cHAPTER r5

SPAIN: THECONSOLIDATION OFSTRONG REGIONAL

GOVERNMENTSAND THE LIMITS

OF LOCALDECENTRALTZATION

CESAR COLINOELOISA DEL PINO

INrnoDUcrroN: Tun HrsroRy oF THEDnnnocRATrc Sr¡.rB rN SPArN

Liberalism arrived earþ in Spain with the r8rz Constitution, which followed the

War of Independence against the Napoleonic occupation. Spanish liberalism,

nevertheless, was weak and had to struggle during the whole nineteenth centurv

SPAIN 357

Spain

I nhobitonts: 40 8 million

Surfoce oreo:505 996 km2

lnhobitonts/km2: 80 'l

Stote form: Federaì

)fficiol description:

Parliamentary monarchy

Longuoges: Castilian

Spanish 74010, Catalan

1 7ol0, Galician 7ol0, Basque

20lo

Su b notio no I g ove r n m e nt:

8112 municipalities

50 provinces

1 7 autonomous

com mu n ities

Map 15.1 Spain: Autonomous communities

with the supporters of the ancien régime. Centralism remained at the formal level

but in practice localism prevailed (Fusi r99o).

Regarding the evolution of the Spanish nation-state, moderate liberalism

initiated a state-building project modelled on the French state. However, the

stàte inherited several shortcomings: it was ineffi.cient, small, with an incompetent

¿nd clientelistic administrative apparatus and public services that emerged later

th¡rn in western and northern European countries. It also suffered from a typical

lack of legitimac¡ being opposed first by absolutists and the Church, by republicans'

and then by socialist, anarchist, and regionalist movements. It thus failed to produce

a liberal-democratic concept of citizenship and experienced many episodes of

political violence.

By the end of the centur¡ several economic and social circumstances such as a

dillerential industrialization in Catalonia and the Basque Country would cornbine

rvith socio-cultural differences to lead to the emergence of regionalisms, and later

ruatittnalisms in several territories. Sub-state nationalism thus rose simultaneously

rr,ith the extension of a Spanish national identity in all the country that gathered

strength as national markets greq as urbanization Progressed, and systems of

trrnsport and mass communication developed.

As regards the evolution of liberal-democratícinstitutions and ideas, democratic

rcvolutions similar to those in other parts of Europe did not occur in Spain until

thc end of the r86os. Progressive liberals and republican democrats produced the

r lìó9 constitution. Male universal suffrage, freedom of speech and association were

not elfectively consolidated until the r89os, with the liberal Party governments in

358 CESAR COLINO AND ELOISA DEL PINO

office, but after that, there were also long periods ofexceptional rule and suspen-

sion of rights to repress the labour movement, partly due to the anarchist use ofterrorism. Growing political instability and permanent social unrest and politicalviolence led the king to support the military dictatorship initiated with the coup ofPrimo de Rivera in 1923.

The Second Republic arrived in 1931, and introduced an advanced

democratic constitution in terms of democratic rights and female suflrage int 9y. It allowed for decentralization and the integration of the new urban middleclasses and workers into the system. The republic, however, showed the difficultiesof a shaþ liberal democracy in Spain supported by weak social bases. The

fiagmentation and polarization of its party system, and its enemies on the left

and the right, made it vulnerable again to military intervention. This time the coup

provoked a horrifrc civil war, which would be the prelude of the Second WorldWar in the rest of Europe and eventually large parts of the world, and whichextinguished liberal democrary during the long dictatorship of Franco lasting from7939 to 1976.

The transition to democracy in t977 and its consolidation in the early r98os

required the combined action of elites and civil society with a skilful leadershipthrough a process of 'crystallízation' of institutions and new patterns of beha-

viou¡ which originated during the economic and cultural modernization of the

r96os. It also implied the conscious willingness of avoiding the mistakes con-

sidered to have led to the demise of democrary and to civil war in the r93os

$!liâ 19gò. The new 1978 Spanish constitution would embrace democracy, rule

of law, cultural pluralism, and the welfare state as their main values. It re-

structured the traditional Spanish state by identifting democracy with regionaland local autonomy, thus creating the basis of new constitutionally protectedlocal self-government and regional democracies. By recognizing nationalitiesand regions throughout the Spanish territor¡ it responded to old aspirationsof autonomy not just in the territories with nationalist movements but in all ofthem. At the same time, the process still followed the old Spanish familiarpattern of constitutional pâcts with territorial local elites. In this case, a newpact was made with nationalist elites of the Basque Country that recognizedpre-constitutional historical rights giving special frscal powers to their territoriesin return for their acceptance of the constitution and the relinquishing ofpolitical violence.

At any rate, it was the first constitution that elicited high popular consensus and

Iegitimacy and the only one to have allowed a true liberal democracy to flourish inSpain.

S PAIN 359

Trrn INsrrruTroNAL ExpRESSToNOF DEMOCRACY

It js not easy to categorize Spain clearly into a single state tradition rnodel(Loughlin and Peters 1997). Recent transformations have meant a complete re-

distribution of power and a rescaling of the traditional Spanish state institutions.A rnodern welfare state has been built in the process virtually from scratch in thelast thirty years. Accordingl¡ regions and local governments have come to controlnrore tlran 50 per cent of public expenditure and have 73 per cent of publicenrployees in the country. Due to this restructuring since the beginning of the

democratization period, it shows now a mixture of traits from the Napoleonic and

the Germanic state traditions (Loughlin and Peters 1997).

Regarding the Napoleonic features, many of them were explicitly imported fromFrance during the nineteenth century. For example, Iegalism and the importantrole ofcivil servants corps and administrative law as a separate body that regulates

all public life, the rights and duties of citizens, and at the same time safeguards

them from the undue action of public administration. Most, but not all, of these

traits have eroded, or evolved, with the creation of Autonomous Communities(ACs) and the devolution ofpowers and resources to them (Parrado zoo8).

The state has clearly been transformed in the direction of the Germanic state

tradition, even if, paradoxicall¡ some of the Napoleonic traits have remainedentrenched in the newly established regional governments. For example, legalism,

centralized administration at the regional capitals, largely prefectoral organizationin their territories, or the informal dominance or supervision over local govern-

nients, which have repeatedly been denied additional legislative or implementingpowers and resources by regional governments. That means that the form ofpolitical organization of the Spanish state has evolved towards a compositeor federative state. The form of decentralization has thus evolved from some

asymmetrical devolution towards a kind of cooperative federalism with shared

competences and revenues in most policy areas, alongside weak local autonomy(Aja zoor). Despite the considerable devolution process, the central Spanish gov-

ernment maintains a relevant concurrent legislative role and its own state-wideimplementation network for some policies such as social securit¡ public order,

infrastructures, and tax collection.Regarding state-society relations, the Spanish state tradition also presents a

mixed picture. They have oscillated between organicist and corporatist. The Span-

ish state attributed itself a central role in integrating society and interveningin market and civil society, but at the same time being unable to perform ade-

quately and respond to their demands due to its traditional lack of resources. Thisinterventionist role traditionally led to the dominance of corporatist interest

36rU. cÉsAR colrNo AND EroÍsA DEr PINO

intermediation over pluralistic access to decision-making processes and has been

shifted to the role of political parties as only or main intermediaries between

citizens and the state.

