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Futures 44 (2012) 385–397
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Futures
jou r nal h o mep ag e: w ww .e lsev ier . co m / loc ate / fu tu r es
Framing adaptive capacity through a history–futures lens: Lessons fromthe South East Queensland Climate Adaptation Research Initiative§
Marcus Bussey a,*, R.W. (Bill) Carter a, Noni Keys a, Jennifer Carter a, Robert Mangoyana a,Julie Matthews a, Denzil Nash a, Jeannette Oliver a, Russell Richards b, Anne Roiko a,Marcello Sano b, Dana C. Thomsen a, Estelle Weber c, Timothy F. Smith a
a Sustainability Research Centre, University of the Sunshine Coast, ML 28 – Maroochydore DC, QLD 4558, Australiab Griffith Centre for Coastal Management, Room 3.18, Science Building 1 (G24), Griffith University, Gold Coast Campus, QLD 4222, Australiac The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD 4072, Australia
A R T I C L E I N F O
Article history:
Available online 30 December 2011
A B S T R A C T
This paper explores how the history–futures interface can inform a set of concrete
adaptation options to climate change for stakeholders in South East Queensland, Australia.
It is based on research undertaken as part of the Commonwealth funded South East
Queensland Climate Adaptation Research Initiative (SEQ-CARI) that profiled 33 historical
case studies to identify common themes in the ways societies responded to stress. The case
studies are intended to provide a context for thinking about adaptive capacity with
stakeholders in the four areas of human settlement and health; energy; agriculture,
forestry and fisheries; and ecosystems and biodiversity. The case studies demonstrate that
adaptive capacity varies with context and is affected by the complexity, technology,
leadership, institutions and imaginative resources inherent to the social system examined.
To increase the possibilities for reflection by stakeholders, the case studies were used to
create a set of historical scenarios that explore some of the key features of human
responses to challenges such as climate change. This paper draws on this work to suggest a
set of ‘practical’ lessons for those engaged with climate change today and into the future.
� 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
This paper outlines research designed to spark conversations and stimulate creative ‘out of the box’ thinking aboutcurrent levels of adaptive capacity vis-a-vis possible climate change responses. It involved focus groups of key South EastQueensland (Australia) stakeholders and decision makers in the four sectors of human settlement and health, energy,agriculture, forestry and fisheries, and ecosystems and biodiversity. The starting point for these conversations where a set ofthirty three historical case studies that throw light on the determinants of adaptive capacity as they relate to one or more ofthese sectors. These were thumbnail studies chosen to illustrate the range of possible responses to environmental and/orsocial stress. Historical examples where seen as a non-confrontational, even engaging, way to approach the contextualchallenges of busy and frequently stressed decision makers.
§ This research is part of the South East Queensland Climate Adaptation Research Initiative, a partnership between the Queensland and Australian
Governments, the CSIRO Climate Adaptation National Research Flagship, Griffith University, University of the Sunshine Coast, and University of Queensland.
The Initiative aims to provide research knowledge to enable the region to adapt and prepare for the impacts of climate change.* Corresponding author. Tel.: +61 7 54594889; fax: +61 7 5456 5008.
E-mail address: [email protected] (M. Bussey).
0016-3287/$ – see front matter � 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.futures.2011.12.002
M. Bussey et al. / Futures 44 (2012) 385–397386
The broader context for this work was a three-year Commonwealth funded research project, the South East QueenslandClimate Adaptation Research Initiative (SEQ-CARI), which set out to:
1. id
entify relevant socio-economic patterns and trends; 2. c onduct an historical analysis of adaptation to socio-environmental stress in order to understand the barriers andopportunities that shape adaptive capacity;
3. d evelop a systems conceptualisation of adaptive capacity that identified the perceived and likely vulnerabilities of eachsector to climate change as well as the major and most likely adaptations to climate change;
4. r efine sectoral level understanding of and ability to manage adaptive capacity through institutional and empirical dataanalyses; and
5. d esign cost effective strategies to enhance adaptive capacity that include institutionalised monitoring, evaluation andlearning [1].
Both the trends analysis [2] and the historical profiling [3] were intended to inform the system conceptualisation workconducted with the key sectoral stakeholders in the second half of 2010. This work has been reported in two papers currentlyunder review [4,5].
This paper grounds the thinking that shaped the report Societal Responses to Significant Change [3] by: examining therelationship of historical thinking to futures thinking; providing an overview of the project’s approach to adaptive capacityand the context of social learning; outlining the nine determinants of adaptive capacity that informed the structure of thereport; outlining the use of both in the generation of a suite of historical scenarios to enable the exploration of adaptivecapacity options; and drawing out practical responses to climate change from this research. The paper will not deal with anyspecificity with the sectoral focus (human settlements, energy, agriculture and ecosystems) of the overall SEQ-CARI project.These sectoral interests shaped the selection of the case studies but the conclusions drawn from these are broad and thedeterminants identified are generic in nature, though undoubtedly they are experienced in different ways according to eachsector.
