Zina (Adultery) Under Islamic Law in Nigeria:The Gender Issues in Amina Lawal’s Case

Aminu Adamu Bello

IntroductionSeveral Women non-governmental organizations wereinvolved in the defence of Amina Lawal in her Zina(adultery) trial. After her acquittal, it appeared thatthere was unanimity in the conclusion that women andwomen organizations have acquired significant knowledgeof Islam and, supposedly, Islamic law, to marshalappreciable arsenal in the defence of women living underShari’a or Islamic law. This is interesting, not just forthe fact that there is a supposition that hithertoknowledge of Shari’a or Islamic law was the privilegeddomain of men alone, but that there existed theperception that aspects of Shari’a or Islamic law werebiased and prejudiced against women. It would seemseveral women organizations believe that Shari’s is antiwomen because the laws were made by men.

The amount of literature now available advancing thisposition is staggering, with most of them coming fromestablished local and international NGOs. As civilsociety organizations, the NGOs have added their weightto the discussion on the perceived Shari’a gender-biasagainst women and are championing a crusade to ensurethat women are given adequate protection under the newShari’a criminal justice system.

The involvement of the NGOs in highlighting the gendersensitive elements in the Shari’a (subsequently, Islamiclaw)1 in Nigeria only serve to confirm their role as a Faculty of Law, University of Abuja1 In this paper, the term Islamic law will be used to refer to theKatsina State Shari’a Penal Code in spite of what it calls itself. Thisis because this writer believes that the contents of the Code do not

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part of society that has a life of its own, which isdistinct from the state and fairly autonomous from it,2

thus enabling them to influence and affect publicattitudes towards an issue. It is because of this thatany observation emanating from civil societyorganizations is being taken seriously. On the issue ofthe adultery cases decided by Shari’a courts in Nigeria,civil society organizations have acquired front seats andare generating critical material, including advocatingstrongly that the legislature should hasten the processof repealing all laws, including religiously-inspiredlaws that discriminate against women.

Hauwa Ibrahim, a counsel in the defence team of AminaLawal is one such source of material. It is not only fromher defence pleadings (?) that it is apparent that onecould conclude that she considered her work as a genderspecific assignment,3 her published reflections afterAmina’s acquittal also show how much pressure she saidshe was under while challenging what she has come to beseen as gender bias in the adjudication of sexualoffences under Islamic law.4

represent the totality of Shari’a principles but aspects of the Malikijurisprudence especially since ‘the outcome of the enactment andenforcement of [Shari’a] principles by state institutions is always amatter of secular law and not of Shari’a as the religious normativesystem of Islam.’ See generally Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, ‘Shari’a inthe Secular State: A Paradox of Separation and Conflation’ in PeriBearman, Wolfhart Heinrichs and Bernard G. Weiss eds., The Law Applied:Contextualizing the Islamic Shari’a, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., London, 2008,p.3222 Ibrahim, Jibrin, ‘Democracy and Minority Rights in Nigeria:Religion, Shari’a and the 1999 Constitution’, Paper for theConference on “Globalisation, State Capacity and Self-Determinationin Muslim Context’, organized by the Centre for Global Internationaland Regional Studies, University of California-Santa Cruz, SantaCruz, 7th to 10th March 20023 Ibrahim, Hauwa and Lyman, Princeton N., ‘Reflections on the NewShari’a Law in Nigeria’ Africa Policy Studies Program at the Councilon Foreign Relations, American University Washington College of Law,2004 4 Ibid

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In line probably with the thinking within some Non-Governmental Organisations, (NGO), Hauwa had come to seeher presence in the Amina Lawal case as championing acourse other than that of a counsel defending a client.In the material chronicling her supposed travails as afemale counsel before an Islamic Shari’a court, Hauwa saidshe had to continuously think of the client as a peasantwoman and accordingly psych herself up to defend thewoman from a gender-biased criminal justice system5. Whilethis may be an inference from some material on the issue,6

and may not be sufficient grounds to justify any form ofgeneralization, it nonetheless provides sufficientgrounds to warrant some reflections on the amount ofgender-centric material which the Amina Lawal casegenerated.

Perhaps it is instructive that one of the references withdirect bearing on perceived gender bias in the AminaLawal’s case is the discharge of Amina’s accomplice inthe alleged crime with nothing other than a chance forhim to accuse Amina of impugning his integrity. Given theevidential rules required for conviction in the crime ofadultery adopted by Katsina State and encoded in theState Shari’a Penal Code, four people must give evidencesupporting the prosecution’s case or, according to Malikijurisprudence, the pregnancy of a woman will prima facie,and subject to some exceptions, provide the ground forproof and possible conviction. That Amina’s accomplice

5 Ibid: This position has since been refuted by the lead Counsel inthe two celebrated adultery cases in Nigeria to date. See, Yawuri,A.M., ‘On Defending Safiyatu Hussaini and Amina Lawal’ in PhilipOstien et al, (eds.), Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria: A Sourcebook,Vol. IV, pp.129-1396 Ibid, Also, translation(s) of Safiya Hussaini v. The State, in PhilipOstien et al, (eds.), Shari’a Implementation in Northern Nigeria: A Sourcebook,Vol. V, pp.32-51: also Amina Lawal v. The State, in Philip Ostien et al,(eds.), Shari’a Implementation in Northern Nigeria: A Sourcebook, Vol. V, pp.52-107

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maintained that he never made a confession meant thatAmina could have been charged for defaming him (qadhf).This position irks women rights activists and hasremained a sour point that continues to provide reasonsfor complaints about the treatment of women by Islamiclaw. While feminist issues have been alive and activewithin civil society organizations in Nigeria for quitesome time, the new Shari’a Penal Codes have, evidently,produced such heightened public involvement that theNigerian Civil Society organizations are nowsignificantly influencing the direction of the discoursein pursuance of women emancipation.7

It may bear clarifying that the provisions of someNigerian statutes providing for criminal liability in thejurisdiction have not been perceived as biased againstwomen, probably because none has so far been challengedas discriminating.8 Even so, existing customary laws havebeen giving women and women organizations concern suchthat they have continuously fought for changes in theones perceived as bad laws.

