Post on 31-Jan-2023
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I Introduction
Is Chinese partnership beneficial to African nations? Simple
or definitive answers to this question have eluded scholars,
despite years of earnest research.1 Academic responses have not
been uniform – often the only fact that can be agreed on is that
Chinese-African relations are becoming increasingly important and
prominent. A dominant narrative has arisen that paints China as
an aggressor or even neocolonialist, coming to the continent to
reap its abundant natural resources, empowering antidemocratic
strongmen along the way. This viewpoint is reflected strongly by
a non-academic community of Western policymakers and some
journalists who are deeply concerned about the relative decline
of Western influence and the prospect of Western political values
being replaced by Chinese-style autocracy in Africa. The
responding narrative, pushed by Chinese officials and several
African leaders, argues that Sino-African relations are mutually
1 The field of Sino-African studies took off after the 2006 FOCAC meeting, which garnered press around the globe for China’s lavish promises and high attendance by African leaders.
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beneficial and based on common respect for sovereign rule. Yet
China’s approach to African nations is too complex to adhere
fully to either narrative; on the ground, China’s engagement with
African nations varies widely.
One narrative, most commonly expressed by Western political
leaders, paints China as monolithic, domineering and greedy,
while African leaders are mere respondents to the tides of
history. The Chinese state, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and
even private businesses are a single entity. They tower above
Africans, who seek to appease the hungry dragon with minerals and
oil, receiving substandard infrastructure in return. Chinese
investment disregards local labor and environmental laws,
exacerbating pre-existing issues with poor local governance. The
Chinese also support dictators and protect mass murderers from
impunity.
The competing narrative, espoused by African and Chinese
political elites, argues for “South-South cooperation” and
“mutual development.” This narrative is born largely out of the
Cold War-era Non-Aligned Movement, which sought to disregard the
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US-USSR binary for a third way, based on self-sufficiency and
cooperation. The substantial decline and destabilization that
most African nations experienced in the last three decades of the
20th century is largely blamed on Western meddling. Fortunately,
the Chinese arrived with fair loans and deep trust, creating
economic partnerships that have helped these countries turn
around their fortunes. This narrative suggests that Chinese
investment is long-term and responsible.
Both of these narratives are overly simplistic. The first
narrative negates African independence of thought and action.
Chinese-African relations are guided largely by Chinese business
interests and the search for global investment opportunities.2
And while South-South cooperation is a more accurate model in
terms of trade and the active role of Africans, there is an
imbalance in the distribution of processed Chinese exports and
raw African exports. Chinese engagement differs nation-to-nation
based largely on business opportunities, and is impressively
resistant to unfriendly or controversial political contexts. It
is also complicated by the variety of players. Although state-2 Global Chinese investment is driven largely by their large US currency reserves.
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owned enterprises and the Chinese government are the main drivers
of relations with African states, private companies and
immigrants are often the greatest areas of contention.
This study seeks to offer a third perspective; that the
local context in which China engages produces variable results
for African states. In Oyeranti et al.’s study of Chinese-
Nigerian relations, they note that “[Engagement] with China, just
like any bilateral relationship, has some advantages and
disadvantages and that optimal outcome of the engagement will
depend on the policies and institutions that are put in place to
maximize the complementary effects and to minimize the competing
effects.”3
Thus, partnership with China has largely positive effects
for African economies but a somewhat negative effect on African
governance. Chinese efforts to build infrastructure, concessional
loans and multi-sector investment are indicative of their
position as reliable economic partners, and these efforts are
likely to aid in sustaining growth across the continent. However,
3 Oyeranti, Gboyega A; Babatunde, Musibau A; Ogunkola, E Olawole. “An analysisof China-Nigerian investment relations.” Abstract
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African governments have a long history of weak and corrupt rule,
and the Chinese model of development is likely to encourage
autocratic leaders to continue centralized power and
nondemocratic rule.
Tanzania and Zambia
In order to explore the question of Chinese engagement in
Africa, this study will focus on Tanzania and Zambia. Tanzania
and Zambia have three major strengths as case studies in this
investigation of Sino-African relations. First of all, these two
nations’ economic stability and diversity ensures a clarity that
is lost in Sino-African relations swamped in oil or war.
Secondly, while some African nations are still stagnant and under
a clearly dictatorial yoke, the majority of other nations are
showing strong growth and are moving towards multiparty
democracies with “free and fair” elections, like those in
Tanzania and Zambia. Finally, there are key differences between
them, such as their political and economic structures, which make
them particularly useful to this study.
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The relative peace and stability that Tanzania and Zambia
have experienced since independence simplifies and clarifies the
study of their interactions with China. Other key Chinese
partners, such as Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, are afflicted with guerilla conflicts and long-running
sectarian warfare. Instability and warfare often adds a very
difficult layer of complexity to relations with China. This is
especially true when conflict takes place in resource-rich
regions to which the Chinese are interested in gaining access.
Taking such conflict out of the equation greatly simplifies and
clarifies our analysis of Sino-African relations.
Next, this paper posits that the political peace and
economic growth that Tanzania and Zambia are experiencing are
increasingly common across Africa. These trends are supported by
encouraging reports on expanding health and education. A recent
special report by The Economist, for example, notes that “most
Africans no longer fear a violent or premature end and can hope
to see their children do well” and that Africa is currently the
continent with the highest overall GDP growth.4 Furthermore, the
4 August, Oliver. “A hopeful continent,” The Economist. March 2nd, 2013.
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number of ongoing conflicts across the continent is on a downward
trend, and ‘big men’ have been successfully pushed out of office
in a number of African nations, especially in West Africa.5
Though these do not guarantee success, such reports indicate a
break with the stagnant authoritarianism that has been Africa’s
ill for so long, and strengthen the usefulness of Tanzania and
Zambia as case studies.
Tanzania and Zambia’s strengths in this study also lie in
their differences. China’s partnerships with Tanzania and Zambia,
which have expanded greatly since the late 1990s, have taken
divergent paths. In Zambia, adaptation to a fractious party
system and reopening of the copper mines have driven Sino-Zambian
relations. Sino-Zambian relations, on the other hand, are largely
defined by the pre-existing copper industry, a vibrant business
community, and strong civil society organizations,
characteristics present in many other up-and-coming African
nations. In Tanzania, on the other hand, continuous rule by a
dominant party and untapped economic potential have moved
relations with the Chinese forward. The untapped economic
5 This includes Senegal, Ghana, the Ivory Coast and Nigeria.
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potential and semi-democratic nature of politics align Tanzania
with China’s other African partners, providing a good test of the
"export of autocracy" model.
Thus, Tanzania and Zambia are excellent case studies to use
in our investigation of the impact of relations with China on
African nations. Tanzania and Zambia are fairly representative of
Sino-African relations because they embody a likely future
Africa, yet have several key differences that helps characterize
the variety inherent across Africa. Concurrently, Tanzania and
Zambia’s peace and stability make studying the impact of Sino-
African relations a much more manageable endeavor. We can now
investigate the factors behind the entrance of the Chinese and
the possible impact of Chinese partnership.
Africa Looks East
The nature of each nations’ natural resources, economic
potential, political-public relations and infrastructure deficits
have led to distinct political and economic ties. These ties with
China then have distinct meanings in each nation, and are
manipulated by various domestic African forces for their own
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ends. Sino-African relations are thus malleable and context-
dependent, rather than being rigid and uniform.
In Tanzania, Chinese engagement has been defined by
Tanzania’s infrastructure deficit, its untapped potential for
being a trade link and provider of natural resources, and by the
ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM; Party of the Revolution).
The Chinese ambassador implicitly supports the CCM government
through his presence at CCM rallies, creating an association
between the CCM and China and implying China’s disapproval of
Tanzania’s opposition parties. China has begun to help address
Tanzania’s infrastructure deficit with large loans covering
fiber-optic cables, railways, roads and ports. This
infrastructure construction also seeks to capitalize on
Tanzania’s position as a coastal link for its five landlocked
neighbors. China has also recently begun to get involved in iron
and coal mine projects in Tanzania.
In the coming years, China’s impact on Tanzania is likely to
include an economic boost in the form of infrastructure and
investment, as well as low-key support for an increasingly
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repressive regime. The special economic zone at Bagamoyo and its
accompanying port and railway will make a major mark on the
Tanzanian economic landscape, drawing traffic away from the
congested Dar es Salaam port and boosting trade and investment
across the nation. The emergence of iron and coal mines could
make labor conditions an important factor in Sino-Tanzanian
relations. Politically, China’s role in the nation’s economy
could become controversial if it’s overt support for CCM is
targeted by opposition figures, or if CCM engages in violent
repression in order to win elections with Chinese tools and/or
weaponry.6
In Zambia, Chinese engagement has been defined by Zambia’s
pre-existing industries, infrastructure deficit, and relatively
strong civil society organizations. The 1970s Tanzania-Zambia
railway initiated Chinese-Zambian relations, but interactions
lapsed in the succeeding decade. Zambia's move to privatize
copper mines in the late 1990s reinitiated engagement. Trade with
6 It is possible, yet quite unlikely, that the CCM could find a serious reformcandidate, surviving the next elections and go on to crack down on corruption and engage in more business reforms, retaining the vote through positive actions rather than fraud or Nyerere’s legacy. Yet there seems to be little will amongst CCM cadres to support such reforms.
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China, which made up less than 1% of Zambia’s total exports in
2001, has risen steadily to 35%, becoming the dominant export
market in 2011.7 Zambia’s infrastructure deficit is being tackled
by numerous Chinese SOEs and private companies, mostly through
bidding for road contracts. Zambia’s unions and NGOs have
provided significant pushback against labor conditions and shifty
deals in the mining industry, strengthening Zambian democracy and
holding their own against China’s aggressive capitalism.
Chinese engagement in Zambia will likely lead to stable and
diverse economic growth but uncertain political progress, a
result of a tug-of-war between President Sata’s political
instincts towards autocratic nepotism and the public’s growing
consensus around clean governance, multiparty democracy and the
role of media. Chinese-built roads are helping to confront the
nation’s poor infrastructure problem. Zambian civil society
groups are playing their part in forging a mutually beneficial
path for Zambian workers and Chinese investors. Yet just like
Tanzania, Zambia’s future lies in the hands of its citizens and 7 “Untangling Zambia’s Currency Controls and Implications for Copper ETFs” Diverging Markets, July 23, 2012. Available at (http://www.divergingmarkets.com/2012/07/23/untangling-zambias-currency-controls-and-implications-for-copper-etfs/)
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it is unclear if Zambian elites will do the necessary work to
ensure that the Chinese presence helps rather than hinders
sustained economic growth.
Conclusion and Implications
Ultimately, China’s impact on the continent will be decided
by Africans. In both Zambia and Tanzania, investment in
infrastructure and extraction industries is giving the economy a
boost, but the government’s recent repressive tactics, now
silently aided partly by the Chinese model, could backfire.
National leaders must tackle corruption seriously and continue
current business reforms to maximize benefits from the Chinese
presence in Africa.
Yet autocratic governance is not the same as poor
governance, and vibrant, multiparty democracy is not a necessary
condition for a government to have a positive impact on the
nation.8 The Chinese model is working for China, insofar as it
has delivered hundreds of millions out of poverty, and it has
been done without a single popular vote. However, Afrobarometer
8 There are also a number of smaller issues that arise from unenforced labor and environmental laws, such as poor safety standards and the presence of Chinese immigrants outcompeting locals in their markets.
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polls indicate rising rates of democratic values in Tanzania,
Zambia and a number of other nations around the continent –
African leaders attempting to create one-party states are facing
increasing resistance from both their own populations.
Though varying depending on local contexts, it is clear that
across Africa China is simultaneously providing a leg up to
underdeveloped economies and an attractive model of autocratic
governance to undemocratic leaders. The conclusions drawn here in
Tanzania and Zambia are reflected in others’ research across
Africa. Oyeranti et al. argue that “The major characteristic of
Chinese investment in Nigeria is its concentration in a few
sectors that are of strategic interest to China.” Such targeted
investment reverberates in other parts of the economy; in Zambia,
investment in the mining sector has aided in the creation of
domestic road contractors. Investment is already diversifying,
helping African economies escape resource dependency.
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Roadmap
This paper begins with a discussion of the recent histories
of Tanzania and Zambia. Political differences between Zambia and
Tanzania became apparent with Tanzanian President Julius
Nyerere’s 1985 resignation, ensuring his party’s political
survival in the coming wave of democratization. Zambia’s
democratic reforms and election of the Movement for Multiparty
Democracy, however, resulted in a fractious multiparty system
that has encouraged ‘big men,’ as well as political visionaries.9
In the second chapter, we will discuss Chinese relations
with the continent, and with Tanzania and Zambia in particular.
Sino-African relations took off in the 1960s as China sought
support for its UN Security Council seat. China, Tanzania and
Zambia formed informal anti-imperialist alliances to combat the
Portuguese and Rhodesian regimes just south of Tanzania and
Zambia. From the late 1970s to the mid-1990s, however, Sino-
African relations took a backseat as stagnation set in throughout
Africa and China turned inward to deal with domestic reform. Yet
9 Big men are essentially rulers of neopatrimonial states, whose rules are marked by intolerance of opposition and rely on patronal networks.
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China’s enormous economic expansion soon began touching all parts
of the globe, and relations with Africa took off once again in
the late 1990s. Since then, China has become Africa’s dominant
trading partner, and has helped fund most of the continent’s
largest infrastructure projects.
The next chapter will analyze the quickly expanding economic
relations between China and these two nations, and attempt to
chart a potential path for future engagement. Despite labor
issues and the politicization of the Chinese presence in 2006,
Chinese actors have easily and continuously expanded from
Zambia’s copper industry into most sectors of the copper-
dependent economy, especially infrastructure. In Tanzania,
however, Chinese involvement remained limited until the past
half-decade, when untapped economic potential began receiving
attention from the Chinese. In both Tanzania and Zambia, China
is supplying critical infrastructure loans and business
opportunities, providing economic boosts by taking on the
Africans’ crippling infrastructure deficits. Crucially, the
evidence points to the Chinese being long-term economic partners
for Africa, unlike previous Western investors.
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In the fourth chapter, this paper will turn to the political
relations between China and Tanzania and Zambia. This chapter
will investigate the question of whether African leaders might
learn from or be influenced by Chinese political behaviors and
the Chinese political system. There has been little imperative
for the Chinese to export their political values or become deeply
involved in the domestic politics of Tanzania or Zambia. Rather,
the Chinese are well-renowned for their non-interference policy,
which essentially serves as a diplomatic blanket of silence; only
recognition of Taiwan will draw public ire from the Chinese.
Thus, by replacing requirement-laden Western loans with China’s
silent support, African leaders’ accountability is moving away
from the international community towards increasingly democratic
African audiences. However, the loss of international
accountability for leaders may simultaneously provide an opening
space for autocratic African leaders, exacerbating contention
between the political elite and the largely impoverished public.
To conclude, this study will review the Tanzanian and
Zambian cases and compare them to China’s relations with other
African nations, before extrapolating to possible future
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scenarios. It will be confirmed that China’s expanding engagement
in Africa is founded largely on China’s global economic goals and
Africa’s infrastructure deficit, as defined by the possibilities
of each local context. There is no need to fear Chinese
expansion, but channeling it is necessary to bring maximum local
benefits.
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IIHistorical Landscapes in
Tanzania & ZambiaIn order to examine the implications of Chinese partnership
for African nations, it is critical to understand the histories
of Tanzania and Zambia leading up to the present day. Tanzania’s
postcolonial success as a regional leader has faltered
significantly since the 1970s, partly as a result of continued
rule by independence party Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM). Tanzania’s
de facto one-party state has vastly limited political
participation and innovation, and Tanzania has thus far largely
failed to exploit its own untapped potential for transport and
resource extraction or build the infrastructure needed for
sustainable growth. Zambia, on the other hand, faced similar
issues of stagnation and decay in the 1980s, yet came out of the
next decade with a comparatively vibrant democracy and
reawakening copper sector. Zambia’s ruling party has changed not
once but twice since independence and civil society organizations
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(especially unions) have muscle to flex, yet Zambia still
struggles with inadequate infrastructure and a copper-dependent
economy.
This chapter will review these historical trends in
Tanzania, Zambia and Africa at large by focusing on the role of
political leadership through three historical periods. First of
all, we will examine the period from colonization to the height
of postcolonial anti-imperialist fervor in the 1970s, including
the rise of anti-imperialism and the major political parties in
Tanzania and Zambia. Then, the Lost Decade and the reforms of the
1980s and ‘90s will be discussed, focusing on how political
leaders dealt with the Third Wave of Democratization and Western
pressure to reform economically and politically. Finally, we will
discuss the developments that have taken place since the start of
the new century.
From the Frying Paninto the Fire
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Portuguese trade, exploration, and colonization at the end
of the 15th century marked the beginning of major interactions
between Europeans and sub-Saharan Africans. Early contact was
based primarily on trade or through missionaries. In 1488,
Bartolomeo Dias was the first European to round the Cape of Good
Hope. Subsequent voyages a decade later, led by Vasco de Gama and
others, resulted in landfall in modern-day Mozambique, Tanzania,
Kenya and Somalia. Most interaction remained centered on trade,
with population extraction (slavery) on the eastern coast of
Africa instigated by Portuguese and Arab slavers.10 From the 16th
to the 19th century, overseas territories were used to enslave
local populations and send them to the Americas. In the early
19th century, a dramatic shift began in the colonies,
transforming them from slavery-oriented to resource-reaping
economies. Colonies rebelled against European domination up and
down the Americas, and European governments moved to criminalize
domestic slavery. Europeans began focusing on an exploration- and
10 As many historians enjoy pointing out, forms of slavery existed in many African societies before the arrival of Arab and European slavers. Yet it was a fundamentally different form of slavery, one which settled disputes by adopting a child from another tribe. This child worked for the host family butdid not suffer from cruel or unusual punishment, and could become a full member of his adopted society.
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business-oriented approach to the African continent, and Western
expansion throughout the continent was regulated by agreements
made in European capitals. Informal treaties were signed on the
ground by often illiterate tribal chiefs who were duped into
signing away land and, later on, the loyalty of their own
people.11
The period from the late 19th century through to
decolonization in the mid- to late-20th century can effectively
be seen as the beginning of nation-state governance in Africa, as
governments were formed within geographical boundaries that have
mostly survived intact. World War Two was important to
nationalist African liberation movements. Colonial authorities
liberalized their African policies during the war while
recruiting hundreds of thousands of Africans to fight,
inadvertently opening spaces for anticolonial thought.12 While
11 Gordon, David. “Owners of the Land and Lunda Lords: Colonial Chiefs in the Borderlands of Northern Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo.” 2001. P.31712 There were a combination of factors at work here. First of all, most Africans still had not come into close contact with their imperial masters, and the war brought these white men on military campaigns through some regions. Secondly, it led to an upsurge in Africans studying in European universities, where they were exposed to Marxist ideals. Perhaps most importantly, however, WWII shattered the myth of European invincibility, and showed Africans that Europeans could be just as cruel to one another as they were to Africans.
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political opposition to colonialism appeared in different forms,
it was often driven by popular reactions to colonial economic
schemes. These unpopular schemes often employed Africans in very
harsh labor conditions with little pay, often forcing them to
work against their will.
New African nations faced a number of serious obstacles to
growth and stability, chief among them being highly centralized
governments with little to no representation outside of the
capitals. Public officials and soldiers were poorly paid, and
there was no historical foundation for nation-state governance in
areas of high ethno-lengual diversity. A serious lack of well-
educated citizens and unrealistically high expectations on the
part of the newly-liberated populace intensified the pressure on
the first generation of leaders. Within a decade, the majority of
African nations saw regime change through violent means.
Tanzania and Zambia, however, remained relatively stable and
peaceful. Across the continent government bureaucracies expanded
ostensibly to serve the citizenry, but as Therkildsen points out
they “expanded in size but remained, at least in design,
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hierarchical and centralized.”13 Systemic corruption flourished
throughout the postcolonial period across the continent, and
Heilman et al. note “...the major reason being that the legal-
rational bureaucratic model was developed in Europe and
transplanted into an alien environment.”14
Founding fathers Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere were
instrumental in shaping the political environments of Zambia and
Tanzania respectively. Both saw the one-party state as essential
to the stability and the capacity of the nation in carrying out
respective plans for economic growth and increasing the
citizenry’s wellbeing. They formed political ideologies –
Nyerere’s Ujamaa (also called African Socialism) and Kaunda’s
Humanism – in attempts to give meaning to the nation at large.15
While both implemented one-party states within a decade in
office, there were differences in political and electoral
structure. These differences were most pronounced at the end of
13 Therkildsen, 2000. “Public Sector Reform in a Poor, Aid-Dependent Country, Tanzania.”14 Heilman, Bruce; Kamata, Ng’wanza; Ndumbaro, Laurean. “Corruption, Politics and Societal Values in Tanzania.” Journal of Social Philosophy, p.50015 However, Kaunda’s Humanism came later and did not attempt the kind of society-altering program as the sweeping ideological narrative of Ujamaa, which sought to shift the rural countryside towards self-sufficient villages based on traditional nostalgia.
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their times in office, when Nyerere stepped down peacefully while
Kenneth Kaunda refused to pass on the presidency, and civil
society pressure rose to unmanageable levels.
From Tanganyika to Tanzania
Tanzania was originally colonized by the Germans in the late
1880s. Like many colonies of the time, German East Africa never
turned a profit and was continually subsidized by the German
treasury. Though there were a number of uprisings that attacked
local German forces and colonial offices, the best remembered was
Maji Maji, a conflict lasting from 1903-1907. Maji Maji resulted
in half a million deaths by war and an intentional famine
perpetrated by the Germans, killing around an eighth of the
population at the time.16 Though unsuccessful in removing the
German colonial presence, Maji Maji is regularly cited by
contemporary Tanzanian politicians to invoke a legacy of anti-
imperialism and resistance to foreign rule.
The United Kingdom took charge of the territory after the
Treaty of Versailles apportioned Germany’s overseas holdings to 16 Iliffe, John. “The Organization of the Maji Maji Rebellion,” p.498. Population statistics found at populstat, by Jan Lahmeyer, available at (http://www.populstat.info/Africa/tanzanic.htm )
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World War One’s winners. Britain applied its colonial methodology
of indirect rule, forcing chiefs or their direct underlings to
work for them as tax-collectors and local administrators.
Education of Africa’s best and brightest at European universities
resulted in their radicalization, and students returned home as
anticolonial activists. Tanganyikan Julius Nyerere was one of
these, and upon return home he founded the ultimately successful
Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU) to lead his nation to
independence.17
Julius Nyerere’s ruling style can essentially be described
as that of a philosopher-statesman with poor managerial skills,
which, combined with an undereducated civil service, resulted in
a deeply disconnected leadership. Nyerere’s assumption of power
was rather unorthodox; six weeks after independence, he retired
as Prime Minister and handed power to Rashidi Kawawa, before
returning to power in Tanzania’s first free elections. He spent
the next nine months as a backbencher in parliament, developing
his ideology of Ujamaa.18 His successes abroad and anti-17 TANU became Chama cha Mapinduzi in 1977, in a merger with Zanzibar’s rulingAfro-Shirazi Party.18 Hatch, John Charles. “Two African statesmen: Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of Tanzania”, p.179-181
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imperialist rhetoric earned him significant respect from
international leaders. Domestically, however, failing to provide
hands-on management, his vision of a self-dependent Tanzania
never came to fruition; the economy stagnated and dipped from the
early 1970s until the early 1990s. State control of the major
industries led to bloated industries and there was a distinct
crisis of leadership and management.