Due to the combination of institutional traits developed with the recent trans-

formation and to the workings of several informal elements that operate differently

in different periods, it is diffrcult to assign Spain consistently into one of Lijphart's

ideal types. JÀ¡hat seems clear is that Spanish democracy shows, at least in their

formal arrangements, a combination of predominant majoritarian features in

the executive-parties dimension with a consensual configuration in the federal-

unitary dimension.In the executive-parties dimension, all features are clearly majoritarian except

the interest-group system, which showed punctuated periods of corporatist con-

certation during the transition years. Ifwe look at the other characteristics, Spanish

democrary shows a clear concentration of executive power in single-party majorit¡"

cabinets, without having experienced a single executive coalition. Even in the case

of minority government, the most frequent situation in the Spanish parliament,

central governments dispose of both political and constitutional resources that

make them able to govern as if they had a majority (Ajenjo and Molina zoog). The

executive, in particular the prime minister, is dominant in executive legislative

relationships.In addition, the electoral law, theoretically proportional but with clear dispro-

portional effects, has shaped a largely bipolar and highly stable party system.

Besides, despite the consensus-seeking behaviour and the moderation of elites

typical of the first years of transition, party politics and competition since the

mid-r99os have been evolving very clearly towards adversarial politics and high

polarization between the two main state-wide parties typical of some majoritrrìan

democracies. Polarization of the media, the negativism of campaigning strategies,

and the personalization of politics have reinforced this trend (Hopkin zoo5;

GonzâIez and Bouza zoog). On the other hand, this Spanish form of majoritarian-

ism is occasionally tempered by some informal practices, such as informal parlia-

mentary coalitions with small or non-state-wide parties, certain conventions iu the

workings of parliament, and partisan proportionality in the appointment of

members of some constitutional bodies (Gunther et aI. zoo4).

If we turn to the federal-unitary dimension, we find more similarities with

consensual democracies, since Spain displays features offederal and decentralized

government, a rigid constitution that may be changed only by supermajorities and

two consecutive legislatures; strong judicial review of constitutionality through

courts and a Constitutional Tribunal; and an independent central bank tlpical of

the consensus model. It also has a second chamber, the Senate, which may lrave

some scrutiny and control role. It has only suspensive veto capacity and is sub-

ordinated in most issues to the Congress of Deputies.

SPAIN 36t

Following the tlpology proposed by Hendriks, it seems clear that most decisions¿re made in an aggregative process, even if for some institutional policy decisionsthere is a tradition of reaching the widest possible agreement through a typicalconsensus-building process between elites more typical of integrative democrary.\íaybe as a consequence of past experiences with democracy and the way thetransition was accomplished, stability and governability seem to be more valued bypoliticians and citizens alike than representativeness and inclusiveness of all mino-rities and groups. Informal arrangements or the effects of the electoral formulahave worked well to allow fair representation of the two main cleavages, theterritoriai one-through fair representation of sub-state nationalist and regionalistpârties-and the left-right one within state institutions-with the incorporationof labour through left parties and the alternation in offrce-(Field and Hamman:oo8). Third national parties with a spread vote, howeveÍ, may be said to beunfairly represented.

As regards representative versus direct democracy, we should distinguish betweenthe rules and the reality. The 1978 Spanish constitution mandates the government'to lacilitate the participation ofall citizens in political life' and establishes the rightofcitizens to participate in public affairs, not only through representatives but alsodirectly. It regulates the so-called citizens or popular legislative initiative and thepossibility of consultative referendum on policy decisions (see more on this in thesection on subnational citizenship and participation).

The practice of democracy at the national level, however, differs strongly fromthese rules and is characierized by the dominance of representative democrac¡espccialìy through the monopoly of political parties in the institutional arenacoupled with a relatively high turnout in national and subnational elections.Political participation and party and union membership have remained low despitepolitical and social and value changes. As both citizens and parliamentary repre-scntatives recognize, it is clear that despite regulations supporting the involvementol'citizens, there is low participation and a low wish to participate.

l'he late arrival of Spanish democracywould explain some of these peculiarities,such as weak party membership, and others such as the comparativety highintluence of television and other media in voters, the 'presidentialization, of theexecutive power and the increasing cartelization ofthe political parties. spain didnot experience the rise of mass and catch-all parties in the mid-twentieth century,and leaped straight to a later stage, more dominated by individualism, posr-niaterialism, or what has been called the Americanization of Spanish politicst(ìunther et al. zoo4).

In sum, this mostly aggregative process and its representative or indirect demo-cratic nature produces a typical model of pendulum democrary (Hendriks) inwhich power alternates between two parties, and where citizens periodically casttheir votes and hand over legislative powers to their elected representatives.Âlthough rr'ith consistently high turnout, citizens limit themselves to participate

362 cÉsAR coLINo AND ELoÍsA DEL PINo

in elections. Participation will be higher or lower depending on polarization and

the main issues involved.

Trrn INsrrrurroNAL ExPRESSToN

oF SUBNATIONAT DNNNO CRACY

The institutional framework of subnational authorities

Spain is composed of seventeen Autonomous Communities (ACs) with constitt¡-

tionuþ entrenched autonomy, whose legislative assemblies are directþ elected by

their citizens. All of the ACs have adopted parliamentary systems in which regional

presidents and governments are politically responsible to regional parliaments

(Table rl.r).In addition to the seventeen ACs, there are three types of elected local bodies in

Spain: flfty provinces, 8,[z municipalities, and ten islands. More than two-thirds of

Spanish municipalities (7r.5 per cent) have a population of fewer than z,ootl

inhabitants; 85 per cent have fewer than 5,ooo inhabitants, concentrating o¡lv

13.1 per cent of the population; r45 municipalities have more than 5o,oo<r

Table 15.1 The number of inhabitants in Autonomous communities,2008

46 157 822

I 202 220

1 326 918

1 080 r38

1 072 844

2 157 112

2 075 968

582 138

2 5s7 330

2 043 100

7 364 078

1 097 744

2 784 169

6 271 638

1 426 109

620 377

317 501

5 029 601

148 83?

SPAIN

Anda lusia

Aragon

Astu rias

Balearic lslands

Basque Country

Canary lslands

Ca ntabria

Castille Êt Leon

Castille-La Mancha

Cata lonia

Extremad ura

Galicia

Madrid

MurciaNavarre

Rioja

Valencia

Ceuta and Melilla

Soul'ce: lNE.

