Education, Race, and Inequality: Expenditure on Elementary Education, Racial Ideologies, and
Immigration Policies in Brazil from 1890 to 1930
Josué L. Nobrega Jr1
________________________________________________________________________ Abstract: In this paper I examine the effect of racial heterogeneity on the provision of elementary education in Brazilian states in the period of political decentralization of public finances (1889-1930). Previous literature on provision of elementary education in Brazil did not explore systematic effects of racially biased motivations on the variation in the distribution of educational resources across different states. Using census data for the racial composition of Brazilian states in the period, the empirical analysis and the statistical model I employ suggest that states with larger share of descendants of ethnic African groups provided less expenditure on elementary education; on the other hand, states which promoted the settlement of white European ethnic groups spent more on elementary education in the period. This pattern holds when I conditioned the results to other explanatory factors of expenditure in education per capita - such as the state tax revenues per capita, and the total expenditure on elementary education as a share of states’ total tax revenues. I describe how statistical differences on educational expenditure per capita across states in Brazil are dependent upon the racial composition of the population. Alongside with statistical analysis, the resulting distribution of educational resources in the period is a privileged angle to further explore the structuring of racial disparities in Brazil. I provide additional historical evidence about the mechanisms that account for the empirical results. I argue that racially motivated immigration policies of labor supply and the settlement of European groups in some states were related with discriminatory policies against the African descendant population.
Keyword: Race and Ethnicity; Education; Distributive Politics; Racial Policy; Brazil
________________________________________________________________________
1 Graduate Student, Department of Political Science. University of California – Los Angeles (UCLA). [email protected]
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INTRODUCTION
Brazil has experienced long-term patterns of inequality often associated with poor
educational provision and insufficient promotion of schooling across states and regions
(Mariscal and Sokoloff 2000; Martinez-Fritscher, Musacchio and Viarengo 2010;
Carvalho Filho and Colistete 2010). Differences on schooling and literacy are also related
with the unequal application of the rights of citizenship and inefficient public policies
among distinct racial groups (Fernandes 1965; Hasenbalg 1978; Telles 2004). This paper
addresses the question of inequality on educational provision in Brazil emphasizing the
role of historically established racial differences across states as an explanation for poor
governance, low public good provision, and differences on investments in primary
education. I advance the argument that an increase in the fiscal capacity of states to spend
on education and the ideological drive to change racial characteristics of the Brazilian
population led to significant differences on educational expenditure per capita across
states.
Historically, most of the extension of social rights in Brazil happened under weak
access to legal channels of political accountability, disproportionally affecting the
political participation of the population of African descendants (Love 1970; Skidmore
1972; Hasenbalg 1978; Weyland 1996). The legacy of unequal citizenship particularly for
blacks and mixed with black (Pardos or Mullatoes)2 from the long period of African and
2 These are the terms used in the census to refer to mixed-race persons of African descent. Pardo is used as a racial category since 1960, and mulatto is the term used in the first racial census of 1872.
3
Afro-Brazilian enslavement affected the social, economic, and political rights of
citizenship from African descended groups in Brazil.3 As a consequence, this has led to
persistent levels of economic inequality, low political participation, voter
disenfranchisement, and increasing forms of discrimination against African descendants
(Andrews 1991; Reichmann 1999; Telles 2004).
In this paper I argue that the racial heterogeneity among Brazilian regions have
influenced the educational expenditure per capita in the country. Given the enduring
historical inequalities between African descendants (Blacks) and European descendants
(Whites) in terms of literacy4 and years of schooling, I compare the expenditures on
elementary education per capita in Brazil focusing on the racial differences present at the
beginning of the twentieth century.
In order to test my argument, I investigate the determinants of education
expenditure per capita across states in Brazil in the period of the First Republic (1889-
1930). The focus on this period is linked with state’s financial autonomy to collect export
taxes and autonomously spend on public goods inaugurated by the Constitution of 1891.
The period is also concomitant with the termination of approximately three hundred years
of enslavement of Africans and African descendants.
The empirical analysis identified that states with larger shares of African
3 The censuses of 1940, 1950, and 1980, and the National Household Surveys of the 1970s and 1980s, documented the clear disparities between Whites and Blacks in terms of education, income, and health. These data do indicate that the socioeconomic status of the mixed population is intermediate to Blacks and Whites. Nevertheless, the overall social position of the mixed population (Pardos) is much closer to Blacks than to Whites. 4 The educational census of the population with more than 65 years old in 1988, particularly important for a study on schooling in the early twentieth century, registers 68.8% of illiteracy among Blacks and Mixed with black, compared to 31.4% of illiteracy among Whites. (Source: Census IBGE, PNAD Data, 1988) On average, illiteracy rates are 20% higher among blacks and mixed with blacks compared to whites since the redemocratization of Brazil in 1988 for all age groups.
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descendants in their population between 1890 and 1930 had statistically significant
differences in expenditures on education per capita compared to other states. In summary,
the evidence I gathered suggests that states with large majorities of African descendants
tended to spend less in education per capita. I argue that on the one hand, states that
invested in the long-term supply of African slavery labor in the population are also where
white plantation elites would receive a less than proportionate share of the benefits of the
expenditure on public schools and elementary education. The provision of few
educational opportunities for African descendants was in the interest of plantation elites
in control of local political systems organized through indirect elections and restrictions
on voting based on literacy requirements. On the other hand, the empirical evidence
suggests an opposite pattern linked with the share of European immigrants in each state.
The data analysis suggests that states that promoted racially biased immigration policies
of European settlement tended to spend more in education per capita in the period. I
exam how the politics of subsided immigration from Europe with state funding for
settlement in new agriculture frontiers seems to have an effect on the propensity of local
elites to spend on elementary education.
