lippe where most Roman bases were located (see Murdoch, 2008, xi).
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So how do we characterise Varus’ manoeuvres? According to Dio (56.21.1), Varus abandoned
a part of baggage during the initial encampment so that the army could march with better
order. This was a standard Roman technique during withdrawals.777 If Varus abandoned the
baggage, it was to render his army more mobile and effective in battle, considering the
trouble caused by the impedimenta during the initial attack (Dio 56.20.5). Thus, Varus was
clearly not intending to stand and fight, but to keep moving, in an attempt to withdraw from
what he now realised was enemy territory. Velleius Paterculus, in his use of the term
egrediendi (escaping) implies that withdrawing was, or should have been, one of the army’s
intentions.778 For what other reason would Varus have destroyed most of his baggage
(presumably including food and other essentials), if not to move more quickly, disengage
from the enemy and reach safety as soon as possible?
The destruction of the baggage leads to other deductions. The closest Roman base was
approximately 100 kilometres away–back in the direction from which the army had come.779
Haltern was his more likely destination, as it was a large base close to other Roman bases and
the Rhine legions. However, it was over 100 kilometres away.780 As Varus had unexpectedly
found himself in enemy territory, any chance of obtaining provisions from local allies was
gone. Further, the sparse agricultural resources of this region rendered foraging for food and
fodder impractical.781 To reach Haltern from the army’s position at Kalkriese would take a
week at best, as the Romans were burdened with carts of wounded men and supplies.782 The
army was at the outermost limit of the distance it could operate from a base without grazing
for fodder, and its horses would probably collapse from exhaustion by the end of the week.783
777 Ch. 4, 145–6. 778 Vell. Pat. 2.119.2: Exercitus omnium fortissimus ... circumventus, cum ne pugnandi quidem egrediendive occasio nisi inique ... Also see Woodman, 1977, 199. 779 100 kilometres: von Schnurbein, 2003, 94. Also see Murdoch, 2008, xi. 780 Cf. Murdoch, 2008, xi. This distance is as the crow flies. The paths suitable for the passage of an army with wagons probably made the trip longer. Varus might not have known the precise distance, but he must have been cognisant that his destination was not particularly close by. 781 Timpe, 1995, 20. Water may have been easy to find in the wetlands in which the Romans were operating, especially if it was raining heavily. Food and foraging were more difficult. 782 Varus probably had wagons of wounded soldiers (Rost, 2016, 561, cf. BAfr. 21). In ideal circumstances, mule–driven carts could travel between 20 and 30 kilometres per day (Roth, 1999, 211). However, the situation in Germany will have enormously reduced this rate of movement. 783 An army could only operate further than 80 to 100 kilometres from a supply base by grazing their animals (Roth, 1999, 129, 198, 201). This was impractical in Varus’ situation. Horses, and other baggage animals, required a full rest day of grazing every five to seven days (Engels, 1978, 154–155). They could have been eaten, but probably not cooked, as the Germans will have prevented the Romans from collecting firewood.
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Varus’ decision to destroy the baggage thus allowed the Romans only one week to survive.
Schlüter argues that this action rendered it impractical for the Roman army to wait out the
Germans in an encampment or to go back the way it came.784 Therefore, speed was of the
essence. Varus must have intended to march expediti, perhaps burdening his infantry and the
calones and other non–combatants with extra supplies to reduce the army’s diminishing
reliance on wagons and pack animals.785 The infantry could not be overburdened, as they
would be expected to fight, but reducing the army’s baggage too severely could cause food
shortages within only a few days.786 By the time Varus had dismissed his plan to confront the
northern rebellion, the only avenue of escape was through the Kalkriese–Niewedde
depression.787 Varus’ broader strategy must have been to retire from enemy territory by
marching westward through the Senke, to reach friendly territory near the Rhine.
Sheldon raised a key criticism of Varus’ decision–making process; that he did not reconnoitre
the defile before entering it.788 She assumes that reconnaissance was possible and that there
was an alternative route available. Regarding reconnaissance, by what means could Varus
have gained intelligence about what lay ahead? Of primary importance is the fact that
Arminius and his auxiliaries had probably been Varus’ main source of intelligence,
particularly as the army was passing through Cheruscian land.789 Polybius, no mean authority
on military matters, admits that a general could not always be personally acquainted with the
army’s path and sometimes had to rely on local guides.790 It is also essential to note that, in
this period, contra Sheldon, the Roman army had no professional tactical intelligence–
gathering apparatus.791 At any rate no scouting force could have survived, considering that
the vicinity of Kalkriese Hill was in possession of enemy troops. The defection of Arminius
and his auxiliaries deprived Varus of a vital source of local information and under the
circumstances, there was no way to rectify this deficiency.792
784 Schlüter, 1993, 46. 785 Note that expediti did not mean marching without baggage, but with minimal baggage (Roth, 1999, 81). 786 Ibid., 88. 787 Schlüter, 1993, 45. 788 Sheldon, 2001, 29–30. 789 See Murdoch, 2008, xi. 790 Polyb. 9.14.2–4. For example, Caesar relied upon Diviciacus in Gaul (BGall. 1.41.4). 791 Austin &Rankov, 1995, 108, 135, 168–169, 246; contra Sheldon, 2001, 29–30. Sheldon gives Varus too little credit, as Varus had local informants, chief among them Arminius. Varus’ other auxiliary troops did not have the local knowledge of Arminius’ auxiliaries (Timpe, 1970, 110). 792 Goldsworthy, 2007, 98.
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Although the terrain in the Senke was unsuitable for an army, this does not mean a safer route
was available.793 Other Roman generals had found themselves in this type of position in the
past. In 188 BC, Gnaeus Manlius Vulso, while campaigning in Thracia, entered a narrow
defile and suffered heavy losses (Livy 38.40.6–15). He later successfully defended himself
against senatorial criticism on the grounds that he understood the danger but had no other
choice of route and could never have achieved anything without advancing aggressively
(Livy 38.49.5–13). If Varus had survived, he might have made a similar justification.794 In
108 BC Metellus Numidicus, while campaigning in Numidia, detected an enemy ambush
overlooking a defile through which he had to march (Sall. Jug. 49). Scarcity of supplies
forced him to enter the defile and suffer the ambush anyway (Jug. 50). Similarly, Varus must
have understood that he was taking a calculated risk.
For several reasons, primarily the logistical ones given above, Varus had no choice but to take
the most direct route to safety. He could not wait inside a camp or simply defend himself on
high ground. The route he needed can only have been through the Senke, where Varus surely
did not expect the enemy to commit themselves to a decisive battle, as the Germans were
usually worsted in such encounters.795 The fact that he kept some wagons shows his
confidence that they would be able to make their way through the defile safely. It is likely
that he did not expect to remain there for long. If he was not aware of the extent of the
preparations for the ambush in the corridor, he must have expected the Romans to force their
way through any resistance.796 The only way the Roman army could have been stopped from
passing through the Senke was if Germans were so numerous and well–prepared for intense
fighting that they could stop them.
793 Assuming Varus fully understood the perils of the Kalkriese path, perhaps he could have taken a westward path further south, avoiding the defile at Kalkriese (see Schlüter, 1992, 311). But even if he could have, this would simply have exposed his forces to the sort of hills and forests that Dio describes (56.20.1–4, 21.2) as being so debilitating to Varus’ army, by preventing it from deploying and manoeuvring its formations. 794 In AD 15, when the experienced general Aulus Caecina Severus was ambushed by Arminius in similar terrain, he also chose to push forward in search of better ground (Tac. Ann. 1.64–65). 795 It would have been reasonable for Varus to expect the Germans to launch a major attack on him and for his army would win such a direct encounter (Goldsworthy, 1996, 53). Again, note Tac. Ann. 1.63–64. 796 Schlüter, 1993, 36, 46.
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As mentioned, the Roman army had a number of wagons accompanying them to the Senke,
many probably loaded with wounded soldiers. A usual order of march would have placed the
baggage in the centre of the Roman formations, but the narrow space would have made this
difficult as Roman army would have been divided in half by the baggage. The fatal chaos
caused by fighting troops entangled with wagons and other impedimenta is emphasised by
Tacitus and Dio.797 Although Dio’s statement (56.21.1) that Varus reduced his baggage and
proceeded from his first camp in a relatively orderly formation has been accepted, the
confined terrain near the rampart and the intensity of German attacks must have rendered the
remaining baggage an enormous liability, taking up valuable space that the army required to
fight and rally. Thus, the baggage was a serious impediment, and yet this was an unavoidable
complication of fighting on such difficult ground and was largely outside the general’s
control.