Harking back to a nostalgic vision of a self-sufficient
precolonial African rural life, Ujamaa attempted to reproduce
this in a modern context by creating self-sufficient villages.
These would be initially supported by the government before
community members (organized through the cell structure) were to
take over the running of farms, schools and other local offices.
The failure of Ujamaa can be chalked up to a number of factors,
yet they all point to poor governance and management: shoddy,
occasionally violent implementation; a lack of local initiative;
a lack of educated public workers; the existence of shortcuts for
local bureaucrats to fulfill their quota; and perhaps most
importantly, Nyerere’s failure to sell Ujamaa ideologically to
subordinates and the population at large. Nyerere decided to
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leave office in 1985 after two and a half decades in office,
thanking the people for forgiving his “many mistakes of
commission”.19
Deconstructing a Copper-Chocked Colony
Zambia was originally colonized by settlers from the south,
forming the northern half of Rhodesia in conjunction with modern-
day Zimbabwe. Zambia was never settled to the same degree as
Zimbabwe, and thus faced less resistance during the post-WWII
independence movement. This struggle organized politically in the
mid-20th century under the leadership of Kenneth Kaunda.20 Though
he won Zambia’s first nationwide elections, Kenneth Kaunda faced
an impending economic crisis due to the nation’s economic
dependence on copper exports. Zambia is a landlocked nation and
all transportation links ran through white-controlled Rhodesia
and Mozambique, nations which Kaunda actively opposed. A new
route was needed quickly and he found a willing partner in Julius
Nyerere, whom he had got to know through the independence
movements. Nyerere was searching for a way to energize the 19 Nyerere, Julius. Farewell Speech, November 4th, 1985.20 Harry Nkumbula was in fact the first prominent independence leader in Zambia, but his popularity waned when his position became compromised by negotiations with the British.
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Tanzanian economy and aid nearby liberation groups. The Rhodesian
Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Ian Smith’s white-
minority government in 1965 put further pressure upon Kaunda to
find an alternative path. The same year, Nyerere forged a
financial alliance with the mainland Chinese government to fund
and construct a railway from the Copperbelt to the Tanzanian
coast.
Zambia’s economy rose and fell from then on, as neighboring
civil wars, poor economic policy and falling commodity prices
took their toll on the economy. At the same time, transition to a
one-party state eliminated official opposition. The early 1970s
saw economic growth rise and fall due to changing copper prices.
With the completion of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) in
1978 and the end of conflict in Zimbabwe in 1979, Zambia gained
some political breathing space. However, economic stagnation led
to popular discontent, as Kaunda began taking major loans from
the World Bank and IMF. These loans came with strings attached:
the removal of subsidies and mass trimming of the bloated
government workforce. In 1986, food riots broke out as a result
of a doubling of the price of mealie meal, presenting the first
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major threat to Kaunda’s regime in decades.21 Ultimately,
however, what doomed Kaunda’s presidency was his unwillingness to
negotiate and make way for a multiparty state. Instead, he
stubbornly watched his statist model come crashing down around
him and he fell from power in 1991, after being forced to open
the electoral field to other parties.
The Lost Decade,Strings, and ReformThe stagnation of the 1980s was a result of factors both
external and internal to Africa. Among these are diminishing
commodity prices as well as institutionalization of patronage
networks and the utter failure of independence leaders (and more
often than not, their illegitimate successors) to prevent or
combat corruption in any meaningful way. For this reason, the
1980s in Africa is known as the Lost Decade. In the late 1980s,
Western donors began rethinking their relations with African
21 “AROUND THE WORLD; Food Riots in Zambia; Borders Are Closed.” The New York Times, December 10, 1986. Available at (http://www.nytimes.com/1986/12/10/world/around-the-world-food-riots-in-zambia-borders-are-closed.html)
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nations as global communism collapsed. It became clear that they
could no longer politically afford to prop up nepotistic and
undemocratic regimes. As a result, the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund increasingly took center stage in
loaning money to African nations, using neoliberal tactics
(previously adopted in Eastern Europe and Latin America) in an
attempt to restart the stagnant economies in Tanzania and
Zambia.22
As multiparty reforms swept across Africa’s one-party
states, the political arena was opened slightly for opposition
politicians. The opposition attracted disenfranchised ruling-
party members, business leaders and others with personal
vendettas and deep pockets. Because the ruling parties in
Tanzania and Zambia had been in power since independence,
opposition parties focused on issues of good governance and
economic liberalization. For the electorate, multiparty elections
were approached in a similar manner as previous one-party
elections – referendums on whether or not to retain the ruling
party.22 Shaw, Timothy M. “Africa’s Quest for Developmental States: ‘renaissance’ for whom?” Third World Quarterly, 2012, p.848
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Mwinyi and Mkapa
In Tanzania, Nyerere’s decision not to run in the 1985
election helped ensure the political survival of the CCM. His
successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, was chosen based on a combination
of luck and necessity.23 Mwinyi was chosen to lead Zanzibar by
the CCMs National Executive Committee (NEC), which is two-thirds
Tanganyikan.24 Two months later Edward Sokoine, a favorite of the
President and the people, died in a car crash, leaving the
presidential arena wide open. Mwinyi was nominated as the CCM
candidate in the one-party elections of 1985 and took power in
November of that year, as the Tanzanian economy continued to
plummet. President Mwinyi used his decade in office to break
down barriers between the public and private sectors. Reflecting
this, he was known in office as Mzee Rukhsa (translated as “Mr.
Anything Goes”). He deregulated the economy and opened it to
investment. While his break from the economic statism of Nyerere
was welcomed by many, Schroeder points out that this laissez-
faire attitude “was reflected in the rampant corruption of his
23 Bakari, Chapter 3, Political Succession in East African leadership24 A result of the 1977 merger of TANU and ASP.
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regime.”25 Crucially, the 1991 Zanzibar Declaration removed the
restriction of CCM members from engaging in private economic
affairs, freeing them to earn multiple sources of income,
construct residences to rent, gain directorships and buy
stocks.26
Mwinyi’s official moves towards privatization also aimed to
reform the bloated bureaucracies. On his way out of office he
signed the 1995 Public Leadership Code, which instructed public
servants to “not have private interests, other than those
permitted by the Code” and to resolve conflicts of interest in
favor of public interest, yet removed the key article in the 1967
Arusha Declaration that forbade public servants from having other
sources of income.27 It also did not require public servants to
declare their wealth publically, only to report them to a
Secretariat.28 However, Mwinyi did find success in increasing
25 Schroeder, Richard A. “Africa after Apartheid: South Africa, Race and Nation in Tanzania” p.5526 National Executive Committee. May 1, 1991. THE ZANZIBAR DECLARATION. Retrieved from http://www.tzaffairs.org/1991/05/the-zanzibar-declaration/27 Public Leadership Code, 1995. 6d and 6e. “Multi-Party Elections in Africa”,Tanzania: Elections at the Borderland, p.29528 When the Secretariat revealed in 2011 that just over a half of those required to register their wealth and assets had done so, the number shot up to three-quarters the succeeding year. However, it was not made clear whether the numbers checked out.
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investment confidence, and both GDP per capita and foreign direct
investment began rising again in 1994, after falling for
decades.29
From retirement, Mwalimu Nyerere led the nation toward
multiparty democracy. Opposition parties were legalized, and
twelve official opposition parties were registered in early 1993
and 1994. The 1995 elections were important in that they set up
CCM’s position as the still well-trusted founding party while
ostensibly competing as one of several parties in the first
multiparty presidential elections since 1962. Mwinyi peacefully
left office as CCM faced the first real opposition since
independence. Yet the race was complicated by slow voter
registration, the failure of the opposition to provide a united
front, and Nyerere’s national tour.30 Opposition parties largely
campaigned using anticorruption and anti-ruling party rhetoric,
but lacked a strong vision of what to do in the wake of electoral
success.
29 Both statistics are far from perfect indicators of economic health, and FDIis especially skewed with one-time buyoffs, such as foreign corporations buying up a mining operation. Retrieved from http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/tanzania/foreign-direct-investment . 30 Richey, Lisa, p.80-82
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Brian Cooksey notes that the Mwinyi administration contained
rampant grand corruption and misuse of foreign aid funds.31
Mwinyi’s reforms are generally regarded as having opened the
country up to foreign investment, but there was little sense this
did much to aid most Tanzanians, who still lived below the
poverty line. “The last five years have been ones of unchecked
corruption in high places” said former MP and newspaper chief
Jenerali Ulimwenu in the run-up to the 1995 election. As a
result, all parties, including CCM, ran on anticorruption
tickets.32
CCM's Benjamin Mkapa benefitted from Nyerere’s unofficial
endorsement, cruising to victory on an anti-corruption campaign,
gaining 62% of the votes.33 Like many African leaders elected in
the 1990s, Mkapa found structural reform to be difficult to
implement and he misdiagnosed a number of issues, much like his
predecessor. He began his time in office with high hopes, pushing
31 Cooksey, Brian. “Trends in Corruption during the Mkapa Era – Who Wants to Know?” p.17932 Orr, David. “Poll rivals promise to clean up Tanzania.” The Independent, October 28, 1995. Available at (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/poll-rivals-promise-to-clean-up-tanzania-1579813.html)33 African Elections Database. Retrieved from (http://africanelections.tripod.com/tz.html)
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through the 1997 Investment Act in an attempt to further open the
economy to outsiders. Mkapa set up a commission to investigate
the state of corruption in Tanzania, which released the
influential Warioba Report in 1996. It was devastating in its
description of government corruption. The 1998 Transparency
International survey, which was the first to include Tanzania,
tied Tanzania with Nigeria at 81st of 85 nations.34 Mkapa forced
the resignation of three ministers in his first term who had been
suspected or indicted of corruption; later he claimed that he was
pressured into one of these firings as a result of political
intrigue.35
Mkapa’s second term in office saw continued growth, but a
continued tepidness in his pursuit of corrupt politicians. At
Benjamin Mkapa’s reelection in 2000, the Economist noted some of
the changes during his first term: “Inflation plunged from over
30% in 1995 to about 6% this year. Most of the state
manufacturing firms have been sold off; utilities are on the
block. After years of neglect, main roads have been repaired. 34 The Corruption Perceptions Index (1998), by Transparency International. 35 Nyanje, Peter. “Tanzania’s Mkapa: My presidency was tough.” Africa Review, November 20, 2013. Retrieved from (http://www.africareview.com/News/Tanzanias-Mkapa-My-presidency-was-tough/-/979180/2080572/-/582vjqz/-/index.html)
P a g e | 36
Foreign investment—mainly in mining, tourism and manufacturing—
has increased nine-fold in five years.”36 In an interview
conducted with the BBC, Mkapa diagnosed the roots of corruption
in Africa to be low wages and poor conditions for the police and
judiciary. In the same interview, he claimed to have no evidence
of grand corruption, but that he would take action were such
evidence to come to him.37 It seems unlikely that evidence of his
ministers’ corrupt behavior was that difficult to find – rather,
he would take action only when it was politically advantageous.
Mkapa continued this balancing act throughout his second
term, pressing for the trials of former cabinet members while
getting frightfully close to being implicated in corruption
himself. The following year, the former Minister of Works under
Mwinyi, alongside four co-defendants, was placed on trial for the
alleged loss of Sh2.7bn over two road contracts in 1992 and
1995.38 After nearly two years in court ex-minister Nalaila Kiula
walked free as the judge claimed there was insufficient evidence
36 “A modest success story”, The Economist, October 19th, 200037 “Tanzania is fighting corruption, says Mkapa.” BBC News, May 25, 2000. Retrieved from (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/764224.stm)38 "The Kiula Case." Tanzanian Affairs, September 1, 2001. Retrieved from (http://www.tzaffairs.org/2001/09/the-kiula-case/)
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for a conviction, though Kiula’s former permanent secretary
received a three-year sentence for concealing financial
information.39 In January 2013, Kiula claimed that he was hounded
as a result of rumors that he would be selected for the 1995
Presidential election.40 No one has corroborated this, but it
would align with the history of corruption trials being used for
political persecution.
39 "Ex-Zambian minister cleared of corruption charges." Panapress, April 17, 2003. Retrieved from (http://www.panapress.com/Ex-Zambian-minister-cleared-of-corruption-charges--13-480722-17-lang2-index.html)40 "I was victim of circumstances – Kiula." IPPMedia, January 20, 2013. Retrieved from (http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/index.php?l=50320)
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Chiluba and the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy
In Zambia, on the other hand, public frustration with
economic and political stagnation was made into a potent
political force by the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU).
The ZCTU galvanized the copper mining sector to challenge Kenneth
Kaunda, whom refused to pass on the presidency within his own
party. The ZCTU had long served as Kaunda’s unofficial
opposition, becoming increasingly vocal during the Lost Decade,
as UNIP’s reforms brought little respite. As Miles Larmer notes,
“the ZCTU consistently criticised UNIP’s implementation of
structural adjustment and economic liberalisation policies…[they]
attacked the increasing influence of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and World Bank over the Zambian economy, and the close
relationship between multinational capital and the management of
state-owned corporations.”41 In late 1989, as Soviet satellite
nations fell and a new wave of democratization began spreading
across the globe, Frederick Chiluba became the first prominent
Zambian to question the continuation of the statist Zambian
political system, remarking “If the owners of socialism have
41 Larmer, p294
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withdrawn from the one-party system, who are Africans to continue
with it?...The one-party system is open to abuse.”42
The Movement for Multi-Party Democracy was founded in 1990
with the express intent of dethroning the UNIP, and the following
year and a half saw the incredible destabilization of a once-
strong state. On June 25, riots broke out in Lusaka and spread to
other towns in response to the doubling the price of the staple
food cornmeal (known locally as mealie meal).43 Students took to
the streets demanding Kaunda’s resignation. Separately, a small
group of officers attempted to forcefully dethrone Kaunda,
leading to their arrest.44 The following month, Kaunda legalized
opposition parties, and the MMD was registered within days of the
announcement. The MMD derived their support from urban areas and
union members, winning the 1992 election with three-quarters of
the vote. Once in office, Frederick Chiluba chose a young lawyer
named Levy Mwanawasa to be Vice-President. Chiluba put off
42 Meredith, p40643 “Thousands of Youths Riot in Zambia Over 100% Rise in Price of Corn Meal.” Los Angeles Times, December 10, 1986. Retrieved from (http://articles.latimes.com/1986-12-10/news/mn-2287_1_price-of-corn-meal)44 “3 Reported Slain After Coup Is Crushed: Zambia: Troops fire on a celebrating crowd in the capital. President Kaunda denounces the plotters.” Los Angeles Times, July 1, 1990. Retrieved from (http://articles.latimes.com/1990-07-01/news/mn-919_1_coup-plotters)
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privatization of the state’s 284 parastatals for a few years,
instead launching the Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP) to
increase government capacity, improve ministerial capabilities,
and make the public service “more efficient and responsive” to
the people.45 This was to be accomplished through restructuring,
improving management, and decentralizing and strengthening local
government.46 Yet a wide variety of constraints and inadequacies
in the PSRP’s implementation limited improvements in service
delivery.47
Vice-President Mwanawasa resigned from office in 1994,
making allegations of corruption against MMD politicians. He
claimed that Minister of Health and future President Michael Sata
directed the Director-General of Medical Stores to employ his
relative, and instructed a junior official to pay Sata’s rent.
When Mwanawasa followed through to prosecute, he was shut down by
Chiluba, leading to Mwanawasa’s resignation.48
45 Bwalya, p24746 Ibid.47 Ibid, p.25848 Malupenga, p59. Mwanawasa recounted this in 2008, two years after a viciouselection campaign that pitted him against Michael Sata and his newly-formed Patriotic Front.
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In 2001, Mwanawasa re-entered the national spotlight,
winning the election with the help of his former rival Frederick
Chiluba. Chiluba eventually embraced his protégé-turned-rival,
and enthusiastically campaigned for him until Mwanawasa felt that
“Mr Chiluba wanted to deliver the presidency for me because he
wanted to make sure that he was the boss.”49 Levy Mwanawasa
cracked down on corrupt ministers and started reforming
government institutions. 50 In a move designed to both distance
himself from Chiluba and prove his anticorruption credentials, he
pressed for the prosecution of his predecessor.51 Unlike his
predecessors, President Mwanawasa’s actions outdid his rhetoric,
bringing in a sweeping range of measures to combat corruption in
the nation. He banned senior officials and cabinet ministers from
bidding for government contracts. 52 In 2006, he passed an
electoral law which prevented persons with records of corruption
from elected office.53 These and other reasons suggest that Levy
Mwanawasa was true to the anticorruption fight.49 Malupenga, p.14050 Statistics available at (http://africanelections.tripod.com/zm.html ) 51 Sichalwe, Noel. “Chiluba Asks Court to Warn Mwanawasa” The Post, October 14, 2003. 52 Unfortunately, it seems this was more of a rhetorical move than legally-binding legislation.53 The Electoral Act, No. 12 of 2006. National Assembly of Zambia.
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The Last Few YearsKikwete’s Kickin’ It
In the two decades of multiparty elections in Tanzania,
opposition parties have been unsuccessful in dethroning the CCM.
It is clear that the CCM has benefitted enormously from their
historic dominance, Nyerere’s legacy, and a lack of serious
public scandals. However, CCM has done little to combat systemic
corruption, and most politicians display erratic behavior on the
issue. Corrupt behavior continues to plague the nation and
electoral irregularities continue to emerge.54 Nevertheless,
Julius Nyerere’s legacy continues to provide the CCM with
election victories even as it faces human rights issues, public
relations scandals, poor governance, and ethnic/religious
troubles.
In comparison to Zambia, Tanzania has a more limited range
of NGOs and civil society organizations working on the
anticorruption crusade, and good governance efforts have largely
54 Mostly on the island of Zanzibar. Chadema also alleged fraud in Dar es Salaam. A Freedom House report notes that “on several occasions in 2010 authorities either banned demonstrations or arrested peaceful protestors.”
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come from the government itself. These crusades are mostly
single-leader in their implementation, and are often in response
to foreign loan commitments or campaign pledges. In January 2013,
the African Peer Review Mechanism released its report on
Tanzania, with praise for Tanzanian nationhood but withering
criticism of current leadership.
The National Plan of Action (NPoA) estimated to cost 7.75
billion dollars, would take ‘more than five years,’ has more
acronyms than teeth, and is an indication of talk without
action.55 Another common form of institutionalized corruption are
per diems, by which government employees are given a daily
allowance, usually for going to workshops, conferences and
training camps even when these are part of their job
responsibilities. Government attempts to curb runaway per diems
and unofficial charges were foiled by the 2010 Public Service Pay
and Incentive Policy, whose authors’ noted the resilience of
corrupt practices.
55 Liviga, Athumani Juma. “The APRM Process in Tanzania; Setting the Governance Agenda”, Open Society Foundations. 2013, p.20-22
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On top of stagnant anticorruption efforts, the Tanzanian
political system has begun destabilizing over the past few years,
with scattered outbursts of violence.56 All signs point to a
ruling party not ready to release their grip on the government,
deploying a loyal police force to discourage a rising political
opposition. Most of the mainland’s recent political violence has
taken place at Chadema (opposition) rallies.57 Previously, the
CCM kept power through sheer lack of political opposition.
Holding fraudulent elections was unnecessary when there was only
the CCM candidate. However, a small but growing Tanzanian middle
class based in Northern Tanzania provides a base for Chadema’s
flourishing support, while the wider Tanzanian populace is
growing to believe that CCM no longer prioritizes their
interests. While it is not clear that Chadema (or any other
opposition party) would necessarily be less corrupt than CCM, the
ruling party has proven themselves unwilling to truly tackle the
scourge of corruption.
56 Nkwame, Marc. “Bombs Rock Chadema Rally, Three Feared Dead.” Tanzania DailyNews, June 16, 2013. 57 Chadema stands for Chama cha Demokrasia na Maedeleo, or Party of Democracy and Development
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Copper, the Cobra and the Chinese
Zambian President Mwanawasa became more outspoken throughout
his presidency, but his death in 2008 led to a snap election and
the rule of his uninspiring Vice-President. Shortly before his
death, Mwanawasa defied the long-standing tradition of defending
Zimbabwean liberation leader-turned-dictator Robert Mugabe,
telling a Zimbabwean delegation that “the [Southern African
Development Community] will not always support [Robert
Mugabe]”.58 Mwanawasa also confronted Thabo Mbeki over the
burgeoning issue of Zimbabwe’s violent and fraudulent elections.
In the wake of Mwanawasa’s death, the nation held an emergency
election, pitting vice-President Rupiah Banda against Patriotic
Front chairman Michael Sata. In a leaked cable, the United States
embassy opined that “Neither Sata nor Banda has the leadership or
inclination to follow in the increasingly principled footsteps of
former president Mwanawasa.”59 Rupiah Banda was elected by a tiny
margin, and though Sata alleged voting fraud, he did not contest
58 Wikileaks, US Embassy Lusaka. “08LUSAKA429, SADC EMERGENCY SUMMIT: MWANAWASA TELLS ALL.” April 15, 2008. Retrieved from (http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08LUSAKA429.html)59 “Post-election Zambia: A World of Uncertainty”, US Embassy Lusaka, October 28th, 2008. Available at (http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08LUSAKA1044)
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the election in court. The campaigns were much cleaner than in
2006, likely due to respect for Levy Mwanawasa and a lack of
time, and Sata dropped some of his more virulent rhetoric, even
claiming he would protect Chinese investments if elected. The
election was generally deemed free and fair by outside
observers.60
President Banda set out a half-hearted national anti-
corruption policy the following year.61 The case against
Frederick Chiluba was dropped and the Task Force on Corruption
was disbanded.62 Vice-President George Kunda claimed the
taskforce had become too expensive to maintain; however, the loss
of Western aid resulting from the downsizing suggests
otherwise.63 When pressed by international colleagues on his lack
of commitment to the anticorruption cause, Banda claimed he had
60 “EU Election Observation Mission, Zambia 2006.” EU Election Observation Mission, p.161 Government of Zambia, National anti-corruption policy, 2009. http://www.zambian-economist.com/2009/08/national-anti-corruption-policy-2nd.html62 Though a separate case in England had settled in favor of the prosecution in 2007, and demanded Chiluba repay $58 million to the Zambian treasury. “Zambia disbands anti-graft task force” Reuters, October 30, 2009. 63 Silwamba, Chibaula. “RB will be haunted for removing abuse of office clause” The Post, September 30, 2010. Available at (http://www.postzambia.com/post-read_article.php?articleId=14170)
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commitments to his constituencies.64 Various claims of corruption
have risen from the Zambian press, insinuating Banda’s role in
typical family-wide corruption.65
The 2011 election was largely a repeat of the 2008 election,
yet this time Michael Sata’s populist slogan of “lower taxes,
full employment and more money in your pocket” proved
successful.66 The press has played a very active role in Zambian
democracy, and has exposed a number of prominent officials
corrupt behavior. However, the press has also been noted for
taking sides during election time, reporting exclusively on the
misdeeds of one candidate or another. The Zambian Watchdog, a
fiery opposition newspaper, became popular for breaking news on
the misdeeds of the ruling MMD elite.67
Change has gone both ways. The range of manners in which
citizens can report corruption has expanded, including landline
64 Silwamba, Chibaula. “Rupiah explains his corruption stance” The Post, September 7, 2011. Available at (http://www.postzambia.com/post-read_article.php?articleId=22909)65 Carlucci, Paul. “First Family Problems: Zambia’s Former President on Trial”Think Africa Press, September 10, 2013. Available at (http://thinkafricapress.com/zambia/banda-men-trial-corruption)66 “Know your Leading Political Parties” Foundation for Democratic Progress. Available at (http://fodep.blogspot.com/p/know-your-political-parties.html)67 The Zambian Watchdog, whose executive is in self-imposed exile in South Africa, has been criticized routinely for its usage of sources.
