Post on 12-Jan-2023
Dilemmas of shared spaces among the Kazakhs and the Buryats
Suchandana Chatterjee
Among expectations about connectivity across shared spaces in
post-Soviet Eurasia, pertinent questions have been raised about
the complexity of relationships within the spatial units that the
Eurasian nations collectively or individually represent. In the
immediate aftermath since Soviet disintegration, ethnicity within
a Turkic, Mongol or Baikal space was given maximum attention and
the friction between ethnic groups in Central Asia was
highlighted. Only in recent years the emphasis seems to have
shifted from ethnic polarization in Central Asia to fluid
contours of space, place and identity. Talking about varying
degrees of attachment to different places of origin and places of
living, scholars have identified interactive behaviour in various
landscapes and the ways in which the people relate to that
particular landscape.1 Others have argued that in post-Soviet
Eurasia, social tension brews at the ground level, arising out of
intra-ethnic differentiation and contested identities.2 The
debate therefore swings between two poles—from areas of
interaction to areas of confrontation and competition, indicating
1That landscape is mostly associated with tribalism and descent. But this association has also been recreated over time by the people who have carried out ‘acts of remembrance’ and have perpetually engaged with that particular environment. Judith Beyer, ‘Settling descent: place making and genealogy in Talas, Kyrgyzstan’, Central Asian Survey, Nos 3-4, September-December 2011. 2 Meltem Sancak, ‘Contested identity: Encounters with Kazak diaspora returningto Kazakstan’, Anthropology of East Europe Review, Vol 25, No 1, 2007.
1
contrasting claims about place and identity, questioning
assumptions about reciprocity, community interaction etc. In this
paper, I would like to take into account both positions to show
how the Buryats and the Kazakhs nurture different perceptions of
home which is reflected in uneasy relationships with their co-
ethnics in a shared Mongolian, Turkic or Baikal space. In
Buryatia, the territorial mergers of 2002 have revived bitter
memories of territorial restructuring of the Soviet period. Also,
new concerns and tensions have emerged in kinship relations and
familial ties (called ‘avuncular relations’) not only in Buryatia
but also in Mongolia where the Buryats have settled or resettled
over time. The flexibility of those relationships has generated
complications in the post-Soviet context.
Home, belonging and identity
There has been a growing awareness about the role of home and
sense of belonging which are pivoted around a place (perceived by
some experts as the ‘power of place’ in relation to its
environment)3 or sometimes local contexts and minority-majority
settings that reflect a grounded feeling among the minority
groups or the non-titular nationalities. 4 Sociologists have
interpreted the term ‘home’ differently, sometimes focusing on3 Harm De Blij, The power of Place: Geography, Destiny and Globalization’s Rough Landscape, Oxford University Press, 2009. Alexander Diener approaches the question from the Kazakh perspective of ‘territorial belonging’. Alexander C. Diener, One Homeland or Two? The Nationalization and Transnationalization of Mongolia’s Kazakhs, Stanford: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2009, Introduction, p. 2.
2
individual experiences and sometimes on social structures and the
gamut of relationships within that social structure. There are
opinions that home and homelessness are polar opposites and that
homelessness represents the absence of home. A homeless person
can also ‘feel out of place’. Since the aspect of human
attachment is directly related to the live-in space, hence it
would be logical to argue that there is a dynamic relationship
between a person and his environment—therefore, home can be
judged to be an experienced space—which is dynamic and not fixed.
The ways in which people negotiate and adjust themselves within
that space is part of their homely existence and therefore,
indicates a dynamic process. Adaptation to the endlessly changing
conditions makes a diasporas condition dynamic.
Theorists have also linked these arguments to the larger debate
about migration. Among nationalizing states of Eurasia, concepts
of the homeland and return migration are invariably linked with
the integration of titular nationalities. Within such a
framework, it is assumed that non-titular nationalities are
marginalized. Now, one would expect that dispersed ethnic groups
would consider themselves automatically bonded with the new
nation states or their ancestral homelands. But it so happens
that there is a dual response among migrants within the same
community and this is what makes the Mongolian Kazakhs so unique.4 Leo B. Hendry, Peter Mayer, Marion Kloep, ‘Belonging of Opposing? A GroundedTheory approach to a Young People’s Cultural Identity in a Majority/Minority Societal Context’, Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research, 7 (3), 2007.
