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Jaya Goyal Social Audits in Outcome Budgeting…

Social Audits in Outcome BudgetingAn Experiment of Accountability in Maharashtra

JAYA GOYAL

Social Audits were carried out to understand people’s perception about the outcomesof public services in thirty-two flagship schemes of the outcome budget exercise inMaharashtra. The mandate of the Public Verification Exercise (PVE) was to makestate budgets sensitive to the outcomes that directly affect people’s everyday lives,especially those in which they encounter state machinery. The paper reveals how theconcepts of social audit were adapted into a PVE jointly conducted by the stategovernment departments and a public university. The paper discusses the origins ofsocial audit and recent trends of using social audits as instruments of accountability in the wake of democratic decentralisation and devolution of powers to local bodies. Indoing so, the paper critically examines two schemes implemented in Maharashtra and poses more questions on the ongoing debates on the notions of public accountabilityitself that differs across stakeholder groups.

Jaya Goyal is a Ph.D Scholar, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai.

INTRODUCTION

The entry of mul ti ple ser vice pro vid ers, both pub lic and pri vate, has raised

con cerns on the qual ity and ris ing costs of ser vices; meet ing di verse needs of

the pop u la tion, es pe cially the poor, with eq uity and jus tice. One of the dom i -

nant dis courses led by the World Bank di ag no ses sys temic prob lems that

might ex plain poor ser vice de liv ery on the whole to weak ac count abil ity

mech a nism that acts as a bar rier to im prov ing ser vices across board (World

De vel op ment Re port, 2004). The prin ci ple of pub lic ac count abil ity is also

pro moted by two other cat e go ries of ac tors. First, UN (United Na tions)agen -

cies, such as the United Na tions De vel op ment Programme (UNDP), are now

seek ing ef fec tive gov ern ment in ter ven tion and im ple men ta tion of

programmes through the bot tom-up ap proach of ac count abil ity. Sec ond,

civil so ci ety ac tors com pris ing nu mer ous non-gov ern men tal (NGOs) and

IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011

Tata In sti tuteof

So cial Sci ences

THEIN DIAN JOUR NAL

OFSO CIAL WORK

Vol ume 72, Is sue 4October 2011

peo ple’s move ments are pro vid ing plat forms to the gen eral pub lic to voice

their con cerns and en gage closely with the state to de liver ser vices.

So cial audit is one such in stru ment of pub lic ac count abil ity which is gain -

ing ground, es pe cially in the wake of dem o cratic de cen trali sa tion and de vo -

lu tion of power and fi nances to panchayats and urban local bod ies. In

Maharashtra, the con cept of so cial audit was used as a Pub lic Ver i fi ca tion

Ex er cise (PVE) across 32 flag ship schemes im ple mented by the State Gov -

ern ment from 13 de part ments in 2006–2007. The schemes in cluded ag ri cul -

ture, rural de vel op ment, pub lic works, hous ing, health and nu tri tion, child

pro tec tion, pri mary ed u ca tion, so cial wel fare, em ploy ment, water and san i -

ta tion, prison and po lice. While the PVE fit ted the bill of a pub lic ac count -

abil ity in stru ment, there were few on to log i cal as sump tions at the onset that

guided the ex pec ta tions of such a pro cess. First, de mand ing ac count abil ity

from the sys tem in India is still weak (Mukhopadhyay, 2005). The RTI (the

Right to In for ma tion) move ment is em pow er ing the cit i zens by clos ing the

‘in for ma tion-gap char ac ter is tic’ of gov ern ment func tion ing, who oth er wise

face im mense hur dles to ac quire sim ple doc u ments like land re cords, pen -

sion dues, min i mum wages and pend ing po lice cases (Viju, 2006). How ever,

de spite such pos i tive trends in clud ing em pha sis on de cen trali sa tion, ac -

count abil ity is the weak est at the level of panchayats and mu nic i pal bod ies.

Weak ac count abil ity at the local level en cour ages pil fer age of state re sources

and cor rup tion. Sec ond, ac count abil ity of panchayats can not be ex pected

when in re al ity, the de vo lu tion of pow ers has not taken place. Also, the

elected rep re sen ta tives of panchayats and mu nic i pal bod ies are ac count able,

who do not even know their roles and re spon si bil i ties and sig nif i cance of

local self gov ern ment (Vaddiraju and Mehrotra, 2004).

Know ing that such re al i ties were in ci den tal to de cen trali sa tion, an in stru -

ment like the ‘so cial au dit’ was seen as an an swer to ac count abil ity con cerns

plagu ing all pub lic ser vices. Is sues of au dit ing are rooted in the con cerns of

the poor, their sur vival, and their right to live with dig nity and jus tice. So cial

audit is claimed to have the po ten tial for par tic i pa tion of the poor in gov er -

nance by mon i tor ing programmes that di rectly af fect their lives (Nagraj,

2006). This is what makes a so cial audit rel e vant and even cen tral to the out -

come bud get ing pro cess. A so cial audit blends cit i zens’ vig i lance with gov -

er nance, trans par ency with ac count abil ity and dem o cratic prac tice with

dem o cratic in sti tu tions. There fore, it be comes im per a tive to ex am ine con -

texts and lo cales where so cial au dits have been im ple mented or ex per i -

mented with and learn les sons for par tic i pa tory gov er nance.

IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011

538 Jaya Goyal

This paper is di vided into two parts. The first part dis cusses briefly the

or i gin of the term so cial audit and the mean ings it has ac quired as an in stru -

ment for ac count abil ity in var i ous con texts. The sec tion also dis cusses the

trends on the use of so cial audit, both as an in sti tu tion al ised mech a nism

within the gov ern ment, and one by the civil so ci ety to im prove ac count -

abil ity of var i ous pub lic programmes in India. In the sec ond part, the paper

high lights how so cial audit was adapted in the out come bud get in

Maharashtra as an ex per i men tal PVE. The PVE al lowed local com mu ni ties

di rect in ter face with the state func tion ar ies at local and state level. Fi nally,

the paper ends with a sec tion on the les sons learned from Maharashtra and

a crit i cal anal y sis on the po ten tial of so cial audit as an ef fec tive in stru ment

of ac count abil ity in pub lic ser vice de liv ery in India. It is be yond the scope

of this paper to dis cuss and cri tique the the o ret i cal as sump tions and con -

cep tual frame work of ac count abil ity, es pe cially the New Pub lic Man age -

ment and World Bank’s Good Gov er nance dis course under which so cial

au dits are un der stood.

SOCIAL AUDIT: CONCEPT AND EXPERIENCES

The word ‘au dit’ is de rived from the Latin word ‘audire’ which means to

hear (FMSO, 2007). Dur ing the early stages of civili sa tion the ac count ing

par ties were re quired to pres ent ac counts orally to the au di tor, who heard

the ac counts (Egankosh, 1992). So cial au dits aim at giv ing a voice to stake -

holders and, hence, em power them to be heard (ibid).