SPAIN 363

Table 15.2 Range of population size in municipalities, December 20OB

Number of municipalities o/o Combined population

0-2,0002,000-5,000

5,000-20,000

20,000-50,000

50,000-500,000More than 500,000

Total

5 797

1 025

906239139

6

I 112

71.5

I ¿.6

11.2?q

170.t

100

6.1

7

19.2

15.2

36.',t

16.4

100

2837 647

3 217 354I 8s5 s78

6 997 338

16 681 191

7 56871446157 822

9urce: Ministry of Public Admin¡strat¡on.

inhabitants with 52.5 per cent of the population. Twenty-four large municipalitiesof more than z5o,ooo have 3o per cent ofthe population (see Table r5.z).

Provinces are based on territorial divisions established in the early nineteenthcentury and comprise inter-municipal councils with indirectly elected provincialgovernrnents (diputaciones) and presidents, which assist and cooperate with munici-palities ensuring the provision of local services to the smallest ones. During thedevolution process seven provincial governments were merged with regional govern-nrcnts in those ACs formed by only one old province-Asturias, Cantabria, La Rioja,the Balearic Islands, Madrid, Murcia, and Navarre. The Spanish islands-Balearic andCanary Islands-are served by councils that perform functions símilar to those ofthc continental provinces and possess some of the powers of the other ACs.

ACs have also established other subnational units of government (see Table r¡.¡).Catalonia, the Basque Countr¡ and Aragon have been active in creating counties(cttnrLtrcas) for multi-municipal servicing and planning. Moreover, several ACshave established r,oz3 inter-municipal single or multi-purpose horizontal servicepartnerships (møncomunidades),by bringing together two or more municipalitiesto manage local public services (AgranoffzooT). Special arrangements also exist forthe tlvo autonomous cities in North Africa (Ceuta and Melilla) and the major citiesof Madrid and Barcelona. The metropolitan areas of Spain's other large cities are

not sen'ed by their own government bodies, since ACs have opposed such struc-tures because they would compete for powers and functions. Nonetheless, munici-pal authorities of some metropolitan areas do provide different organizationalstructures for selected public services.

I[we ]ook at the executives and legislative bodies and their leaders, their electoralsystems and financial arrangements in all these subnational governments, we shouldfirst refer to ACs, which comprise overall seventeen legislatures with r,rB6 regionalMPs and play an important role in shaping regional politics and policies. Their role,horveve¡ is conditioned by the predominance of regional executives (López Nieto:.o04). The presidents and governments of the regional executives have followed thenlodel of thc central government. Regional prime ministers have had considerable

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... -.... -¡.;....

SPAIN 365

!r ipfluence in their institutional systems. This influence is greater when they controlr'lhei¡ party organizations and are charismatic leaders. They have important powersSrich as the appointment of regional ministers and the structure of governments

ü.,us leading to 'presidentialization'of regional governments (Magone zoog).

;:: Begional statutes of autonomy in all ACs regulate their electoral systems and

. almost all ofthem have approved electoral laws that outline electoral procedures'i (Table r5.4). Regional electoral systems share the basic features of central

15.4 The electoral system(s)

Elector¿l rules

9f Depqtíes 350 mçmbers directly elected by univenal adult suffrage for a four-yearterm of office. Fifty provincial constituencies are entitled to an initialminimum of two seats.

The remaining 248 seats are allocated among the fifty provinces in

proportion to the¡r populations.Closed and blocked party lists,Seats apportioned.according to the largest average method ofproportional representation (PR) D'Hondt.

3o/o threshold c'f all valid votes cast in the constituency, ineluding blankballots.

208 Senators elected directly by voters.

Majority system applied in provincial multi-nom¡nal constituencieswith open lists.

Each mainland province directly elects four Senaton. lsland provinces

elect three senators on each of the larger islands and one on theremaining islands or groups of islands. Cities of Ceuta and Melilla also

directly elect two Senators each.

56 Senators are appointed by the Legislative Assgmblies of each

Autonomous Commun,ity punuant to the procedure l¡id dopn in itsown :legislation.

COnmuni| Different númbersof deputies to elect (ranging from Catalonia with 135seats to La Rioja with 33)..

Different types of districts.Proporlignal'iepresentat¡on with D'Hondt formu la and multimemberdistricts.Threshold of 30./o or 5o/o of valid votes in a district.

Municipality id a s-ingle district with a number of councillors accordingto population.

Majoritarian uninominal in small municipalities (<1oo), majôritarianplurinominal with open lists and preferential vote (25=250),

proportional plurinominal in municipalities (>250).

Mayor elected by the councillors in towns of more than 5,000; by thecitizens' ãssenÌbly.in open council in municipalities of fewer than 100inhabitants.lf there is no majoriry, the head of the most voted list gets elected.Threshold of 5o/0.

elaborat¡on.

366 CÉSAR coLINo AND ËLOÍSA DEL PINO

regulations such as closed, blocked party lists, and the D'Hondt formula. The

number of seats, the type and size of the districts, and the electoral thresholds all

vary across ACs and have changed in some cases over time-all ACs have thresh-

olds to win seats, although these vary between 3 and 5 per cent of valid votes.

Overall, regional electoral systems produce more ProPortional effects than those of

general elections, since 4o per cent of constituencies assign more than fifteen seats

(L6pez Nieto zooS).

There are two distinct funding arrangements and tax systems for the ACs: the

common and the special or charter regimes-for the Basque Country and Navarre

(Loughlin and Lux zooS). These two ACs have maintained particular fiscal and tax

regimes, which allow them to raise their own taxes and negotiate a transfer to

Madrid to pay for common services. This is a source of tension, but agreement has

always been reached. The scheme causes some resentment in other regions, since

the Basque Country and Navarre not only are able to have a higher level ofregional

public expenditure per capita, but they are also not integrated in the structured

system of state-wide flscal equalization despite being among the wealthiest regions

in Spain. Within the common regime, ACs' revenue autonomy has signiflcantiy

increased, through both the devolution of some taxes and the revenue sharing of

tax yields in main taxes-personal income, VAI-(see Täble rr.r). The SufÊcienq

Fund-fiscal equalization scheme-supplements the gap between the funding

needs of ACs and their tax capacity with the existing taxes.

Regarding municipalities, the municipal executive is formed by the mayor

(alcalde), who presides over the full council (ayuntamiento) comprising all elected

councillors. Legislation dictates the number of councillors according to population

Table 1 5.5 The subnational system of finances and taxation: sources of finance

of Autonomous Communities, 2006

€ (millions) olo alo

Toxes

Own taxes

Shared taxes

Gronts

Sufficiency Fund

Grants from EU

lnterterritorial Compensation Fund

0ther grants

BorrowingOther revenues

Provincial revenues

Fees and others

Total revenues

70 587

1 759

68 82848 49529 941I 608

1 142I 8044 898

2 646191

2 455't26 627

1.4

54.4

23.6

6.8

0.9

7.O

0.2

1.9

55.7

3.9

2.1

100.0

Source: Adapted from Bosch and Vilaìta (2008).