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phone, fax, toll free cell numbers, letters and in person. The
Zambian populace seems to be increasingly in support of a vibrant
multiparty democracy with limited presidential powers. Yet Sata
has overseen several unequal pay rises and proved to have a
rather dictatorial temperament, raising his own salary but
clamping down on striking nurses.
The State of Africa There are two clear yet contradictory trends amongst leaders
in Tanzania and Zambia, whom work in deeply corrupt environments.
The prioritization of anticorruption by civil society,
international donors, and presidents has become common place, yet
corruption continues to touch everyone and everything.68 Although
presidents and prime ministers are the ultimate trendsetters in
political systems, they almost always benefit from corruption,
directly or indirectly. The ruling party thrives on corruption
and all lower-level public servants are indoctrinated in systemic
corruption early.69 It would be hard to argue that a majority of
68 The authoritarian nature of government and local political landscape have allowed for a variety of outcomes across the region.69 In Tanzania and Zambia and neighboring countries, the 1990s saw one of fourtypes of methodologies for dealing with multiparty elections: term limit were
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political leaders meant ill for the country; instead, upper-level
public service jobs are seen as requiring stylish suits,
expensive cars and security, both physical and financial. Moving
from economic liberalization and multiparty elections to clean,
accountable governance requires both effective legal bodies and
historical precedents.
Thus, the major differences between systemic corruption in
Tanzania and Zambia are related to the system of governance.
Specifically, Zambia has changed ruling party twice, while one-
party rule has continued in Tanzania under CCM.70 Both nations
have had their share of major corruption scandals and failed
anticorruption programs. However, Zambia is probably in a better
position to formalize the public bureaucracy and create a new
norm of professionalism and anti-graft behaviors. Three political
perspective surveys conducted by Afrobarometer in 2004, 2008 and
2013 show that while popular support for leaders’ waxes and
wanes, there are clear trends supporting increasingly democratic
extended in Zimbabwe, Uganda and Namibia, while dubious elections with handpicked successors emerged in Mozambique70 Understanding the differences between systemic corruption in Tanzania and Zambia is quite tough and is best done so using local news sources and countryexperts.
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attitudes in both nations. This includes support for clean,
multiparty elections, press freedoms, term limits and the
existence of an opposition party.71 Yet how these aspirations are
to be met remains to be seen.
71 Q34 on Round 5 (2013) Zambia – 89% agree well-run elections are more important than an unfavorable outcome, 67% very strongly. Up from Round 4 in 2008 (when 76% agreed, 54% very strongly)
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IIIChina’s Interactions with
AfricaChina’s return to Africa has been arguably the most
important development for the continent since the end of the Cold
War. Between 2000 and 2013 China-Africa trade increased more than
sixteen-fold, showing little sign of letting up as annual trade
passes $200 billion.72 China is not only a comparatively unknown
actor in Africa, but is quite distinct from the European powers
that have dominated Africa for the past several centuries. Where
Western powers have tended to intervene on behalf of economic
interests and political ideals, the Chinese have sought
pragmatic, noninterventionist trade deals with significantly
softer terms. The Chinese have tended to use their historic role
in the anti-imperialist conflicts of the Cold War as a basis for
an alliance modeled on South-South cooperation, (a.k.a. Third
World Solidarity). However, their image in Africa has been
complicated by a comparatively harsh work ethic and accusations
72 “The Chinese are coming…to Africa” The Economist, April 22, 2011.
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of neocolonialism, leading to a wide range of opinions by
Africans on the Chinese role in Africa.
Thus, in pursuit of the implications of Sino-African
partnerships, we will assess China’s global rise and domestic
governance, China’s relations with Africa, and contemporary
African perspectives on their role in Tanzania and Zambia.
Historically, Chinese involvement in Africa began with
revolutionary fervor in the 1960s and 1970s. On the part of the
Chinese, this was a combination of the Cold War and a drive to
gain the necessary votes to take the UN Security Council seat
from Taiwan. The Chinese then retreated from the continent for
the next two decades, as Deng Xiaoping’s reforms turned China’s
gaze inward and Africa’s explicitly anti-imperialist conflicts
drew to a close. As the new millennium began, China burst back
onto the scene with the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and the
Go Out policy, seeking uncritical global partners for their
extraction and construction industries. Through focusing on four
key sectors of society in Tanzania and Zambia, we will then see
that African perspectives on the Chinese contain a wide range of
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views, but are largely optimistic. We will then conclude with a
few notes on Sino-African dynamism and Western criticism.
The Dragon AwakesSino-African relations have come to fruition considerably
more conspicuously on the African continent than in China. Yet it
is important to understand the movement of Chinese money and
people from the Chinese perspective.73 There are three major
phases in modern Chinese history: Maoist governance (1949-1976);
turmoil and reform (1977-1992); stabilization and global
expansion (1993-today).
Post-revolution consolidation saw the Maoist regime
stabilize the nation under the totalitarian rule of the Chinese
Communist Party. Land reform began with the change of ownership
of large tracts from landlords to the peasant majority. Mao
cracked down on capitalists and those deemed to be antithetical
to the Communist cause, instilling a climate of fear throughout
the elite. By the early 1960s, China had begun to fund global
73 Of course, it goes both ways. Today, there is a quickly growing population of African students in China.
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Marxist groups in colonial Africa. The Cultural Revolution,
running officially from 1965-1968, caused a massive disruption in
rural life, party governance and Chinese industry, as well as
resulting in tens of thousands of deaths. Only with Mao’s death
in 1976 did China begin to move away from Maoist philosophy.
The period of reform, roughly lasting from 1977-1992, was
dominated by Deng Xiaoping and the idea of “socialism with
Chinese characteristics.” Deng pushed through a wide array of
reforms including dismantling of the commune system (that had
largely destroyed agricultural production), liberalizing the
economy and pushing for the ‘four modernizations’. This included
modernization of the economy, of agriculture, of scientific
development and of national defense. While these reforms
unleashed economic growth and a huge expansion in manufacturing,
notably absent was the ‘missing modernization’ – democracy. This
culminated with the Tiananmen Square uprising, when the
government responded to a popular protest group, which included
student activists’ calls for democracy, with a military
crackdown.74 By the time of Deng’s resignation in 1992, China
74 Binyan, Liu. “Deng’s Pyrrhic Victory,” October 2, 1989. P.34
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had moved from isolated, underdeveloped status to that of a
nation on the cusp of breaking into world markets.
Jiang Zemin, whom took over from Deng in 1992, largely
continued Deng’s economic reforms. Jiang did not relinquish the
centralist control of the CPC, but let others within the party
take over economic policy. He also lobbied for entry into the
World Trade Organization, in order to gain wider access to global
trade. The same year, the “Go Out” policy began implementation,
encouraging Chinese companies and entrepreneurs to trade and
invest abroad.75 By the time Jiang handed over power to Hu Jintao
in 2002, China had joined the WTO and begun to accrue foreign
reserves, mostly in the form of US bonds.
Under Hu, Chinese economic growth continued unabated and
reform shifted to the local level as urbanization began putting
enormous pressure on Chinese society. Official opposition
remained stifled, but civic participation evolved into an online
cat-and-mouse game on Weibo (China’s microblogging service),
whereby the state spying services censure certain words and
bloggers come up with clever stand-ins. The 2008 Beijing Olympics75 Ye, Min. “China Invests Overseas: Regulation and Representation” p.176
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brought global respect, but neither that nor economic growth have
stifled the West’s claims of human rights abuses. The Chinese
government, and the Communist Party of China in particular are no
more tolerant of dissent than in the 1980s. Hu pressed for global
initiatives, continuing the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC) begun under Jiang and calling for a ‘peaceful rise,’ that
would ostensibly avoid threatening neighboring nations. Xi
Jinping, whom took over in 2013, has made anti-corruption a
priority in a campaign to refresh the party’s image and make the
‘Chinese Dream’ a distinct possibility for hundreds of millions.
However, he has similarly avoided any real loosening of the one-
party system, signaling national reform is to remain primarily
economic for the time being.
Corruption in Modern China
The central concept behind modern corruption in China is
that of ‘guanxi’, meaning interpersonal networks of influence.
This is essentially a form of social capital, and applies outside
of China’s borders as well as within China.76 Guanxi translates
76 The so-called ‘bamboo network’ is used to describe guanxi relations in the Chinese diaspora.
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into corruption when the requested favor is a corrupt one.
Corruption in China has been declared a major priority of the Xi
administration, and he has announced a wide bundle of minor
reforms to tackle it, including bans on luxury funerals and the
improper use of public vehicles.77 However, the fight against
corruption is, like many things in China, centralized and
unwelcoming of civil advocates. Guanxi is seen as a methodology
for corrupt conduct, rather than a necessary form of social
interaction.78 Thus, it is not that corruption is culturally
inherent to China through guanxi, but rather that corruption is a
product of contemporary Chinese society, and that guanxi is a
popular and well-understood method of corruption.
In Karklins’ typology of corruption in post-communist
regimes, judicial corruption is noted as key to the overall
anticorruption fight, as “the rule of law is at the heart of
democracy, and undermining it severely limits accountability in
all sectors of the state and public life.”79 Yet China is not a
77 “Xi Jinping’s Anticorruption Paradox,” Bloomberg Businessweek, Jan 15, 2014.78 Li, Ling. “Performing Bribery in China: guanxi-practice, corruption with a human face.” P.279 Karklins, Rasma. “Typology of Post-Communist Corruption,” p.24
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democratic nation, and does not currently seek to be so.
Corruption in China is instead characterized by autocratic
selectivity, guanxi networks and the pressures of newly-formed
capitalism. The CPC views most corruption as a scourge that
threatens a functioning bureaucracy, but also understands its
importance in retaining the one-party state. As Deborah Brautigam
points out, “Corruption is widespread in China…yet it has not
derailed economic development.”80 The Chinese government makes a
distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ corruption in their quest to
model development in a one-party state. That which prevents
development or unnecessarily toughens individual or corporate
economic prospects is to be eliminated, while select judicial
corruption which aids the CPC in running the country smoothly is
to be left alone. As this is the current government model of the
PRC, it is also the one most likely to be exported to Africa and
elsewhere.
80 Brautigam, “The Dragon’s Gift.” p.296
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They Arrived From theEast
Sino-African relations are best understood as founded on
global economics and the history of the Non-Aligned and Third
World solidarity movements. The newly-formed People’s Republic of
China was born during a heyday of Cold War hysteria. Staunchly
‘communist’, Mao Zedong forged a new path for his nation through
his interpretation of Marxism; Maoism. Chinese foreign policy
thus placed themselves as a Third World nation, meaning they
sided with neither the United States nor the USSR. However, their
spot on the UN Security Council was taken by the Republic of
China (Taiwan), as recognized by the US and the West. Thus, a
major goal of China’s from the get-go was to drum up support to
take their rightful place on the council, through an election in
the General Assembly.
The 1955 Asian-African conference held in Bandung, Indonesia
was a key moment in the history of Sino-African relations and the
formation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The Bandung
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Conference advocated a wide range of international policies,
including but not limited to noninterventionism, anti-
imperialism, economic independence and global solidarity. The
Bandung Conference was, in its day and age, a revolutionary
conference, one staffed with leaders whom had often risen through
the anticolonial movement and were determined to see it through.
Sino-African scholar George Yu identified three components
to China’s role in Africa in 1970: the Chinese model; the
superpower struggle; and China’s Third World policy.81 The
Chinese model refers to their historical experiences with both
revolution and development – notably, during Zhou Enlai’s 1964
tour of Africa, he pronounced the continent “ripe for
revolution.”82 The struggle between the United States and the
USSR for military and ideological supremacy was resented hotly by
many developing nations.83 Thus, the reactive force against this
was the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), led and staffed by the ‘Third
World.’ These were postcolonial nations, including almost all of
81 Yu, George. China’s Role in Africa. p.9782 This understandably disturbed a number of African leaders, whom considered themselves products of the revolution.83 As an African proverb (heard across multiple cultures) succinctly puts, ‘when the elephants fight, the grass is trampled.’
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Africa and Southern Asia. China sought to become a central
influence in the NAM, but was never granted full membership. Yu’s
three components can thus be understood together as placing China
solidly on the side of independent African nations resisting
American and Soviet interventionism.
Yet the results of these policies were often messy: the
Chinese often supported self-declared Marxists, underdogs that
weren’t already funded by the Soviets, and failed to side with
many ‘winning’ revolutionaries.84 Chinese rhetoric in the early
1960s was fiery and polarizing, likely losing them a number of
potential allies. In 1970, Yu hypothesized that “China can expect
to retain its presence in Africa if it responds to Africa's
changing situation.”85
TAZARA, the Anti-Colonial Railway
The defining piece of Chinese diplomacy in Africa of this
period was their funding and construction of the Tanzania-Zambia
Railway, built to help land-locked Zambia export copper without
84 Especially in wars in Angola and Mozambique, the Chinese struggled to find a group not being supported already by the US or USSR. They then either fundeda small group with no real chance of domination or ‘betrayed the cause’ and sided with an American-supported group.85 Yu, George. “China and Tanzania: a study in cooperative interaction.” 1970.
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benefitting the white minority regimes of Rhodesia and
Mozambique. Kenneth Kaunda pursued Western funding until multiple
reports made it clear that no Western nations had interest in
backing TAZARA, deeming it inefficient and politically motivated.
He thus joined Nyerere in negotiations with the Chinese in early
1965.
In mid-1965, the Chinese government agreed to carry out a
survey on the railway over the next two years. Once completed,
the Chinese then agreed to fund and construct the project in
1967, issuing a concessionary loan that granted Tanzania and
Zambia 15 years to begin paying it back. Between 1970 and 1976,
it is estimated 10,000 Chinese and 40,000 Tanzanians and Zambians
worked on the railway.
After the project was completed, Chinese interactions waned
as domestic reform issues gained momentum. Deng Xiaoping
deprioritized the Third World struggles, and began converting aid
programs into investment. TAZARA was handed over to Tanzanian and
Zambian authorities in the early 1980s, although Chinese advisors
stayed on. The railway’s heyday was shortly after inception, and
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reshaped agricultural development in Southern Tanzania, yet it
failed to live up to its load-bearing capabilities for the
Zambian copper industry. It was periodically injected with
capital and engines were donated by the US and West Germany,
although services continued to decline throughout the 1990s and
2000s. Today, TAZARA’s major issues include long delays,
bureaucratic mismanagement, under-funding and track maintenance.
TAZARA remains most potent as a political symbol rather than an
economic accomplishment, and serves as an incentive for other
African nations to engage with the Chinese on large
infrastructure projects.
From Tiananmen to Today
Tiananmen Square was a transforming moment in Chinese
international relations: the quick condemnation by Western
leaders contrasted sharply with the words of support from African
dictators that had faced similar disdain from the West.86 Many of
these same dictators lost power in the coming elections, yet
their support reminded the Chinese that there was a continent of
similarly-disdained leaders with huge, untapped markets. China
86 Taylor, Ian. “China’s Foreign Policy Towards Africa in the 1990s,” p.443
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began investing in nations whose economies had been ripped open
by structural adjustment packages, and set up the first Forum on
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 to coordinate expanding
ties.
In 2006, Beijing hosted the third triannual FOCAC meeting
with the highest-ever attendance by African leaders – thirty-five
heads of states, and officials from thirteen more (of 52 total
nations at the time).87 A wide variety of aid was rolled out at
this event, including $5 billion in interest-free loans. Perhaps
the most distinctive result of this conference, however, was not
the economic impact of newly-announced projects, but the global
reaction. This conference sparked a huge wave of Western media
reports and literature, most of it initially intensely negative,
calling out China for supporting Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir, who was
terrorizing the Darfur region of Sudan through the notorious
Janjaweed militia. Though many media reports continue to follow
the narrative of a neocolonial China bent on reaping Africa’s
natural resources, the academic literature quickly evolved beyond
this. 87 “FOCAC Beijing Summit” People’s Daily Online. Retrieved from (http://english.people.com.cn/zhuanti/Zhuanti_492.html)
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Chinese policy has also evolved considerably, and the
government has honed a pragmatic approach to political
instability and ambiguity. In Holslag’s analysis of China’s
reaction to five coups across the continent between 2003 and
2010, he notes that China’s response to the coups was guided by
“the strategy of adapting to political realities, rather than
trying to shape them.”88 China considers nonintervention a
central principle in a continent marked by political instability
– a strategy shared by Westerners when they similarly have
significant investments in a nation.
China tends to distribute aid and help through their own
governmental programs and state institutions, rather than
multilateral organizations such as the World Bank. Unfortunately
for contemporary scholars, the Chinese government has been far
from transparent; their definition of aid includes ‘free’
services by Chinese parastatals and large corporations, most
often doing construction work on large infrastructure projects.
Chinese aid entails strict control of funds from start to finish.
Chinese money usually pays for a Chinese company to hire Chinese 88 Holslag, Jonathan. “China and the Coups: Coping with Political Instability in Africa” p.367
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managers and begin building, bypassing often corrupt and
inefficient African state-owned enterprises. Brautigam breaks
down the two types of ‘aid’ offered by China and the Export-
Import Bank of China (Eximbank) into preferential export buyer’s
credit and concessional loans. The first of these are offered in
foreign currency, mostly to be used to purchase Chinese goods and
services.89 Concessional loans, on the other hand, are issued in
Renminbi with at least 50% of each loan spent on Chinese goods
and services.
Most projects that are funded by the Chinese hire Chinese
firms through competitive bidding, and the resultant employment
is usually managed by Chinese nationals and staffed by African
laborers. Pushback against the Chinese manager/African laborer
system has resulted in negotiation and new frameworks in a number
of countries, with varying degrees of success. In Zambia, the
Chinese have often sought long-term site-specific development,
which requires acquiescence to employee demands.90 Chinese labor
relations in Africa are dependent upon several key factors,
89 Brautigam, p.17390 Lee, Ching Kwan. “Raw Encounters; Chinese Managers, African Workers and thePolitics of Casualization in Africa’s Chinese Enclaves.” P.665
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including long-term vs. short-term investment, profit margins,
and location flexibility. While labor relations between Chinese
managers and African laborers cannot be easily generalized, it is
generally true that projects are majority staffed by African
laborers, whom are paid and treated similarly in non-Chinese
projects.
The Chinese largely focus on large-scale infrastructure
projects are sources of national pride, public confidence, and
economic growth. Economic network projects tend to include road
networks, railways, electrical networks, production facilities,
and various processing plants. This largely began with the TAZARA
railway. Economic network projects provide an economic tool that,
if wielded successfully by governments and businesses, can
further unlock the nations’ economic potential. However, if the
projects are badly mismanaged, they can turn out to be
burdensome. Nationalist symbols at their worst are known as
‘white elephants’ – pits for corrupt politicians to pull cash
from, or projects that are ultimately of little use. In Tanzania,
the Beijing Construction Engineering Company Ltd. is constructing
the Benjamin Mkapa National Stadium, while the Chinese government
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finances around 60% of it.91 Apart from stadiums, the Chinese
have also funded a number of presidential palaces across
Africa.92 These have tended to bring criticism from both
international governments and domestic opposition groups, and
China has not worked on an African presidential palace since
2009.
A quick note should also be made of trade between Africa and
China. While overall export/import is fairly balanced, Africa is
a continent, not a country; thus, oil-producing nations like
Angola export far more than they import from China, while nations
such as Tanzania continue to import in excess of exports to
China. Sino-African trade is imbalanced insofar that China sends
much more value-added products, demanding more skilled Chinese
workers, while mining Africa’s surface for various commodities.93
Perhaps the most badly-hit industry has been textiles; cheap
Chinese imports caused such an uproar in South Africa, a quota
91 “National Stadium handed over” Daily News, July 4, 2013.92 China aided in the funding or construction of presidential palaces in Cote D’Ivoire (2002), Namibia and Togo (2003), Comoros (2005), Guinea (2006), Sudan(2007), Burundi (2008), Guinea Bissau (2009).93 Konings, Piet. China and Africa: Building a Strategic Partnership. p357
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was installed.94 One of the first and still most common
criticisms of the Chinese in Africa is that they are
neocolonialists, coming to reap the abundant natural resources of
the continent; nearly 90% of Chinese imports from the continent
are raw materials, and the Chinese are currently on a global
chase for commodities.
As well, China’s moves in Africa are not just profit-seeking
businesses. Cultural cooperation between China and Africa
consists not only of travelling troupes of entertainers but also
academic cooperation, namely through the China-Africa Think Tanks
Forum and the China-Africa joint research and exchange program.
Most of these programs exist almost entirely as part of the tri-
annual meetings, and accomplish little outside of them. Chinese
medicine has become popular across the continent, and traditional
Chinese medicine clinics can be found in both Zambia and
Tanzania. According to Elizabeth Hsu’s study of Chinese clinics
in Tanzania, they are profit-oriented – i.e. they are businesses.
Popular respect for dawa ya Kichina (Chinese medicine) likely stems
from the clinics that set up during construction of TAZARA in the94 Naude, W., & Rossouw, R. (2008). South African quotas on textile imports from China: A policy error? Journal of Policy Modeling, p.743
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1970s.95 These clinics tend to combine traditional Chinese
medicine and modern medicine; such as traditional herbs in
capsule form. In Zambia, these clinics can be found in Lusaka and
in the Copperbelt, and are patronized by both Zambians and
Chinese immigrants.96
It is also useful to discuss the growing number of Africans
studying at Chinese universities. The Chinese began recruiting
Africans in the 1950s, but as the first account of this suggests,
everything from the academic environment to treatment by the
Chinese public was problematic.97 In 2009 it was estimated there
were over 12,000 African students in China, and 20,000 in 2011.98
The Chinese support scholarships for these students for a number
of reasons, top amongst them being to improve their image in
Africa and to increase the number of Chinese-speaking Africans.