The or i gin of so cial audit can be traced to the ‘man age ment’ dis ci pline.

The con cept was uti lised to im prove the ef fec tive ness of com pa nies and or -

gani sa tions. In com merce, the term ‘au dit’ means an in de pend ent ex am i na -

tion and ver i fi ca tion of an or gani sa tion’s fi nan cial state ment or other

pub lic re ports. As so ci at ing ‘so cial’ with ‘au dit’ means that the or gani sa -

tion is ac count able to and seeks to in volve the di rect par tic i pa tion of all its

stake holders.1

User feed back as a basis for mon i tor ing and as sess ing ‘pub lic ser -

vices’, is a rel a tively new phe nom e non. As men tioned ear lier, au dits

have been con ducted in the busi ness world for a much lon ger pe riod.

With the ad vent of New Pub lic Man age ment in the 1980s and 1990s, so -

cial audit found ap pli ca tions in the so cial and de vel op ment sec tor.

How ever, there are hardly any ex am ples of gov ern ments adopt ing this

ap proach in de vel op ing coun tries. The few ini tia tives in de vel op ing

coun tries have come from civil so ci ety or gani sa tions (Goetz and

IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011

Social Audits in Outcome Budgeting… 539

Gaventa, 2001; Paul, 2002). Civil so ci ety or gani sa tions have been ex -

per i ment ing with audit of ser vice de liv ery, pro cure ment as well as with

dis sem i na tion and fol low-up of audit find ings and rec om men da tions

through di rect cit i zen and media par tic i pa tion such as the ‘Cit i zen Re -

port Card Sys tem’ and par tic i pa tory audit lead ing to the ‘Right to In for -

ma tion Act’, which have pro duced pos i tive re sults in im prov ing the

qual ity of pub lic ser vices. (United Na tions, 2007).

Based on the claims made in of fi cial gov ern ment re cords, the con cept

note on the Out come Bud get by the Tata In sti tute of So cial Sci ences

(TISS) de fines so cial audit as a pub lic ver i fi ca tion and as sess ment of out -

puts and out comes of pro jects. This audit is con ducted by the com mu ni ties

of ben e fi cia ries them selves in their lo cales. (Nagraj, 2006). Al though lim -

ited in its scope of cov er age and tracks only a frac tion of the total ben e fi cia -

ries and stake holders, so cial au dits are sig nif i cant for their qual i ta tive

anal y sis. The audit pro cess cul mi nates with the adop tion of de ci sions or

res o lu tions ap proved for im proved ser vice de liv ery.

So cial audit was first in tro duced in India in 1996 by the Mazdoor Kisan

Shakti Sangathana (MKSS), a civil so ci ety or gani sa tion based in

Rajasthan. Fo cus ing on live li hood is sues, the MKKS used the RTI Act to

in sti tute jan sunwais or pub lic hear ings (Jenkins and Goetz, 2007). The

need for con duct ing so cial au dits grew in re sponse to check ram pant ir reg -

u lar i ties and cor rup tion in min i mum-wage reg u la tions, drought-re lief

works, sub si dised food through the Pub lic Dis tri bu tion Sys tem (PDS) and

to pre vent the il le gal oc cu pa tion of gov ern ment land by pow er ful local in -

ter ests (ibid). Jan sunwais en abled peo ple to gain greater un der stand ing

and con trol over gov ern ment de vel op ment programmes that tar get them as

main ben e fi cia ries. Pub lic hear ings or jan sunwai (in an ideal sit u a tion) is

an in for mal gath er ing of peo ple in the vil lage, where all stake holders like

users of ser vices, panchayat mem bers, NGO rep re sen ta tives, local pol i ti -

cians and gov ern ment func tion ar ies gather to gether to scru ti nise de tails of

a pub lic work or a pro ject.

The suc cess and pos i tive im pact of the audit pro cess in Rajasthan led to

the institutionalisation of so cial audit in the Na tional Rural Em ploy ment

Guar an tee Act, 2005 (NREGA). As per the NREGA guide lines, “so cial

audit is a means of con tin u ous pub lic vig i lance for check ing and ver i fi ca -

tion of scheme im ple men ta tion with ac tive in volve ment of the pri mary

stake holders in clud ing the gov ern ment func tion ar ies and the com mu nity”

(Ministry of Rural Development, 2005).

IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011

540 Jaya Goyal

Some of the pa ram e ters under which a pro ject is mon i tored in a jan

sunwai are quan tity and qual ity of works in re la tion to the ex penses in -

curred and dis burse ments made. These in clude wages, num ber of works

and ma te ri als used, se lec tion of works and lo ca tion of work-sites, and so

on. The basic ob jec tive of a so cial audit is to en sure pub lic ac count abil ity

in the im ple men ta tion of pro jects, laws, and pol i cies. The aim is to en sure

the ef fec tive im ple men ta tion of pro jects and con trol ir reg u lar i ties (Singh

and Rajakutty, 2007).

So cial au dits can also be un der stood from the way it is re lated or not re -

lated to other types of au dits. Singh and Rajakutty (2007) have iden ti fied

three kinds of au dits.

1. For mal au dits en tail ing pe ri odic fi nan cial re views are con ducted by

in sti tu tions and gov ern ments. For ex am ple, au dits con ducted by the

Comp trol ler and Au di tor Gen eral (CAG) of India.

2. Facilitated by NGOs, pub lic au dits are con ducted by the ben e fi cia ries

them selves. Such au dits have min i mal or no in volve ment of gov ern -

ment de part ments.

3. So cial au dits are ‘jointly’ con ducted by all the stake holders, in clud ing

ben e fi cia ries and the gov ern ment.

How ever, given the com plex ity and di ver sity of so cial sit u a tions, even

so cial au dits are seen to be of two types. The first is an ideal type of so cial

audit, as car ried out by Gram Sabhas/Panchayats or local level Vig i lance

and Mon i tor ing Com mit tees (VMCs) as stip u lated by the gov ern ment in

the guide lines of var i ous so cial sec tor programmes. The sec ond, are those

car ried out by civil so ci ety groups (CAG, 2010). It is, how ever, not clear in

such a clas si fi ca tion, the pres ence and role of gov ern ment func tion ar ies

and de part ments par tic i pat ing in the au dits.

While a fi nan cial audit like the one by CAG largely fo cuses on the ques -

tion of whether the money is spent ap pro pri ately, so cial audit fo cuses on

es tab lish ing whether the spend ing made a dif fer ence, that is, the out come.