3
Their case reflects what is more important in the homeland issue—
i.e. not who we are but where we feel we belong to or also where
do not belong to. These feelings are not primordial dictates but
are related to certain historical contexts and settings. These
settings impact on the psyche of the return migrants to such an
extent that may continue to have enduring ties with their host
societies and fail to identify themselves with their co-ethnics
in their ancestral land—a feature among the Mongolian Kazakhs.5
Historical ties, however attractive, fail to bond different
generations within the same ethnic group, as has happened in the
case of the Buryats living abroad. Territorial restructuring also
tends to disrupt the inner fabric of an ethnic space as the
ethnic core shrinks in size-a feature that is seen among the
Buryats of the Baikal region. In short, this paper seeks to
question the hypothesis of ethnicity as a binder of social
relationships across Eurasia’s shared spaces. Transnational
identities seem to have a greater influence in forging regional
ties.6
5 This ambiguity is explained in the following literature: Alexander C. Diener, One Homeland or Two? The nationalization and Transnationalization of Mongolia’s Kazakhs, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009, Diener, ‘Kazakhstan’s Kin state Diaspora: Settlement Planning and the Oralman Dilemma’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol 57, No 2, March 2005; Diener, ‘Problematic Integration of Mongolian-Kazakh Return Migrants in Kazakhstan’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol 46, No 6, 2005. Sharad Soni is the only Indian scholar who deals with the Mongol-Kazakh relations from an international relations perspective. See Sharad Soni, ‘Moving beyond nomadism: emerging equations in Kazakh-Mongol relations’, in Anita Sengupta and Suchandana Chatterjee eds The state in Eurasia: performance in local and global arenas, Delhi: KnowledgeWorld, (Forthcoming in end 2012).6 Scholars have dealt with the forging of contact among dispersed groups. Alexander C. Diener, ‘Transnationalism and minority territorialization in
4
CASE STUDY ONE: THE BURYATS
Historical ties
The Buryats settled as compact Mongol communities around Lake
Baikal, were subjected to repeated Russian incursions in the
Angara region and were displaced due to forced Russian
settlements. There is also a parallel discourse about internal
displacement that examines how the Buryats were also the
competitors of the Tungus whom they had displaced earlier in the
course of their settlements. The Baikal fabric was reconstituted
as the Russians entrenched themselves firmly in the Yenisei-
Angara basins and forced the Evenkis and the Tofalars to migrate
from their homeland. The original Buryat ethos, comprising of 16
tribal groups on both sides of Lake Baikal was reconstituted
further with territorial adjustments that brought it closer to
the Mongol territory. 7 The mainstream Buryats of the Baikal
region, depicted as an ethno-linguistic group of a Mongol stock
were framed as a territorial unit (called the Buryat-Mongol
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) with well-defined
Kazakhstan’, in Choi Han Woo ed International Journal of Central Asian Studies, Vol 11, 2006. 7 The Historical Museum of Ulan Ude refers to 16 ‘ethno-territorial groups of Buryats’-Nizhneudinskie Buryats, Balaganskie Buryats, Alarskie Buryats, Idinskie Buryats, Kudisnkie Buryats, Verkhoudinskie Buryats, Olonskie Buryats,Kudarinskie Buryats, Barguzinskie Buryats, Okinskie Buryats, Tunkinskie Buryats, Zakamenskie Buryats, Selenginskie Buryats, Khorinskie Buryats, Aginskie Buryats, Ononskie Khamnigany.
5
territorial identity markers like Aga autonomous okrug (district),
Ust-Ordinskii okrug [that had high density of Buryat population]
within the Irkutskaya and Chita oblasts. In the 1950’s, the Mongol
component was removed from the ethnonym “Buryat-Mongol” and the
republic was renamed as Buryat Autonomous Soviet Socialist
Republic. In the 1990’s, the Buryat-Mongol ethnonym was readopted
and became a feature of the post-Soviet nationalist rhetoric in
the Buryat republic which was heavily criticized by a section of
scholars as a deliberate attempt of politicizing historical
memory.8
Merger dilemmas
Social polarization increased after 2005 when President Putin
issued decrees about ukrupnenie (merging) on grounds of regional
consolidation. Merging of the two Buryat districts of Ust Orda
and Aginsky with Irkutsk’s Olkhon district has created
discomfiture about the logistics of the arrangement and its
direct impact on Buryatia’s ethnic culture.9 There is a strong
feeling that the mergers have limited powers of autonomy in these
oblasts due to their incorporation into the wealthy Russianized
8 Tatiana Skrynnikova and Darima Amogolonova, ‘Discourse on ethnicity in post-Soviet Buryatia’, Central Eurasian Studies Review, Vol 5, No 2, Summer 2006. 9 A series of writings indicate the tone of dissent. Andrey Makarychev, ‘New challenges to Russian Federalism’. [http://ceres.geogetown.edu/esp/ponarsmemos/page/78412.html]; Gary N. Wilson, ‘Abandoning the Nest: Regional mergers and their impact on the Russian North’,Polar Geography, Volume 27, Issue 3, 2003.
