1
On September 11th, the west experienced firsthand the
horrific reality of the suicide attacks that plague the Middle
East. This phenomenon has sparked a flood of interest in both the
region and the underlying causes behind such attacks. What
motivates a usually young man to end his life prematurely in an
act of mass murder?
The predominant theory is that this is an effect of their
theology. Their faith in Islam is what makes these people able to
destroy their own lives, usually for rewards in the afterlife.
Given the rhetoric of these attackers, and the politicians in the
region this is the first guess one might make as to this
perplexing mystery. This, however, does not stand up to scrutiny.
Scholars have studied the mystery of the suicide attacker in many
fields, and while they brought forward a plethora of
explanations, none seem to point to religion as a major cause.
This paper will investigate different theories as to the real
motivations behind their attacks, and attempt to begin an
interdisciplinary explanation which has so far been locked away
in different intellectual silos. The political scientists,
economists, military theorists, psychologists, and sociologists
2
have all put forward valid motivating factors for suicide
attackers that need to be assembled into a complete picture.
The Religion Approach
Because of the prevalence of religious rhetoric in middle
eastern politics and in the groups that commit many suicide
attacks, many influential political speakers in the west resist
the ability to reason with them on the basis that their
motivation is simple religious zealotry. People such as Michael
Ledeen of the American Enterprise Institute have posited that
American imperialism was not a factor.1 They argue that a hatred
of the liberal, democratic lifestyle of the west, fueled by a
sanctified holy war is what motivates these suicide attackers. In
the Islamic world, religion and politics cannot be separated.2
In Israel, the Palestinians who commit these attacks do so
in the frame of an eternal struggle between Judaism and Islam.3
Terrorist leaders then promise the suicide attackers rewards in1 Andrea Smith, "Bedfellows at the Interfaith Zionist Leadership Summit; With God on Our Side,"Against the Current, 4 (2003): 5, p.52 Simon Haddad, "A Comparative Study of Lebanese and Palestinian Perceptions of Suicide Bombings: The Role of Militant Islam and Socio-Economic Status,"International Journal of ComparativeSociology, no. 5 (2004): 337-363, p.3553 Mark Tessler, and Michael D H Robbins, "What Leads Some Ordinary Arab Men and Women to Approve of Terrorist Acts Against the United States?,"Journal of Conflict Resolution, no. 2 (2007): 305-328, p.307
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the afterlife to incentivise the attacks. One Shayk working for
one of the major Islamic studies centers in Cairo claimed that
those who committed attacks by Hamas against Israeli citizens in
1995 would achieve paradise. Some have argued that this has
motivated more suicide attacks, determining it as a fatwa or a
religious legal decision.4 The same factors, according to this
argument, motivated the infamous September 11th hijackers:
…the attacks of September 11 were acts of religious devotion-a formof worship, conducted in God's name and in accordance with hiswishes. The enemy was the infidel; the opposing ideology, "Westernculture."That religious motivation, colored by a messianism and insome cases an apocalyptic vision of the future, distinguishes al-Qaida and its affiliates from conventional terrorists groups such asthe Irish Republican Army, the Red Brigades, or even the PalestineLiberation Organization. Although secular political interests helpdrive al-Qaida's struggle for power, these interests are understoodand expressed in religious terms.5
What stands out in particular is that last line. Terrorists
often explain attacks such as suicide attacks in religious
terminology. It would be tempting, at first glance, to take them
at their word on this, but it would be misleading. Religious
terminology is a powerful rhetorical tool in the discourse of
Middle Eastern politics, and so should be investigated for its
real intent.4 Roberto Marin-Guzman, "FANATICISM: A MAJOR OBSTACLE IN THE MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN DIALOGUE. THECASE OF TWENTIETH CENTURY ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM,"Arab Studies Quarterly, no. 3 (2003): 63-965 Steven Simon, "The new terrorism," The Brookings Review, no. 1 (2003): 18-24
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While this might show a real dedication to their belief in
Islam, the prevalence of religious rhetoric is a politically
motivated move. Many nations use religious language as a way to
boost their legitimacy as states and rulers. Shari’a has its
secular uses in the Middle East as well. It functions as a
resonant accountability mechanism. Islamists, such as the Muslim
Brotherhood often espouse this; a group that has a religious
basis for their politics, but as a method of rhetorical power and
reinforcement of legitimacy.