In fact, there are three major dif fer ences be tween an in sti tu tional audit and

so cial audit that makes them less com ple men tary to each other. First, in sti -

tu tional au dits are pas sive in na ture, and do not in volve a two-way di a logue

pro cess be tween the stake holders and the gov ern ment. Sec ond ‘so cial’ as -

pect is in her ent in most pub lic de vel op ment programmes, but in sti tu tional

au dits seem only to focus on the eco nom ics and ef fi ciency of funds while

ne glect ing the so cial im pact or ef fec tive ness of the money spent, that

IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011


di rectly im pacts peo ple (Singh and Rajakutty, 2007). Fi nally, audit of local

self gov ern ment in sti tu tions is a state sub ject, and the ex ter nal audit of

Panchayati Raj In sti tu tions (PRI) and Urban Local Bod ies (ULBs) is with

the State Local Funds Audit De part ment (LFAD), or with the des ig nated

au di tors as spec i fied in the state laws, with an ex cep tion for West Ben gal,

Bihar and Jharkhand. In such a sce nario the CAG can not audit the func -

tion ing of local self gov ern ments like PRIs and ULBs (CAG, 2010).

In ad di tion, for mal mech a nisms of au dit ing and mon i tor ing like the one

by CAG mech a nisms are quite di vorced from the peo ple and have failed to

be a part of the pub lic do main (Nagraj, 2006). Also, judg ing by the im pact of

the CAG audit re ports or per for mance bud get ing of state gov ern ments, they

have proved in ef fec tive in im prov ing the man age ment of pub lic funds by the

gov ern ment (Jo seph, 1986). Most au dits are car ried out by NGOs. These fall

under ‘pub lic au dit’ rather than so cial audit as in most of the cases, there is

no par tic i pa tion of the gov ern ment. The gov ern ment de part ments come into

the pic ture only when the find ings are to be shared. For ex am ple, so cial audit

was claimed to be used by SEARCH, a Gadchiroli based NGO, to trig ger

better re port ing and cor rec tive ad min is tra tion to wards re duc ing child mor -

tal ity (Bang, Reddy and Deshmukh, 2002). It re sem bled a par tic i pa tory eval -

u a tion of the Mon i tor ing and In for ma tion Sys tem (MIS) rather than an audit.

Many such in ter ven tions claim to be a form of so cial audit, but are more

eval u a tion sur veys done by NGOs in volv ing local peo ple.

An other NGO, Anchalik Vikas Samiti, con ducted a so cial audit to

stream line the In te grated Child De vel op ment Scheme (ICDS) programme

in the Bolangir dis trict of Orissa (ADHAR, 2007). The audit met with fair

suc cess by way of gen er at ing aware ness among the lo cals about their

entitlements and pre sent ing the gross ir reg u lar i ties in the ad min is tra tion of

the scheme to the Dis trict Col lec tor. In 2008, 42 jan sunwais were held as a

part of com mu nity based mon i tor ing (CBM) of health ser vices under the

Na tional Rural Health Mis sion (NRHM) in Maharashtra (Kakde, 2010).

The ex er cise that cov ered five large dis tricts, was largely fa cil i tated by var -

i ous NGOs and by 2011, it was ex tended to eight more dis tricts in the state.

One of the in ter est ing find ings was that most panchayats in Maharashtra do

not see health ser vices as their man date. How ever, SATHI, the NGO that

led the so cial audit pro cess, re ported a change in at ti tudes of func tion ar ies

and im proved di a logue with lo cals. The com mu nity also ex pe ri enced an

im proved sense of own er ship of pub lic health ser vices, as well as in creased

women par tic i pa tion (ibid).

IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011

542 Jaya Goyal

With var ied ex pe ri ences of so cial au dits across states and sec tors, ev i -

dence shows that ef fec tive ness of com mu nity mon i tor ing of pub lic

programmes in de vel op ing coun tries has been con flict ing (Afridi, 2008).

When fi nan cial ir reg u lar i ties come to sur face dur ing the audit pro cess and

er ring of fi cials do not face dis ci plin ary ac tion or other sanc tions, then the

pur pose of the ex er cise is re duced to fact or fault find ing, which by it self,

may not re sult in re duc ing cor rup tion or im prov ing ser vices.

So cial audit has been in sti tu tion al ised into the gov ern ment’s mon i tor ing

mech a nisms in Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh. Lim ited ev i dence on so cial

au dits in spe cific states show that it has made de liv ery of pub lic

programmes like Na tional Rural Em ploy ment Guar an tee Scheme

(NREGS) more ef fec tive (Aakella and Kidambi, 2007). By def i ni tion, a

so cial audit is car ried out by the com mu nity of stake holders like the ben e fi -

cia ries/par tic i pants, rep re sen ta tives from im ple ment ing agen cies, gram

panchayat rep re sen ta tives, and so on. In prac tice, for ma tion of such an

ideal group may not be pos si ble. So, an audit group may in clude rep re sen -

ta tives of ben e fi cia ries, self-help groups (SHGs), vil lage level or gani sa -

tions, local/com mu nity lead ers, youth clubs, mar gin al ised sec tions like

sched uled castes, sched uled tribes, and women. For ex am ple, VMCs

formed under NREGS in Rajasthan com prise ben e fi cia ries, so cial work ers,

re tired pro fes sion als, teach ers, and so on. In Andhra Pradesh, ed u cated un -

em ployed youth are trained as vil lage so cial au di tors (VSAs) to help fa cil i -

tate so cial au dits (ibid). So cial au dits in some states like Maharashtra and

Andhra Pradesh, have been con ducted ei ther by civil so ci ety or through an

in sti tu tion al ised mech a nism in na tional programmes like the NRHM, the

Mid-Day Meal scheme (MDM), PDS, Sarva Siksha Abhyan (SSA), ICDS

and Indira Awas Yojana (IAY).

The ex pe ri ence of the out come bud get ex er cise in Maharashtra using so -

cial audit in the form of PVE is an op por tu nity in ret ro spect to com pare re -

cent and past ex pe ri ences of so cial au dits else where in the coun try in terms

of their de ter mi nants, con texts, com mon al i ties and dif fer ences on larger is -

sues of pub lic ac count abil ity and par tic i pa tory gov er nance. In 2006, as a

part of the out come bud get ex er cise, the De part ment of Fi nance (DoF),

Gov ern ment of Maharashtra (GoM), and TISS col lab o rated to un der take a

PVE for 32 flag ship programmes across 12 gov ern ment de part ments in

few dis tricts of Maharashtra to get the pulse of the ser vice de liv ery; im ple -

men ta tion chal lenges; fail ures; and also best prac tices in spite of many

odds. It was a downscaled ver sion of so cial audit, al most like a hy brid form

IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011


of ac count abil ity mech a nism that in volved re spec tive gov ern ment de part -

ments and their field func tion ar ies, an ac a demic in sti tu tion, and the ben e fi -

cia ries.