SPAIN 367

size. The largest cities have between twenty-five councillors and fifty-five-inMadrid-but around twenty-seven in most large cities. In Spain, there are more

than 65,ooo elected councillors, 50 per cent of whom are in municipalities withpopulations between z5o and5,ooo and of whom 31 per cent are women. There are

S,rrz mayors, of whom 15 per cent are women.

Reforms have given the full council more scrutiny and control Powers over the

mayor, which means local government has been under a Process of progressive'parliamentarizatiod. These reforms have introduced the automatic calling of the

full council, the censure motion, and the motion of confidence in the mayor,

related to the adoption ofcertain decisions such as budgets, organizational regula-

tions, urban planning, or financial controls (Salvador zoo6). Recent attemPts have

also been made in law to decentralize local council administration through the

creation ofdistricts. So far, and with the exception ofa few cities, councils had been

reluctant to decentralize or even to deconcentrate their administration.The political profile of the mayor has also been reinforced by transferring most

of his administrative functions (public procurement, public services, local public

employment, economic management, permits and authorizations, and others) to

the local government board or cabinet, formed by several councillors supporting

the mayor (Salazar zooT). Especially in large cities, a strong executive body has

t¿rken on most of the management functions from the mayor (Magre and Bertrana

roo5). This has also ended with the traditional concentration ofexecutive powers

in the mayor and the traditional local 'semi-presidentialist' model, produced inpractice by his domination of the local party structure and its independence fiomthe national parties.

The main bodies of the provincial governments are the president and vice-

president of the provincial council (Diputación), the plenary assembly of the

provincial council, formed by delegates of the different municipalities within the

province, and the government commission, which supports the president, formed

b,v several members of the provincial council.

The mayor is elected by the councillors in the full council, and must be a party

groLrp leader. Citizens elect councillors directly through a system of closed party

lists. For municipalities with more than z5o inhabitants (69 per cent) election of the

nrayor is made by the councillors in closed party lists and a proportional formula.Three-quarters of councillors are elected in councils whose size is between seven

aud seventeen councillors, and r4 per cent in districts of five councillors. This

means that the electoral system has effects that are more proportional in large cities

and is rnore majoritarian in small municipalities. Overall it is more proportional

than the national system (Delgado zoo8).

The main funding for local governments comes mainly from the central govern-

ment but recently also from the ACs (see Table 15.6 and Lougtrlin and Lux zooS).

Revenues, however, are clearly insufûcient, since municipal governments carry out

a great jeal of unfunded mandates. Despite this, they have more tax autonomy

368 cÉsAR coLINo AND ELoísA DEL PINo

Table 15.6 Revenue composition of municipalities for 2004 without borrowing

Fees, public prices, and othersMunicipal taxes

Property taxLocal business taxVehicle taxTax on increased property vâluesTax on construction, facilities, and infrastructure0therTax sharing

Personal income taxValue added tax [VAT)Excise dutiesGra ntsFrom central governmentFrom Autonomous CommunitiesFrom abroad

From other sources

28.50

31 .92

16.06

3.04

4.93

2.92

4.9s0.02

0.97

0.6

o.24

20.63

9.31

0.67

7.15

Source: Adapted from López Laborda et al 2006.

than regional governments, since the share of own-source revenues is 6o per cent.These are based largely on taxes and fees related to development permits, buildingand housing, which has led to many cases of irregular financing and to ¿r.r

uncontrolled urban development.

Subnational politics

Subnational politics has been dominated in the last decade, similarly to rhenational level, by the three main state-wide parties-the Socialist party (psoE),the People's Party (PP), and United Left (IU)-and by several regional, AC-basedparties (Hanley and Loughlin zoo6). some of the latter have also been important inthe national parliament-convergencia i unió (ciu), Basque Nationalist party

(Pln/), and canary coalition (cc) (Pallarés and Keating zoo6). Regional partiesare in parliament or cabinets in all but five regions. In catalonia, the Basquecountr¡ Galicia, Navarre, and the canary Islands theyhave given rise to distincrregional party systems. In some cases-until zoo3 in catalonia and zoog in theBasque country-they have dominated regional parliaments and cabinets fromtheir inception. Also state-wide parties and their regional branches have adapted todecentralization and elecroral competition with regional parties and have changc.dtheir organizations accordingl¡ gaining growing influence within state-wide partvorganizations and leadership.

1.82

Jt,tô

S PAIN 369

Table |5.7 Government formation and electoral

regional parties in the last regional elect¡ons

results for state-wide and

State parties or regional

bra nches

Regional parties Government(o/o of votes) formed by

Andalusia 2008

Aragon 2007

Asturias 2007

Balearic lslands 2007

Easque Country 2009

Canary lslands 2007

Cantabria 2007

Castile Êt Leon 2007

Castille-La l\4ancha 2007

Catalonia 2006

PSoE [a8.1); PP [38.6); lU

(7 1)

PSoE (a1.03); PP (31.0e);

ru (4.12)

PP (41.8); PSoE (a1.61; lU

(s.8)

PP [46.01); PSoE (31.75)

PSE-EE/PSOE (30.70); PP

(r4.1); UPD (2.1s)

P50E (34.72); PP (24.37)

PP (a1.s2); PSoE (24.33)

PP (4s.41); PSOE (37.4e)

PSoE (s1.e2); PP (42.4s)

PP (1 0.65)

PA (2.s)

PAR (12.12); CHA

(8.17);Other (4.72)

BLOC (9.8); UM

(6.75)

PNV-Etu [38.56);ARALAR (6.03); EA

(3.6); EB-B (3 s1)

cc (23.36)

PRC (28.87)

UPL (2.7 4)

PSC (26.82); C¡U

(3 1 . s3);

Ci utada ns-Pa rtidode la Ciudadania(3.03); ERc

(i4.03); lcv (s.s2)

BNG (16.01); TEGA

[1 .1 1)

UPN (a2 2); CDN

(4.4); NB (23 7)

PR (5.e5)

ru-cPV (7.07)

PSoE (Naaj)

PSOE PAR

(Maj)

PSoE (Min)

PSOE UM

PSM lU (Maj)

PSOE [M¡n)

cc PP (Maj)

PSOE PRC

(lva;¡

PP (Maj)

PSoE (lvaj)

PSC ERC ICV

(lvaj)

Extremadura 2007

Galicia 2009

Madrid 2007

Murcia 2007

Navane 2007

Rioja 2007

Valencia 2007

PSoE (52.e); PP (38.7e)

PP (a6.68); PSoE (31.02);

UPD (1.41)

PP (s3.3); PSoE (33.46); lU

(s.Be)

PP (s8.a9); PSoE (31 81);

ru [6.24)PSoE (22.a); lU (+.a)

PP (a8.7a): PSoE (40.47)

PP (s2.s2); PSoE (34.49)

