Why Some of the Poor Get Richer: Economic Change and Mobility in Rural Western India

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Why Some of the Poor Get Richer: Economic Change and Mobility in Rural Western India [andComments] Author(s): D. W. Attwood, Mahadev L. Apte, B. S. Baviskar, Alan R. Beals, Edwin Eames, J. V.Ferreira, Sylvia M. Hale, John Harriss, N. Krishnaji, M. K. Kudryavtsev, Jayant K. Lele, DavidG. Mandelbaum, Joan P. Mencher, Moni Nag, J. Albert Rorabacher, Hilary Standing and ZoltánTagányi Source: Current Anthropology, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Sep., 1979), pp. 495-516Published by: on behalf of The University of Chicago Press Wenner-Gren Foundation for

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CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Vol. 20, No. 3, September 1979 ? 1979 by The Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research 0011-3204/79/2003-0001$02.65

Why Some of the Poor Get Richer: Economic

Change and Mobility in Rural Western Indial

by D. W. Attwood

INDIA, IN WESTERN EYES, has long been a wonderland, amazing and terrible. For some, it has been a land of perfect resignation, an immobile Asiatic society in which the laws of religion and caste prevented people from attempting to improve their economic condition. Lately, India has also been the great proving ground for theories of global economic disaster: for the Malthusian theory of mass impoverishment due to population pressure and for the Marxian theory of mass impoverishment due to expropriation and exploitation by the rich.

Each theory suggests interesting hypotheses concerning changes in the distribution of essential resources. In rural India, land is an essential resource. If, for some part of rural India, one were to compare the distribution of land in the past with its distribution today, and also determine how the former distribution was transformed into the latter, then one should be able to test in detail the strength of the Malthusian and Marxian theories. It should not be difficult to marshall evidence in support of one or both. Indeed, if one were to select, say, a heavily commercialized village with a large landless population,

l It is a great pleasure to record my debts to B. S. Baviskar, D. P. Apte, V. M. Dandekar, R. F. Salisbury, and S. Saberwal for their valuable suggestions at various stages of the field research. I am particularly grateful to U. Locher, R. Rosenfeld, D. Von Eschen, R. F. Salisbury, A. C. Carter, S. Bandopadhyay, J. Kurien, R. Attwood, W. Bogart, and P. Laramee for their specific comments and suggestions regarding this paper. J. Kurien very kindly obtained the figures on the inflation of the rupee, while S. Bandopadhyay offered crucial advice on the use of statistical methods. D. Winslow assisted in compiling the data.

The data were collected in a period of 18 months (1970-71) spent mainly in two villages in eastern Poona District. The field research was supported by the Canada Council, the Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute, and the Centre for Developing Area Studies at McGill. The analysis presented here was made possible by research grants from the Canada Council and the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research at McGill.

D. W. ATTWOOD is Assistant Professor of Anthropology at McGill University (855 Sherbrooke West, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3A 2T7). Born in 1943, he was educated at the University of California, Berkeley (B.A., 1965) and at McGill (Ph.D., 1974). His research interests are the impact of irrigation and cash- cropping on peasant cultivators, particularly changes in resource distribution and efforts by cultivators to control the impact of the market economy through cooperatives and other economic and political mechanisms. His publications include "Patrons and Mobilizers: Political Entrepreneurs in an Agrarian State" (Journal of Anthropological Research 30:225-41) and "Conflict Cycles: The Interaction of Local and Regional Politics in India" (Man 14:145-60).

The present paper was submitted in final form 2 x 78.

one would expect to find abundant evidence in support of either theory. Perhaps it is because the evidence seems so obvious that few attempts have been made, particularly by anthropologists, to test these theories against evidence of change and mobility.

To put the matter very crudely, both the Malthusian and Marxian theories predict that the poor have been getting poorer, while the Marxian theory also predicts that the rich have been getting richer.

This paper presents two unexpected conclusions from an analysis of economic change over a period of 50 years in a village of western India. One conclusion is that there has been a considerable amount of mobility, upward as well as downward, among families with all sizes of landholdings and even among families with no land at all. Some of the poor have gotten richer. The other conclusion is that land has not tended to become concentrated in fewer hands. The rich have not gotten richer, at least not in terms of their share of the land. Indeed, some have gotten much poorer. These conclusions are mutually reinforcing: the lack of increased concentration is explained by the pattern of mobility.

These conclusions do not mean that there is abundant land per capita or that the rich are kind to the poor. They do mean that the Malthusian and Marxian perspectives explain, at best, only limited aspects of the data. This should not come as a surprise, since, as Rao (1972:A-133) points out, the whole subject of land transfer and redistribution is permeated with beliefs and assumptions which have seldom been tested by hard facts and thorough analyses.

The Marxian perspective generally suggests that increasing commercialization of agricultural production leads to increasing concentration in the control of essential resources. By "commercialization" I mean an increase in the use of purchased inputs and in that portion of the produce which is sold on the market. Commercialization can involve switching from subsistence crops to more profitable cash crops, but it need not do so. In terms of the relations of production, commercialization means the increasing use of hired labor, in addition to, or in place of, family labor. The noncommercialized cultivator, the peasant, relies mainly on family labor and produces mainly for the direct subsistence of his family (Chayanov 1966).

The "Green Revolution," created by the recent introduction of high-yielding seeds and other improved inputs into Indian agriculture, has generated controversies which touch on the general issue of whether increased commercialization does lead to increased concentration of wealth and income. It may be that the present study, which is concerned with changes over

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a long period preceding the Green Revolution, will shed some light on this controversy. Critics of the Green Revolution (e.g., Frankel 1971, Griffin 1974) suggest that improved technology and the accompanying commercialization of production generate increased disparities in rural incomes; and this implies that land will flow increasingly into the hands of those who obtain the larger incomes. My study of a village which has experienced technical change and progressive commercialization for more than 80 years indicates that such a cumulative concentration of land has not taken place, at least not from 1920 to 1970. The evidence from this village does show that the landless prole- tariat has increased; however, the processes which underlie this effect have no connection with the expected expropriation by the rich. Consequently, this case study causes me to wonder if increased commercialization necessarily enables the rich to take more land away from the poor.

In the sections which follow, predictions derived from the Malthusian and Marxian perspectives will be tested against data collected from a sample of residents of a village in western India. The data include comparisons between the size of each respondent's family landholding in 1970 and that of the same family's holding in 1920. Additional data concern the transactions which changed each 1920 holding into its 1970 counter- part. The analysis is by simple quantitative methods which are rendered somewhat difficult by the complexity of the data.

The two sets of hypotheses used here have been constructed so that they can be tested by data of this sort. They are my own hypotheses, which I have constructed as logically as I can from what I take to be some of the basic assumptions of the Malthusian and Marxian perspectives. I do not pretend to have derived these hypotheses, word by word, from the canonical texts. Anyone is free to disown them if he wishes. To emphasize that the theoretical constructs are of my own devising, I refer to them in the body of the paper as the population-pressure and class-polarization theories, respectively. I have tried not to erect straw men and welcome any alternative hypotheses which are equally testable and grounded in a more sophisticated understanding of theory.

I will first explain the ideas which inspired these theoretical constructs and list the hypotheses which I derive from them. Then I will describe the history of the locality from which the data were collected and the nature of the data themselves. Next I will deal with a fundamental analytic problem presented by the data, one which complicates all subsequent analysis. I will then present the detailed results of the analysis and compare them with those of other investigations.

HYPOTHESES

My construction of a class-polarization theory derives its inspiration from Marx's analysis of industrial capitalism, which included the observation that small peasants in England were being driven off the land by the concentration of resources in fewer and fewer hands (Marx 1961:149-51). Lenin dealt in more detail with the impact of commercialization on the Russian peasantry, concluding that the rich peasants, or "peasant bourgeoisie," were making greater profits, while the poor were becoming more impoverished (Lenin 1956:177-78). This theory has been applied to the commercialization of peasant societies in general (Roseberry 1976), and it has played an important role in some economic histories of India (e.g., Patel 1952, Mukherjee 1957).

The general theme, as applied to India, might be summarized as follows: The imposition of British rule, in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, brought the introduction of private property rights in land, along with oppressive taxes and the commercialization of production through the creation of large export markets for agricultural products. A commercialized

peasantry burdened with heavy taxes tends to run into debts; and in a system of private property the demand for credit leads to mortgages, which lead in turn to foreclosures and the alienation of lands from small cultivators to big landlords and financiers. Most of the small cultivators are driven into the class of sharecroppers and landless laborers, while the lands they formerly owned become concentrated in fewer and fewer hands. This theory is logical, convincing, and supported by many kinds of statistical data. Careful reconsideration of the data, however, is tending to cast doubt on some of its conclusions (Kumar 1965, 1975; Ray and Ray 1973).

The class-polarization theory suggests a number of specific hypotheses concerning economic mobility, or change in the distribution of resources. For present purposes, I define "upward mobility" by a family as the expansion of its landholding and "downward mobility" as the contraction of that holding. Such a definition is restrictive, since there are other resources in a village economy besides land. Nevertheless, land is a crucial resource, and it is often believed that its distribution is determined by Malthusian or Marxian mechanisms.

The following hypotheses, which are amenable to testing with the data at hand, seem to derive logically from the class- polarization theory:

Cl: The proportion of landless villagers will increase. C2 (a): This increase will be mainly due to downward mobility

among the village cultivators, (b): especially among the smallholders.

C3(a): The land will become concentrated in fewer hands (b): because of the disproportionate contraction of the smaller holdings (c): and the expansion of the larger holdings.

C4: Most families will move downward, and very few will move upward.

C5: Since the rich will remain rich and the poor remain poor, there will be very little relative mobility; in other words, if holdings are ranked according to size, there will be little change in the rank order.

C6: The big landholders will make a disproportionately large share of the land purchases.

C7: The smallholders will make a disproportionately large share of the land sales.

C8: Land sales will be the main cause of downward mobility. C9: As big holdings get bigger and small ones smaller, the

heterogeneity of the holdings (the standard deviation from the mean) will increase.

CIO: There will be a decline in the mean or median size of holding. (The median will be the more telling measure if the distributions are highly skewed.)

There are no exact quantities specified in these hypotheses, leaving room for argument about how well the data fit. How- ever, one would expect rural India to provide cases with no ambiguity concerning the fit.

The population-pressure theory is a construct I have based on the common observation that the average size of landholding in India is shrinking as the rural population increases. The rule of inheritance is that holdings are partitioned equally among sons, which means that as more sons survive their holdings inevitably diminish in size. Many writers (e.g., Keatinge 1921:64-72; Wyon and Gordon 1971:6-10) have noted that increasing population adds to the problems of rural poverty in India (see Klein 1974:191-92 for a selection of classic quotations). Nanavati and Anjaria (1970:272) state cate- gorically that "the apparent concentration of ownership is a reflection of the phenomenon of pressure of population.... The crowding at the bottom of the agricultural ladder is thus not necessarily the consequence of the top few occupying excessive areas."~

As a theory of mobility, the population-pressure model might run as follows: As population increased in the later 19th century, and particularly from 1920 onward, most cultivable

496 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY



Attwood: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MOBILITY IN INDIA land was brought under the plow. From that point on, most holdings diminished over time as they were partitioned among multiple heirs. The lack of unclaimed cultivable land would prevent most families from expanding their holdings as their labor forces expanded. Families which had large holdings at the end of the 19th century would remain better off in comparison to others, but the larger holdings would lose, on the average, just as great a proportion of their areas (since any holding, if divided into halves, becomes 50% smaller). If the average rate of reproduction were the same among rich and poor families, and if this were the most important variable, then there would bk no change in the relative sizes of holdings but an absolute decrease for all. In other words, there would be no change in the pattern of concentration.

It is possible, however, that the average rates of reproduction are not equal: richer families may have been able to produce more surviving sons (Mandelbaum 1974:48-49; cf. Shanin 1972:91). With a larger number of heirs, the larger holdings would tend to diminish at a more rapid rate, unless there were an opposing mechanism at work. Such a mechanism might be the greater economic efficiency of larger families with larger holdings. Families with more sons have a source of cheap labor which can be invested directly in improvements on the land or in off-farm occupations which provide funds for investment in production. Wealthier families not only may have more surviving sons, but also may tend to remain in large joint families for longer periods (Mandelbaum 1970:47-54). The resulting efficiency and savings might enable these families to buy up land at a rate which would compensate for the partitioning of their estates among more numerous heirs. The proportion of land lost by the rich might then be no more than the average.

If the rich are better able to buy land, the poorest may be more obliged to sell it. Partitions among the smallest landholders would tend to reduce their holdings below the minimum size capable of withstanding an economic crisis-such as the failure of a crop, the death of a bullock, or the marriage of a daughter (Bailey 1957, Scott 1976). Consequently, there would be many forced sales of land by the smallest landholders, and many would become landless.

Among the hypotheses which follow from this theory, some are equivalent to their counterparts from the class-polarization theory, while others contradict elements of that theory:

Pl: The proportion of landless villagers will increase (= Cl). P2(a): This increase will be mainly due to downward mobility

among the village cultivators (= C2[a]), (b): especially from among the smallholders (= C2[b]).

P3: Holdings of all sizes will shrink; consequently, there may be no change in the concentration of holdings (5 C3).

P4: Most families will move downward, and very few will move upward (= C4).

P5: There may be some relative mobility because of demo- graphic fluctuations or different patterns of family organization (5 CS).

P6: If the big landholders are more efficient because they have larger families, they may make a disproportionately large share of the land purchases (= C6).

P7: The smallholders will be forced to sell a disproportionate share of their holdings once they fall below the margin of protection against economic crises (= C7).

