Virtus significationis, violentia usus. Porretan views on Theological Hermeneutics

LESSICO INTELLETTUALE EUROPEO

MEDIEVAL THEORIESON ASSERTIVE AND

NON-ASSERTIVE LANGUAGEActs of the 14th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics

Rome, June 11-15, 2002

Edited by

ALFONSO MAIERU and LUISA VALENTE

LEO S. OLSCHKI EDITORE2004

CONTENTS

VII Preface

1 IRENE ROSIER-CATACH, Les discussions sur le signifié des propositionschez Abélard et ses contemporains

35 KEVIN GUILFOY, Peter Abelard’s Two Theories of the Proposition

59 JOHN MARENBON, Dicta, Assertion and Speech Acts: Abelard and someModern Interpreters

81 IWAKUMA YUKIO, Are Argumentations Propositions?

111 CHRISTOPHER J. MARTIN, Propositionality and Logic in the Ars Meliduna

129 STEN EBBESEN, Porretaneans on Propositions

141 ALLAN BACK, Avicenna on the Categorical Assertion

163 LUISA VALENTE, Virtus significationis, violentia usus. Porretan Viewson Theological Hermeneutics

185 COSTANTINO MARMO, Una semantica del verbo nella grammatica e nel-la teologia tra XII e XIII secolo

207 SIMO KNUUTTILA, Wodeham’s Cognitive Theory of the Passions

219 C. H. KNEEPKENS, The via antiqua and the via moderna in Grammar:the late Medieval Discussions on the Subject of the Sentence

245 CHRISTOPH KANN, Assertive and non-Assertive Sentences. Classifica-tions of the oratio perfecta in the Thirteenth Century

259 FREDERIC GOUBIER, Propositions modales et paradigmes logiques auXIIIe siècle

289 ANDREA TABARRONI, «Plures interrogationes»: A Fallacy in Question?

307 GIORGIO PINI, Scotus on Assertion and the Copula: a Comparison withAquinas

333 FABRIZIO AMERINI, Le statut de la proposition chez Hervé de Nédellec

355 ERNESTO PERINI-SANTOS, La structure de la proposition modale ockham-ienne

VI Contents

377 AURELIEN ROBERT, Les propositions singulières chez Guillaume d’Ockham

401 PALOMA PEREZ-ILZARBE, Complexio, enunciatio, assensus: the Role ofPropositions in Knowledge According to John Buridan

415 GYULA KLIMA, John Buridan and the Force-Content Distinction

429 JOEL BIARD, Signification et assertion chez Blaise de Parme

445 LAURENT CESALLI, «Ubi est propositio?» Richard Brinkley sur les lieuxde la proposition (Summa Logicae V.1-5)

473 ALESSANDRO D. CONTI, Complexe significabile and Truth in Gregoryof Rimini and Paul of Venice

495 RICHARD GASKIN, Complexe Significabilia and the Formal Distinction

517 E. JENNIFER ASHWORTH, Singular Terms and Predication in Some lateFifteenth and Sixteenth century Thomistic Logicians

537 ANGEL D’ORS, «Propositiones de modo loquendi inconsueto: de mixtasuppositione»

571 Index of manuscripts

573 Index of names

VIRTUS SIGNIFICATIONIS, VIOLENTIA USUS.PORRETAN VIEWS ON THEOLOGICAL HERMENEUTICS *

LUISA VALENTE

The intention of this paper is to make a small contribution to the histo-ry of medieval hermeneutics in general, and to the history of the distinctionvirtus sermonis vs. usus in particular.

This distinction was current in grammar and logic during the 13th and14th century,1 and in the 14th century it had a relevant part in a huge philo-sophico-institutional debate.2

Very roughly said, the distinction virtus sermonis vs. usus is connectedwith the idea that every proposition may be interpreted under two differentpoints of view. The first point of view is when one takes into account onlythe intrinsic characteristics of language: that is, basically, the proper mean-ings of the words, and the syntactical rules. This type of interpretation iscalled from the 13th century onwards de virtute sermonis. The second pointof view is when one takes into account also the level of how a proposition ismeant and used by its author and/or how it is understood by those who lis-ten to it or read it. This second way is said then ex usu, secundum usum.

* I would like to thank Irène Rosier-Catach, Alfonso Maierù, and Kevin Guilfoy for theirattentive reading of this text and their usefull suggestions. For the correction of the english versionI am very grateful to Steven Loechel and Kevin Guilfoy. All imprecisions and mistakes are obvious-ly my own responsabilities.

1 Cf. C. MARMO, Semiotica e linguaggio nella scolastica, Roma, Istituto Storico Italiano per ilMedioevo, 1994 («Nuovi Studi Storici», 26), passim, and I. ROSIER, La parole comme acte. Sur lagrammaire et la sémantique au XIII e siècle, Paris, Vrin, 1994 («Sic et non»), passim.