PS0E (l\¡aj)

PP (Maj)

PP (Maj)

PP (Maj)

UPN CDN

(lv¡n)

PP (Maj)

PP (Maj)

.Aralar (Basque Independentist Party); Bloc (Balearic Block); BNG. Bloque Nacionalista Galego (Galician

Nationâl¡st Block); Ciutadans-Partido de la Ciudadanía (Citizens'Party); CC. Coalición Canaria (Canary lslands

Coalition)i CDN. Convergencia de Demócratas de Navarra (Navarre Democrats' Grouping); CHA Chunta

Aragonesista (Aragonesist Group); CitJ. Convergéncia i Unió (Convergence and Union); EA. Eusko Alkartasuna(Basque Solidarìty); EB Ezquerra Batua (Basque Unìted Left): lU. lzquierda unida (united Leftl; lU-lCV

iniciativa per Catalunya-Verts (lnitìative for Catalonìa-The Greens); NB. Nafanoa Bai (Navarra Yes); PA. Partido

Andalucista (Andalusian Party); PAR. Partido Aragonés Regionalista {Aragonese Regionalist Party); PNV-EAJ.

Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party); PP. Partido Popular (Popular Party); PR Partido Riojano

(Riojan Party)i PRC Partido Regìonalista de Cantabria (Cantabrian Regionalist Party); PSoE. Partìdo Socjal¡sta

obrero Español (Spanish Socìalist Party); PSE-EE Basque socialìsta Party; PSC Catalan Socialist Party; UM.

Unión lVallorquina (Mallorcan Union); UPL. Unión del Pueblo Leones (Union ofthe Leonese People); UPN Unión

del Pueblo Nav¿rro fUnion of the People of Navarre); UPD Unión Progreso y Democracia (tJnion Progress and

Dcmocracy).

Source: httpJ/www congreso.es/consti/elecciones/autonomicas and own elaboration.

J70 CESAR COLINO AND ELOISA DEL PINO

Regarding government formation, most Acs-nine until 2oo9 but currentlyeleven-have single-party governments, of which nine rule with a majority (see

Table r5.7). The other six ACs are usually governed by coalition governmenr.s

between state-wide and regional parties-three dominated by non-state-wideparties, Catalonia, Navarra, and the Canary Islands, and three dominated by

state-wide parties, Aragon, Cantabria, and the Balearic Islands. Overall, in 46.4 pcL

cent of regional elections there was a majority in parliament and government. Inaddition, in nine ACs there has been practically no alternation in government-sixPP and three PSOE (L6pez Nieto zooS). Catalonia and the Basque Country have

alternated only after thirty years of dominance by nationalist parties. In twelve ACs

the competition is bipartisan and in the other five it is multipart¡ with three to fivepartres.

In several ACs, voting patterns may differ between general and regional elec-

tions. For example in the Basque Country and Catalonia a significant portion ofvotes go for state-wide parties in general elections and for nationalist parties at the

regional ones. Even in those regions with a different electoral calendar, the dpram-ics of regional politics and electoral competition are closely linked to those at the

national level. Nevertheless, one can also witness a reglotalization of nationalpolitics, due to the importance that non-state-wide parties have acquired for the

stability of the government in the national parliament. circulation of politiciansamong levels is frequent. Over 6o per cent of regional MPs were re-elected in the

election of 2oo7, half of them have had prior political experience at municipal level

and around 10 per cent at the national level (Oñate and Delgado zoo6).The recent electoral trends signal a concentration ofvotes on state-wide parties

or their branches both in national and regional elections. At present, ifwe considerthe Catalan Socialist Party (PSC) as a counterpart of PSOE, sixteen ACs are

governed by state-wide parties alone or in coalition-only Navarre is not, due toUPN's recent tensions with its associate party PP. This trend was visible in the

March zooS national elections-where 89 per cent of votes (9f p.r cent of scats)

went for state-wide parties-and in recent regional elections. since the Basque antì

Galician elections on r March zoo9, nationalist parties do not have a majority inparliaments or control the executives in any of their traditional strongholds, withthe exception of the canary Islands. It is still not clear whether this reflects ¿n

underþing crisis or a momentary electoral retreat of regional nationalisms in

Spain. In any case, it signals a clear success of state-wide parties and their regionalbranches, able to act both as national and as regional parties according to the

elections. This notwithstanding, new third parties have emerged for the firsr rimcand entered the national and regional parliaments, some of them campaigning onterritorial issues (UPD and Ciutadans), which shows a certain degree of disaffec-tion with both national and sub-state existing parties.

At the local level, there are numerous political parties that run in the municipalelections alongside state-wide or regional parties. Many of them are independents,

SPAIN

Table 1 5.8 Municipal elections, 2007

Party Votes Share of Councillorsvotes (o/o)

o/o of Majorities Pluralities Tie

meyors

PP

PSOE

IU

ctuERC-AM

PNV

PAR

BNG

ICV-EUIA-EP

PA

cc-PNcEAE-ANV

Rest of parties

Total pafivotes

Blank ballots

Void

Ïotal votes

7 915 0147 758 7831 216944

722 653347 460309 625

94 087

315 449257 048235 201

217 54094 825

2 318 30621 802 935

427 234263 51 5

22 493 684

36.61

34.91

5.47

3.25

1.56

1.39

o.42

1.42

1.16

1.06

0.98

0.43

10.43

99.09

23 349

24 0292 0353 3841 5941 038

982661

449526403

439

7 241

66 130

35.6628.82

4.17

o.72

1.29

1.13

1.89

0.1

0.07

0.21

0.3

0.31

5.94

80.61

2 880 472

2328 57258 54

337 1 16

104 37

91 411EA )C

896 16

17724 11

25 15

481 117

6 512 1 562

2

2

Source: Ministry of lnterior 2009.

Ìr'ft-wing radicals, greens, and alternatives. They may win in small towns but wouldnormally need the support of one of the large state-wide or .AC-based parties,

which usually present candidates in all municipalities (Márquez zooT; Velasco

roog). Around 70 per cenT of mayors belong to the three main state-wide partiesand tlre rest to non-state-wide parties and to independent parties and citizens'elcctoral groups.