P8: Partitions of holdings among multiple heirs will be the main cause of downward mobility ($ C8).

P9: Since partitions will cut most holdings to a fraction of their former size, the heterogeneity of the holdings (the standard deviation) will decrease (5 C9).

P10: The mean or median size of holding will diminish (== Cl0).

Testing the relative merits of the class-polarization and population-pressure theories requires that we pay particular attention to those hypotheses which conflict (C3 vs. P3, CS vs. PS, C8 vs. P8, and C9 vs. P9).

BACKGROUND

The data for this study were collected in a village I call Olegao, located in the famine tract of Maharashtra state, near the western edge of the Deccan plateau which covers most of peninsular India. The village center is about 4.5 miles from a large market town. The average annual rainfall in the Olegao area is only 20 inches; moreover, it is erratic both in timing and amount. Serious droughts occur every few years, sometimes throughout the region. Consequently, in the late 19th century, the government of the Bombay Presidency began the construction of irrigation works as famine-relief projects.

The Nira Canal, one of the first large-scale works in the area, began operation in 1885. By 1918-19 the canal was being utilized to irrigate 54,000 acres, including 11,000 acres of sugarcane (Keatinge 1921:51). The cultivators in the irrigated villages were switching more and more to the production of this expensive and profitable new crop, though the staple food grains, sorghum and millet, were still cultivated in rotation with sugarcane. In 1969, with 81% of the cultivated area under irrigation in Olegao, 29% of the cultivated area was under sugarcane, while 58% was under grains and pulses.

Around 1920, as later, the mode of production was predom- inantly family farming, the cultivation of holdings mainly by the labor of the families which owned them (Keatinge 1921:64). Some plots were rented out to tenants, most of whom were also owner-cultivators. With rare exceptions, land was not allocated by "feudal" or "semifeudal" mechanisms, and labor was bought and sold on a free market in which demand was tending to outstrip supply. Cane cultivation requires heavy inputs of labor, spread over several seasons. Consequently, there was a rising demand for agricultural laborers, particularly for harvesting the cane and manufacturing crude sugar (gul) in the fields. This meant that real wages, as in other parts of the region, were rising (Keatinge 1912:68-73; Shirras 1924).

Canal irrigation afforded protection from drastic fluctuations in the natural environment. Growing an expensive cash crop, however, made the cultivators more vulnerable to fluctuations in regional, national, and international markets. This vulner- ability was due to high production costs and unpredictable variations in the spread between factor and product prices. Between 1914 and 1921, the average cost of cane cultivation in the Olegao area varied annually between 514 and 1,011 (current) rupees per acre. Average profits during the same period varied between 56 and 131 rupees per acre (Inglis and Gokhale 1928). (This may be compared with a cost of less than 10 rupees per acre for sorghum, the staple food grain, when cultivated without hired labor in an unirrigated village [Mann and Kanitkar 1921:80].)

During World War I, prices rose, and cane cultivation expanded along the Nira Canal; immediately after the war, prices rose even further. By the late 1920s, however, there was a slump in the market for crude sugar, and the subsequent depression brought disaster to the cane growers. Many were caught hopelessly in debt, and quite a few had to sell off some of their lands. Some of the biggest cane growers were ruined, as were some of the broker-moneylenders who financed them. Some of the more conservative small cultivators, who were less caught up in the boom of the 1920s, were able to buy up the lands lost by the big growers. As we shall see, such transfers had important implications for the patterns of economic mobility and concentration. For a number of reasons, land was not bought up during the depression by urban rentiers or financiers: it was simply not a profitable investment for anyone except a few very enterprising cultivators.

By 1970 land had become even less profitable for rentiers because of the impact of tenancy and land ceiling reforms, coupled with a rapid increase in political power among the

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cultivators (cf. Attwood 1977). It has become rare for landowners who are not local residents, or who do not personally supervise the cultivation of their lands, to hold onto them (cf. Rao 1972; Epstein 1962:86-89). Plots are occasionally rented out by those who lack the capital or family labor to cultivate them, but nearly all the landholdings discussed in this paper are cultivated by their owners, using hired or family labor or both.

In 1970 the local sugar economy was booming once again. Sugar prices rose rapidly during World War II, and subsequently the sugar economy of the region was transformed by the establishment of cooperative sugar factories, which provided a stable market and other benefits to the ordinary cane cultivators. In 1957, such a cooperative factory was established in Olegao, contributing substantially to the prosperity of the area. This factory has attracted more labor into the area, both for industrial employment and also for work in the expanding tertiary sector stimulated by the growth of an agro-industrial complex. Olegao now has a high population density (less than one-third of a cultivated acre per capita) and a large landless population.

THE NATURE OF THE DATA

Different theories and methods tend to be applied to studies of social mobility, on the one hand, and the distribution of community resources, on the other (Gartrell 1974:21). A person's chances for upward or downward mobility are likely, however, to depend on where he is located with respect to the overall distribution of resources in his community; and, conversely, changes in the overall distribution will be the collective result of the mobility patterns of many individuals. I have adopted an approach to the data whereby individual mobility and changes in the overall distribution of land are seen as two sides of the same coin.

I have attempted to gather and analyze data which show the distribution of economic resources, particularly land, in Olegao village at two points in time, 1920 and 1970. The data were collected from proportional stratified samples of landowning and landless families during 1970-71. The samples were drawn from an initial census survey of the village. The landed sample was stratified according to caste and size of holding, the landless sample according to caste and occupation. The landed sample amounted to 11% of the landed population of the village, while the landless sample amounted to 3% of the landless population. Since it is necessary to compare certain frequencies across the two samples, table 1 shows how a simple set of calculations can be used to equalize the two samples. The effect is to increase the nominal size of the landless sample

to the point where it represents 11% of the landless population. The distribution, according to size, of holdings among the

landed sample is shown in figure 1. Assuming that sampling errors are not large, this represents a cross-section of the village in 1970. The only way to obtain, for comparison, an equivalent cross-section from 1920 is to trace back the resources of the 1970 respondents to the resources of their immediate ancestors (fathers and grandfathers). In addition to comparing the two cross-sections separated by 50 years, we can also determine by this method how the earlier distribution of resources was transformed into the later one. For this reason, it makes sense to use the family as the unit of analysis: the family endures

500

100 I 50 -

1920f"

s:~~~~ 1970X

3 / ~/J 10

3/

2/

10 20 30 40 50 60 Rank Order of Holdings

FIG. 1. Sizes of sample holdings, Olegao village, semilogarithmic scale.

TABLE 1

COMPOSITION AND EQUALIZATION OF SAMPLES, OLEGAO VILLAGE

SAMPLE EQUALIZED LOCAL FRACTION FAMILIES SAMPLE AS % OF SAMPLE ONLY

IN AND Popu- (C/D X0.11) (EQUALIZED) SAMPLE AND VILLAGE FRACTION LATION - -

FRACTION POPULATION SIZE (C/B) Number % Number % (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H)

Landed Landkeepers 42 42 17 42 29 Landgainers 17 17 7 17 12

Total ........... 535 59 11 59 Landless

Local Landlosers 9 33 13 33 23 Landless stayers 14 51 21 51 36

Immigrant 28 103 42 Total ........... 1,698 51 3 187 Grand Total ..... 2,233 110 246 100 143 100




Attwood: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MOBILITY IN INDIA throughout the 50-year period, it is the normal unit of production, and it determines the inheritance of resources by one generation from its predecessors.

This method of drawing a retrospective cross-section makes it difficult to follow the normal procedure in studies of social mobility, which is to examine the careers of a given cohort of individuals. As Blau and Duncan (1967:82-24) point out, past generations cannot be translated into cohorts. In 1920 the fathers or grandfathers of a given 1970 cohort were at many different stages in their life cycles. Consequently, cohorts cannot readily be fitted to a community cross-section for the earlier period.

This difficulty does not arise if the family is taken as the unit of analysis. Such a procedure might not be helpful in an urban industrial society, but in a society in which there is considerable continuity of residence and occupation and in which one of the major resources (land) is more or less fixed in total quantity and distributed in family holdings, it makes sense to use the multigenerational family as the analytic unit. Comparing a family's resources in 1920 with its resources in 1970 provides both the continuity and the contrast essential to this study.

Each respondent was asked the size of his current family holding, the amounts of land owned and/or cultivated by his father and grandfather, and the various transactions which caused the family holding to increase or decrease since the grandfather's day. Most respondents were fairly precise about the amounts of land involved. Dates were often less precise. In the analysis which follows, the date "1920" is used as short- hand for the decade preceding the depression and refers, from the point of view of most respondents, to the general situation experienced by father or grandfather just before the upheavals of the 1930s.

The size of a family holding, as used in this analysis, is not a simple datum: many holdings include pieces of unirrigated land, and the latter had to be converted into "standard wet acres." There are also problems connected with the interpretation of overlapping rights to the same piece of land. I have attempted to disentangle such rights according to reasonable criteria.

In one sense, family holdings are defined in legal terms: they include land owned and (in a few cases) rented out, but not land rented in or held on temporary mortgage from another family. The unit of ownership is not always the unit of cultivation, since lands are sometimes rented in or out, etc. The dynamic connections between owned and cultivated units will be considered in another paper. At present, we are concerned only with changes in landholdings, that is, with units of ownership.

The definition of the family holding, however, is not determined simply by legal units of ownership, since many family holdings consist of a number of individual holdings. Such family holdings have been divided, at least on paper, among several members in order, for example, to avoid losing land under the ceiling legislation of 1961. In such cases, the definition of the family holding also relies on the social relations of production: if members of the family continue to cultivate jointly, then all their individually owned plots are regarded as shares of a joint estate, and it is the size of this joint holding which is used as the basis for the analysis here. For present purposes, it is irrelevant whether a family continues to cook at one hearth or live in the same building or even in the same village. Many families have separate cooking or living arrangements to preserve domestic harmony; some have members living and working in other villages, towns, or cities. If, however, they continue to share the expenses and products of cultivation, then they have a joint holding for our purposes.

Of course, families come in all sizes. This means that two holdings with the same area per family may have quite different areas per capita. I am preparing an analysis of the interactions

between family size and holding size, and it may be that changes in per capita holdings will turn out to be different from the trends in family holdings discussed here. However, the subject is too complex to be added to this paper.

The comparison between 1920 and 1970 holdings is based on the continuity of the family unit from past to present, but the method of retrospective data-gathering means that it is the present-day family holding which is, in a sense, the starting point of analysis. The 1970 family holding does not include all the shares of father's and grandfather's estates which have been partitioned away to collaterals. This means that the continuity of the family unit, in this analysis, is restricted to a single line of descent. Once a collateral branch has partitioned off, it becomes a separate enterprise, and the fate of that branch is no longer a part of the analysis. The resources controlled by that branch are henceforth lost to the family unit which is the object of analysis. This sloughing-off procedure is necessary to avoid analytical confusion and is also dictated by the inability of most respondents to give detailed information about the fate of collateral branches.

Quite apart from the problems of handling the information, there is also the question of its reliability. I think my respondents were reasonably frank. The wealthier landholders made no effort to pretend they were poor. Most of them spoke in detail about paper partitions, for example, and they indicated whether these partitions had actually changed the size of the joint family holding. Collectively, the landholders have un- challenged control over the countryside, including the rural arms of the state administration. They are politically active and aware, and there was little they could fear from my investigation. A few were taciturn and suspicious; most were not. Attempts were made to check the interview data against the records kept by the village accountant, but the records were organized in such a way that it was impossible to trace the sample of family holdings back in time without missing important types of transactions. Moreover, the records tend to lag behind certain types of transactions, and it is precisely these books which the landholders are most careful to cook.

Another problem concerns the accuracy of respondents' memories. Families which have lost their connection with the land tend to forget the holdings and transactions of previous generations. As we shall see, this creates a special problem for the analysis. Families which retain a connection with the land, in contrast, seem to remember rather well the holdings and transactions of those ancestors whose lives overlapped with their own (cf. Mukherjee 1971:188). While memory may magnify the achievements or misfortunes of years past, I doubt if it introduces a strong systematic bias. The reader will note that I hesitate to draw any conclusions unless the data show a clear trend. Such data might not support an extremely fine- grained analysis, but I believe they are adequate for the uses to which they are put here, particularly since they were gathered not in a quick survey, but during a period of prolonged residence, observation, and collection of supporting qualitative information.

RESULTS

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATION

Before discussing the analysis in detail, it is necessary to consider a striking feature of the data, one which complicates all subsequent calculations. As shown in figure 2, there has been significant mobility, in both directions, between landed and landless categories.2 This creates pitfalls for statistical

2 Because of their diverse occupations and income, the landless are really a category rather than a "class." The same applies to the

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comparisons between the 1970 sample respondents and their ancestors in 1920. For example, it seems plausible at first to draw comparisons between the 1970 landed sample and their ancestors in 1920. Such comparisons, however, are inherently biased. The 1970 landed sample consists of two distinct fractions: those families which also had land in 1920 (labelled "landkeepers") and those which were landless in 1920 (labelled "landgainers"). It is remarkable that no less than 25% of the landless in 1920 had moved upward into the landed category by 1970. However, if one compares the landed families of 1970 (landkeepers and landgainers) with the same families in 1920, there is a strong upward bias because the landgainers were, by definition, all upwardly mobile. Another form of mobility was even more significant: 44% of those who were landed in 1920 had lost their lands by 1970. This fraction is labelled "landlosers." Any comparison which includes the landgainers but not the landlosers (or vice versa) is biased. In other words, it is necessary to control for origin when making statistical comparisons between landowners in the two periods.

Three types of legitimate comparison remain possible: 1. Comparison of landkeepers in 1920 with landkeepers in

1970 (that is, only those with land in both periods). 2. Comparison of landkeepers and landlosers in 1920 with

landkeepers and landgainers in 1970 (that is, all those who had land in 1920 with all who had land in 1970).