For the analysis I use ordinary least square estimators to consider the data on
educational expenditure per capita and test the hypothesis associating the effect of race
on its provision. Using controls for the effect of important explanatory factors
emphasized by the literature on the determinants of educational provision, such as
institutions associated with differences on plantation crops and past colonial institutions,
the enfranchisement of the population, and the wealth of each state, my empirical
findings suggest that there is an association between the expenditure on education per
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capita and the share of Blacks and Mixed with black (Pardos) in each state population.
The results are consistent with the hypothesis that states with large afro-Brazilian
majorities invested significantly less revenue in elementary education. Moreover, I find
that the share of European immigrants is positively associated with more elementary
education expenditures per capita. The effort to spread the access to education seems
more likely to target new white European groups in states where the ruling elites subsided
projects of “white” settlement.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 1 I briefly describe the historical
background of the period. I review the degree to which state elites have access to
influence educational policy in the Constitution of 1891. I report the characteristics of
previous education policies that actively denied access to schooling of African slaves and
their descendants. I also describe the important role of racially discriminatory ideologies
on the promotion of immigration policies, and in the investments of state funds for the
settlement of white European communities. State policies actively provided public
subsidies and land distribution targeted to settle white Europeans in sub-national units of
Brazil under ideological motivations to “whiten” the population.
In section 2 I discuss the main findings of the literature that associate economic,
institutional, and natural factors in the provision of educational resources in general, and
specifically educational expenditure in Brazil. Economic historians tend to emphasize the
relationship between low educational provisions with the quality of the colonial
institutions (Colistete 2001; Wenegast 2003; Martínez-Fritscher et all 2010). I propose an
alternative hypothesis where the differences in educational expenditures across regions
can be associated with discriminatory policies of one racial group against the others. As
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such racial discrimination may lead to inadequate public goods provision.
In section 3, I describe the data and the characteristics of my main dependent
variable, expenditure on education per capita. I use different empirical strategies of
statistical analysis to test the strength of my empirical findings. The main finding of the
paper is that educational spending is associated with racial differences across states in the
Brazilian federation. The empirical findings are consistent with the hypothesis about the
effect of race.
Section 4 offers a concluding argument in which racially motivated policies in
Brazil are associated with educational spending. The new evidence accounts for another
dimension for advancing the interpretation of the structural patterns of racial inequality in
the country. I provide historical evidence for politicians’ motivations between 1890 and
1930 to avoid the spread of elementary education in Brazilian states with an afro-
Brazilian majority.
POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION, RACIAL IDEOLOGIES, AND
IMMIGRATION POLICIES IN THE FIRST REPUBLIC (1889-1930)
The most important changes from 1880’s decade inaugurated in Brazil were
associated with gradual emancipation of African and afro-Brazilian captives in 1888
(Andrews 2010); this transformation is also concomitant with the breakdown of the
Monarchic regime and the inauguration of the so called First Republic. In 1889, the
Republican movement successfully overthrew the emperor in a military coup establishing
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a new Constitution. The Republican government brought major institutional reforms
through the Constitution of 1891; among them were the extension of the political
autonomy to the sub-units of Brazil through federal states, the decentralization of the
public finances across the federation, and the literacy requirement on voting
enfranchisement.
The historical concomitance of the end of slavery and the First Republic also
brought out new themes of debate across states involving the economic demand for labor
in new coffee plantation frontiers. The parliamentary debates about the incentives to
supply the labor necessities were strongly associated with the ideological motivations to
change the racial characteristics of the national identity in the new Republic (Hall 1969;
Skidmore 1993; Schwarcz 1996). Before the inauguration of the Republic, African slaves
and the local freed African descendants supplied most of the labor for regional
plantations. Brazil received a total of around 4 million enslaved Africans (1.5 million
would arrive in the 19th century, with around 40% of the total of enslaved persons in the
Americas) (Love 1970). In 1870 over two thirds (2,887,500) of the total Brazilian
population (3,617,900) was African descendant, and less than one fourth was considered
white (843,000) (Tannenbaum 1947).5
The substitution of the slave labor and the demographic choice of the Brazilian
citizen’s racial characteristics were at the top of politicians’ agenda in the early twentieth-
century (Love 1980), and several states used their export tax revenues to raise funds and
disburse on the settlement of European agricultural colonies (Hall 1969). Hence, the
5 The racial categories used in the first national census of 1870 recorded Whites, Blacks (Negros) and Mulattoes, with Blacks and Mullatoes designated as free or slave.
8
Republican political elite decided to handle the political, social, and economic
consequences of the slave emancipation without the integration of the afro-descendant
population in new state initiatives of citizenship expansion (Fernandes, 1967).
The proposed reforms motivated state elites to advance racially motivated
legislative initiatives of citizenship expansion through immigration, subsiding white
European settlers to the fast growing coffee economy of the Southeast and to the vast
unexplored agricultural frontier in the Brazilian South (Monbeig 1952; Hall 1969;
Holloway 1974). Therefore, the Republican government selectively chose by law white
European immigrants to substitute the slave and freed afro-Brazilian labor in the most
dynamic economic regions of the period. 6 The ideological motivation around race and
citizenship in the period considered African ethnic attributes less valuable to the process
of expansion of citizenship of the Republic, and the idea of mestiçagem (racial mixture)
was associated to the improvement of the population through high-status European ethnic
features (Holloway 1974; Skidmore 1993; Schwarcz, 1996; Telles 2004). The new labor
supply policy combined the objective to promote a modern nation through economic
incentives to “whiten” the demographic racial characteristics of the population (Andrews
2010).7
The “whitening ideology” had considerable impact on state policies to attract, and
to settle immigrants mainly from Italy, Germany, Spain, and Portugal to substitute the
6 Decree 528, 06/28/1890. Forbidden the entrance of Africans and Asians as part of the immigration and colonization initiatives. (Holloway, 1974) 7 It is important to emphasize that racial categories in Brazil developed differently than United States. Blacks and Mixed have in general several categorizations through color identities. However, African descendants and African ethnic attributes are historically identified with low-status citizenship. Phenotypical characteristics such as the skin color and the texture of the hair promote specific racial profiling to this population. For an overview of Brazilian racial discussion see Telles (2005).