2. Historical and futures thinking
The case studies in the report were chosen to provide the basis for thinking about the future. This is not because ‘historyrepeats itself’ but because it provides insights into how context, social imagination, technological ability and human problemsolving interact in generalised ways that have unique outcomes. As David Staley argues, there are strong links betweenhistorical thinking and futures thinking [6]. Both the past and the future constitute fields of human activity that can bestudied via evidence. Following Inayatullah, this ‘evidence’ can be questioned via a range of structural and post-structuralmethods in order for those in context to better understand the opportunities and risks before them [7]. Evidence, in thissense, is the effects both our possible pasts and futures have on the present – on our actions, choices, hopes and fears. Thus,Staley notes:
‘‘The past is no longer in existence, therefore the historian must create a (textual) object that can stand in its place. Inthe same way, it can be said that we can write a ‘history of the future’ in order to compensate for the absence of thefuture itself; that we need to create representations of the future as a substitute for the future. In the face ofuncertainty, we create representations of the future in order to fill this void’’ [1,p. 2].
The collection of historical case studies thus served to:
� s
timulate thinking about the future; � d escribe specific historical contexts in which social learning either succeeded or failed to respond to an environmental orsocial stress;
� id entify and profile key determinants in the success or failure described in the previous point; and � s uggest historical-futures templates (scenarios) for thinking about climate change adaptive capacity and how we mightmost effectively respond over time.
The theoretical grounding for this work is largely post-structural in that it draws on the insights of Foucault [8] into theconstructed nature of reality, which is open to genealogical analysis/disruption. Similarly, the work of Deleuze and Guattari[9] reminds us of the historically constituted nature of knowledge and that the present is open to multiple readings in whichknowledge is a culturally produced lens with no absolute validity beyond its historical context. Furthermore, Derrida [10]offers us an understanding of context that is, as Staley [6] notes, ‘textual’ in nature’. This insight suggests that a discursivestrategy, such as scenario development, is a valid tool for questioning context and both our pasts and our futures. Finally, thepost-structural lens reminds us of the multiplicity inherent to the human experience and problematises the essentialistnature of modernist historical thinking that, as both Deleuze and Guattari [9] and also Ashis Nandy [11] remind us, has been alargely Western and nation state building enterprise. Thus, we move from the singularities of universal history and future toplurivesal readings of histories and futures [12–14].
M. Bussey et al. / Futures 44 (2012) 385–397 387
3. The cultural context of adaptive capacity
Adaptive capacity is historically specific. It is a measure of the human ability to respond to threats and stimuli in the socialand natural environment. As such, it is framed by a set of contextual tangible (e.g. assets, finances) and intangible (e.g. values,knowledge) variables. As Katharine Vincent notes:
1 For
to clim
‘‘Adaptive capacity is defined as a vector of resources and assets that represents the asset base from which adaptationactions and investments can be made.’’ [15 p. 13]
These resources and assets are unequally distributed, often poorly understood and contextually defined. Because of suchvariations in any socio-ecological system, certain groups and contexts will be more vulnerable to the effects of climatechange. Thus, the report on socio-economic trends [2] conducted by the SEQ-CARI team identified lone person households,the elderly and sole parent families to be more at risk during extreme weather events. These groups tend to be sociallyisolated, financially constrained and as a result resource scarce. Hence their adaptive capacity, as determined by their level ofsocial and financial capital, is low and their resilience is compromised as a result.
Both historical and futures thinking allow such social vulnerabilities to be accounted for as the result of structuralprocesses that marginalise specific groups while advantaging others. Both forms of thinking also allow for reflection on theway culture mediates the human experience and therefore suggests possible interventions to reduce or mitigatevulnerability [16]. One way to understand human culture and social institutions is through the measures taken to increasesecurity in the face of chaos. Ever since humans began organising into groups, they have sought to guard against the vagariesof both the natural and social world. Natural disasters and human violence have deeply shaped the human psyche and lie atthe heart of human social evolution [17,18].
The tools (personal, technological, institutional, cultural) developed to respond to these challenges seek to ensuresecurity and order in an environment that is deeply uncertain. Humanity’s technological, social and institutionalinventiveness can be understood from this perspective, as responses to this sense of vulnerability and disorder. Bothproactive and reactive measures to ensure the maintenance, stability and continuation of the system fall within this field ofendeavour. So too do the occasional transformations of a system, such as when humanity, under pressure from theenvironment, switched from hunter-gathering to agriculture [19,20]. The collective learning [17] of peoples across time andplace demonstrate both creativity and the limits of innovation within the paradigms that frame meaningful responses toecological and social stress [21,22].
4. Understanding the social system
Like all systems, the human system is always responding to feedback from its environment. Yet the environment is nothomogenous [23]. Systems inhabit systems and function across scales of action from the intensely local to the macrocosmic.Yet it is easy to reify this human system and forget that people inhabit it at all levels and that all responses are thereforehuman responses. This research sought to explore this human ‘system’ through historical case studies. Being aware that thesystem was not homogenous, we (1) chose case studies that were relevant to the sectoral interests the overall study isdesigned to inform, and (2) proposed a four-quadrant representation of the social system that adequately accounts for theheterogeneity of the system. It is this latter point that is relevant to this paper.