3. Comparison of landkeepers, landgainers, and landlosers from both periods (that is, those who moved into or out of the landless category in either period, plus those who had land all along).

There is one serious problem with comparisons of Type 2 or 3: Most of the landlosers provided only sketchy information about their previous holdings; it is difficult to know just how much land they had lost. This is one reason for using comparisons of Type 1: they are more limited but based on better data. It is essential, however, to try to compare the effects of downward mobility among the landlosers with those of upward mobility among the landgainers, so in certain calculations I have used estimated values for the 1920 holdings of the landlosers. The estimates are formed by assuming (a) that the landlosers were all small- or medium-scale landholders in 1920- specifically, that they were all comparable to the smaller 50% of landkeepers who had less than 15 acres in 1920-and (b) that the landlosers were evenly distributed along the range from 0.5 to 15 acres per holding.

These are plausible assumptions. It must be emphasized that they conform to the predictions of both the class-polarization and population-pressure theories (Hypotheses C2 [b] and P2 [b]) Thus the estimates which are influenced by these assumptions cannot be used to verify C2, P2, or related hypotheses. This does not mean they are useless, however: they generate a calculation of how a certain fraction of the sample would behave if it conformed to one or both of the theories. The estimates on this fraction can then be combined with real data on the other fractions; and if the overall calculations then do not conform to the predictions of the two theories, we will know that there is a serious discrepancy between the predictions and the real data.

In the following section, the emphasis is on Type 3 comparisons, with a few also of Type 1. Type 2 comparisons would not be substantially different from Type 3 ones, but they would be less complete.

landed. Moreover, the dividing line between these two categories is not as sharp as one might suppose. Some 32% of the landless can lay claim to very small shares of land either in the Olegao area or in a distant village, but they obtain most or all of their income from other sources. Many of the smallest landholders are in a similar position, except that they elect to continue working the land and derive some income from it. For these reasons, and also because "class" has different meanings for different people, I have eschewed the term.

A few comparisons are broadened further to include other landless fractions. Here again, though, there is a dynamic element (based on geographic mobility) which must be taken into account. Among the families which did not rise into or fall from the landed category, there are those who were local residents in 1920 (labelled "landless stayers") and those who migrated into the area after 1920 (labelled "landless immigrants"). These fractions can be added to the comparisons listed above. I have not given much attention here to the landless-immigrant fraction: to do so would require an analysis of geographic mobility, with the use of additional variables and hypotheses. Hypotheses on geographic mobility can be tested more systematically with comparative data from an unirrigated village near Olegao, a village which sends migrants into the canal area and which will be the subject of another paper.

HYPOTHESES TESTED

1. Table 1 and figure 2 clearly support Hypotheses Cl and Pl, which predict that the proportion of landless villagers will increase. Fully 44% of the 1920 landed families were landless by 1970. On the other hand, there has also been upward mobility into the landed category, a change which is predicted by neither theory. The number of families moving into the landed category is only half the number of those moving out, but it is still a significant share of the local sample. (Land- gainers equal 12% and landlosers 23% of the total local sample, excluding landless immigrants: see table 1, column H.) It may be that one or both of the two theories is necessary to explain the downward mobility of the landlosers, but they are both insufficient to explain the overall pattern.

An inherent limitation in the data weakens the comparison between landgainers and landlosers: there may have been a number of landlosers who emigrated from the village. Given the high local demand for labor, both skilled and unskilled, this was probably not a very large trend. There was no way to collect systematic data on landloser emigrants, though further analysis of family histories may yield a minimum estimate for this trend. In the meantime, the size of the landloser fraction must be considered as an underestimate.

2. Table 1 and figure 2 indicate that the landlosers were not the most numerous new recruits into the landless category: they account for 33 cases, or 24% of the 136 new landless families in 1970. On the other hand, immigration since 1920 accounts for 103 cases, or 76% of the new landless families. Immigrants were attracted to the Olegao area not only by the increasing demand for labor in the cane fields, but also by the possibility of employment in the Olegao sugar factory (32% of the landless immigrants were employed there) and in various trades and services. This means that there are other important resources in the village economy besides land. Within the compass of this paper, however, it is impossible to deal systematically with these other resources.

Roughly half of the landless stayers were also fairly recent immigrants. From the later 19th century onward, they had immigrated to the Olegao area to work on the construction of the canal or to meet the growing demand for cane workers. As a force for recruitment into the landless category, then, the local expansion of employment opportunities has been far more powerful than the economic failure of the landlosers, the latter accounting for just 33 cases out of 187, or 18% of the total landless in 1970.

Thus the prediction that the proportion of landless villagers will expand mainly because of economic failures among the landed (C2[a], P2[a]) is verified only to a limited extent. In order to account for the observed pattern, we would need hypotheses concerning geographic mobility.

3. The distinctive prediction of the class-polarization theory is that the land will become concentrated in fewer hands (C3). Figure 3 compares the concentration of landkeepers' holdings




Attwood: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MOBILITY IN INDIA LANDED LANDED

Landkeepers

{42) > (42)

Landgainers IMMIGRANT LANDLESS

(17) (33). .

LOCAL LAND LESS

LANDLESS Landlosers (33)

(17) Li I(103)

Landless stayers (51) (51)

1920 1970

FIG. 2. Mobility between landed and landless samples, Olegao village.

in 1920 and 1970, in the form of Lorenz curves. These curves suggest that, if anything, land has become less concentrated, not more.

A Lorenz curve is interpreted as follows, taking the 1920 curve in figure 3 as an example: In order to calculate the points on the curve, the family landholdings were first arranged in rank order, from the smallest to the largest. Then the cumulative percentage of families was plotted against the cumulative percentage of land area in their holdings. For example, Point A on the curve indicates that the smaller 50% of the landkeepers owned less than 10% of the total area held by landkeepers. Point B indicates that the smaller 80% owned less than 40% of the total or, conversely, that the larger 20% owned more than 60% of the land. Points A and B, and all others on the curve, indicate that the distribution of land among the landkeepers in 1920 was quite skewed, with much of the total area in the hands of a minority. If the land had been distributed absolutely equally, then the Lorenz curve would lie along the 450 diagonal. Points D and E would then show that 50% of the families owned 50% of the land, 80% owned 80%, and so forth. The inequality in the actual distribution is shown by the sag between the diagonal and the Lorenz curve. This sag can be measured by comparing the crescent-shaped area between the diagonal and the Lorenz curve with the total area of the triangle under the diagonal. The ratio between these areas is known as the Gini coefficient. The larger the Gini coefficient, the greater the inequality of distribution.

In figure 3, the Gini coefficient for the 1920 curve is 0.60, while that for the 1970 curve is 0.50. This suggests that the 1970 distribution is less skewed than the 1920 distribution. For example, Point C shows that the smaller 80%o of landkeepers owned 50%O of the land in 1970, whereas in 1920 they held less than 40%O of the land (Point B). This is contrary to the key prediction of the class-polarization theory (C3), that land will become concentrated in fewer hands.

4. It is, of course, desirable to extend this comparison to include the landgainers and landlosers. This will enable us to measure the effect of movements into and out of the landed category on the overall concentration of holdings. The main problem with such a comparison is that we must rely on estimates of the landlosers' holdings in 1920.3

As shown in figure 4, this broader comparison eliminates nearly all the difference between the two curves. This is to be expected, since landlosers outnumbered landgainers: the greater number of landless families in the 1970 curve causes it to sag to meet the 1920 curve. The Gini coefficient for 1920 is now 0.71, while that for 1970 is 0.72. (Both coefficients are higher than in figure 3 because both now include a number of landless families.) In concrete terms, the analysis shows that the concentration of holdings decreased among those who kept or gained land, but this was counterbalanced by the number of families who became landless. The slight difference in shape of the two curves could be interpreted to mean that the 1920 curve is more egalitarian, since it rises above the 1970 curve at the lower end. Most of this difference, however, is due to the assumptions used in estimating the landlosers' 1920 holdings, for these estimates were added to the 1920 curve in precisely the region where it rises above the 1970 curve.4 The only safe

100

1920 Gini = 060 80 1970 Gini = 050 E/

E / /~~~~~~~~~~

60 / CD~~~~~~~

cm

40 C-D

20 ~~~~~~~~~~1920

0 20 40 60 80 100 Cumulative Percentage of Families

FIG. 3. Concentration of holdings, Olegao village, landkeepers.

3 Another problem with estimating the 1920 distribution is that we do not know the sizes of holdings which belonged to landloser emigrants. If these emigrants were numerous, and if they were mostly medium-scale landholders (which is unlikely), then the Lorenz curve for 1920 would show a more equal distribution than that of figure 4. On the other hand, there is at least one known case from this village of a large, high-status landholder who was wiped out in the depression and who left for employment elsewhere (cf. Beteille 1965). A few cases of this sort would have made the 1920 distribution more unequal than that of figure 4. Until better information can be obtained, it is well to assume that the absence of this subfraction biases the results in neither direction.

4 Of course, the landlosers' holdings might have been estimated according to other assumptions. Two plausible alternatives might be:

a) Let the 1920 distribution of landloser holdings be equivalent to the distribution of landkeeper holdings in the same period. This assumption would generate a Gini coefficient of about 0.69 for landkeepers and landlosers in 1920. Mathematically, this would mean a slight increase in concentration (from 0.69 to 0.72) by 1970. This result is obtained, however, by assuming that the proportion of




100 f

1920 GCin = 071

80 - 1970 GCin = 072

60 20 40 60 81970 / CUmUIalVeCPeCentaeDOf Fmill/

FIcm .Cocetato o hlins,Oegovilae lndepe/

centrationof Cumulatgve Penrcenag tof FamiliesiC3

5. If the landless-stayer fraction were added to both curves, the relationship between the curves would remain the same, but the additional landless families would cause both curves to sag further, so that the Gini coefficients would be 0.81 for 1920 and 0.82 for 1970. If the landless immigrants were also included in the 1970 curve, the Gini coefficient would rise to 0.89, as compared with 0.81 for 1920. In this comparison, land has become much more concentrated from 1920 to 1970, as predicted by Hypothesis C3(a). However, the cause of this concentration, which is immigration, is not consistent with the mechanisms posited by the class-polarization theory: that is, that the holdings of the rich will expand (C3[c]) as those of the poor contract (C3[b]).

6. Up to this point, we have considered only collective measurements of economic mobility and change. Figure 5 presents data on individual family mobility, comparing the changes among landkeepers with those among landgainers and landlosers. Each point compares the number of acres owned by a family in 1920 with the number owned by the same family in 1970. If there had been no change (as predicted by the old, static image of Asiatic society) all points would fall along the diagonal line. Most points are not even near it. All points above the diagonal indicate upward mobility. Among the landkeepers these number 11 out of 42 families, or 26%o. Only 7 families (17%o of the landkeepers) fall along the diagonal.

landlosers among the large landholders was as great as the proportion among the smallholders-an assumption at odds with the class- polarization theory (Hypotheses C2 and C3).

b) Let the 1920 distribution of landloser holdings be equivalent to the 1970 distribution of landgainer holdings (that is, assume the same degree of mobility in either direction). This would generate a Gini coefficient of about 0.75 for 1920, suggesting that holdings had become less concentrated by 1970. The assumptions actually used (in figure 4 and elsewhere) are more favorable to the class-polarization theory.

Apparently, the only way to introduce more radical change into figure 4 would be to assume that the landlosers were concentrated among the medium-sized landholders in 1920. I cannot imagine what the theoretical justification for such an assumption would be.

All this toying with assumptions does boil down to a useful result: I have attempted to generate as much class polarization as plausible with the landloser estimates, and the result is no real change in concentration.

Below the diagonal, indicating downward mobility, there are 24 families, or 57% of the landkeepers. The strength of this downward trend among the landkeepers is significant: it points to the frequency of downward mobility among the families with the largest holdings in 1920.

All 17 families of landgainers, of course, experienced upward mobility, while all 33 families of landlosers moved downward. Among all three fractions, 28 families (30%) moved upward, 7 (8%) stayed the same, and 57 (62%) moved downward. Both upward and downward trends are significant, though the latter is again about twice as strong.

7. If we calculate the correlation between 1920 and 1970 landholdings in figure 5, the coefficient is 0.237, meaning that the 1920 values explain less than 6% of the variance in 1970 holding sizes. More simply put, the correlation between the two values is low, indicating that there has been a large amount of relative mobility. This can be corroborated by reducing the data in figure 5 to rank orders and computing the Spearman rank-correlation coefficient; it comes to 0.256, meaning that rank-order position in 1920 explains less than 7% of the variance in 1970. These results contradict Hypothesis C5, which predicts very little relative mobility.

8. Another feature of the data in figure 5 is the significant change in the standard deviation, from 51.4 in 1920 to 14.5 in 1970. This means that there has been a great reduction in the heterogeneity of the sample or, in other words, that the holding sizes are now compressed into a much narrower range. This trend is consistent with Hypothesis P9, which predicts that the larger holdings will lose larger amounts of land through partitions, thus reducing them to sizes which are closer in absolute, if not relative, terms to the smallest holdings. On the other hand, Hypothesis C9, in predicting increasing concentration, also predicts an increase in the standard deviation. By this test, the population-pressure theory is clearly superior.