After the Roman army entered the Senke and encountered intense opposition, it was not
practical to turn back.798 If the Roman plan had been to force a passage west through the
defile, the lack of space and enemy attacks would have made it too difficult for the Roman
army to continue moving or properly defend themselves. There was no space to use tactics
that might have allowed the Romans to make a fighting retreat, such as forming a hollow
circle or square.799 Little could therefore be done but to attempt to fight in this
disadvantageous location.800 The only other option was to move north and utilise the pass on
the southern and south–western edge of the Great Marsh. There is some evidence that the
Romans attempted to do this, but Arminius would have predicted the directions in which the
Romans might flee and acted to prevent this.801
Failing to break through or take an alternative path through the Senke, the Roman army had
exhausted all options. At some point, casualties mounted to the point that the army’s cohesion
collapsed, logistical and medical capacities failed completely and groups of soldiers or
individuals attempted to escape. Of Varus’ involvement in this stage of the battle, it is only
797 Tac. Ann. 1.64–5; Dio 20.5. As another example, the Vitellians at Cremona in AD 69 were defeated after becoming entangled in their baggage (impedimenta) and wagons (vehicula) (Tac. Hist. 3.25). 798 Schlüter, 1993, 36; Sheldon, 2001, 30; Rost / Wilbers–Rost, 2012, 121. 799 Caes. BGall. 5.33, BCiv. 1.79.5; Plut. Ant. 42.1. Cf. Goldsworthy, 1996, 105. Cf. Ch. 5, 179–80. 800 If the rampart was German, it was the key obstacle that the Romans had to attack. There is evidence that they did so: Schlüter, 1993, 37; Moosbauer / Wilbers–Rost, 2007, 28; Wilbers–Rost, 2016, 573–575. 801 Schlüter, 1999, 131–133.
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known that he was wounded fighting and, when the situation became hopeless, probably for
fear of capture, he and a number of senior officers killed themselves.802 It was a measure of
the difficulty of the situation that Varus was wounded, as a Roman commander of his stature
did not habitually expose himself to direct danger.803 Varus was no doubt engaging in active,
charismatic leadership in a desperate attempt to bolster the nerve of his crumbling formations.
Such behaviour was typical for a general attempting to support retreating troops.804 However,
at some point after being wounded, he killed himself to avoid capture, and his death no doubt
triggered a general rout, as Dio describes.805
To summarise, Varus’ tactics in response to the initial ambush were to encamp, minimise the
baggage train and attempt to force his way through the ambush. Although Varus plunged his
forces more deeply into the enemy ambush, his intention was to reach safety as quickly as
possible. He did not plan to confront the enemy in battle, but was carrying out a withdrawal
and utilised standard, aggressive, forward–moving tactics in doing so. Logistical constraints
forced the Romans to take the shortest feasible route westward to where Roman bases were
located. Although the Romans’ path through the Kalkrieser–Niewedder Senke comprised a
natural defile not suitable for an army, Varus likely expected that even on difficult ground the
Germans would be unable to defeat his men in a direct confrontation and that the Romans
would eventually emerge from the defile and continue their withdrawal westward. There was
no precedent in Roman experience for the intensity of the fighting they encountered in the
pass. It is thus difficult to blame Varus for his choice to move through the Senke when his
alternative options and his knowledge of the enemy forces were so limited. Once the Roman
army was trapped in the area of what is now called the Oberesch, it could not escape intact, as
the army was prevented by the terrain and enemy action from turning back, deploying and
fighting effectively, taking the route to the north along the edge of the Great Marsh or
breaking the enemy in a decisive fight. The intensity of enemy attacks stopped the Roman
army in its tracks, leaving it trapped in the ambush when it had originally intended to force its
way through. The army had to stop and fight under incredibly disadvantageous circumstances
and, while it attempted this, as shown by the evidence of heavy casualties, it failed. With the
802 Tac. Ann. 1.61; Dio 56.21.5. Also see Swan, 2004, 266; Rauh, 2015, 400. 803 See Gilliver, 2007, 136–137. 804 Sall. Jug. 98.1–4. Livy 30.18.12–4. Also note Caes. BCiv. 5.35.5. 805 Dio 56.21.5–22.1. The death of an army’s general was a severe psychological shock that could easily trigger a rout (Sabin, 2007, 431).
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weakening of the army after its defeat near the rampart, a return to Varus’ original plan of
advancing through the ambush cannot have been possible.
Sheldon is probably correct in stating that the fate of the Roman army was sealed as soon as it
entered the Senke.806 As the Romans were prevented from escaping, breaking the enemy was
their best hope of survival, but there was probably no opportunity for a decisive clash. What
appears clear from the archaeological evidence is that the Romans attempted every
possibility: advance, stand and fight, change path and flee. Arminius seems to have planned
for every eventuality, and the numbers of German warriors only grew as the Roman situation
worsened (Dio 56.21.4). The Roman defeat was not due to any weakness or gap in their
tactical repertoire, but due to the sheer impossibility of their situation.
Just as Antonius succeeded where Crassus failed because the latter had been decisively
defeated while the former was not, Varus’ retreat tactics failed because in such terrain he
could not win a decisive battle and yet he was forced to fight one. There was no opportunity
on such ground to dissuade enemy pursuit, and movement under the circumstances was all
but impossible. Varus’ army was simply not strong enough, and the difficult terrain removed
any other advantages they might have had. The Romans could not form a square or circle, nor
manoeuvre their cavalry and auxiliaries in support of the milites (Dio 56.21.2). Perhaps a
final factor working against the Romans was the difficulty of night marches, which Dio
described as the Romans’ final attempt at escape.807 The last thing holding the army together
once it was trapped in the defile was probably Varus’ leadership. When he died a rout was
inevitable, but the fact of his suicide almost certainly demonstrates that there was nothing
else to be done.
Arminius must be credited for placing the Roman army into an impossible situation. In later
German campaigns, when Roman armies were placed in similar situations they did not
significantly change their tactics, but were simply fielding larger forces.808 Perhaps Augustus
806 Sheldon, 2001, 30. Also see Lienemann, 1993, 79. 807 Dio 56.21.3–4. 808 Caecina, finding himself in a comparable situation in AD 15, utilised similarly aggressive tactics, but with the crucial advantage of greater forces than had been possessed by Varus (Tac. Ann. 1.65). When Germanicus faced another comparable ambush in AD 16, he had a mammoth force of eight legions at his disposal (Ann. 2.17). Germanicus used artillery to escape another ambush by Arminius in AD 16 (Ann. 2.20), and archaeological evidence suggests that the Romans did likewise in another possibly comparable situation during
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should never have left Varus to administer such a country with so few men.809 But it was the
betrayal by Arminius who held, for a German, a position of unparalleled trust and authority in
the Roman army that was the decisive factor.810 Any other commander in Varus’ position
would have been hamstrung by the betrayal of the auxiliaries depended upon for local
intelligence. He would have responded by abandoning much of his baggage, making a
fighting withdrawal along the shortest path towards the Rhine, and would almost certainly
have fallen into Arminius’ ambush. If Varus’ tactics displayed vulnerabilities that Arminius
could take advantage of, these vulnerabilities were systemic to the Roman army and did not
disappear with Varus’ death. When it came to Varus’ attempts to withdraw, his plan was
sound, but inside the defile at Kalkriese, he had neither the numbers nor the physical space to
utilise the army’s typical retreat tactics. Arminius had surely known that this would occur.