2 About the parisian statute of 1340 and the meaning of the distinction de virtute sermonisvs. ex usu: R. LAMBERTINI, C. MARMO, A. TABARRONI, Virtus verborum: linguaggio ed interpretazionenel Dialogus di Guglielmo d’Ockham, in Langages et philosophie. Hommage à Jean Jolivet, edd. A.de Libera, A. Elamrani-Jamal, A. Galonnier, Paris, Vrin, 1997, p. 221-238; A. DE LIBERA, Référenceet quantification. Sur la théorie de la distributio au XIII e siècle, ibid., p. 177-200, particularly p.196-200; Z. KALUZA, Les sciences et leur languages. Note sur le Statut du 29 décembre 1340 et leprétendu Statut perdu contre Ockam, in Filosofia e teologia nel Trecento. Studi in ricordo di EugenioRandi, ed. L. Bianchi, Louvain-la-Neuve, Fédération Internationale des Institutes d’Études Médié-vales, 1994, p. 197-258; W. J. COURTENAY, Force of words and figures of speech: the crisis over virtussermonis in the fourteenth Century, «Franciscan Studies», 44, 1984, p. 107-128; W. J. COURTENAY

and K. TACHAU, Ockham, Ockhamists, and English-German Nation at Paris, 1339-1341, «Historyof Universities», 2, 1982, p. 53-96. All these have a bibliography on the subject.

164 Luisa Valente

The distinction between virtus sermonis and usus is mainly used in orderto describe how to interpret propositions which are problematic either be-cause they are used in an improper and figurative sense, or because theycontain syntactical irregularities. The idea is that for such propositions,these two ways of interpreting give different results. Deviant propositionsmay then be perfect and true, taking into account the level of usus, even ifthey are not perfect and/or not true under the point of view of their virtussermonis. It is also possible, vice versa, that propositions which aren’t trueaccording to the usus, are true de virtute sermonis.

In this presentation, I would like to suggest that the distinction be-tween virtus sermonis and usus may have some relevant precedents in thehermeneutics of the theological propositions elaborated in the 12th centuryby Gilbert of Poitiers (part 2) and his pupils Alain of Lille and Simon ofTournai (part 3).

But first of all, I wish to call attention to two passages, the first fromthe Institutiones grammaticae of Priscian and the second from the De divinisnominibus of Ps. Dionysius (part 1). My point is that these two passagesmay probably be added to the long list of sources which have been indica-ted as background for medieval hermeneutics, and for the distinction virtussermonis vs. usus in particular.3

1. Two more possible sources for medieval hermeneutics

1.1. Priscian Institutiones grammaticae VII

As has been shown,4 the following principle from Institutiones gram-maticae XVII.187 was frequently quoted by medieval masters:

3 For the ancient rhetoric, cf. M. L. UHLFELDER, De proprietate sermonum vel rerum. A stu-dy and critical edition of a set of verbal distinctions, Roma, American Academy, 1954; for Augustin,W. COURTENAY, Force of words and figures of speech cit., p. 109 ff. In the De trinitate (IV, 14) byHilary of Poitiers we find one principle which would be repeated very often in medieval herme-neutic discussions: «intelligentia enim dictorum ex causis est adsumenda dicendi, quia non sermo-ni res sed rei est sermo subiectus». Cf. L. VALENTE, ‘Phantasia contrarietatis’. Contraddizioni scrit-turali, discorso teologico e arti del linguaggio nel De tropis loquendi di Pietro Cantore († 1197), Fi-renze, Olschki, 1997, p. 60-61, n. 78, and I. ROSIER, Les mots, les choses et l’intention: autour demaximes d’Hilaire et de Grégoire, in Du pouvoir de diviser les mots et les choses, ed. P. Legendre,Bruxelles, Émile Van Balberghe Libraire and Yves Gevaert Éditeur, 1998 («Travaux du Labora-toire Européen pour l’Étude de la Filiation», 2), p. 39-56.

4 M. SIRRIDGE, Institutiones grammaticae XVII, 187. Three medieval reactions, in L’héritagedes grammariens latins de l’Antiquité aux Lumières. Actes du Colloque de Chantilly, 2-4 septem-bre 1987, ed. I. Rosier, Louvain, Peeters, 1988, p. 171-180; M. BARATIN, La naissance de la syntaxe

Porretan Views on Theological Hermeneutics 165

Omnis enim constructio, quam Graeci suntaxin vocant, ad intellectum vocisest reddenda.

In the lines following these words, Priscian remarks that often the au-thors use figurative expressions which seem «to be irregularly disposed ifwe consider the words as such», but which are judged «very rightly or-dered» if one takes into account «the reason of the sense»:

Itaque per diversas figuras variare solent auctores in constructione accidentia,de quibus iam supra docuimus, quae, quamvis quantum ad ipsas dictiones incon-grue disposita esse videantur, tamen ratione sensus rectissime ordinata esse iudi-cantur [...].5

But another passage from the Institutiones is also often quoted, at leastin the 12th century, in connection with hermeneutic reflections. It comesfrom the book VII, and its context is the discussion of the dative and abla-tive plural of the names of the second declination. 12th century masters suchas Abelard 6 and Alain of Lille (cf. infra, par. 3.2.4.) quote the last sentenceof this passage to support the thesis that the criterion of respecting the usemade by authors is stronger than the criterion of respecting the linguisticregularity, when use and regularity conflict with each other: irregular formsattested in authoritative writings may be admitted, while regular formswhich are not attested shouldn’t be chosen.

In this passage, Priscian remarks that some names can be found onlydeclined under some cases and not under other cases. It would surely beeasy to reconstruct the lacking forms on the basis of «analogy», but sincethese forms weren’t attested by authors, they should be refused. After acouple of examples, Priscian gives a general rule: one has to «know therules of analogy», but in fact one has to «imitate the real use» of words as itis found in the writings of the authors:

sunt tamen quaedam nomina, quorum aliqui casus in usu deficiunt: quos quamvissecundum analogiam possumus proferre, tamen, quia apud auctores non inveni-

à Rome, Paris, Éditions de Minuit, 1989, 3th part; I. ROSIER, La parole comme acte cit., p. 47, 148and passim.