9. So far, we have been attempting to discover what has happened without knowing why. That is, we have been exam- ining the two end points in a series of transformations, without knowing the processes which connect them. Just as it is important to know how the landless were recruited, after knowing how many there were, so it is important to know what caused some families to gain or lose land. This question of causation is approached here in simplified form, by asking what the trans-

500

r =0237 p=0 256

1920 s =51 4 1970s=145

100 /

A6 U 50 -

E U

A~~~~~ A

34 m **landkeeper 2 A Landgainer

U * * * landloser

1O

1 U U 05 0 0

Acres In 1920

FIG. 5. Change in size of holdings, Olegao village, logarithmic scale.




Attwood: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MOBILITY IN INDIA

Z C1zz IN oi n d

O? ~~~~o 00ee o No

Z 00" = o

z +

2 uO w tl

3 <N o n 1- 0 C ?XXCSse

z . . . . . Cl

z ~ ~ ~ D''k

actions were which changed the 1920 distribution into the 1970 one.

Table 2 shows the sum of these transactions, according to the size in 1920 of the holdings which were affected by them.' Table 2 can be read as follows, taking the smallest landkeepers as an example: In 1920 there were 16 families of landkeepers with fewer than 10 acres apiece, owning 81 acres all together. Between 1920 and 1970, these families added 211 acres through purchases, lost 24 acres through sales, and lost another 160 acres through partitions. Their net gain was 46 acres, an increase of 57% over the original 81 acres held in 1920. This works out to an average net increase of 3 acres per family.

On the other hand, the 10 largest landkeepers, with more than 50 acres apiece in 1920, lost 934 acres as the net result of all transactions. This was a net loss of 80% of their original holdings, which totaled 1,170 acres. Thus table 2 indicates that the smallest landkeepers enlarged their holdings, while the largest landkeepers lost most of their lands. This result, of course, contradicts Hypothesis C3, which predicts that the larger holdings will expand while the smaller ones contract.

10. Column D of table 2 provides the very interesting information that more land was purchased by landgainers and small landkeepers than by the larger landkeepers. This is true both in terms of absolute acreages and relative to the original total areas owned by each stratum (column E). This result contradicts Hypothesis C6, which predicts that the rich will buy out the poor, and Hypothesis P6, which predicts that the rich will buy more land because they have larger and more efficient production units.

11. Column F of table 2 shows that much more land was sold off by the larger landholders than by the smaller ones, contrary to Hypotheses C7 and P7, which predict that the smallholders will be forced to sell more land than the large ones. However, column G indicates a weaker contrast between the strata: the largest landholders sold off 40% of their original area, while the smaller ones sold off 30%. As we shall see, the difference between these percentages is not sufficient for a convincing refutation of Hypotheses C7 and P7.

12. Our scepticism concerning the relative impact of land sales must increase in the light of two considerations. The first is that the data on sales within the top stratum are heavily weighted by a single case. This case involved an enterprising sugarcane grower, very successful on a large scale in the 1920s, who was all but wiped out by the depression. As his enterprise failed, most of his land (some 406 acres) was rented out and then sold to his former laborers (who were originally landless immigrants around the turn of the century). This case was by no means unique, but it is difficult to estimate whether comparable cases occurred in the general population with the same frequency and severity as this one did in the sample. As it seems desirable to avoid interpretations which are heavily weighted by a single case, I have repeated all the calculations for the top stratum in table 2, but with this single case omitted. This yields the row of adjusted figures printed below the body of table 2. The effect of this adjustment is that there are now 9 families (instead of 10) which had more than 50 acres apiece in 1920, giving them a total of 728 acres (instead of 1,170) at that

6 The 1920 holdings are divided arbitrarily into four strata. In order realistically to compare the rates of change within these strata, it is desirable that they be equivalent in size of membership. The lowest stratum automatically consists of the landgainers, 17 in number, who had no land in 1920. The other three strata consist of landkeepers (with estimated landlosers added in table 3). The lower and middle landkeeper strata were each assigned 16 members, leaving 10 for the top stratum. In terms of land areas, the breakpoints between strata then fall at 10 and 50 acres, which seem high by 1970 standards but are reasonable for 1920, when the average holding was larger.

Vol. 20 * No. 3 * September 1979 503



time. The adjustment has no effect on the amount of land purchased by this stratum, but it means that they lost only 57 acres (instead of 463) through sales. They also lost 415 acres (instead of 439) by partitions. The net change-for this stratum, consequently, is a loss of 504 acres, or 69% (instead of 80%) of their original holdings, equivalent to an average loss of 56 acres per family.

This adjustment causes a dramatic change in the proportional area sold: a mere 8% instead of 40%. Since 8% is much smaller than the 30% sold by the smallest landkeepers, the adjusted figures confirm Hypotheses C7 and P7, which predict that the smallholders will have to sell a larger share of their holdings than the big landholders.

13. A more serious problem with the data on sales in table 2 is that the landlosers are excluded from the calculations because of the general lack of sufficient detail in their interviews. This problem can be confronted by taking the estimates concerning the sizes of the 1920 landloser holdings and adding assumptions concerning the percentage of land lost through sales. The effects of these assumptions are shown in table 3. The estimated holdings of the landlosers in 1920 total 255 acres, of which 105 acres belonged to 21 families with fewer than 10 acres apiece and 150 acres belonged to 12 families with 10 to 15 acres apiece. If we assume that the landlosers lost all their lands through sales and none through partitions or other transactions, then adding these estimated losses to the real losses of the landkeepers and landgainers produces the results shown in columns D and E. Given the assumption that 100% of the landloser area was lost through sales, we find that landkeepers and landlosers with fewer than 10 acres in 1920 lost 70% of their original holdings through sales. This is consistent with Hy- potheses C7 and P7, which predict large proportional losses among the smallholders.

It is not very plausible, however, that 100% of the landloser holdings were lost through sales. A glance at columns F-I in table 2 indicates that losses through sales were generally exceeded by losses through partitions, particularly in the lower strata, where the landlosers are concentrated. Consequently, it is far more plausible that at least 50% of the area lost by the landlosers was lost through partitions and other transactions besides sales. Columns F and G in table 3 show the effect of assuming that the landlosers lost, at most, 50% of their holdings through sales. Here there is no real contrast between lower and upper strata: families with fewer than 10 acres in 1920 lost 41% of their original holdings (instead of 30% as shown in table 2), while those with more than 50 acres lost 40%. These figures provide no basis for accepting or rejecting Hypotheses C7 and P7.

What this means, then, is that the inclusion of more plausible landloser estimates provides no grounds for evaluating Hy- potheses C7 and P7. On the other hand, the adjustment in table 2 which excludes one case from the data does provide evidence that the smallholders sold a larger proportion of their area than the large landholders. If we believe this adjustment was necessary, then Hypotheses C7 and P7 are confirmed. Without this adjustment, they are neither confirmed nor refuted.

14. Even if we decide that the smallholders sold a greater proportion of their holdings than the large landholders, however, it is also true that the smallholders bought a great deal more land. In fact, the purchases made by the smallest landkeepers (211 acres), and also those by the landgainers (158 acres), were far in excess of even the largest (unrealistic) estimate of 129 acres sold by the small landkeepers and landlosers (table 3, column D). By comparison, the largest landkeepers purchased only 24 acres, a negligible 2-3% increase in their holdings and not enough to compensate even for the lowest estimate of their sales (57 acres). The largest landholders unquestionably achieved a net loss of area through their sales and purchases, whereas the smallholders certainly did not.6 By this somewhat broader interpretation, Hypotheses C7 and P7 clearly fail.

15. Column H of table 2 indicates that the higher the stratum, the greater the acreage lost through partitions. This is, of course, inevitable, since a larger area is lost when a larger holding is divided. It is more instructive to look at column I, which shows the proportional areas lost through partitions. In this column, the landkeepers with fewer than 10 acres in 1920 show a remarkable rate of loss, nearly 200%. (If we included the landloser estimates, and if half their lands were lost through partitions, then the total loss of those who began with fewer than 10 acres would be 213 acres, or 114% of the original area.) Such a rate of contraction could only be sustained if counterbalanced by a high rate of expansion, as shown in columns D and E: 211 acres, or 261% of the original area

6 Total sales by all sample fractions (761 acres) were well in excess of total purchases (475 acres), assuming that 50% of the landlosers' holdings were lost through sales. It might be supposed that the difference (287 acres) represents a net outflow from the community to rentier landlords or moneylenders. However, the balance between sales and purchases is heavily influenced by the case of the big cane grower who sold off some 406 acres to his former laborers and tenants. So far as I could determine, all of the purchasers in this case were local cultivators, though many, of course, did not happen to fall within my sample. If this case is removed from the calculation, the balance between purchases and sales within the sample becomes positive instead of negative.

TABLE 3

SALES 1920-70 ACCORDING TO SIZE OF HOLDING IN 1920, INCLUDING ESTIMATES FOR LANDLOSER FRACTION

ESTIMATED ESTIMATED ESTIMATED ESTIMATED ESTIMATED AVERAGE

ESTI- TOTAL SALES, 1920-70, SALES, 1920-70, NET CHANGE NET SIZE OF MATED 1920 ASSUMPTION la ASSUMPTION 2b IN AREA CHANGE 1920 NUMBER AREA OF -_PER

HOLDINGS OF HOLDINGS % % % HOLDING SAMPILE (Acres) HOLDINGS (Acres) Acres of (C) Acres of (C) Acres of (C) (Acres)

FRACTION (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J)

Landgainers. 0 0 17 0 -17 - -17 - +122.6 - +7.2 Landkeepers and

landlosers . 0.1-9.9 37 186 -129.3 -70 -76.8 -41 -59.2 -32 -1.6 Landkeepers and

landlosers .10-4 . 10-49.9 28 603 -279.5 -46 -204.5 -34 -270.3 -45 -9.7 Landkeepers . 50+ 10 1,170 -463 -40 -463 -40 -933.7 -80 -93.4

Total ............. 92 1,959 -888.8 -45 -761.3 -39 -1,140.6 -58 -12.4

a That is, assuming that 100% of the land lost by the landloser fraction was lost through sales. b That is, assuming that only 50% of the land lost by the landloser fraction was lost through sales, the rest being lost through partitions and other transactions.




Attwood: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MOBILITY IN INDIA belonging to the smallest landkeepers, were added through purchases. (If landloser estimates were included, these purchases would equal 113% of the original area.)

These figures suggest that there may have been a cyclical relationship between the high rate of purchases and the high rate of partitions. It is possible that the smallest landholders have behaved as predicted by Chayanov (1966): that is, they may have purchased bits of land as their family work forces expanded, then partitioned their holdings after the joint family reached the peak of its developmental cycle. Table 2 does not suggest the same cyclical pattern among the higher strata. This may be because the larger landholders were free to balance their supplies of land and labor by a method which is much simpler than buying land in a labor-surplus economy: that is, by hiring or firing nonfamily workers.

16. Although partitions have had the greatest impact on smallholders, the effect on the top stratum has not been negligible: landkeepers with more than 50 acres lost 38% of their original area, 57% if we rely on the adjusted figures for this stratum. Moreover, these losses among the large landholders have not been made good by purchases, which amount to merely 2-3% of the original area. This result contradicts Hypothesis P6, which predicts that the greater efficiency of the larger and wealthier families will enable them to compensate through purchases for losses due to partitions.

17. Partitions have accounted for a total loss of 747 acres, or 44% of the original area held by landkeepers, while the loss through sales was 617 acres, or 36%. (If landgainers and estimated landlosers are included, and if the area lost by the landlosers was divided equally between partitions and sales, then 924 acres, or 47% of the original holdings of all three fractions, were lost through partitions and 761 acres, or 39%, through sales.) Hypothesis P8, which predicts that population pressure will cause holdings to diminish through partitions, and Hy- pothesis C8, which predicts that economic failures will cause holdings to diminish through sales, are shown to be about equally correct. Since both are equally valid, neither alone is sufficient.

18. Columns K, L, and M in table 2 summarize the net impact of all transactions on the different strata. The results are striking: the higher the stratum, the greater the loss of land. This is true not only in terms of absolute acreages, but also relative to the original area owned and the average loss

per holding. This comparison still holds good with the adjusted figures for the top stratum.

Table 3 was constructed to correct the bias caused by lack of data on landlosers' transactions. Adding the estimates for landlosers generates greater losses for the lower strata, of course. Despite this correction, however, the comparative results are the same: the rich lose more than the poor by every comparison (columns H, I, and J). Again, this result holds good whether the adjusted figures for the top stratum are used or not. The unadjusted figure for the top stratum shows a net loss of 80% of the original area; the more cautious, adjusted figure (table 2) shows a loss of nearly 70%. The results clearly contradict Hypotheses C3(b) and C3(c), which predict that the small holdings will contract while the large ones expand.

19. The net loss of area from all landkeeper transactions was 1,008 acres, or 59% of the 1,704 acres held by landkeepers in 1920. Consequently, the mean area of landkeeper holdings has diminished from 40.6 to 16.6 acres, also a loss of 59%. If landgainers and estimated landlosers are included, the total area lost comes to 1,141 acres, or 58% of the area held by all three fractions in 1920. As a result, the mean holding among all three fractions declined from 26.1 to 13.9 acres (a loss of 47%), while the median declined from 7.4 to 2.5 acres. Hypotheses CIO and PIO, which predict a reduction in the mean or median, are confirmed.

A decline in the average size of holding may have been counterbalanced, however, by an increase in the average value of the land. The simplest way to test this hypothesis is to compare the per acre output and value of sugarcane in 1920 and 1970. (Other crops are, by comparison, of negligible market value.) Row H in table 4 indicates that the average net income per acre in constant rupees has risen by 159% in the Olegao area. About 45% of this increase is due to a favorable shift in the balance between costs and the price of cane, while about 55% is due to increased yields per acre (the latter improvement, in the case of an expensive cash crop, being dependent on the former).