PUBLIC VERIFICATION EXERCISE: AN EXPERIMENT IN

MAHARASHTRA

In sim ple terms, a PVE is an audit con ducted under the open sky as op -

posed to one in a closed room, and the au di tors are not a se lect group of

tech ni cal (largely fi nan cial) ex perts, but the com mu nity of in tended ben e -

fi cia ries them selves (Nagraj, 2006). At the very min i mum, the PVE is an

as sess ment of the programme out comes by the ben e fi cia ries against the

claims made in of fi cial or gov ern ment re cords. Like so cial audit, a PVE es -

sen tially in volves shar ing with the com mu nity all the in for ma tion (fi nan -

cial, tech ni cal and per for mance) per tain ing to the pro ject and en gag ing in a

pub lic as sess ment of that scheme.

A PVE is aimed at yield ing sig nif i cant in sights and in for ma tion re gard -

ing the de liv ery of the schemes in the state. If a pub lic ser vice is not reach -

ing the peo ple ef fec tively, then such an ex er cise of fers mid-term

cor rec tions to im prove ser vice de liv ery in stantly. It is also aimed at iden ti -

fy ing and ob jec tively un der stand ing re gional com mon al i ties, con trasts and

stark vari a tions on scheme per for mance in urban, rural and tribal set tings.

In ad di tion, the PVE yields in for ma tion cov er ing only a frac tion of the total

com mu nity of ben e fi cia ries, but its qual i ta tive depth is sig nif i cant. The

audit pro cess cul mi nates with adopt ing de ci sions or res o lu tions for im -

proved ser vice de liv ery. To this ex tent, a PVE com ple ments a wider but

more quan ti ta tive as sess ment of a scheme or programme through a large

scale sur vey. Al though, lim ited in its reach, a PVE is nev er the less a first

step in mov ing to wards a more peo ple ori en tated, re spon sive and trans par -

ent pro cess of pre par ing, mon i tor ing and eval u at ing bud gets and their out -

comes. Owing to these char ac ter is tic rea sons, a PVE is termed as an

ex per i ment and not strictly a so cial audit ex er cise.

The Process of PVE

The PVE was a joint ex er cise in volv ing all the stake holders—gov ern ment

func tion ar ies from each of the 12 de part ments2, the ben e fi cia ries of ser -

vices and TISS, which acted as a fa cil i ta tor in this pro cess. Twelve task

forces, each com pris ing 20–25, were cre ated from 12 par tic i pat ing de part -

ments. Each task force led by their re spec tive de part ment sec re tary was

IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011

544 Jaya Goyal

com posed of com mis sion ers, di rec tors, ad min is tra tive staff, and mid and

field level of fi cers. An Out come Bud get Cell led by the Sec re tary of Fi -

nance was in sti tuted within the DoF for co or di nat ing ac tiv i ties with other

de part ments and TISS.3 The TISS team com prised fac ulty and re search ers.

A broad frame work out lin ing the pro cess of con cep tual is ing, plan ning,

ini ti at ing and com plet ing a so cial audit was de vel oped in con sul ta tion with

the con cerned de part ments. The var i ous steps in volved are listed below:

• Preparing a calendar of dates for conducting a PVE for each of the 32

schemes.

• Conducting workshops with the respective department task forces

delineating the objectives, purpose, process, coverage, sampling and

survey tools of the social audit process and the PVE.

• Selecting the locale—districts, blocks and villages for the PVE. The

districts were selected through purposive sampling by utilising

government data available on performance indicators of a scheme

and arriving at a poor performing district and a good performing

district in Maharashtra.

• Creating PVE teams constituting members from the task forces and

TISS researchers.

• Conducting initial field visits and discussions with beneficiaries of

the selected sites.

• Initiating the process and convening the forum for PVE in the

selected sites.

• Workshops on sharing results of the PVE with stakeholders.

• Using PVE results and recommendations to make mid-term

corrections in budgets, policy or programmes.

These steps briefly de lin eate the en tire pro cess of plan ning and con duct -

ing the PVE. This ex er cise was con ducted be tween De cem ber 2006 to Feb -

ru ary 2007. To help il lus trate the pro cess and find ings of the PVE in the

Maharashtra Out come Bud get, two sig nif i cant schemes im ple mented by

the GoM in most dis tricts of the state are pre sented here as case stud ies.

These case stud ies are fol lowed by a cri tique and dis cus sion on so cial audit

as a tool for im prov ing the out come ef fec tive ness of pub lic programmes

and les sons learnt from the Maharashtra out come budget ex pe ri ence on its

scalability and replicability in other con texts. These schemes are the Em -

ploy ment Pro mo tion Programme, and the Total San i ta tion Cam paign. The

IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011


data pre sented in this sec tion is ac cessed from the un pub lished

Maharashtra Out come Bud get Report 2007–2008, except where other

sources are stated.

Case Study 1: Employment Promotion Programme

The Em ploy ment Pro mo tion Programme (EPP) scheme is a 100 per cent

state spon sored scheme by the De part ment of Em ploy ment and Self Em -

ploy ment (GoM). The scheme falls under the bud get head of Em ploy ment,

Mar ket In for ma tion and Youth Em ploy ment Ser vice with an an nual bud -

get of Ru pees 12.07 crores in 2007–2008. The main ob jec tive of the

scheme is to as sist ed u cated un em ployed youth in the state to ac quire and

ad vance their skills, and ap ti tude, by pro vid ing them on-the-job train ing in

pri vate sec tor es tab lish ments and pub lic sec tor un der tak ings. The scheme

en cour ages the youth to change their con ven tional mind-sets and take up

op er a tives or shop floor jobs, rather than look ing for only white col lar jobs.

Till 2005–2006, the scheme pro vided jobs to more than 8,400 youths.

The el i gi bil ity cri te ria for avail ing this scheme re quires the youth to be un -

em ployed and above eigh teen years of age, a do mi cile of Maharashtra;

passed at least the Sec ond ary School Cer tif i cate Ex am i na tion (SSC); and

reg is tered with the Em ploy ment Ex changes of the gov ern ment. The

scheme is op er ated from the Dis trict Em ploy ment and Self Em ploy ment

Guid ance Cen tre com pris ing 35 di vi sions and dis trict of fices, in clud ing

two of fices in Mumbai. The data on the fi nan cial and out come per for -

mance of the scheme is tab u lated in Table 1. The per cent age of can di dates

se lected for EPP train ing against the va cant po si tions reg is tered by the em -

ployer with the em ploy ment ex changes has re mained close to 50 per cent

for the last four years ,that is, from 2002–2003 till 2005–2006. It means

that about 50 per cent of the va cant po si tions were not filled, even though

there were dou ble the num ber of can di dates reg is tered. A sec ond vis i ble

trend is the per cent age of can di dates who suc cess fully com pleted the train -

ing have been in creas ing, from 67.3 per cent in 2002–2003 to 73.6 per cent

in 2005–2006. This means, that, even though there is an im prove ment in

the scheme out put, there is yet a high drop out of can di dates who reg is ter at

these ex changes, start the train ing, but do not com plete it. These ob ser va -

tions were noted dur ing the plan ning phase of the PVE. A de ci sion was

taken to probe fur ther with the can di dates, em ploy ers and of fi cials of the

EPP programme.

IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011

546 Jaya Goyal

The key out come of the EPP scheme in terms of the per cent age of can di -

dates who suc cess fully com pleted train ing and got gain ful em ploy ment,

mar gin ally in creased from 16.2 per cent in 1996–2097 to 26.7 per cent in

2001–2002, but again fell to18.9 per cent in 2005–2006. It shows that the

scheme is largely in ef fec tive in plac ing the un em ployed youth in gain ful

em ploy ment. The PVE used this in for ma tion to seek ex pla na tions for que -

ries on the in abil ity of can di dates to com plete train ing; road blocks en coun -

tered; and re me dial mea sures sug gested by stake holders.

The dis tricts, com pa nies and can di dates se lected for the PVE are listed

in Table 2. Ac cord ing to the de part ment of fi cials, Thane was a better per -

form ing dis trict, while Bhandara was weak on scheme im ple men ta tion.

Four or gani sa tions from Thane Dis trict and two or gani sa tions from

Bhandara dis trict, who reg u larly em ployed can di dates reg is tered with Em -

ploy ment Ex changes agreed to par tic i pate in the PVE. Among a total of 64

can di dates, who were part of the PVE ex er cise, ma jor ity had passed the

Higher Sec ond ary Cer tif i cate (HSC) with lit tle or no ex pe ri ence, while the

re main ing were equipped with an ITI di ploma. The train ing was for a du ra -

tion of six months with no un der tak ing signed or a guar an tee that the

trainee would get ab sorbed in the com pany. The train ees’ sti pend ranged

from Rupees 2,200–3,500 per month, and var ied from em ployer to em -

ployer. Train ing was im parted for low skilled to semi-skilled jobs, usu ally

re quired for shop floors. These in cluded train ing for pack ag ing and bun -

dling of goods; and train ing for as sis tance in op er at ing man u fac tur ing ma -

chines, tools, and equipments.

The ob ser va tions and find ings of the PVE can help the de part ment to in -

tro spect on its pol i cies and bud gets. The main mo ti va tion for em ploy ers to

em ploy EPP can di dates was to ful fil the com pany’s re quire ment, while

dis charg ing min i mum ob li ga tions. Con sid er ing the oc cu pa tional risks in -

volved, most em ploy ers pro vided the can di dates with ac ci dent in sur ance

cover. In ad di tion, they also claimed to have pro vided free trans port, ar -

ranged for over time pay ment and free pri mary med i cal fa cil i ties. How ever,

the can di dates were not en ti tled to any leave, which had im pli ca tions on

their sal ary being cut in lieu of any ab sence. The train ees seemed to be sat -

is fied with the qual ity of train ing pro vided, but felt that the du ra tion of

train ing could be ex tended to more than six months. Nev er the less, most

can di dates were un sat is fied with the em ploy ment con di tions like low sti -

pend, expect in Bhandara where they re ported con tent ment with their sti -

pend.

IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011


IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011

548 Jaya Goyal

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TABLE 2: Sampling of EPP for the PVE, Maharashtra 2007–2008

Sl.

No.

Division and

Districts

Name of the Industry/

Employment Exchanges

Visited for PVE

Number of

Candidates

Interviewed

I. Division–Thane Clariant Chemicals (India) Ltd.,

Kholse Road, Thane

10

District–Thane Caprihans India Limited, Wagle

Industrial Estate, Thane

12

Mukund Ltd., Thane-Belapur

Road

07

Employment and Self-Employment

Centre, Thane

13

II. Division–Nagpur Ashok Leyland Ltd., Bhandara 08

District–Bhandara Employment and Self-Employment

Centre, Bhandara

14

Total 2 Districts 6 Organisations 64 Candidates

Source: Outcome Budget Maharashtra Report, 2006–2007.

As pointed out ear lier, the gap be tween the num ber of can di dates reg is -

tered with the em ploy ment ex changes (1,03,046 in 2005–2006), out weighs

the reg is tered va cant po si tions (15,896 in 2005–2006). How ever, the ac -

tual num ber of can di dates who join the train ing cover just about half (8,456

in 2005–2006) of the reg is tered va can cies. This means that de spite a high

reg is tra tion of un em ployed can di dates, the de mand for jobs (mea sured by

the num ber of can di dates who fill up the reg is tered va can cies) is low as

com pared to the sup ply of jobs (mea sured by the reg is tered va can cies).

There is a clear mis match be tween the na ture of man power skills avail able,

and the spe cific de mands of the in dus try need ing train ees. This fact can be

ex plained better with the ex am ple of can di dates seek ing blue-col lared jobs

in BPOs, in sur ance, mar ket ing, trad ing or ex port firms. If the va can cies

listed in the em ploy ment ex change do not match their pref er ence, the can -

di dates do not apply and con tinue to search for other op tions. This anom aly

was re vealed dur ing the PVE as it was found that the com pa nies which

were reg is tered with the em ploy ment ex changes were largely from the

man u fac tur ing sec tor.

IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011


There fore, one of the im por tant les sons that emerged for the con cerned de -

part ment spon sor ing the EPP scheme was to en gage in pol icy that could cre ate

an em ploy ment de mand in sec tors like food grain pro cess ing; hor ti cul ture and

flori cul ture; wood and wood prod ucts in clud ing paper pulp; leather and tan -

ning in dus try; trans port; com mu ni ca tion; hos pi tal ity; real es tate, healthcare,

bank ing and in sur ance; and re tail trades. These sec tors have dem on strated

high po ten tial for la bour ab sorp tion and in come gen er a tion op por tu ni ties.

Reg u lar ‘skill-map ping’ of can di dates was seen as a nec es sary de part -

men tal in ter ven tion to bridge the gap be tween de mand and sup ply. One of

the em ploy ers shared the ben e fits of using the map ping pro ce dure dur ing

in ter views and final se lec tion of can di dates. Through skill-map ping, the

ap par ent com pe ten cies and ap ti tude of the can di dates was matched with

the avail able man power re quire ments for a par tic u lar de part ment of the in -

dus try. The ad van tage of the map ping pro ce dure is that both can di dates

and the em ployer can get the op ti mum learn ing and out put from the train -

ing pro cess. The de part ment should con sider ag gres sive publicisation of

em ploy ment ex changes via re gional and na tional tele vi sion chan nels.

Also, the web based soft ware needs to be con tin u ously up graded with cur -

rent avail able tech nol o gies to make it more competitive with private

portals like Naukri.com or Jobsahead.com.

Low sti pends and no guar an tee of ab sorp tion within the com pany after

com ple tion of train ing have de terred youth from tak ing up train ing of fers.