Conclusion
The subject of this chapter has been the limitations of Roman retreat tactics. It has been seen
that even the most advanced retreat tactics were not always successful. In general, as
highlighted through the examples of Crassus and Marcus Antonius, withdrawal in open
ground could be extremely challenging against an aggressive enemy. In these examples, the
presence of large numbers of enemy cavalry and horse archers made engagement in open
terrain difficult enough but, as examined previously, a fighting withdrawal could not be
carried out indefinitely under enemy pressure.811 With no high ground or camp to withdraw
to and no opportunity to decisively defeat the enemy, a long distance withdrawal could only
be successful if the marching army, like that of Antonius, was able to maintain order and
thereby utilise heavy infantry, missile–armed light infantry and cavalry in combination to
the Battle of the Harzhorn c. AD 235 (‘Auf den Spuren der Römerschlacht am Harzhorn‘, NDR (2015) accessed 2019. https://www.ndr.de/geschichte/schauplaetze/Die–Roemerschlacht–am–Harzhorn,roemerschlacht100.html). But as mentioned, the presence of at least one ballista at Kalkriese leaves open the possibility that Varus used the same tactics (Stark, 2016). Even Roman intelligence practices did not change significantly for a long time (Austin & Rankov, 1995, 245–6). 809 Wells, 1972, 238–9. 810 When Drusus had been trapped by Germans in a defile in 11 BC, he was simply allowed to escape through enemy laxity (Dio 54.33.3–4), but Arminius was a more disciplined ambusher (cf. Tac. Ann. 1.68). He was just as capable in a pitched battle (Tac. Ann. 2.17, 45–6). Varus had allegedly been warned about Arminius (Tac. Ann. 1.55, 67–8; cf. Swan, 2004, 258), but if this actually occurred, Varus probably chose to stay out of what will have seemed an internal German dispute (Sheldon, 2001, 15) and gave Arminius the benefit of the doubt by virtue of his professional position in the army (Timpe, 1970, 104). 811 Cf. Ch. 2, 89–92.
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fight off or counterattack pursuers.
Marcus Antonius’ withdrawal from Media was in all ways better conducted than Crassus’
from Carrhae, but this was fundamentally due to the fact that Antonius’ army was strong
enough to avoid a decisive defeat and that it thus retained its discipline and organisation. It
was not enough for the army to contain experienced troops and be led by an experienced
general. For instance, the Caesarian army led by Curio, when it attempted to retreat at the
Battle of Bagradas, 49 BC, collapsed quickly under enemy pressure because it had taken
heavy casualties and the morale of the soldiers eventually failed (Caes. BCiv. 2.42). A similar
situation occurred at Carrhae, when the milites refused to listen to the sound advice of their
general and forced him to negotiate with the enemy, ruining their chances at safety (Plut.
Crass. 30.3–5). The size and strength of a retreating army, relative to its enemy, was thus
essential to the success or otherwise of a fighting retreat or withdrawal.
Withdrawal through very constricted terrain was even more difficult, because any army
passing through a defile was exposed to attack along its extended flanks and unable to
manoeuvre or counterattack. The failure of Varus’ withdrawal through the Senke in AD 9 was
due to the fact that he could not utilise his army’s superior battle tactics in such restricted
terrain, and so he could not throw off enemy attacks or dissuade pursuit. He was forced to
stand and fight a battle he could not win, and the heavy casualties suffered in this decisive
defeat made further movement while under pursuit totally impossible. If, as Dio describes
(56.21.3–4), the Romans made one last attempt at escape after the main defeat, the balance of
forces was by this point too far out of the Romans’ favour for such a fighting withdrawal to
be achievable, even if the terrain to the west and north–west was more favourable.
It is a generally applicable observation that an army of roughly equal strength to its enemy, or
greater strength, was better able to retreat or withdraw successfully than an army that had
suffered heavy casualties and a loss of cohesion. This, on the face of it, is unsurprising.
However, the underlying reason that this observation is true is because, as has been argued an
army required strong discipline, organisation and leadership to maintain a fighting retreat or
withdrawal. Heavy casualties eroded discipline, organisation and leadership in large part due
to the deaths of large numbers of veterans and junior leaders who were at the forefront of any
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battle.812 This directly affected the quality of the army’s leadership and indirectly made it
more difficult to keep the army organised, while also affecting the discipline and motivation
of the troops through the loss of leadership figures who were intimate to the milites.813
To conclude, the Roman army’s retreat tactics were highly effective during the Late Republic
and Principate, but it was a partial condition of a successful fighting retreat or withdrawal that
the Roman army maintained ratio so that it could fight successfully if forced to do so, or at
least present a bold enough front that the enemy would not commit to a decisive fight. Any
army that did not have the strength to dissuade enemy pursuit through intimidation or actual
fighting could not sustain a fighting retirement over a long distance without taking refuge on
high ground or in a fortified camp. It might be said then that Roman retreat tactics themselves
had no real limitations, as long as the balance of forces was in the Romans’ favour. It was
possible that unfavourable terrain, such as that at Kalkriese, could put paid to a withdrawal
that might have been achievable if the action were fought in open ground. However, just as
logistical and other factors informed the fateful Roman plan at Kalkriese, some tactical
circumstances were simply not conducive either to fighting a successful battle or to
withdrawing safely. The Romans always needed space to deploy and adjust their infantry
formations and to utilise their light infantry and cavalry, the effective combination of which
was key to Roman retreat tactics. In these cases, even the most efficient army and commander
were fairly helpless if their enemy made no blunders. The success of Antonius’ withdrawal
through Media over a very long distance and under heavy pursuit shows that, even for the
well–organised and disciplined Romans, sometimes there was no substitute for numbers. If
Crassus or Varus had approached their final crisis with more men, they might have been
successful.
812 On the heavy casualties suffered by centurions, see: Caes. BGall. 2.25, 6.40, 7.51, BCiv. 3.71; BHisp. 23; Lee, 1996, 211; Kagan, 2006, 169. It is also likely that many veterans fought in the front ranks (Gilliver, 2007, 130) and would thus be first to die in any major reverse. 813 This phenomenon has been studied by Rush in American and German infantry units during the Battle of Hürtgen Forest, 1944 (Rush, 2001, 323–4, 333–5, 343).
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Retreat? Hell, we just got here!
(U.S. Marine Captain Lloyd Williams)
Conclusion
Retreats and Withdrawals in Roman Warfare
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Summary of the Thesis
This thesis has sought to answer the question of how retreats and withdrawals affected the
tactics and strategies used by the Romans during the Middle and Late Republic. This topic
has been under–appreciated, perhaps because so many ancient battle accounts end with routs.
However, a significant proportion of battles also ended with a losing army retreating mostly
intact, and armies also regularly made withdrawals over longer distances in order to improve
their tactical or strategic situations (Introduction, 19–20). These retrograde manoeuvres were
common enough that they must have been part of the normal skill–set of Roman soldiers, and
an important consideration in the tactics and strategies of Roman generals. Thus, by
examining why and how the Romans performed retrograde manoeuvres, this thesis has
offered a new perspective on Roman tactics and military decision making during battles and
campaigns, as well as on Roman military evolution, from the Middle to the Late Republic.
In Chapter One, an examination was made of the varying scenarios in which organised
retreats or withdrawals were necessary and could be feasibly conducted, and of the places
that retiring armies typically sought refuge. Defeat in battle was the most common such
scenario. This type of retreat could be performed deliberately or involuntarily, either to avoid
further fighting or to re–engage in a more favourable location. Armies would also generally
disengage if night fell during a battle, if an engagement was indecisive, or if the weather was
particularly poor, but these were not particularly common scenarios. Armies could also
simulate flight or a disorganised retreat to lure their enemies into an ambush or surprise
counterattack, but infantry–based Roman armies did not commonly do this. An army seeking
refuge following a retreat would usually make for the closest fortified position or high
ground, a fortified camp being the preferred destination, particularly if the intent was to avoid
further fighting. An army intending to re–initiate fighting in a better position might, however,
choose to withdraw onto a hill instead of into their camp. Finally, an army that could not
retreat to high ground or a nearby camp, or was forced to retreat further for any reason, could
make a withdrawal, a retrograde movement over a longer distance. A withdrawal had
different characteristics to a retreat due to the increased speed and distance that the army
moved. A withdrawal was generally carried out in a marching column or square formation,
whereas a retreat could be conducted over a shorter distance, with a formed battleline while
still facing the enemy. Both retreats and withdrawals appear to have occurred fairly
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commonly and so were major features of Republican Roman warfare.
In Chapter Two, it was shown that retreating or withdrawing troops were not always able to
do so unmolested, as they were often pursued or attacked by the enemy. Pursuit most
commonly took the form of either a general advance by a victorious battleline or a cavalry
attack, the latter in particular being highly effective in open ground and presenting less risk to
the victorious army. It was also demonstrated that pursuit by the enemy had a significant
impact on the success or failure of the retrograde movement. The advance of a victorious
battleline could easily induce a total rout if any shock occurred among the retreating troops,
and an army in withdrawal could be delayed or seriously disordered by pursuing cavalry or
light infantry. Retreats and withdrawals were difficult and by their nature demoralising. They
could thus easily break down into mass flight under enemy pressure. Sometimes the victors in
a battle chose not to pursue a retreating enemy, particularly if the latter maintained good order
or possessed visible reserves. Many generals will have been cautious of unrestrained pursuit
of a retreating enemy, in case their forces fell into disorder and were victims of a
counterattack. However, the most common scenario for a defeated army was a disorderly
retreat, leading to flight and disproportionate casualties. To avoid such a scenario, a retreating
or withdrawing army needed to prevent or counter enemy pursuit.