This rise in net income per acre means an increase in the value of the land, which offsets the decrease in the average size of holding. As shown in table 4, the average landkeeper holding has decreased by 59% in area, but has not decreased at all in

TABLE 4

INDICES OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 1920-70, OLEGAO VILLAGE

ACTUAL VALUE INDEX

ESTIMATED AVERAGEa 1920 1970 1920 1970

A. Yield of sugarcane (metric tons per acre) .................... 29.5 50.5 100 171.2 B. Cost of cultivation (rupees per metric ton) ................... 18.0 55.0 100 305.6 C. Cost of cultivation (rupees per acre) ........................ 531.0 2,777.5 100 523.1 D. Net incomeb (rupees per metric ton) . ........... 3.0 19.4 100 645.5 E. Net income (rupees per acre) .............................. 88.6 978.0 100 1,103.8 F. General or consumer price index 100 426 G. Net income per ton in constant rupees (D/F) . ....... 3.0 4.6 100 151.5 H. Net income per acre in constant rupees (E/F) . ........ 88.6 229.5 100 259.1 I. Size of holding (acres)

Landkeepers only ......................................... 4o.6 16.6 100 40.9 Keepers, gainers, and losers ............................... 26.1 13.9 100 53.3

J. Net income per holding in constant rupees (HXI) Landkeepers only .......................................... 3,597.2 3,814.7 100 106.0 Keepers, gainers, and losers ............................... 2,312.5 3,194.2 100 138.1

SOURCES: Inglis and Gokhale (1928), records of the Olegao Cooperative Sugar Factory, Statistical Abstracts for British India, Statistical Abstracts, India. a Estimates from the earlier period are drawn from data for 1914-21 or 1918-22, depending on availability. Estimates from the later period are drawn from 1960-70 or 1966-70. b Net income means cash earnings minus cash costs (for seed, fertilizer, hired labor, irrigation, interest on credit). These costs do not include imputed values for rent and family labor or deDreciation on bullocks and eauiDment.

Vol. 20 * No. 3 September 1979 505 This content downloaded from 132.174.254.12 on Thu, 26 Mar 2015 14:47:24 UTC



terms of net income. For all three sample fractions, the area of the average holding has diminished by 47%, but the average net income per holding has actually increased by about 38%. These figures suggest that the population-pressure and class-polarization theories can lead to undue pessimism, particularly with reference to change in a highly commercialized village such as Olegao. Increasing commercialization, which seems to entail rising land values (due to higher yields and product prices), provides at least a partial remedy to the problem of population pressure. Moreover, it seems possible to obtain this remedy without the expected cost of increasing concentration in the distribution of land.

CONCLUSIONS

First, how well do the hypotheses stand up to the data? Cl and PI: Yes, the proportion of landless villagers has

increased. C2(a) and P2(a): This increase is not, however, due mainly

to the downward mobility of village cultivators; it is due mainly to immigration.

C2(b) and P2(b): The data are too sketchy for an adequate test of whether or not most of the landlosers were smallholders.

C3(a): No, the land did not become concentrated in fewer hands, (b): because the smallholdings did not contract disproportionately (their net proportional losses were smaller than those of the larger holdings) and (c): because the large holdings did not expand at all (they lost more area, absolutely and proportionately, than the smaller holdings).

P3: Yes, holdings of all sizes did tend to shrink, and the pattern of concentration stayed about the same.

C4 and P4: No, upward mobility was not exceedingly rare. By several measurements, the upward trend was about half as strong as the downward trend.

C5: No, relative mobility was not rare either. On the contrary, rank-order position in 1920 is a very poor predictor of position in 1970.

P5: Yes, there was plenty of relative mobility, but the causal significance of family size and organization is a topic for future research.

C6 and P6: No, the big landholders did not make a disproportionately large share of the land purchases; it was the smallholders who did so.

C7 and P7: The smallholders may have sold a larger proportion of their holdings, but they more than compensated by their purchases (whereas the large landholders did not). In this respect, the hypotheses fail.

C8: Yes, land sales were an important cause of downward mobility.

P8: Partitions were also, however, an important cause of downward mobility. C8 and P8 are both necessary, and neither alone is sufficient.

C9: No, the heterogeneity of the holdings (standard deviation) did not increase.

P9: Instead, heterogeneity decreased, indicating that the largest holdings moved closer to the mean.

CIO and PlO: Yes, the mean and median size of holding did diminish, but the rise in the average value of this holding may have offset the decrease in size.

In those cases where the predictions of the two theories diverge (C3 vs. P3, C5 vs. P5, C9 vs. P9), the population- pressure theory appears to be more consistent with the evidence. The exceptions are C8 and P8: both hypotheses are partly correct, and neither alone is adequate. In general, it appears that the population-pressure theory (P1, P3, P5, and especially P8, P9, and PlO) is needed to explain at least some aspects of economic change and mobility in this village. On the other hand, the class-polarization theory does not seem really neces-

sary, since its most distinctive predictions (C3, C5, and C9) are not consistent with the evidence.Hypothesis C8 is consistent with the data; however, it need not be tied exclusively to the class-polarization theory. It is possible for concentration to decrease as the result of land sales, if the sellers are big landholders (as was the case with the big cane grower who was removed from the figures in table 2).

I have not encountered any previous attempts explicitly to compare the predictive value of class-polarization and population-pressure hypotheses. This is an important point, for it is possible that observations which have been used to verify one theory may, in fact, be readily explainable by another. I believe I have demonstrated two requirements for testing either theory which have received little, if any, previous attention: (1) the theory must be broken down into explicit, testable hypotheses, and (2) some attempt must be made to sort out those hypotheses which are distinctive from those which overlap with other theories.

Of course, neither theory stands or falls on the strength of one local case study. Aside from the obvious possibility of sampling error, there is the fact that many of the crucial processes involve movements of resources across local boundaries. If, for example, it could be shown that there has been a mass exodus of landlosers from the Olegao area, the data might then show a better fit with the class-polarization hypotheses. Hypothesis C2, which concerns the number of landlosers, would certainly be strengthened by such a finding, but it does not automatically follow that C3, which predicts increasing concentration of the land, would also be strengthened. Beteille (1965) reports a village study in which the big, high-status landlords have moved toward urban professional occupations, selling off large portions of their estates, and similar cases are known from the Olegao area. A landloser exodus might fit with a decrease in concentration.

It is my intention to try to pin down the interactions between the local and regional economies from 1920 to 1970, though I am not optimistic about determining the rate of landloser emigration. Within the present limits of the data, two of the crucial hypotheses of the class-polarization theory (C2 and C3) are not thoroughly refuted. Other predictions crucial to the theory (C5, C6, and C9), however, appear to be convincingly contradicted by data which would not be affected by a mass emigration of landlosers. This latter point is significant: the data show a high degree of relative mobility, a high rate of land purchases among the smallholders (but not among the large landholders), and a decrease in the heterogeneity of the holdings. These findings could not be explained away by landloser emigration. In fact, it is difficult to imagine how these findings could be reconciled with the class-polarization theory even if we were to assume all kinds of resource transfers across local boundaries. On the other hand, these three findings are perfectly consistent with a lack of increased concentration, so I am inclined to place more confidence in the evidence which contradicts Hypothesis C3.

There is one aspect of the data which is entirely unexplained by the hypotheses we have examined and which, indeed, lies at the root of many of the conflicts between data and hypotheses. This, of course, is the tendency of some of the poor to get richer instead of getting poorer as they ought. Why did they not get poorer?

Part of the answer is that the great depression was particularly hard on some of the rich, presumably because they were overextended. As mentioned earlier, a group of immigrant laborers, among othels, was able to pick up some of the pieces. Another part of the answer lies in the growing importance of cooperative credit, marketing, and manufacturing institutions (such as the Olegao cooperative sugar factory), which helped to protect small as well as big cane growers from fluctuations in the market system (Attwood n.d.; cf. Baviskar n.d.). As Shanin (1972 :112-21) has argued, the local pattern of mobility




Attwood: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MOBILITY IN INDIA is strongly influenced by fluctuations in market prices, state policies, and the weather.

Changes in landholdings are also, of course, influenced by the distribution of other resources in the local area, including education, ritual status, kinship connections, off-farm employment, political influence, administrative connections, and so forth. It is also likely that mobility is related to cyclical changes in the size and composition of the farming family itself (Shanin 1972:101-9; Chayanov 1966; Kessinger 1974:130-46). It may be impossible to assign relative weights to all these causal factors, but there seems to be little doubt that the cultivators of Olegao, like the peasants in early 20th-century Russia, have undergone a complex pattern of "multidirectional and cyclical mobility" which cannot be fitted to any monistic theory of change (Shanin 1972:96-121).

What do the present findings suggest about agrarian change in general? I do not claim that Olegao is a representative village. There is certainly a need for comparative analysis of these questions, and I have already begun to analyze similar data from an unirrigated, less commercialized village near Olegao. A brief search for comparable data in the literature on economic change in rural India reveals many gaps and uncertainties (cf. Bardhan and Srinivasan 1971), with some evidence that supports and some that contradicts the findings of this paper.

Among village studies, there are a few which mention examples of upward mobility by those who were not rich and downward mobility by those who were (Kessinger 1974; Epstein 1962, 1973; Beteille 1965), but the subject is generally ignored. It is also rare to find data on changes in the distribution of land, though there are two studies which show increasing concentration (Lewis 1958:105; Mukherjee 1971:193) and one which shows a remarkable decrease due to land reform (Chak- ravarti 1975:111-12). The table provided by Kessinger (1974:114) appears to show no significant change from 1848 to 1968, though the data are too aggregated to be sure.

Turning from local to regional studies, historical surveys have found increasing concentration in one region of northern India (Stokes 1975) and no real change in a region of southern India (Kumar 1975). Rao (1972) has analyzed the distribution and transfer of lands between 1956 and 1965 in 28 sample villages located in the region of western India where Olegao village is situated. The results are striking: in most cases, the largest share of the total area purchased was bought by smallholders, landless tenants, and other landless persons (p. A-137). (These figures include only market transactions, not lands transferred to tenants through the direct implementation of tenancy reforms.) Likewise, the greatest share of the area sold (about 60-80% in most cases) belonged to the larger landholders. Virtually all the purchased area was bought for cultivation, not as a source of rental income, and there is no evidence that lands were sold to moneylenders (pp. A-139, A-142). I confess it surprises me to find such a high degree of consistency between the data on Olegao and Rao's study of the entire region, since Olegao is in many respects not a typical village. Rao's study amply confirms the conclusions that lands do not necessarily flow from the poor to the rich as India's villages become more commercialized and that even the landless are capable of acquiring land.7 With this confirmation at the regional level, the findings from Olegao are less easily dismissed as the result of sampling error.

The literature contains a number of findings concerning the impact of irrigation, which often facilitates commercialization. One survey of 12 villages in South India reveals no difference in the concentration of holdings between irrigated and unirrigated villages (Chambers and Harriss 1974:16). On the other

7 In another part of his paper, Rao (1972: A-134-A-138) uses cross-sectional data from 1956 to support the inference that concentration was generally increasing before that date. The inferences in this section are circular and unconvincing.

hand, a survey of 84 villages in another part of South India shows a negative association between irrigation and the concentration of landholdings (Gartrell 1974:16). This finding is backed up by regional and national data which tend to indicate that the distribution of irrigated land is more equitable than the distribution of unirrigated land (Sen 1974:40-41; Bardhan and Srinivasan 1971:88; but cf. Kumar 1975:254). This is probably because "small farmers have been found to irrigate a larger proportion of their cultivated area than the large farmers" (Rao 1975:136). At least in this crucial respect, the smallholders are at less of a disadvantage when an opportunity arrives to adopt higher-yielding technologies (Sen 1974:39-49).

Smallholders have also been shown to invest more labor and supervision per acre, generating higher yields than those obtained on larger farms with the "traditional" (nonmecha- nized) technology (Rao 1975:142). This may help to explain why, over the long run and with mechanization proceeding at a fairly slow pace until recently, a number of smallholders in Olegao have been able to improve their positions.

Technical change and the efficient use of irrigation are dependent to some extent on access to markets-that is, on commercialization. There are some empirical and theoretical reasons for supposing that commercialization as such may lead to less concentration. One survey of 11 villages in Bengal shows that there has been less downward mobility among resident landholders in those villages which are closer to market towns (Bandopadhyay n.d.). It is reasonable to hypothesize that proximity to market towns provides more varied and efficient factor and product markets and also more varied sources of off-farm employment (Tang 1958), leading to productive investments in holdings which might otherwise be too small for viability (cf. Smith 1975).

On the specific impact of the Green Revolution technology, some research indicates that incomes and holdings have become more concentrated (Dasgupta 1977). Rao (1975:136-50) argues, as many do, that large landholders have been able to adopt the new technology at a faster rate, but he also believes that land has become less concentrated for other reasons. Some authors point out that, although smallholders may lag in the rate of adoption, a substantial proportion has nevertheless adopted the new technology and obtained proportional increases of income which are not very different frori those obtained by the largest landholders (Bhalla 1974:45-47; cf. Sen 1974:43-54 and the references cited there). Randhawa et al. (1974:168) provide survey data which indicate that more land has been gained by the smallholders and lost by the large ones, as occurred in Olegao. Bhalla (1974:48-49) offers data which suggest that incomes have become less concentrated among those who adopt the new technology, though of course there is a widening disparity between adopters and nonadopt- ers.

These findings deserve more careful comparison and evalua- tion than space permits. The net result, however, is clear: we know little for certain about what has happened to the distribution of land in most parts of India and even less about why it has happened. There may, in fact, be systematic variations, within which the Olegao case would find its proper place. The only way to discover if this is so would be to conduct local and regional comparative studies with controls for such variables as population pressure, migration, irrigation, proximity to markets, cropping patterns, etc.