The PVE gave valu able in for ma tion on the ef fec tive ness of the EPP

scheme in terms of ac tual out comes, cal cu lated as the per cent age of can di -

dates com plet ing the train ing and get ting gain fully em ployed ei ther in the

same com pany or else where. By pro vid ing trained la bour, the EPP scheme

has the po ten tial to drive growth not only in the large scale man u fac tur ing

in dus try, but also in small and me dium scale in dus tries, cot tage in dus tries

and the ter tiary sec tor.

Case Study 2: Total Sanitation Campaign

The Total San i ta tion Programme (TSC), a sig nif i cant flag ship programme

of the Gov ern ment of India (GoI) as pires to pre vent open def e ca tion by ac -

cel er at ing san i ta tion cov er age in rural areas. The TSC, with an out lay of

Rs.13,423.97 crores (US$ 3.35 bil lion), com prises the con tri bu tions made

by the Centre, the State and the com mu nity in the ratio of 60:20:20 re spec -

tively. This scheme is op er a tional in 578 out of 600 rural dis tricts

(UNICEF India, 2008).

IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011

550 Jaya Goyal

With in creas ing em pha sis on com mu nity in volve ment and part ner ship

in pub lic programmes, Maharashtra has been the front-run ner in the Com -

mu nity led Total San i ta tion (CLTS) ap proach since 2002. Mahatashtra ac -

com plished a feat in 2006, when its two pilot blocks—Mahabaleshwar in

Satara Dis trict, and Murud in Raigad Dis trict were de clared Open Def e ca -

tion Free (ODF) blocks (Kar and Bongartz, 2006). In 2006, the GoI

awarded the Nirmal Gram Puruskar to 770 Gram Panchayats (GP), of

which 381 were awarded to Maharashtra alone (ibid). Al though, a lot re -

mains to be done to achieve total ODF panchayats, Maharashtra has shown

the way with the high est num ber of ODF GPs.

Prior to the in tro duc tion of the CLTS, the qual ity of san i ta tion in

Maharashtra was poor. Ac cord ing to the World Health Sur vey (2003), 73

per cent of house holds in Maharashtra did not have any ac cess to san i ta tion

fa cil i ties (SATHI, 2008). As per the data gath ered from an eco nomic sur -

vey of Maharashtra con ducted in 2010–2011, 60 per cent of rural house -

holds in Maharashtra and 8 per cent urban house holds had no ac cess to

toi let fa cil i ties avail able to them. Women, ad o les cent girls and chil dren are

the worst hit as man i fested in a vi cious cycle of dis eases, ill ness, mal nu tri -

tion and pov erty. The sit u a tion is not much dif fer ent in other parts of the

coun try. This means, that even as India reg is ters a fair growth in GDP

(Gross Do mes tic Prod uct), a vast ma jor ity of her peo ple liv ing in rural

areas have no ac cess to proper san i ta tion fa cil i ties.

One of the tar gets of The Mil len nium De vel op ment Goals (MDG) for

im prov ing san i ta tion in both rural and urban areas in India is to halve, by

2015, the pro por tion of peo ple with out sus tain able ac cess to safe drink ing

water and basic san i ta tion. Erad i cat ing the prac tice of open def e ca tion by

2012, and to mini mise the risk of con tam i na tion of drink ing water sources

and food is an other tar get to be achieved. Con sid er ing the ex ist ing ground

re al i ties, only an out come-fo cused im ple men ta tion of the scheme can con -

trib ute to the reali sa tion of the goals, and to the over all so cio eco nomic de -

vel op ment of the states and the coun try.

The de sign of the scheme informs the ob jec tives for achiev ing the goals.

The scheme cov ers con struct ing toi lets and priv ies for all rural house holds.

While sub si dies are pro vided for BPL house holds, pri or ity is given to APL

house holds. The scheme also cov ers pri mary schools and anganwadi cen -

tres in rural areas. Pro mot ing hy giene and san i tary hab its among stu dents

and the gen eral pop u la tion is an ob jec tive achieved by way of cre at ing

aware ness and health ed u ca tion.

IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011


The De part ment of Water Sup ply and San i ta tion, GoM had al lo cated Ru -

pees 28.8 crores from its An nual Bud get to wards the TSC. While the state

sub sidy for the con struc tion of toi lets for BPL house holds is shared be tween

the State and the Cen tre, there is no sub sidy for APL house holds. Of the total

92.9 lakh toi lets con structed, ap prox i mately 32 lakh toi lets were for BPL

house holds, while 60.8 lakh toi lets were built for APL house holds (TISS,

2007). Sub sidy kills col lec tive com mu nity ac tion (Kar and Bongartz, 2006).

The high state sub si dies could be a fac tor in hib it ing BPL house holds from

ac quir ing san i ta tion fa cil i ties.

Ad di tion ally, 72,782 toi lets were con structed in gov ern ment

schools, 50,433 toi lets in anganwadis and 2,723 toi lets in com mu nity

com plexes.

In con sul ta tion with the de part ment task force, the PVE was ini ti ated

with a clear dis tinc tion being made be tween the out put and out come in di -

ca tors. 115.9 per cent of the funds were dis bursed for uti li sa tion in

2005–2006 (Table 3). This fig ure can not be used as a yard stick to as sess

fair or poor out come of the scheme im ple men ta tion. In stead, in di ca tors

like per cent age of un cov ered house holds; or per cent age re duc tion in

water borne dis eases in vil lages cov ered by TSC, or num ber of vil lages

that have at tained open def e ca tion free sta tus could as sess how the

scheme faired on ac tual out comes. While the de part ment had data for

some in di ca tors listed in the table, for data like water borne dis eases, es -

tab lish ing for mal convergences with the De part ment of Health (DoH)

was rec om mended.

Work shops were con ducted for the task force from the De part ment of

Water Sup ply and San i ta tion and the TISS team to iden tify the dis tricts and

blocks for the PVE. Tools like Logframe Anal y sis were used to pri ori tise

the road blocks per ceived by the ac tors (both gov ern ment func tion ar ies and

vil lag ers as ben e fi cia ries); match the ob jec tives of the scheme in view of

the cur rent sta tus; dis tin guish be tween out puts and out comes and link these

with in di ca tors and strat e gies of achiev ing the goals. As per the feed back

and sug ges tions from the task force, four dis tricts were se lected for the

PVE, namely – two poor per form ing dis tricts (Jalgaon and Chandrapur)

and two best per form ing dis tricts (Jalna and Satara) on the basis of out -

come in di ca tors like the ODF sta tus. The 4-6 blocks or vil lages se lected are

listed in Table 4.

IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011

552 Jaya Goyal

TABLE 3: Distinction between Output and Outcome Indicators for TSC in

Maharashtra

Sl.

No.