During the r999-zoo3 period, there was a government with an absolute majorityin 83.r per cent of municipalities (see Table r5.8). Majority governments predomi-nated in the srnaller municipalities, while they decrease in middle-sized towns and

especially in big cities (SaIazar zooT: 163; Márquez zooT:3o6ff.) This shows a pictureof a party system similar to the national and regional one and increasinglybipartisan. If we look at the stability of local governments and the use of censure

nlotions, we k¡ow that in zoo3-6, rB5 motions of censure were tabled, which is very[,.'w if rve consider the number of municipalities. Likewise, the data show that cases

o[ turrrcoat councillors (trønsfuguismo) are aT the origin of less than half of themotions of censure (Salazar zooT). Lt the same time, this shows how the balance

bctrveeu governability and representativeness of local government is accomplishedby the clectoral system more fairly than many of its critics suggest when advocatingits refbun.

t/z CESAR COLINO AND ELOISA DEL PINO

Regarding the nationalization of local elections, until now the party winning thelocal elections has usually won the subsequent national election. For this reason,

many in the parties' campaigns and in the media see local elections as the firstround of general elections. Local election turnout, at around 60 Ío 70 per cellt,similar to regional elections but usually lower than national elections, has re-

mained stable. Within parties, central organizations decide frequently on the

candidates and the coalitions in municipal governments, especially regarding the

big cities. On the other hand, the 'localization' of national politics is less importantthan in other countries. For example, among the deputies of the lower chamber, the

congress ofdeputies, there are eight mayors and forty-one councillors.

Subnational citizenship and participation

spanish citizens in all regions give high support to democracy as the best politicalsystem. Electoral turnout is very similar to other democracies such as the French,Irish, or British. This support for democracy coexists, however, with a widespreaddisaffection among citizens towards the political sphere. For instance, with smallregional variations, only a quarter of Spaniards feel 'very' or 'quite' interested inpolitics and around three-quarters have negative opinions about politics and

politicians.

However, although Spanish civil society has traditionally been considered weak

and with poor social capital, some recent data on associational activit¡ shorvingregional variations, allow for some qualifications to this perception. For instance,while the number of associations remains small in most regions, there has been an

increase of non-political associations in many regions. Data on protest events,

especially demonstrations, show very active citizens, comparable to those of otherneighbouring democracies. Similarl¡ although the levels of interpersonal trust arc

loq they score better than in other advanced democracies. Some authors havc

suggested that social capital in the Spanish case is onlyweak when measured ag.rinst

the usual criteria in Anglo-Saxon studies. It could be considered much higher ilmore expansive criteria were used and frequent bar-hopping or clubbing werc

included, as an equivalent to bowling for the American case (Encarnación zooS).

spaniards in all regions also adhere to a statist view and to a universalisticconcept of the welfare state, with a strong emphasis on equai opportunitics,Most citizens believe that the government should be responsible for the welfareof all citizens and around 70 per cent would rather pay more taxes and have

more or better services, than pay less for fewer or lower quality ones (Del pino

zoo5). A majority of citizens, with some regional variations, are 'very' or 'rluite'satisfied with public services provided by regions and the central governnlent(Arriba et al. zoo6).

S PAIN

The decentralization model of the so-called State of Autonomies (EI Estado de las

Autottomías) has high levels of support in most ACs. Nowadays more than Bo percent of citizens have a dual identity or allegiance both to their AC and to Spain,identifying with the two political communities. Since r97ó support for centralism

',lccreased from 43 per cent to 9 per cent in zoo5. The percentage favouring more

pt¡wers for ACs has gone from being about half of the population in t984 to almost

Ztl per cent in zoo5. Most citizens would like the central government to retainresponsibilities for pensions and social security (Del Pino and Van Ryzin zoo8).Finally, municipal governments are seen as the ones most responsive to citizens'needs and as those encouraging citizen participation the most.

Traditional mechanisms of public consultation in administrative procedures are

lìrlly consolidated in Spain and function relatively well in issues of high pubticsalience. Some regional governments have also created directorates-general in theiradministrations to promote citizen participation, for example Catalonia, CanaryIslands, Valencia, and Aragon. All ACs have regulated regional popular legislativeinitiatives. These mechanisms have not been used much. In the Spanish parliamentthere have been fifty-seven popular initiatives, and in the Catalan parliament, forinstance, eleven, virtually all without success.

At the local level, the 'popular municipal initiative' was introduced in zoo3. Theloo3 Law on Modernization of Local Governments regulated standards and proce-dures for the effective participation of residents in local affairs, both in the munici-pality as a whole and in the districts. It has regulated participation in straregicplanning and local development policies through the creation of the Social Councilof the City and the participation in the improvement of the municipal administra-tion (Rodriguez2oo5).It is stiii too soon to see the effects of these measures, but datashorv decreasing interest in participation in local politics, even where there are

channels of participation, such as attendance at the meetings of the council, citizens'assernblies in the open council system, or the possibility of following the councilmeetings through broadcasting by local TV stations.

lb this, we must add the very limited practice of direct democracy mechanismsprovided for in the constitution and other regulations. Referendums have beenlittle used in Spain. In addition to the four state-level referendums in total, onlyseven regional referendums have been held, three in Andalusia, two in Cataloniaand orìe in the Basque Country. Regarding municipalities, the central governmenthas to authorize referendums. Between 1985 and March zoo9, only twenty-six were¿uthorized out of the 111 proposed by municipal authorities in more than B,roo

rn unicipalities.Consultative councils are the most used mechanism of citizen participation in

nrLrnicipalities (see Table r5.9). They can be sector-specific (consejos sectoriales) orterritoriaÌ (consejos territoriales). All Spanish municipalities with more thanroo,ooo residents have some consultative sector-specific councils and nearly

+o per cent have territorial councils (Font and Blanco zoo6). The practice of

374 CESÀR COLINO AND ELOISA DEL PINO

Table 1 5.9 Number and type of local referendums in Spain, 1 985-2009

Requested Authorized lssuesinvolved

Anda lusia

Aragon

Basque CountryCanary lslandCastìle and Leon

Castile-La ManchaCata lon ia

Extremad u ra

Ga licia

Madrid

Murcia

Navarre

La Rioja

Valencia

Ceuta

Total

17

4

I4

20

9

15

6

3

3

2

3

1

15

1

111

1

1

2

2

3

4

2

0

2

0

1

,]

3

0

26

Local festivals (2), lntegration of municipality in

supramunicipal consortium (1 ), Facilities (1 )

Municipal seqreqat¡on

Dissolution of municipalityEnvironment (t), Change name of municipality (t)Environment (1), Municipal organization (1)

Facilities (1 ), Local festivals (2)

Town-planning (2), Change name ofmunicipality (1 ), Local festivals (1 )

Facilities (1), Local festivals (1)

Facilities (1)

Environment (1 )

Environment (1)

Change name ofmunicipality (l), Local festivals (2)

Source: Own elaboration w¡th data from M¡nistry of Public Administration.

participatory budgeting is recent and still small-scale in several municipalities, butthere are some experiences worthwhile mentioning. In Catalonia, it was launchedin Sabadell in zooo and Rubí in zooz. Other examples are found in the city ofCordoba or Cabezas de San luan, Albacete, and Getafe, and more recently in

Seville. In this cit¡ the council allocated between 3z and 4z per cent of its budgetto eighteen districts; and all residenrs in the neighbourhoods voted for particularprojects, social policies, and actions in their area. Local governments have also used

polls and surveys on specific aspects of municipal life, or deliberative polls in some

Andalusian cities. According to a recent survey in middle-sized cities, most citizensdo not know or use many of the mechanisms mentioned above.