9
local African descendant population and former African slaves (Holloway 1974). It
formed a powerful ideology for Brazilian policy-makers to speed up the process of
immigration into the country and to expand the investments on infrastructure (Reichmann
1999). These ideologies reached party politics and have influenced political decisions
about race in parliamentary debates with discriminatory evaluations about the capacity of
blacks to develop the Brazilian economy (Fernandes 1965; Skidmore 1974).
In the first decade of the Republic, the state of São Paulo alone received more
European immigrants than Argentina in the period 1891-1900 (Hall 1969). Almost
700,000 Europeans made their way to the state. Until 1930, 2,233,000 white immigrants
came to the state, in which more than 1,000,000 were from Italy. The demographic
change in São Paulo after the end of the period of state sponsored immigration
transformed drastically the racial characteristics of the population of the state (Loveman
2009). In 1890, approximately 48% of the population was considered non-white
compared to 14% of non-whites in the decade of 1930 (Brazilian Censuses, 1890 and
1940). In this context, European settlers were fortunate in being able to receive fertile soil
in those regions, better employment opportunities, and higher wages in the coffee
plantations (Holloway 1974). The concerted action of local state elites raised funds for
recruitment in Europe, and they received government grants to aid private immigration
societies specifically targeted to subsidize immigrants of these regions. Therefore, local
governments spent substantial amounts of tax revenues in public policies of immigration
attraction in regions such as the Southern Italy, the north of Portugal, parts of Spain and
Germany, Poland, Ukraine and other Eastern Europe countries (Hall 1969; Holloway
1980). Many tax incentives supported immigration companies in the provision of food,
10
lodging, and land for settlers. The government sponsorship of immigration shared the
costs of subsiding white settlement among all states in the federation, but benefited
mostly states expanding new coffee agriculture frontiers in Southeast Brazil (Holloway
1974). Government incentives were also helpful to avoid the migration of the settlers to
other countries with similar policies, such as Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, or even to the
United States (Toplin 1976; Loveman 2009).
Local politicians in states with large Afro-Brazilian majorities also tried to settle
European immigrants in other regions as part of the “whitening” effort, but with less
success to settle them in sugar cane, cotton, tobacco, and cocoa plantations (Holloway
1980). In fact, politicians all over the federation had pessimistic views of the African
descendants prospects for effective political and economic participation, restricting the
integration of afro-Brazilians not only in the in the civic life of the new regime, but also
unequally offering labor contracts in the wage economy of the coffee expansion in
different conditions in relation to Europeans (Love 1970; Andrews 1988; Skidmore
1993). The states with sugar cane and cotton plantations located in the Northeast region
of Brazil had less export revenues to invest on immigrants, and still could employ the
labor from the long-term supply of African slaves from previous periods. Local freed
African descendants provided most of the labor in those regions and received fewer
incentives from the central government funding for immigration settlement (Holloway
1980).
In the next section I briefly review the spread of education in Brazil in such
historical context. I also review the explanatory causes for public goods expenditure in
general, and educational expenditure in particular, emphasizing the main explanatory
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causes in the literature.
ON THE PROVISION OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION IN THE FIRST
REPUBLIC
The republican constitution of 1891 decentralized the educational expenditure to
state level jurisdictions, and local governments were allowed to tax exports and keep
most of the revenues (Martínez-Fritcher et al 2010). This significant decentralization of
public finances allowed states not only the right to tax exports, but also property, land
transfers, industries and professions. Specifically important for this study, the political
decentralization affected the way schooling was financed; articles 55 and 56 of the 1891
Constitution gave autonomy to municipalities to spend on elementary education freely.
Thus, the expenditure on elementary education was mostly financed as a share of state’s
tax and exports revenues (Martinez-Fritscher 2009). Martínez Fritcher et al (2010) argues
that the decentralization of taxation over the Brazilian territory in 1891 had the important
effect of increasing the expenditure on education across states. 8
In retrospect, the advancement of elementary schooling in Brazil on previous
periods was very restricted (Love 1970; Martínez-Fritcher et al 2010). The imperial
government of 1824 provided most of the education investments in the capital of the
8 This pattern adds more evidence to the literature that studied the early growth of schooling in advanced democracies, which has noticed the relationship between local level autonomy and its importance to explain why Northern United States and Germany took the lead in public education in the nineteenth century (Lindert 2004). Studies about the timing of the expansion of public schooling in Brazil stress the importance of the decentralization of revenues in this period to increase the expenditure on education per capita (Martínez-Fritscher, Musacchio and Viarengo 2010).
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country, the city of Rio de Janeiro (Colistete et al 2010). Indeed, the monarchical
government provided few educational opportunities in general, and definitely impose
limits on the rights of slaves to be enrolled in schools by statutes that made it illegal to
teach them to read or write, also restricting the enrollment of freed Afro Brazilian
children with slave parents (Andrews 2004). At the end of slavery in 1888, only 15% of
the population of Brazil was literate.
This placed Brazil as one of the countries with the lowest literacy rate in the
Americas (Engerman, Sokoloff, and Mariscal; Martínez-Fritcher et al 2010). The level of
elementary education in Brazil was lower not only compared to literacy rates in countries
of the region such as Argentina, Chile, Colombia, or Uruguay, which around 1890 had
literacy rates between 30% and 50%, but also compared to Caribbean countries such as
Jamaica and Barbados which also had large Afro-American populations (Engerman and
Sokoloff 2002; Engerman, Mariscal and Sokoloff 2009).
As a matter of fact, most of the increase of spending on elementary education in
Brazil presented a very substantial regional variation. This paper will focus on the
literature that could explain this variation.
Studies about the regional differences on the spread of education in Brazil suggest
the association between the various forms of local colonial heritage and the variation on
expenditures on education across states (Carvalho Filho and Colistete 2010). Such
explanations on the variations of the expenditure on public goods per capita, such as
education, are related to the widespread argument in cross country comparisons that
acknowledge how colonial institutions are often associated with inadequate public good
provision, poor policies, and inequality (e.g. Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; North,
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Summerhill and Weingast, 2000; Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002).