To get a sense of the nested nature of systems impacting adaptive capacity, we turned to Ken Wilber’s four quadrantmodel [24]. This model offers a representation of the dynamic nature of the socio-ecological system.1 The model allows us tosee that the ‘socio-ecological’ system is constructed across related domains which account for a range of sub-systems such asclimate, economics, values, knowledge personal hopes and fears. When mapped according to the quadrants these can beseen to involve physical events (upper right: UR), social and institutional processes (lower right: LR), cultural systems (lowerleft: LL), and personal subjective states (upper left: UL). Each quadrant operates according to its own sense of inherentpurpose (aka ‘rules’ or ‘reason’) and collectively constitutes the reality in which all decision making, action and reaction takesplace. Fig. 1 depicts these quadrants working across micro, meso and macro scales and offers examples for each.
In developing this figure, the research team was keen to illustrate that adaptive capacity needs to be considered through asocio-historical lens in which action (i.e. responses to physical changes of the entire system (upper right)), as Adger et al. [25]argue, is always framed by social, cultural and personal conditions (the other three quadrants). It was also important forthese conditions to be understood as mutually reinforcing. In this way, the case studies, the determinants of adaptivecapacity and the proposed historical scenarios are all reflexively drawn into the interactive field of the human-ecologicalsystem.
Understanding adaptive capacity as the dynamic potential inherent to context can stimulate thinking about context thatis free from habit and conditioning. The four-quadrant model presented demonstrates that adaptive capacity exists in adynamic and complex field of folding relationships. No longer can the ‘system’ be thought of as a discrete agent in a socialcontext. The system is now clearly connected to values and assumptions about knowledge and identity. These assumptions
Ken Wilber it is much more than this as it covers the entire universe in what he calls All Quadrants All Levels. Being focused on the human responses
ate change we have remained rather parochial in our deployment of this ordering device.
Fig. 1. Dynamic and folding field of social action.
M. Bussey et al. / Futures 44 (2012) 385–397388
in turn are carried forward by individuals who hold to a set of beliefs that time, culture and identity have imprinted on them.In addition, biophysical events such as the weather and processes such as ecosystems are no longer separated from thecultural and institutional domains they affect. How people make sense of and respond to such ‘natural’ occurrences is nowfolded (hence the arrows in Fig. 1) into their adaptive capacity at any one moment, selecting and promoting valid-as-rationalresponses from a range of alternatives, including the rational, irrational, preferable and improbable, embedded in context.
5. The determinants of adaptive capacity
To understand how any context emerges, this paper argues we need to understand the conditions that shape these fields.Such understanding is a form of social learning. Such learning enables people to reflect on their context and appreciate how itframes their approaches to problem solving. Our adaptive capacity is determined via these frames. Understanding ourframes, therefore has direct implications for how we engage with climate change adaptation. As Collins and Ison note:
‘‘. . .adaptation proceeds on the basis of particular framings and assumptions about what one can know about theworld and its inhabitants. Revealing the framings and assumptions relating to adaptation offers the potential fordeveloping more effective policy and praxis’’ [26 p. 351].
In identifying the nine determinants (Fig. 2) profiled in the research report, the four quadrant model acted as a catalyst fora world historical perspective that draws on the work of David Christian [17]. These determinants are macro level frames forunderstanding the processes that determine our adaptive capacity. The first determinant is the degree of complexity of acontext. Christian argues that collective learning is linked to this complexity (all quadrants: AQ) and that while it has createdstress it has also unleashed incredible levels of human creativity over time. Similarly, the work of John and William McNeill[27] emphasises the importance of social webs and complexity in the evolution of social thought. The second determinant isleadership which functions across the lower left (LL) and lower right (LR) quadrants. Leadership impacts on how societiesfunction, problem solve and also generate their futures [19,28,29]. Institutions (LR) and the values (LL) that shape them aretwo other determinants that the report identified. Institutions supply meaningful structure for action. They shape the
The Nine Determinants of Adap�ve CapacityComplexity AQ
Leader ship LL, LRIns �tu�ons LR
Values LLTechnology LR , UR
Social Imagina� on LLKnowled ge LL, UL
Informa�on UR , LRScal e AQ
Fig. 2. The determinants of adaptive capacity.
M. Bussey et al. / Futures 44 (2012) 385–397 389
dominant logic of a context and are instrumental in implementing responses to change [30]. Values inform institutions andare instrumental in determining the actions institutions perform [31,32].
Two other determinants identified in the report are technology (LR and UR), which shapes social interactions anddetermines how collectives solve problems [33,34] and social imagination (LL) that informs this problem solving andgenerates, in optimal contexts, new possibilities for human action [19,35]. Knowledge (LL and UL) and information (UR andLR) are two other determinants that interact with imagination and the technologies available to a context. There is a politicsof knowledge at work in all situations [36] and this has been highly charged in the climate change debate in which vestedinterests work to undermine the legitimacy of the science that underpins key assumptions driving the rethinking of theWestern growth at all costs paradigm [37,38]. Finally, scale (AQ) determines how such social forces play out over time. Themore complex a system the easier it is to hide dysfunction for longer [21,39]. Small systems tend to show stress rapidly andcan be considered the canary in the mineshaft for larger systems. Furthermore, system priorities often change betweenscales and can cause turbulence when there is interaction across scales.