Subnational governance

Apart Íiom parliarnents, audit courts, ombudsman ofûces, and economic andsocial councils, ACs in Spain have developed independent regional administrationsand civil services to implement their policies and coordinate national policies withthe central government's administration. Most of them followed the nationalbureaucratic model in their departmental organization and concentrated powersin the regional capitals, establishing ministerial field offices over their territories,

SPAIN 375

fiequently following the traditional division in provinces. ACs with a greater

nurnbel of powers at the beginning, the fast-track ACs, developed a more stable

and professionalized civil service and some others have relied more on non-career

civil servants' posts. Many ACs have created agencies or public companies forlcgional economic development, and haYe independently regulated spatial

planning, urbanism and land use, or savings banks, or have set strategic plans forbig cities. They have also approved regional economic strategies, such as Regional

Pacts for Employment, Regional Spatial Strategies, Regional Transport and Infra-structure Plans, etc. They have their own R&D policies, education and vocational

training schemes, or set their own environmental standards or transPort regula-

tions within EU and Spanish framework directives (Colino zoo8).

Most of the revenues of AC governments are unconditional and have constantly

grorvn in the last years. It appears that their institutions and resources have enabled

growing, if still limited, policy and financial discretion by regions. That has given

thenr a certain capacíty to implement innovative policy options and policy experi-

rnents. AC governments have chosen different public-private mixes for the provi-

sion of their services, have decided to invest more on cultural, linguistic, or welfare

policies, on primary or secondary education, on technology, or in tourism, or tochange their priorities. Apart from increasing policy diversity in such important

sectors as health, education, social services, or environmental policy, they have

produced some policy innovation in programmes such as family assistance, hous-

ing policies, poverty assistance, environmental impact assessment, health care

narìagement, development aid, etc. (Gallego et al. 2oo5; Subirats zoo6).

ln addition, most regional administrations have been under pressure to mod-

ernize even more than the central government. Many public-private partnerships

have been established (Catalonia, Andalusia, Madrid). Additionall¡ several ACs

Iìûve attempted systems of quality management, e-government, and informationtcchnologies.

As regards municipalities, according to their population size, they provide

a nurnber of basic services, such as local policing, flre fighting, refuse collection,

street cleaning, land-use control, urban transportation, social services, leisure and

cultural activities, public works and town planning, central markets, housing, etc.

Only the larger municipalities have a role in the delivery of services such as

education or health, which are AC governments' responsibility. Recentþ localqovernments have turned to welfare servíces and have had to deal with new

problems such as environment sustainability, immigration, new technologies,

ancl educational deprivation. Often they have done this without having explicitjurisdiction or resources.

ln this sense, the high number, fragmentation, and diversity of local govern-

ments ir-r Spain has led to the lack of sufñcient financial means and a chronic

fìnancial deficit, and made them dependent on other governments-central and

regionai-in order to be able to provide their services. This has led to two typical

376 cÉsAR coLINo AND ELoÍsA DEL PrNo

solutions: inter-municipal cooperati service

partnerships (mancomunidades) or of the

delivery of important local services, ater' or

even social, cuitrrral, and educational e third-

sector NGOs, non-profit and religious organizations. Services managed by private

operators rePresent 44Per cerrt for municipalities between 1oo'ooo and 5oo'ooo

inhabitants (Torres et al. zoo3).

Spanish subnational democracy in the

Lijphart-Hendriks tYPologies

Summarizing the situation of subnational democracy so far, we find mostly

majoritarian features albeit with some qualifications. For instance, we find con-

centration of executive power in one-party regional governments in eleven

ACs, the executive dominance in

governments and two-party systems

most of them. There are also cent

central institutions and weak sub-regional institutions and a concentration of

regulatory powers in re

under regional political

are the electoral system

effects; some indicationsratism, and flnally the legal-administrative supervision by higher regional courts'

At the local democracy level, there are clear differences between large cities and

small municipalities. But generally we may also find a majoritarian concentration

of executive power in one-party local government, mostly supported by pluralities;

increasing executive dominance of mayors vis-à-vis the council, a two-Party system

in most of the councils, and a more pluralist local interest grouP system. we alstr

find concentration of regulatory Powers, the importance of council sectoral com-

mittees and related bureaucracies; mostly centralized local government with weak

sub-local institutions. On the consensus model side, we may find the proportional

electoral system; a disPersal o

governmental tiers and externa

trative supervision bY courts, w

If we add the consideration

Ievels, we nt are

many reg re ion

and even on nce

in practice as to the levels of compliance with these regulations and the use of

existing mechanisms across regions and tlpes of local governments'

S PAIN 377

CrrnrlsNcEs ¡.ND OppoRTUNrrrES oFSusNA,rroNAL DnnnocRACY rN SPArN

Subnational democracy in Spain faces several exogenous and endogenous chal-lenges that affect its qualit¡ that is, the responsiveness, effrcac¡ and legitimacy ofgtr\¡eruments.

The lìrst challenge we can mention is globalization, Europeanization, and

economic competiveness, which are three different albeit related dimensions ofthe exogenous challenge to subnational democracy. Global competition and adap-

tation to EU membership has been a challenge that has put a strain on the capacityof subnational governrnents to compete with each other in international marketsfor plivate investments and domestically for public investments and structuraltunding from central government and EU. This competition, aggravated by theinternational economic crisis, has also affected big cities and metropolitan areas

in Spain that have competed for a new role on the global scene.

In this sense, lack of resources seems to be the main challenge for the effective-

ncss of subnational governments in Spain. Decentralization of most welfare state

lirnctions in the r99os produced ever-growing spending in health and otherser vtces.

Corruption in regional and local government seerns to be one, if not the mostserious, of the malaises plaguing subnational democracy in Spain. In virtually allparties and at all governmental levels, regional, provincial, and municipal, there

have been repeated scandals in the last years. The pervasive party politicizationof the higher echelons of both regional and local administrations and the ineffec-tivcness of audit and other supervision mechanisrns aggravates the situation.Irinall¡ a source of corruption at the regional and local level has been the 'turncoat'phenornenon. The main state-wide parties tried to agree a national pact against

tlris phenomenon that has subsequently not been honoured. This creates a climatein prrblic opinion and attitudes that undoubtedly lead to politicai disaffection and

to incr-easing levels of abstention and cynicism.Lìowever, if corruption and disaffection are severe problems of subnational

tlcnrocracv in Spain, still more serious for its survival is the problem, currentlyunique in Europe, ofthe persistence ofpolitical violence and nationalist terrorismirr thc Basque Country and in Navarre, affecting indirectly the rest of the country.lhe telrorist organization ETA, which has sizeable (albeit decreasing) supportlì'onl the population, has sought independence for the Basque Country and

annex¿rtion of Basque lands in France and Navarre. It has done this through thekilling of nearly 9oo peopìe. In many areas of the Basque Countr¡ non-nationalistscrnnot campaign freely in elections, and dozens of journalists and thousands ofothcr prolcssionals have been forced into self-exile through fear and persecution.