In general, the literature about country cases like Brazil has used the colonial
origins of institutions looking back to the sugar cane cycle for instance, and the slavery of
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to explain differences on public good provisions
in subsequent periods (Naritomi et al. 2007; Carvalho Filho and Colistete 2010).
Wegenast (2010), for example, discusses the role that endowments and crop choices have
to explain lower levels of education in some states. Most of these analyses associate the
levels of inequality in the late nineteenth-century as an important determinant of long-
term redistributive transfers, including expenditures on education.
Other studies, such as Mariscal and Sokoloff (2000), argue that enfranchisement
served as a central mechanism in which inequality has affected the spread of schooling
comparing country cases. Most recently, Sokoloff, Mariscal and Haber (2011) emphasize
the variation observed in the spread of schooling in United States and Canada in
comparison to Latin America and Caribbean arguing that voting expansion would explain
differences on educational expenditures among these regions. Case studies, specifically
about the variation within Brazil, suggest that large state revenues from coffee plantations
and the better political institutions associated with them had shaped the differences
observed in the expenditures on elementary education across states (Martínez-Fritscher et
all 2010). Accordingly, the increasing export revenues from favorable prices of the
international coffee market affected states’ wealth in the period 1889-1930, and, as a
consequence, the total amount invested on elementary education.
In short, the literature on education provision in Brazil has important case studies
that shed lights on some of the fundamental determinants of the inequality on educational
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provision in general, mainly emphasizing the key role played by the coffee economy.
However, in accordance with the historical evidence mentioned before, this paper puts
forward an alternative conjecture acknowledging that patterns of inequality on education
provision have also been constant along the racial lines of the Brazilian population
(Hasenbalg 1979; Stepan 1991; Reichmann 1999; Telles 2004). For the Brazilian case,
however, such studies did not explore the important association between race and
educational provision acknowledged in countries in which the levels of inequality are
very correlated with the distribution of the population along racial lines like United States
and South Africa (Smith 1984; Margo 1990; Marx 1998).
In this paper I expand the hypothesis of the previous literature on determinants of
the educational expenditure in Brazil taking into account the influential contribution from
the large body of empirical evidence in distributive politics which has identified how
policies linked with racial and ethnic diversity matters for political and economic
outcomes in numerous country cases (e.g. Bates 1974; Horowitz 1985; Fearon 2003;
Posner 2005; Sawyer 2006; Fearon, Kasara, and Laitin 2007; Chandra 2009; Alesina and
Zhuravskaya 2010). As the previous section briefly review, the period is known by the
spread of racial theories that formed an ideology for Brazilian policy-makers to speed up
the process of European immigration into the country (Hall 1969; Stepan 1991;
Reichmann 1999). More important, these ideologies reached local politics within the
states and exerted decisive influence on politician’s choices about educational policies
and cultural strategies to “whiten” the population (Skidmore, 1993; Loveman 2009).
Thus, I advance the argument that racial differences could impact the provision of
educational resources in Brazil.
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Racial Differences as an Explanatory Factor to Educational Expenditures
My main working hypothesis is that the results of an increase in the fiscal
capacity of states to spend on education and the ideological drive to change racial
characteristics of the population led to significant differences on elementary educational
expenditure per capita.
The explanation is explicitly designed to establish empirically the link between
mechanisms that might link racial favoritism to the distribution of educational spending.
This hypothesis departs also from recent contributions that associate cross-country ethnic
variation to the low production of public goods (Habyarimana et al 2007; Chandra 2008;
Baldwin and Huber 2010; Alesina and Zhuravskaya 2011). Conceptually, I propose a
definition of race based on the Brazilian census classification.9
In most of the states, a Brazilian white minority elite from the colonial period has
controlled a disproportionate share of economic resources, land, and political power over
time. Moreover, racial hierarchies from the colonial period in states with majority of
African descendants were also important to advance economic limitations to the political
participation of Afro-Brazilians in political decisions (Love 1970). I suggest that unequal
distribution of elementary education across racial groups was a very strategic power
9 The census on Brazilian racial differences can also be theoretically convergent with the broad definition of ethnicity proposed by Chandra (2006) to explain consistently the impact of ethnic differences on economic and political outcomes. That is, according to Chandra (2006) descendent-based visibility and constrained change in the short run are often the most important factors of characterization across a wide range of studies about the potential effect of ethnicity. I assume that it can also be applied to differences between the African Descendants (blacks and mixed with black) and the European Descendants (whites) classified in the Brazilian censuses.
16
resource from local elites when they represent the minority of the population. Departing
from the core argument that state elites had different preferences across the diverse racial
groups of Brazil, they influenced government expenditure to secure their interests linked
with economic advantages and public subsidies to settle white European groups in the
country. The theory suggests that the heterogeneous distributional patterns of education
expenditure were associated with the policies to change the racial characteristics of
citizens. Therefore, the desired improvement of the racial characteristics of Brazil
advocated by the enthusiasts of the eugenic policies in the late nineteenth century was
focused on the distribution of economic benefits and patronage in prosperous economic
frontiers to white European settlers.
Thus, I argue that the presence of an economically and political dominant group
represented in the Brazilian political system of the period may lower the spread of
elementary education given their heterogeneous preferences about the racial
characteristics of the population. Under this circumstances, the association between racial
favoritism and policy decisions goes beyond the effects of the institution of slavery,
income inequality, and the wealth of the states. White elites influenced by eugenic ideas
would also benefit from the continuing that the restriction on the spread of elementary
education to African descendants would have for political participation and the levels of
enfranchisement in states with black majorities. I expect a negative association between
the share of African descendants and the expenditures on elementary education.
However, I also expect that educational funds could be redirected to secondary and
college level where they would be directed benefitted from the general levels of
education expenditure.