Throughout Chapter Three, an examination was made of the factors that contributed to the
ability of Roman armies to carry out successful retrograde movements, including training,
leadership, reserves and combined–arms tactics. It was shown that an army would more
likely be successful in retreat or withdrawal if it maintained ratio, thereby intimidating
pursuers and making the army more capable of fighting off any attack, and also if it acted to
prevent or counter enemy pursuit, such as by utilising reserves to intimidate or to
counterattack. Roman infantry appear to have been trained to carry out retreats and
withdrawals, and maintained ratio in a retrograde movement by combining close order
formations with gradual movement. The disciplina required to maintain ratio during a retreat
or withdrawal was facilitated by this training and also the leadership of officers, who
provided coercion, inspiration and direction. Centuriones and tribuni appear to have been the
key figures that milites would turn to when under pressure, and so they were essential for
transmitting the general’s instructions and maintaining order among the infantry during a
retrograde movement. Key tactics used by the Romans to manage or prevent enemy pursuit
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included deploying the reserve infantry lines of the triplex acies, or using separate arms such
as cavalry, javelineers (velites or later, auxilia), or archers to fight pursuers, while the milites
retreated in tightly–formed bodies. The Roman army thus had all of the necessary tools to
maintain order in retreat or withdrawal, and to counteract enemy pursuit.
Chapter Four explored the role played by the general prior to and during retrograde
movements. To begin with, a Roman general was usually an older and more experienced
man, with decades of political and military education and experience, which he drew upon to
form the essential military qualities of scientia rei militaris, virtus, and consilium. Before a
battle, it was the responsibility of a general to gather and interpret intelligence so that he
could decide where and when to deploy his army to fight, and Roman generals typically
chose a battlefield with a fortified camp or high ground close enough to their battleline that
an orderly retreat to that location should have been possible. It was also their responsibility to
deploy reserves that could assist the milites if a retreat became necessary. During a retreat,
just as during a battle, a general had limited influence over what was happening. Mainly, a
good general demonstrated virtus by staying close to the fighting and encouraging his men
verbally and with his presence, and utilised consilium by dispatching reserves or his personal
guard to support hard–pressed soldiers or to threaten enemy pursuers. If an army had to
retreat into or out of a fortified position, the general ensured the walls were adequately
defended, exhorted the defenders, and organised the army’s march so that it was not thrown
into disorder while entering or leaving the position. During a longer withdrawal, a general
firstly ensured there was an adequate rearguard or some force dedicated to fighting pursuers,
and established ratio agminis that suitably protected the army’s vulnerable elements, such as
the impedimenta. During the withdrawal the general ordered counterattacks when necessary,
and managed the army’s direction of march, taking the most direct practical route to their
destination but also using terrain to their advantage when possible, such as by adhering to
high ground or denying it to pursuing enemy forces. If something went wrong, the general
could abandon part of the baggage to make the army faster and more effective in fighting, or
halt the army and bring it into encampment. It was thus demonstrated that while all parts of
the Roman army were responsible for a successful retreat, as milites and their officers had to
maintain ratio and fight off pursuers, the decisions made by the general were key to the
outcome of affairs. A general trained the army, chose officers, selected the terrain and
position for a camp, deployed the army for battle and posted reserves. A successful retreat or
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withdrawal depended on the maintenance of ratio and management of enemy pursuit, which
were heavily affected by the general’s decisions.
In Chapter Five, the development of Roman retreat tactics from the Middle to the Late
Republic was examined in closer detail. In the Mid–Republic the Romans could if necessary
utilise the reserve lines of the triplex acies, and cavalry deployed on the flanks, to support a
retreat by the fighting line. Throughout the mid–to late second century BC, however, hints
emerge of Roman infantry learning to fight more independently in semi–isolated units, while
some talented commanders, such as Scipio Aemilianus and Gaius Marius, utilised cavalry
more dynamically by manoeuvring and counterattacking where necessary to support the
infantry. The smaller–scale and extensive skirmishing of Roman campaigns in this period
may partially explain these changes, but what is indisputable is that by the middle of the first
century, Roman retreat tactics emerge as much more complex and effective than they had
been in the Mid–Republic. In the Late Republic, the Roman army’s organisational and
tactical development meant that generals more often had flexible cavalry and light infantry
units to rely on. Legionaries could themselves serve in the latter capacity, as expeditae
cohortes. Roman armies could utilise more complex formations, including hollow squares or
circles that could move while fighting in all directions, and these formations worked hand–
in–hand with mobile reserves to fight while moving, to stand their ground, or to counterattack
as necessary, in order to create the necessary space for a safe retreat. Structural changes to the
Roman army, such as enhanced training regimes, the formalisation of cohorts, the integration
of missile–armed auxiliaries with heavy infantry units, and increasing use of auxiliary cavalry
increased the strength of Roman infantry units while making the army more flexible as a
whole. Therefore, a general had more options for utilising light infantry and cavalry to keep
milites secure during a retrograde movement, while the soldiers themselves manoeuvred more
skilfully in stronger formations, thereby resisting enemy pressure more effectively. This
variety of tools meant that by the mid–first century BC, good quality Roman armies led by
skilled commanders, such as Marcus Petreius, Marcus Antonius, and particularly Julius
Caesar, showed the ability to carry out fighting retreats in the most difficult circumstances,
even over long distances, against heavy pursuit, and in unfavourable terrain.
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In Chapter Six, the limitations of advanced retreat tactics were examined through the analysis
of three large–scale examples of failed Roman retrograde manoeuvres in the Late Republic
and Early Empire. The chaos of the retreat after the Battle of Carrhae in 53 BC was
contrasted with the far more orderly and successful retreat of Antonius’ army through Media
in 36 BC. This comparison showed that Antonius was successful where Crassus had failed
because he was able to prevent the Parthians from either decisively defeating him in battle, or
pressuring him enough that he could not continue his retreat. The various tactical and
leadership failures in the retreats at Carrhae ultimately stemmed from the enormous casualties
the Roman army had suffered in battle, which had shattered its tactical effectiveness.
Antonius never suffered from this disadvantage. In the third case study, that of Varus’ famous
defeat at Kalkriese in AD 9, there was an examination of the general’s decisions, particularly
regarding his choice of route through a defile. However, it was argued that Varus had little
choice in the matter, and had likely expected that his men would win any skirmishes in the
defile. Unfortunately, enemy resistance was greater than expected and his army was forced to
fight in extremely unfavourable terrain, resulting in the army’s decisive defeat. As a result of
this defeat and the heavy casualties suffered, the Romans could no longer threaten nor
counterattack their pursuers, or even move in an orderly manner, and so there was no further
opportunity for a successful retreat. The fact that the Romans lost heavily in the battle at
Kalkriese was the decisive factor in the failure of this retreat, suggesting that the army was
perhaps never as strong as it needed to be in order to escape its situation. At both Carrhae and
Kalkriese, casualties were decisive in preventing successful retreat. Very heavy casualties
weakened the army at all levels, particularly with disproportionate casualties among veterans
and centuriones who usually bore the brunt of the fighting.814 They also emboldened the
victors. A weakened army attempting to retreat against superior and confident forces was
unlikely to be successful no matter its chosen tactics, if it could not find immediate refuge. As
such any fighting retreat, even with the Roman army’s highly effective tactics, still required a
favourable balance of forces so as to prevent decisive engagement and allow successful
counterattacks. No matter how far the Roman army’s tactics advanced, the general rule still
applied that a retreating army under pressure needed at some point either to dissuade its
pursuers or to find secure refuge.
814 One modern study of soldiers’ morale in battle demonstrates that the loss of junior leaders, who were the soldiers’ most intimate leaders, had a critical impact on morale and discipline (Rush, 2001, 323–4, 333–5, 343).