The statues establishing criminal liabilities in Nigeria,the Criminal Code and the Penal Code, did not include theapplication of customary law in criminal cases. TheNigerian Criminal Code provides that ‘no person shall betried or punished in any court in Nigeria for an offenceexcept under express provisions of the code or of some Act orLaw which is in force in, or forms part of law of Nigeria9 (emphasisadded). The Penal Code10 also provides at s.3 (2) that

7 Cf. BOABAB, WOCOL etc8 This paper will not engage in any arguments relating to someprovisions of the Nigerian Criminal Code (s.353 Indecent Assault) andthe Penal Code (s.55 allowing wife beating) on whether they arediscriminatory against women or not. 9 Section 4, Criminal Code Act10 Applicable in the Northern Nigeria states with predominant muslimpopulations

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‘after the commencement of this law no person shall beliable to punishment under native law and custom’11 forwhich purpose Islamic law had been treated as customarylaw. Until recently therefore, the Nigerian legal systemwas not concerned with determination of criminal cases innative or area courts. In the case of Alkamawa v Bello,12 theSupreme Court, per Wali, JSC, held, obiter, that Islamiclaw is ‘a complete system of universal law more certainand permanent and more universal than the English CommonLaw.’13 It would seem, probably, that along with theallowances made in the 1999 Constitution, the Alkamawacase set the stage for serious consideration of enactmentof criminal law statutes that would check perceived vicesand immorality. This has enabled some states in Nigeria,including Katsina State where Amina’s zina ordealtranspired, to ‘expanded the application of the Shari’alegal system’14 to include criminal law provisions, thusclearly justifying ‘the intimate authority in thepeople ... to decide whether a particular mode ofpunishment is acceptable within their respectiveborders.’15 11 The Penal Code Law is the source from which most of the elevenstates which have established Sharia legal system deviated andavailed themselves of the provisions of s.6(2) and s.6(5)(k) of the1999 Constitution. Section 6(2) states: ‘The Judicial powers of astate shall be vested in the courts to which this section relates,being courts established, subject as provided by this Constitution,for a State’ while the courts to which this section apply include atsection 6(5) (k) ‘such other courts as may be authorized by law toexercise jurisdiction at first instance or on appeal on matters withrespect to which a House of Assembly may make laws. Somehow, RuudPeters takes exception to a situation in Nigeria where, in exerciseof constitutional powers, states create courts and rules of evidence.He observes that Evidence is a federal matter and since Sharia hasimplicit laws as to evidence, there is a conflict with theconstitution, see Islamic Criminal Law in Nigeria,12 (1998) 8 NWLR (Pt. 56.561)13 Ibid, 17314 Ladan, M.T. Introduction to Jurisprudence, Classical and Islamic, MalthousePress Limited, 2006, p.28515 Zydney Mannheimer, Michael J., When the Federal Death Penalty is “Cruel andUnusual”, University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 74, (2006) 821

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In our present discussion, we will not be seekingjustification for the penalty of zina outside theparticular statute, (the Katsina State Shari’a Penal CodeLaw) because, whatever is said for or against thecodification of the hudood in Katsina State, it is todaythe law that governs criminal adjudication in the statein respect of all those who profess the Islamic faith andevery other person who may willingly submit to thejurisdiction of the Shari’a Courts in the state. It is onlywithin the Shari’a Penal Code that prosecution and defencemust marshal ammunition for their respective positions.It will therefore serve no purpose to venture intoseeking justification for the enforcement of hudood aspositive law in Katsina State. What this paper intends todo is look at the law and respond to the claim that thehudood provisions in the Katsina State Shari’a Penal Codehave singled out women for oppression. This is thereforea response to suggestions that Islamic law oppresseswomen. This paper will look at the gender issues whichcommentaries on the trial of the Amina Lawal’s adulterycase have highlighted. It will discuss facts that weredisclosed in the charge against Amina Lawal before theShari’a Court. This will include what the Katsina Shari’aPenal Code Law describes constitutes the offence ofadultery and if this is capable of interpretation asdiscriminatory. It will also review the process oflitigation and level of access to justice that manifestedthroughout the trial of Amina Lawal while also trying toisolate areas that could lend themselves tointerpretation as gender biased against women. It willalso argue that the perceived discrimination of women byIslamic law does not exist within the parameters ofIslamic criminal law but essentially, and for arguablygood reasons, resides within the province of Islamic

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personal (civil) law, especially the Islamic law ofinheritance. To import personal law argument intocriminal law would appear to be a non-issue in as much asIslamic criminal law has made categorical and specificprovisions to deal with identified crimes, criminalactivity and criminals.

A. The Case against Amina Lawal16

Amina Lawal was arrested, along with an accomplice, oneYahayya Mohammed, in Kurami, a village in Katsina Statein Northern Nigeria.17 They were both arraigned before theShari’a Court Bakori, for the crime of adultery. The casewas first heard on the 15th of January 2002. PoliceProsecutor, Corporal Idris Adamu of the Nigeria PoliceCommand, on behalf of the Katsina State Commissioner ofPolice, prosecuted.

Amina Lawal and Yahayya Mohammed were charged jointly, itwould seem, with continuously committing the offence ofzina from the time their courtship began, that is abouteleven months ago, and continuing up until quite

recently18 as a result of which the 1st accused, AminaLawal, became pregnant and eventually gave birth to ababy girl.

Prosecution had led evidence to prove that Amina Lawalwas a Muslim woman who was previously married but nowdivorced. That at the time of arrest, she had confessedto having had illegal sexual intercourse with a man,identified as one Yahayya, which could have resulted in her

16 Amina Lawal v. The State, KTS/SCA/FT/86/2002, supra note 617 Ojeih, Francis E. ‘AMINA LAWAL – Nigerian Constitution and Sharialegal system: A battle for Supremacy?’, in M.M. Gidado, C.U. Anyanwuand A.O. Adekunle (eds.), CONSTITUTIONAL ESSAYS [Nigeria Beyond 1999:Stabilizing the Polity through Constitutional Re-engineering] In Honourof Bola Ige, 2004, Chenglo Limited, Enugu, pp.305-31418 The exact wordings in the translation of the Record of Proceedingsin Ostien, et al, (eds.), Op. Cit., note 6

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pregnancy. On the evidence of the birth of her baby, AminaLawal was charged with the offence of adultery, contraryto the provision of the Katsina State Shari’a Penal CodeLaw19 which defined the crime of adultery (zina), asfollows:

Whoever, being a man or a woman fullyresponsible, has sexual intercourse through thegenital of a person over whom he has no sexualrights and in circumstances in which no doubtexists as to the illegality of the act, isguilty of the offence of zina.20

During the trial, Amina reportedly confessed tocommitting adultery with her accomplice, Yahayya. Theaccomplice said he did not commit adultery with her. Thecourt discharged and acquitted Yahayya and proceeded toconvict Amina upon the circumstantial evidence of herpregnancy and the birth of a child outside legalmarriage.