To illustrate how these determinants were deployed in the report, this paper focuses in the following sections (Sections6–9) on how the key determinants of complexity, technology, leadership, institutions and imagination have impacted sociallearning. Each determinant is captured in a historical case study. Following each of which a short ‘Practical Lesson’ is offeredto illustrate how the case studies were used to stimulate thinking about responses to climate change. The researchers acceptthat there was a strong link between the ability to learn (i.e.: reflect, reframe and enact/test) and adaptive capacity [26]. Theextent to which a system can learn is a measure of its resilience. Resilience relates to the ability of a system to cope withchange [40]. It implies social learning and the ability to develop appropriate practical responses to an emergent condition[41]. A resilient system is a learning system. Adaptive capacity is therefore a measure of the resilience within a system [42].The key determinants can be understood as conditions that shape and direct the capacity of a social system to effectivelynegotiate periods of stress and uncertainty.
6. Complexity
Complex social systems are energy hungry [39,43]. Highly complex societies are consequently vulnerable to fluctuationsin energy. Their complexity also fosters a deep commitment to the infrastructure that maintains their complexity [44]. This iswhat Ronald Wright calls the ‘progress trap’ [19] and is generally termed ‘path dependency’ [45]. In such contexts choice canbe constrained by resource dependency and lock-in, which can make systems resistant to forces, either natural or social, thatwould challenge the dominant order [21,46]. Because complex systems are highly energy dependent, they are oftenreluctant to redeploy resources to enhance adaptive capacity. Socio-cultural, financial and institutional inertia maintainpathways and the pace of change, so considerable energy is needed to shift trajectories.
6.1. Case study 1: ancient Rome
The case of the Roman Empire exemplifies these points. Rome’s famous roads were not just for its armies but also for drawingthe resources of Empire into the centre. The result of Rome’s need for bread was to heavily farm both local lands and lands acrosssouth west Asia (the modern Middle East) and North Africa [18]. Ultimately, the pressure on farming in all these areas depletedthe viability of the lands and led to the collapse in the Empire’s ability to feed its citizens [39].2 This collapse led to a loss of socialconfidence and considerable social dislocation and was central to the collapse of the Western Roman Empire.
The response of the Roman leadership over this period of agricultural decline was to squeeze local elites and thepeasantry for more while giving them less in return [47]. Eventually it was no longer in the interests of the elites to keeppropping up a regime that gave them less and less. Yet in the squeezing we can see the desperate attempts of people withpower to leverage energy – in this example, bread – from a system by increasing known mechanisms (tax, military
2 McNeill and McNeill point out that the impact of intensive farming and wide spread deforestation around the Mediterranean was already having
detrimental effects by 200BCE [24, p. 79–80].
M. Bussey et al. / Futures 44 (2012) 385–397390
intimidation, tribute) for centralising energy flows. The innovation shown by Rome in early years (e.g. Augustus Caesar andhis administrative reforms [48]) is lacking in the last centuries of the Roman empire, where pathway dependency corralssocial imagination into inflexible and ultimately self defeating responses.
6.2. Practical lessons 1: multi-temporal, open ended, systems thinking
It is tempting to tackle adaptive capacity as a set of physical and social challenges to human security. However, asDiamond [21] demonstrates, historical analysis indicates that human practice is always culturally and historicallydetermined. Without sufficient reflection, a practical response can be reactive rather than proactive [49]. Such an insightshould strike a note of caution for all of us looking for ways to respond to climate change. For a start, what we consider‘practical’ today may lead to problems in the future. As the case of Rome illustrates, simply ratchetting up the knownresponses to a problem will not necessarily foster long-term sustainability. The ‘practical lesson’ here is that a new set ofconceptual tools is required to determine how to respond to climate change. Many social and technological responses cansimply fuel the problem by overlooking the way a dominant paradigm shapes the logic on the ground. New tools for thinkingabout climate change include a post-normal science [50], reflexive anticipatory learning cycles [51], multitemporal frames[52] and alternative indicators for thinking about development, growth and security [53,54].
Futures analysis suggests that multitemporal frames are a useful tool when looking for practical responses [52]. Certainly,vulnerable communities and habitats need to be protected today, but medium and longer-term thinking also should beengaged. Such thinking needs to frame the ‘practical’ within open ended contexts that demonstrate a preparedness toinnovate, take risks and also develop multiple responses to an array of possible emergent conditions [41]. Furthermore,complexity points to the need for systems thinking, and the development of tools for handling uncertainty and a questioningof dominant assumptions about viable solutions to an issue such as climate change [55].
Such responses are profiled by the report in the studies focusing on Sweden’s approach to biofuels over past decades andthe Brazilian city of Curitiba in the 1990s. Such cases illustrate the practical importance of new social tools, such as citizenparticipation, dialogical leadership, technological and institutional innovation, co-creative community work and thereframing of problems as opportunities. In such contexts, the ability of innovative technologies to bridge the gap betweenpresent need and future possibilities is central to a complex system’s adaptive capacity.
7. Technology
Technology has played a central role in all practical responses to change in the past [20]. Its impact on human experienceis profound, as it shapes both the physical contexts in which humans live and work and the way people understand the world[30]. Technology also affects social identity and social choices with the result that alternatives to dominant constructions ofthe present can be sidelined or overlooked [56]. Social imagination can challenge such omissions by finding unexpectedapplications for a technology. The following case of the mobile phone illustrates this point.