Output Indicators Maharashtra

2004–0205

(in percent)

2005–2006

(in percent)

1. Percentage of villages in which 1HHL

installations are done for BPL families

2.7 7.81

2. Percentage of villages in which 1HHL

installations are done for APL families

4.37 11.43

3. Percentage of utilisation of funds

disbursed

54.98 115.91

4. Percentage of sanitation in schools 9.02 20.85

5. Percentage of balwadi toilets 3.41 18.38

6. Percentage of uncovered households

(TSC)

65.39

(2001–2007)

–

7. Percentage utilisation of IEC funds 3.69 5.92

8. Number of villages that have attained

‘open defecation free’ status/Number

of villages that have recieved the

Nirmal Gram Puraskar

13 villages 381 villages

9. Percentage of covered households

(APL and BPL)

3.83% 10.18

Total percent of

households

covered till now

= 43.25 percent

10. Number of uncovered household

(Census)

62.39 lakhs

(2001–2007

–

Source: TISS-Department of Finance, Maharashtra Outcome Budget Report, 2007–2008.

The PVE en tailed in ter ac tion with a large num ber of ac tors and or gani -

sa tions. These in cluded 14 mem bers of the TSC, who im ple mented the

scheme at the vil lage level; 3 CEOs (Chief Ex ec u tive Of fi cers) and dep uty

CEOs from the se lected dis tricts; 39 per son nel be long ing to par tic i pat ing

NGOs, 4 sarpanches and 675 users from var i ous ben e fi ciary house holds in

vil lages.

IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011


IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011

554 Jaya Goyal

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Data showed that Mahabaleshwar block of Satara Dis trict had achieved

100 per cent san i ta tion cov er age for in di vid ual house holds and schools, and

was de clared as an ODF block. In rec og ni tion of the clean en vi ron ment and

the benchmarks achieved, the GoI awarded the Nirmal Gram Puruskar to

the Mahabaleshwar block in 2006. While four blocks in Jalna and three

blocks in Satara had achieved re sults close to this bench mark, the other two

dis tricts were found to be lag ging be hind.

There were two key de ter mi nants for the suc cess of the TSC in Jalna and

Satara dis tricts. First, a proactive local level lead er ship com pris ing CEOs

and dep uty CEOs of dis tricts, ICDS su per vi sors, in di vid u als of local re li -

gious groups and for mer mil i tary of fi cers in stru men tal in the achieve ment

of the ODF sta tus took keen in ter est in the im ple men ta tion of the scheme.

De mands for con struc tion of toi lets not only in their homes, but also in

schools, anganwadis and at the com mu nity level, were made by var i ous

women’s groups. Higher level of fe male lit er acy and women em pow er -

ment in these dis tricts has led to the cre ation of strong women’s groups.

The suc cess ful or gani sa tion of the com mu nity is a re sult of the gov ern ment

led In for ma tion Ed u ca tion Communication (IEC) cam paign, and the local -

ised Sant Gadge Baba cam paign on san i ta tion.

Sec ond, the high con ver gence of the DoH in these dis tricts, helped to

track the in ci dence of water borne and com mu ni ca ble dis eases among its

pop u la tion, prior to the ODF and post ODF phases of TSC im ple men ta tion.

The DoH re ported con sid er able re duc tion in dis eases after the vil lages

achieved ODF sta tus. Strict mon i tor ing of the scheme en cour aged gov ern -

ment func tion ar ies to im prove im ple men ta tion of the TSC. The pos i tive

im pact of the scheme was vis i ble to the vil lage com mu nity, mo ti vat ing all

res i dents to de mand better san i ta tion fa cil i ties. In ad di tion, these dis tricts

cre ated websites and up dated data on var i ous as pects of the scheme. Open

and trans par ent com mu ni ca tion of in for ma tion aided the smooth flow of

fund ing to these dis tricts.

The sit u a tion was ex actly the op po site in the other two dis tricts of

Jalgaon and Chandrapur, where the TSC im ple men ta tion was poor. The

vil lages in the se lected blocks were far from achiev ing the ODF sta tus. The

CEOs were ei ther in dif fer ent, or did not con sider san i ta tion as a cru cial

sec tor for pri or ity, which re sulted in de mor ali sa tion of the frontline func -

tion ar ies. Women in these dis tricts were not em pow ered enough to par tic i -

pate in the de mand for san i ta tion ser vices. The de vel op ment quo tient and

com mu nity par tic i pa tion was found to be low in these dis tricts. As

IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011


com mu nity la trines were not cleaned, they were not used. Lack of sus -

tained cam paigns was an other lim it ing fac tor. In abil ity of the Zilla

Parishads to fill in the va can cies for the con tract posts was an ad min is tra -

tive fail ure, con trib ut ing to wards weak im ple men ta tion of the scheme.

Con ver gence with other de part ments, such as Health and Ed u ca tion, and

other water re lated schemes like the Jalswarajya was found to be miss ing

in these dis tricts.

LESSONS FROM MAHARASHTRA

So cial audit, in the form of a PVE jointly con ducted by state de part ments

and a uni ver sity, was one of Maharashtra’s ini tial at tempts at pub lic ac -

count abil ity. The ex er cise re sulted in bridg ing the di a logue void be tween

local stake holders and users in the vil lages and the gov ern ment func tion ar -

ies to gether with civil so ci ety or gani sa tions. This re sulted in ac cu rate di ag -

no sis of the road blocks to ef fi cient ad min is tra tion of ser vices, and the

re struc tur ing of the scheme. Rather than chase fi nan cial and phys i cal tar -

gets, the re struc tured scheme was peo ple-centric and out come-fo cused.

Iden ti fy ing and re cog nis ing the rea sons for suc cess of the schemes,

rather than fault find ing was the USP of the PVE in Maharashtra. Even

though, Jalna and Satara, were se lected through pur pos ive sam pling as dis -

tricts with better cov er age of san i ta tion, and Jalgaon and Chandrapur as

dis tricts with in ef fi cient im ple men ta tion of the scheme, the PVE iden ti fied

local lead er ship and women’s em pow er ment as cru cial de ter mi nants of su -

pe rior out comes. This find ing helped the de part ment to ‘bench mark’ both

the out puts and out comes of the scheme as of achiev able stan dards and cite

it as a role model for other lag ging dis tricts in the State.