6
environment of the Irkutsk and Transbaikal oblasts. The appeal of
pan-Mongolism as an integrationist model did not fade, but there
was serious speculation about territorial delimitation based on
ethnicity. 10
Those who opposed the merger (including sections of the local
elite, local businessmen, local intelligentsia, local activists,
sections of the political opposition at the federal level) have
argued that there was no need to merge poor or poorer regions--
they needed to be given more financial support from the Centre;
governance is bound to be a problem as the enlarged size of the
oblasts (Irkutsk and Chita) under republican administration will
be unmanageable; socially, mergers cannot eliminate the
disproportionate living conditions and that the existent
mechanism of social security will be paralysed; culturally, it
will signify marginalization of the indigenous people. Nikolay
Tsyrempilov, Chairman of a regional union of young scholars and
member of the Buryat human rights group, Erkhe, argued against the
relevance of such a mega project that was destined to make Aga
Buryat district a non-entity after its incorporation into Chita
oblast.11
10 Comment by Matthew Derrick, ‘The merging of Russia’s regions as applied Nationality Policy: A suggested rationale’, Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Vol 3, (3), Summer 2009.11 Nikolay Tsyrempilov, archivist at the Buryat Academy of Sciences, Moscow Times, 13.11.2005.
7
Earlier experiments of cultural autonomy and national unification
were also part of this nation wide debate about mergers.
According to the new age historian Vsevolod Bashkuev, under the
turbulent conditions of the Russian Civil War of 1918-1920 the
concept that built the Buryat lands into a common Mongolian
historical and cultural space and favored creation of an
independent all-Mongolian state seemed universally attractive.
Till 1937, the Buryat Mongols remained under paternalistic
control of Soviet authorities—a scenario that changed completely
due to regional competition triggered by Japan and Tibet.
Stronger administrative control was envisaged for Buryatia’s
bordering regions. Buryat aimaks lying to the north (Alar,
Bokhan, Ekhirit-Bulagat and Olkhon) were detached from the Buryat
republic and attached to the Irkutsk province of the Russian
republic and the cluster was named as Ust Orda Buryat Mongol
National Region, while the two south-eastern aimaks of Ulaan Onon
and Aga were subordinated to the Chita province of the Russian
Republic under the name Aga Buryat Mongol Autonomous Region. Ust
Orda and Aginsky Buryat became autonomous enclaves having no
common border with the Buryat Republic. The Buryats in these
districts continued to live with the memory of being closely
connected to the Buryat Republic, yet were reduced to a numerical
minority.12 Aga Buryat territorial demarcation became the core
issue of the merger debate in the post 2005 period. The repeated
12 Between 1926 and 1939, the Buryat population of the Buryat-Mongol ASSR decreased from 42.8 % to 21.3 %.
8
restructuring of Aga district that was very close to the
Mongolian frontier created a lot of discomfort among Buryats on
both sides of the border.
A serious complaint against mergers was that it would lead to
mass migration from poor and resource-starved Ust Orda region to
resource-rich regions and producing large scale cultural gaps
between the older and the younger generations.13 Also, the
Irkutsk region has its own constraints---from the perspective of
Chinese trade diaspora and the advent of Chinese ‘ethnic markets’
that has created a new economic stratification in Eastern
Siberia. Specialists of migration have argued that the problems
associated with ‘ethnic business’ are the most difficult and
faced by the host societies in the Russian Federation.14 Irkutsk-
based sources reveal the complexity of this mechanism, especially
the problems associated with Chinese migratory movements in the
bordering regions of Siberia. Irkutsk therefore is confronted
with its own problems and the Buryats’ fate will be linked with
all of that.
13 Such an argument is a reflection of the urban-rural competition spoken of by several local authors. 14 Viktor I. Dyatlov, ‘Chinese migrants in Asian Russia: the dynamics ofnumbers, structure and problems of adaptation’, in Globalization in Siberia and theRussian Far East, Kolkata: Towards Freedom [publication of Maulana Abul Kalam AzadInstitute of Asian Studies], 2010; Viktor I. Dyatlov, ‘ “Ethnic markets” ofthe post-Soviet era: the mechanism of supply, institution and socialorganism’, in Suchandana Chatterjee and Anita Sengupta eds Communities, institutionsand transition in post-1991 Eurasia, New Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2011.
9
Stories about a frightening existence are also frequently heard.