5 PRISCIAN, Institutiones grammaticae, XVII, 187, in Prisciani grammatici Caesariensis. Insti-tutionum grammaticarum libri XVIII ex recensione Martini Hertzii, 2 voll., Leipzig, Teubner, 1855-1888, repr. Hildesheim-New York, Georg Olms Verlag, 1981 («Grammatici Latini ex recensioneHenrici Keilii», II), vol. II, p. 201, l. 11-15.

6 Sic et non, ed. B. Boyer and R. McKeon, Chicago-London, University Chicago Press,1976-77, Prologus, p. 90, l. 21-22; Theologia Summi boni, ed. E. M. Buytaert and C. J. Mews, PetriAbaelardi Opera theologica III, Turnhout, Brepols, 1987 («Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Me-diaevalis», 13), p. 182.

166 Luisa Valente

mus, recusandos puto, ut [...] ‘maria’, ‘area’, ‘vina’, ‘mella’, ‘hordea’ genetivos etdativos plurales in usu raro habent nisi apud vetustissimos, apud quos multa prae-terea deficientia invenies. oportet igitur scire quidem analogiae rationem, usum ta-men auctorum magis aemulari.7

The medievals could therefore find in the Institutiones grammaticae ex-plicitly expressed both criteria which (they thought) may justify the accep-tability of irregular linguistic forms: the ratio sensus – in order to be accep-ted in use, a deviant linguistic form has to transmit an intelligible sensus, orintellectus; and the usus auctorum – an irregular form may be accepted onlyif it is attested in authoritative texts (or, a regular form has to be refusedthough its regularity if it is not attested by an author).8

1.2. Pseudo-Dionysius

Another possible source for the medieval idea of opposing a merely su-perficial way of judging propositions with a way that considers the sense in-tended by the author could be seen in a passage which comes from the De

7 PRISCIAN, Institutiones grammaticae, VII, 28, ed. cit., vol. I, p. 310, l. 13-19. In book VIII,writing on the verb, Priscian remarks that some verbs are defective in respect to some of theireight accidents (tense, mode and so on). Analysing the reasons why the nature of things may produ-ce irregularities in the grammatical system, Priscian says that some words may not be producedbecause their meaning would be repugnant in respect to nature, as for example an hypotheticalword ‘puerperus’. Furthermore, some words would be so difficult to pronounce that it is necessa-ry to introduce a variation in respect to the form, which would be produced by analogy. ‘Expul-sor’ for example would produce the feminine ‘expulsrix’, which is quite impossible to pronounce,and because of this «incommoditas vel inconsonantia» Cicero wrote of an ‘expultrix’. PRISCIAN, In-stitutiones grammaticae, VIII, 4, ed. cit., vol. I, p. 371: «Incommoditate vero vel inconsonantia [...]deficiunt quaedam, ut, si velimus ab eo, quod est ‘cursor’ et ‘risor’, feminina facere secundumanalogiam mutatione ‘or’ in ‘rix’, absonum fit et incongruum naturae literarum. unde Cicero vo-lens ab eo, quod est ‘expulsor’, proferre femininum mutavit s in t et ‘expultrix’ dixit Tusculana-rum V [...]». Differently, some modifications with respect to the normal linguistic forms happenonly by chance, as is the case when some forms which could be regularly produced by analogy,nevertheless do not get to be really used. These words, even if they are regular on a purely formallevel, should not be used because they aren’t accepted by the tradition; ibid.: «Per fortunam quo-que duobus modis prohibemur quaedam proferre, vel quod inusitata sunt vel quod inconcinna etturpia vel aspera prolatu videntur esse. Inusitata sunt, quibus non inveniuntur usi auctores, quamvisproportione potestatem faciente dicendi, ut ‘faux’, ‘prex’, ‘dicio’. positivum ‘faris’ debet esse ‘for’,passivum ‘do’ debet esse ‘dor’. ea enim quamvis ratione regulae bene dicantur, tamen, quia in usuauctorum non inveniuntur, recusamus dicere» (Here and in the following quotations, the italics armine). Cf. also ibid., XI, 26, vol. I, p. 565: «Multa tamen in his quoque, quae regula exigit dici, si-ve euphoniae causa deficiunt sive quod in usu non sunt, sicut et in aliis partibus orationis».

8 Medieval masters seem not to reflect very much on the problem of which «authority» «au-thorises» the «author» who first, in the past, has chosen to introduce a linguistic variation or animpropriety. Cf. on this subject infra, par. 3.2.4.


divinis nominibus (I, iv, 19) of Ps. Dionysius. In order to defend an unusuallinguistic choice, that of defining God as ‘eros’, the Ps. Dionysius makes apolemic against those who could criticize his choice, asserting that it isagainst the Sacred Scriptures («contra eloquia»). In this polemic, Ps. Diony-sius describes two contrasting ways of approaching language: the first wayis to consider language a fixed and rigid system of elements (letters, sylla-bles, words); the second approach considers language a human instrumentaimed at communicating human thoughts, and sufficiently elastic to permita person to use different and unusual words in order to communicate thesense which he has in mind. His critics, says Ps. Dionysius, consider onlythe superficial and material level of language (labia et auditus; elementa, syl-labae, dictiones, scripturae, orationes), without attending the deeper level ofthe meaning intended by the author (quid dictio significat; sensus). He him-self thinks that it is irrational and stupid to take into account only wordsand not to follow the «force of the intention»: «virtus intentionis» accord-ing to the translation of Eriugena and John the Saracen, while Ilduin wroteof a «virtus sensus». Such a merely superficial way of reading the texts isagainst reason, says Ps. Dionysius, since it is because of the «senses» thatletters, syllables, words and so on are used:

Et est etiam divinus amor optimus et optimi per optimum; ipse enim benefac-tor exsistentium amor, in optimo per excellentiam ante subsistens [...]. Et ne quisnos arbitretur contra eloquia amoris cognominationem honorificare. Est quidemenim irrationabile (ut arbitror) et stultum non virtuti intentionis attendere, sed dic-tionibus. Et hoc non est divina intelligere volentium proprium, sed sonos leves reci-pientium, et hos usque ad aures transeuntes forinsecus continentium, et nolentiumscire quid quidem talis dictio significet, quomodove jam oporteat et per alias aequi-potentes et manifestiores dictiones declarare; patientiumque elementis et litterisnon intellectis, et syllabis et dictionibus incognitis, non ingredientibus in animaesuae intellectuale, sed foris circa labia et auditus eorum percrepitantibus, ac si nonliceat quatuor numerus per bis duo significare, aut simplam lineam per rectam li-neam, aut maternitatem per paternitatem, aut aliis quibusdam multis orationis par-tibus idipsum significantibus; oportet autem scire secundum rectam rationem, quiaelementis et syllabis et dictionibus et scripturis et orationibus utimur propter sen-sus; [...].9

The passage, quoted above, from Priscian Institutiones book VII, hasbeen cited by Abelard and Alain of Lille. I am unaware of any 12th centurymaster making an explicit reference to this text from the De divinis no-

9 PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS, De divinis nominibus, I, iv, 19, trans. Johannis Scoti Eriugena, ed. P.Chevallier, Dionysiaca, s.l. (Bruges, Desclée de Brouwer), 1937, vol. I, p. 202 ff.

168 Luisa Valente

minibus. Nevertheless, both represent – in addiction to other sources suchas Augustin and Hilary of Poitiers – the theoretical background of medievalhermeneutics. In particular, both these passages express the idea (whichhad to become common in the 12th century scholastic) that in order to un-derstand a text, it is necessary to go beyond the level of its superficial com-prehension, and to consider attentively the «intention of the author» as wellas the way the text is «normally used».10

2. Gilbert of Poitiers 11

Let’s now come to Gilbert of Poitiers. Commenting on Boethius Opus-cula sacra, Gilbert makes some remarks both on the sensus and on the ususwhich develop in a more dynamic way the hints which he may have gottenfrom these sources.

2.1. «Intellectus quem faciunt scripta» and «intellectus ex quo facta sunt»

In the preface to his De trinitate (which has the form of a dedicatoryletter to his adoptive father, father-in-law, and patron Simmacus), Boethiusdeclares that he has consciously chosen to obscure his own reflections in

10 Cf. for example the following text from PETER THE CHANTER De tropis loquendi, ms. Or-léans, Bibliothèque Municipale, 199, f. 279ra/b: «Subtilior autem consideratio theologica consistitin recta intelligentia dicendorum, que attestante Hylario assumenda est potius ex causis dicendiquam ex intelligentia dictorum (add. interl.: scilicet verborum). Sermo enim subservit (add. marg.:vel succumbit) rei, et non res sermoni. Unde potius mens et intentio dicentis (add. marg.: et scri-bentis attendenda est) in condendo canone et in aliis quam superficies verborum, cui adherentescalumpniari, aucupari et venari sillabas verborum magis – sicut litteratores et pusille rei quia silla-bis dediti – malunt quam veritatem que sub hiis iacet cognoscere. [...] Unde et in his et in consi-milibus intelligentia dicti assumenda est ex causa dicendi potius quam ex compositione predicati adsubiectum et superficie verborum, cui cuidam adherenti alius legis peritus et grammaticus magis at-tendens causam dicendi et mentem dicentis aiebat: ‘‘similis quidem es sic intelligendo que dicun-tur homini qui monacum sequitur quem ad hostium amittit’’. Littera enim meretrix est at ad di-versa retorqueri potest. Unde et eam sequens sepe mentem auctoris non cognoscit sed perdit eterrat; qui vero mentem scribentis attendit prope est videre verum. [...] Quicquid autem sonentverba, semper presumendum est papam non nisi iustum et equum precipere. Similiter et alios scri-bentes potius scripsisse sensibus et rebus quam vocibus tantum, et litteris quasi nugis». This pas-sage is analysed by L. VALENTE, ‘Phantasia Contrarietatis’ cit., note 3, p. 60 ff., and by I. ROSIER,Les mots, les choses et l’intention cit.