7.1. Case study 2: the mobile phone
The impact of the mobile phone on modern culture has been immense [57]. It has been the most widespread and rapidlyadopted information communication technology ever, with over 4 billion mobile phone subscribers, representing 61% of theglobal population [58]. The number of mobile subscribers first exceeded fixed-line subscribers in 2002 and the numbercontinues to rise as developing nations rapidly adopt this technology [58,59]. This rise can be attributed to the socialrelevance of the technology, which has ceased to be simply a communication device. Not only do mobile phones conferstatus to their owners, they meet/maintain/generate the need for mobility, freedom, continuous communication and thesense of belonging to networked communities [60].
The mobile phone consequently fulfils a number of social functions simultaneously [53]. There is the need for connectionto friends and family, there is status and identity, there is technological fascination and a desire for novelty, there is also asense of the power of communication in the broader political sphere where SMS and Twitter are making themselves felt inpolitical demonstrations such as those that occurred in Iran in 2009, Greece in 2010 and the Arab Spring of 2011 [61]. Notonly is the mobile phone a possibly subversive tool, it also is changing social relationships with information and space [62].Modern mobile phones act as assistants, info portals, global positioning systems and networking devices and are the bedrockof the 24/7 life style. Furthermore, the use of the mobile phone in contexts of historical importance is also changing the waypeople understand and navigate their world [63]. Examples of such unexpected applications include the mobile’s use in thehands of those who died in the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers; the role it played as part of the Mumbai Terror attacks wherethey were used by both terrorists and those caught in the hotels; and its strategic use in the election of Barak Obama, wherematerial was streamed globally onto the internet.
7.2. Practical lessons 2: technology and identity
Human identity is formed through what we do. As what we do is always determined by the technologies that shape oursocial reality, identity is very much a product of the technologies with which we interact [34]. We certainly need innovative
M. Bussey et al. / Futures 44 (2012) 385–397 391
technology to help us leverage our adaptive capacity, but we also need to generate a new set of social parameters thatgenerate innovations in identity [60,64]. Examples of identity innovations are the ‘Green Consumer’3 and ‘Eco-Parent’.4 Thecase of the mobile phone indicates how technological success is linked to emergent possibilities for identity. As soon as a newtechnology enters the social realm, it becomes a player in that realm. In short, technologies are not passive but dynamic andviral social processes.
In exploring the determinants of adaptive capacity, we need to work on links between social choices made abouttechnology and the necessary social learning that will underpin any effective response [22]. For example, themultifunctionality of the mobile phone is helping consumers make greener choices when shopping [65]. A practicalmove is to link technological innovations with social purposes that promote sustainable activity [31]. This can be done bylinking a technology with an individual’s identity and choices. Such work involves both the media and marketing and can bebuilt into a technology’s emergence within the social domain.
Because modern societies are so technologically dependent, it is also easy to over emphasise our technology’s ability toavert disaster. It is in the interplay between technology and culture that the real work of innovation and change occurs [66]. Aheavy reliance on technology when thinking practically can lead to some interesting, imaginative and innovative resultssuch as the big thinking involved in terra-forming and geo-engineering [67] and experimentation with urban environmentslike the Masdar project in Dubai [68]. Such approaches are useful but can ultimately perpetuate the same cultural habits thatcreated the problem.
The historical survey also demonstrates that cultures carry the seeds of their own destruction. The case of Angkor Wat[69], situated in modern Cambodia, is a good example of what can happen when a civilisation fails to confront their dominantassumptions and the technologies with which these are linked. It is presented here to illustrate Practical Lesson 2.
7.3. Case study 3: Angkor Wat
This medieval Khmer civilisation at Angkor was dependent on the control of water. In fact, archaeologists refer to it as ahydraulic urban development [70]. Over centuries of monsoonal rain, the Khmer people of Angkor Wat were forced to extendand modify their hydraulic technology of locks, canals and water wheels in response to heavy erosion. Over this time, theyalso continued to modify the technical infrastructure of their society; intensifying the activity (deforestation, canalirrigation) that was actually undermining the viability of their agricultural system [71]. At no time did they consider alteringthe basic principles and premises upon which their society was founded [72]. Theirs was a hierarchical, regionally aggressive,authoritarian, theocratic state and although they demonstrated considerable technical flexibility, ultimately they could notmaintain the agricultural base of their society. Collapse was quick to follow.
8. Leadership and institutions
The SEQ-CARI report focused on authoritarian and adaptive leadership. Two studies (Easter Island and Azerbaijan)profiled authoritarian leadership as likely to foster short-term maladaptive responses to climate change. Such leadershiptends to reduce creativity and the sense of agency in its citizens, communities and institutions. The exception was the case ofCuba’s response to the collapse of the USSR, where authority stepped back and allowed a degree of freedom to respondcreatively to what essentially constituted a mini-peak oil experience [73,74].