However, some students report being disappointed by the quality
of study China has to offer.99 95 Hsu, Elizabeth. “The medicine from China has rapid effects”: Chinese medicine patients in Tanzania, p29596 Gadzala, Aleksandra W. “From formal- to informal-sector employment: examining the Chinese presence in Zambia.” P.4697 Hevi, Emmanuel John. ”An African Student in China.” 196398 “Statistics of International Students in China in 2011” Study In China, February 29, 2012. Retrieved from (http://www.csc.edu.cn/laihua/newsdetailen.aspx?cid=122&id=1399)99 Haugen, “China’s Recruitment of African University Students” p.314
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Thus, it can be understood that the majority of programs
intending to build socio-cultural links between China and Africa
are designed as public relations distractions by the Chinese
government.100 Currently, Sino-African ties are also aided by the
appearance of Confucius Institutions, which teach Chinese in
various African universities. Thirst by the Chinese nouveau riche
for art resulted in a successful exposition of Tanzanian Tinga
Tinga art in September, 2012.101 Export of Chinese culture has
been much less successful, although Chinese radio and TV channels
are increasingly available throughout Africa.
The Chinese are well renowned for their lack of criticism
towards modern-day partners – not since the 1970s has the Chinese
government openly condemned a new African regime. They make it
abundantly clear there is only one requirement of their
friendship: the One-China policy, i.e. the recognition of the PRC
and not Taiwan. Since 1995, ten African nations have switched
allegiance to the PRC, leaving autocratic Swaziland the sole
100 There is no reason, however, to believe more grassroots movements won’t arrive in the coming years.101 “Tanzanian Artist Proves Success in China” Tanzania Daily News. Available at (http://dailynews.co.tz/index.php/features/popular-features/15633-tanzanian-artist-proves-success-in-china)
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friend of Taiwan on the continent.102 China's changing political
relations has two major goals in Africa: to enhance economic
relations and to legitimize the Chinese role on the world stage.
The Chinese government is well known for the lavish
attention it pays to guests and hosts. Chinese officials attend
inaugurations, congratulate leaders on their elections and/or
offer small donations of aid to those looking to keep new regimes
afloat.103 While China’s African policies during the Cold War were
generally stringent, fiery and non-negotiating, they have changed
considerably. China’s role in Africa has become notably more
flexible since Deng’s reforms and the Go Out policy came into
effect.
The re-emergence of China as a world power is likely the
most significant trend since the end of the Cold War. The 2000
Beijing Declaration states that “the universality of human rights
and fundamental freedoms should be respected…” yet “[each]
country has the right to choose, in its course of development,
its own social system, development model and way of life in light
102 “Taiwan has some sketchy friends” GlobalPost, July 10, 2012.103 Holslag, 371-374. The Chinese offered Rajoelina’s Madagascar $30m in cyclone relief, and an unknown sum to the Nigerien coup leaders of 2010.
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of its national conditions.” This accurately summarizes the
simultaneous deference to the global value of human rights and
state-by-state interpretation of such values. At this time,
Tanzania had opened up its political system without changing
parties, while the opposition had gained power in Zambia. These
changes, not necessarily irreversible, have led the political
systems of Africa and China down divergent paths.
The discussion of human rights should also be considered in
terms of contrasting cultural values: Western individualism
versus Chinese notions of social duties. Ian Taylor breaks this
down further, explaining that the difference lies in the West’s
focus on political rights, compared to China’s focus on socio-
economic rights.104 This, then, betrays a difference in
priorities; Western democracy or Chinese development? The
Chinese have not made it an official goal to sway African nations
away from democratic practices; a large part of their
attractiveness to Africans lies in their silence on domestic
issues. This silence is a welcoming respite from the unwelcome
advice of Western diplomats and NGOs. Chinese silence is not
104 Taylor, Ian. “Sino-African Relations and the Problem of Human Rights”
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limited to electoral issues but all governance. A number of
African leaders have specifically chosen Chinese aid deals over
Western ones in order to avoid the political requirements
attached to Western loans.
China regularly supports an array of African leaders in
international global organizations, including the UN and the
African Union (AU). In 2012, Hu Jintao and Ethiopian President
Meles Zenawi opened the new Chinese-built African Union
headquarters in Addis Ababa. Chinese support in international
institutions is largely based on rhetoric of South-South
cooperation.105 However, the Chinese have a tendency to bypass
regional and international organizations in pursuit of bilateral
relations, which provide a much more direct route to cooperation.
African Eyes on ChinaChinese presence in Africa is often competitive and
contentious; for the majority of Africans, the Chinese exist
through imported products and various headlines. However, more
105 This is essentially identical to Third World Solidarity in terms of participating nations, but more focused on trade
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and more Africans are working one-on-one with Chinese, be they
building roads, haggling in the markets or mining minerals. It is
impossible to generalize African sentiments towards the Chinese,
but it is possible to note developments between the Chinese and a
few sectors of African societies. In order to analyze the
interaction between the Chinese and the socio-political
landscapes in Tanzania and Zambia, it is useful to examine four
major sectors of African societies: political elites, business
elites, civil society and the public.106 Public sentiment towards
the Chinese, according to a Pew survey, is overall quite positive
across the continent: over 90% of the populations in Ivory Coast,
Mali and Kenya in 2007 found China’s growing economy to be a good
thing for their nations.107 This may be because Africans view
Western economic domination as having had overall deeply negative
effects on their nations. However, opinions have cooled slightly
on the Chinese across Africa, positive impressions down 3-5% in
African nations polled in 2013 compared with the same countries
in 2007.108 In Zambia, the public’s view of the Chinese has 106 For purposes of this analysis, the public refers to the civil population that does not consist of elites or civil society leaders.107 Pew Global Attitudes Project survey, How the World Sees China. Available at(http://www.pewglobal.org/2007/12/11/how-the-world-sees-china/)108 Pew Global Attitudes Project surveys.
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fluctuated considerably since their entry in the late 1990s,
especially since Sata’s opportunistic usage of the Chinese as a
political punching bag in the 2006 election. While anti-Chinese
sentiment rose to an all-time high in the wake of the election,
it has since settled as rhetoric cooled and new negotiations saw
better conditions for Zambians working under Chinese.109
Civil society in Africa includes groups most concerned about
Chinese partnership – many civil society organizations have
financial or ideological connections to the West, and oppose
China on account of their human rights record. Religious
organizations are the most powerful players in civil society in
most African nations, but they have largely kept out of the
debate over the Chinese (exceptions include Desmond Tutu, a
strong critic of the Chinese government).110 Trade unions have
been the most deeply involved in dealing with the new Chinese
presence on the continent, but success in negotiating with the
Chinese has varied. In most cases, trade unions have found the
109 Larmer, Miles; Fraser, Alistair. “Of Cabbages and King Cobra: Populist Politics and Zambia’s 2006 Election” 2007. p.629110 Tutu, Desmond; Guangcheng, Chen. “A Year for Human Rights in China” Huffington Post, June 3, 2013.
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Chinese to be manageable partners and flexible negotiators, and
welcome Chinese investment.111
Most simply and obviously, African political leaders view
China as a cooperative and generous economic partner, as well as
a welcome respite from demanding Western donors. The lack of
conditionality is enticing, especially those with undemocratic
processes. The 2006 Zambian election had notable anti-Chinese
rhetoric, though most politicians view the Chinese as an economic
necessity. African business leaders mostly seem to view the
Chinese positively, as they bring enormous deals to the continent
– however, some view the Chinese as dangerous competition. Cheap
Chinese exports, often counterfeit, have had detrimental effects
on a few African industries.112 In both Tanzania and Zambia,
cheap, mostly small-scale Chinese companies have competed with
and often undermined local traders.113
Watching From the Swahili Coast
111 Kragelund, Peter. “Part of the Disease or Part of the Cure? Chinese Investments in the Zambian Mining and Construction Sectors” 2009, p.646112 Wei, Huang. “Free to Choose” November 2, 2006. p.2113 Interview with author, Zambian shopkeeper, Lusaka, July 22nd, 2013.
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The Chinese presence in Tanzania is much less controversial
than in Zambia. With a numerically small presence, the Chinese
migrants in Tanzania have remained located either in project site
camps or in coastal Dar es Salaam. The only available poll on the
popularity of the Chinese in Tanzania is one from 2007, which
noted that 70% of Tanzanians had a favorable view of China, while
78% viewed Chinese influence positively.114
In Dar es Salaam, Chinese entrepreneurs have become a
noticeable presence in Kariakoo, a market district where they
have formed a Kariakoo Chinese Chamber of Commerce. Most of the
Chinese nationals running small businesses are engaging in it
illegally, as they are unable to fulfill the 1997 requirement of
$100,000 minimum capital investment.115 Resentment towards these
small shop-owners by Tanzanians grew sufficiently, so that in
January 2011 the Deputy Minister of Industry, Trade and Marketing
gave Chinese businesses a 30-day ultimatum to leave Kariakoo.116
However, nothing came of this. Three years later, the newly-
114 Pew Survey, How the World Sees China. (http://www.pewglobal.org/2007/12/11/how-the-world-sees-china/)115 “Traders in Tanzania seek rescue from illegal Chinese vendors,” by African Topics. August 21, 2013116 “Govt plans making Kariakoo re-export centre – Nyalandu” by IPP Media. January 7, 2011.
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formed Kariakoo Chinese Chamber of Commerce (KCCC) had all two
hundred members pledge to adhere to Tanzanian product quality and
tax laws. The KCCC stated they would “pay all taxes in accordance
with the law” and treat workers well.117 Thus, resentment from
local traders in Tanzania has not been taken up seriously by the
Tanzanian government, and Chinese traders are instead taking the
initiative to bridge the gap.
Civil society in Tanzania consists of religious groups,
various NGOs and a few weakened unions. Religious groups have
kept out of the discussion over the Chinese. There are also those
that are deeply irritated by Chinese involvement in illegal
smuggling, especially ivory. Though the Chinese government
condemns it, there are still Chinese citizens that find it to be
a lucrative business – in November 2013, 1.8 tons of ivory was
discovered at the home of a Chinese national in Dar, and three
Chinese nationals were arrested.118
117 “Chamber pledges to ensure high quality products” by The Citizen. January 23, 2014.118 Heath, Kevin. “1.8 tonnes of ivory found in Chinese home in Tanzania.” Wildlife News, November 3, 2013. Available at (http://www.spaceforgiants.org/?q=ele-news/18-tonnes-of-ivory-found-in-chinese-home-in-tanzania)
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Politicians from the ruling CCM party largely seem to
appreciate the role the Chinese have played in the revitalization
of the Tanzanian economy. Relations between the CCM and Communist
Party of China (CPC) go back half a century, and they regularly
visit each other’s nations.119 They have a number of common
interests: economic growth through South-South trade; the success
of alternative development models; and the most troublesome –
their respective political parties being synonymous with the
state. In September, 2013, the Chinese ambassador Lu Youqing
attended a CCM political rally in Shinyanga region. At the rally,
he announced a plan for cotton investment in the area, including
cotton processing, livestock processing and an agricultural
college.120 The issue caused a small outrage in the private press,
and opposition party Chadema announced they would write letters
to the Tanzanian and Chinese governments to register their
complaint, saying Lu intentionally violated the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations.121 It seems the Chinese view governance
in Tanzania as essentially a one-party state like their own.
119 Including a Chinese delegation in Tanzania in 2011 and vice versa in 2013120 Machira, P., & Nyanje, P. (2013, September 17). China envoy at CCM rally irks Chadema121 Ibid.
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To Chadema, the Chinese present a legitimate business
opportunity, but one that has largely benefitted CCM at the
expense of the nation (and it’s democracy). However, unlike the
Patriotic Front under Michael Sata, they have avoided using
xenophobic or Sinophobic rhetoric in their quest to gain power.
Instead, Chadema’s critique of the ruling party focuses on CCM’s
corrupt and ineffective leadership.
Possibly the biggest issue in private business relations
between Tanzania and China has been quality control and the
‘flooding’ of Chinese goods into the Tanzanian marketplace. There
is resentment on the part of small-scale Tanzanian entrepreneurs
that are forced to compete with cheap Chinese goods in local
markets.122 The Chinese have long recognized their ‘quality
problem.’ During the 2008 infant formula powder scare in China,
when Tanzania banned these imports, the same product was smuggled
through the ban into the black market, potentially affecting
thousands of young Tanzanians.123 What unites businessmen and
122 Most notably, when the deputy industry minister threatened to kick Chinese vendors out of the Kariakoo market in Dar es Salaam, in January 2011. No action was taken.123 McGregor, Sarah. “Tanzania Seizes Chinese Milk-Powder Imports After Imposing Ban.” Bloomberg News, September 23, 2008. Schoder, Dagmar. “Melamine Milk Powder and Infant Formula Sold in East Africa” Journal of Food Protection, 2010.
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entrepreneurs in Tanzania in support of the Chinese is their work
in infrastructure. In 2011, Sichuan Hongda got on board with a
$3bn deal that will involve the construction of a coal mine, an
iron ore mine and a thermal power station.124 All told, Chinese
companies are involved in building or supporting every major form
of national infrastructure, and this is likely to only win them
more friends and fans in the Tanzanian business sector.
Zambian Stares
Public opinion of the Chinese in Zambia has fluctuated
intensely over the past 15 years – Michael Sata’s rhetoric in the
2006 election elevated the issue of the Chinese presence to one
bordering on violent xenophobia, before abandoning this tactic in
favor of economic partnership with the Chinese. Since then, the
Zambian public’s view of the Chinese has been dominated by their
perceived labor relations and their role in the Zambian economy.
Disputes over minimum wage and labor conditions in the mining
sector have turned violent on multiple occasions. Thus, while
initial reaction to the Chinese could be described as trepidation
p.1710124 Anthony, Ross. “Infrastructure and Influence: China’s presence on the coastof East Africa.” 2013, p.135
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growing into outright hostility, Zambians have since become
accustomed to their presence in the shops and mines, and now tend
to view them largely as economic partners.125
There are a wide range of civil society actors in Zambia, in
comparison to Tanzania’s more modest offerings. The most
influential actors in Zambia’s civil society are the Church, the
unions and various NGOs. The unions’ strength comes from their
role in the Copperbelt, powering Zambia’s major industry. The
Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ) is the oldest, continues to
represent a majority of miners, and was instrumental in the
electoral success of the MMD in 1991. Transparency International
Zambia has also been vocal, but has largely kept from criticizing
or endorsing the Chinese.
Chinese interactions with the MUZ, Zambia’s largest and most
relevant union, have been rocky as Chinese engagement in the
Copperbelt deepens. Carmody et al., consider Chinese actors to be
provoking violence in Zambia, through their labor policies and
political behavior.126 Leading the debate has been questions over
125 Kopinski et al. p.190126 Carmody, Padraig; Taylor, Ian. “Flexigemony and Force in China’s Resource Diplomacy in Africa: Sudan and Zambia Compared” 2010.
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labor relations and a number of violent incidents that have
disproportionately raised the international profile of Chinese-
owned mines. These incidents began in 2005 with an accident at an
explosives plant that killed 49 Zambian workers, highlighting
conditions faced by workers in the Copperbelt. The following
year, a wage dispute escalated into a shooting; both police and
Chinese managers seem to have shot at strikers.127 Over the next
several years, acts of violence continued to occur at strikes,
and the Zambian government continued to half-heartedly intervene.
In 2011, NFCA Mining fired around two thousand workers striking
over wages – they were shortly reinstated after pressure was put
on the Chinese by the Zambian government.128 It seems likely that
while the unions are engaged in bitter disputes with the Chinese,
they realize the necessity of negotiation, and do not view a
Chinese exodus as a viable option.
Zambian political elites are largely in line with their
neighbors views of China; the Asian nation is seen as an
enormous, largely unquestioning business opportunity. However, as
127 “Workers shot during Zambia mine riots” by Mail & Guardian, 26 July, 2006.128 “NFCA Mining in Chambishi re-instates the fired workers.” By Lusaka Times, October 21, 2011.
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Sino-Zambian relations moved quickly over the past decade,
Michael Sata led the pack in revolutionizing usage of the Chinese
for political gain. At first, he called the Chinese out for being
“infesters, not investors” during the 2006 campaign, essentially
turning the election into a referendum on the Chinese.129 When
this tactic failed to gain him the presidency, Sata instead
turned towards a more generally populist stance, positioning
himself as a defender of the working man. Sata’s penchant for
public spectacles continues, and he has used his position as
president to personally lambast various Chinese contractors for
less than satisfactory progress.
Around three-quarters of Chinese investment in Zambia has
been in the mining sector, but Chinese companies, especially
private ones, have continually diversified since the 1990s.130
Chinese investment pledges through the Zambian Development Agency
have reached $300m in the manufacturing sector alone.131 The
Chinese are involved in building and upgrading roads, railways,
129 To see a full discussion of the 2006 election and the xenophobic rhetoric employed by Michael Sata, read “Of Cabbages and King Cobra” by Larmer and Fraser.130 Kragelund, p.484131 Ibid.
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hydropower stations, stadiums, transmitters and more.132
Currently, various Chinese contractors are hard at work
fulfilling the Link Zambia project, which will see the
construction or paving of 8000 kilometers of road. Broken up into
a number of smaller projects, Chinese companies bid against
others from Zambia and South Africa to win government
contracts.133
Zambian business elites perspectives on the Chinese vary by
industry between mining, construction, agriculture and
manufacturing. Mining companies view them as one of several large
investors in the mines (despite all appearances, the Swiss are
the largest investors in the Copperbelt), yet more volatile in
terms of local reactions. Chinese companies win around three-
quarters of infrastructure project contracts, and are thus viewed
as fierce competition. 134 In response, local companies are
pairing up with South African and British companies in bidding
132 For a complete list of Chinese projects in Zambia, visit china.aiddata.org133 Named companies include Reubex, Copperfields Mining Services and Nyatsi Zambian Ltd. Mwapa, Isaac. Interview with author at the Road Development Agency, July 22nd, 2013.134 Hairong, Yan; Sautman, Barry, “Small Chinese Activities in Zambia: More than Just Mining” p.6
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wars for Link Zambia 8000 projects, which are vastly expanding
Zambia’s road network.135
ConclusionChinese relations with African nations began under highly
ideological conditions during the Cold War, and have evolved
considerably since then towards a pragmatic, non-intervening
trade-based foreign policy. Sino-African relations are dynamic,
and though they are largely government-led, they include many
outside the state and a wide range of investments and actors.
Chinese rhetoric of South-South cooperation is legitimized
somewhat by their dealings on the continent. However, Chinese
migrants continue to cut themselves off from Africans, and could
benefit both personally and economically from improved relations
in this region. Chinese cultural exports continue to underperform
abroad.
Western media reports can skew the image, in subtle and
less-subtle manners. The Economist, for example, published three
separate articles between 2010 and 2012 entitled “The Chinese are
135 Interview with author, RDA official, July 2013.
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coming…” on the expansions of Chinese tourism, Sino-African trade
and media.136. If one followed only Western news, one would likely
be under the impression that China dominates the Zambian copper
sector and is widely despised for their horrid working
conditions. This is exacerbated by human rights NGOs which tend
to view the Chinese as inherently dictatorial and dismissive of
labor and human rights, while ignoring similar violations by
Western firms. In order to gain a more accurate view of the
Chinese presence in Africa, it is important to focus on very
recent research (since 2008) and African media sources, as well
as seek out both governmental and nongovernmental reports.
Thus, Sino-African history is based largely on the political
conflicts of the Cold War and the African economic renaissance of
today. Though buffeted much by the harsh winds of imperialism,
Africans continue to exercise their agency in choosing leaders
and allies, limited options though they may be. China and
Africa’s success in overcoming their histories of global
oppression and underdevelopment is yet to be played out, but an
136 The Economist. “Chinese tourism in Britain: The Chinese are coming.” December 29, 2010. “Banyan: The Chinese are coming,” March 4th, 2010. “Chinesein Africa: The Chinese are coming…to Africa” April 22nd, 2011.
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economic partnership without their former colonial masters is a
step in the right direction.
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IVBuilding the Chinese DreamThe economic partnership between Africa and China has been
the driving force behind the renaissance of Sino-African
relations, above and beyond any political considerations. China
has proven its interest in a long-term business partnership, and
has engaged in sincere South-South cooperation in both Tanzania
and Zambia – although some serious issues have surfaced. After
staunch growth for the past three decades, the Chinese economy is
resource-hungry, and unprecedented levels of foreign reserves are
forcing the Chinese to invest wherever they can.137 African
nations, on the other hand, are coming out of two decades of
Western-led economic and political reforms that have led to
unprecedented economic openness, which the Chinese have taken
advantage of. Thus, while Chinese investment is by and large a
very positive development for the continent, there is often
137 “China to Use Forex Reserves to Finance Overseas Investment Deals,” Bloomberg News, January 14, 2013. Retrieved from (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-14/china-to-use-forex-reserves-to-finance-overseas-investment-deals.html)
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inadequate enforcement of labor, safety, and environmental
regulations by African governments.
This chapter will analyze these burgeoning economic ties.
First, the state of Sino-Tanzanian and Sino-Zambian economic
relations will be broken down into extraction, construction,
investment and immigrant activities. Then a wide variety of
issues with Chinese business will be reviewed, ranging from
Chinese immigrants involved in poaching ivory to an unintentional
destabilization of the East African Community (EAC). Finally,
this chapter will sum up the impact of Sino-Africa’s multifaceted
business relations, concluding that China’s most beneficial role
in Tanzania and Zambia has been support for their infrastructure
projects and investment diversification.
What is China Looking for in Africa?
Chinese-African trade is, in fact, only one part of a global
strategy that is directing Chinese businesses to invest, extract,
and expand at unprecedented levels.138 In terms of resources, oil
138 Brautigam, p.279. Also, in Joshua Eisenman’s breakdown of China-Africa trade, he concludes that five causal factors drive the trade: Africa’s plentiful national resources; China’s comparative advantage in manufacturing; rapid Chinese growth; China’s emphasis on, and Africa’s needs of, infrastructure-building; and China’s formation of massive shipping and light
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makes up an estimated two-thirds of Chinese-African trade,
dominating relations with oil exporters yet not affecting oil-
less Tanzania and Zambia.139 Metals are next; the Chinese are
engaged in large operations extracting cobalt from the DRC,
copper from Zambia and uranium from Niger. On the other hand,
China’s foreign reserve surplus has been behind rapidly expanding
investment in African infrastructure, manufacturing, and banking.
What do African Nations Want from China?
African nations want reliable and fair trading partners that
invest in diverse industries and infrastructure projects. There
are several major obstacles to economic development in Africa,
including but not limited to poor governance, inadequate
infrastructure and resource dependence. Of these, infrastructure
development has been the major beneficiary of Chinese investment.
Chinese export-import businesses have begun by focusing on the
continent’s resources, but are expanding to other industries.
Infrastructure is key to development in Africa, and is the
largest area of investment for Chinese companies in Tanzania. A
manufacturing industries.139 Kelley, Jeremy. “China in Africa: Curing the Resource Curse with Infrastructure and Modernization” p.38
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2013 World Bank report estimated adequate infrastructure could
bring productivity levels up 40% across the continent.140
Businesses need a reliable supply of electricity and transport
networks to manufacture and ship goods. Private citizens also
benefit directly from paved roads, electricity and clean water
supplies.
Tanzania’s most pressing development issues lie in its poor
infrastructure, educational system, and poor local governance.