11 A very useful contribute on Gilbertin hermeneutics is L. O. NIELSEN, On the Doctrine ofLogic and Language of Gilbert Porreta and His Followers, «Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-ÂgeGrec et Latin», 17, 1976, p. 40-69. Cf. also ID., Theology and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century. AStudy of Gilbert Porreta’s Thinking and the Theological Expositions of the Doctrine of the Incarna-tion during the Period 1130-1180, Leiden, Brill, 1982 («Acta Theologica Danica», 15), particularlyp. 103-115; B. MAIOLI, Gilberto Porretano. Dalla grammatica speculativa alla metafisica del concre-to, Roma, Bulzoni, 1979 («Biblioteca di cultura», 173), particularly parts 1 and 2.


this treatise by using new words. Even the reading of it should be difficultto those who aren’t prepared to understand it correctly:

Idcirco stilum brevitate contraho et ex intimis sumpta philosophiae disciplinisnovorum verborum significationibus velo, ut haec mihi tantum vobisque, si quandoad ea convertitis oculos, conloquantur; ceteros vero ita submovimus, ut qui capereintellectu nequiverunt ad ea etiam legenda videantur indigni.12

Commenting on these words, Gilbert of Poitiers enunciates a quitecomplex and subtle theory of how a text should be correctly interpreted,a theory which has been masterfully exposed by Jean Jolivet in an articlepublished 1998.13 Gilbert first of all describes those «ceteri» whom Bethiusintends – aristocratically and esoterically enough – to keep out from read-ing his theological writings, as those who, troubled by the «unusual» and«halved» way of signifying («semiplena et inusitata significacione commo-ti»), aren’t in the condition of understanding them through the intellect.These people are therefore unworthy not only to judge them, but even toread them:

CETEROS UERO ab his ITA SUBMOUEMUS scriptis UT, QUIcumque semiplena et inu-sitata significacione commoti NEQUIUERINT ea CAPERE INTELLECTU, non eo quem scriptafaciunt sed eo pocius ex quo facta sunt, AD EA non modo iudicanda uerum ETIAM LE-GENDA UIDEANTUR INDIGNI.14

What I would like to stress from this passage is the way Gilbert expli-cates the word ‘intellectus’. In the text Gilbert is commenting on Boethiushad used ‘intellectus’ to denote a mental faculty. Gilbert seems to shift(consciously?) from Boethius’ use of the term, he uses ‘intellectus’ to de-note a mental content. Secondly, Gilbert distinguishes two intellectus (i.e.mental contents) involved in the process of understanding a written text:one is produced by the written words when they are read («intellectusquem scripta faciunt»), and one is in the mind of the author when he iswriting («intellectus ex quo facta sunt»). Gilbert then interprets Boethius’remark to his father in law to mean that most people aren’t worth to read

12 BOETHIUS, De trinitate, in ID., Opuscula sacra, ed. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand, Boethius:The Theological Tractates with an English Translation ... The Consolation of Philosophy with an En-glish Translation, London and Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1918, 9a ed. 1973,repr. 1978, («Loeb Classical Library», 74), p. 1-129; p. 4, l. 16-22.

13 J. JOLIVET, Tournures et défaillances du dire. Trois textes du douzième siècle, in Du pouvoirde diviser les mots et les choses, cit. note 3, p. 57-69.

14 GILBERT OF POITIERS, Expositio in Boecii librum De trinitate, ed. N. M. Häring, The Com-mentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers, Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies,1966 («Studies and Texts», 13), p. 67, l. 50-54.

170 Luisa Valente

his treatise because they stick to the first intellectus, and do not try to goback from it to the second intellectus.15

In the following lines, on the background of the aristotelian-boethiantriade res, intellectus, vox, Gilbert declares that there is no equiextension ifwe compare the reality, concepts and words. Reality is much more exten-ded and complex than concepts may grasp, and concepts may grasp morethan words may explain:

Tria quippe sunt: res et intellecus et sermo. Res intellectu concipitur, sermonesignificatur. Sed neque sermonis nota, quicquid res est, potest ostendere neque in-telligentie actus in omnia, quecumque sunt eiusdem rei, offendere ideoque nec om-nia conceptus tenere. Circa conceptum etiam remanet sermo. Non enim tantum reisignificacione uox prodit quantum intelligentia concipit.16

There is therefor an intrinsic deficiency in how language expressesthoughts, and how thoughts reflect reality. Consequently, in order to graspas well as possible the truth about reality, the interpreter of a text has firstto conjecture, from the effects produced on himself by the words, the con-ceptum or intellectus auctoris:

Similiter et scripture significacio ad auctoris sui conceptum se habet. Undemanifestum est quod, qui audit uel legit, oratoris quidem seu scriptoris conceptumex his, que significacio prodit, perpendit. Sed de re non nisi ex eiusdem oratorisseu scriptoris sensu recte decernit.17

Gilbert goes on to tell us that Boethius was correct in preventing fromreading his work those who think to be able to reach the res directly fromthe words (significatio), refusing to take into account the intermediationperformed by the concept intended by the author. The intellectus of the au-thor is in fact the real source of the speech and of writing:

Ideo ab huius sui tractatus lectione illos merito arcet qui scriptoris intellectum,ex quo fit sermo siue scriptura, contempnunt et ad rei iudicium significacionem suf-ficere putant [...].18

15 13th and 14th century masters often use the notions of a first and a second intellection. Cf.I. ROSIER, La parole comme acte cit., passim.

16 GILBERT OF POITIERS, Expositio in Boecii librum De trinitate, ed. cit., p. 67, l. 55 - p. 68,l. 60. This passage of Gilbert is quoted almost literally in the anonymous Porretan tractate QuodPatris et Filii, ed. N. M. Häring, A Treatise on the Trinity by Gilbert of Poitiers, «Recherchesde théologie ancienne et médiévale», 39, 1972, p. 14-50, p. 47 ff. (the attribution to Gilbert is nolonger accepted), and in ALAIN OF LILLE, Summa Quoniam homines, ed. P. Glorieux, «Archivesd’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen-Âge», 20, 1953, p. 113-368, p. 140.