Ever since the Second World War, the new states in the
Middle East have competed with one another in their rhetorical
devotion to the Arabic people and the Islamic faith. For a while,
this coupled with a dedication to the destruction of the state of
Israel. This is to establish a sense of legitimacy to their
reign. Some nations in the region that were less religious, such
as the Iranian Shah, were overthrown and transformed into
religious governments. It also acts as a way to get resources
from other nations such as cash, weapons, and fighters.6 Another
example of this was with the Islamic leader Jaafar Muhammad al-6 Monica Toft, "Getting Religion? The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil War," International Security, no. 4 (2007): 97-131, p.111
5
Nimeiri who overthrew the civilian government of Sudan in 1969.
Part of his legitimization amongst the Sudanese Muslims and to
get support from the nearby Arab world was to denounce the
existence of Israel and establish its religious foothold. Though
the Arab world would attempt to destroy Israel on several
occasions, they were forced to give up. They relegated anti-
Israeli rhetoric to a political tool. This has led to a climate
of increasingly anti-Israeli rhetoric as well as stronger and
more conservative Islamic-based policies in the Middle East; 7 a
process called religious outbidding. It buttresses their
legitimacy as states and quiets clerical opposition to their
regimes. This results in a slowing of the move to modernity.8
Their legitimacy is, however, threatened by the Islamist
movement, and the counterbalance of Shari’a.
Islamism is an ideology that fires off red lights in the
west by their overtly religious rhetoric as well. Their ideology
uses their religion, specifically the divine law code Shari’a, as
an accountability mechanism in these secular dictatorships. Noah
7 ibid, p.1208 Steven Simon, "The new terrorism," The Brookings Review, no. 1 (2003): 18-24
6
Feldman’s The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State is an excellent account of
the genesis of this. He explains that Shari’a, before the
Tanzimat reforms,9 acted as a counterbalance to the power of the
Ottoman emperor. That system led to the long period of stability
and prosperity in the Middle East during the Middle-Ages. The
breakdown of this system, Feldman posits, led to unchecked
expansion of the executive and the decline of the empire. This
unchecked executive was the model of governments put into power
as the empire collapsed after the First World War. Islamism and
Islamist rhetoric, therefore, is a desire to bring back that
counterbalance to these dictators across the region. The concern
then comes in, and legitimately so, that this political Islam
fosters popular support for terrorism and suicide attackers as
actions in the name of Islam.10 However, that is a tool of
rhetoric to legitimize and build support for, but not motivate
these suicide attacks.
9 The Tanzimat reforms were part of a codification of Shari’a by the Ottoman Empire.10 Mark Tessler, and Michael D H Robbins, "What Leads Some Ordinary Arab Men and Women to Approve of Terrorist Acts Against the United States?,"Journal of Conflict Resolution, no. 2 (2007): 305-328, p.308
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The Political Science Approach
The prevailing argument in popular politics is that anti-
western sentiment motivates suicide attackers, and by extension a
hatred of the western liberal, permissive society. A study
conducted by Robert Pape in 2003 of 188 suicide attackers negates
this. He observed that there was no link to religious motives and
that political and strategic goals were more likely. Suicide
attacks are a form of warfare that serve to coerce foreign troops
from the land they are occupying.11 In 2006, he argued that since
religion is fairly static, but trends of suicide attacks come in
measurable waves, that some other event triggers them.12 These
groups perceive occupations from the west and particularly blame
on United States and Israel.
The crux of all of these sentiments is western violation of
their sovereignty. This blatant western intervention, from the
Great Game13 to the Iraq war, is undeniably connected to the
11 Simon Haddad, "A Comparative Study of Lebanese and Palestinian Perceptions of Suicide Bombings: The Role of Militant Islam and Socio-Economic Status,"International Journal of ComparativeSociology, no. 5 (2004): 337-363, p. 338, 35612 Shaun Best, "Liquid Terrorism: Altruistic Fundamentalism in the Context of Liquid Modernity," Sociology, no. 4 (2010): 678-694, p.68313 This is a reference to the 19th century competition over spheres of influence in central asia between Russia and Great Britain.
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sectarian violence in the Middle East today.14 In a modern
context, this is heavily committed by the United States. Many in
Al-Qaeda see the US military presence in the Persian Gulf as
veiled colonialism and the lynchpin of Islamic terrorism.15 The
other key issue with the United States is their unwavering
support of Israel. The loss of the wars against Israel combined
with this unquestioning support manifests as social rage that is
then denoted as fundamentalism.16 Since the Second World War, the
United States has established Israeli security exceptionalism.