There is a prevailing misunderstanding that an unmarriedwoman, including divorced women should not be chargedwith adultery in the first place.21 This presumptionappears to be predicated on the feeling that since sexualactivity is a perfectly healthy and normal humanactivity, there is no rational basis for criminalisingthe act, especially where the alleged criminal hasalready acquired a taste for the act. This taste, theargument would continue, having been imbibed as it were,within legal marital relationship and that just becausethe marriage has broken down, the estranged spouse(s)should not be burdened by any feeling of guilt. Thisargument is inconsistent with Islamic law.

19 Katsina State Sharia Penal Code Law No. 2 of 200120 Ibid, Section 12421 Ojeih, F. E. Op. Cit., note 17, p.313

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All schools of Islamic jurisprudence qualify extra-marital sexual relations resulting in intercourse aseither fornication or zina. Though both are implied in theQur’anic proscription,22 hadith law establishes adistinction between illegal sexual activities of amarried person from that of an unmarried person. It is inthe evidential rules for proof of the offence and whetherthe penalty upon conviction are appropriate, just andfair that scholars of the various Schools of Islamic lawand even scholars within the same School of Islamic lawhave continued to engage. For this paper, all referencesto Islamic law will maintain the position of the MalikiIslamic law jurisprudence.

Three issues are pertinent for our discussion of genderbias in the Amina Lawal case. One, the insistence andpredication of prosecution on the evidence of pregnancyas proof of zina; two, the absence of an accomplice in acharge of zina due to an initial discharge of the co-accused, and three, the presumption that women are deniedaccess to justice under Islamic law.

B. Proof of adultery and the inadmissibility ofconsensual sex as a defence

The three general means of proof of zina are confession,evidence of four unimpeachable (male) eye witnesses andmanifestation of pregnancy in the unmarried woman. Forproof by confession to lead to conviction and theapplication of the hadd punishment, the person confessingmust be an adult and in full and complete mental health.In this situation, one confession (Iqrar) is oftensufficient to convict23 but the confessor may be persuaded

22 Qur’an 17:3223 Sanusi, S. L., ‘The Hudood Punishment in Northern Nigeria: A MuslimCriticism’, available at www.uga.edu/islam/sanusi.htm p.6, citing IbnQudamah, Al-Mughmi, Vol. 10, esp. pp.191 ff; Al-Jazairi, Kitabul fiqh ala ‘l-Madhahib al-Arba’, Vol 5 75, 94 and passim; M. Abu Hassaan, Ahkam al-Jareemah wa ‘l-Uqoobah fi ‘l-Shariah al-Islamiyyah 255-257; Ibn Hazm, Al-Muhalla,

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to retract such confession in any way whatsoever(mutlaqan) or even run away during implementation of thehadd punishment.24 Retraction of the confession isacceptable on its own and will lead to acquittal, butsome Maliki scholars and jurists have maintained that forthe retraction to avail a defendant, it must beaccompanied with some defensive plea of what amounts tosome doubt, justification or defence (shubhah).25 Malik isreported to have said:

As for him who confesses committing fornicationand then says, I didn’t do so, and said it wasfor so and so reasons, that it’ll be acceptedfrom him and he won’t be punished because thispunishment is for Allah, it can’t be donewithout either clear proof on whosoever does soor by his confession. If he confesses, he’d bepunished.26

Four unimpeachable male witnesses that saw the res–in–resare required for proof of zina by evidence.27 Evidence maybe taken jointly or severally on condition that the timespent in between the testimonies is short.28 This fourwitness rule is claimed to have been imposed throughdivine revelation to require the strongest possibledirect evidence before any allegations might be madeagainst a woman’s chastity.29

Vol II, 155-157 24 Ibid25 Uthman, M.B., ‘Protecting the Rights of Accused Persons through the Proper Implementation of the Shari’a Procedural Guarantees in Northern Nigeria’, in Joy Ngozi Ezeilo, Muhammed Tawfiq Ladan, AbiolaAfolabi-Akiyode (eds.) Shari’a Implementation in Nigeria Issues & Challenges on Women’s Rights And Access to Justice, Women’s Aid Collective (WACOL), 2003, p.18626 Al-Muwatta’ (The Approved), supra note 100, hadith no. (1563) 1427 Uthman, M.B., Op. Cit., note 25, p.18628 Ibid 29 Shah, Nik Noriani Nik Badli, ‘Man Made Codifications of Hudud Law’,Sisters in Islam, Kaula Lumpur, 2002, online at http://www.sistersinislam

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The manifestation of pregnancy in an unmarried womanresident in the jurisdiction constitutes sufficientground to accuse a woman of zina. Her silence about herstate of pregnancy until it is discovered supports theestablishment of a prima-facie case against her.30 In thecase of a woman who is divorced or whose husband has diedand is found to be pregnant or has a child without firstremarrying, Maliki law holds that such pregnancy or childbelongs to the former or dead husband. The former husbandmay however repudiate the pregnancy or child throughLi’an.31 This Maliki position is espoused as follows:

And if she [the widow or divorced woman] givesbirth to a child after (the waiting period)before expiry of the maximum gestation forpregnancy it is attached to the (former/dead)husband unless the husband (if alive) rejectsit with the oath of Li’an.32

From the above, it is obvious that where a divorcee or awidow has a child within the maximum gestation the childbelongs automatically to the previous husband unless heis willing to go through the process of Li’an.33 The womanwill avert the hadd of zina if she makes a counter oath ofLi’an.34

30 Ibid, citing al-Tasuliy, (n.d.) al-Bahjah Fi Sharh al Tuhufah, A.A al-sa’ud & Uthman al-Tayyib, Kano, Vol. II, p.35731 Sanusi, L.S., Op. Cit., note 2332 Ibid, citing Muhammad Ulaysh, Minah al-Jaleel, Sharh ‘ala Mukhtasar SayidKhaleel, 4:30733 Li’an is a process in which a husband takes an oath before a courtfour (4) times, each time swearing by Allah that his wife is guiltyof zina. He completes the oath by saying: “Allah’s curse be upon me ifI am a liar in my accusation of zina against my wife” (he is expectedto name her). 34 The woman also swears four times with her own conclusion like this:“Allah’s wrath be upon me if he is truthful in his accusation of zinaagainst me.”