17
Differently, I suggest that elites in control of some states responded more directly
to white European immigrant demands with respect to public goods. White elites found
the provision of public funds, subsidies, and land distribution to white Europeans
instrumental to the project of white settlement in some regions. It is important to
emphasize once more the fact that immigration policies in Brazil gave particular attention
to the formal exclusion of populations from Africa and Asia from the efforts of settlement
in prosperous agricultural areas of the country. The distribution of government aid for the
colonization of lands in the South of Brazil was racially motivated to “whiten” the
country. Thus I expect a positive correlation between the share of immigrants and the
expenditure on public elementary education.
In the next section I explain the data and I provide the empirical strategy to test
the hypothesis.
DATA AND EMPIRICAL DESIGN
This section describes the empirical data for the analysis of educational spending
in the period. The Appendix explains in detail the sources and describes the calculation of
the key variables used in the present analysis.
In order to document the causes of expenditures on elementary education, I use
census data on the total expenditures on education in each state from 1890 to 1930; I
replicate the variable calculations of the analysis used by Musacchio et al (2010) on the
average expenditure on education per capita. I also used the data on the total revenues per
18
state and the average state expenditure on education as a share of the total revenue from
previous analysis on the topic (Lindert 2004; Martínez-Fritscher et al 2010). In order to
test the impact of the racial differences, I used the census data about the number of
European immigrants of each state and I calculate the average share of white immigrants
in each state population until 1930. The share of African descendants in the population is
also calculated as an approximation until 1930 using census data. The census on race and
slavery is limited to the year of 1871, with estimates valid for the population in the year
of 1890 (Vidal Luna and Klein 2005). To estimate the share of African descendants for
the period (Blacks and Mixed), I assumed the share of Afro-Brazilians in the total
population of the states until 1930 as fixed, and I compare the share of Blacks and Mixed
with Black with the census of 1940. I considered that these descendent-based attributes
did not suffer a considerable change on average through internal migration in the period,
except in those states that received large waves of European immigrants. As a control of
my proxy measure of the share of Afro-Brazilians, I correlate the share of the black and
mixed in the census data of 1940 with the information of the previous census of race in
1890. They are very correlated with the proportions of Black and Mixed populations in
subsequent periods (r=0.78). I found some variation in the share of people considered
“black”, but not in the number of mixed with black (“pardos”). I assumed a 50%
threshold of African descendants (blacks+ mixed with black) population in the 1940’s as
a control for the proxy of the state shares in 1890. For example, the share of blacks and
mixed with blacks in the state of Pernambuco as a share of the total population varies
from 72% in 1890 to 65% in 1940, but it is still more than 50% of the total population
identified as African-descendant. Thus, I keep the correlation between states with black
19
and mixed majorities in both periods as a control.
The empirical findings section is divided into three parts. Initially, I am interested
in showing that variation on African descendants in each state led to a variation in
expenditures on education. That is, I want to focus on the variation over the share of
Afro-Brazilians in each state population and how it affects the expenditures on education
per capita. I start by running ordinary least square regression using a log measure of
expenditure on education per capita.10 The models include several controls. One is the
average revenue per capita of each state between 1901 and 1925, which is known to have
a very strong relationship with the level of public good provision per capita. I also
include controls for rival explanations of the literature, such as the importance of the
coffee plantation economy and the share of voting enfranchisement (Mariscal and
Sokoloff 2000; Wenegast 2008; Engerman, Mariscal and Sokoloff 2009; Martínez-
Fritcher et all 2010). I include a control for total expenditure in education as a share of
the total revenue, which has relationship with other political and economic differences
across states, such as ideological differences.
Once more, to check whether racial differences have influenced educational
expenditures as hypothesized, I assume the share of blacks and mixed with blacks
(pardos) over the total population as the main proxy for my theory.11
10 The log transformation was necessary because the data on educational expenditure per capita data exhibit right skewness (positively skewed). 11 Given Brazil’s history of slavery and late emancipation (1888), I would want to check if the expansion of education we document benefited blacks and mixed race Brazilians as much as it benefited say white Europeans. The models in this section treat a state as the unit of analysis. As noted previously, the data used to construct the measures are from Brazilian Census from the 1890 to 1930 period. I averaged most of indicators used to measure the economic indicators.
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RESULTS
The multivariate model I employ estimates the relationship between the
logarithmic values of expenditure on elementary education on these variables. The
currency unit of the period is difficult to interpret in substantive terms without a more
complete analysis of exchange rates. However, log transformed coefficients are usually
interpreted in terms of percent change, which can give an approximation of the
substantive meaning of the results. Ordinary least squares regression shows that even
when other explanatory actors emphasized by the literature were take into account,
African descendants received less educational resources on average than white European
immigrants (Table 1).
In Table 1, models 1 to 4 include the controls and the measure of educational
provision per capita as the dependent variable.
Model 1 includes only the variables of interest: the share of the African
descendant population and the share of white immigrants from Europe. Consistent with
the theory expectations, the coefficient for both explanatory factors is in the expected
direction, negative for afro-descendants, and positive for European immigrants. States
that increased the share of white European immigrants spent considerably more on
elementary education than states with larger share of African descendants on average.
According to model 1, the impact of educational spending is very economic significant
for the states that received more immigrants. At every increase one percent of increase in
European immigrants, the expenditure on elementary education per capita expands 7.5%.
Asymmetrically, every one percent increase in the share of African descendants in the
21
population is related with almost 2.5% less spending on elementary education per capita
on average. The statistical significant results for the difference between blacks and whites
in this context stresses the important historical connection linking the provision of
elementary education and the inequality along racial lines in the Brazilian population.
However, this model did not suggest a causal relationship about the effect of race. As the
historical analysis of the immigration policies suggest, most white European immigrants
went to rich coffee regions—with higher tax and exports revenues per capita. Thus, the
link between white immigrants and the higher expenditure on elementary education could
also be probably associated with their settlement in regions with more revenues from the
coffee economy. The next models include the most important control variables to
establish how the association between race and education expenditure is conditioned to
other covariates.