The Islamic world expresses resentment at Western leaders who
allowed this violation of their sovereignty in establishing
Israel, and then lecture them today about the virtues of
tolerance and peace.17 This frames the long history of grievances
and the anti-western sentiment’s direct link with the
establishment and continued support of the state of Israel.
14 Phillip Benedict, Nora Berend, Stephen Ellis, Jeffrey Kaplan, Ussama Makdisi, and Jack Miles, "AHR Conversation: Religious Identities and Violence,"The American Historical Review, no. 5(2007): 1432-1481, p. 145715 Shaun Best, "Liquid Terrorism: Altruistic Fundamentalism in the Context of Liquid Modernity," Sociology, no. 4 (2010): 678-694, p.68216 Mehdi Parvizi Amineh, and Henk Houweling, "IR-Theory and Transformation in the Greater Middle East: the Role of the United States," Perspectives on Global Development & Technology, 1, no. 3 (2007): 57-86, p.5917 ibid, p.86
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Far right Zionists, extremely influential in both America
and Israel often reiterate their divine mandate to their land
borders, and to some, expansion into the Palestinian conclave in
the West Bank. They argue that there are no such people as
Palestinians,18 and that these Arabs are occupying land that is
rightfully theirs. They argue that Jordan, while part of the
biblical Israel, contains an Arab-Palestinian population and
therefore should be considered the homeland of the Palestinian
people. All people are entitled to a national land, and that
Israel is Jewish by religious, historical, and security fiat.19
In a court of international law, religious claims to land are
specious at best, and a cursory study of the history of
indigenous peoples around the world would find the holes in the
denunciation of Palestinian cultural existence. This easily would
anger the Arab and Muslim populations in the region. This
movement does not directly influence military action but does
influence a creeping threat to the Palestinians in the West Bank.
If this denial of culture to the Palestinian people angered the
18 This is primarily argued by the Zionist far right by arguing that there is no Palestinianlanguage, religion, or culture.19 Andrea Smith, "Bedfellows at the Interfaith Zionist Leadership Summit; With God on Our Side,"Against the Current, 4 (2003): 5, p.5
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Arab world, their grievances over the settler movement make it
much worse.
Motivated by a perceived divine mandate, Israeli religious
nationalists have begun to move into and build homes illegally in
occupied Palestine. They believe deeply in the need for a Jewish
presence in the biblical land of Israel. Even Israeli politics
depicts this as a major hurdle to finding a solution to the
conflict that has been a pestilence on their nation since its
inception. Their unwillingness to make compromises on the
territory of Israel as a violation of Arab sovereignty halts the
peace process.20
This approach explains the legitimate grievances that might
motivate suicide attacker attacks, but is incomplete. It may
explain why there are attacks in general, but does not explain
the peculiar nature of suicide attacks. While this author would
argue that this is likely the reason suicide attackers take
action, context is needed to explain why they choose their method
20 Joyce Dalsheim, "On Demonized Muslims and Vilified Jews: Between Theory and Politics," Comparative Studies in Society and History, no. 3 (2010): 581-603.
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of attack and willingness to sacrifice their own lives for these
causes.
The Economic Approach
Some scholars have pointed to the economic problems of the
region as the source of The Middle East’s discontent. Many
countries in the Middle East suffer from low economic growth, low
wages, high unemployment, poor schooling, problematic
urbanization, decline of environmental resources like water, as
well as political alienation and hopelessness over the situation
with the Palestinians.21 Brian Burgoon argues in his 2006 article
On Welfare and Terror: Social Welfare Policies and Political-Economic Roots of
Terrorism, that violent acts like terrorism can be linked to
things such as economic insecurity, inequality, and poverty. The
economic prescription is to establish a welfare state in the
region, and move the rational choice away from forms of
extremism. The economic situation, and the helplessness fuels
what they would perceive as a defensive war.
21 Steven Simon, "The new terrorism," The Brookings Review, no. 1 (2003): 18-24
12
This argument builds a little context as to the desperate
situation many in the Middle East face but is still incomplete.
If economic despair and defensive struggle were the causes of
suicide attackers, there would be more of them in different
regions. Furthermore, while this may explain some of the suicide
attacks, it far from covers the context. The suicide attackers of
the September 11th attacks were not poor and educated
individuals.22 Suicide attacks require some sort of strategic
merit, and something more than simple economic situation to
explain why these attacks in particular are used so often in the
region.