What weighs most heavily for the Buryats is the threat that they
will be forced out of their lands—a similar situation arose
during the land reforms of 1900-01 15 when there was a cut-down
of Buryat pastures according to the norms of the Russian farms 16
and again after the Revolution, during collectivization and the
campaign that resulted in the resettlement of Buryats from
dispersed farmsteads into larger villages followed by large scale
deportation and exile of Buryat kulaks (farmers). Now, this
movement away means movement from a space, meaning leaving one’s
own masters to a new land that could be dangerous to life. So,
15 The law On Assignment of state land in Siberia to private Individuals, enacted on 8th June 1901, introduced a new category of possession of real property in the way state lands east of the Urals could be allotted to immigrants coming from European Russia. It envisaged that part of the territory earmarked for colonization would be set aside as ‘private land property’ (chastnaia pozemel’naia sobstvennost’), in addition to those lands conferred in ‘use’ (zemplepol”zovanie) topeasants coming from European Russia. Alberto Masoero, ‘Layers of property in the tsar’s settlement colony: projects of land privatization in Siberia in thelate nineteenth century’, Central Asian Survey, Vol 29, No 1, March 2010, p. 9. 16 Historians in the west are emphasizing the importance of the 1905 Revolution and the land debates that have affected the non-Russian people of the Russian Empire, especially the Buryats of south-eastern Siberia. Robert Montgomery’s bibliographical guide about social and political activism in Buryatia is a useful tool for understanding the character of socio-political activism in pre-1917 Buryatia. Here, the collection of abstracts and short papers on the Social Democrats and the government’s transfer of land from the local population to the settlers—which became a bone of contention between theTsarist government and the Buryats have been taken into account. The Buryats to this day nurture grievances due to the loss of their farmland. Veniamin Mikhailovich Samosudov ed revoutsiia 1905-1907 gody I borba trudiashikhsia Sibiri protiv Tsarizma: tezisy nauchnoi konferentsii posviashchennoi 80-letiuu Revolutsii 1905-1907gody v Rossii; Omsk: Omskii pedagogicheskii institut, 1985, mentioned in Robert W. Montgomery, The Revolution of 1905, the First two State Dumas, and Nationalities (with special reference to Buryats): a selected Annotated Bibliography,[www. ii.umich.edu/UMICH/crees/Home/Montgomery_2009.pdf].
10
the Olkhon Buryats, whose way of life is based on unbroken ties
with land, find the Tunka valley’s clan sentiments very difficult
to adapt to.
Avuncular relationships
Newer assessments about family ties, i.e. ‘avuncular’
relationships’ in social anthropology terminology, in the Buryat
homeland as well as in the host society Mongolia where the
Buryats settled or resettled over time indicate the changing
dynamics of Eurasia’s shared spaces. The local experiences are so
varied and diverse that relationships based on genealogical
connection tend to have lesser relevance. 17 Responsibilities and
obligations of the nephew (zee) to the maternal uncle (nagasa)
were fixed by Buryat customary law of the 18th and 19th centuries
and there has been no reason to question that. But in the course
of their live-in relationship with the Russians for centuries,
the Buryats have developed a parallel set of avuncular relations
with their Russian kin. But this spectacular relationship was
broken when due to the mass arrival of Russian settlers there was
an extreme loss of prestige on the part of Buryat clan leaders.
Land acquisition by the new Russian settlers became a bone of
contention which completely altered the pattern of goodwill17 Sayana Namsareva, ‘Avuncular terminology in Buriad Diaspora relationships with both homeland and host society’, Working Paper No. 126, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Working Papers, 2010. Revised paper ‘The metaphorical use of avuncular terminology in Buriad diaspora relationships with homeland and host society’, Inner Asia, Vol 12, issue 2, 2011.
11
relations with the Russians. The Khori Buryats used migration as
a survival technique and sought refuge with other Mongol kin
groupings. The alliance with the Russians seems to have broken,
but this did not completely exclude the Russians as relatives,
especially as uncles. Ominous signs of complexities and tensions
in relationships emerged as the Russian nagasa (uncle) ‘became
insulting and dangerous’.18 In popular usage of avuncular terms,
especially in the Mongolian context, the Buryats became
subordinated to the Russians and this somewhat affected the
‘brotherhood’ notion among socialist countries that was
formalized during the Soviet period. Because of their special
treatment, the Russians became the metaphor for the nagasa and
became the object of ridicule and sarcasm among the local Buryats
and Mongols. So, different degrees of strains in inter-ethnic
relations crept in and the common method was the usage of the
avuncular kin terms. These terminologies also reflected the ego
and sentiments among the Buryat diaspora settled in Mongolia that
was considered as the zee (nephew) in terms of their relations to
the dominant ethnic group in Mongolia, i.e. the Khalkh Mongols.