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It will be a defence to a charge of zina however if thewoman is able to prove that the pregnancy was not due toconsensual sex outside marriage. One way to do this is toclaim that she was raped. According to Imam Malik:

The established practice with us concerning thewoman that is found to be pregnant and withouthusband, who claims that ‘I was raped’ or ‘Igot married’ is that these defences will not beadmissible and the hadd penalty will be appliedupon her except she can advance evidence tosupport her claim of marriage or rape such asher turning up bleeding if she is a virgin, orscreaming until she is found defiled, orsimilar corroborative evidence that establishesher claim of her defilement.35

Thus, Malik has acknowledged the possibility thatpregnancy can result from an unwilling sexual act and hasestablished a number of safeguards that aim to assurethat no innocent party is convicted unjustly, theprincipal safeguard of which is physical evidence asundeniable proof of rape.36 Other safeguards are thetimeframe within which the matter is reported.37 Also, thecharacter of the alleged rapist,38 and that of the womanmaking the allegation become points at issue.39 In theevent, for instance, that the man alleged to havecommitted the rape is seen by witnesses making away withthe woman until she is found defiled, this is a different

35 Uthman, M. B., Op. Cit., note 25, p. 187, citing Abdul-Baqi, M.F.(n.d.) al-Muwatta li Imamil A’immati Malik bin Anas (R.A), Maktabah Anas binMalik p. 64736 Al-Zurqaani, Hashiyat Al-Zurqani Ala Muwatta’ Al Imam Malik, Beirut, Dar Al-Ma’rifah, 1989, Vol. 4, p.150. 37 Uthman, M. B., Op. Cit., note 25, p.187, citing Ibn Rushd, BidayatulMujtahid wa Nihayatul Muqatsid, Vol I, pp.353-354 38 Ibid, p.188, citing Ibn Juzay, al-Qawanin al-Fiqhiyya; Tasuliy, Bahjah,Vol II, p.35639 Ibid, citing Al-Tasuliy, Bahjah, Vol II, p.356

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case altogether40 and a presumption is established tosupport the woman’s plea of rape.

The issue of extra-marital consensual sex is completelynon-existent in Islam so that any argument that extra-marital sex could be consensual will not be a defence ina charge of zina. The Qur’anic injunction which says: ‘Norcome nigh to adultery: For it is a shameful (deed) And anevil, opening the road (To other evils)’41 makes a simpleand categorical prohibition

Under the Nigerian Criminal Code, adultery is not seen asa crime42 but can be pleaded in support of a petition fordivorce43 where the court is compelled to take notice ifthere is any form of condonation of adultery by thespouse pleading it as a ground,44 which condonation mayvitiate and defeat the petition, according to thediscretion of the court.45 It would appear that thisattitude to adultery has been formed based on the conceptof consensual sex. This concept maintains that thelegitimacy of sex flows from mutual consent, not from anyformal status. It rejects the traditional definition oflawful sex, which presupposes a marital bond.46 The

40 Ibid, p.18941 Qur’an 17:32, Abdullah Yusuf Ali (trans.), Amana Corp., 198342 Aoko v Fagbemi & other, (1961) 1 N.L.R. p400, (the accused was charged,tried and convicted for adultery. On appeal, his conviction wasquashed because the offence of adultery is not defined and penalizedunder the Nigeria Criminal Code Act).43 S. 28(a), Matrimonial Causes Act 197044 Tinubu v Tinubu [1959] WNLR 316; Craig v Craig (1962) 16 NLR 10345 Onwudiwe v Onwudiwe [1957] WRNLR 98, where the court refused toexercise its discretion because of failure to file discretionarystatements46 Khan, Ali, ‘Hermeneutics of Sexual Order’, Santa Clara Law Review, Vol.31, 1990, p.84 also available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=979394 (Khan advances the argument that ‘marriage dwells upon an historically ingrained precept that genital sex is legitimate within a socially contracted relationship. Through the ritual of marriage, genital sex acquires a new meaning: it becomes marital sex: a new reality, a new symbol, which represents a

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principle dismantles the moral boundary between maritaland premarital sex, between marriage and cohabitation.47

Under Islamic law, it is only the genital sex within amarital relationship that is legitimate and not subjectto any form of sanction.

C. Penalty for Adultery under Maliki Law/KatsinaShari’a Penal Code Law

It has already been observed that to assume simply thatbecause of the nomenclature or title Shari’a or Shari’a PenalLaw, the content of such enactment represents Shari’a isactually deceptive. This is because codificationrealistically obviates the principles of Shari’a as thereligious normative system of Islam. For this samereason, this paper has maintained all references to thelaw as Islamic law and not Shari’a. So, it is safe, for thepresent purpose, to continue on the understanding thatthe provisions in the Katsina State Shari’a Penal Code Lawrepresent only an aspect of Shari’a as espoused by aparticular jurisprudential school, in this case, theMaliki Islamic Law Jurisprudence. This singulardistinction would validly put paid to and indeed negateany claim to the validity of making different choiceswithin the diversity of the variously acceptedinterpretations of the shari’a, unless indeed the varyinginterpretations are those obtainable within the Malikimadhab.

In Nigeria, it is only the interpretation of Islamic lawper Maliki jurisprudence that is tenable at law whichwould seem to agree with the assertion that ‘what isassumed to be Muslim in one community may be unknown oreven be considered un-Islamic, in other Muslimcommunities,’48 a position that will also effectivelybond, a commitment, a family’.)47 Ibid48 Umar, M.S., ‘Gender Issues in Application of Islamic Law inNigeria’, Aljami’ah, Vol 45, No.1, 2007 M/1428 H, p.43, citing Ayesha

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remove the discussion of the judicial processes employedin the Nigerian Shari’a Courts from any kind of comparisonwith any other outside the Katsina/Nigerian jurisdiction,except where the Maliki Law also exists and forms thebasis of that other jurisdiction’s legal framework.

The penalty for zina under Maliki Islamic law is not genderbiased. The penalty of death by stoning falls on allpersons who are either married or divorced, once they areconvicted of the crime, irrespective of gender. Unmarriedconvicts would ordinarily have been charged with thecrime of fornication and not adultery.49 It may help todefine the boundaries of adultery and fornication assexual offences under Maliki Islamic law with thefollowing two authentic Hadith.