The study focused on what we call adaptive leadership, following Heifetz [29]. Such leadership is open, respectful,imaginative, engaged and prepared to take risks to ensure that a broad community of stakeholders benefit from socialrenewal [75]. It also suggests that adaptive institutions emerge over time and only through collective effort. Institutions aresocial products designed to solve perceived problems with the ordering and maintenance of society. Adaptive leadership[76] understands how to develop and foster adaptive institutions as the case of Solon in ancient Greece demonstrates.
8.1. Case study 4: Athens 590 BCE
At the opening of the 6th Century BCE, the city-state of Athens was struggling with social unrest, economic decline andthe violent rivalry of its wealthier citizens. Leadership was contested and usually factional [77]. The city’s status, prosperityand security were all threatened. The Athenians turned to a trusted member of the aristocracy, Solon. He was elected chiefmagistrate (archon eponymous) of Athens in 594, BCE. In this position, Solon instituted a number of sweeping reforms [78].The reforms were counter to the interests of Solon’s own class. To ensure that he was not compromised by his position oncethe elected period was over, Solon went into voluntary exile for ten years.
At first, these reforms were not that effective and Athens again had to endure a period of tyranny under Solon’s cousinPeisistratos. However, the reforms laid the foundations for the emergence of Athenian democracy later in the century. In thisexample, we see that social learning takes time. Solon prepares for a future democratic Athens by sowing the seeds of an ideaand setting up the institutions that over time gain strength, legitimacy and ultimately authority. Solon’s idea bore practical
3 See: http://www.gdrc.org/sustbiz/green/doc-cons_vitalsigns.html.4 See: http://au.lifestyle.yahoo.com/practical-parenting/toddler-preschooler/article/-/7589931/eco-parenting-green-play/.
M. Bussey et al. / Futures 44 (2012) 385–397392
results in the form of a democratic polity that managed rivalry and shaped identity in a way that avoided the worst offactional and competitive violence [79].
8.2. Practical lessons 3: patience, memory and vision
It took a century for Solon’s ideas to catch on. Change always experiences a period of up take when it is an emergent trend(one amongst many) before it gains momentum and legitimacy [80]. This case study is a reminder that patience andpersistence go hand-in-hand with vision and courageous leadership. Social memory is also important because people had toremember what it was that Solon had sought to establish. The democratisation of Athens also flags the necessity of buildingthe institutional infrastructure and conceptual tools in anticipation of a desired change.
Practical responses therefore inhabit all four quadrants of Fig. 1 presented earlier in this paper: we need responses now(UR), institutional preparedness both now and into the future (LR), cultural ferment in which new ideas, values and languageare sown through effective leadership (LL), and also individual ownership of this cultural ferment (UL) for sustainable futuresto be even considered a viable possibility.
9. From historical case studies to historical scenarios
Such historical reflections are crystallised in the report into four broad scenario archetypes based on the work of futuristJim Dator [81]. Dator [82] has been working with scenarios for over thirty years and suggests that for all the variety availableto scenario planners, there are in fact only four archetypes:
1. c
ontinuation or business as usual; 2. c ollapse in which a society loses coherence and returns to a less complex form of social order as happened following thefall of Rome;
3. a disciplined society that adheres to a strict social or spiritual/religious ideology such as in feudal Europe, communistNorth Korea and Taliban dominated regions of Afghanistan; or,
4. tr ansformation, in which context experiences a qualitative shift to another level of social order as occurred when Westernsociety moved from an agricultural to an industrial society.
The historical case studies were mapped against the scenario archetypes and presented according to sectoral interests.Thus Fig. 3 outlines the scenario spread for Human Settlements and Health.
As noted above, these historical scenarios are intended to stimulate discussion and reflection for stakeholders who aretaking part in the broader SEQ-CARI project. In this context the past is used as a resource for rethinking the present. It ishelpful to understand the forces that shaped the choices, actions and meaning making of those faced with social stresses ofone kind or another. The overall intention of the research initiative is to foster better institutional and personal
Fig. 3. Historical scenarios for human settlements and health.
M. Bussey et al. / Futures 44 (2012) 385–397 393
understandings about adaptive capacity in relation to climate change. The goal is to empower stakeholders and thusstrengthen resilience across South East Queensland. In this the use of historical scenarios is a stimulus for anticipatory actionlearning [51].
Scenarios are a key tool for fostering such learning [83]. They do this by suggesting alternatives, challenging dominantconstructions of the present and allowing people to develop preferred visions of the future, identify futures they wish toavoid and to explore the logics inherent to both [42,84–86]. Scenarios challenge linear constructions of social process andaffirm human agency – our ability to act on the present – by highlighting our centrality as social actors [83]. Furthermore, asChermack [86] has argued scenarios can inform decision making and reduce the instances of folly with which historyabounds [28].
Staley is useful here. He notes that scenarios act like the ‘rules of a game’ which supply the structure and logic that shapesany future possibility.
‘‘Like the shape around the flight of gnats, a scenario attempts to describe the shape around possible future events, astructure within which events may occur . . . a scenario is a description of the environment, and is not a description ofthe sequence of events themselves. To say a scenario is a description of an environment is to already admit toexamining a conceptual space, rather than a line’’ [6 p. 77]
Thinking about the determinants and possible drivers and barriers to adaptive capacity becomes more reflexive when itoccurs in conjunction with scenarios.