One study of the Green Revolution (Sen 1974) concludes that technical improvements in production and the increasing commercialization which they entail are not in themselves causes of increasing concentration. On the other hand, the limited improvements in agricultural production (and marketing) which have taken place in India are not in themselves sufficient to cure the problems of rural inequality. Both advo-




cates and critics of the Green Revolution have been too enthusiastic in their claims (Sen 1974:102-4). The evidence from a longer commercial and technical "revolution" in the Olegao area supports Sen's conclusions.

It is probably not agrarian commercialization, but rather insufficient growth of industrial employment and insufficient expansion of the rural infrastructure (especially of irrigation, transportation, and electrification) which have made the problems of rural poverty intractable. Lack of urban employment opportunities and lack of irrigation in their home villages are the main reasons that workers have migrated into the Olegao area in such numbers as to halt or reverse the upward trend in real wages which began in the late 19th century.

Olegao need not be considered a "representative" village to shed light on some of these problems. This investigation is best regarded as the equivalent of a laboratory experiment, conducted under conditions which are unusual but can nevertheless be "controlled" to some degree by taking explicit account of those factors (such as the irrigation canal and the sugar factory) which make them unusual. As with any experiment which generates anomalies in relation to an accepted paradigm, the results may be dismissed in a variety of ways. It is my hope, however, that they will arouse curiosity as well as indignation and that other experiments of this nature will be attempted.

Comments

by MAHADEV L. APTE Department of Anthropology, Duke University, Durham, N.C. 27706, U.S.A. 9 III 79

Attwood is to be congratulated for undertaking the much needed and worthwhile task of rigorous application of Mal- thusian and Marxian theories to a concrete case. He has succeeded in pointing out the problems inherent in such an application, thus demonstrating that many theories, though internally consistent and logical at the analytical level, have built-in weaknesses that make them insufficient to explain empirical data.

Although I agree with his findings and conclusions, I feel that information on the following points would have given even more credence to his analysis: (1) the amount of new land brought under cultivation, as well as the conversion of nonirrigated land to irrigated land, during the 50-year period he examines and the relevance or lack thereof of these factors to changes in landholding patterns; (2) the nature of other transactions (column J in table 2), since these seem to affect some categories substantially; (3) a decade-by-decade break- down of the transactions reported in table 2. This would have helped Attwood to delineate trends in the partition and the buying and selling of land and perhaps to relate them to specific historical events. For instance, such a compilation would have helped him, I believe, to determine the degree of influence wielded by the big land sale during the decade of 1920-30. A somewhat broader issue related to this last point is the effect of availability of land for purchase on economic mobility in Olegao. Although Attwood adjusts his data to eliminate the single case of the sale of 406 acres, it is not clear if he also adjusts them by deleting the purchase of that land by landholders from all categories. Therefore, the question of how this land sale affected the overall gain of +57% among the small landholders is not satisfactorily answered. Villagers in India, especially those who work on the land, are often reluc- tant to sell their land and may do so only as a last resort. This means that although there may be potential buyers, cultivated land may not always be available for purchase.

In discussing his population-pressure model, Attwood argues

that wealthier families tend to remain longer in large joint families. There is, however, evidence to support a counter- argument. For instance, Orenstein (1960), in a survey of 59 villages in the very region in which Olegao is located, found that there were proportionately fewer joint families in those villages that had the most acreage per family under irrigation. Orenstein's explanation is that members of such joint families are likely to separate quickly because irrigated land provides more income in cash and allocating this money may lead to disputes.

Despite the lack of information on the points mentioned above, Attwood's analysis is methodical and thorough. He is quite aware of some inherent weaknesses in his data. I find his conclusions and his attempts to relate them to the general agrarian changes in India stimulating and hope that his paper will encourage others to undertake similar ventures.

by B. S. BAVISKAR Department of Sociology, University of Delhi, Delhi 110007, India. 16 iv 79

We should be grateful to Attwood for taking up the vital and challenging problem of changes in the distribution of land in rural India and for attempting to tackle it systematically and imaginatively. The breaking down of the postulates of the Marxian and Malthusian theories into testable hypotheses and the matching of data with their theoretical propositions is in itself a remarkable achievement. What impresses me most is the honesty and modesty with which Attwood presents his results and the dispassionate, almost clinical manner in which he handles his data in a field in which ideological orientation rather than objective analysis determines the approach of many others. All practising anthropologists know very well how difficult it is to collect and interpret data on landownership in rural India.

While Attwood has convincingly proved that, contrary to popular assumptions, the big landowners have not grown bigger (in fact, some of them have become smaller) and some of the poor have managed to achieve upward mobility, he has not clearly demonstrated the process through which this has happened. To be fair to him, he does mention the factors which contribute to these changes and point out that "it may be impossible to assign relative weights to all these causal factors." I wish he had discussed the processes of landgaining and landlosing in greater detail. It would have enhanced the value of his analysis and provided a more convincing explanation for the changes. Bailey (1957), for example, constructs a model to demonstrate how land comes to the market and shows how various social and political forces have enabled the Distil- lers of Bisipara to acquire such land. Epstein (1962) describes the changes in the ownership and control over land in Wangala and Dalena through effective use of case material. In my opinion, the explanatory power of Attwood's analysis would have been increased if he had adopted either of these methods.

Attwood does not seem to take into account the distinction between landownership and land control, which is very significant in an area of commercial farming. Since cultivation of sugarcane is dependent on control over resources such as irrigation, credit, and other inputs, rich cane growers often cultivate lands owned by poor peasants as legal tenants or under informal arrangements. The tenancy and ceiling laws have made this a widespread practice. In a similar sugarcane growing area in the Ahmednagar district of Maharashtra, I have noted several cases in which rich cane growers cultivate lands owned by poor peasants. Restricting one's attention to change in landownership often leads to ignoring the real inequalities in the effective control over land. I have discussed this phenomenon briefly in my study of sugar cooperatives in Ahmednagar district (Baviskar n.d.).

The above criticism does not in any way reduce the value of

508 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY This content downloaded from 132.174.254.12 on Thu, 26 Mar 2015 14:47:24 UTC



Attwood: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MOBILITY IN INDIA Attwood's contribution to the understanding of a problem which is of interest not only to anthropologists, but to all students of development and change. This discussion will serve an important purpose if more such studies are under- taken to advance the analysis beyond the point to which Attwood has taken it with his painstaking research.

by ALAN R. BEALS Department of Anthiropology, University of California, River- side, Calif. 92521, U.S.A. 10 iv 79

Attwood's explanation of change and mobility in rural western India raises the level of discourse concerning the economics of rural India. The data are abundant, lovingly analyzed, and convincing. There is yet a great deal to know before a convincing explanation can be found. Certainly, as Attwood notes in the conclusion, many more variables need to be considered.

At the outset, it is worth testing the possibility that the reported effect is simply regression to the mean. Since it is difficult for the poor to get poorer and difficult for the rich to get richer, there is always a probability that in any setting more poor will get richer than will get poorer and more rich will get poorer than will get richer.

In Village Life in South India (Beals 1974) I reported that landless laborers are more numerous where lands are irrigated than where they are not. Putting this with Attood's figures, it might be that the increase in number of landless laborers is due to intensification of agriculture related to sugarcane raising. Reduction in the size of landholdings may also be attributed to intensification and to the resulting difficulties encountered in finding capital and efficient labor. In this context, population increase may well be a dependent variable. Attwood's figures suggest that conditions for life have been steadily improving.

In Mysore State, the area around Mandya where Epstein worked was almost depopulated during the 1930s by endemic malaria. Might malaria have been a factor in the rise and fall of farm enterprises in Maharashtra? Might the influenza epidemic of 1919, which caused population reductions in the neighborhood of 30%, have been a factor that killed off old people and caused family divisions to accelerate?

Migration and sojourning may also have had important effects. Did the rich become educated and move away as the author suggests? Were they driven out, like some Madras landlords, because of fear of revolution? Did their widows sell land which they could not farm in order to meet expenses? What effect has the migration of both rich and poor to Bombay had upon the village? Perhaps many of the people who gained land were members of scheduled castes who were given marginal land under government affirmative-action programs.

With regard to the hypotheses, we are left about where we would be left by an article that tested the law of supply and demand in New York during a period of rent control. Economic theories, even Marxist and Malthusian theories, involve constraints. Uncontrolled tests which ignore such constraints are intriguing but hardly decisive. Land distribution is a complex outcome of interactions among a large number of variables. A theory explaining land distribution should arise from a con- ception of the interrelationships among those variables. Hy- potheses derived from the theory can be tested only when laboratory or statistical controls can be applied to all of the implicated variables.

I would like to see the author develop a more sophisticated theory utilizing all of the variables mentioned in the paper and included in the tables. The relationship between family man- power (not personpower) and landholdings needs to be investigated, as does the optimial size of agricultural holdings. Some of the data in table 4 suggest that the size of holding that could be operated efficiently has declined as a result of new technology.

by EDWIN EAMES Department of Anthropology, Bernard M. Baruch College, 17 Lexington Ave., New York, N.Y. 10010, U.S.A. 12 III 79

Attwood's research clearly challenges many of the assumptions of Malthusian and Marxist doctrine. He has derived testable propositions and, through careful use of his own data, shown the degree to which such statements are validated or invalidated by the data. What is surprising and intriguing about the analysis is that it calls into question many of the more pessi- mistic views of what is happening in Indian villages and perhaps throughout the entire peasant world. We read much about peripheral (dominated) and central (dominant) zones of economic development in the current anthropological literature. Unless Attwood's village community is considered to be central rather than peripheral, it clearly departs from trends noted in other parts of the world. As Attwood notes, it is essential that similar studies be conducted in other regions of India to test the degree to which the trend he has noted is widespread rather than atypical or idiosyncratic.

Attwood's community has a sugarcane cooperative that at- tracts workers from outside. He argues that this population can be set aside in the analysis, since he is concerned only with change in landownership. Some might argue with this point.

Although the article is quite convincing, there are several issues it does not consider. Perhaps the most important of these, related to Malthusian doctrine, is population growth; setting aside the issues of migration by concentrating upon household units and their mobility as measured by landholdings, we obtain little information about the population size of the village. Further, harvest yields and their cash equivalent may have doubled in the period 1920-70, thus compensating for the decline in the average size of landholdings.

Perhaps the most telling statistic reported is the decline in the standard deviation of landholdings. This one fact does more to challenge Marxist doctrine than most of the more recent philosophically based arguments in anthropology.

by J. Vr. FERREIRA Department of Sociology, University of Bombay, Bombay 400098, India. 5 II 79

Attwood merits considerable praise for having given us a very instructive paper.

To have demonstrated, however limitedly, that "there has been a considerable amount of mobility, upward as well as downward, among families with all sizes of landholdings and even among families with no land at all" and, again, that "land has not tended to become concentrated in fewer hands" is a healthy corrective to the sweeping claims of the Malthusian and Marxian "perspectives."

I like Attwood's use of the term "perspectives" to describe these two points of view, but he lapses time and again, perhaps inadvertently, into confusion by also using the term "theories." This term has now acquired so many confusing meanings that it is better avoided by students of the sociocultural disciplines.

As Attwood points out, not much work has been done in India or elsewhere along the lines which he has followed in this paper. Since, however, his conclusions are so significant, I take this opportunity of appealing to all students of the sociocultural disciplines to follow in his footsteps and inform us whether his conclusions hold for other areas or not. My own view is that they should, with variations.

When Attwood concludes, further, that "the cultivators of Olegao, like the peasants in early 20th-century Russia, have undergone a complex pattern of 'multidirectional and cyclical mobility' which cannot be fitted to any monistic theory of change," he is talking the language of the humanities, but when he adds that his "investigation is best regarded as the




equivalent of a laboratory experiment" he lapses into a posi- tivistic frame of reference. This oscillation occurs frequently in the sociocultural disciplines and is best explicable in terms of subjective dialectics.

by SYLVIA M. HALE Department of Social Science, St. Thomas University, Frederic- ton, N.B., Canada E3B 5G3. 7 II 79

This article undertakes the systematic testing of clearly stated hypotheses drawn from two rival theories of development- class polarization and population pressure. The study offers a methodological approach of critical value in overcoming the blinkers of political ideology. It is refreshingly free of the ad hoc escape clauses by which many theorists protect themselves from refutation.

Attwood focuses on key predictions on which the two theories conflict. The class-polarization theory predicts that land will become concentrated in the hands of elites as they buy out impoverished small holdings, thus increasing the class differential. The population-pressure thesis predicts reduced concentration of land, as all holdings shrink through partition rather than sale, with fairly stable relative ranking.

The research findings refute both sets of hypotheses. Evidence that elites have sold lands and that the differential in landholdings has decreased refutes the class-polarization hypothesis. Evidence that once small landowners have been gaining land through purchases, offsetting the effects of partition, refutes the population-pressure hypotheses.

The conclusion is that both theories, as stated, are falsified. Logically, either the underlying theoretical assumptions must be false or critical restricting conditions must be placed on the theories. It is the latter avenue which I shall explore here. Data from Attwood's study suggest that a crucial limiting condition is omitted from the statement of the theories- namely, the availability of new sources of livelihood through commercial investment in factories and through wage labour. The derivation of both sets of hypotheses incorporates the im- plicit assumption of a closed feudal land-based economy, but the hypotheses are tested in the context of an expanding factory system which provides alternative avenues for capital investment and income. The data suggest that for this reason neither set of predictions holds.