The first reports an incident of allegedadultery/fornication during the lifetime of the Prophet(SAW) involving a young unmarried man and a marriedwoman, which incident resulted in the young man beingpunished with one hundred lashes and exile for one yearand the married woman, who confessed to adultery with theunmarried young man, being stoned to death.50 The secondahadith and perhaps the most frequently cited is

M. Imam, Mufuliat Fijabi, and Hurera Akilu-Atta, ‘Women’s Rights inMuslim Laws: A Resources Document’, BOABAB for Women’s Human Rights, Lagos,2005, p. 14 49 It is not presumed that a clear distinction exists between ‘fornication’ and ‘adultery’ in Islamic law. However, it is significant that the point is made that unmarried persons, who have not been previously married , are not given the same punishment for indulging in consensual sexual relations as those who were once married but were found to have committed the offence after the dissolution of their marriage. It is therefore the punishment that differ and apparently, the effect of extra-marital sexual relation onmarriage and the protection of progeny that elicits the direct and unequivocal punishment stipulated for persons who are either married,widowed or divorced, convicted of engaging in ‘consensual’ sexual relations. 50 SM: 3210, reproduced in Souaiaia, Ahmed E., Human Rights & Islam: TheDivine and the Mundane in Human Rights Law, iUniverse Inc, (2003) p.61

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attributed to Umar Ibn al-Khattab, RAA, who is reportedto have said ‘stoning is a duty laid down in God’s Bookfor married men and women who commit adultery when proofis established, or if there is pregnancy, or aconfession.’51

One of Professor Asifa Quraishi’s papers asks thequestions: ‘Who demands the stoning of women foradultery?’ In it, she advances the argument that Shari’aper se, as the Law of God does not demand the stoning ofwomen for adultery. She distinguishes the sources ofIslamic law and concludes that it is indeed the work ofthe jurisprudents that eventually created the penalty ofstoning for the crime of zina under Islamic law.

According to Professor Quraishi, the Qur’anic evidentiaryrules make it impossible to secure a conviction for thecrime of adultery because it was unlikely that ‘sex willtake place in front of four people who are willing totestify to it, with the risk that maybe one of the otherwitnesses might chicken out, and then the rest end upbeing lashed for making an unsubstantiated accusation.’52

She also points out that ‘in the time of the Prophet,they [the people] didn’t drag people in and prosecutethem for zina’53 especially because there was no feelingand a desire that the ‘people’s private lives—especiallywomen’s—should be closely monitored, and any sexualindiscretion should result in a criminal prosecution forconsensual extramarital sex.’54 It would appear that womenactivists are concerned that the enactment of Islamic lawcreates such a monitoring permission that curtails the

51 SM 3201, reproduced in Souaiaia, Ahmed E. note 53 supra, p.60 52 Quraishi, Asifa, ‘Who Demands the Stoning of Women?: A Descriptionof Islamic Law and Constitutionalism’ Berkeley Journal of Middle Eastern &Islamic Law, Vol. 1, pp.163-177, 2008, also available online athttp://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1140204 53 Ibid54 Ibid

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freedoms enjoyed by women. The suggestion however thatthe sentences for adultery discriminate against women,because they are more severe than the penalties for menconvicted of adultery55 does not draw from any source ofIslamic law since married men and married women convictedof the offence are liable to stoning according to Malikilaw.

D. Grounds of Amina’s acquittal The grounds upon which Amina Lawal succeeded at appealwere both substantive and procedural. Islamic lawprohibits adultery and includes it in the list of haddoffences for which there are specified penalties in theQur’an.

When the Katsina State Shari’a Court of Appeal heardAmina’s appeal, it considered several issues including(1) statutory composition of the court that tried Aminaat first instance, (2) gestation period for fertilizedembryos, (3) circumstances and method of apprehension ofalleged offender(s). Eventually, the Katsina State Shari’aCourt of Appeal discharged and acquitted Amina Lawal onthe following grounds:

(1) That one judge was present during Lawal’sinitial conviction instead of the threerequired under Islamic Law. Therefore the courtwas not properly constituted; (2) That under proper interpretation of Shari’alaw, babies can remain in gestation in amother’s womb for over five years, therebycreating the possibility that her ex-husbandcould have fathered the child; (3) That the policeman who first arrested Aminain 2002 should have been flogged because he did

55 Zuhur, Sherifa, ‘Gender, Sexuality and the Criminal Laws in theMiddle East and North Africa: A Comparative Study’, Women for Women’sHuman Rights (WWHR)-New Ways, Inonu Cad. Saadet Apt. No: 37/6Gumussuyu 4437, Istanbul, Turkey, 2005, p. 22

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so in violation of Islamic law which requiresfour witnesses to the crime.

From the foregoing, it would appear that the secondreason touched on substantive law. It states that embryoscould be in gestation for periods of up to five yearswith the consequence that a previous husband is liable toaccept paternity of a child born as a result of thispregnancy, unless he refutes by swearing the oath of li’an. This was sufficient to acquit Amina Lawal andsubstantive Maliki Islamic law would have beensatisfactorily applied and implemented.56

E. The Claim of Gender DiscriminationIslamic law has the means to safeguard justice based onits own principles, procedures,57 but this has beenchallenged, it would seem, by the assertion that theShari’a Penal Codes have been heavily stacked against womenand poor Muslims while allowing influential Muslim elitesto escape prosecution of corruption and the sternpunishment of hudood.58 What this would seem to imply isthat the various hudood cases that have been decided wereresolved in consideration of reasons that do not includeadherence to the law and due process. It is probably toemphasis this feeling that it has been claimed that:

The success of the [Amina Lawal] appeal waspartly the result of campaigns by activistconstituencies of human rights, women’s rights,democracy promotion, local and internationalnon-governmental organisations, the EuropeanUnion, embassies of Western countries in

56 Sanusi, L. S., Op. Cit., note 23 57 Von Struensee, Vanessa M.G., The Punishment of Death by Stoning for Offence ofZina (Adultery); Sharia in Nigeria and its Impact on Muslim Women, abstract athttp://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=570148, accessed13th January, 200858 Umar, M. S., Op. Cit., note 48, p. 51

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Nigeria and local and international mediacommentators.59

It is further claimed that the Amina Lawal appealsucceeded because there was pressure on the Qadis of theKatsina State Shari’a Court of Appeal to find all possibleways to discharge and acquit thereby de-escalating thetension that has been building both locally andinternationally and at the same time averting theunwanted scrutiny from hostile quarters.60 While activistswould feel comfortable with these assertions, the samegroups would have defeated their claims to improvedknowledge of Islamic law and how they collectivelypursued the defence of hapless women (including AminaLawal) charged with the offence of adultery under theShari’a Penal Codes.