Tanzania’s dismal education system can only be aided by the
Chinese with the construction of schools and educational advice;
the real reform must be enacted by the Tanzanian political
elite.141 The Chinese will not directly act to improve Tanzanian
local governance or to reduce local corruption as part of their
economic engagement.142 China’s most useful role in Tanzania has
been in the form of infrastructure development, including working
140 This includes telecom networks, electricity networks, railways, ports and roads. “The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013,” p.69141 The Tanzanian public educational system is linguistically fractured; primary schools are in Swahili, while secondary and onwards are in English. The transition between primary and secondary schools is handled poorly, and many Tanzanians fail to make much of secondary education, as their English-language courses are insufficient.142 The Chinese could certainly have a policy of ‘do no harm’ and come down strongly on Chinese that engage in local corruption.
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with the port system, road construction and other general
infrastructure.
Zambia needs roads and economic diversification; since its
creation as a nation-state, Zambia’s economy has been dominated
by the copper industry, leaving it vulnerable to commodity price
fluctuations. Additionally, Zambia’s position as a landlocked
state makes transportation links incredibly important. China has
thus played a similar role in taking on Zambia’s infrastructure
deficit, and has additionally aided in investment
diversification.
The Role of Diasporas
Though Sino-African trade is still dominated by government
loans and state-owned enterprises, immigrants are playing an
increasingly important role in developing trade links between the
subcontinents. Away from the five-star hotel meetings and Sinopec
board meetings, thousands of Chinese are moving to Tanzania and
Zambia as economic migrants. They come largely to escape the rat
race, and to make a few quick bucks before going home to start or
rejoin a family with new savings.143 Though their English and 143 Interview, Bank of China, Lusaka.
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Swahili language skills are often sorely lacking, they learn to
get the message across in mines and markets, and shop employees
learn to understand their pidgin English.144 The size of China’s
immigrant population is poorly documented – a reasonable estimate
puts it at 60,000 in Zambia – but it is clear the diaspora in
Zambia is larger than Tanzania and continuing to increase.
Estimates for Tanzania range from mere hundreds to tens of
thousands.
Tens of thousands of African university students and
immigrants in China have been central to the creation of trade
links between the continent and the country.145 The Chinese
government offers scholarships to African students, and many from
the new middle classes see China as a cheaper alternative to a
Western degree.146 In a 2011 study, Heidi Haugen found that
“Africans may arrive in China as students and leave the country
as traders in Chinese goods as they compensate for
dissatisfaction with the academic experience by entering into
144 Authors’ observations, Lusaka, Zambia.145 David Leblang’s article “Familiarity Breeds Investment” found diaspora networks have a significantly positive effect on cross-border trade.146 As well, Chinese universities are well-advertised in Africa. Haugen, “China’s Recruitment of African University Students” p.315
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business.”147 In 2012, the Chinese Ministry of Education put the
total number of African students in China at 27,052.148
147 Haugen, p.332148 To compare, there were just over thirty thousand in the US a year before. Retrieved from (http://www.campusexplorer.com/college-advice-tips/E311AB9D/African-International-Students/)
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Resources for Infrastructure?
It is common for Western observers to sum up Chinese-African
trade relationships as African resources being traded for Chinese
infrastructure (or investment). In Chan-Fishel et al.’s study of
Chinese deals in four African nations, the authors support a
model of resources for investment (referred to as R4I). While
noting “Beijing is not the only country on the Continent offering
aid and investment in exchange for natural resources,” they
caution African leaders looking to play Chinese and Western
companies off each other in search of a better deal.149 It should
also be noted that this report is nearly seven years out of date.
Chinese extraction efforts and infrastructure building are
large themes in Sino-African relations, yet a resources-for-
infrastructure model tends to cloud over other important aspects
of their relations. The Chinese government has sent tens of
thousands of health workers and engineers to the continent, and
thousands of private citizens are migrating annually for business
reasons. The rhetoric and actions of Chinese officials paint a
149 Chan-Fishel, Michelle; Lawson, Roxanne. “Quid Pro Quo? China’s Investment-for-Resource Swaps in Africa” 2007 p.
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government genuinely interested in South-South cooperation and
mutual development.
The lynchpin of the claim that the Chinese are
neocolonialists is the idea that China is exploiting Africa in
its quest for resources. At face value, a comparison of European
colonialism and Chinese expansion is deeply misleading. The
Chinese pay for resources and do not have the Wests’ historical
baggage of centuries of unequal and deeply exploitative dealings
with Africa. The Chinese policy of noninterventionism is the
antithesis of historic Western policy. When journalist Wu Yi
responded to Jane Goodall’s accusation that “China is merely
doing what the colonialists did,” he pointed out that the Chinese
feared similar Western exploitation when their economy was opened
in the 1980s. Instead, “China took the opportunity of dealing
with developed economies, and became what it is now.”150 While
this view clearly emphasizes the Chinese approach (a solid work
ethic laced with pragmatism), it also highlights Chinese optimism
for Africa, an attitude rarely shared by Western authorities.
This is not to say that Chinese racism doesn’t exist; it is a 150 “Goodall wiser on chimps than ‘colonialism’” Global Times, February 23, 2014.
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disturbingly common trait amongst Chinese peoples, both at home
and abroad.151 But this does not necessarily constitute
exploitation.
All Roads Lead ToLusaka
Chinese business in Zambia is a mixed bag. China’s
involvement in the Zambian economy is still focused in the
Copperbelt Province on copper extraction and smelting, but is
diversifying into manufacturing and construction. Chinese
economic involvement in Zambia is led by Chinese SOEs and large
private companies, as well as the Chinese government’s offer of
loans. However, the growing Chinese diaspora has vastly
complicated and diversified Sino-Zambian business ties.
What Business?
Extraction
151 “Michael”, a Chinese trader the author interviewed in Kasama, Zambia, called Zambians “lazy” and “unhygienic” after attempting to relate to the author’s skin tone. The only local friends any immigrant had was their colleagues.
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Chinese-Zambian relations took off largely on the back of
several investments in Zambia’s previously-dormant copper mines
made in the late 1990s and early 2000s. High global commodity
prices have made for profitable business, and the Chinese have
expanded from extraction into processing and smelting in Zambia.
Most Chinese investment in Zambian extraction industries is
through the China Non-ferrous Metals Mining Corporation (CNMC),
but there are also a few scattered private organizations. Chinese
mining has been amongst the most controversial of their
operations in the country, and miners’ wage disputes have given
rise to violence.
Chinese state-owned investments in the Zambian copper
industry consist of two mines, a smelting plant, a processing
plant, and processing facilities. CNMC began by buying the
Chambishi mine in 1998, during Chiluba’s privatization drive.
Purchased for $25 million, CNMC invested $125 million in its
renewal, reopening it in 2003 to fanfare.152 CNMC opened Sino
Metals three years later, providing “lower-level processing into
152 Human Rights Watch; “You’ll Be Fired if You Refuse”; Labor Abuses in Zambia’s Chinese state-owned Copper Mines, 2011.
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exportable copper cathode” for Chambishi’s copper.153 In 2009, the
unproductive Luanshya mine was sold off by its majority-Indian
owners to the Chinese, whom promptly returned the mine to
activity.154 The same year, CNMC opened the Chambishi Copper
Smelter.
Collum Coal Mine, which operated from 2000-2013, was a
private Chinese venture that was plagued by labor conflict and
environmental irresponsibility. It was eventually taken over by
the Zambian government. Collum was initially funded and operated
privately by three brothers from Jianxi province that began work
with encouragement from the local government. From the beginning
Collum ran into environmental problems, and was accused of
contaminating local water supplies. In its later years, Collum
was beset by pay disputes, riots and a shooting. The government
took over in February 2013, citing a wide range of issues
including riots, pay disputes, and safety and environmental
concerns.155 The Zambian parastatal currently in charge of Collum
153 Ibid.154 “Kambwili Accused of Illegally Occupying Golf Course Land” Zambia Reports, May 6, 2013.155 “Zambia revokes Chinese mine licenses on poor safety” Reuters, February 20,2013.
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Coal Mine is waiting for a private company to buy it back. If a
Chinese parastatal takes over, it would indicate the government’s
willingness to bail out failed ventures by private Chinese
citizens.
Construction
Not long after assuming office, Sata announced the Link
Zambia 8000 (LZ8K) project, which seeks to build or revamp over
8000 kilometers of road over a five-year period.156 The goal of
LZ8K is, according to the Road Development Agency, “to construct
an efficient road network and international highways linking
Zambia [to all its neighbors].”157 Split into three phases and
countless segments, Chinese parastatals and private companies
handily outcompete rival firms from Britain, South Africa and
Zambia.158
Chinese businesses have aided in construction across many
other sectors of the Zambian economy, including power
infrastructure and communications. Chinese investors have been
156 “Sata launches phase one of the Link Zambia 8000 Project” The Post, September 20, 2012.157 Zambia Development Agency. 2013. “Infrastructure Sector Profile.” P.5158 RDA official, interview with author, July 22nd, 2013.
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behind construction of dams, stadiums and fiber-optic lines in
Zambia. Most notably, the Chinese funded the Levy Mwanawasa
Stadium, home to the Zambian national football team. Chinese
telecommunications have remained limited to Huawei, who budgeted
two million dollars for marketing alone in 2013.159
In 2006, Hu Jintao announced that China would be building
its first African Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Copperbelt
Province. Built in Chambishi, this SEZ focuses on mineral
processing and, according to Yejoo, has “led to increased output
and job creation.”160 A second, subzone SEZ was announced the same
year, but construction did not begin until 2010. This second SEZ
is located just outside of Lusaka, and focuses on manufacturing,
including “garments, food, appliances, tobacco, [and]
electronics.”161
Chinese Immigrants
In Lusaka and Copperbelt Province, Chinese immigrants
unaffiliated with SOEs are setting up shops and small companies.
Some of these migrants work in the mines as managers, but most
159 “Huawei budgets $2mn for marketing in Zambia.” ItWebAfrica, July 9, 2013.160 Yejoo, Kim. “Chinese-led SEZs in Africa” p.7161 Brautigam et al., “African Shenzhen” p.32
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work in shops that are directly or indirectly connected to the
copper industry. This has led to resentment by local traders,
whom are easily outcompeted by cheap Chinese products. Chinese
entrepreneurs have dealt with this growing resentment by having
their Zambian employees deal with shoppers and keeping a low
profile.162 This is aided by their conglomeration of several shops
– interviews with Zambian employees in Lusaka revealed that
Chinese bosses visited between once a day and once a month, to
restock and take count.
Blue, Gold, Black andGreenbacks
After the TAZARA project, an active attempt to energize the
Tanzanian economy, Chinese economic involvement in Tanzania
remained limited to select aid projects, medical workers and the
occasional refinancing loan for the partially-defunct TAZARA
railway. Chinese involvement remained relatively low-key until
multibillion dollar projects signed over the past four years.
Between 2011 and 2012 alone, Chinese direct investment in the 162 Interviews with the author, Lusaka, Zambia, July 2013.
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Tanzanian economy tripled from $700 million to $2.1 billion.163
Recent large investments by China in Tanzania have focused on
building much-needed infrastructure, as well as showcase
projects, such as the Benjamin Mkapa Stadium in Dar es Salaam.
Extraction
In Tanzania, the main extractive sectors are natural gas,
coal, gold and other precious stones and metals, with major
recent Chinese gains in access to coal, gas and iron. In 2012,
China National Gold Group Corporation began talks with Canadian-
owned African Barrick Gold to take over their largest mining
operation in Tanzania. Talks fell through in early 2013, however,
as the companies were unable to agree upon a price, and China
remains outside of Tanzania’s gold industry.164 Though Chinese
companies have not entered the Tanzanite extraction sector
either, a private Chinese jewelry company signed a deal in late
2013 to import finished stones.165
163 “China’s investment in Tanzania surges” The Citizen, February 15, 2014.164 “African Gold Miner in Limbo” Wall Street Journal, January 8, 2013.165 “Tanzanite supplier to meet Chinese demand” Mining Weekly, October 11, 2013.
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In 2011, the Chinese company Sichuan Hongda signed a $2.5
billion deal with the Tanzanian government to gain access to iron
and coal deposits.166 This consists of three major construction
projects: the Mchuchuma coal mine; the Liganga iron mine; and a
600MW thermal power station. The projects will be under joint
ownership, with 20% owned by the Tanzanian National Development
Corporation (NDC). The NDC will be able to increase its shares to
49% once Sichuan Hongda has recouped their investment costs.
These projects were completed in 2012, and are coming online.
Tanzania has also recently discovered large reserves of
natural gas off the coast, which the Chinese are poised to get
involved in. South from Dar es Salaam, where the gas fields were
discovered, the Chinese loaned Tanzania $1bn in October 2011 for
the construction of an Mtwara-Dar es Salaam gas pipeline. At the
time, the energy ministry had estimated only around ten trillion
cubic feet of natural gas, but that number had tripled by mid-
2012.167 The Ministry of Energy and Minerals announced it expected
the reserves to increase fivefold more in the next two years, to
166 AidData.org, project #1928167 “Tanzania’s Natural Gas Reserves Almost Triple on New Finds” Bloomberg News, June 20, 2012.
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200 trillion cubic feet, which would place Tanzania’s reserves in
the top ten worldwide.168 It seems unlikely the subsidiaries of
China Natural Gas, Inc. will remain uninvolved in the Tanzanian
gas fields over the coming years.
Construction
The Bagamoyo deal signed in early 2013 sets up financing of
around $10 billion to go towards building a ‘mega-port’, a
special economic zone (SEZ) and a railway network. This is a
combination of Tanzanian requests for a better port and adoption
of the successful Chinese model of SEZs in other nations.
Tanzania’s role as a gateway to the sea for its landlocked
neighbors (Zambia, Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, eastern DRC)
has been an underused source of revenue for the usual reasons;
clogged ports, poor road and rail infrastructure, and
dysfunctional bureaucracies. The new port in Bagamoyo will be
capable of moving 40 times more containers than the Dar es Salaam
port, which currently handles goods worth 60% of Tanzania’s
GDP.169 The special economic zone, costing between $300 and $500 168 “Energy industry sees much promise in Tanzania” Financial Times, September 30, 2013. 169 The Dar es Salaam port has a widespread reputation for being backlogged, asnoted by several traders interviewed in southern Tanzania and in Zambia.
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million, will consist of a wide range of industrial parks.170 The
SEZ is also expected to benefit from its close proximity to Dar
es Salaam and pre-existing power infrastructure.171
Chinese contractors have also been deeply involved in
building roads, internet infrastructure and airports in Tanzania.
Over a thousand kilometers of road have already been built by
various Chinese contractors under bids from the Tanzanian
government, but several may be banned from future work for
“collusive practices” that took place in the Philippines. After
the African Development Bank (AfDB) announced a $112m loan to
build a highway from Arusha, Tanzania to Tengeru, Kenya in April,
2013, reports emerged that the contract had already been given to
China Geo Engineering.172 China’s Eximbank has also extended a
loan to build a national fiber-optic network.173 As well, in 2007,
170 This includes, according to a report by the Tanzanian consulate in Dubai, export processing zones, industrial parks, a tourism park, a free trade zone, free port facilities, science and technological parks, an international business center and industrial sheds.171 “Bagamoyo Special Economic Zones”, Tanzanian Consulate Dubai.172 There was then an initial error in the construction, resulting in a sectionprone to heavy flooding, China Geo immediately agreed to rebuild the portion between January-April 2014. In2EastAfrica. (2013, November 18). African Development Bank. (2013). Project Appraisal Report; Arusha-Holili/Taveta-Voi Road Project. Abidjan: OITC Department173 “China, Tanzania sign loan agreements on ICT, air transport infrastructure.” People’s Daily, April 17, 2010
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the Sonangol group signed up to revamp the Dar es Salaam airport,
but this seems to have largely fallen flat.174
Chinese Immigrants
Though Chinese business in Tanzania mostly consists of
large-scale projects carried out by Chinese parastatals, a
growing number of Chinese immigrants have begun small businesses
in Dar es Salaam’s Kariakoo district. After outcompeting their
Tanzanian compatriots for a few years with cheap (directly
imported) Chinese products, they have formed the Kariakoo Chinese
Chamber of Commerce (KCCC). In its opening act, the KCCC got over
200 Chinese signatures for a statement on ethical standards to be
upheld. According to KCCC’s spokesperson, this includes paying
all the relevant taxes (a rarity for small-scale traders), good
conditions for Tanzanian employees, cooperation with Tanzanian
traders, and supplying “quality Chinese products in the local
174 Yin, B. (2012, March 2). Chinese investment in Tanzania bears bitter fruit | Beibei Yin | Global development | theguardian.co.uk. Retreived from (http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/mar/02/chinese-investment-tanzania-airport-eviction)
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market.”175 The Minister of State replied by urging Tanzanians to
“continue cooperating with them in every way.”176
Issues from the EastPoaching
A major issue for the Tanzanian government in dealing with
Chinese immigrants is their involvement in the illegal ivory
trade.177 Poaching of endangered animals and violations of the
international ban on ivory trade have increased over the past few
years. Chinese traders find the ivory trade to be lucrative, and
the biggest markets for ivory are in East Asia. Some Chinese
immigrants to Tanzania have taken advantage of rising Chinese-
Tanzanian trade ties, Tanzania’s loose National Park boundaries,
and underpaid rangers to participate in the slaughter of around
850 elephants every month.178 In early November 2013, three
Chinese nationals were discovered with over seven hundred tusks
175 “Kariakoo Traders Urged to Work Together” Tanzania Daily News, January 27, 2014.176 Ibid.177 This is a much smaller, but still significant issue in Zambia and South Africa.178 “Kagasheki unveils Chinese ivory haul in Dar es Salaam” IPPMedia, November 3, 2013.
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at their home in Dar es Salaam, worth nearly $5 million.179 They
have not yet been convicted, and President Kikwete has agreed to
burn, rather than sell the ivory in order to keep the ivory out
of the global marketplace entirely.180 On the 3rd of January, 2014,
a shipping container full of tusks was seized at the Dar es
Salaam port.181 In Zambia, there has been less evidence linking
the Chinese to a rise in poaching, yet an Oxpeckers report
revealed the involvement of Chinese middlemen in moving ivory out
of Zambia through neighboring nations.182
‘Stealing’ Resources
There has been little indication Chinese parastatals are
signing particularly unfair trade deals in Tanzania and Zambia’s
extraction industries. However, private Chinese companies are
likelier to flout local tax laws or otherwise defraud the
government. Upon Sata’s election in 2011, he fulfilled a campaign179 “Case on illegal possession of tusks facing Chinese nationals adjourned” IPPMedia, December 31, 2013.180 Operation Tokomeza, a military-driven anti-poaching campaign, faced a fair amount of controversy for its usage of torture against villagers whom may or may not have been complicit in poaching. Kikwete halted, and then re-launched Tokomeza in early 2014, in order to up the ante in the anti-poaching fight. “Putting ‘Operation Tokomeza’ in its perspective” Daily News, December 22, 2013.181 It was not clear whether there was Chinese involvement. “Container full of elephant tusks seized in Dar” IPPMedia, January 3, 2014.182 “Zambezi’s ivory poaching exposed” Lusaka Voice, March 27, 2014.
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pledge to double mine royalties, aiming to support a government
budget focused on poverty reduction.183 In Tanzania, Chinese
involvement in the extraction industry has not expanded
sufficiently, nor are the deals transparent enough, to understand
the current state of Chinese business dealings. Historically,
many African nations have struggled to make good on the promise
of their natural resources, and there are few signs this has
changed significantly. However, leaders have been negotiating
increasingly beneficial deals. This has probably been helped by
the diversification of business partners; with China in the mix,
African unions and governments have greater leverage. Corporate
responsibility has also been helped by the flourishing of
initiatives such as the Extractive Industry Transparency
Initiative, a mechanism for self-reporting that is increasingly
used in both Tanzania and Zambia.184
Quality Control
Chinese construction quality has improved drastically over
the past few decades, yet shoddy construction remains a common
183 “Zambia to double mine royalties” Financial Times, November 11, 2011.184 More information available at www.eiti.org
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complaint against Chinese contractors. In Tanzania, a World Bank
ban on several Chinese construction companies indicted for
corrupt practices in the Philippines may be extended to their
non-World Bank work in Tanzania. The debarred companies include
several of China’s largest constructions SOEs.185
Unfair Competition
There have been recurring concerns that cheap Chinese
imports undermine local manufacturing industries, as well as
complaints by African traders that Chinese immigrants are unfair
competitors. Most notably outside of Tanzania and Zambia, textile
industries have been closed in both Southern and West Africa. In
Zambia, Chinese immigrants and private businessmen have been
competing with Zambians in a number of sectors for more than a
decade now, and a combination of government and civil society
actors have worked to change the landscape for Zambian traders.186
Zambian employees replaced their Chinese bosses as the faces of
many of the businesses, partly due to negative publicity as well
as increased conglomeration of stores.187 In Tanzania, on the 185 “Dar road works at risk as WB bans 3 firms,” The East African, January 23, 2009.186 This includes the 2008 subcontracting law.187 Interviews with author, June 22-23, Lusaka, Zambia.
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other hand, Chinese traders in the Kariakoo market have sought to
deflect local resentment through self-organization.
Equitable Growth?
As Mohan and Lampert point out, “the African actors that
appear to benefit most are often political and business elites
and this might reinforce unaccountable modes of political and
economic governance as well as highly uneven distributions of
wealth and power.”188 It’s widely accepted in development circles
that inequality rises before it falls, as business elites make
millions before the new middle classes become a majority. With
the increasing complexity of global investments, it is difficult
to hold Chinese investment solely responsible for the increasing
inequity seen in most of Africa. The question remains, however,
if investment, by the Chinese or others, is limiting the ability
of African nations to ensure current economic growth does its
part to lift people out of poverty.
Labor Conditions
188 Giles, Mohan; Lampert, Ben. “Negotiating China: Reinserting African agency into China-Africa relations” 2012, p.110
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The flashpoint of Chinese relations in Zambia has been
around labor conditions. A tragic accident at an explosives plant
in 2005, followed shortly by a shooting at a miner’s strike,
catalyzed global concern for Zambians working in Chinese-owned
operations. These incidents and the wider state of Chinese mining
in Zambia have been highly controversial in the West, and have
dominated much of the debate over the Chinese presence in Zambia.
The highly influential organization Human Rights Watch
recently published a report on labor abuses at Chinese state-
owned copper mines, claiming that Chinese mines “fall short of
practices among the copper mining industry elsewhere in
Zambia.”189 Several supporters of the HRW report are discredited
by their usage of a wide range of factual inaccuracies.190 Barry
Sautman and Yan Hairong, however, tackle HRW’s report in an
article entitled “Barking up the wrong tree,” claiming that the
report “reinforces erroneous notions promoted by Western media 189 “’You’ll be Fired if you Refuse’ Labor Abuses in Zambia’s Chinese State-owned Copper Mines.” Human Rights Watch, 2011.190 For example, the widespread claim that Sata won on an anti-Chinese ticket –he ran on that in 2006, but dropped it from his rhetoric in 2008 and 2011. This claim is also made in a Time article by Jennifer Cheng, available at (http://world.time.com/2013/07/16/six-chinese-megaprojects-across-the-globe/slide/collum-coal-mine-in-zambia/), and a New Yorker article by Alexis Okeowo,available at (http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/currency/2013/10/china-zambia-and-a-clash-in-a-copper-mine.html).