17 GILBERT OF POITIERS, Expositio in Boecii librum De trinitate, ed. cit., p. 68, l. 60-64.18 Ibid., p. 68, l. 65-67.


Commenting the Contra Eutichen et Nestorium, Gilbert makes also acontrast between the right way of interpreting texts, which is judging thewords by depending on the sense intended by the author («accipere verbaex sensu mentis eius qui loquitur») and the wrong way, which is that ofjudging on the sens depending on the words («ex verbis sensum accipere»):

Quod quidam – qui cum nichil intelligant omnia iudicant, homines impuden-tissimi, desipientia sapientissimi, absque disserendi ratione disertissimi – minime co-gitant attendendum (scil.: intellectum mentis). Ideoque non ex sensu mentis eius, quiloquitur, uerba: sed ex uerbis sensum – et alium sepe quam illum cui sunt articulata– accipiunt. In his etiam, que ipsi proferunt, uerba non intelligentes. Neque que lo-quuntur neque de quibus affirmant.19

I think that in the hermeneutic theories expounded by Gilbert ofPoitiers in his commentaries on the boethian theological treatises we maysee a germ of later technical hermeneutic distinctions. In fact, Gilbert dis-tinguishes between an «intellectus quem scripta faciunt» and an «intellectusex quo scripta fiunt», as well as between a «conceptus (or: sensus) mentis»and a «conceptus (or: sensus) ex verbis». We will see the very similar no-tional couple «sensus quem faciunt verba» vs. «sensus ex quo fiunt verba»used by some disciples of Gilbert of Poitiers. It will also be common lateron through the 13th and the 14th centuries, tightly connected to the notionsof virtus sermonis and usus.20

19 GILBERT OF POITIERS, Expositio in Boecii librum Contra Euticen et Nestorium, ed. N. M.Häring, The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers, Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Me-dieval Studies, 1966 («Studies and Texts», 13), p. 298, l. 91-97. Cf. also the following text fromthe same commentary, p. 309, l. 30-34: «Diligenter attende quod dicitur ‘‘a diuinitate assumptahumanitas’’. Et non tam ex dictionibus sensum quam ex sensu dictiones iudicaturus quid secun-dum gramaticos locutio, quid secundum rethores elocutio lectoribus intelligendum ministret, exrerum ipsarum proprietatibus disce».

20 There is a similarity between the distinction «intellectus quem» vs. «intellectus ex quo»on the one hand and the distinction «significatio nota» vs. «significatio nutu» on the other hand.Cf. GILBERT OF POITIERS, Expositio in Boecii librum De trinitate, ed. cit., p. 67 (immediately beforethe last quoted passage): «Hac autem et breuitate contraho et nouitate uelo UT HEC scripta breui-tatis et nouitatis MIHI UOBISCUM TANTUM, SI QUANDO ab aliis studiis uestris AD EA CONUERTITIS OCU-LOS, non tam nota quam nutu COLLOQUANTUR. CETEROS UERO [...]». Cf. SIMON OF TOURNAI, Disputa-tiones, ed. J. Warichez, Louvain, Université Catholique, 1932 («Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense,Études et documents», 12), Disputatio LII, p. 152: «Redditur. Vox significat dupliciter: nota etnutu; ut hoc nomen homo, nota significat hominem, nutu, risibile. Sic quoque preceptum nota si-gnificavit Deum velle immolari Ysaac, nutu vero significavit Deum velle probari Abraham. Fuitergo preceptum falsum signum significatione note, sed verum signum significatione nutus. Noluitenim Deus immolari Ysaac, quod significabat preceptum; sed voluit probari Abraham, quod pre-ceptum insinuabat». Insinuare will be used in the 13th century in a sense similar to this, for exam-ple by Henry of Gent; cf. I. ROSIER, Henri de Gand, le De dialectica d’Augustin, et l’institution desnoms divins, «Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale», 6, 1995, p. 145-253, p. 180 ff.

172 Luisa Valente

2.2. Natural language, theological language: «Idem dicendi modus, alius in-tellectus ex quo dicitur»

The theoretical relevance of the distinction between the intellectus orsensus quem and the intellectus or sensus ex quo may be understood if werealise that for Gilbert, correct interpretation of theological propositions ispossible only if one takes these two levels of interpretation into account. Infact, theological propositions are similar to propositions of the natural lan-guage only in their exterior form (dicendi modus). The propositions «X esthomo» and «X est Deus» have the same dicendi modus, but they have com-pletely different dicta as one may understand by considering their sensus exquo. In the first proposition, which belongs to natural language, the predi-cate tells only one of the properties which is inherent to the subject, but itdoesn’t express the whole being of the subject: a man, in addiction to beinga man, has a huge number of other determinations which are not communi-cated by the attribution of the predicate ‘man’ (being white and so on). Onthe contrary, in the proposition «X est Deus», since God is absolutely sim-ple, the predicate expresses exhaustively the being of the subject: 21

SED quamuis dicendi modus idem sit cum de aliquo dicitur «est homo» et dealio dicitur «est Deus», sensu tamen ex quo dicitur, alterum dictorum ab altero DI-STAT QUONIAM scilicet is qui predicatur esse HOMO quamuis sit homo, NON tamen EST

INTEGRE hoc IPSUM quod predicatur HOMO. Id est: non toto, quo est, predicatur essequod est in eo quod dicitur esse homo. Sed qui hoc de aliquo dicit, plurima, quibusidem ipse est, de ipso adhuc dicenda – i.e. qualitates quibus est qualis et quantita-tes quibus est quantus – reliquit. [...] Ille UERO de quo dicitur «est Deus», EST per-fecte HOC IPSUM quod dicitur esse: scilicet DEUS. Id est: nihil prorsus, quo ispe sit, deipso adhuc dicendum relinquit.22

What is important here from our point of view is the contrast betweenthe formal identity of the two propositions («idem dicendi modus») and thediversity of their dicta: the dicta being different because of the differentconcepts according to which the propositions are pronounced («sensu exquo dicitur alterum dictorum ab altero distat»). All propositions have to beunderstood accordingly to the sensus ex quo dicitur, but it is clear that forGilbert this is particularly true for theological propositions.