Mohammed S. Umar’s analysis of gender issues in theapplication of Islamic law in Nigeria61 includes anextensive review of the effort of several civil societyorganisations in the defence of women charged withadultery under Islamic law in Nigeria. However, hisconclusion that the involvement of strategic non-governmental organizations like BAOBAB helped to improve‘religious literacy [which] can be [an] effectiveresponse to the hegemonic politics of religious revival,which seems to demand subordination of women as anecessary tenet of Islam62 only inflates claims thatindeed Islamic law oppresses women. Nowhere in his paperdid he avert his mind to the existence of female IslamicScholars of repute during and after the time of theProphet Mohammad (SAW). This line of reasoning does nothelp at all in furthering the course of education for theuneducated, especially religious education, so that the59 Ibid, pp.39-4060 Ibid, p. 5161 Ibid 62 Ibid

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application of Islamic law can be treated in all itsramifications from the point of knowledge.

In the Amina Lawal case, the issues that could bedistilled as likely to have constituted bias against heras a woman may be listed under the following headings:

1. Pregnancy of the alleged offenderIt is obvious that pregnancy can only manifest in a womanand Amina Lawal is a woman whose pregnancy was indeed thereason for her arraignment for trial before a Shari’a courtin Bakori, Katsina State in Nigeria. Ordinarily, themanifestation of pregnancy in a woman today will raise noeyebrows. Indeed, until the enactment of the Shari’a PenalCodes in Nigeria, pregnancy out of wedlock was simply amoral issue that was left to the families concerned totackle. While Islamic law equates morality with thenormative religious law, the Shari’a, it also establishedprohibitions against unlawful sex such as fornication,adultery and instituted the conventional institutions ofmarriage and family as aspects of a moral frameworkdesigned to bring order and stability to humansexuality.63

During the period in Nigerian history when the Penal Codeprovision ousted criminal jurisdiction from customarycourts,64 the Islamic law had been treated as customarylaw. Issues termed as criminal under Islamic law weretherefore not taken to court and were left in the realmof morality which the state was unwilling or unable toenforce. In the event that a Muslim man accused his wifeof adultery, there was nothing in the laws of Nigeriathat could have assisted him other than resorting todivorcing the woman, after swearing to the oath of li ‘an.The marriage would have been dissolved after the accused63 Khan, A., Op. Cit., note 46, p.50 64 Section 3(2), Penal Code Law 1960

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woman also swears to the oath of li ‘an. No prosecutionwould have ensured for any offence. However, it ispresumed that the child born as a result of any pregnancythat might have resulted will not be ascribed to theformer husband. This is also the situation when thepaternity of the pregnancy of a woman is being challengedby her husband. A pregnancy is therefore prima facieevidence that could support a charge of zina against awoman, and a woman only. A man cannot get pregnant. Hecannot be charged for zina on the evidence of a pregnancy,even where the woman claims the man is responsible. Suchclaim would introduce the issue of consent, showing thatthe woman knew what she was doing with the man and alsothat she knew that one of the consequences of theactivity was pregnancy. Where the man she accuses deniesher claim, she may be charged for qadhf even where theaccusation is of rape, i.e. absence of consent on thepart of the woman.

2. Absence of an Accomplice/Collaborator in the OffenceAmina Lawal’s purported accomplice, one Yahayya, was notcharged and prosecuted beyond the court of first instancebecause he said he did not have illegal sexualintercourse with Amina.65 The way and manner in whichYahayya was discharge and acquittal was frowned at by theKatsina State Shari’a Court of Appeal. The Bakori Shari’aCourt had only asked Yahayya to swear to an oath,supposedly, an oath of suspicion. In its reaction to theoath taking, the Katsina State Court of Appeal said that:

There is no authority that says that a personaccused of zina should take an oath in theabsence of evidence. The Shari’a Court Bakorierred when it administered the oath on YahayyaMohammed. It is wrong to administer the oath ofsuspicion in this type of case.66

65 Amina Lawal v. Katsina State, Supra note 666 Ibid p.103

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The court also emphasized that cases like the one underconsideration are proved by the evidence of fourwitnesses, confession or pregnancy and that in theabsence of any of these, the charge is not proved and theinformants or complainants shall receive punishment forqadhf. ‘Therefore it was wrong to administer an oath inthis case.’67 The Katsina State Shari’a Court of Appeal didnot however say it was wrong to have discharged andacquittal Yahayya of the charge of adultery due to lackof evidence to support a charge against him.

The main argument of those who claim that there is genderbias in the treatment of women for the offence ofadultery under the applicable Islamic law in Nigeria isthat, where pregnancy is used as a basis for theprosecution of the offence, there must in fact be thepresence of two persons, a male and a female, since thefemale who eventually becomes pregnant cannot be said tobe the single architect of her own pregnancy. This sameargument turns on its head when it is further claimedthat pregnancy alone cannot be proof of adultery becausepregnancy could result from non-consensual sex.Introducing and insisting that an accomplice/collaboratormust be charged confirms sexual activity, eitherconsensual or non-consensual. In the event that it isnon-consensual, the applicable Islamic law in Nigeriaprovides for several methods of proof including victim’sallegation that she was raped,68 or that she was deceivedinto having sex by one claiming to be her husband.69

Consensual non-marital sex constitutes adultery if sexualpartners are married, but not to each other or they wereonce married, but are now divorced; the same constitutes

67 Ibid68 Al-Zurqaani, Hashiyat Al-Zurqani Ala Muwatta’ Al Imam Malik, Beirut, Dar Al-Ma’rifah, 1989, Vol. 4, p.15069 See especially Uthman, M. B., Op. Cit., note 25, p180

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fornication where sexual partners have never beenmarried.

The absence of an accomplice/collaborator in the offenceof zina is therefore not an expression or indication ofgender bias. To insist that a person who has availedhimself of a defence under the law should have beencharged in order to sustain the zina charge against theaccused defeats the purpose of legal presumption ofinnocence. The accused has several defences, as theoutcome of the appeal which discharged her has shown, toprove that her pregnancy was not as a result ofconsensual sex, out of legal wedlock.70 That she did notplead non-consensual sex, but was still discharged andacquitted speaks volumes for a legal system that sets outto ensure the delivery of substantive and proceduraljustice.