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and politicians.” Specifically, they accuse the report of
“[playing] into the racial hierarchy in Zambia” by demonizing
non-white mine owners. Sautman and Hairong ask if it is “a
coincidence that HRW studies of abuses in the mining industry in
Africa have been confined to one about a Chinese SOE and two
others that implicate the Zimbabwean government, a target of
Western sanctions?”191 The Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ) has
also repeatedly defended Chinese miners.
However, the HRW report isn’t to be entirely dismissed. The
report’s discussion of low Chinese wages was not strongly refuted
by Sautman et al., and has been backed up by other observers. The
privately-owned Collum Coal Mine, which was not part of the HRW
report, had a long string of trouble with employees and
government regulations before being shut down in early 2013. It
may be that Chinese state-owned corporations’ shareholders (that
is, the Chinese government) keep them from the most egregious
violations of Zambian regulations. There are fewer Tanzanians
working on Chinese managed projects, but the numbers are steadily
191 Sautman, Barry; Hairong, Yan. “Barking up the wrong tree” Pambazuka News, 2011.
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rising with the recent Bagamoyo deal and associated construction
deals.
Comparing the success of Tanzanian and Zambian laborers
resisting employment casualization (the transformation of
permanent positions to less-stable short-term contracts) by
Chinese managers, Ching Kwan Lee notes the divergent state
methods of negotiation as being central to employees’ success.192
Chinese decision-making was similar at the two worksites in their
pursuit of profits, but in Zambia, the Chinese sought long-term
site-specific development, which required acquiescence to
employee demands.193 Chinese labor relations in Africa are thus
dependent upon several key factors, including long-term vs.
short-term investment, profit margins, and location flexibility.
The ratio of Chinese to African laborers also varies widely
across the continent, from Zambia’s one-to-fifteen to Angola’s
one-to-one.194 This disparity is due to the type of project and
availability of skilled labor – road-builders are plentiful in
192 Employment casualization is the process by which long-term contract workersare moved onto shorter-term contracts, often with less benefits. This makes iteasier for employees to hire and fire, but destabilizes workers.193 Lee, Ching Kwan. “Raw Encounters; Chinese Managers, African Workers and thePolitics of Casualization in Africa’s Chinese Enclaves.” P.665194 Moyo, Dambisa. “Winner Take All.” P.159
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peaceful Zambia, while oil engineers are in short supply in war-
torn Angola. There have also been complaints that the Chinese
import semi-skilled labor that could be found locally, such as
drivers and cooks. Thus, labor relations between Chinese managers
and African laborers cannot be easily generalized, but there is
insufficient evidence to endorse the idea that African staff get
a worse deal under Chinese managers.
Private Chinese Entrepreneurs
Chinese businessmen working on their own volition in African
nations have often engaged in the most risky and law-defying
operations. Zambia’s privately-owned Collum Coal Mine, for
example, was lacking any emergency medical facilities when it was
taken over by the Zambian government in early 2013.195 In 2007,
the private businessman Sam Po, representing a consortium of
companies including China Sonangol, signed a deal to upgrade the
Dar es Salaam airport and revive the national airline Air
Tanzania. In return, China Sonangol was granted licenses to
explore oilfields in southwest Tanzania. Though the eviction of
195 “Zambia revokes Chinese mine licenses on poor safety” Reuters, February 20,2013.
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1300 local residents was carried out, construction has not made
any progress in the past few years, and the oil deal was
revoked.196 This lack of constraint on the part of private Chinese
actors likely stems from lowered concerns around image – they are
less likely to worry about the general image of China in Africa
compared to state-owned enterprises.
Environmental Issues
China’s record on environmental issues is mixed; many
Chinese entrepreneurs have little regard for the environment, yet
also invest heavily in green industries such as solar power. The
prioritization of development in the world’s most populous nation
has created domestic environmental disasters, and China’s sprint
for resources and businesses abroad has similarly taken advantage
of weak enforcement of environmental laws in Africa. Zambia’s
Collum Coal Mine is an example of the dangers of weak local
political structures on environmental issues; local governance
encouraged private Chinese investment, yet failed to hold the
company to account when local water sources were contaminated.
196 “Chinese investment in Tanzania bears bitter fruit” The Guardian, March 2, 2012.
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Upon the mine’s closure, the Minister of Mines Yamfwa Mukanga
said that the mines issues largely derived from unqualified
employees.197
Lack of agricultural trade
Agriculture makes up a quarter of the Tanzanian economy and
a fifth of the Zambian economy by GDP, and constitutes around
three-quarters of the labor forces in each country.198 Yet
agriculture, Africa’s historically dominant sector, has generally
failed to benefit from China’s economic engagement with the
continent.199 According to a 2009 study by Nelson Villoria,
agriculture’s mediocre gains are due to Chinese price
inflation.200 This has negated any gains in Sub-Saharan African
food exports to China over the past decade, even though China
grew enormously as an overall food importer during the same
period.201
197 “Zambia revokes Chinese mine licenses on poor safety” Reuters, February 20,2013.198 CIA World Factbook199 China’s main agricultural imports from Africa are soybeans, palm oil and wheat.200 Villoria, Nelson. “China’s Growth and the Agricultural Exports of Sub-Saharan Southern Africa.”201 Villoria, p.534
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Unintentional Effects on the East African Community
China’s recent deals in Tanzania have caused ripple effects
through the East African Community, causing Tanzania to be
effectively isolated by its neighbors Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda
(dubbed the ‘coalition of the willing’ by local media).202 Shortly
after the Bagamoyo deal was signed, leaders from Kenya, Uganda
and Rwanda met and formulated plans for the expansion of the port
at Mombasa, Kenya and a regional rail network. They also began
organizing closer regional cooperation, including a regional
passport, without Tanzania or Burundi. Tanzania has historically
been a less successful economy than these three (in ratio to
population size), yet its stability is a source of envy in the
region. This chapter in EAC relations seems likely to be a
Kenyan-led response to the Bagamoyo expansion, and is
characterized as such in the local press.203 The exclusion of
Burundi, however, means the coalition of the willing are not only
responding to Chinese business in Tanzania, but have a genuine
internal cohesion.202 The EAC, revived in 2000, was originally just Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. Rwanda and Burundi joined in 2009. Burundi has also been left out of the ‘coalition of the willing.’203 Wekesa, Bob. “China Connection in East Africa’s Infrastructure Wars, State Rivalries,” Business Daily, October 22, 2013.
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Additionally, the coalition between Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda
does not seem to have an anti-China agenda. China pledged $5bn in
grants and concessional loans to the port and rail Kenyan
project.204 The recent inclusion of South Sudan into the mix has
also strengthened the Kenyan plan, as the new nation is currently
applying for EAC membership and attended the opening of the
Mombasa port.
ConclusionThough the picture of economic engagement between China and
Africa is muddied by a lack of transparency by their respective
governments, it seems clear that infrastructure construction is
booming while private Chinese investment remains quite limited.
However, the foreign and domestic obstacles that historically
held back African growth have not been entirely vanquished, and
Western companies that previously made up the bulk of investment
in Africa remain cautious investors. Though the general economic
engagement trends are similar in Tanzania and Zambia, Zambia is
likely to achieve greater benefits from Chinese business than 204 “Presidents welcome Mombasa port expansion” Business Day Live, August 30, 2013.
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Tanzania in the short term, primarily due to Zambia’s strong
unions, competing investors, and economic diversification into
manufacturing and agriculture. Though government pressure is
minimal in Tanzania, Chinese actors have recently recognized
their image problems and are tackling them. In both nations,
however, private Chinese businessmen have proved themselves
lower-quality economic partners than their state-owned
counterparts.205
205 However, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which requires compliant nations to report payments by oil, gas and mining companies, has reported slow, yet uneven improvements over the past few years in levels of taxation and fraud. Nonetheless, only 5 of 30 compliant Tanzaniancompanies reported paying corporate income taxes. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, Zambia Reconciliation Report for the Year 2011. EITI,Tanzania Reconciliation Report, 2011.
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VIs China Sinifying Africa?A defining feature of the debate over China’s impact on
African nations is the concern that the Chinese will ‘export’
their human rights record and governance style to Africa, thus
reinforcing local human rights and corruption problems. Yet this
analysis is flawed both in its assumption that the Chinese aim to
export their style of governance and in its ignorance of China’s
nonintervention policy. Rather, China has little interest in
preaching Chinese values, and China’s commitment to uncritical
support (noninterventionism) supplies the freedom to make
domestic political decisions without foreign interference to all
their partnering African leaders. Of course, these African
leaders’ decisions may be to the detriment of their
populations.206
To take on the issue of the political impact of the Chinese
on Tanzania and Zambia, this chapter is split into two major
206 In Tanzania, for example, Western pressure on an increasingly repressive regime is being lifted by lessening dependence upon Western economic aid through a shift to Chinese funding.
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sections. The first section takes on the issue of whether China
is exporting its political values to Africa. This will be
assessed using the paradigms of soft power and diplomacies,
breaking down the most important Chinese political values and
analyzing whether they are being pushed in Tanzania and Zambia.
Once it is made clear that the Chinese have little interest in
exporting their political values, the discussion will move onto
an assessment of China’s noninterventionist policy. It will then
be noted that noninterventionism is a hallmark of Chinese
involvement in Africa, and that it simultaneously creates
political breathing space for African leaders while enabling
dictatorial tendencies.
What are Global Values?
Global values are a wide range of values that cover the
political, economic and social realms, and represent the ideal
systems leaders wish to see realized. These values overlap
between the realms; for example, the social value of
individualism commonly held in Western societies is reflected in
their push for individual political rights – democracy. This
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study is concerned specifically with political values, and will
thus focus on the values that are supported and represented by
politicians, government officials and government institutions.
This includes concepts such as the union of state and party,
freedom of political expression, and accountability. Political
values are the specific concepts within political culture that
can be exhibited or promoted by the nation’s politicians and
government officials.
What is Soft Power?
Soft power is generally recognized as the brainchild of
Joseph Nye, whom first defined soft power in 1994 as “getting
others to want the outcomes that you want.” Soft power works as
it “co-opts people rather than coerces them.”207 This definition
has been expanded by the Chinese, whom tend to view “everything
except traditional military coercive measures” as soft power.208
Chinese academics and politicians are pushing for an expanded
definition of soft power to include economics and it is likely
that the definition of soft power will continue to evolve. Thus,
207 Nye, Joseph. “Soft Power” 2004. 208 Li, Xin; Worm, Vernon. “Building China’s Soft Power for a Peaceful Rise.” P.225
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the definition of soft power in play here is non-coercive power;
the vehicle in which Chinese political values could be shipped to
Africa.
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Chinese Soft Power
Historically, the Chinese have struggled against a narrative
that paints them as regional aggressors, proselytizing
Maoists/communists, and most recently, shoddy manufacturers. The
Hu Jintao administration made increasing soft power a primary
directive, spending billions of dollars on expanding foreign news
services and government cultural institutions. As part of his
address to the 17th National Congress of the CPC, former
President Hu Jintao spoke of China’s need for increased soft
power resources;
We must keep to the orientation of advanced socialist culture, bring about a newupsurge in socialist cultural development, stimulate the cultural creativity of thewhole nation, and enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country to betterguarantee the people's basic cultural rights and interests, enrich the cultural life inChinese society and inspire the enthusiasm of the people for progress.209
In 2012, the world’s leading soft power index ranked China
22nd globally, as well a 5th and 6th in the sub-indices of
education and culture.210 As the report notes, “China’s curbs on
individual freedom, heavy-handed management of the press, and an 209 Hu Jintao. “Hu Jintao’s Report at the 17th Party Congress” October 15, 2007.210 McClory, Jonathon. “The new persuaders III” 2012. As defined by The New Persuaders III, the five quantitative sub-indices are business/innovation, culture, diplomacy, government and education. The subjective measures include cultural output, cuisine, soft power icons, national airline/airport, global leadership, design/architecture and commercial brands. These subjective measures are decided upon by a panel at the Monocle and Institute.
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aversion to political criticism, undermine its efforts to
generate soft power.”211 Fijalkowski additionally points out that
only half of soft power is how well the Chinese sell it; the
other half is whether Africans are willing to buy it.212
At best, China’s ‘soft power’ instrument in Africa is the appeal of its ‘model’ ofdevelopment, and the idea of a new type of strategic partnership with Africa basedon political equality and mutual trust – the scripted ‘win-win’ cooperation mantra.But different agents are involved in Chinese African policy, and the government’sability to ensure that these diverse agents will act according to the general policygoals is highly limited.213
China’s intention to allay Western fears over aggressive
expansion while attracting under-developed partners is neatly
summed up in the well-touted concept of ‘peaceful development.’
In 2003, Hu Jintao coined the term ‘peaceful rise’ to describe
the Chinese assumption of world power and assuage those that
worry China is a threat to global security.214 It was changed to
‘peaceful development’ in 2004, as the term ‘rise’ was considered
too aggressive.215 For Westerners concerned about their own
relative decline, peaceful development is an obvious attempt to
convince them that China has no ill intentions on the world
211 McClory, p.13212 Fijalkowski, Lukasz. “China’s ‘soft power’ in Africa” 2011, p.231213 Fijalkowski, p.231214 Li and Worm. 215 Xiaoxiong, Yi. “Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition: Understanding China’s‘Peaceful Transition’” 2005.
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stage. For nations in the global South, peaceful development
represents the possibility of stable and sustainable growth.
What is Chinese Soft Power Made Of?
For the intents and purposes of this paper, Chinese soft
power will be understood by the definition laid down in Li and
Worm’s article on the topic, “Building China’s Soft Power for a
Peaceful Rise.” They identify six pillars of soft power and three
channels for wielding soft power.216 These pillars are cultural
attractiveness, political values, development model,
international institutions, international image, and economic
temptation, and the three channels are economic, formal and
cultural diplomacies. Efforts to expand Chinese soft power
generally focus on promoting a better global understanding of
Chinese culture and history. Chinese soft power, however, faces
at least one major stumbling block; the contradiction between a
centralized autocracy and the individual free-for-all that
culture production thrives on. Worst of all for the Chinese
government, some of China’s best-known celebrities passively or
216 Li, Xin; Worm, Vernon. “Building China’s Soft Power for a Peaceful Rise.”
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actively oppose the government on the grounds of human rights and
democracy.217
Chinese Political Values
Chinese global values have been almost entirely defined by
the Communist Party of China as a result of its six-decade
domination of Chinese politics. The face of China on the world
stage is essentially that which the CPC presents. Having ruled
mainland China for more than six decades, a fair amount of
fluctuation in values has occurred under the CPC. The largest
national shift in Chinese political values has been the influx of
market-economy ideologies under Deng Xiaoping.218 Today, the most
relevant political values for this study are the one-party state,
pragmatism, non-interference, the developmental state, and South-
South cooperation.
The most conspicuous political value that the Chinese
exhibit is the one-party state. The Communist Party of China has 217 Internationally renowned artist Ai Weiwei, for example, has been jailed andbeaten for his criticism of the government.218 This disruption of ‘your grandfathers’ socialism’ has led to massive socialupheaval, a quickening of urbanization and economic growth, and increases in inequality and global Chinese networks. Younger Chinese are more urban and connected, and have thus been slowly departing from the traditional family structure, which has placed large burdens on them through the one-child policy.
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been the only legal political party since 1949, and there are few
signs the CPC is loosening its grip on power. Apart from the
obvious reasons of self-interest, the CPC view the one-party
state as instrumental in ensuring political stability and
continued economic growth. Chinese leaders argue strongly against
the imposition of democracy in foreign countries, citing the
instability and ineffectiveness inherent to democratic regimes.
Modernization or economic development remains the priority
of the Chinese state under Xi Jinping. The corresponding
political value can be understood as government-led economic
development, better known as the developmental state. The
Japanese government has been a model for the developmental state,
having developed it in the postwar period.219 Brautigam et al.
note the Chinese developmental state as being “especially
difficult to disentangle [abroad],” owing to the continued
dominance of state-owned enterprises in international business.220
Nonetheless, it is an attractive value for the scores of nations
with millions still mired in poverty.
219 Brautigam, Deborah; Xiaoyang, Tang. “Economic statecraft in China’s new overseas special economic zones: soft power, business or resource security?”220 Ibid.
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A commonly-cited Chinese value is pragmatism, and an ability
to adapt to difficult situations. Though some scholars and
journalists use outdated and racist stereotypes of the ‘huddled
masses’ to justify the necessity of pragmatism, others have found
evidence for such an attitude in interviews and social
research.221 Sociologist Tom Doctoroff examined twelve
“quintessential Chinese behavioral characteristics” and declared
two of them to be “pragmatic elasticity” and “incremental
pragmatism.”222 He notes this elasticity to be a result of the
regimented nature of Chinese society, which gives extra clout to
those that display “clever resourcefulness.”223 However, this also
leads to moral relativism and the usage of bribery as a tool to
get by in tough situations. Incremental pragmatism, on the other
hand, explains how resourcefulness fits into a strictly-
structured society; there is a common trajectory of progress for
Chinese men, and individual progress is inevitably slow.224
221 See “Asia’s Mired Huddled Masses” by Sheila Tefft, 1995.222 Doctoroff, Tom. “The China Code: A Continuum of Twelve Quintessential Chinese Behavioral Characteristics.” P.123223 Doctoroff, P.127224 This Confucian saying describes it well; “At fifteen my heart was set on learning; at thirty I stood firm; at forty I had no more doubts; at fifty I knew the mandate of heaven; at sixty my ear was obedient; at seventy I could follow my heart's desire without transgressing the norm.” Quoted in “Billions:Selling to the New Chinese Consumer” by Tom Doctoroff, p.91
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Pragmatism as a political value for this study holds
relevance in work ethics and the habit of gift-giving. Gift-
giving is a widespread practice in China, used by citizens,
employees and officials to smooth the path ahead and gain
promotions, favors or simply better service; it is essentially
corruption.225 The Chinese state under Xi Jinping has made active
efforts to crack down on such behavior, such as outlawing the
usage of public funds to buy mooncakes, one of the most common
gifts.226 Another widespread form of gift-giving in China is the
usage of public funds for cigarettes, which have become a heavy
habit in China.227
Perhaps the most important Chinese political value is
noninterventionism, though it is clearly self-defeating to
suggest that the Chinese would export it. Noninterventionism, or
silence, states that governments should not intervene in
another’s politics, especially against the wishes of the ruling
government. Noninterventionism is actively promoted across global
225 “China trying to pull back on gift-giving” by Los Angeles Times, October 16, 2013.226 Ibid.227 See “Tobacco as a Social Currency: Cigarette Gifting and Sharing in China” by Rich, Zachary C; Xiao, Shuiyuan
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forums, and is responsible for some of the most glaring breaks
with Western politicians, whom often view intervention as a
necessary tool in civil conflicts and a useful one in economic
conflicts.228 Chinese noninterventionism includes governance
styles; Chinese officials claim China does not export or push its
values on other nations. The Chinese claim of noninterventionism
is a complex concept, and it is not always clear when private
suggestions become arm-twisting.
Finally, South-South cooperation is a strong rhetorical
tactic the Chinese have undertaken to explain their connections
to Africa and other parts of the global South. Justified by
China’s historical support of the Non-Aligned Movement and
African independence movements, China positions itself as a non-
exploitive partner that seeks ‘mutual development’ alongside
African nations. Officials highlight similar colonial histories,
and the ongoing plight of an unfair global economic power
structure is emphasized. South-South cooperation thus states
China and Africa are natural allies, and that China is in Africa
228 Most notably, Western nations intervened economically in Africa in the late1980s and 1990s by forcing borrowing nations to carry out certain reforms through structural adjustment packages.
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for the mutual good of Africans and Chinese. South-South
cooperation is likely the Chinese political value most explicitly
exported by the Chinese, as it advocates that Africans should
look east for beneficial economic partnerships.
Exporting ChineseValues
There is an important distinction to make when discussing
the export and import of political values – unlike physical
trading, the imported value will not be the exact same as the
exported value, as it changes to exist in the new context of the
importing nation. This is true whether Western values or Chinese
values are being addressed. While the Chinese seemingly have
little interest in exporting their political values, there is a
general tendency to promote a more statist approach to the
economy and governance. Ultimately, the exchange of political
values between China and Africa has much more to do with what
African leaders view as attractive and adaptable to their
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context, rather than any attempted export of Chinese values. Yet
it is important to give an overview from the Chinese side first.
Economic Diplomacy
Chinese use of economic diplomacy has not been explicitly in
support of Chinese political values. In describing the
developmental state abroad, Brautigam and Xiaoyang point out that
the Japanese model used “official aid, export credits and
investment support” in order to expand overseas, and that the
Chinese have by and large followed this model.229 However, this is
not necessarily aimed at exporting economic or political models,
but instead an active effort to expand economic links for the
benefit of the Chinese state. Economic diplomacy is thus likely
implicitly promoting the Chinese model of the developmental
state.
Formal Diplomacy
Chinese ambassadors and officials are the most important
spokespeople for the Chinese government, and have made a number
of comments pushing back against the imposition of Western values229 Brautigam, Deborah; Xiaoyang, Tang. “Economic statecraft in China’s new overseas special economic zones: soft power, business or resource security?” p.802
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on Africa. However, they have avoided promoting their own
political values, instead leaving Africans to choose their own.
Thus, what is useful to analyze is which Western political values
the Chinese have pushed back against most consistently.
The Chinese may no longer make fiery anti-capitalist
speeches, but Western democracy still draws ire, leading to the
implicit promotion of the one-party state by Chinese officials.
As Ian Taylor notes, “Liberal democracy has in fact been held up
by the Chinese as a source of much of Africa’s woes (going
directly against the Western mainstream view that it is a lack of
democracy that helps account for Africa’s maldevelopment).”230 In
2005, a prominent Chinese official stated “For a starving man,
which should he choose, bread or ballot, if he is supposed to
choose only one? The ballot is of course important. But he must
feed himself with the bread before he can cast a ballot.”231 This
statement signals a deep-rooted pragmatism in Chinese political
culture, combining China’s developmental state and one-party
state to push for rapid, centralized economic growth.232 Thus, 230 Taylor, Ian. “Sino-African Relations and the Problem of Human Rights”, p.69231 “Human rights can be manifested differently” Xinhua, December 12, 2005.232 This pragmatism can be considered partly responsible for the emphasis of development over democracy.
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formal diplomacy implicitly supports both the one-party state and
the developmental state.
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Cultural Diplomacy
Chinese cultural diplomacy has focused on promoting Chinese
culture and history, thereby implicitly supporting the
aforementioned five global values. One of the most successful
initiatives of the Chinese government in this area has been the
Confucius Institutes. Founded in 2004, there are now over 320
throughout the world lodging at various academic institutions.233
Their stated goal is to teach and promote Chinese language and
culture, as well as encourage trade ties; by all accounts
considerable success has been achieved. There are now three
Confucius Institutes in Tanzania (two in Dar es Salaam, one in
Dodoma) and one in Zambia.234 The Chinese have also engaged in
various bilateral cultural exchanges – the first Spring Festival
(known by many as the Lunar New Year) celebrations in Zambia were
held in late January, 2014. These same celebrations have been
held in Tanzania since 2010, similarly funded by the Confucius
Institutes. In Tanzania, the opening of the China Library in
233 Nearly 40 of these are located in Africa, according to Confucius Institute Online. This is much less than the nearly 500 in North America, but is at least partly related to the comparative lack of universities and colleges available to host them.234 “Worldwide Confucius Institutes,” available at (http://www.chinesecio.com/m/cio_wci)
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September 2012 was attended by the Tanzanian Minister of
Education.235 A travelling photography exhibit on “Henan in the
Eyes of World Photographers” in Tanzania in 2011 had an extended
section titled “Rediscover China”.236 Thus, much like economic and
formal diplomacies, cultural diplomacy avoids explicitly
promoting Chinese political values.