378 CÉSAR CoLINo AND ELoÍsA DEL PINo

Most non-nationalist politicians, local councillors, and Mps, and their families inthe ACs of the Basque country and Navarre, must live with round-the-clockbodyguards. That means that rights to freedom of expression or representationare denied in that region to many citizens (Mata zoo5; Gil-Robles zoo5). parties

supporting violence have until recently enjoyed regional parliamentary seats andgoverned many municipalities without condemning or criticizing violence againsttheir fellow councillors or deputies. At the same time, they have controlled morethan sixty local councils, which have been used as a major source of income andpatronage to support the terrorist organrzatron.

Finall¡ regional and local governments have to face the challenge of integrationand management of old and new diversities. Apart from the smaller participationof women in political offices and other inequalities, immigration in Spain hasincreased dramatically in the last ten years, from 6 to 12 per cent oftotal popula-tion. cities like Barcelona have now r8.r per cent of foreign residents. Muslim andLatin American immigrants have been the most numerous, and their distributionhas varied in different regions. ACs with double national identities and tlvoIanguages have felt the integration of immigrants as an additional hurdle in thcirparticular integration and nation-building projects. on certain occasions, imnri-gration has led to acts ofracism and the emergence ofxenophobic parties.

RrspoNDrNG To rHE Crr,rrrnNcnsAND OppoRTUNITIES

Most of these challenges have been addressed through institutional reforms andpolicy changes carried out by the central parliament and government or throughcoordination of the three governmental levels. The demands of globalization,Europeanization, and the lack of resources have been mainly dealt with throughlegal and policy reforms to promote coordination, collaborative government, antjincreased political and fiscal autonomy of subnational units, alongside reforms inpublic management at the three levels in the direction of more evaluation andaccountability of public activity. A new funding system for regional governmentswas negotiated in zoog that achieves more revenue autonomy and responsibility ofregional governments. cooperation bodies for vertical and horizontal coorclina-tion both in domestic and EU affairs have been created or reinforced, such as thcconference of Presidents or the new ho rizonial bodies to promote and coordinatesubnational participation in EU decision-making.

Regarding the overdue reform oflocal government and its financial problenrs,based on a zoo5 !\rhite Paper on Local Government, the central government drafted

SPAIN 379

a bill that tried to clari$t and expand local jurisdiction and the financial resources¡r,ailable to local governments and to strengthen democracy at the local level.Other proposals have advocated the reinforcement of intermunicipal cooperationor the amalgamation of some existing micro-municipalities.

On the other hand, the central government has promoted the equality of womenin political representation in public ofûces, through quotas in party lists.r\n opportunity has been lost to further democratize the internal workings ofpartics with the Law on Political Parties in zooz. The government has also relin-quished the traditional governmental control of public television and radio by thecrecutive, transferring to the parliament the appointment of the director of thenational public television corporation. Unfortunatel¡ regional executives have nottollowed this path in their publicly controlled media.

Holvever, the principal set of measures to regenerate democracy has been thoseaddressed to frght corruption and promote transparency. This has been donethrough the change of party finance regulations, a law regulating conflict-of-interest cases for high ofûcials, and the promulgation of a Code of Good Gover-n¡nce lor members of the central government, who must act in accordance with a

scrics of ethical principles. Other anti-corruption measures have targeted thoseareas like land use and planning, increasing the limits for local public authorities tochange urban plans and grant development permits (Fundación A_lternativas

:rro8 ).

Iìcgional and local governments have also taken several measures to fightcitizcns' disaffection and lack of involvement in political life. They have donethat partly through the promotion of more direct democracy and public partici-p;ìlion in ACs and municipalities. The local governments association (FEMP) has

dcveloped an agenda for public participation with several lines of action, related tornur-ricipal organization, the strengthening of partnerships, the associative networkin municipalities, the training of citizens to exercise the right to participate and/ortheir involvement in civic associations, and the coordination with regional andcentral governments to promote civic partrcrpatron.

Finally, terrorist and political violence in the Basque Country has been addressedthrough a coml¡ination of a ban on violent parties, social isolation of violentgroups, and attempts to establish political negotiations with terrorists. By meansof thc' zoor Law on Political Parties, the Spanish parliament decided to ban thoseparties cleally linked with the terrorist organization ETA and advocating violence.:\ccordingl¡ legitimate grounds for such a ban include, among other things,'giving express or tacit political support, legitimizing terrorist actions or excusing¿nd minimizing their significance', providing institutional ol economic support tolhose rvho carry out such actions, and helping to create a 'culture of confrontation'thrt infringes the fundamental rights of those who take a contraty view. Despitesonre political and legal controvtrsy and the opposition ofrulirg Basque national-ist parties, the law proved somewhat effective in reducing terrorist resources and

380 CÉSAR coLINo AND ELoÍsA DEL PINo

weakening their room for manoeuvre. Recentl¡ in June zoo9, the European Courtof Human Rights has also upheld the ban on Batasuna and other parties support-ing terrorism in the Basque countr¡ who had appealed against the spanish courts'rulings.

ETlt's ceasefrre in eoo6 raised hopes of a long-term peace and incited thezapaTero government to conducr direct talks with ETA. This was deeply controver-sial and divisive among the main political parties and public opinion. AIso inMarch zoo9, for the first time in democrac¡ parties supporting terrorism rvert,

banned from participating in Basque regional elections, which has resulted in thefirst ever alternation of the Basque government in thirty years.

CoNcrusroNS

The Spanish model of subnational democrac¡ it has been argued in this chapter,has evolved parallei to the consolidation ofthe first successful experience ofliber¿ldemocrary which has occurred at the national level during the last thirty years inSpain. Democracy at the subnational level has been influenced by the state tradi-tion, but at the same time has transformed its structure and the behaviour ofpolitical actors from a consensual towards a more majoritarian model. Democracl,,identified with autonomy fiom the start, has provided cultural-political recogni-tion, social integration, and economic development for most of the newly createdautonomous communities and other local representative governments. At the sanre

time, the building of subnational democratic institutions and governance syste¡lìshas been dominated byACs to the detriment of local entities.

The tlpe of spanish democracy has served to overcome long-standing tradition¿lcleavages present in spanish societ¡ and has guaranteed political stabilit¡ improvtdgovernance' and respect for minorities. on the other hand, due to the manncr inwhich it emerged and to some unique characteristics of spanish history andpolitical culture, democracy both at the national and the subnational level hirs

suffered from some shortcomings in terms of their capacity to promote and channclcitizens'participation in the public sphere. Spaniards have been reluctant in practiceto make use of participation mechanisms and to get involved in politics. Thcconsequences of this fact for the quality of democracy and governance in spainremain controversial.

S PAIN

Rr¡¡nnucns

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