The Strategy Approach
Suicide attacks may just be the evolution of tactics in
ongoing conflicts against what terrorist groups would call an
occupying force. It could be described as part of the playbook of
asymmetric warfare. The unconventional strategies one uses when
facing a foe that is better equipped and has more resources. The
point is to exploit vulnerabilities, and terrorize the opponent
22 Yuval Neria, David Roe, Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, Hassan Mneimneh, Alana Balaban, and Randall Marshall, "The Al Qaeda 9/11 instructions: A study in the construction of religiousmartyrdom," Religion, 35, no. 1 (2005): 1-11, p.2
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into surrender rather than a conventional military victory.
Suicide attacks are an attempt to get around this asymmetry by
using a human being as the delivery mechanism rather than a
rocket or missile. Such groups will attempt to find any advantage
they can to at least partially equalize their chances. The
successes of some suicide attacks will then disseminate easier
between non-state groups (as they rarely fight each other and so
share these tactics more freely) and increase adoption locally.23
This might not necessarily be a strategic boon, but merely needs
to be perceived as one.
This approach gives much more insight into why suicide
attacks seems to come in waves, and give the rational reasons for
its use. IT does, however, not exactly explain why suicide is so
readily used by these attackers. Something needs to explain the
prevalence of this strategy beyond the possible tactical
advantage contributing to its proliferation.
The Psychology Approach
23 Michael C Horowitz, "Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations: The Case of Suicide Terrorism,"International Organization, no. 1 (2010): 33-64, p.39, 42, 60
14
A topic such as motivation ultimately relies on the
psychology of the created attacker. A few psychological studies
challenge the economic argument of the poor and alienated
becoming suicide attackers. The most famous example is that the
9/11 hijackers were rather well-off, and it appears to be par for
the course.24 Psychologists who analyze psychopathology tend to
describe suicide attackers as chaotic or irrational people who
fall under the influence of these terrorist group leaders. They
say that many want to die for personal reasons like an ordinary
suicide and that they may suffer from paranoia or depression. It
may be a way for the attacker to turn their life’s failings and
frustrations into glory and victory.25
The trouble with this is that it atomizes the problem and
reduces it to a clinical issue. Like the economic approach, this
analysis is problematic on the grounds that it is incomplete.
Research has shown that collectivist cultures like that of the
24 Mark Tessler, and Michael D H Robbins, "What Leads Some Ordinary Arab Men and Women to Approve of Terrorist Acts Against the United States?,"Journal of Conflict Resolution, no. 2 (2007): 305-328, p.31025 Shaun Best, "Liquid Terrorism: Altruistic Fundamentalism in the Context of Liquid Modernity," Sociology, no. 4 (2010): 678-694, p.682
15
Middle East experience a higher rate of terrorism and higher
willingness to sacrifice oneself for the good of the group.26
The Cultural Approach
The cultural approach to suicide attacks yields a critical
angle in finding what makes a society that enables and supports
suicide attacks. Of primary interest is the distinction in
Islamic societies between suicide and martyrdom. In Islamic
teaching, regular suicide motivated by despair and depression is
called intihar and forbidden as is common to all Abrahamic
faiths. There is also shahada, or martyrdom, which represents the
giving of one’s life for the well-being of their community.27 It
is therefore imperative when looking at the suicide attacker
issue to not impose a western idea of suicide on the analysis.
This dimension of culture rings as the critical clue that
ties all of these approaches together. Under a reclassification,
the aspect of collectivist culture explains the acceptability of
suicide attacks, and with its efficacy, the proliferation of
26 Michele J Gelfand, Gary LaFree, Susan Fahey, and Emily Feinberg, "Culture and Extremism," Journal of Social Issues, 69, no. 3 (2013): 495-517, p. 500-50127 Simon Haddad, "A Comparative Study of Lebanese and Palestinian Perceptions of Suicide Bombings: The Role of Militant Islam and Socio-Economic Status,"International Journal of ComparativeSociology, no. 5 (2004): 337-363, p.341
16
them. This is perhaps the hardest concept to understand from a
western point of view, leading to the psychological approach.
Towards an Interdisciplinary Understanding
The prevalence of suicide attackers in the Middle East comes
down to a contextual situation favourable to self-sacrifice and
desperate means, overlaid by a conflict that required
asymmetrical warfare to gain advantages as these attacks do.