The territorial demarcation of the 1930’s and the 1950’s that
reduced the territories of Aga Buryat district made the Mongols
strict about their Buryat ‘guests’—their idea was that these
Buryats should give up their ger (felt yurt) and return home,
i.e. to Buryatia. For these Buryats, it was extremely18 Ibid.
12
embarrassing to ‘return’ to their ancestral home. So, Buryats at
that time became marginalized in Mongolia—a fact that is narrated
and retold by older generation of Buryats. The image of the
Buryats in Mongolia fluctuated at that time—they were perceived
both as guest and as enemy—which was very insulting for them.
What is evident here is not only the adaptability of the Buryats
but also the complexities they encounter in the course of their
adjustments in the host society. Sayana Namsaraeva points out
that despite the cultural ties of the Buryats with their kin
groups in Mongolia or Inner Mongolia, the relationship between
the mother’s brother and the sister’s son tends to get affected
over time. During the configuration of state boundaries between
Tsarist Russia and Qing China, the Aga steppe was recognized as
the actual homeland for the Buryats of the Khori clan. They used
to move, settle and resettle in the Aga region that was close to
the Mongolian border. In course of time, the next generation of
Buryats migrated to Mongolia and settled there, occasionally
claiming to be reunited their brethren in Buryatia. So, what we
see here is (a) genealogical connections based on Buryat kinship
(mostly Khori) and (b) diasporic connections that are extremely
hybrid and are not often labeled by kinship relations. The latter
quotient is described by Uradyn Bulag who too explains the
irregular traits among the Buryat migrants in Mongolia. 19
19 Uradyn E. Bulag, Nationalism and Hybridity in Mongolia, Clarendon Press, 1998; Bulag,‘Mongolian modernity and hybridity’, Minpaku Anthropology Newsletter, Number 19,December 2004.
13
Generational gaps
Young Buryats who live in western countries face difficulties of
making a choice between (a) Buryatia which is their ancestral
homeland and an independent country and sentimentally close to
Russia and (b) their host-country, say, Australia. Such
ambiguities are reflected in Khachig Tololyan’s thoughtful
writing on the diasporic status of the Armenians in America.
Tololyan, an American-Armenian, has an Armenian identity that has
nothing to do with the actual experience of the Armenian
homeland.20 This is the standard dilemma of all Buryats living
abroad who are completely unaware of the inner strains---the only
thing they are aware of is their long history of association with
the Russians and other nationalities who settled in Buryatia
since the 17th century. A famous Buryat sportsman Vladimir
Esheev, a former champion in archery and now president of the
Russian Archery Federation in Australia finds it difficult to
distinguish between a Buryat and a Russian. Esheev was the son of
Buryat refugees whose nationality was Russian and who had fled
from Soviet Union in the 1920’s. They settled with other Buryat
refugees in a village in Inner Mongolia. Decades later, after
World War II, his father decided to return to Russia but
recommended his son to settle abroad, and Australia became the20 Khachig Tololyan,’Rethinking diasporas: stateless power in the transnational moment’, Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, Vol 5, No 1, 1996, pp. 6-7.
14
new home for Esheev. So, here is a testimony of a Russian who
grew up together with Buryats in Inner Mongolia and who later
migrated to Australia. But until disintegration, there was hardly
any discussion about making a choice between a Buryat and a
Russian and the significance of a Buryat who brought pride to his
Buryat nation in a foreign land was hardly understood.21
So, the Buryats have an ambiguous status—as federal members of
the Russian Federation, they are tied to the Russian fabric; as a
transnational Mongol-speaking community they share familial ties
and historical links with Mongolia.
CASE STUDY TWO: THE MONGOLIAN KAZAKHS
The kin state-host state relationship is also a problematic in
the case of the Kazakh diaspora in Mongolia. The Kazakhs perceive
Kazakhstan as their kin state and live as a diaspora community in
host states like Mongolia, Turkey, Russia, China and Germany.
Within Kazakhstan, they coexist with several non-titular
nationalities like the Russians, Uyghurs, Uzbeks, Koreans,
Germans and Poles. The Kazakh homeland issue is a critical
component of the nation wide debate about integrating co-ethnics
living as diaspora outside Kazakhstan. This has led to a good
deal of international debate about the status of the oralmany21 Stefan Krist, ‘From nomads to migrants: reassessing Buryat history’, Third Congress of Reseau Asia-IMASIE, 26-27-28 September 2007, Paris, Centre National De La Recherche Scientifique, www.reseau-asie.com.