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The Relationship of Retreats and Withdrawals to Roman Tactics and Strategy
Two unique and well–observed features of Republican Roman warfare are salient in
determining the relationship of retrograde movements to Roman tactics and strategy. The first
is the Romans’ longstanding tendency to adopt tactics from their neighbours and enemies.815
In the Middle Republic, it is striking that the Carthaginians appear to have regularly carried
out orderly retreats and withdrawals, or attempted to do so, and that in this period their tactics
were not dissimilar to those of the Romans.816 In the second and first centuries BC, some
Roman legionaries also developed an advance–and–retreat fighting style in simulation of the
fluid fighting styles they encountered against Spanish tribesmen.817 The defeats and reverses
suffered by Roman arms contributed to this tendency of adopting successful tactics and
strategies, and will have affected the Romans’ development of more effective tactics and
strategies for conducting retreats and withdrawals, such as increased use of foreign light
infantry and cavalry, use of different formations such as defensive circles or squares, and
implementing deceptive tactics when retreating from camps. The development of Roman
retreat tactics from the Middle to the Late Republic was therefore a fluid and adaptive
process, shaped by Rome’s military experiences throughout this period.
The second relevant feature of Republican Roman warfare is two–fold, the organisation and
fighting style of Roman legions, incorporating the army’s professional core, the centurionate
and rank–and–file veterani, and the triplex acies. As observed in Chapter Three (113–6), the
Romans utilised a slow and steady advance–and–retreat fighting style with their multiple
battlelines, and from the Middle Republic were already capable of using these lines as reserve
forces, to advance and support the front line (Ch. 6, 157–60). The slow–and–steady fighting
style of a fully deployed Roman army was always well–adapted to the maintenance of ratio
in retreat, the systematic use of reserve lines gave the army an ideal tool for supporting the
fighting troops if they retreated, and the officers that formed the army’s institutional memory,
particularly the centuriones, developed more advanced tactical knowledge and so were better
able to provide leadership and tactically–sound directions during a retreat. The Romans
815 Goldsworthy, 2011, 24, 29–31. 816 Cf. Polyb. 11.21, 24; Livy 25.37.15, 28.13–5, 30.18. Also see Cagniart, 2007, 92. Hoyos (2007, 76) points out that the superior skill of Scipio Africanus’ army during the Second Punic War was ‘a counter, and a tribute to the professionalism of Carthage’s land forces in the Barcid era’. 817 Caes. BCiv. 1.44; Potter, 2010, 328.
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diversified their tactics over time, incorporating more cavalry and various kinds of missile–
armed light infantry into their forces, and as legionaries and junior officers became more
experienced, the Romans were able to build upon the tools they already had to carry out more
complex retreats and withdrawals in more difficult situations. Eventually, as Roman battle
tactics became more varied, maintaining the triplex acies was no longer necessary to support
a retreat, as good generals diligently deployed specific units of infantry or cavalry in support
of retreating troops.
The Romans thus built upon their existing fighting style and military structure to become
more effective at retreats and withdrawals, just as they became more effective in general. The
Romans were capable of carrying out orderly retreats and withdrawals from at least the late
third century BC, but their methods of doing so were not initially unique to them. For several
reasons, including the adoption of tactics from their enemies, accumulated experience from
previous defeats and the army’s general increase in efficiency and combined–arms
cooperation, from the Middle to the Late Republic the Romans developed a more advanced
capacity, in both form and function, to conduct successful retreats and withdrawals. In other
words, the Romans not only became more effective, but their tactics and strategies for
carrying out retreats and withdrawals also became more and more distinctively theirs, in line
with the increasingly unique characteristics of the army and its tactics. The superiority of
Roman retreat tactics will have been a significant strategic advantage, for they were more
capable of retreating from battlefield defeats and withdrawing from unfavourable positions,
and could thus better preserve their forces for successful action elsewhere. And so by the first
century BC, Roman retreat tactics had a significant impact on the methods by which the
Romans fought battles and conducted campaigns, and their general success in doing so. As
demonstrated by Marcus Antonius in 36 BC (Ch. 6, 208–9), a strong and cohesive Roman
army with a competent general could successfully retreat and withdraw in dire circumstances
and against the most formidable enemies. The Romans were able to retain these advanced
tactics not only through the institutional continuity of the Roman army, provided by
professional officers such as centuriones, but also their developing reservoir of written
material on warfare.818
818 Most such manuals are lost, but Frontinus (Strat. 2.13) and Onasander (Strat. 27) both discuss retreats and withdrawals, demonstrating that these were later considered to be manoeuvres that a good general should understand and perform correctly.
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Retreats and Empire
No argument is necessary to state that the Roman army was the dominant military force in the
Mediterranean for hundreds of years, perhaps from the fall of the Successor kingdoms in the
second century BC until after Imperial field armies began suffering major defeats to the
Goths in the in the third and particularly, the fourth centuries AD. In this age of dominance,
the Romans were capable of fielding very large and efficient armies, and they rarely suffered
significant defeats in battle. Early in this period, the Roman army had become the most
successful exponent of retreat tactics in the Mediterranean. Thus, in the rare case of the defeat
the Romans could potentially recover from tactical reverses when their opponents could not,
reinforcing their already impressive array of advantages in battle.
The advantages of these superior retreat tactics are demonstrated in several incidents depicted
in Josephus’ account of the First Roman–Jewish War (AD 66–73). At the siege of Gamala in
AD 66, for example, Roman forces had initially penetrated deep into the city but were
eventually routed, leaving Vespasian and a body of men isolated (Joseph. BJ 4.31–4). These
Romans formed a testudo and resisted enemy attacks until the pressure slackened, and then
steadily retreated from the city while still facing the enemy (BJ 4.31–4). Also at Gamala, a
Roman officer named Placidius, who commanded six hundred cavalry, was able to entice a
group of Jewish fighters onto flat ground and carry out a successful feigned retreat, turning
and defeating his enemies once they had spread out in pursuit (4.58–60). Later, in AD 70 at
the outset of Titus’ siege of Jerusalem, an incident occurred in which the majority of a legion
was routed by a ferocious Jewish attack, leaving the general himself isolated with his
personal guard (5.76–7). Titus and his comrades beat back the Jews pressing upon them, and
when the enemy attempted to bypass him in pursuit of the rest of the legion, Titus
counterattacked their flank (5.81–2). The fleeing soldiers eventually rallied and
counterattacked, driving the Jews to flatter ground, where they attempted to make their own
fighting retreat, but were quickly overwhelmed as the Romans attacked from higher ground
(5.90–5).
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In the extracts regarding Gamala and Jerusalem, the resilience of small groups of Roman
legionaries against more lightly–equipped foes is demonstrated, as these groups were able to
force back potential pursuers and retreat safely.819 In the case of Placidius, it can be see that
the Romans continued to use feigned retreat tactics with cavalry, just as they occasionally had
in the Republic.820 In the Jerusalem example, one can see the inability of Jewish infantry to
replicate effective retreat tactics, as after their first flight they attempted to rally, but when
attacked from higher ground they simply fled once more. With their lack of training, less
developed organisation and tactics, and lack of reserves, it would have been almost
impossible for these Jewish infantry to carry out a fighting retreat against an effective Roman
pursuit. It can therefore be seen that even in a war that featured few large field battles, the
Romans’ superior ability to carry out retreats meant that they could preserve their forces in
potentially disastrous situations, while Jewish fighters that suffered defeat in open ground
were not so fortunate.
Imperial forces continued to use the tactics developed in the Republican period. They used
heavy and light infantry cooperatively during battle, as notable for instance in the joint attack
of ferementarii and milites during the Romans’ final battle against the British chieftain
Caratacus, in AD 50 (Tac. Ann. 12.35.10). It is reasonable to assume that these separate arms
supported each other as closely during retreat and withdrawal as they did in attack. However,
just as Late Republican armies sometimes suffered reverses in retreat and withdrawal, such
also occured in the Imperial period. Prominent examples include Cestius Gallus’ disastrous
withdrawal through the pass of Beth–Horon in AD 66 (Joseph. BJ 2.540–50), and Caesennius
Paetus’ disorderly and costly retreat from Armenia following his defeat near Rhandeia in AD
62 (Tac. Ann. 15.16). As explained (Ch. 6, 217–20), difficult terrain and an unfavourable
balance of forces could prevent a successful retreat or withdrawal in any situation. As late as
the eleventh century AD, the Byzantine army at Manzikert demonstrated that the Romans had
not forgotten how to carry out complex and large–scale fighting retreats, utilising close order,
gradual movement and combined arms.821 The Romans were eventually routed at Manzikert,
primarily due to the fact that their reserves did not support the fighting line when it attempted
to counterattack.822 At Manzikert the Romans attempted to maintain ratio, to use reserves and
819 Cf. Sall. Jug. 97.5; App. Pun. 103. 820 See Ch. 1, 58–9. 821 Haldon, 1999, 178–9, 205. 822 Ibid., 205.
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to make counterattacks in order to manage enemy pursuit. While the reserves did not perform
their role properly in this instance, the same principles of successful retreats observed in the
Middle and Late Republic evidently still applied to Roman retreat tactics, a millennium later.