Model 2 uses a measure of the total revenue per capita in each state to control for
the actual wealth and financial capacity to spend on elementary education. The average
total revenue per capita of each state is also expected to have a statistically significant
impact on education expenditure per capita, given the superior capacity of states with
higher tax revenue to spend on public goods. Although the increase on expenditure in
education per capita associated with the new state revenues is highly probable, the change
is statically inconsequential according to model 2, especially when racial variables are
considered. The results for the association between race and educational spending are
also affected in their 10% statistical significance level using this control. However, I
consider that this limitation in the quantitative result could plausibly be the result of an
analysis with a small sample size (20 observations). In order to examine this result in
22
detail, I will explore possible implications of a substantive relationship on my
explanatory variables considering that this relationship can still be analyzed taking into
account the patterns of the standard errors of the models. I illustrate this connection
subsequently in the analysis of the figure 1, and in the analysis of the interactive effect of
race on different sets of states organized graphically in figures 2 and 3.
Model 3 also expects that coffee plantations would increase expenditure on
education per capita, a very central conclusion of the literature. The dummy variable on
major coffee economies kept the coefficient in the expected direction, but with
considerable statistical error.
This result means that the expected influence of the expansion of the coffee
export revenues in new agriculture frontiers did not affect the expenditure on education
per capita uniformly. Consequently, a very important consequence is the rejection of the
direct association between an increase on the expenditure on elementary education per
capita to the revenues from the coffee exports. Model 3 also shows how the important
correlation between the share of immigrants of each state and the presence of coffee
plantations has affected the statistical significance of both covariates and in the
explanatory power of the share of immigrants.
The important result of model 3 is the statistical significant effect that any
increase in the share of African descendants represents in diminishing the expenditure on
education per capita. The corresponding decrease on elementary education expenditure
was 2.5% lower when the share of Afro Brazilians increases. Model 3 also rejected one
of the rival hypothesis analyzed by Engerman and Sokoloff (2000) about the effect of
voting on schooling. According to model 3, the increment in the number of voters did not
23
have statistical significance for the expenditure on educational resources in the Brazilian
case.
In the analysis of the model with more explanatory power, model 4, the African
descendants’ share accounts for statistical significant differences on educational
expenditures when several other factors were controlled. Every increase in the percent of
the African descent population has a statistically significant negative effect on the percent
invested in education per capita. However, the magnitude of the effect does not seem
very powerful considering the log units as the source of interpretation of the analysis.
That is, 2.2% less spending on elementary education per capita for each increase on the
share of African Descendants in the population is a very modest impact. The
interpretation of the coefficient in log units has advantages and disadvantages in this case.
The disadvantage is the impossibility of the interpretation on changes in units of
expenditure per capita in monetary terms. But the advantage seems to be more
substantive in comparative terms. In contrast, immigrants can receive on average 5%
more education expenditures per capita from the states where they were settled. These
differences in comparative terms with African descendants can be translated into
substantial differences in percentage of educational expenditure, with nearly twice the
revenues spent in white immigrants compared to Afro Brazilians (5% and 2.2%,
respectively). As a matter of fact, the increase of Afro-Brazilians in the population is
likely to decrease the expenditures on education per capita as predicted, and this impact is
more substantive in comparison with the opposite pattern observed for the share of white
European immigrants.
24
TABLE 1. Effect of Race on State’s Expenditure on Elementary Education Per Capita (Ordinary Least Squares Estimates) ===================================================================== (1) (2) (3) (4) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(Intercept) 0.945 -0.395 0.608 -0.173 (0.533) (0.893) (0.933) (1.071) %ForeignEuropean 7.511* 5.583 4.142 3.856 (3.077) (3.080) (4.100) (3.991) %AfricanDescendant -2.420* -1.663 -2.502* -2.211* (0.862) (0.911) (0.996) (0.991) log(AvgRevCap) 0.472 (0.261) Coffee 0.514 0.453 (0.486) (0.474) sharevoters 10.618 10.321 (13.896) (13.508) exp_edu.totalexp1901.25 5.637 (4.113)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- R-squared 0.551 0.628 0.631 0.674 adj. R-squared 0.499 0.558 0.532 0.558 sigma 0.594 0.558 0.573 0.557 F 10.444 8.990 6.407 5.801 p 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004 Log-likelihood -16.330 -14.465 -14.380 -13.121 Deviance 5.994 4.974 4.933 4.349 AIC 40.659 38.929 40.760 40.242 BIC 44.642 43.90 46.734 47.212 N 20 20 20 20
====================================================================== Notes: The dependent variable is estimated as ln(expenditure on education per capita). Coefficients marked with * indicate significant at 10%. Standard errors in parenthesis.
As hypothesized, the share of African descendants has affected the expenditure on
education per capita consistently on 3 of the model estimations. Although the models I
have discussed seems to be consistent about the effect of race on educational expenditure,
this analysis can be improved when I consider the differences in the general wealth of
states measured as the average revenue per capita (model 2). In order to deal with this
25
inconsistency of the statistical results, Figure 1 presents all models on the determinants of
the average expenditure on Education per capita organized graphically to explore any
consistent pattern among all models.
An alternative interpretation would be to consider the lines representing the
standard errors of the effect of the African descendants on expenditures on elementary
education suggesting a pattern whereby African-descendents in some Brazilian states,
and the immigrants on other states, mediating independently the motivations about the
Figure 1. Comparison among Models (colors): Estimated Coefficients (points) and Standard Errors (lines) from an OLS Model of Elementary Expenditure on Education per Capita (log) by the Total Expenditure on Education, Share of Voters, Coffee, Revenue per Capita, Foreign Europeans, and African Descendants, Brazil, 1890-1930
(Intercept)
AfricanDescent
ForeignEuropean
log(AvgRevCap)
Coffee
sharevoters
exp_edu.totalexp1901.25
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
−10 0 10 20 30 40Coefficient
Variable
modelName
!