Explicit inclusion of this condition radically alters the hypotheses which can be derived from each theory. The class- polarization theory would predict that landed elites have the capital resources to invest in more lucrative business, while poorer people remain in agriculture, where they are subject to a declining relative, although possibly increasing absolute, level of living. The population-pressure theory would predict a reprieve in the process of emmiseration in that factory wages can provide a livelihood for a larger number of people than can be supported by agriculture alone.

The two resources, land and wages, are intimately related. It is access to more lucrative investment opportunities which may persuade the elites to sell some of their marginally productive lands and access to wages which may give the landless the funds with which to purchase land. The two theories also com- plement rather than conflict with each other when this condition is introduced. The greater attraction of alternative investment may stimulate elites to release marginal lands for sale, which in turn reduces the effects of population pressure on land.

Attwood's data on first sight appear to contradict the prediction of increasing differential drawn from the class-polarization theory. The problem, however, is that measurement of relative wealth is confined to land. Attwood acknowledges that "there are other resources in a village economy besides land," but these are not explored. Their potential importance is under- scored by his observation that "land was not bought up during the depression by urban rentiers or financiers: it was simply

not a profitable investment...." Furthermore, "by 1970 land had become even less profitable for rentiers."

Additional data are needed for a test of the revised hypotheses. What happened to the once large landowners who sold some land? Did the majority sell their land because they were impoverished, or because they did not want it? Have they in fact become poorer, or only divested themselves of marginal landholdings while they concentrate investments in the sugar industry and prosper as educated and elite employees in sugar factories? Have the strata of poor and once landless labourers significantly reduced the income differential through factory wages and subsequent purchase of land, or does this absolute improvement disguise an increasing differential in standards of living as the nonagricultural sources of income become more important?

I hope that Attwood will further explore the interrelation between the two theories when the condition of expanding alternative opportunity structures is given explicit recognition.

by JOHN HARRISS School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia, Norwich, England. 25 ii 79

Attwood's paper is notable for the care and thoroughness of his analysis, but I wonder whether he has not erected a straw man with his "class-polarisation" theory in spite of his pro- testations to the contrary. He sets up a mechanical model of class polarisation as the result of the "commercialisation" of agriculture, but one in which the processes whereby this might come about are largely ignored. He proceeds to falsify this model against his data, which is interesting but, I suggest, only confirms what we already know-that such a mechanical model of the transformation of an agrarian economy as it is penetrated by capitalism simply will not do. It is true that on the basis of Marx's own analysis of the development of capitalist agriculture in England and Lenin's work on the development of capitalism in Russia, some Marxists, in particular, have assumed that differentiation and polarisation amongst the peasantry must necessarily occur as capitalist production ex- pands. Yet the historical experience of large parts of Europe shows that such tendencies are not invariably produced and that family farming may remain "the most successful form of production for putting the maximum volume of surplus peasant labour at the disposal of urban capitalists" (Vergo- poulos 1978:446). Further, in India an important debate has been concerned with forms of capitalist development in agriculture (Alvai 1975; Banerjee 1975; Patnaik 1976; Sau 1976)- a debate which is entirely ignored by Attwood. It is possible to conclude from this debate that the development of capitalism in the specific conditions of Indian agriculture is "distorted," partly because of the continuing reproduction of small-scale property (instead of concentration) and the development of merchant capital associated with it (Banerjee 1975; B. Harriss 1979; J. Harriss 1979). I suggest that Attwood's analysis would have contributed more to our understanding of the agrarian economy if he had not set up his class-polarisation model without reference to the processes which underlie empirical patterns of differentiation-those of the expansion and development of capitalism. What Attwood's work shows is that there has been a substantial development of commercial, capitalistic production and that in the process a number of initially quite large producers have gone to the wall-something very characteristic of developing capitalism, which is a messy business. It appears that small-scale production per- sists-but what has happened to the concentration of economic power, and what determines the structure and organisation of the whole economy? Trends in landholding may be a poor guide in answering these questions, especially in an economy in which moneylending and speculative trading are important means of appropriating surpluses (see, for example, Wash-




Attwood: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MOBILITY IN INDIA brook's [1976: chap. 1] analysis of the dryland economies of the Madras Presidency). In short, Attwood's concern with the empirical phenomenon of trends in landholding is rather abstracted from examination of the determinants of development and change in the economy.

by N. KRISHNAJI Centre for Development Studies, Aakulam Rd., Ulloor, Tri- vandrum 695011, Kerala, India. 13 ii 79

I shall restrict myself to Attwood's treatment of Marxian theory. The latter is a theory of classes, and any testable hypotheses derived from it have to be based on class categories defined in a Marxian way; there is no logically consistent way of disputing Marxian hypotheses by looking at the size of landholdings as a proxy for the class status of the landowner. Owners of large holdings may be rentiers (leasing out land) or capitalist farmers (relying wholly on wage labour for cultivation) or both. Households owning small plots of land may derive their subsistence largely from family labour expended on their own land or depend on wages as an additional, or even a major, source of income. Thus class status cannot be determined from the size of landholdings alone, although the latter is often one of its important determinants. By the same token, the categories of "rich" and "poor" are not Marxian, especially when they are defined in terms of landholdings.

The Marxian theory relevant to Attwood's analysis, or the class-polarisation theory, as he calls it, is a theory of transition of classes under the development of capitalism. The theory equates the latter with the separation of direct producers from the means of production (and, in the case of agriculture, as developed by Kautsky and Lenin, with the progressive disinte- gration of the "middle peasantry"), giving rise to the classes of proletarians and capitalists. Middle peasants are character- ised, in societies in transition, in which markets have already made inroads into the natural economy, by minimal involve- ment in markets (as buyers and sellers) and incapacity for being categorised as either exploiters or exploited, although they may in reality be involved in markets to varying degrees as buyers and sellers of both labour power and products of agriculture. It is here that the distinction between commercial and capitalist farming becomes crucial. After markets-internal and external -have evolved, to whatever extent, commercial farming on a significant scale can coexist with an inadequate development of capitalist relations, i.e., the lack of a clear-cut tendency towards polarisation of the agrarian society. The point is important, for there do exist social formations in which family farming on a wide scale and inadequate development of land and labour markets coexist with a fairly high degree of commercial farming. Kerala, where poor and middle peasants cultivate such commercial crops as coconuts, rubber, and spices, is an excellent case in point.

What is "upward mobility" in this, Marxian, context? It is certainly not the movement of households from one size-class of landholdings to the next higher. Indeed, the Marxian model not only does not rule out such mobility, but explicitly allows for it, for as the middle peasantry disintegrates some peasants accumulate assets and land and become capitalists. The process relevant in this context is the gradual subordination of land to capital, not the concentration of land in the hands of a few "rich," although the two processes may coincide when capitalism becomes the predominant mode. In any case, such processes may not be clearly visible when the pace of the development of capitalism is slow.

It is impossible to study these processes at work in transitional societies in terms of changes in the distribution of land alone. Attwood eschews class categories, "because 'class' has different meanings for different people." How can he claim to have "tested" the class-polarisation theory? What remains in the paper is the set of empirical observations concerning

"landlosers" and "landgainers." The only inference which can be drawn from these observations is that, under certain historical circumstances, commercialisation need not lead to concentration in landownership (in terms of surface area) through a process of transfer of land from small to large landholders. This may be interesting as such but does not constitute a refutation of Marxian hypotheses. To test the latter, a number of additional questions have to be asked: Did agricultural labourers (landless or otherwise) acquire land and become self- sufficient peasants on a significant scale? Were the "rich" landlosers capitalist farmers losing land to small landowners or feudal types losing land to those engaging wage labour? Which class or classes of farmers have accumulated assets through the process of commercialisation? Has the latter led to the development of capitalist relations, and if so, at what pace? And so on.

by M. K. KUDRYAVTSEV

Institute of Ethnography, Universitetskaya 3, Leningrad 199164, U.S.S.R. 12 ii 79

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[This paper is based on the field investigation of its author in one of the villages of Maharashtra in 1970-71 and some comparative data from 1920. Thus it covers a period of 50 years. In Attwood's opinion, India during that time was "the great proving ground for theories of global economic disaster." Therefore he examines the material collected in accordance with two lines of hypotheses: one based on the Malthusian theory of impoverishment due to absolute overpopulation, the other on the Marxian theory of class polarization and impoverishment due to expropriation and exploitation. Change and mobility in village population are considered in terms of two directions: downward and upward. The author distinguishes only three landholding categories: landkeepers, or original holders, landgainers, who became holders during the period in question, and landlosers, who lost their holdings. In each category there are large landholders and smallholders. The landless population is not classified at all except to distinguish immigrants within it.

The main conclusions on the 50-year development of landholding in the village may be summarized in terms of the following points: the proportion of landless villagers has increased, but mainly through immigration; the land has not become concentrated in fewer hands, because the large holdings have not expanded and have even diminished; the downward mobility of some has been accompanied by the upward mobility of others; downward mobility was a result both of partition of holdings and of land sales; sales and purchases were more intensive among smallholders than among large ones.

While stating these results, the author abstains from any generalization and practically refuses to explain some of them. They appear to him unexpected. It is strange that he does not take into consideration the influence of the land reforms in independent India upon the landholding situation in the village. The situation itself and many of the author's conclusions become more comprehensible in the light of these reforms. Further, instead of adopting 1920 as the period for comparison, it would have been better to use data from the period on the eve of these agrarian reforms.

Another weak point of the paper is the absolute refusal to take into account the caste composition of the rural population-the role of castes in social life in general and in land relations in particular. Thus a rather high percentage of the landless village population consists of nonagricultural professional castes. Their position in rural society is essentially different from that of the landless agricultural castes; they have property and income independent of agriculture, whereas the landlessness of the others is pregnant with poverty. Caste traditions influence the character of inheritance, landholding, and land alienation. Taking into account the caste composition of the property groups distinguished would allow a more precise statement both of the initial hypotheses and of the conclusions.]

by JAYANT K. LELE Department of Sociology, Queen's University, Kingston, Ont., Canada. 15 iii 79

In western India, where irrigation covers less than 10% of the cultivable land, a canal is like the descent of the Ganges. Olegao has had this privilege since 1885. Significant changes have occurred in cultivation patterns and in man-land relationships. Attwood has studied a 50-year period of social mobility in this

village through data on land ownership. Handling very difficult data with statistical virtuosity, he has arrived at conclusions that are, in appearance, somewhat startling. Despite a long period of commercialization of inputs and products, no significant concentration of land in the hands of rich landlords or moneylenders has occurred. The size of the category of landless labourers has increased, but perhaps this increase is largely due to alternative nonagricultural employment. While downward mobility has prevailed, upward movement has also been significant. Some of the poor have become richer, even though population increase and parcelization of land as well as land sales have contributed to a general downward trend in mobility.

These are important findings for the social history of the region. They are a major improvement on speculations about mobility and a global understanding of some basic structural forces. For that very reason, they lead me back to those forces. There are several questions that seem pertinent. For example, what was the initial impact of private property rights (of sale and mortgage) on the preceding configuration of social, cultural, political, and economic relations? Did the commercialization of land proceed much more slowly than that of inputs and products? How did this affect sales and mortgages of land in the first period of transition? Since the size of holdings shows a tendency to hover around a mean, how does it relate to the question of an efficient unit of production at a given level of development of productive forces (family farms and low-level technology)? Above all, how did new property relations and the commercialization of production affect local man-land relations, and what repercussions did they have on the activities of the state in the colonial and postcolonial eras?

These questions arise logically from both Attwood's conclusions and his hypotheses, which are derived from propositions about the impact of colonial rule. British rule brought with it a cash economy and changes in property relations. Their con- sequences-credit bottlenecks, the alienation and sale of land, and the pauperization of the peasantry-were part of the logic of the market, of the principles of profitability and competi- tion. There is nothing "Marxian" about them. The inherent contradictions that necessarily lead commercial economies to excesses generate political reaction and corrective counter- tendencies through state intervention. Historically derived propositions about colonial rule address themselves simul- taneously to the laws of the market and the role of the state. In western India, early commercialization produced its anticipated results, such as the riots of the richer peasants against moneylenders in 1875. The state intervened to ease the impact through commissions of inquiry and legislation to halt land transfers, to extend easy credit, to protect tenants, and to subsidize land improvements. This activity began in 1879, continued through the colonial period, and became more intense under the postcolonial state. The first economic and political impact to which Attwood's hypotheses relate came during the 50 years that preceded the period of his study. As a result, he is less sensitive to this history of the region. He also seems to lose sight of the continuity of relationships of production, market, the state, and the class-caste configurations of local political power. When he invokes notions such as the Asiatic society and class polarization, he does so outside of a historically developed complex theory within which their contingent meanings nest. His orientation towards that theory is ahistorical. He works within a positivistically abridged nexus of ideas about theory, hypotheses, and proof. He denies history when he claims Olegao as his "laboratory."

For me the value of Attwood's work does not depend on the "validity" of his hypotheses. It is a fascinating piece of research because it gives us a rare glimpse into an aspect of the social history of the region and because it generates some very important questions about his concrete observations on social mobility.




Attwood: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MOBILITY IN INDIA by DAVID G. MANDELBAUM Department of Ant hropology, University of California, Berkeley, Calif. 94720, U.S.A. 3 ii 79

It would be useful if the author could give us more information on just how some of the poor of Olegao village became richer. A landless village family in India usually has difficulty in obtaining sufficient land for its subsistence for several reasons. One may be the lack of capital with which to buy the land, another the inability to buy the tools and animals needed for cultivation, still another the resistance of fellow villagers of higher, wealthier status. Some landless families may be able to amass sufficient savings from factory wages to buy land; others may be favored and encouraged by wealthier kin; occasionally some obtain land through governmental grants and preferences. Whatever case examples can be cited for Olegao should give us more understanding of how certain of the landless managed to acquire some land.