Following the seeming culmination of the Roman army’s development of retreat tactics in the
first century BC, perhaps the most significant new challenge to the Roman army came from
the cavalry–based armies of Asia. As demonstrated (Ch. 6, 197, 199–200), the offensive use
of retreat tactics by the Parthians was already giving the Romans trouble in the first century
BC.823 The feigned retreat, a manoeuvre particularly effective with cavalry, could be
combined particularly effectively with mounted archery to keep a force safe from enemy
action whilst inflicting heavy casualties. Because feigned retreats were not common in
Roman tactics, they did not field mounted archers. The Romans quickly attempted to counter
such tactics with large numbers of local auxiliary cavalry, perhaps some of whom utilised
similar equipment and techniques.824
However, the Romans continued to encounter problems with the horse peoples of the
Eurasian Steppe, and in the final years of the Western Roman Empire the Huns repeatedly
demonstrated the incredible power of horse archery and feigned retreats in battle.825 Effective
use of such tactics could overwhelm an infantry–based army, even one well–practised in
carrying out fighting retreats or withdrawals. As a result, the Romans developed their own
horse archer and cataphract units with which they could utilise the same tactics, and they
continued to adapt these cavalry forces in response to the successful tactics of the steppe
peoples and Persians.826
823 Cf. Plut. Crass. 24.5–6, Ant. 41.1–4. 824 Plut. Ant. 37.3. Such auxiliaries could even include Parthians (App. B Civ. 4.59). 825 These were the typical tactics of the steppe (May, 2012, 130). As peoples from the steppe, the Huns were experts in mounted archery (Rance, 2007, 355). The Mongols further evolved the already–sophisticated tactics of the steppe (May, 2012, 130–1), and were all–but invincible in battle for an extended period of time. On Mongolian tactics and training under Genghis Khan see May (2006, 620–1, 622–3, 623–4, 632–5). The first significant battle that the Mongols lost (Ain Jalut, AD 1260) was against the Mamluks of Egypt, who themselves employed similar tactics (May, 2006, 625–7, 631). 826 Response to Parthians: Kennedy, 1996, 87–8. Response to Huns: Rance, 2007, 355. During the final Romano–Persian war of AD 602–628, the Emperor Heraclius spent some time training soldiers as horse archers before launching his decisive counterattack campaign (Gregory, 2009, 172).
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As the steppe peoples continued intermittently to conquer European and Asian states for
centuries after the fall of the Western Empire, cavalry–based retreat tactics continued to play
a decisive role in warfare, but in a very different context to the experiences of the Roman
Republic. The Romans had painstakingly built their empire in the Western Mediterranean,
where battles between infantry–centric forces were the norm. In this context, the retreat
tactics that the Romans developed were probably never improved upon. The resulting ability
of Roman armies to preserve themselves even after serious defeats was surely a factor in the
army’s endurance during the myriad challenges it faced throughout the Later Empire.
Suggestions for Further Study
There are enough examples of retreats noted by ancient sources to show that the writers were
far from ignorant that such manoeuvres could play a significant role in battle. Given the
evidence, there is scope for further research on the subject. This thesis has only touched upon
the role of retreats and retreat tactics in Imperial Roman warfare, and it has said almost
nothing of Byzantine warfare. Although it would be logical to assume that the Romans
utilised their well–developed retreat tactics throughout the Later Empire, I have not tested
this assumption. I have also not examined in any depth the role of such tactics in the military
actions of Greeks, Macedonians and the Successors, the Carthaginians, or other
Mediterranean powers such as the Gauls and Iberians.827 Nor have I considered in detail the
extent to which Rome and these other powers influenced each other in their retreat tactics.
Nothing has been said of the legacy or new development of these tactics in Medieval warfare,
for although this would be outside the scope of ancient history, the technology and tactics of
the periods are comparable. I have only fleetingly touched upon the famous retreat tactics of
the horse peoples. Furthermore, even in the main focal period of this study, the Middle
Republic to Early Empire, there is room for deeper analysis than I have carried out. A closer
examination of links between changes in the structure of the Roman army and their retreat
tactics could be instructive. Finally, detailed studies of the countless battles and wars
throughout this period have usually been constructed without a significant appreciation of the
827 There are many examples of retreats and withdrawals by Greek and Hellenistic armies (eg. Thuc. 1.105–6; Xen. Hell. 5.3.3–7, 6.2.20–3, 6.5.13–4; Polyb. 2.68, 4.69, 8.14, 11.17; Diod. Sic. 19.43.4–5; App. Syr. 35, etc ). There were several recorded examples of retrograde movements by the Carthaginians in the Second Punic War (Polyb. 11.21, 24; Livy 28.13–5, 30.18; perhaps also Polyb. 15.13). There is a even an example of a fighting retreat by the Helvetii at Bibracte, 58 BC (Caes. BGall. 1.25).
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important general role that retreats played in Roman–era warfare. In the light of my analysis,
it may be possible to review some aspects not only of Rome’s military history, but that of
other ancient states and peoples.
This thesis opened by examining the prevalent assumption that ancient battles usually ended
with the rout of one army. However, it is evident that the ways in which battles and
campaigns could end were more varied than has generally been recognised. Perhaps most
major battles ended with routs, but many others ended by mutual consent, in confused retreat
or with orderly withdrawal. Likewise, a campaign might climax with a major battle, but could
also end with a withdrawal from the theatre of operations, or surrender due to one army
having been manoeuvred into a position of supply shortage.
Roman armies were trained and organised to perform retreats and withdrawals. Officers knew
how to lead and manage such movements, and good generals will have considered retrograde
movements in their tactical and strategic thinking. The ability of Roman armies to retreat and
withdraw efficiently contributed to their military success by allowing them to escape from
difficult situations without suffering heavy casualties.
No army was invincible in battle. After a reverse at Dyrrhachium in 48 BC, Caesar (BCiv.
3.72) criticised premature celebration by the Pompeians thus:
... they did not recollect the common chances of warfare, how often trifling
causes, originating in a false suspicion, a sudden alarm, or a religious scruple,
have entailed great disasters, whensoever a mistake has been made in an army
through the incapacity of a general or the fault of a tribune ...828
What is important to recognise is that while defeats were common, disaster did not inevitably
follow. In the case of the Romans, disasters in the wake of defeat were perhaps the exception
rather than the rule.
828 Trans. A. G. Peskett, 1914.
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Appendix A: Table of Basic References to Retreats and Withdrawals Following are the main primary source citations used throughout the thesis. This is not an exhaustive list of all references to retreats and withdrawals in Roman warfare. Other references may be found in some sources that I have not relied upon heavily, and some of the citations provided are difficult to interpret and classify, as retreats and the reasons for retreat, flight or disengagement from battle are not always described or stated by the sources. Some of the below examples of retreats are only inferred to have been such. There are also ancient references in the thesis that do not appear below. Nonetheless, these are the sources I have used for my central arguments.
Retreat from Battle Withdrawal
Successful
Polyb. 3.84, 6, 4.12, 11.24, 18.25; Diod. Sic. 19.43.4-5; Sall. Jug. 97-8; Caes. BGall. 1.25, 6.40, BCiv. 1.45-6, 2.25, 3.46. 3.94-5; BAfr. 15-8, BHisp. 31, BAlex.40; Livy 4.39.4-9 , 25.19.1-8, 28.13, 15, 33.15, 18, 42.59, 44.42.2-3; Plut. Aem. 20.1-6, Ant. 39.5-7; App. Pun. 103 Hisp. 88, BCiv. 2.80. Front. Strat. 1.5.9, 15-6.
Polyb. 3.74, 3.84, 5.86; Livy 4.39.4-9, 27.49, 32.12.2-3, 37.38; Plut. Ant. 41.4-5, 42.1-4, 45.2-3, 49.1-2; Tac. Ann. 15.16; App Hisp. 82; Joseph. BJ 2.540-555. Front. Strat. 1.5.1-8, 12-4, 17-8.
Unsuccessful
Polyb. 2.68, 4.69, 5.86, 11.17; Caes. BCiv. 2.41-2; BAlex. 76; Livy 6.24, 24.16.1-5, 27.49, 30.18, 32.12.2-3, 37.38, 38.25.10-13, 40.40; App. Syr. 6.35, BCiv. 1.90, 3.69, 4.128.