!
!
!
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
26
decisions on expenditures in states with similar levels of wealth (measured as revenue per
capita).
In order to illustrate how the effect of the variation of racial differences as
determinants of expenditures on education could mediate the association between wealth
and expenditures, I classify two sets of states based on the average revenue per capita. I
suggest that this strategy can be a form to isolate the intervenient effect of race on
different levels of wealth, and possibly to reveal patterns of substantive trends that were
restricted by the sample size limitations. I classify randomly the first quartile of the
distribution of total average revenues per capita in the period as representing wealth
states. All other states were classified as poor. I do not consider this classification
appropriate theoretically, but instrumental for a comparison between sets of states in
different positions of the distribution of tax and exports revenues. I assume this
classification useful to evaluate to which extent the association between race and
education provision has an independent impact on different groups of states.
Figures 2 and 3 plot the main model of interest with an interaction between race
and a dummy variable dividing wealthy and poor states. Once more, I classify as
“wealthy” states of the first quartile of the distribution of the average fiscal revenue per
capita.
Figure 2 graphs the estimated effect of race (measured as the % African
descendants and the % of white European immigrants) on the propensity to spend on
elementary education in wealthy states. Not only the increase on the share of European
settlers in the population of a wealthy state has the positive effect on the expenditure on
elementary education, but also the variation on the share of African descendants on rich
27
states decreases the likelihood to spend more on elementary education. Although one
could expect that racial biases could be dissipated in wealthy states, such bias tends to be
constant even in states with more revenue to spend on education.
Figure 2. Effect of Race on Expenditure in Education per Capita in Wealthy States
%White European Immigrant %African Descent
The same association is also constant in the comparison among states classified as
poor. Even though they received much less European immigrants, in figure 3 the pattern
also continue suggesting the association between race and expenditure on elementary
education per capita.
ForeignEuropean*WealthyState effect plot
ForeignEuropean
log(exp_edu_capta1901.25)
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
WealthyState WealthyState
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
WealthyState WealthyState
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
WealthyState
WealthyState
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
WealthyState WealthyState
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
WealthyState
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
WealthyState
ForeignEuropean*WealthyState effect plot
ForeignEuropean
log(exp_edu_capta1901.25)
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
WealthyState WealthyState
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
WealthyState WealthyState
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
WealthyState
WealthyState
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
WealthyState WealthyState
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
WealthyState
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
WealthyState
AfricanDescent*WealthyState effect plot
AfricanDescent
log(exp_edu_capta1901.25)
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
WealthyState WealthyState
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
WealthyState WealthyState
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
WealthyState
WealthyState
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
WealthyState WealthyState
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
WealthyState
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
WealthyState
AfricanDescent*WealthyState effect plot
AfricanDescent
log(exp_edu_capta1901.25)
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
WealthyState WealthyState
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
WealthyState WealthyState
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
WealthyState
WealthyState
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
WealthyState WealthyState
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
WealthyState
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
WealthyState
28
Figure 3. Effect of Race on Expenditure in Education per Capita in Poor States
%White European Immigrants %African Descent
The magnitude of the effect would need a better assessment in order to evaluate
how this difference in the variation of the investments on elementary education could
impact the provision of educational resources. But it is important to stress that the
variation on the magnitude of the log units of expenditure on education per capital reveals
a very clear pattern. In both wealthy and poor states, European immigrants were two to
three time as likely to receive more educational resources than African Descendants.
ForeignEuropean*WealthyState effect plot
ForeignEuropean
log(exp_edu_capta1901.25)
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
WealthyState WealthyState
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
WealthyState WealthyState
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
WealthyState
WealthyState
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
WealthyState WealthyState
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
WealthyState
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
WealthyState
ForeignEuropean*PoorState effect plot
ForeignEuropean
log(exp_edu_capta1901.25)
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
PoorState PoorState
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
PoorState PoorState
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
PoorState
PoorState
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
PoorState PoorState
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
PoorState
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
PoorState
AfricanDescent*PoorState effect plot
AfricanDescent
log(exp_edu_capta1901.25)
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
PoorState PoorState
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
PoorState PoorState
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
PoorState
PoorState
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
PoorState PoorState
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
PoorState
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
PoorState
29
It seems plausible to expand the hypothesis to a future study using a more
disaggregated data analysis to estimate the distribution of educational resources at local
level expenditures within municipalities.
CONCLUSION
In this study, I examine the effect of racial differences on government’s
expenditure on elementary education in Brazil. Despite racist ideologies and racial biases
among Brazilian politicians in this period to be very well documented in the
historiography (Skidmore 1974; Stepan 1991), the effect of racist political motivations on
patterns of distribution of resources in Brazil had very few studies. In fact, the objective
to promote a modern nation through the process of “whitening” the population selectively
chose and invested public funds in white European immigrants in conjunction with a set
of public policies and private investments to keep European settlers in Brazil.
Such biases on the distribution of public resources among racial groups are more
developed in the literature of racial relations in United States. The link between the
differences in human capital accumulation through education and racial inequality is very
well developed in studies comparing the North and Southern United States (Smith 1984;
Margo 1990). Racial inequality in United States provides contributions for this kind of
hypothesis and research design, where policies motivated by race had economic and
political consequences. For example, Smith (1984), Margo (1990) and Collins and Margo
(2006) show how the evolution of racial disparities were enforced by the unequal
provision of education from the emancipation of afro-Americans in the post-Civil War,
30
and considering the potential legacy of racial policies for human capital accumulation.
Much less is known about Brazil and other Latin American countries, which also had
specific policies associated with race (Sawyer 2004; Telles 2005).