21 This is the reason why theological propositions are not predications in the same sense aspredications in natural philosophy, but sort of terminological equations, similar to mathematicalor logical propositions. Cf. GILBERT OF POITIERS, Exposition in Boecii librum De trinitate, ed. cit., p.134 f., l. 77-79. Cf. L. O. NIELSEN, Theology and Philosophy cit., 94-95, 111, and S. EBBESEN, Porre-taneans and propositions, in this volume.

22 GILBERT OF POITIERS, Expositio in Boecii librum De trinitate, ed. cit., p. 123, l. 30-37, l. 42-44.


2.3. «Natura» or «vis nominis» and «usus»

Besides this idea of a «sensus auctoris, ex quo scripta facta sunt», as thedecisive criterion for a correct interpretation of propositions, we find inGilbert’s writings also the idea of the possibility of a contrast between theeffective use and the proper meaning of a word. In fact, in some passages ofhis commentaries on Boethius Gilbert contrasts usus and vis (nominis anddictionis).

Every name has a vis, the vis nominis, which corresponds to the propermeaning of the word, the one which has been instituted by the imposition(the vis is also called natura nominis).23 The use of a word through time mayexert a force of its own, modifying the original meaning of the word.Gilbert speaks of two types of such modifications: the reduction of the se-mantic extension of the words (contractio),24 or the moving from one mean-ing to another (commutatio).25

One example of contractio is offered by the term ypostasis, substantia inlatin. The term ypostasis, as substantia in latin, originally had the capacity torefer to every individual being, rational or irrational. But then with time,the use made by the Greek authors restricted the original range of ypostasisto let it cover only rational individual beings. This did not happen with theequivalent word in latin, substantia, which still has its original vis and co-vers the all range of individual beings, both rational and irrational:

Quod peritior sermonum Grecia non modo rationalem uerum etiam irratio-nalem indiuiduam substantiam uocet ypostasin, a ceteris – que aliorum nominumsunt – rebus eam diuidens, ipsius nominis ui et proprietate ostendit quoniam uideli-cet a substando et Grecus ypostasim et Latinus substantiam dicat. Recte utiquequoniam sicut rationalis ita et irrationalis ypostasis siue substantia his, que in se uel

23 Abelard speaks of a natura or nativitas nominum, which has its origin in the human insti-tution; cf. PETER ABELARD, Logica Nostrorum petitioni sociorum, ed. B. Geyer, Peter Abaelards phi-losophische Schriften. II. Die Logica Nostrorum petitioni sociorum, Die Glossen zu Porphyrius,Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 1933 («Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie desMittelalters», 21/4), p. 522, l. 16-17: «Quid enim aliud est nativitas sermonum sive nominum,quam hominum institutio?»; PETRUS HELIAS, Summa super Priscianum, ed. L. Reilly, 2 vol., Toron-to, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1993, p. 22: «Natura enim in vocabulis nihil aliud estquam inventio ipsorum».

24 Cf. Expositio in Boecii librum De trinitate, ed. cit., p. 71: «In religione prima est fides quequidem generaliter est ueritatis cuiuslibet rei cum assensione perceptio. Sed ad quorundam maxi-me perceptionem inuisibilium hoc nomen per eccellenciam usus contraxit ut scilicet fides dicaturqua rationalis mens uere et cum assensione percipit id quod est omnium esse [...]».

25 Ibid., p. 132, l. 9-10: «[...] FACIES hac propositione EIUS QUOD EST ‘NUNC’ illarum morarum,quas sub hoc nomine locutionum uicissitudo commutat [...]». Cf. B. MAIOLI, Gilberto Porretanocit., p. 41-42.

174 Luisa Valente

affixa extrinsecus habet, accidentibus substat. Postea tamen idem nomen a generead speciem Grecorum usus contraxit, rationalem tantum substantiam «ypostasin»nominans, cum tamen Latinorum usus nomen «substantie» iuxta naturam et uimdictionis ipsius in omnibus, que substant accidentibus, adhuc retineat. [...] Suntenim huiusmodi multa nomina que, cum per naturam significationis sue possint plu-rimis conuenire, usu tamen non de omnibus illis sed tantum de quibusdam dicuntur.26

2.4. Conclusion on Gilbert of Poitiers

Summing up this long section dedicated to Gilbert of Poiters, we maysay that we find in his commentaries on Boethius a theory of the hermeneu-tic process, which is at the same time subtle and pragmatic. The main ideasof Gilbertin hermeneutics are that of distinguishing two levels of under-standing as well as two moments of producing meanings. The two levels ofunderstanding are expressed by the couple «intellectus quem scripta fa-ciunt» vs. «intellectus ex quo fiunt», this second intellectus being identicalwith the sensus auctoris. The two moments of producing meanings are thefirst institution of a word, his natura or vis, and the historical developmentof the used language (usus), which can modify the original «force» of theword.