15
(returnees) from Mongolia which is a multi-generational Kazakh
community who feel marginalized in their ancestral homeland,
Kazakhstan and has not benefited in any way from return
migration. The sense of belonging to the historical homeland was
completely lacking for this generation of return migrants who
were more at ease with their country of living, i.e. Mongolia.
Much of the debate has revolved around the fact that for many
Kazakhs who have tried to return from their diasporic venues in
the early 1990’s, the experience of repatriation has not been
satisfactory. Their odd experiences of repatriation point a
finger to the policy deficiencies of the independent Kazakh
state. While some non-titular groups of Kazakhs (Koreans and
Germans) are of the opinion that “a homeland is forever” and are
optimistic about the land of the Kazakhs as the future for their
children and grandchildren, younger generations of Kazakhs have
preferences for transnational spaces like Mongolia or western
countries like Turkey, Germany and Australia. Responses of the
oralmandar (returnees to Kazakhstan) reveal that Kazakh community
in Mongolia (called Mongolian-Kazakhs) feel more alienated,
placeless and foreign in Kazakhstan than living abroad. Over
time, other images about Mongolian Kazakhs have emerged—not
merely as a dispersed ethnic community but as a transnational
community situated within a dynamic process called ‘diaspora
migration’ and ‘transnational migration’—i.e. subjects which have
16
been explored at length by sociologists like Pal Koltso,22 Judith
Shuval23 and Sarah Mahler. 24 Such reappraisals indicate that a
diaspora’s territorial dimensions are much wider---the term
denotes a people who are not de-territorialized but
transnational25--spread out in host states like Mongolia, Turkey,
Russia, China and Germany.
As per the Migration Law that became effective in Kazakhstan in
1993 after it was sanctioned by the First Qazak Qurultay in
Almaty in 1992, the families of oralmandar—immigrants of Kazakh
descent living in neighbouring countries and abroad were invited
by the Kazakh President for building a new Kazakh nation. The
hypothesis of ‘primordial ownership’ signified grant of special
status, i.e. state benefits, access to labour market and
acquiring Kazakhstani citizenship. The event (the convening of
22 Pal Koltso, ‘Territorialising Diasporas-The Case of the Russians in the former Soviet Republics’, Millennium-Journal of International Studies, Vol 28, No 3, 1999.23 Judith T. Shuval, ‘Diaspora Migration: Definitional ambiguities and a theoretical paradigm’, International Migration, Vol 38, No 5, 2000.24 Sarah J. Mahler. ‘Transnation almigration comes of Age’, in Ajaya Kumar Sahoo and Brij maharj eds Sociology of Diaspora: A Reader, Vol I, Jaipur: Rawat Publications, 2007. 25 This conceptual overlap between diaspora and transnationalism has been projected in recent studies about cross-border processes. The synthesis is used to describe an entire gamut of relationships across social spaces and theeveryday engagement of migrants in various activities ranging from kinship networks to small scale entrepreneurship of migrants across borders and cultural exchanges. Thomas Faist, ‘Diaspora and transnationalism: what kind ofdance partners?’, in Rainer Baubock and Thomas Faist eds Diaspora and Transnationalism: concepts, theories and methods, MISCOE Research:Amsterdam University Press, 2010,p. 11-12. Some authors have also argued against the fixed notion of territoriality. For instance, Arjun Appadorai emphasise lateral ties and uses the generic term ‘trans-nation’ as a diasporic experience of all mobile persons. Arjun Appadorai, Modernity at large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996, cited in Faist op.cit..
17
the Qurultay) was portrayed in Kazakh language newspapers as a
celebration of the independence of the homeland and was greeted
with a lot of enthusiasm. 26 The diaspora Kazakhs and the Kazakhs
of the homeland were defined as ‘blood brothers’ in these
newspapers. In his address to the Qurultay, President Nazarbayev
underlined the importance of Kazakhstan’s independence as an
opportunity to extend the country’s ability to serve as a
homeland not only for those living with its territorial limits,
but also for its diaspora living outside its borders. The spirit
of Nazarbayev’s speech, a speech which presented the Qurultay as
the first step towards constructing Kazakhstan as an extended
homeland, was embodied in these words: ‘We have only one homeland
in this world and that is independent Kazakhstan.’ (‘Qushaghymyz
Buayrlagha Aiqara Ashyq’, 1992). The ‘we’ in the president’s speech
clearly referred to all Kazakhs, regardless of place of
residence. In accordance with the resolutions of the First
Qurultay, it was decided to establish a permanent institution for
dealing with the affairs related to the Kazakh diaspora. This is
how the World Association of the Kazakhs came into being in 1992.