The economic growth associated with the coffee economy period have indeed
expanded opportunities for upward mobility in Brazil through education, but the analysis
shows that the distribution of these opportunities disproportionately affected the
opportunities for Afro-Brazilians. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that this
occurred despite substantial increases in the total revenues spent on education. Data of
posterior periods enforces the paper main findings. In 1950 only 48,000 Afro-Brazilians
(out of a total black and mixed population of 16.5 million) had graduated from high
school, and only 4,000 from college. This was a level of educational achievement
considerably lower compared to the white population. One way to examine this
association is to look at the education accomplishments of two cohorts, those who were
6-10 years old in 1920 and those who were of the same age in 1930, using data from the
Brazilian census of 1960 compiled by Martínez-Fritcher et al (2012). The difference in
the educational attainment of afro-Brazilians compared to whites is around twice higher
in the latter group. The percentage of people who never attended school is closer to 80%
in the black and mixed race group, versus 50% for whites.
Given the contemporary difference between blacks and whites on levels of human
development of the Brazilian population, the public debate about specific policies for the
Black population has been very controversial. However, less is known about how this
historical gap between Blacks and Whites can be associated with the differences on the
distribution of public resources across regions.
31
Overall, education could be also an important source of political patronage for
immigrants and provided most of the human capital for the new labor necessities of the
country’s industrialization. The economic interest for a new labor provision after the end
of the slavery, and the political interest for the maintenance of the power led to the
perverse combination of more educational resources for European immigrants, and less
educational spending for the citizens freed after the end of slavery.
The main implication of the initial distributive strategy of elementary education
could have impacted current levels of educational inequality in the contemporary Brazil. I
think this project can be improved in order to explain the accumulated gap in terms of
educational achievement of different ethnic groups, and states, based on the political
decision to provide education for European immigrants, and the denial of elementary
education for the original population formed by the African descendants of Brazil in the
early XX century. The effort to transform Brazil into a white, European society into the
tropics had perverse effect for the social and economic conditions of the Afro-Brazilian
population. In so doing, I think the next step in the research is to reopen the question of
the path of Brazil's development emphasizing the role played by the racial character of its
inequality.
32
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Sawyer, Mark Q., Racial politics in post-revolutionary Cuba. Cambridge University Press Schwarcz, Lilia Moritz. 1993. O Especutáculo das Raças: Cientistas Instituições e Questão Racial no Brasil, 1870-1930. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras. Smith (1984) "Race and Human Capital," American Economic Review, September 1984, 74, 865-98. Skidmore, Thomas, 1974. Black into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought. Duke University Press. Stepan, Nancy, 1991. The Hour of Eugenics: Race, Class and Nation in Latin America. Cornell University Press Summerhill, William R., “Colonial Institutions, Slavery, Inequality, and Development: Evidence from São Paulo, Brazil,” MPRA Paper, No. 22162, 2010 Tannenbaum, 1947. Slave and Citizen: The Negro in The Americas, New York. Telles, Edward. Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. Toplin, Robert Brent, 1940- Slavery and race relations in Latin America. Edited with an introd. by Robert Brent Toplin. Wenegast, Tim. "Cana, Cafe, and Cacau: Agrarian Structure and Educational Inequalities in Brazil." Revista de Historia Economica 28, no. 1 (2010): 103-137. Weyland, Kurt. 2002. The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies: Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
36
APPENDIX Data Sources: Variable Definition Source Expenditure on Education Per Capita
Brazil: Expenditures per children estimated using the average total expenditures on education by state for 1914-1915 (except for the Distrito Federal for which we used the expenditure data for 1906) divided over our estimates of population in school age. Data for expenditures comes from Brazil (1926) and from Wileman (1909). Data for Brazil assumes that half of the federal budget was spent on elementary education in the Federal District.
Martinez-Fritscher, Musacchio and Viarengo (2010) 1872, 1890, 1900 and 1920 from Brazil (1923); 1940 from Brazil (1950)
Population 1872 1872, 1890, 1900 and 1920 from Brazil (1923); 1940 from Brazil (1950) Population Census
Race and Foreign Population Levy (1974) for 1872-1970; IBGE (2010, Banco de Dados Agregado – SIDRA. http://www.sidra.ibge.gov.br/) for 2000 figures.
Voters Brazil (1913) and ipeadata.com
Dummy Coffee Bruhn and Gallego (2007), Wenegast (2010)
Education Expenditure and Export Tax Revenue
Willeman (1909) and Brazil (1926), data for the 1880s from Brazil (1887)
State Public Revenue For data before 1897, we use Brazil (1914). For data from 1897 to 1939, see AEB V (1939/40).
37
Table 1a: Average Years Of Schooling across Racial Groups– Census Data
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970
Blacks
Whites
38
Figure 1a. Map of Brazil with the State Borders that prevailed from 1891-1930
Note: The territory of Acre became a state in 1903.
39
MAP 1: Variation of the Racial Heterogeneity of the Brazilian Population according to the Percent of Blacks and Mixed with Blacks in each Municipality.
Source: Census of 2009, elaborated by the Government center of Statistics.
40
Table 1b: Year of Approval and Subsidies to White European Immigrant
Settlement in Brazil
Policy/Law 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920
Exclusive
White settlers
State Policy
State Policy
Law Law Law Inclusion of Asians
Transportation Private Funds
State Taxes
Law taxing slaves
Public funds and
tax incentives
Public funds and
tax incentives
Public funds and
tax incentives
Food and
Lodge
Private Funding
Private Funding
Public funds and
tax incentives
Public funds and
tax incentives
Public funds and
tax incentives
Public funds and
tax incentives
Housing Private Funding
Private Funding
Private funding and tax
incentives
Private funding and tax
incentives
Private funding and tax
incentives
Private funding and tax
incentives Work
Contract
Law Law Law Law Law Law
Familiar Land
Distribution
State Policy
State Policy
State Policy and
Law
State Policy and
Law
State Policy
and Law
State Policy
and Law
Education
(Portuguese
literacy)
Private Funding
Private Funding
Public funds
Public funds
Public funds
Public funds
* Author’s elaboration. Source Hall (1969) and Holloway (1974)
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