Approaches such as the psychological and economical ones
displayed earlier are too atomized and incomplete. Their
approaches fail to acknowledge the role of the dynamic of
individualistic and collectivistic societies in their
explanations. The religious approach is a misunderstanding of the
rhetorical nature of politics in the region. Most favourable are
the cultural, strategic, and political science approaches.
The context of the society in which this takes place is
paramount. This society is collectivistic rather than
individualistic, and the Islamic world in particular emphasizes a
concept that reveres the practice for self-sacrifice for the good
of society. This cultural context creates a society that would be
17
receptive to the concept of suicide attacks in a situation in
which their collective was under threat.
Enter into the picture then the political grievances
inflicted on the region from the west and Israel over the
centuries. The region perceived themselves as under invasion from
outsider forces that have vastly superior military capabilities.
This calls for a form of asymmetrical warfare to attempt to work
around their deficiencies. Suicide attacks work effectively, or
at least appear to, and with a context receptive to the idea of
martyrdom, its popularity comes as no surprise.
Conclusions
Different areas of research have attempted to investigate
this question of the suicide attacker, and developed their own
explanations within their own intellectual silos. When looked at
from an interdisciplinary perspective, some appear problematic,
and some emerge as useful but incomplete pictures of why these
attacks are so prevalent. The religious approach is a
misunderstanding of the rhetorical nature of the politics in the
region. Approaches such as the psychological and economical as
18
displayed earlier are too atomized and incomplete. Their
approaches fail to acknowledge the role of the dynamic of
individualistic and collectivistic societies in their
explanations. The societal context of the region and its culture,
sparked by foreign intervention by a superior force seems to be
the roots of these attacks.
Since the September 11th attacks, research in suicide
attacks has increased in many fields. The problem with this is
that these fields are locked into their discipline’s
methodologies and scopes. To understand this complex phenomenon,
researchers need to analyze from various approaches and areas of
study. This attempt to use the literature of different fields
yielded that the major approaches were either misconstrued or
incomplete as a result of the narrow approach. Progressing
together, the many facets of suicide attacks take on a more
complete picture.
19
Works Cited
Amineh, Mehdi Parvizi, and Henk Houweling. "IR-Theory and
Transformation in the Greater Middle East: the Role of the United
States." Perspectives on Global Development & Technology. no. 1-3 (2007):
57-86.
Benedict, Phillip, Nora Berend, Stephen Ellis, Jeffrey Kaplan,
Ussama Makdisi, and Jack Miles. "AHR Conversation: Religious
Identities and Violence."The American Historical Review. no. 5 (2007):
1432-1481.
Best, Shaun. "Liquid Terrorism: Altruistic Fundamentalism in the
Context of Liquid Modernity." Sociology. no. 4 (2010): 678-694.
Dalsheim, Joyce. "On Demonized Muslims and Vilified Jews: Between
Theory and Politics." Comparative Studies in Society and History. no. 3
(2010): 581-603.
Feldman, Noah. The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2008.
20
Gelfand, Michele J, Gary LaFree, Susan Fahey, and Emily Feinberg.
"Culture and Extremism." Journal of Social Issues. no. 3 (2013): 495-
517.
Haddad, Simon. "A Comparative Study of Lebanese and Palestinian
Perceptions of Suicide Bombings: The Role of Militant Islam and
Socio-Economic Status."International Journal of Comparative Sociology. no. 5
(2004): 337-363.
Horowitz, Michael C. "Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of
Innovations: The Case of Suicide Terrorism."International Organization.
no. 1 (2010): 33-64.
Marin-Guzman, Roberto. "FANATICISM: A MAJOR OBSTACLE IN THE
MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN DIALOGUE. THE CASE OF TWENTIETH CENTURY ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALISM."Arab Studies Quarterly. no. 3 (2003): 63-96.
Simon, Steven. "The new terrorism." The Brookings Review. no. 1
(2003): 18-24.
Smith, Andrea. "Bedfellows at the Interfaith Zionist Leadership
Summit; With God on Our Side." Against the Current. no. 4 (2003): 5.
21
Tessler, Mark, and Michael D H Robbins. "What Leads Some Ordinary
Arab Men and Women to Approve of Terrorist Acts Against the
United States?."Journal of Conflict Resolution. no. 2 (2007): 305-328.
Toft, Monica. "Getting Religion? The Puzzling Case of Islam and
Civil War." International Security. no. 4 (2007): 97-131.
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