Landlosers may, in considerable part, have left the village for better employment and a higher standard of living elsewhere, as occurred in the village described by Beteille and cited by Attwood. The author's comments on this matter should also help us understand what happened in Olegao.

Another question concerns the relation between gains and losses in land and changes in general social status and in power. To what degree have shifts in landownership reflected or stimulated changes in status and power within the village and in its vicinity?

by JOAN P. MENCHER Department of Anthropology, Lehman College, Bedford Park Blvd. West, Bronx, N.Y. 10468, U.S.A. 9 III 79

Attwood's presentation of excellent and interesting field data from what was until recently a dry region of Maharashtra makes a significant contribution to knowledge about this region. However, I find his theoretical discussion extremely frustrating. His discussion of the class-polarization theory is oversimplified in several ways.

First, while it is clear that inequality in landholdings has a long history in South Asia, the degree and type of inequality have differed significantly between traditional dry regions (where there were few agricultural laborers and limited tenancy in pre-British times) and wet regions (where there have always been many agricultural laborers, as well as tenants, in a multi- tiered system). One of the major factors which has led to increased polarization in many wet regions has been the decrease in the number of tenants as landowners, especially larger landowners, reclaim land for personal cultivation-both because they expect to make more profits this way and because they fear that tenancy legislation might ultimately give tenants some rights to the land (as has happened in Kerala).

Secondly, I am struck by the absence of any reference to the Studies in the Economics of Farm Management published by the Directorate of Economics and Statistics of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture of the Government of India. In an excellent study making use of these materials for three districts in three different states of India (Muzaffarnagar, Ferozepur, and Coimbatore), Vaidyanathan (1978:76-77) points out that there has been a significant increase in the use of hired labor and continues: The phenomenal rise in the hired labour is associated with a general tendency in all districts for increase in the size of operational holdings. The average size of holdings, as well as the area operated per holding has increased sharply, between 30 and 40 percent, in all districts. That this has taken place during a period when the average cultivated area per capita must have declined, permits of only one inference, namely that the small farmers and tenants have increasingly been dispossessed of their holdings and have swelled the ranks of the agricultural labour classes dependlent primarily on wage employment.

(Though Vaidyanathan's study is not yet published, the data on which it is based are available.)

The area where Attwood worked has a strikingly small amount of absentee lhndlordism, in sharp contrast to most of the wet areas found in such states as Tamilnadu, West Bengal, or Kerala. In fact, one of the ways in which people in these areas have managed to circumvent the land ceilings has been to put land in the names of relatives far and wide, thus making it appear on paper that holdings are small, whereas many households actually have very large operational holdings. Since Attwood's data come from regions of low absentee landholdings, I am very uneasy about his generalizations beyond that region.

Clearly, present land reforms and land ceilings have made it somewhat difficult for large landowners to retain their land. Attwood discusses the loss of land resulting from partitions among the large landowning families and notes that most have not bought new land to maintain the size of their holdings. It has been my experience in other parts of India (mainly wet-rice regions) that, during the past 20 years, larger landowners have often chosen to use extra capital to diversify their economic interests-e.g., to buy rice mills, paper mills, busses, brick kilns, etc.-rather than to keep all their assets in the land. Thus their wealth, while much greater than before-as is apparent to all villagers from their high standard of living (children sent to boarding school, piped water and electrical appliances in the home, cars and tractors)-is not all in the land.

Finally, Attwood's presentation ignores certain relevant work by some of the Indian leftists, such as N. Krishnaji. Specifically for Attwood's argument, Krishnaji (1977) has proposed an explanation for the fact that the so-called middle peasantry has not collapsed, as predicted by Marxist theory. He points out that there have been conscious governmental policies- such as subsidies for irrigation costs, electricity, other water charges, fertilizers, pesticides, etc., as well as pricing policies (especially in the wheat regions)-which have helped the middle peasant enormously and have prevented this sector from having to sell off its land. Thus it is clearly not just natural forces, such as those described by Attwood, but conscious government intervention that has prevented further polarization.

by MONI NAG Population Council, 1 Dag Hammarskjold Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017, U.S.A. 22 ii 79

Attwood has made a significant contribution, both conceptually and methodologically. He has demonstrated how anthropological technique can be fruitfully used to study a problem which has so far stimulated research primarily among economists. The ways in which the resources of a society are redistributed as a consequence of various economic and social changes are currently of great importance to the policy makers of less developed countries. The studies done by economists on the basis of large-scale sample survey data have given the impres- sion that the development projects of the past few decades have generally resulted in the concentration of resources among the richer sections of society. Attwood's skillful analysis shows that such a generalization is questionable, at least for the redistribution of land.

I have one reservation about Attwood's methodology. In his analysis he uses as a measure the landholdings of a family rather than per capita holdings. The landkeepers with smaller holdings in 1970 are likely to have, on the average, a larger number of surviving children than the landkeepers with larger holdings. The former are also perhaps more likely to have joint holdings, i.e., sharing the expenses and products of cultivation. These factors may be responsible for a bias in overestimating their holdings and thus underestimating the concentration of resources among the richer sections.




by J. ALBERT RORABACHER Department of Geography, South Dakota State University, Brookings, S.D. 57007, U.S.A. 24 ii 79

There has been a spate of articles and papers attempting to adapt Marxist theory to the non-Western socioeconomic systems of many less developed countries. Likewise, with nations experiencing rapid population growth, one is often lulled into the acceptance of the Malthusian theory of mass impoverishment as a satisfactory explanation for growing rural poverty. Neither explanation adequately addresses the issues or does justice to the intricacies of rural Indian society. Further, while conceptually tempting, the Marxist and Malthusian theories have tended to distract many scholars from building their own theories or models. It is far easier to test existing theories than to frame more suitable explanations for phenomena observed in the field.

This situation is further complicated by the fact that many scholars, for either personal or ideological reasons, use existing theory as a straw man. While Attwood suggests that he has tried not to do this, I think he has done so nevertheless. In his conclusions, neither theory adequately explains the character of socioeconomic mobility in Olegao. One might ask: Within the context of such a specialized setting as Olegao, would any large-scale theory explain the action of a few families over a period of 50 years? I think not. This observation is the more important since "Olegao is in many respects not a typical village," even for its region.

Attwood's project is complicated by a variety of data limitations. First, since all survey research relies heavily upon respondents' abilities to recall facts, figures, and dates, and within traditional peasant societies without accurate book- keeping methods, much information and accuracy of data is lost. In Attwood's study the when and how of land transfers are very important. If they cannot be accurately reconstructed, the processes at work cannot be understood. Second, Attwood states that "it was impossible to trace the sample of family holdings back in time without missing important types of transactions." I must disagree. It may be tedious and painstaking to trace land transactions back through time, but it is not impossible. R. S. Smith of Cambridge recently studied all the transactions of one village in Ludhiana district, Punjab, for the period 1885 to 1947. Such an attempt would seem essential to this study. Finally, such a study is dependent upon reliable data. I find Attwood's belief that his respondents "were reasonably frank" to be grossly naive. In my experience, cultivators tend either to exaggerate or to understate the basis of their wealth, and in the absence of accurate supportive documentation one never knows the true nature of the bias.

On the basis of the village background data and the data Attwood collected, an alternative explanation might be tendered, one that might explain both the upward and downward mobility of the people of Olegao. The success of anyone in Olegao can be measured in terms of his ability to manage resources. The greatest benefits from either the Green Revolu- tion technologies or growing cash economies accrue to those who possess a keener capacity for the management of their resources or have better entrepreneurial skills. This is particularly true in scarce-resource situations, during periods of hard- ship, and relates to both administrative and political environ- ments through which access to resources is frequently controlled. Those able to cultivate relations with the local and district officials tend to acquire the inputs or opportunities for upward mobility-the acquisition of land through purchase. Upward mobility would indicate skillful management of existing resources and the ability to take advantage of new opportunities. Downward mobility would indicate simply a landholder's inability to cope with situations requiring more sophisticated, far-sighted entrepreneurial and managerial skills. An example of this is the case of the large landholder who was forced to part with 406 acres because of overextension during

the great depression. A managerial-entrepreneurial explanation tends to explain far more than Attwood's class-polarization or population-pressure theories.

by HILARY STANDING AFRAS, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9QN, Sussex, U.K. 20 II 79

Attwood's excellent paper should be required reading for every- one with an interest in South Asian peasants, but particularly for those disposed to be seduced by Marxist and Malthusian theories. Dogmas are seldom put to test by their proponents.

The methodology is pioneering, and one hopes that others will take it up and refine it further. The difficulties of this kind of empirical testing in India are well known. Unfortunately for many theories, including the ones under examination, land rights in South Asia are rarely amenable to classification in terms of exclusive categories such as "landlord" and "tenant," and this may be one reason few serious attempts have been made to test theories against data on actual cultivated holdings. It may also be that such testing is empirically more straight- forward in Maharashtra than it would be in other parts of India, as, to use the important distinction insisted upon by Stokes (1978:282 n), cultivating and proprietary rights do by and large coincide.

This brings me to two possible criticisms-one of assumption and one of method. Both the theories under scrutiny and the paper itself assume size of landholding to be an index of wealth. Insofar as the paper is a test of the validity of theories which are based on this assumption, the incorporation of size of landholding into the set of propositions to be tested is clearly necessary. However, the paper is titled "Why Some of the Poor Get Richer," suggesting that the author also accepts this assumption as valid. This may be so, but we do not have much information by which to judge. We do not know what happened subsequently to the big cane growers who lost their lands in the slump. Has there been no diversification into other kinds of enterprise or employment? Nor is it possible to disentangle from the tables what proportion of land is under sugarcane for different sizes of holding.

In terms of method: from the point of view of the class- polarisation theory, the influx of landless immigrants cannot be so easily dismissed by accounting for their presence in terms of increased employment opportunities without at the same time considering whether they have suffered land losses. Such evidence as there is suggests that few cultivators with land willingly give it up to become landless labourers, even for high wages. Are they a constant population, or do they reflect an increasing pauperisation of former proprietors? In short, the objection would be that a village is not an appropriate socio- logical unit for a true assessment of Marxist-derived theories.

These seem to me to be minor points, however, in that sufficient carefully worked data are at hand to cast doubt on the central propositions of two influential theories in a given context. The class-polarisation theory seems to be in particular trouble, as it does not lend itself to the kind of piecemeal acceptance occasionally advocated by the author. The proposition that the poor are getting poorer depends on the further proposition that the rich are getting richer. If doubt is cast on either of these propositions, then the status of the whole is surely in doubt?

by ZOLTAN TAGANYI MTA Szociol6giai Kutat6 Intezete, Uri u. 49 1250 pf. 20, Budapest, Hungary. 22 ii 79

Attwood writes about landownership without considering the fact that the system of land tenure is specifically Indian and of a particular historical origin. Under the jajman system, described by Lewis (1958), landowners gave land or crops to




others in exchange for services. This phenomenon of exchange of services was very widespread and important in maintaining the caste system. We can observe the remnants of this system in Attwood's mention of sharecropping and tenancy. Examina- tion of its historical origin is called for because it can be found not only all over East Asia, but also in the homeland of the Moguls. Thus Lewis writes of the maliks, who have a special place in the caste system of India, but this term also appears in Afghanistan in reference to the leader of a village community.

The village investigated by Attwood has an irrigation system, so we would expect to find in it the bureaucratic power arrangements which Wittfogel, in his discussion of Oriental despotism, has considered characteristic of such systems because of their need for collective effort and mutual aid. Thus the British colonial administration introduced some institutions of a feudalistic character to insure tax revenues. The zamindars referred to by Henry Sumner Maine were absentee landlords and had the task of collecting taxes for the British. While they were not present everywhere, as Lewis points out, the question of their existence should be raised.

A further shortcoming of this paper is that it investigates only a single village and lacks a full description of its connections with the surrounding area. Attwood tells us something about the outside world, but there is no systematic review of connections of this kind. This is worth attention because it has been shown that members of the lower castes, especially craftsmen, often seek to move from village to city (Kudryavtsev 1971). Perhaps this neglect of the wider context is a consequence of the tradition of monographic studies of closed communities in isolation as seen in structuralist and functionalist anthropological and miscrosociological research.

Attwood correctly points out that the joint family is characteristic of the higher levels of social stratification. This important fact is not always taken into account, and it is of interest in that the same is true of European peasant society. Further, he observes that landholdings in the higher strata have a cyclical character. Again, this is also true in Europe and important for the study of social structure.

[D. W. Attwood's reply appears in the Newsletter (pp. 657-58).- EDITOR.]

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Wanted

a Contributions to a third volume in the series Social Change in the Modern Philippines: Perspectives, Problems, and Pros- pects, published by the editors of the University of Oklahoma Papers in Anthropology. This volume will deal mainly with aspects of directed sociocultural change under the Marcos mar- tial-law regime. Preference will be given to papers by Philippine specialists who have not contributed to previous volumes. For particulars, write Mario D. Zamora, Department of Anthro- pology, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Va. 23185, U.S.A.

* Manuscripts for a text to be entitled Ethnohistory: A Researcher's Manual, edited by Gerry C. Williams, Mario D. Zamora, and Denis Wiedman. The goal is to represent the wide range of source materials available to the researcher and the techniques involved in their use. The volume will include contributions from archivists, anthropologists, historians, geographers, and others dealing with the use of photographs, maps, census materials, manuscripts, government documents, and so on. Individuals interested in contributing papers should write either Gerry C. Williams, CC 209 Bristol Terrace, Lawrence, Kans. 66044 or Mario D. Zamora, Department of Anthropology, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Va. 23185, U.S.A.




Why Some of the Poor Get Richer: Economic Change and Mobility in Rural Western India

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