Importing ChineseValues
There is a rising body of journalists and policy-makers in
Africa who advise Africans to learn from but not copy the
Chinese. The Gabonese ambassador to China stated that “The rise
of China calls for every African, including me, to take pause and
think. Africa cannot imitate the Chinese model, but we can learn
from [their] experience.”237 As African democracies solidify and
economies grow, the success story of the Chinese economy stands
out amongst non-Western nations. However, the (mostly Western)
235 “China opens library in Tanzania to boost exchange,” CCTV English, September 27, 2012236 “Speech by H. E. Ambassador Liu Xinsheng at the Opening Ceremony of the Photo Exhibition.” June 13, 2011237 Allo, Emmanual M. Interviewed by Weijuan, Yan; Zhijian, Li. October 2011.
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international outcry against China in Africa that arose in the
wake of the 2006 FOCAC meeting has given some African leaders
pause. Thus, despite China’s immense diplomatic and economic
gains across the continent, there are still very few Africans
that actively or explicitly seek out Chinese culture and
governance style.
While African leaders largely embrace Chinese investments
wholeheartedly, the more democratic and better unionized nations
are savvier in negotiations that benefit the population. Zambia,
for example, has had notably better results than Tanzania in
bargaining for improved conditions and wages. Reasons for this
revolve around their respective governments and civil societies.
Zambian unions are much better organized and more powerful than
their Tanzanian counterparts, and political power has changed
hands in Zambia (which likely leads to better political
accountability). Most Zambian jobs are also neither transportable
nor as impermanent.238
One-Party State
238 Lee, Ching Kwan. “Raw Encounters; Chinese Managers, African Workers and thePolitics of Casualization in Africa’s Chinese Enclaves.” P.665
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The one-party state is a very attractive model to African
nations still resisting multiparty democracy, as well as to those
that gained power through elections but now don’t want to lose
it. Tanzania, fitting in the first category, has grown
increasingly repressive over the past few years in a bid to stem
growing opposition parties. In Zambia, on the other hand, Michael
Sata’s PF came to power through opposition parties, and the
spirit of anti-authoritarianism that Sata channeled is now
returning to challenge his rule.239 This is also reflected in Mo
Ibrahim Foundation’s Index of African Governance, which shows
that civic participation and human rights have gone in two
different directions in Tanzania and Zambia since 2000. While
Tanzania’s score has declined slightly as a result of an overall
decline in participation and gender equality, Zambia has improved
enormously in participation and rights.
The Party of the Revolution at the Ballot Box
Over the past few years, electoral fraud, corruption and
political repression have ramped up under CCM’s rule – an organic
239 Sata’s PF is largely centered around his charisma. He has jumped ship from the ruling party twice, from Kaunda’s UNIP to Chiluba’s MMD in the mid-1980s, and then left MMD in the mid-1990s.
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response to a growing opposition. It is thus difficult to claim
that Tanzania is ‘importing’ the one-party state; rather, CCM’s
nostalgia is reinforced by their increasingly important alliance
with China’s powerful one-party state. In the early 1990s CCM saw
one-party states crashing around them, giving way to multiparty
elections. CCM thus saw the transition as inevitable and thus the
only option, and democratized despite the wishes of a
conservative electorate. CCM held onto power as economic growth
resumed, but incompetence in tackling corruption and heavy
handling of the opposition has recently increased support for the
opposition.
As Tanzania comes closer to kicking CCM out of power, CCM
increasingly views elections as dangerous distractions, and views
the CPC’s lack of opposition with some envy. The question is thus
whether CCM views the one-party state as a viable option to which
to return, or if the tools of repression of electoral fraud
should be utilized in order to retain power in a multiparty
environment. The appearance of a Chinese official at CCM events
is not new, yet its consistent reoccurrence can be considered a
breach of China’s noninterventionism and a display of ignorance
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by the Chinese government. CCM leaders have struggled immensely
with bringing Tanzania into modernity, and China’s repressive
response to similar opposition movements thus probably seems like
an attractive option.
State repression can also been seen as a stopgap measure for
elections, keeping a lid on opposition support to ensure the
ruling party’s electoral victory. For the CCM, China is a
generous economic partner whose projects can energize the
Tanzanian economy and redeem the CCM as a key developmental
partner, thus winning the CCM further elections. In a thorough
breakdown on Jamii Forums, Tanzania’s main online political
forum, a journalist and self-described CCM supporter noted
Tanzania’s incredible fortune in avoiding political conflict
despite many factors correlated with it being present.240 He goes
on to claim that CCM’s support comes not from wise policy
decisions but from “cautious Tanzanians who see a vote for CCM as
a vote for the peaceful political culture.”241 Clearly, Tanzanians
240 This includes high unemployment, a large youth population, a very ethnically and religiously heterogeneous society, chronic foreign aid dependency, and neighboring military insecurity.241 Mchambuzi, “CCM, Chadema and the Theory of Conflict and Violence.” 2011.
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are becoming increasingly incautious as CCM grows ever more
skittish. This is a dangerous combination.
Zambian Democracy
In Zambia, a fractious political system has hardened
presidents, whose personal governing styles have defined the
benefits they see in Chinese partnership. Thus, while Levy
Mwanawasa used increasing Chinese investment to advance his
anticorruption agenda, his successor President Banda used the
same economic growth to devalue the anticorruption agenda. Today,
the question of the one-party state lies in the hands of the
fiery populist President Michael Sata.
Michael Sata has been successful in jumping parties as a
means to gain power, and he displays some clear anti-democratic
tendencies. Sata’s interest in building a security state similar
to China’s has been demonstrated in several cases. In August
2013, the Zambian government awarded a $210m contract to ZTE to
build a network of security cameras, claiming it was to catch
speeding drivers and to curb criminal activity.242 It was revealed
242 “Zambian government defends controversial CCTV contract” by Lusaka Voice, August 27, 2013.
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that ZTE had won the contract without bidding, despite interest
shown by other companies.243 The government thus abandoned the
plans and instructed the Anti-Corruption Commission to
investigate.244 A month later, at a meeting with Chief Jumbe,
President Sata revealed he had been spying on him, stating that
“Every 24 hours I know what happens everywhere you go, in your
bedroom all the 24 hours of the day…Why did you criticize my
introducing Paramount Chief Mpezeni?”245 There are also reports
that a bug was planted at the desk of King Lubosi Imwiko, leader
of the nonviolent secessionist Barotseland movement.246
There have also been less believable reports on China’s
involvement with Sata’s administration. Most interestingly, there
is a report that the Chinese government has aided the Zambian
state intelligence services in spying on their own people. This
claim arose from the Zambian Watchdog, that Huawei’s $48m fiber-
optic cable network in Zambia is a front for installation of
243 “Corruption Concerns over ZTE’s No-Bid Contract in Lusaka” by Zambia Reports, August 24, 2013.244 “Government terminates the CCTV $210 million contracts, instructs ACC to investigate” by Lusaka Times, September 5, 2013.245 Chao, Rebecca. “Zambian President Admits to Spying on Fellow Officials,” published on TechPresident, October 16, 2013.246 “Spying device found on Litunga’s chair, as suspect flees to State House,” by Barotsepost, July 8, 2013.
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hacking devices on all Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in the
country. Huawei immediately issued a denial, and no evidence has
surfaced to support the claim.247
These cases indicate that Michael Sata sees the Chinese one-
party state as a favorable model. However, intense press scrutiny
has taught him that the destruction of Zambia’s vibrant
multiparty democracy would be very difficult and would come with
harsh repercussions. Instead, he has gone a middle way, offering
muddled by-election seasons as opposition politicians defect to
the PF.248 Though his autocratic tendencies may be shared by the
Chinese, the Chinese do not see much value in aiding Sata in his
quest for power. Chinese companies that are involved in building
Sata’s security state are doing so out of self-interest, not by
instruction of the Chinese of government; contracts are to be
had. The Zambian people, however, increasingly view multiparty
247 “Huawei distances itself from Zambian Watchdog accusations,” by HumanIPO, September 5, 2013.248 At least 1600 MMD members, led by six constituency officials and an ex-provincial chairman, defected to the PF in 2013. For more information see “Political Defections” by the Zambian Economist, April 8, 2013. Available at (http://www.zambian-economist.com/2013/04/political-defections.html). For information on by-elections, see Motsamai, Dimpho. “By-elections galore in Zambia: Is parliamentary democracy under threat?” July 5, 2013.
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competition as the defining feature of democracy.249 Thus, Sata’s
autocratic tendencies, which may be reinforced by his view of the
Chinese one-party state, face fierce resistance from both the
public and the media.
Noninterventionism
The question of exporting Chinese noninterventionism to
Tanzania and Zambia might be considered a non-issue. Neither
Tanzania nor Zambia are involved in intervening in other
countries, and have not taken part in direct (non-peacekeeping)
conflicts since the 1979 Tanzania-Uganda war. Mentions of
noninterventionism by African leaders is largely related to
Chinese noninterventionism towards them, or rejection of
interventionist Westerners. However, noninterventionism may be
becoming rhetorically popular; in defending Chinese investments
in Tanzania, President Kikwete said “Our investment conditions
don't include democracy standards or values of the investors'
country of origin.”250
249 31% of Zambians in 2013 view fair multiparty elections as the “most essential characteristic of democracy” up from 21% in 2005. Compiled from Afrobarometer.250 “JK defends Chinese investors” IPP Media, October 6, 2012.
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Pragmatic Gift-Giving
Gift-giving as a form of bribery already exists in African
nations, most obviously in cases of buying votes and securing
favors from low-level officials (teachers, policemen etc.).
However, it is fundamentally different from Chinese gift-giving:
African gift-giving is not nearly as widespread if one does not
count the palming of small bills. Chinese gift-giving is
ubiquitous and some might contend that it is not always corrupt
behavior per se. The issue of giving gifts directly to African
heads of state, such as by building presidential residences, is
possibly the example of Chinese gift-giving that causes the most
concern for those worried about Chinese reinforcement of corrupt
African practices. It has the ability to reinforce the notions of
the political elite’s ‘right’ to luxurious living, which can
trickle down from the presidents’ office to other regional
political leaders keen on a luxurious lifestyle. Best known in
Kenya as the wabenzi, the luxuries that governments’ afford their
parliamentarians and other officials is attracting a wide range
of criticism.251 This criticism is not just from domestic lower
251 Wabenzi literally means owners of Mercedes-Benzes, named after the propensity of the ruling elite for the German model.
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classes and the West, but is increasingly coming from political
elites looking to burnish their name in the anti-corruption
fight.
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South-South Cooperation
After decades of Western interventionism in the form of
political turmoil and economic dependence, the Chinese concept of
South-South cooperation might be considered incredibly
refreshing. Though Sino-African relations contain a wealth of
concepts, South-South cooperation represents at least three major
changes for African leaders. First, it is an assertion that
African leaders need not go to the Western international
financial institutions for loans or aid, gaining them some
breathing room. Secondly, it tells them to look East for new
partnerships. Finally, it provides leaders with a more evenly
balanced relationship that does not make automatically make
Africa the ‘dependent’ or ‘recipient’ in said relationship
(though the reality may play out quite differently). South-South
cooperation is thus quite popular throughout Africa. South-South
cooperation can only be tenuously linked to poor governance
through its rejection of Western political values. Yet even these
neither explicitly nor necessarily implicitly lead to corrupt
behavior – only if the rejected Western norms include rational-
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logical bureaucracies, transparency or accountability. It would
thus be difficult to argue that South-South cooperation is in
fact a means to directly entrench poor governance; only that it
may be defending those who practice it.
The Developmental State
The issue of the developmental state is quite complex and
ill-defined, but can be largely understood as a question of the
state vs. the free market’s role in national economic growth.
After independence, most African states chose to go the way of
state-led development, nationalizing industries and resources and
developing statist economic policies. However, mismanagement,
entrenched corruption, poor educational systems, and an often
hostile global economic environment led to decay within state-
owned enterprises. The privatization of the 1990s is unlikely to
be reversed, but the state can lead development in other ways. A
production-oriented private sector, for example, is something
that the government can influence but not directly mold.
The Tanzanian State
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From the perspective of government leadership, Tanzania is
especially lacking. President Kikwete has made development a
national priority, yet according to development expert Joseph
Ayee, he does not have “the vision…a developmentalist ideology
and the commitment” required for development-oriented
leadership.252 Kikwete may not be an example of especially poor
governance, insofar that he has not massacred his own people or
destroyed economic growth, but he is certainly an example of a
mediocre and uninspiring president. National development planning
in Tanzania is aspirational rather than problem based. The
government has stated it aims to bring Tanzania to middle income
status by 2025, yet this would require high levels of sustained
growth as seen in only a few other countries.253 Rather, the
Tanzanian leadership seems to muddle through development, taking
a backseat in the growth of the Tanzanian economy to global
commodity prices and ambitious Chinese infrastructure projects.
252 Ayee, p.266253 Moyo, Mujobu; Simson, Rebecca; Jacob, Arun; de Mevius, Francois-Xavier. “Attaining Middle Income Status - Tanzania: Growth and Structural Transformation Required to Reach Middle IncomeStatus by 2025.”
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In terms of larger government and private-sector roles, the
record of a Tanzanian developmental state is similarly dim. In a
government report on sustainable development in Tanzania, the
state house admitted that “insufficient institutional framework
for coordination” and “insufficient involvement of local
authorities and communities” remain major challenges to
Tanzania’s progress.254 It would be hard to argue that state
autonomy, as defined by Ayee, is rife in the Tanzanian state; it
is better known for a weak and corrupt bureaucracy. Public
service is improving, yet many of these functions are being taken
over by private initiatives that bypass the government and do not
extend to the poorer and more rural sections of society. The
expansion of human capacity is aided by international
initiatives, yet the Tanzanian state itself fails to adequately
address the issue. Lastly, the question of whether Tanzania
harbors a production-oriented private sector is rather muddled –
there are few indications the private sector is up-and-coming in
any way, and cooperation with the government is somewhat limited.
254 “National Report for the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio+20” 2012. P.40
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Overall, it does not seem that Tanzania is a developmental state,
or is seriously moving towards one.
The Zambian State
As one of the first proponents in Africa of privatization
and deregulation in the 1980s, the Zambian government has done
little to encourage the creation of a development state.
Neoliberal economics have only come under fire in Zambia when
they have directly threatened the status of mineworkers, and even
then remarkably rarely. In a 2012 op-ed in the Zambian Post,
Mbita Chitala argued that the “current international financial
crisis points to the collapse of laissez faire economics and
discredits market fundamentalism,” and that a “developmental
state” was necessary for Zambia to seriously tackle rampant
poverty.255 Yet apart from Sata’s efforts to revamp national
infrastructure, little effort has been made to create such an
active role for the government in Zambia’s economic growth –
Zambia is not tending towards a development state.
255 Chitala, Mbita. “Why Zambia is Poor,” the Post. April 30, 2012.
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Sinification? Not InThis Nation.
It is clear that the Chinese government’s efforts to expand
their soft power resources have not resulted in widespread
adoption of either political or social values in Tanzania or
Zambia. This should not surprise observers, given how much values
are molded by history. Rather, any ‘import’ of Chinese political
values is merely opportunistic reinforcement on the part of
African leaders. Indeed, Chinese noninterventionism itself is a
defining feature of their likability on the continent. But what
does this entail for Africans?
How About We Try Not Intervening
Theoretically, nonintervention means that China does not
intervene in the affairs of a nation.256 Though noninterventionism
is partly a reaction to Western military interventions, it also
has political and economic dimensions. Politically, the Chinese
government perceives its rule within China (which, from its 256 Outside of Africa, this has resulted in controversial positions being takenby the People’s Republic of China at the UN Security Council, such as opposition to intervention in Syria.
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perspective, also includes Taiwan) as sacrosanct. Any country
which criticizes its handling of Tibetan demonstrations or who
supports Taiwan's purchase of defensive weapons is viewed as
meddling in the affairs of state. Logically then, China tells
developing nations, and the world at large, that it will not get
involved in their domestic affairs. Chinese support for this
policy is simple; within the Chinese political elite today,
according to Wenran Jiang, “there is a strong belief that
conflict resolution is primarily realized through domestic
dynamics, and that foreign interventions are less decisive, do
not really work, and are often counterproductive.”257 Chinese
officials argue that sovereignty is the basis of a peaceful world
order, and that development is difficult, if not impossible, when
the developing nation faces constant interference from foreign
powers. When the Chinese criticize democracy and Western notions
of human rights, they do so from an angle that sees these as
impositions, unwelcome foreign interventions that do more harm
than good.
Noninterventionism in Africa
257 Jiang, Wenran. P.56
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Pang argues that “China has long observed and defended the
principle of ‘non-interference’ or ‘non-intervention’”; yet
China’s observance of non-intervention in Africa only extends
back to the late 1970s.258 Before this, China was actively
involved in supporting various militant groups across the
continent, such as Mozambique’s FRELIMO and Angola’s UNITA.
Noninterventionism has since taken center stage in Sino-African
relations, especially in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen incident.
The incident earned China harsh criticism from the West, but
several African leaders defended the Chinese on the basis of
sovereignty.259 Emphasis of noninterventionism became a method to
ally China with African nations, whom faced similar histories of
colonization and economic oppression. China’s non-interventionist
role on the continent is most visible in situations such as
Sudan, where the PRC repeatedly vetoed related UN Security
Council resolutions from 2005-2007.260
Chinese non-interventionism divides opinions, as African
political freedoms clash with Western insistence on good 258 Pang, Zhongying. “China’s Non-Interventionist Question,” Global Responsibility to Protect, 2009.259 Taylor, p.443260 Hu Jintao later privately convinced Sudan to accept a peacekeeping force.
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governance. Thus, the Chinese government does not advise others
on how to govern or run their economies, and is quite uncritical
in its dealings with African leaders. To Westerners with moral
superiority complexes, this can be aggravating; the Chinese are
missing opportunities to ‘teach’ Africans how to govern. For the
African political elite, however, Chinese silence means the
replacement of requirement-ridden IMF loans with simple, soft
Chinese loans, creating breathing space for politicians.
Western Criticism
Chinese noninterventionism is criticized by the West for its
passive support of dictators and violators of human rights. In
states such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, Chinese partnership has at
best been as a passive bystander. At worst, China actively aids
and abets repressive regimes in their domestic campaigns of
violence. There is also an implicit criticism that the Chinese
have ‘stolen the spotlight’ from the Western-supported economic
and political reforms that have rolled out in Africa over the
past three decades. Multilateral engagements do not draw as much
attention, but Chinese intentions are questioned: are
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peacekeeping missions “an unobjectional way for China to fly its
flag.”?261
Western powers have consistently criticized the Chinese for
leaving good governance off of the agenda, yet Western history
undermines their own rhetoric in Africa. Former US Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton called Chinese engagement in Africa “new
colonialism.” In 2012, she told a crowd in Senegal that “America
will stand up for democracy and universal human rights even when
it might be easier to look the other way and keep the resources
flowing.”262 The argument that the Chinese are leading Africans
away from a path of democratization and modernization encounters
several obstacles. First, it assumes democracy and modernity are
necessary for African nations. Secondly, this argument assumes
that these are issues that can only be promoted by Westerners,
and makes them indistinguishable from Western political culture.
These criticisms also fail to take into account a comparative
analysis, which would point out American and French friendships
261 Richardson, Anna. “Beijing’s Blue Berets: UN Peacekeeping and the Evolutionof Chinese Diplomacy.” 2013262 Ghosh, Jayati. “Hillary Clinton’s morally superior speech in Africa was deluded.” Available at (http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2012/aug/07/hillary-clinton-speech-africa-deluded)
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with a number of what would otherwise be pariah states. 263 Most
critically, Western critiques are flawed by their continual
ignorance of African agency, painting African leaders as merely
followers of foreign trends rather than active shapers in their
own destinies.
African Freedom, Chinese Consistency
What Chinese noninterventionism means for the African
political elite is increased freedom for political elites.
Specifically, this freedom comes from a stark contrast with the
history of Euro-African relations, and the slow erosion or
transformation of European domination on the African continent.
Much of this comes from the change in financial donor – IMF
requirements pertaining to economic reform and good governance
are glaringly nonexistent in Chinese loan agreements.264
Though the 2005 Gleneagles Summit saw the cancellation of
over 95% of Tanzanian and Zambian debt respectively, these
governments continue to need external support to back the annual
263 Hecht, Gabrielle. “An elemental force: Uranium production in Africa, and what it means to be nuclear.” 2012264 It also comes in the form of uncritical rhetoric – Africans do not need to worry about damning criticism from their biggest partners.
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budget. This historic summit saw the G8 agree on the Multilateral
Debt Relief Initiative, which, combined with the Enhanced Highly
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, cancelled nearly all
of Tanzania and Zambia (and 17 other nations’) public debt.265
This gave nations a clean slate, but new funding was conditional.
In particular, these countries needed to reform and improve their
taxation. Many countries had either no system to collect taxes or
the systems were too weak to provide the state with the resources
to provide necessary educational or health services. Thus,
countries could borrow more from the West, if they chose to do
so, but had to sign up to a slate of new government requirements.
From the Western perspective, improving taxation and trimming
bloated bureaucracies was intended to limit such new debt to
manageable levels. From Africa, it looks like a continuation of
manipulative Western policy.
A major question, then, is whether non-intervention can be
interpreted as silent support for fiscal irresponsibility or poor
governance. A leader with a history of poor governance and
repression may continue this path because his domestic
265 Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative Fact Sheet, by the World Bank.
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imperatives outweigh the effects of international criticism. From
the perspective of African leaders, non-interventionism is a
policy of consistency; the Chinese will invest in their nation
before and after their gaffes. Thus, if the Chinese become
economically involved in a nation, taking over from hesitant
Western lenders, will countries end up more indebted and worse
governed?
Noninterventionism is a negative policy; one can
economically intervene by promoting policies within a
multilateral institution as requirements for loan-receiving
nations. The most obvious example of this is the Western (largely
US) economic interventions in Africa from the late 1980s onward,
when structural adjustment programs (SAPs) were implemented as
requirements of necessary IMF loans.266 While there have been
negative consequences of SAPs, it is unclear if these negative
consequences are because of how the SAPs were implemented,
because there was inadequate accountability, or because the
programs themselves were not economically sound.
266 For more on neo-liberal reforms in Africa, see “Organised Labour and Neo-Liberal Economic and Political Reforms in West and Central Africa” by Piet Konings.