Livy 28.13, 15, 33.18; Caes. BGall. 5.26-31, 37, BCiv. 1.79, 3.94-5; Plut. Crass. 27.5-8, 29; Tac. Ann. 15.16; Joseph. BJ 2.540-555; App. B Civ. 2.80; Dio. 56.19-22.1.
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Appendix B: Table of Retreats and Withdrawals According to Tactical Context Below are the same citations shown in Appendix 1, but organised according to the tactical context in which the retrograde movement was conducted. I have included examples of retreats from battle that were followed by the reformation of a battleline or a counterattack, even where such movements could also be described as routs, because the fleeing army did retain enough order to reorganise itself. Some citations are repeated under different headings as they fit multiple criteria.
Retreat from Battle Withdrawal
Retreats to High Ground
Polyb. 3.40, 3.86, 11.24; Caes. BGall. 1.25, 2.23, BCiv. 1.45; BAlex 40; Livy 27.41-2, 28.15.8–11; Sall. Jug. 51, 98; App. B Civ. 1.90.
Retreats to Camps
Polyb. 11.21, 4; Caes. BGall. 5.37, 6.40, BCiv. 1.45-6, 2.42; BAlex. 76; Livy 6.24, 24.16, 28.13, 15, 33.15, 37.43, 38.25; App. Syr. 35-6, BCiv. 2.80, 3.69, 4.128-9.
Withdrawals from Camps
Caes. BGall. 2.10-1, BCiv. 1.61-4, 2.43; BAlex. 31; Livy 22.16-7, 28.15.12-16.8, 36.46.7.
Pursuits stopped or prevented by cavalry reserves
Caes BCiv. 1.46; Livy 42.59; App. Mith. 49.
Withdrawals under cover of fire/smoke
Sall. Jug. 75-7; BHisp. 27.4; Plut. Luc. 19; Front. Strat. 1.5.1-3, 8, 16.
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Retreat from Battle Withdrawal
Feigned retreats Caes. BGall. 6.7-8; Sall. Jug. 50; Livy 6.24, 29.34; Onas. Strat. 21.9.
Mutual retreats Polyb. 3.105; Livy, 10.35.1-3, 25.19.4-5.
Armies disengaging at nightfall/ withdrawing by night:
Caes. BGall 1.50; Livy 4.39.4-9, 9.23, 32, 10.12, 27.2, 38.40, 44.4; Sall. Jug. 98.1-5. Front. Strat. 2.1.13.
Caes. BCiv. 1.27-8; Livy 4.39.4-9, 10.12, 27.2; Plut. Crass. 27.3, 28.1; App. Hisp. 82.
Armies disengaging due to poor weather:
Livy 8.1.4, 28.15.11.
Retreats and Routs followed by rally or counterattack
Pol 3.86, 11.15, 18.22; Caes. BGall. 1.25, 2.23, 5.37, 7.80, BCiv. 1.45, 3.95; Sall. Jug. 51; Livy 27.49; App. Hisp. 58, Mith. 42-4, BCiv. 1.50, 1.90.
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Appendix C: Table of Routs and Flights from Battle Following is a selection of accounts of routs and flights from battle, for the interest of readers who wish to compare accounts of retrograde movements and accounts of more chaotic flights. This list is by no means exhaustive.
Polybius Livy Caesar Sallust Appian
2.34, 68; 3.84; 4.12, 58, 68; 5.73, 69, 85; 10.12, 31; 11.14, 16-7; 11.21, 24; 14.8; 15.13; 18.25-6.
4.33.11-2; 5.38; 6.8.7, 13; 7.23.7-10; 9.39; 10.14.21, 39.7-9; 22.6, 49, 24.16, 39; 25.21, 34, 37, 39; 27.12, 14, 18, 42, 49; 28.2.9-12, 15.7-10; 29.3, 34; 30.18, 34; 31.37, 41; 32.12.2-3; 33.9-10, 15, 18; 33.36.11; 34.15, 28; 35.5; 36.38; 37.38, 42-3 ; 38.23, 27, 41; 39.31; 40.28, 32, 33, 40; 41.3; 42.59; 43.10; 44.12, 42.
BGall. 1.52-3, 2.11, 2.23, 4.12, 15, 6.8, 7.27-8, 51, 80, 8.13, 19; BCiv. 2.25, 34, 3.37, 46, 64, 69-71, 95; B. Alex. 40, 29, 31, 76.
Sall. Cat. 60; Jug. 38, 52, 54, 56, 58, 74, 99, 101.
BCiv. 1.50, 84, 2.62, 2.80, 3.69, 4.55, 4.128, 5.114. Hann. 7; Hisp. 56, 82; Mith. 42-4, 80, 85, 100; Pun. 102, 124-5; Syr. 35.
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Appendix D: Detailed References to Retreats and Withdrawals by Chronology, Location and Result Find below a chronological list of the main references to retreats and withdrawals used throughout this thesis, with the name of the battle or campaign where known. Not all examples are Roman: I have included a small handful of Hellenistic examples because they are either referenced in the thesis, or because they are otherwise instructive. Again, this list is not exhaustive, but does include the main source material discussed throughout the thesis. c. 423 BC, Battle of Verrugo Reference: Livy 4.39.4-9. Result: An indecisive battle followed by a night retreat. c. 381 BC, Camillus’ campaign against Satricum Reference: Livy 6.24. Result: The Romans pursue when enemy make feigned retreat, become disordered and attempt their own retreat, but broke into flight. 316 BC, Battle of Gabiene Reference: Diod. Sic. 19.43.4-5. Result: The argyraspides fall back successfully in a square formation. 222 BC, Battle of Sellasia Reference: Polyb. 2.68. Result: The Spartan phalanx is pushed over the summit of a slope, then forced to retreat downhill and finally routed. 220 BC, Battle of Caphyae Reference: Polyb. 4.12. Result: An orderly retreat breaks down when anticipated support does not materialise, but the army escapes to safety in nearby towns. 218 BC, Battle of Stymphalus Reference: Polyb. 4.69. Result: The Eleans make an orderly retreat to higher ground while the troops did not despair of safety, but once they realised they were alone, their formation broke and was annihilated in flight. 218 BC, Battle of the Trebia Reference: Polyb. 3.74. Result: The Roman centre breaks that of Hannibal and marches through the gap, 10,000 men escape the battlefield and withdraw to Placentia.
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217 BC, Battle of Raphia Reference: Polyb. 5.86. Result: The Seleucid phalanx is broken and flees in disorder to Raphia, but Antiochus is able to withdraw his army to friendly territory. 217 BC, Battle of Trasimene Reference: Polyb. 3.84, 6. Result: Like at Trebia, a large force of Roman infantry break the enemy to their front while the rest of the army is defeated. This force gets to nearby high ground and tries to withdraw, but is forced to surrender. A group of cavalry also escapes to a hill and surrenders. 217 BC, Hannibal’s operations near Casilinum Reference: Livy 22.16-7; Front. Strat. 1.5.28. Result: After being outmanoeuvred by Fabius Maximus, Hannibal decided to withdraw, and to avoid pursuit through nearby defiles he had bundles of sticks tied to oxen and set them alight, then used the mass of flaming animals as a distraction with which to withdraw his army. 216 BC, Carthaginian operations in Spain Reference: Livy 23.26.8-10 Result: The Carthaginian general Hasdrubal Gisco, alarmed by an enemy attack, leads his army onto a steep hill with a river to its front, and fortifies the position. 216 BC, Battle of Cannae Reference: Polyb. 3.115; Livy 22.47.4-10. Result: The Carthaginian centre deliberately retreats from a heavy Roman assault, drawing the Romans into a position where their flanks were open to counterattack. 214 BC, Battle of Beneventum Reference: Livy 24.16.1-5. Result: The Carthaginian line is forced back in confusion, eventually breaking into flight. 212 BC, Battle near Capua between Hannibal and the Consuls Reference: Livy 25.19.1-8. Result: Both armies disengage without incident. 212 BC, Roman counterattack after the Battle of the Upper Baetis Reference: Livy 25.37.15. Result: A Carthaginian force is driven back in confusion after a failed attack on the Roman camp, but when they saw there was no pursuit, they regained order and retreated slowly to their own camp. 211 BC, Hannibal attacks Q. Fulvius Flaccus (cos. 211) Reference: App. Hann. 41. Result: Hannibal attempts to trick the Romans into retreating from their camp to a nearby hill, but the Roman general prevents his army from doing so.