9.1. Practical lesson 4: probable, possible and preferable futures
Scenarios challenge our thinking about the present. One of the difficulties faced by decision makers is to really engagewith medium and long-term thinking. The present simply seems too dominant, too real, for any considerations about anopen-ended future to be relevant. Such ‘strategic inertia’ [49] is a real barrier to effective action in the area of climate change.Historical reflection and the scenarios distilled from this analysis offer powerful evidence that longer-term thinking is verymuch to the advantage of those locked in a struggle to ensure viable and sustainable social and economic structures into thefuture [87].
Scenario work in this context is slanted towards optimal futures. Futures thinking seeks to navigate through probablefutures to possible futures and ultimately to futures that are deemed by those in the context to be preferable. Such partisanwork is ethically valid as long as everyone agrees to owning the process and challenging dominant power constructions of the‘preferable’. In the case of Dator’s four scenario archetypes, we can see that Scenario 1: Continuation is for many of uspreferable, and may, with some technical ingenuity even be possible, though probably unlikely; Scenario 2: Collapse andScenario 3: Disciplined Society are both possible, they may even be probable, but certainly they are not preferable. Scenario4: Transformation for many might be considered preferable but may also be considered neither probable nor possible. Thelens we choose to apply to these scenarios will determine responses and reveal to participants their fundamental valueorientation: optimist, pessimist, or pragmatist. It is therefore important to consciously use the lens most appropriate to thecontext. It should be sufficiently grounded to offer practical engagement, sufficiently empowering to offer hope and apathway to success, sufficiently real to focus attention and sufficiently sobering to demand immediate action.
9.2. One final case study: Britain 1800
The industrial and political elites of Britain in and around the year 1800 developed a vision for their preferable future. Thisvision required considerable social will and institutional creativity. To develop an industrial and capitalist system requirednew laws, new institutions, a rethinking of political structures and processes, the turning upside down of the settledagricultural world of the majority of Britons, and an extensive and rapacious, but also seductive, Imperial system [88]. Thiswork took place mostly between 1750 and 1850 and can be considered completed with the 1851 Great Exhibition at theCrystal Palace in London, which enshrined the vision and imagination of the new industrial epoch.
The social suffering of the majority seemed, in the short term, a small price to pay for the longer term dividends theseelites hoped to receive. This work was certainly both practical and risky. It was also a work of great social imagination [89].The effects were immediate and once unleashed almost uncontrollable. The Luddite rebellion of 1811–1812 [90], the Swingriots of 1830 and the near revolt of 1848 all point to the immense unrest that these changes elicited from the Britishpopulace. It was in this period that the working class was ‘invented’ along with the factory and the notion of ‘capital’ [91].
9.3. Practical lesson 5: imagination and will
What stands out in this historical case study is that imagination needs to be coupled with social will, institutionalcreativity and empowered leadership if deep and lasting (i.e. sustainable) change is to be achieved. If we frame practicalresponses in an instrumental and reactive context, the results will only buy a sinking ship additional surface time. For deepertransformative and preferable futures to emerge, there needs to be a deep engagement with the imaginative and structuralbedrock of our civilisation [see for examples: [92,93]]. The British case study illustrates how such sustained proactive socialengineering occurs. Without such an engagement, all our work will tend to be reactive and cosmetic in nature.
Table 1
Summary of practical lessons.
Observations ‘Practical’ responses
Practical lesson 1 Move from reactive to proactive � Apply and develop tools for reframing issues
� Take calculated risks
� Apply systems thinking
� New tools involve a post-normal science, reflexive
anticipatory learning cycles, multitemporal frames
and alternative indicators for thinking about
development, growth and security
Practical lesson 2 Technology and Identity are linked � We need innovative technology that links
with innovative identity
Technology becomes a social agent
once it is created
� Work on social choices made about technology
Technology can foster a false sense
of security
� Cultivate identity between a technology and its
utility as a response to climate change
Practical lesson 3 Social process can be represented
across four quadrants thus
‘Practical’ is a shifting signifier
� Change takes time but needs effective leadership
Adaptive leadership fosters
adaptive institutions
� Institutional building needs to anticipate the
desired change
� Develop reflexive leadership
Adaptive institutions emerge over
time and only through
collective effort
� Keep the long term in mind
� Be Proactively Patient
Practical lesson 4 Scenarios challenge our thinking
about the present
� Use short, medium and long term thinking
� Use scenarios to challenge constructions of
what is possible
� Be clear about value base and base choices and
responses around these
� Do not be shy about promoting preferable futures
Practical lesson 5 We need to couple imagination with
social will, institutional creativity
and empowered leadership
� There needs to be a deep engagement with the
imaginative and structural bedrock of our civilisation
M. Bussey et al. / Futures 44 (2012) 385–397394
10. Summary
The historical case studies and the scenarios they generated have been designed to stimulate reflection on how best torespond to climate change within the contexts of human settlement and health; energy; agriculture, forestry and fisheries;and biodiversity and ecosystems. These reflections are summarised above in Table 1. Some ‘practical’ responses aresuggested.