3. The question of access to justiceVarious claims that women and the poor are at thereceiving end of the Islamic justice system because theylack the wherewithal to access justice and that ‘the zinalaws are far more difficult for uneducated and poor womento counter’71 only reflects the inherent contradictionswithin all modern legal systems. No modern legal systemhas perceptible ready-made inbuilt mechanisms that ensureall persons have equal and unfettered access to justice.To claim that such a system really exists will be furtherfrom the truth.

In all legal systems, there are established courts andthe procedures to be followed to institute and maintaincauses. Almost all judicial systems provide for an70 There is a worrisome issue that may arise however, where artificialinsemination may indeed make for a successful pregnancy in a woman. It may be sometime yet before it is known how the hadd law would handle such a situation. 71 Ibid

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education process that ensures that practitioners receivesome legal training to participate in the system. Today,legal representation is sine-quo-non to access to justice.It is presumed that only those who are knowledgeable inthe workings of the judiciary and the judicial system can‘speak’ the language of the law.72 The Islamic legalsystem admits of legal representation and indeed places aburden on the judge to guide litigants where they have nolegal advisers.

F. Observations The prosecution/respondent in the Amina Lawal zina casebuilt its case on the Qur’anic proscription of illegalextra-marital consensual sex and the codification of theoffence in the Katsina State Shari’a Penal Code Law. TheQur’an, says: ‘Nor come nigh to adultery: For it is ashameful (deed) And an evil, opening the road (To otherevils).’73

In his commentary on this verse, Abdullah Yusuf Alimaintains that:

Adultery is not only shameful and inconsistentwith any self-respect or respect for others,but it opens the road to many evils. Itdestroys the basis of the family; it worksagainst the interests of children born or to beborn; it may cause murders and feuds and lossof reputation and property, and also loosenpermanently the bonds of society. Not onlyshould it be avoided as a sin, but any approachor temptation to it should be avoided.74

Abdullah Yusuf Ali sees the act of zina as capable ofcausing:

72 See Oba, A., Legal Education73 Qur’an 17:32, Abdullah Yusuf Ali (trans.), Amana Corp., 198374 Ibid, Footnote 2215, at p.703

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1. Shame: this may not be readily acceptable incommunities where the definition of shame doesnot include repercussions for acts that aremorally wrong essentially because suchsocieties dwell on claims and counter claims asto the validity of morality as a regulator ofhuman behaviour and interactions. In societieswhere morality is a non-issue, the concept ofcriminalizing consensual sex is unheard of andfrequently vehemently challenged;75

2. Zina brings about disrespect for self and othersbecause of the intimacy involved in the act ofsexual penetration. Many relationships aredestroyed where expectations are establishedthat give the impression that a lastingintimate relationship may ensure, and suchexpectations are dashed once parties haveexperienced sexual penetration. Unfortunately,prostitution thrives where the urge is simplyto satisfy a craving or, for some femaleparticipants, to make money from male patrons;76

3. Zina may lead to other evil vices (moralmisdeeds), including acts calculated at hidingthe fact that parties are involved in sexualrelationship. In this respect, any activitythat may appear to shield sexual partners fromprying eyes (within a society with clear moralvalues that emphasize marital sex only), mayreadily be accepted as legitimate way to hidethe zina act;

4. Zina destroys the basis of the family: Theconcept of family is another issue whichcreates conflicts when consensual sex isdiscussed. This is because most concepts of thefamily presume that procreation is the onlyjustifiable reason for engaging in sexual

75 Khan, Ali, Op. Cit., note 4676 Some anti-hadd advocates have even expressed the view that poverty is responsible for some women going into prostitution in order to raise money to look after themselves and in some cases, also look after their children either from a previous marriage or born out of wedlock (as a result of zina or rape).

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penetration.77 However, this is contested,including the expressed position that sexualpenetration may and could indeed be indulged infor pleasure and nothing more. Those whoexpress this view would insist that thepleasure derived by participants does not haveto lead to conception. Also, it is possible tohave a family without an intention toprocreate, hence sexual penetration withinmarriage losses its value. Indeed marriageitself is often discountenanced;

5. Zina works against the interest of the childrenespecially when consideration of paternity andprogeny are introduced. Several countries,including Nigeria have made it illegal todiscriminate against a citizen solely on thebasis of the circumstances of his birth.78 Thisconstitutional provision has been interpretedto mean that it is illegal to consider a personillegitimate where such a person was bornoutside of legal marriage.79

6. Zina may cause severe disruptions to societalvalues including loss of reputation andproperty.80

Ibn Kathir’s commentary on the same verse is alsoilluminating. According to the exegete, Allah says,forbidding His servants to commit zina or to approach itor to do anything that may lead to it: ‘(And come notnear to unlawful sex. Verily, it is a Fahishah (immoralsin) meaning a major sin, (and an evil way.) meaning, aterrible way to behave.’81

77 Khan, Ali, Op. Cit., note 4678 Section 42 (2), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 199979 It is probably only in the situation where a husband divorces his wife through li’an that the child born of the pregnancy will be deprived of a father’s name and would also not inherit from him.80 Societies which do not consider consensual sex wrong between unmarried couples, often frown at the same act if it is done by a married couple or even where only one of the consenting partners is married. See for instance Aoko v Fagbemi & other, (1961) 1 N.L.R.; Tinubu v Tinubu [1959] WNLR 316; Craig v Craig (1962) 16 NLR 103

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He then proceeds to state:

Imam Ahmad recorded Abu Umamah saying that ayoung man came to the Prophet and said, "OMessenger of Allah! Give me permission tocommit Zina (unlawful sex).'' The peoplesurrounded him and rebuked him, saying, "Stop!Stop!'' But the Prophet said, (Come close).Theyoung man came to him, and he said, (Sit down)so he sat down. The Prophet said, (Would youlike it (unlawful sex) for your mother) Hesaid, "No, by Allah, may I be ransomed foryou.'' The Prophet said, (Neither do the peoplelike it for their mothers.) The Prophet said,(Would you like it for your daughter) He said,"No, by Allah, may I be ransomed for you.'' TheProphet said, (Neither do the people like itfor their daughters.) The Prophet said, (Wouldyou like it for your sister) He said, "No, byAllah, may I be ransomed for you.'' The Prophetsaid, (Neither do the people like it for theirsisters.) The Prophet said, (Would you like itfor your paternal aunt) He said, "No, by Allah,O Allah's Messenger! May I be ransomed foryou.'' The Prophet said, (Neither do the peoplelike it for their paternal aunts.) The Prophetsaid, (Would you like it for your maternalaunt) He said, "No, by Allah, O Allah'sMessenger! May I be ransomed for you.'' TheProphet said, (Neither do the people like itfor their maternal aunts).82