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208 BC, Battle of Baecula References: Polyb. 10.39; Livy 27.18. Result: Scipio attacks Hamilcar Barca’s rearguard as the latter attempts to depart Spain to assist Hannibal in Italy, and despite some casualties the Carthaginians are able to withdraw successfully. 207 BC, Battle of Mantinea Reference: Polyb. 11.17. Result: Machinidas attempts to retreat with a body of men through surrounding enemies, but when their line of escape is blocked the men flee. 207 BC, Battle of Metaurus Reference: Livy 27.49. Result: The Carthaginians are pushed back and routed with heavy casualties, but some of the army withdraws or flees successfully as the Romans are too exhausted to pursue. 206 BC, Battle of Ilipa References: Polyb. 11.24; Livy 28.13, 15. Result: The Carthaginians attempt an orderly retreat but are overwhelmed and flee back to their camp, which they successfully defend. They then attempt to withdraw further, but their disordered column is caught by pursuers and destroyed. 203 BC, Mago Barca defeated in N. Italy Reference: Livy 30.18. Result: The Carthaginian army retreats in an orderly manner at first, but Mago falls wounded and the army flees. Much of the army apparently withdraws successfully to Africa as it reappears at Zama. 198 BC, Battle of the Aous Reference: Livy 32.12.2-3. Result: The Macedonians are beaten and part of the army flees, part is cut off from retreat, but the ground prevented effective pursuit and the Macedonians were able to reorganise many of their forces and withdraw. 197 BC, Battle of Cynoscephalae Reference: Polyb. 18.25 Result: The Roman left wing forced to slowly retreat under pressure of phalanx. 197 BC, Macedonians defeated near Corinth Reference: Livy 33.15.10-3. Result: A Macedonian army falls back with order at first, but under pressure they broke and suffered many casualties in pursuit. 197 BC, Macedonians defeated near Bargyliae Reference: Livy 33.18.17-8. Result: The Macedonian line retreats slowly, but when attempting to reform to face enemies
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attacking their flank, disorder occurs and the Macedonians break and flee toBargyliae. 190 BC, Battle of Magnesia Reference: App. Syr. 6.35. Result: The Seleucid phalanx retreats with order at first, but is broken by the panic of elephants sheltering inside the phalanx. 190 BC, Seleucid and Roman cavalry skirmish prior to Magnesia Reference: Livy 37.38. Result: Seleucid cavalry attempt to retreat across a river while under pursuit by Roman cavalry. They suffer a number of casualties, but succeed in returning 4 miles to their camp. 189 BC, Battle of Mt. Olympus Reference: Livy 38.25.10-13. Result: The Roman consul and his guards are attacked by Galatians, and at first retire gradually, but eventually scatter in flight and suffer a number of casualties to pursuers. 181 BC, Battle of the Manlian Pass Reference: Livy 40.40. Result: Celtiberians looked for a place to retreat and found nothing, so they fled. Destroyed while attempting to escape through a defile. 171 BC, Battle of Callinicus Reference: Livy 42.59. Result: Cavalry and light infantry skirmish. Successful retreat, primarily supported by Thessalian cavalry. 168 BC, Battle of Pydna References: Livy 44.42.2-3; Plut. Aem. 20.1-6. Result: Successful retreat as the Romans cause the enemy formation to become disrupted, and then counterattack. 149 BC, Battle of Nephoris Reference: App. Pun. 103. Result: A successful retreat, facilitated by Scipio’s use of cavalry counterattacks. 136 BC, Withdrawal from the Siege of Pallantia Reference: App. Hisp. 82. Result: A disorderly but successful withdrawal, perhaps only due to the weakness of pursuing forces. 134 BC, Cavalry skirmish near Pallantia Reference: App. Hisp, 88. Result: Successful retreat by cavalry.
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106 BC, Battle of the Muluccha Reference: Sall. Jug. 97-8. Result: A complex and successful retreat organised by Gaius Marius, partly done at night using both infantry and cavalry. 82 BC, Sullan ambush near Praeneste Reference: App. B Civ. 1.90. Result: The Marians are beaten in a sharp contest and try to take refuge on a hill, but fail. 58 BC, Battle of Bibracte Reference: Caes. BGall. 1.25. Result: A successful and long-distance retreat as Helvetian phalanx disengages and re-establishes their fighting line on a hill over a kilometre away. 54 BC, Battle of Atuatuca Reference: Caes. BGall. 5.26-31, 37. Result: Sabinus withdraws his army from winter camp and the Romans are destroyed in an ambush in a defile. 53 BC, Battle of Carrhae Reference: Plut. Crass. 27.5-8, 29. Result: Two withdrawals, one semi-successful but costly in men from the battlefield to Carrhae, and a disastrous one towards Armenia that saw the rest of the army destroyed. 53 BC, Q. Tullius Cicero defends his camp in Gaul Reference: Caes. BGall 6.40. Result: Successful retreat through encircling enemies, but heavy casualties suffered. 49 BC, Skirmishing near Utica Reference: Caes. BCiv. 2.25. Result: Curio falls upon a group of Numidian infantry and cavalry, killing over a hundred and driving the rest into their camp. 49 BC, Battle of Bagradas Reference: Caes. BCiv. 2.41-2. Result: Curio’s exhausted infantry attempt to retreat to nearby high ground, but fail and are destroyed. 49 BC, the Ilerdan Campaign Reference: Caes. BCiv. 1.45-6, 1.79. Result: Caesar retreats successfully from a dangerous position on the slope below Ilerda, after five hours of fighting. The Pompeians later make repeated attempts to withdraw to another location for logistical reasons, but are delayed and cut off repeatedly by Caesar and eventually forced to surrender.
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48 BC, Battle of Dyrrachium Reference: Caes. BCiv. 3.46. Result: Caesar successfully organises the retreat of a legion from a heavily exposed position, in the face of enemy pursuit, thanks to support from archers and a successful counterattack. 48 BC, Battle of Nicopolis Reference: BAlex.40. Result: The Legio XXXVI is surrounded but successfully retreats to nearby high ground, and withdraws entirely, after the rest of the Roman army is destroyed. 48 BC, Battle of Pharsalus References: Caes. BCiv. 3.94-5; App. B Civ. 2.80. Result: The Pompeian army is beaten in battle and suffers many casualties, but apparently escapes to their own camp successfully. The camp is then overwhelmed by Caesar, and the army retreats to nearby hills with the aim of withdrawing to a nearby town, but Caesar prevents this and forces them to surrender. 47 BC, Battle of Zela Reference: BAlex. 76. Result: The Pontic phalanx attempts to retreat downhill after a failed assault, but is driven into flight and their camp is taken. 46 BC, Battle of Ruspina Reference: BAfr. 15-8. Result: Caesar organises a successful retreat against heavy and well-organised pursuers. He utilises an unconventional battleline, with cohorts facing alternately forward and backward, and also orders repeated counterattacks with both cavalry and infantry. 45 BC, Battle of Munda Reference: BHisp. 31. Result: The Pompeians are beaten and retreat successfully into Munda. 43 BC, Battle of Forum Gallorum Reference: App. B Civ. 3.69. Result: An inexperienced Roman force attempts to retreat from Antony’s victorious veterans, but is overwhelmed and routed. 42 BC, Second Battle of Philippi Reference: App. B Civ. 4.128. Result: The triplex acies of Brutus falls back under enemy pressure, and eventually falls into confusion and is routed. 36 BC, Antony’s Parthian Campaign References: Plut. Ant. 39.5-7, 41.4-5, 42.1-4, 45.2-3, 49.1-2. Result: Antony retreats successfully to his camp after a failed pursuit (39.5-7), and over a period of weeks makes a number of successful retreats and withdrawals in the face of constant pursuit
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by Parthians. AD 9, the Clades Variana Reference: Dio. 56.19-22.1. Result: Varus is betrayed and ambushed, and attempts to withdraw towards the Rhine but is trapped and killed at Kalkriese, and his army destroyed. AD 62, Battle of Rhandeia Reference: Tac. Ann. 15.16. Result: Paetus allows his forces to become disorganised as they withdraw and they are heavily pursued by Parthians, suffering many casualties. The army is later rescued by Corbulo. AD 66, Battle of Beth-Horon Reference: Joseph. BJ 2.540-555. Result: Cestius Gallus successfully withdraws his army from Judea despite very heavy attacks in unfavourable ground, but suffers heavy casualties, loses his baggage, and has to sacrifice his rearguard.
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