Policies on ethnic return were announced. The legitimizing
discourse on the part of Kazakhstani leadership was juxtaposed to
the victimization discourse about forced exodus of ethnic Kazakhs
during collectivization and forced sedentarizationin the 1930’s.
26 The Kazakh newspapers Khalyq Kenesy and Egemen Qazakstan reported on the event. See Isik Kuscu Bonnenfant, ‘Constructing the homeland: Kazakhstan’s discourse and policies surrounding its ethnic returnmigration policy’, Central Asian Survey, Vol 31, Number 1, March 2012.
18
The repatriation policy was legitimized and there were
expectations about an increase in the number of Kazakhs as the
titular nationality. The policy was also justified from the point
of view of a renewal of national culture and traditions in the
ancestral homeland. There terms that were used to emphasise
return migration reflected the governmental rhetoric. These were
atameken, atazhurt (land of the forefathers), otan (homeland), Tarikhi
otan (ancestral homeland). For diaspora Kazakhs, the following
terms were used: Shetel qazaqtari (Kazakhs abroad), shette zhurgen
qandastar (brothers living abroad). Subsequently, the relationship
between place and identity became the dominant feature of the
renewed vision about a civic nation and this change in stance is
reflected in the recent usage of the word otandash which means the
connection with land and its people rather than blood ties or
genetic ties. 27 Ubiquitous trope of “hospitality” (qonaqzhailylyq),
as a defining characteristic of “Kazakhness” (Qazaqtyq) and an
essential part of Kazakh nomadic ‘heritage” was often used to
explain the reason for harmonious interethnic relations in
Kazakhstan.
The impact of this return migration has been tremendous, not only
resulting in a quantum jump of immigrants from Mongolia (about
860,000 oralmandar) but also escalating social tension especially
in western Kazakhstan where there has been exceeding pressure on
housing which became scarce and expensive because Soviet-era27 Isik Kuscu, op.cit, p.34.
19
buildings deteriorated and the new construction was inadequate to
meet the growing demands. The stresses and strains of post-Soviet
transition emanating from an urban-rural divide are reflected in
the migrants’ discourses about otherness. An Almaty-based analyst
Naubet Bisenov remarked-"The main problem is with the acceptance
of oralmandar as equals to local Kazakhs, because they think
oralmandar are uneducated freeloaders. When they go for a job
interview, people show genuine surprise that oralmandar can have
a higher education and speak languages and be specialists in jobs
that demand quite high qualifications." 28The rural migrants’
relocation to urban centres was considered to be an obstacle to
the urban Kazakhs’ adjustments in a globalized environment.
Apathy was expressed against the rural settlers’ adherence to
genealogical traditions defined by the local term shezhire 29 which
helped them to convey their belonging, rootedness and identity. In
fact, the shezhire emerged as an important marker of group identity
or Kazakhness (Kazakshilik). In their post-Soviet reflections,
Kazakhs have reconsidered new ‘routes’ of migration despite their
28 ‘Kazakhstan: Astana Lures Ethnic Kazakh Migrants with Financial Incentives’, eurasianet.org, Feb 26, 2009.
29 Among the Kazakhs, the shezhire, adopted from the Arabic form of the word“tree”, denoted specifically the oral tradition of genealogical reckoning thathelped to form political alliances, social structuring, and lineagesegmentation, and was ultimately linked to the division of pasturelands andannual migration routes. Saulesh Yessenova, ‘Routes and Roots" of KazakhIdentity: Urban Migration in Post-socialist Kazakhstan’, Russian Review, Vol.64, No. 4, October 2005, pp. 661-679.
20
appeal for the ethnic ‘root’.30 Such a trajectory reflects the
contested notions of Kazakh identity. The Kazakhs from the
villages have tried to move over to the urban centres like
Almaty, identified as ‘recent urbanites’ and have been caught up
with the complexities of adjusting between two worlds and living
at the margins of urban society. This is a case of internal
displacement—featured by unequal relationships based on rural-
urban identities in Kazakhstan. There seems to be competing
loyalties among various actors who express their concerns about
migration, displacement and adjustment to new environments.31
Complexities of return migration
Initially, the Migration Law/Law on Immigration was drafted as a
broad legal document that applied to the ethnic Kazakh diaspora
in general. Subsequently, there were amendments (in 1997, 2002,
2004, 2007, 2010) that delineated the types of migration. At
present, there is a migration quota system to designate Kazakh
returnees as oralmandar--the number of quota immigrants who will be
30 There has been an attempt to revive and showcase the concept of a tribalhome. A series of revisionist writings in the 1990’s touched upon intricatepatterns of tribal confederation that dealt with aspects like (a) Uzbek andUyghur lineages of Kazakhs residing in the south and south eastern borderlands(b) Dasht-i-Kipchak region representing collective memories of the Kazakhs andthe Uzbeks’ Shaibanid legacy. Narratives of migration of the three hordes(zhuzy) in the direction of Dzhungaria tended to rejuvenate genealogicaltraditions among the Kazakhs with multiple tribal affiliations.