The na ture of the PVE, how ever, re mained top-down, as it was planned

and ex e cuted by gov ern ment task forces and an ac a demic in sti tu tion. In -

volve ment of the stake holders or users was lim ited to field dis cus sions,

meet ings or in ter views. Al though, the task forces were in volved in plan ning

the audit ex er cise in terms of its cov er age, scope, sam pling and so on, only a

lim ited num ber of gov ern ment func tion ar ies ac com pa nied the PVE teams

from TISS. As this was an tic i pated, the work shops con ducted with the 12

de part ment task forces were termed as a pub lic ver i fi ca tion ex er cise and not

a so cial audit. The PVE teams did a fair anal y sis of data and gained a re al is tic

un der stand ing of the im ple men ta tion of the scheme on the ground. The per -

cep tions of the gov ern ment func tion ar ies were also ob tained. This in for ma -

tion was taken to the local stake holders for feed back and sug ges tions. The

IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011

556 Jaya Goyal

final find ings were com mu ni cated to the se nior po lit i cal lead er ship of the

state—the Fi nance Min is ter of Maharashtra at the Cab i net level, and the

Min is ters and the Prin ci pal Sec re tar ies of the var i ous De part ments. The Sec -

re tary of Fi nance, and the Out come Bud get Cell of the DoF, Mantralaya, was

the hub for all in ter face be tween TISS and the GoM.

Se nior pol i ti cians and bu reau crats ex pressed great in ter est in the find -

ings of the PVE, as it was per ceived to be a re port card for state pol i cies and

gov er nance. Much of the find ings from var i ous schemes were ac cepted by

the re spec tive de part ments, amid crit i cal com ments and clar i fi ca tions.

Many de part ments with proactive sec re tar ies, such as those be long ing to

the Pris ons (Home De part ment), Health, Tribal De vel op ment, and Em -

ploy ment and Self Em ploy ment de part ments, in cor po rated many of the

rec om men da tions listed in the re port. This di rect ad vo cacy for im ple men -

ta tion of pol icy was a strength of the PVE and the Out come Bud get ex er -

cise. It is also true, how ever, that the scope of the PVE was not to find

fi nan cial ir reg u lar i ties in the fund flow of the scheme or to stage con fron ta -

tions be tween local stake holders and gov ern ment func tion ar ies on cor rup -

tion. The man date of the PVE was to make state bud gets sen si tive to the

out comes that di rectly af fect peo ple’s ev ery day lives, es pe cially those in

which they en coun ter the state ma chin ery, such as the po lice, road works,

water, hous ing, health cen tres, and so on.

Sim i lar au dits can be rep li cated in other In dian states. The re spec tive de -

part ments will need to de fine the cov er age, sam pling, fre quency, sur vey

tools and se lect a part ner agency for con duct ing a so cial audit or a PVE.

Con sid er ing the scale, human and fi nan cial re sources re quired to con duct a

PVE, such an ac tiv ity should be re peated only after a gap of three years.

More over, a PVE is also de pend ent on the na ture of the scheme im ple -

mented, as some schemes prom ise out puts and out comes only after a cer -

tain pe riod of time.

REFLECTIONS ON THE WAY FORWARD

Di rect ac count abil ity of the state to its peo ple has taken cen tre-stage today.

This is re flected in the first jansunwais held in the vil lages of Rajasthan in

the 1990s, the en act ment of the RTI Act and more re cently, the Jan Lokpal

move ment.

The GoI and the coun try’s su preme audit in sti tu tion, the CAG, have

real ised the sig nif i cant con tri bu tion of var i ous so cial audit groups in en sur -

ing ac count abil ity of the programme man ag ers and im ple ment ing

IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011


agen cies. The GoI has em bed ded so cial au dits (vil lage level mon i tor ing,

com mit tees/vig i lance com mit tees) in al most all its flag ship so cial sec tor

programmes, such as NREGS, ARWSP, NRHM, MDM, and so on (CAG,

2010). In the pres ent neo-lib eral con texts, in which the In dian gov ern ment

is func tion ing, the state is in creas ingly en trust ing im ple men ta tion of var i -

ous so cio eco nomic de vel op ment schemes to au ton o mous agen cies or so ci -

et ies, PRIs/ULBs, many of whom are ei ther quasi-gov ern men tal or NGOs,

or even pri vate play ers. In such a sce nario, ac count abil ity to the users of the

ser vices as sumes all im por tance.

Even with high lev els of con sen sus on mak ing ac count abil ity func tional

through nu mer ous in stru ments, there are many fun da men tal un an swered

ques tions. Schol ars are ar gu ing whether local gov ern ment in sti tu tions like

the PRIs/ULBs and their or gani sa tions like PHCs, schools, PDS ra tion

shops, po lice sta tions, and so on, are to be ac count able to their cre ator, that

is, the State or to the peo ple or both? For ex am ple, M. A Oommen ar gues

that the scope of ac count abil ity of panchayats is not only lim ited to for mal

and ex ter nal gov ern ment audit, but also to gram sabhas through so cial au -

dits (Oommen, 2009). Datta strongly re buts this point and ar gues that so -

cial ac count abil ity of panchayats to gram sabhas needs to first be come a

re al ity through state leg is la tion after ac tual de vo lu tion of fi nances and

func tions have taken place (Datta, 2009). In most states, in clud ing

Maharashtra, panchayats func tion poorly in an en vi ron ment of lim ited de -

vo lu tion of pow ers and lack of ca pac i ties and au ton omy.4 Ac cord ing to

Datta, panchayats are pri mar ily ac count able to its cre ator, which is the

state gov ern ment, in the ver ti cal ac count abil ity frame work.

Mul ti ple un der stand ings and per cep tions of ac count abil ity co-exist

among var i ous ac tors in gov ern ment, civil so ci ety, in ter na tional agen cies

and the pub lic or users. Nev er the less, so cial au dits or PVE are one among

many mech a nisms of ac count abil ity in pub lic ser vice de liv ery. When in te -

grated in the larger frame work of out come budgets, it has a po ten tial for

being a pow er ful mech a nism of plan ning, im ple men ta tion and mon i tor ing

as sess ment for the gov ern ment on the one hand, and a po tent tool to de -

mand better gov er nance for the peo ple on the other.

NOTES

1. Zadek and Evans (1993) defined social audit as “…a process of defining, observing

and reporting measures of an organisational ethical behavior and social impact against

IJSW, 72(4), 537–562, October 2011

558 Jaya Goyal

its objectives with the participation of its stakeholders and the wider community.”

(Fraser and Hill, 2000).

2. The departments that participated in the Maharashtra Outcome Budget exercise were:

Public Works, Housing, Home, Public Health, School Education, Social Justice,

Women and Child Development, Agriculture, Employment and Self Employment,

Tribal Development, Rural Development, and Water Supply and Sanitation.

3. A GR was passed by the Government of Maharashtra on March 6, 2006 which

officiated all activities on the outcome budget. It meant that outcome budget became a

special commitment of the State Government with its own resolution, funding and

personnel. In addition, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between

the Department of Finance, Government of Maharashtra and TISS which listed down

the roles and responsibilities of both the parities together with mutually agreed

activities,timelines and meeting schedules.

4. Karnataka is the only state (barring Sikkim) which has devolved all these 29 subjects

to panchayat raj bodies, according to a recent evaluation report of the government of

India (Ghorpade. 2002).

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