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An implicit criticism of the uncritical Chinese alliance
with African nations is the idea that Africans are missing out on
the reforms and requirements of IMF and World Bank loans. These
reforms most commonly came in the form of SAPs and Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).267 Yet effective and
sustainable reform will only come through legislation with
widespread political support. As Meles Zenawi pointed out,;
Good governance can only come from inside; it cannot be imposed from outside.That was always an illusion. What China has done is explode that illusion. It does notin any way endanger the reforms of good governance and democracy in Africabecause only those that were home-grown ever had a chance of success.268
Economic (Non)intervention
China’s economic presence in Africa is similarly
noninterventionist. To economically intervene is to use specific
economic activities or tools (not just sanctions but also subtler
ones like price-fixing) to affect outcomes in a foreign state, or
to attempt to change the economic structure of another state.269
Economic noninterventionism, then, is to engage economically
267 Generally speaking, SAPs push for privatization, deregulation, and the reduction of trade barriers.268 Meles Zenawi, quoted in The Dragon’s Gift, by Deborah Brautigam. P.287-288269 Thus, to be economically noninterventionist is to avoid tangling economic links with goals for foreign change. It also includes offering negative policies, reducing the need to make painful but important changes in economic practices.
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without a) using economic or political tools to manipulate a
foreign economy or b) target foreign industries. Because economic
interventionism does not include global trade, economic
noninterventionism that accompanies existing relations is
essentially a form of passive, or non-targeted interventionism.
Military (Non)intervention
According to a comparative study on Chinese vs American arms
transfers from 1989-2006, the Chinese sent more arms to
democratic nations rather than autocratic ones, relative to
American arms transfers.270 China also sent much less arms to
nations suffering from civil wars.271 However, the conflicts in
Sudan and Zimbabwe have brought China considerable negative
press. Zimbabwe’s burgeoning relationship with China was revealed
in embarrassing ways when a shipload of Chinese arms headed to
Zimbabwe was caught in South African legal limbo during Mugabe’s
wave of electoral violence.272
270 De Soysa, Indra; Midford, Paul. “Enter the Dragon! An Empirical Analysis ofChinese versus US Arms Transfers to Autocrats and Violators of Human Rights, 1989-2006.”271 Ibid.272 Though the weapons were ordered before the election, their arrival would have coincided with the worst stage of violence. South African dockworkers refused to unload it, and after being similarly rejected by Mozambique and Angola, it’s fate became foggy ; some journalists claimed the shipment went through Congo-Brazzaville, others that it was rerouted back to China. In the
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In a study of Chinese diplomacy in the wake of coups in five
African nations between 2003 and 2010, Holslag notes that China
continued “to practice conservative restraint, has avoided being
entangled in international sanctions, and has not moved an inch
from its sovereigntist principles.”273 Chinese pragmatism plays
out well in the wake of military coups; rather than immediately
condemning an illegitimate takeover, they monitor the situation,
stay low, protect their investments, and re-engage with the new
administration.274 This might have a destabilizing effect;
potential coup leaders may anticipate Chinese silence and rapid
re-engagement to sustain them in the turbulent post-coup period.
Nonintervention in Tanzania
Chinese noninterventionism in Tanzania largely revolves
around the same theme of an uncritical alliance. CCM and the
Communist Party of China are both rooted in their nations’
independence and Chinese diplomatic officials in Tanzania tend to
meantime, Sino-Zimbabwean relations settled significantly, and no above-groundmilitary deals have been made since. Spiegel, Samuel J; le Billon, Philippe. “China’s weapons trade: from ships of shame to the ethics of global resistance.” 2009.273 Holslag, Jonathan. “China and the Coups: Coping with Political Instability in Africa,” p.386274 Holslag, p.385
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point to their historic connections as a means to explain their
current relations and future prospects. This has proved to be a
successful tactic in solidifying their unofficial alliance.
In Tanzania, Chinese military intervention has taken the
form of limited military aid and connections. According to the
Aid Data project, the Chinese have invested in the Tanzanian
military through funding an Army uniform factory and a defense
college, in 2001 and 2011 respectively. Also in 2011, Chinese and
Tanzanian military leaders agreed “to further promote the
relations between the two countries’ armed forces,” according to
Xinhua.275 However, no concrete proposal or deal came out of this
meeting.276
The style of Chinese support for the Tanzanian political
elite is revealed in an odd case surrounding a coal mine. At the
end of President Mkapa’s second term, Tan Power Resources,
jointly owned by Mkapa’s family and the family of his Energy and
Minerals Minister, bought the defunct Kiwira Coal Mine for a 275 “Chinese, Tanzanian armed forces to further ties.” Xinhua, June 15, 2011.276 Considering the usual flurry of paperwork and concessionary loans, it seemslikely then that Tanzanian requests for military aid from the Chinese are quietly shelved, or satisfied through more indirect manners (such as building a defense college.) The Chinese do not seem particularly interested in gettinginvolved with the Tanzanian military.
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tenth of its valued price.277 The issue became increasingly
controversial, and Tan Power Resources stakes were redistributed
by the government. A few private companies bought stakes, and the
Minister of Energy and Minerals announced China’s intention to
issue $400 million soft loan in 2011 to aid in the reform of the
mine.278 However, it is not clear whether this loan ever came
through, and Kiwira shut down once again in mid-2012, citing
unmanageable debt loads. Instead, a $3 billion deal was signed
with the Chinese in 2011, part of which was the opening of a
separate coal mine. This case seems to reveal a willingness by
the Chinese to engage in projects that would save face for the
CCM government, balanced by a drive for profitable business.279
The most hypocritical case of nonintervention in Tanzania
is to do with party-state relations; Chinese officials have
repeatedly shown up at CCM rallies, lending their support through
277 “Kiwira coal mine saga stalemate: It’s JK to decide who gets paid, why, andwho doesn’t” This Day, December 14, 2009.278 “Tanzania shuts operations at Kiwira coal mine,” Platts, July 4, 2012.279 This also indicates as a hesitancy over the financial status of such projects. It is safe to assume that the Chinese suggested such a loan to the Ministry of Energy and Minerals, whom consequently announced it as a means forthe Tanzanian government to save face over the Kiwira scandal. The Chinese then recognized the dire straits of the Kiwira coal mine and looked to invest elsewhere; namely, the $3 billion iron and coal project announced in 2011.
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party solidarity.280 The presence of the Chinese ambassador at CCM
rallies has been quite common. After the most recent appearance,
in September 2013, Chadema cried foul, and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation responded by
stating it would “like to remind all envoys that it is against
the Vienna convention…to participate in any political rally.”281
Ambassadorial participation in these rallies suggests that the
Chinese do not hold Tanzanian multiparty democracy in high
regard, and raises questions about China’s response to a future
CCM loss of power.
The last four years have seen a drastic increase in
political repression and violence in mainland Tanzania, with
Chadema at the center of the CCM’s efforts to delegitimize the
opposition. Trouble began largely in the wake of the 2010
election, which despite being “a considerable improvement over
280 Gift-giving has also been a central tactic of the CPC in showing support for the CCM. A donation of forty-four motorcycles in December 2013, from the Chinese ambassador to the Tanzanian Prime Minister, saw the motorcycles split between secondary schools and CCM ward leaders. When flooding happened in Morogoro, January 2014, the Chinese Civil Engineering Construction Corporationrushed in to rebuild a vital bridge, and ambassador Lu arrived with a $20,000 donation and a message to believe in the “strong leadership of president Kikwete.” “Remarks by He Amb. Lu Youqing At the Donation Ceremony for MorogoroRegion Disaster Area,” Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, February 1, 2014.281 “Ministry Cautions Envoy On Politics,” Tanzania Daily News, September 18, 2013.
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previous elections” was contested by Chadema leaders and
supporters like never before.282 There have been bombings,
arrests, and even the mob murder of a CCM official. This upheaval
is virtually unheard of in the otherwise peaceful mainland.283
The violence began when a Chadema meeting turned into a
protest march on the local police station, where Chadema members
were known to be held. The police opened fire on the protest,
killing two.284 In early May 2012, the Usa River township Chadema
chairman Msafiri Mbwambo was brutally murdered, shortly after he
orchestrated a by-election win for Chadema. An ‘intensive
investigation’ was launched, and at the time the regional police
commander stated he didn’t believe the death “had anything to do
with politics.”285 In September of the same year, journalist Daudi282 “Tanzania: Freedom in the World 2013” Freedom House.283 As Ilana Kessler noted in her 2006 Honors project at Georgetown University,“The belief that Tanzania has low levels of violent conflict relative to its neighbors is so commonly accepted that authors frequently make this claim while offering no evidence of its veracity.”284 “Tanzania police kill two in Arusha at Chadema protest.” BBC News.co.uk, January 6, 2011285 Within a few days, three perpetrators were arrested – sub-village leaders whom the police suspect disliked Mbwambo’s “diligent and strict” stance on various corruption matters. When fellow Chadema officials received death threats, and the Assistant Commissioner lashed out, saying “CHADEMA officials who claim to be threatened are simply sending themselves those messages to boast their popularity and seek public sympathy which, if you ask me, is rather childish.” “Police Dismiss Meru Death Threats As Unfounded” Tanzania Daily News, May 9, 2012. “Grisly Murder of Chadema Usa River Chairman” The Arusha Times, May 5, 2012.
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Mwangosi was murdered by policemen at a Chadema protest, which
was in defiance of a ban on political demonstrations. His
assailants, though identified, have not been convicted. A few
months later, a policeman with a machete came knocking at the
door of journalist Shaaban Matutu. Matutu survived the incident
with a gunshot wound to the shoulder.286 In June 2013, a bombing
at a Chadema rally killed three and wounded more than twenty
others. It was an attempted political assassination aimed at
Freeman Mbowe, the Chadema National Chairman, who escaped
unharmed.287
While the American embassy issued a press release calling
for “the arrest, prosecution and conviction of those responsible”
for the June 2013 bombing, the Chinese embassy remained silent.288
Though it is unclear whether CCM sees Chinese silence as support
for their repressive tactics specifically, the Chinese are
helping legitimize CCM rule while doing nothing about the
political violence in the nation. This close alignment of the
286 “Journalist survives police gunshot” IPP Media, December 6, 2012.287 “Bombs Rock Chadema Rally, Three Feared Dead” Tanzania Daily News, June 16,2013288 US Embassy Dar es Salaam, Press Release, available at (http://tanzania.usembassy.gov/pr_06172013.html)
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ruling parties, however, has not led to Sinophobic rhetoric on
the part of Tanzania’s opposition parties.
Nonintervention in Zambia
Though Zambia has been at peace since the end of the
Rhodesian Bush War in 1980, the Chinese military has made low-key
moves to, in the words of the Chinese government news outlet
Xinhua, “strengthen military cooperation.”289 Chinese military aid
to Zambia included a small direct donation in 2001 of nearly two
million dollars, and two planes in 2006.290 Most recently, the
donation of eight K8P planes from the China National Aero-
Technology Import and Export Corporation to Zambia more than
doubled the Zambian Air Force’s K8P squad.291 They have also
helped restore the Maina Soko Military Hospital, providing
specialist assistance in medical equipment and human resource.292
289 In terms of military cooperation, there is more rhetoric than action. In April 2011 Zambian Army Commander Wisdom Lopa travelled to Beijing and met with the Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie. At the accompanying press conference, no grand deals were signed; Minister Liang thanked Zambia for its support on domestic issues and Lope welcomed China’s role in Zambian infrastructure creation. “China, Zambia pledge to expand military ties.” People’s Daily Online, April 3, 2011.290 All on AidData.org291 “CATIC Hands over Eight K8P Trainers to Zambian Air Force” China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation, March 21, 2012.292 Nyirenda, Catherine. “Govt Pledges to Improve Military Health Care” the Times of Zambia, November 15, 2012.
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Chinese noninterventionism was breached most notably in the
2006 election, when the Chinese ambassador threatened to cut
diplomatic relations with Zambia. This was in response to
presidential nominee Michael Sata’s description of Taiwan as a
‘sovereign state’, and a promise to recognize Taiwan if
elected.293 Ambassador Li Baodong reportedly stated that “Chinese
investors in mining, construction and tourism have put on hold
further investments in Zambia until the uncertainty surrounding
our bilateral relations with Zambia is cleared.”294 Though Sata’s
promise was only stated once and did not ever come into effect,
later reports indicated that Sata borrowed around $30 million
from the Taiwanese Green Party to fund his 2006 and 2008
elections.295
The 2006 election was seen as a referendum on the Chinese by
Western observers due to Sata’s fiery rhetoric and the Chinese
ambassador’s threat to leave, and it was won by Mwanawasa. By
early 2007, Mwanawasa was actively promoting Chinese investment.
A week before Hu Jintao signed on for $800m in investments,
293 Reed, John. “China intervenes in Zambia elections” September 5, 2006.294 Ibid.295 “’$30m debt shows Sata’s thirst for power’” Lusaka Times, March 14, 2011.
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Mwanawasa called on Zambians to improve their opinions of the
Chinese. He defended China’s role in the Zambian economy, asking
“The Chinese government has brought a lot of development to this
country and these are the people you are demonstrating
against?”296 After Mwanawasa’s death, Rupiah Banda largely
followed his footsteps in inviting Chinese investment. Sata
likely steered away from his earlier comments as he recognized
the vital role the Chinese now play in the Zambian economy, and
the heavy cost of ‘switching Chinas.’
As President, Sata has had to balance his previous rhetoric
and campaign promises against China’s golden deals. When he took
power, his first official appointment was with the Chinese
ambassador, and Sata took the opportunity to remind him that
Chinese investors are liable to Zambian laws.297 Since then, his
fiery rhetoric has translated to erratic and sometimes worrisome
action, revealing an opportunist populist at the core. Sata has
held constant by-elections, which his opponents claim are aimed
296 “Embrace Chinese firms, urges Mwanawasa” The Lusaka Times, January 26, 2007. 297 Brautigam, Deborah. “Michael Sata and China in Zambia,” October 3, 2011. Retrieved from (http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/2011/10/michael-sata-and-china-in-zambia.html)
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to confuse the political process and help his PF cronies.298 He
has also begun using the previously forgotten colonial-era Public
Order Act, which requires organizers of public gatherings to
notify the police seven days in advance. The government under
Sata has also arrested a number of opposition leaders, holding
them on various charges.299 There has been little word from either
Chinese or Western embassies on these developments.
ConclusionChinese noninterventionism has been a very popular policy in
Africa, and has been critical in gaining access to African
economies. Chinese silence has been a fresh breeze for African
leaders, and effectively negates most exportation of Chinese
values to Africa. Noninterventionism has also been key to Chinese
success in riding out illegitimate changes in political
leadership.300 For Africans, Chinese noninterventionism has
298 Tembo, Lee E. “Zambia’s Wasteful By-Elections in Perspective” Zambia Reports, May 6, 2013.299 In January 2014, Sata’s ex-ally Frank Bwalya was arrested for calling Sata a potato on the radio. As well, UPND leader Hakainde Hichilema was arrested three times within the first year-and-a-half of Sata’s presidency. “Inside Sata’s country” New African, April 1, 2013. “Zambia’s Frank Bwalya charged over Michael Sata potato jibe” BBC News, January 7, 2014.300 As well, coups do less damage to nations’ economies when international partners stick around afterwards.
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provided political breathing space and considerably friendlier
terms on loans and grants. However, it has also reduced
governmental pressure to do more in respecting political rights,
leading to an increased usage of political repression.
In Tanzania, Chinese political presence has taken the form
of low-key political support for the ruling party, Chama Cha
Mapinduzi. This interference is unlikely to challenge China’s
role in the Tanzanian economy. Political violence on the mainland
has risen considerably in the past few years, with bombings,
arrests and murders of Chadema politicians. However, there is no
evidence to suggest there is a connection to the silence
emanating from the Chinese embassy.
In Zambia, Chinese presence has inadvertently aided Michael
Sata’s rise through his instrumentalization of public discontent
towards Chinese workplace policies. The reduction of Western-
style democratic reforms is being imperfectly replaced by the
Zambian populace’s rising democratic opinions and expectations.
These are increasingly conflicting with Michael Sata’s autocratic
tendencies. Zambian leadership is increasingly challenged by
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popular opinion, yet parties themselves remain largely vessels
for leaders to fill up with their followings.
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VI The Yellow Peril inthe Dark Continent
By and large, it seems that Chinese business in Africa is an
enormous help in the efforts to realize African economic
potential. However, as Chinese-African trade continues to grow,
the bulk of it remains tied to African resources and Chinese
infrastructure projects, which raises three important questions.
Are the Chinese ‘manipulating’ Africans to get hold of their
resources? How will the relationship change as the Chinese
economy slows its growth rate? And how will increasing
independence affect African leaders’ decision-making?
In op-eds published across the continent, African leaders
and columnists call for a policy of “learn from, but don’t copy”
the Chinese, indicating a clear recognition of the impossibility
of simply transferring Chinese values. But as African leaders
attempt to adapt successful policies for their nations, values
come into contradiction. For example, the developmental state
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does not necessarily happily coexist alongside an easy
pragmatism, an issue the Chinese themselves are taking more
seriously. There is some hope in President Xi’s anti-corruption
campaign; it signals a recognition that corruption is not merely
a cultural norm but a political behavior that weakens
productivity and economics. So while there are no current anti-
corruption initiatives going on between China and African states,
it could become an implicit part of cooperation. This could
happen when Chinese companies and African states make it clear
corrupt behavior will not be tolerated. Unfortunately, high-level
judicial corruption, which is a key part of the connection
between the party and state, is unlikely to be tackled anytime
soon in China.
Rocks for Roads and Neocolonial China
The resource-for-infrastructure framework could work in two
ways. Chinese political and business leaders could approach
African nations expressing their interest in extracting African
resources, offering funding and cheap labor for infrastructure in
return. It seems much more likely, however, that Chinese business
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interests could seek out infrastructure bids, which combined with
diplomatic initiatives, sufficiently endears the Chinese to
Africans as to gain them favorable positions in bids for mining
and other resource-plundering initiatives. Kenyan academic Samuel
Nyadema argues the Chinese dangled project financing “as bait, to
secure routes to scarce natural resources.”301 However, the
concept of resources-for-infrastructure has been questioned by
scholars such as Deborah Brautigam and Ian Taylor, whom assert
that Sino-African relations are far too complex to be boiled down
to R4I. This author agrees, but notes that R4I still makes up the
bulk of Sino-African trade.
Yet there are still a few issues related to China’s conduct
in Tanzania and Zambia. In both nations, private Chinese citizens
have demonstrated a disregard for the rule of law, and a clear
prioritization of profits over environmental and labor laws.
Considering the weakness of Tanzania’s unions and taxation, it is
also likely that Tanzanians will struggle to benefit from
Chinese-owned mines. Tanzanian officials will need to do a much
better job than they are currently doing if they want to assure 301 Nyadema, Samuel, quoted in “China moves to secure prime position in mineral-rich Tanzania,” The Citizen, October 30, 2013.
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equitable benefits. In Zambia, negotiations between the Chinese,
the Zambian government and Zambian unions need to continue apace
to ensure a mutually beneficial partnership.
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China Can’t Grow Forever
Next, how might the slowing of the Chinese economy affect
the economic dynamics between China and Africa change? It seems
plausible that the Chinese will continue to encourage
manufacturing in Africa, as the Chinese economy slowly shifts
towards being service-dominated. Thus, much like the exportation
of manufacturing jobs to China from the West, Chinese
manufacturing jobs might shift to booming African nations such as
Nigeria and Ethiopia. The Chinese are likely to continue to
dominate commodities for as long as prices remain high, which
Zambian economist Moyo suggests will last a few decades.302 And if
African economies and political systems continue to strengthen,
this will translate to increased benefits from dealing with
Chinese companies.
African Agency, Adjusted
Are African nations losing out opportunities to reform their
economies by not engaging more with the IMF and other
international lenders? Despite the initial economic losses due to
302 Moyo, Dambisa. “Winner Take All,” p.5-7
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retrenchment of the bloated bureaucracy, politicians and
academics have argued that the privatization and deregulation of
the 1990s has led to a better business environment in Africa.
Similarly, the uneven nature of the reforms may have limited
their effectiveness. Given that the Chinese government generally
try to avoid any political stance that will embarrass them on the
world stage, they are likely to remain steadfastly
noninterventionist for the foreseeable future, avoiding pressing
any similar reforms in Africa.
Economic engagement between China and Africa means fewer IMF
loans, and the stringent safeguards that are required by such
agreements. The question over whether this leads to worse
governance is complex; accountability may become equally
important for both China and Africa within these trade deals.
Chinese loans and grants, rather than being provided to national
governments, where politicians can skim off the top, go directly
towards paying for infrastructure projects.303 That being said, if
trade arrangements remain minimally transparent there remain
considerable opportunities for high-level corruption to persist
303 Brautigam
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throughout Africa. This is where Tanzania and Zambia can once
again shed light on the complicated results of Chinese silence,
and possible routes for Chinese-supported African nations.
In Tanzania, the CCM is likely to continue its sporadic
usage of few repressive tools in order to make up for its fleeing
voting base. Decades of CCM rule have ensured a high rate of
loyalty within government ranks (especially the police).304 Thus,
CCM could in fact be caught in between necessary civil service
reform and losing a loyal fanbase. If CCM stays in power through
the 2015 elections, they will have another five-year to prove
themselves to an increasingly wary public. If CCM loses the
elections outright, it is possible that CCM would resort to
violent tactics to remain in power.305 It seems unlikely, however,
that the Chinese would outright support the Tanzanian government
if it were to violently crack down on opposition.306 For CCM
304 In June 2013, Chadema officials claimed that police had beaten cadres of the party in 2011, leading to a false admission of guilt over electoral violence. CCM and the police denied the claims, and several police officials refused to comment. Noted in “CCM, police under fire over ‘blackmail’” by The Citizen, June 24, 2013.305 Such tactics have already been used in Zanzibar, yet the CCM entered into apower-sharing deal with the Civic United Front in order to save ground and face.306 Chinese silence does not seem to be encouraging the Tanzanian government tooppress the opposition. However, the presence of Chinese officials at CCM rallies has the potential to encourage the CCM to ignore or run roughshod on
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elites to give up power, it must be shown that it is in their
best interests to hold legitimate elections and abide by an
electoral loss to the opposition. It remains to be seen how far
the CCM will go in these stopgap measures, and whether they will
willingly give up power if they are unable to reenergize their
voting base.
In Zambia, on the other hand, Sata’s opposition has been
simultaneously weakened by mass defections and strengthened by a
highly critical press and civil society. Sata’s emphasis on
development over democracy faces fierce resistance by civilians,
yet politicians have largely failed to capitalize on this or
coalesce national parties around ideologies rather than leaders.
The Chinese presence is unlikely to lead to any seismic shifts in
the Zambian political system, yet their economic role may be
revived as a political tool for opportunistic politicians.
Ultimately, this analysis of the import of Chinese political
values by Tanzanians and Zambians makes it abundantly clear that
values need to be generated and fostered from within rather than
the political rights of the opposition. Overall, Chinese military involvement in Tanzania is cautiously responsive to Tanzanian requests for aid, while avoiding any serious entanglement.
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copied from outside. The long political tradition of allying with
or against involved foreign powers in order to gain local
political dominance has often thwarted the development of both
the domestic economy and political values. It could be suggested
that the main role the Chinese seem to play is to balance Western
influence in Africa. China’s role on the continent, for now, is
that of a badly-needed trading partner, whose motions towards
mutual respect and noninterference are a drastic improvement over
the past half-century.
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