31 Saulesh Yessenova, ‘“Routes and roots” of Kazakh Identity: Urban Migration in Post-Socialist Kazakhstan’, Russian Review, Vol 64, No 4, October 2005.
21
given special status by the Kazakh government will be determined
by the President). The amendments generated confusion (due to
lack of database) and corruption was very common (associated with
forced payment by oralmans for their special status privileges).
Further incentives related to housing and employment of oralmans
was included—but there were more debates about special grants,
pension schemes etc. The integration of the oralmans is an ongoing
process and entails further specifications about citizenship
rights.
In short, the Kazakhs who attempted to return to Kazakhstan in
the wake of Kazakization were identified as a diaspora under the
basic assumption that these groups of return migrants will
effortlessly integrate with their ancestral homeland and co-
ethnics in Kazakhstan. In the post-Soviet period all Kazakhs
living outside the territory of Kazakhstan have been confronted
with the difficult choice of migrating from the lands they have
known for multiple generations or remaining as minorities in
their current places of residence. In most cases, their exile
status has been highlighted. Now, this categorisation is not
applicable to the Mongolian Kazakhs who as per Mongolian laws are
not considered to be descendants of the exiles. The Kazakh
settlement in western Mongolia since the 1880’s was voluntary in
nature—some of them may have been forced to with draw from China
to Mongolia during the revolutionary dispensation in China in
1911. Even at the time of Stalinist repression and forced22
collectivization, the Kazakhs voluntarily migrated to Mongolia.
So the Kazakhs living there do not have a victimized identity per
se. The homeland of Bayan Olgi has enabled the Mongolian Kazakhs
to uphold their ‘Kazakhness’ that was hardly possible in the
Soviet setup of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic. So, Kazakh
identity was articulated in Bayan Olgi province of Mongolia while
it was lacking in the kin state in the Soviet period. Here was
the paradox—the Kazakhs living there did not face the
complexities of estrangement or exile — it is when they arrived
to their ancestral homeland that they were confronted with sharp
responses from their ethnic kin.
The category ‘diaspora’ is often not universally accepted by
Kazakh scholars. Gulnara Mendikulova makes a distinction between
the Kazakh diaspora and the Kazakh irredentists and argues about
the stakes of the government in offering the choice of return to
Kazakhs living abroad. There is weariness about the government’s
decision to offer a common space to all Kazakhs across national
boundaries. The complications in a trans-national space are
varied in nature. There are perceptions about how communities not
only share the fruits of a common space, common experience and
identity, custom and practice, but also maneuver situations by
changing their affiliations (by switching their “belonging”),
crossing international boundaries and adopting new citizenships
(very common among the Kazakh Germans). In fact, the citizenship
formula for all ethnic Kazakhs and the articulation of the rights23
of the co-ethnics who are coming from distant locales have been
heavily criticised. Also special privileges (residence permits
and voting rights) to all returnees on the basis of genealogy and
kinship and announcements of “in-gathering” have created
uneasiness among resident Kazakhs as the migrants from abroad got
a new lease of life. There are critiques about this ‘recruitment
of ethnic diaspora’ as it beings the migrants into collusion with
their kin state representatives.32
Conclusions
The varying responses among diaspora groups suggest that
‘homeland’ is not a homogeneous category. On the surface, the
rhetoric of an ethnic homeland has helped Kazakhstan to reach out
to its co-ethnics abroad. But the logic of integration seems to
be unworkable given the long and interconnected histories of
shared spaces and shifting identities. The interactive behaviour
in host states like Mongolia suggests more attachment to the
birthplace instead of the ancestral land. Studies of the homeland
have moved beyond the theme of dispersal of ethnic communities
and have included newer perspectives like transnational
identities and diaspora engagement which is a way of making the
diaspora feel connected with the homeland. Such options about
linking the diaspora groups with the homeland tend to generate32 Tsypylma Darieva, ‘Recruiting for the Nation: Post Soviet Transnational migrants in Germany and Kazakhstan’, Erich Kasten ed Rebuilding Identities-Pathways toreform in post-Soviet Siberia, Berlin: Dietrich Reimar Verlag, 2005.
24