The Qur’anic exegeses on the subject of zina (adultery) arequite extensive. Their conclusion is that the prescribedpunishment for the offence is a deterrent. Yet, the crimeis still being committed and interaction and living incommunity with non-muslims who do not criminalizeadultery has opened up avenues of criticism of theIslamic legal system in this respect. More so when the

81 Qur’an 17:32, Tafsir Ibn Kathir, (Abridged) Volume 1, Parts 1 & 2, Darussalam Publishers, available online at http://www.tafsir.com 82 Ibid

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Universal Declaration of Human Rights has pitched asystem of purportedly non-religious human rights schemesagainst Islamic Human Rights Schemes throughout theworld.83

Several non-governmental organisations mounted theircampaigns against the hadd for zina upon a challenge ofthe offence and its punishment as being in contraventionof human right schemes and also allude to Arab culturaltreatment of women. In several of her works, the Moroccanwriter, Fatima Mernissi84 has referred to the institutionof polygamy in Islam as allowing male sexuality to remainpromiscuous while keeping women in check to be usedsimply as agents of man’s sexual gratification,85 to bediscarded as men pleased. According to her:

Whereas polygamy deals with the intensity ofthe male’s sexual drive, repudiation deals withits instability. Repudiation prevents the manfrom losing his sexual appetite throughboredom. It aims at supplying a new set ofsexual objects within the framework ofmarriage, to protect him against the temptationof zina.86

83 See for instance An-Na’im, A.A., Op. Cit., note 1 84 Behind the Veil: Male female Dynamics in a Muslim Society, Al Saqi Books, London, 1985; The Harem Within: Tales of a Moroccan Girlhood, Bantam, London, 1997; Women’s Rebellion and Islamic Memory, Zed Books, London, 1996; Women and Islam: An Historical and Theological Enquiry, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 199185 Women’s Rebellion, p.49. In ‘A Feminist Interpretation of Women’s Right in Islam’, Kurzman, Charles (ed.), Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook, OUP, Oxford, 1996, pp.122-126, Mernissi claims the ease with which women are manipulated is in part due to the tradition of misogyny within Islamic history, implying that this tradition has persisted and has influenced many an Islamic scholar and leader who do not want their powers diminished in the allocation of resources.86 Ibid: Mernissi has implored that ‘until we arrive at the conceptionof woman as an equal and responsible citizen...as a resource to be managed and as a talent to be developed, every development project inthe Arab world will be doomed to failure.’ See Women’s Rebellion, p.55. It is compelling to note that as much as Islam was revealed from the Arabian Peninsula, there is a difference between Arabism and Islam such that Arab culture and tradition is not necessarily Islamic culture and tradition.

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It would appear that even though Mernissi has argued thatfor a Muslim man, the only person he is allowed to loveis his mother,87 her conclusions almost always is thatwomen should not be asking for equality with men, butseek instead for a re-examination of attitudes to sexualrelations that will take each gender as capable ofcreative ingenuity and contribution to the development ofthe community.88 However, some international non-governmental organisations engaged in human rightsadvocacy deftly refused to acknowledge Mernissi’sconclusions and instead concentrated on the wronglyperceived ‘barbaric and savage’ nature of Islam andindeed the African continent as the pivot of theircampaigns. This attitude must have advised the reasoningof BOABAB for Women’s Human Rights, the Nigerian non-governmental organisation that was in the forefront ofcampaigns and defence of Amina Lawal, to request andadvice caution in NGO strategy of engagement of theNigerian government on the issue of the hadd of zina.

In BOABAB’s publicised advisory,89 the NGO said:

Dominant colonialist discourses and themainstream international media have presentedIslam (and Africa) as the barbaric and savageOther. Please do not buy into this. Acceptingstereotypes that present Islam as incompatiblewith human rights not only perpetuates racismbut also confirms the claims of right-wingpolitico-religious extremists in all ourcontexts.90

BOABAB also enjoined NGOs to always remember that thepoint for human right activists is ‘to question who isinvoking Islam (or whatever belief/discourse) for whatpurposes, and also to acknowledge and support internal

87 Ibid, p.12188 Beyond the Veil, p.17689 Iman, Aisha, Medar-Gould, Sindi, ‘How Not to Help Amina Lawal’ in Cockburn, Alexander & St. Clair, Jeffry, (eds.), Counterpunch, available online at http://www.counterpunch.org/imam05152003.html 90 Ibid

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dissent within the community involved’91 and not allowthemselves to be ‘engaged in wholesome condemnation ofpeoples’ belief and cultures, which is seldom accurate oreffective in changing views within the affectedcommunity.’92

ConclusionIt is arguable whether previous rulings in respect of thehadd of zina may be among those Shari’a rulings that couldbe contextualized, amended, adapted, extended orabrogated,93 but what is certain is that the Prophet ofIslam and the Qur’anic revelation did not come up withexact and specific guidelines for women in terms ofconduct, dressing and the regulation of cross-sexualinteraction.94 Illegal sexual relations are howeverexplicitly prohibited. The Qur’anic prohibitions areunequivocal. No Muslim man or woman would readily confessto engaging in illegal consensual sex. It is instructivethat even Amina Lawal, though illiterate, soughtlegitimacy in the legal system that the world had assumedwas bent on condemning her. According to her counsel,Aliyu Musa Yawuri,

Amina Lawal is a Muslim; she lives in a Muslimcommunity. She believed that the Sharia, underwhich she was convicted and sentenced to death,should contain some mechanism that could allowher appeal and set her free. In other words,she yearned for legitimacy.95

The trial and conviction; appeal, discharge and acquittalof Amina Lawal in the charge of zina under the KatsinaState Shari’a Penal Code Law was not gender biased.

91 Ibid92 Ibid93 Sanusi, L.S., ‘Shariah and the Woman Question’, Weekly Trust Newspaper,Kaduna, 18th September, 200094 Ibid95 Yawuri, A.M., Op. Cit., note 5, p. 133

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