The responses outlined above are ‘practical’ in that they invite people to proactively engage with elements of theircontext. These engagements involve combinations of social, technical, cultural and personal responses that the researchsuggests will enhance adaptive capacity in relation to climate change. The four-quadrant depiction of these interrelateddomains is our attempt to capture the dynamic backdrop to thinking about this. Such a representation allows for the term‘practical’ to become a moving signifier that carries different implications across the four quadrants.
Fig. 4 illustrates how this works and goes some way to challenging the separation of ‘practical responses’ into variousdomains of action such as the sectors this project is designed to inform. From both the historical and futures perspective,technology and culture go hand-in-hand and mutually reinforce one another.
11. Reflections on the research
The SEQ-CARI project’s goal is twofold: firstly, to provide stakeholders with recommendations on possible adaptiveresponses to climate change; secondly, to offer an adaptive capacity assessment of those recommendations. The historicaldimension of this research was intentionally far reaching and broad as it was understood that social choices do not occur in avacuum. In every way climate change is linked to the matrix of processes that support and define modern industrial society.This is so because climate change is intimately connected to our society’s relationship with energy.
As ours is a regional project there is not much we can do about the ‘global problematique’ so ultimately therecommendations will have regional and manageable outcomes. Scale is important here but the big thinking required of usall still needs to be played out at the local. This means all social actors need to become much more self aware. Leaders need torethink what it means to lead [29]. Followers also need to rethink their role as followers [32]. Institutions similarly need tobecome much more conscious of their relationship with technology, knowledge, information and imagination and the valuesthat inform these. All need to appreciate the nature of complex systems and how complexity plays out across scale [43,55].
Bringing a futures lens to these issues offers further opportunities for reframing the present and opening it up toalternative readings and ultimately alternative trajectories [94]. Innovation occurs across the domains described by the four
Fig. 4. Practical responses across the four quadrants.
M. Bussey et al. / Futures 44 (2012) 385–397 395
quadrant model. Similarly, social creativity cannot be tied down to one particular quadrant. Adaptive capacity works acrossall domains and is a measure of society’s ability to act when faced with a threat. This ability is defined by, amongst otherthings: the physical resources available [UR]; the extent to which institutions can act with foresight [LR]; the values, fearsand aspirations of communities [LL]; and the degree to which individuals are willing to change [UL].
South East Queensland is one of Australia’s fastest growing regions and is under pressure in a tightening global market toperform for the greater good of the nation. Yet its rapid growth, proximity to the coast and demographic profile, along withits placement in an ecologically sensitive region, put pressure on its adaptive capacity and resilience. Institutionally it is in agood position having strong local, state and federal governance systems but such systems are globally compromised byconflicting interests and the sense of confusion that uncertainty generates. It is also important to note that, as the eminenthistorian Barbara Tuchman once stated:
‘‘Mankind, it seems, makes a poorer performance of government than of almost any other human activity. In thissphere, wisdom, which may be defined as the exercise of judgement acting on experience, common sense andavailable information, is less operative and more frustrated than it should be [28 p. 2].
12. Conclusion
Society’s resistance to change, without some major intervention (disaster or revolution), is pervasive. For the busyadministrator and the citizens that vote governments in and out of office, the line of least resistance, the business as usualscenario, is the preferred future. Yet, as modelling officiandos know, the future prospects are grim. If we stick with thebusiness as usual trajectory we could face a collapse scenario in which we can no longer meet our energy needs and theglobal climate system fails. The alternatives are either a return to simpler more disciplined societies or transformation. Thedisciplinary route is generally unappealing as it shuts down options for the future while transformation seems, according tocurrent logic, unrealistic or simply impossible. The historical case studies do however demonstrate that though orderedtransition may be difficult to manage, when it does occur it is revolutionary.
Historical thinking demands sensitivity to time frames that have a futures orientation. In short, we need to assess short,medium and long-term benefits arising from any practical response. In working through such considerations, historicalthinking enables futures thinking and brings depth and inspiration. We can see that human history is not simply a litany offailure and collapse. In the stories of Ancient Greece and Rome, we find innovative and creative thinkers, flexible institutionsand courageous populaces all ready to experiment with their world to increase human possibilities and lower risks. In this
M. Bussey et al. / Futures 44 (2012) 385–397396
way, history also challenges us to consciously live in the present by examining other times and places in which individualsand groups worked to improve the security and stability of their worlds. History looks at human action, and the choices thatdrove this action, so that we can think beyond our past and act rather than react to challenges such as climate change.
To be proactive re climate change requires thinking and acting that integrates all the quadrants described above. It alsonecessitates a thorough appraisal of South East Queensland’s adaptive capacity across these fields. Such an assessmenthighlights that though there may be the physical resources and institutional mechanisms to enact changes, there may wellnot be the leadership capacity and the social will to drive them forward. The practical lessons outlined above suggest that toalign resources, institutions, leadership and social will require a reorientation in the values and assumptions that informcurrent thinking about climate change and vulnerability. It is hoped that the SEQ-CARI project makes a small contribution tothis outcome. Certainly there is scope to further develop historical scenario research around climate change and morebroadly social learning and adaptive capacity in order to deepen understanding and capacity at both the institutional andcultural levels. Similarly, the determinants outlined in this paper also need to be road tested by others working on sociallearning, resilience and adaptive capacity assessment. It is hoped that this paper acts as a stimulus to further research inthese areas.
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