3. Two disciples of Gilbert of Poitiers

As brilliant and innovative as Gilbert was, a very important role in de-veloping his ideas, semplifying them, and transmitting them to the youngergenerations, has been played by his pupils, primarily by Simon of Tournaiand Alain of Lille.

26 GILBERT OF POITIERS, Expositio in Boecii librum Contra Euticeen et Nestorium, ed. cit., p.281 f. Cf. ALAIN OF LILLE, Summa Quoniam homines, ed. cit. (note 16), p. 171: «Sed quamvis hocnomen ypostasis una generali significatione repertum sit ut tam animate quam inanimate rei, tamrationali quam irrationali convenire posset, tamen ratione dignitatis a grecis restrictum est circa ra-tionales creaturas, ut sola rationalis natura in individuali statu intellecta [...] dicatur ypostasis[...]». John of Salisbury in his Metalogicon speaks of a vis nominis which is strictly connected withthe significatio nominis, this depending in turn on the etymology of the word. The vis may be re-stricted (contrahitur, coartatur) to cover only a part of its original meaning: «Est itaque logica utnominis significatio latissime pateat, loquendi uel disserendi ratio. Contrahitur enim interdum, etdumtaxtat circa disserendi rationes, uis nominis coartatur [...]. Duplicitatem uero huius significa-tionis nomen a Graeca quidem origine contrahit, quoniam ibi logos nunc sermonem nunc ratio-nem significat». Metalogicon, I, 10, ed. J. B. Hall and K. S. B. Keats-Rohan, Turnhout, Brepols,1991 («Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis», 98), p. 28, l. 8-16.


3.1. Simon of Tournai

3.1.1. «Sensus quem faciunt verba» and «sensus ex quo fiunt verba»

Opening the first part of his Institutiones in sacram paginam, which isdedicated to the theological language (sermo de deo),27 Simon of Tournaisays that in theology both res and voces signify. First of all, he then analyseshow words signify, and he says that they signify the things either accordingto the sense which is made by words – «ex sensu quem faciunt verba» – oraccording to the sense from which the words are produced – «ex sensu exquo fiunt verba». The first sort of speech is said locutio analogica, the sec-ond locutio methonomica:

Vox autem significat rem dupliciter: uel ex sensu quem faciunt uerba, ut ‘Symonscribit’, uel ex sensu ex quo fiunt uerba, ut ‘diligentia Simonis scribit’.

Cum uero sumuntur uerba ex sensu quem faciunt dicitur locutio ‘analogica’, idest rectus sermo, ab ‘ana’ quod est rectus, et ‘logos’ quod est sermo.

Cum autem uerba sumuntur ex sensu ex quo fiunt, locutio dicitur ‘methono-mica’, id est transumptiua nominum, id est uerborum, a ‘metha’, quod est trans, et‘noma’, quod est nomen. Vt cum dicitur «diligentia Symonis scribit», ‘scribere’enim transumitur a Symone, cuius est (ms. L add.: proprium), ad diligentiam, exqua est. Symon enim scribit, non diligentia; set diligentia est scribendi causa. Dici-tur enim Symon proprie, set diligentia improprie scribere.28

The distinction «sensus quem faciunt» vs. «sensus ex quo fiunt» corres-ponds to, and very likely comes from, the Gilbertin distinction between«intellectus quem scripta faciunt» and «intellectus ex quo scripta factasunt». But in Simon this distinction is connected on the one hand to the au-gustinian tradition of signifying by words and signifying by things, on theother hand to the notion of improper language. Furthermore, the terminol-ogy becomes now homogeneous and fixed: while Gilbert spoke once of in-tellectus, once of conceptus, then of sensus, at the time of Simon – about1170 – it seems that there was a sort of crystallisation in the formulas «sen-sus quem faciunt verba» and «sensus ex quo fiunt verba». In fact, it is in

27 Cf. M. GRABMANN, Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode, 2 vol., Freiburg i. Br., Her-der, 1909-1911, vol. II, p. 537 ff. About the semantics of Simon of Tournai cf. C. MARMO, Inferen-tial Signs and Simon of Tournai’s General Theory of Signification, in Vestigia, Imagines, Verba. Se-miotics and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts (XII th-XIV th Century), Acts of the 11th Symposiumon Medieval Logic and Semantics, S. Marino, 24-27 May 1994, ed. C. Marmo, Turnhout, Brepols,1997, p. 61-82.

28 SIMON OF TOURNAI, Institutiones in sacram paginam, Introduction, ed. C. MARMO, Simon ofTournai’s Institutiones in sacram paginam. An Edition of His Introduction about Signification inTheological Discourse, «Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin», 67, 1997, p. 93-103, p. 96.

176 Luisa Valente

this form that the distinction appears in the Disputationes, often used by Si-mon in order to solve theological questions.29 Finally, the connection of thesensus quem with the term analogicus might be an echo of the ratio analo-giae which we have seen in Priscian.30

3.1.2. The double truth of improper propositions

The distinction between the «sensus quem faciunt verba» and the «sen-sus ex quo fiunt verba» is particularly important in Simon’s theological se-mantics because some propositions may be judged one way if level one is

29 We find it for example at the p. 32 (discussing the proposition «Pater est principium to-tius trinitatis»), 167 f. («iste peccat actu», passage quoted infra), p. 265 («Nichil est Deus», passa-ge quoted infra), p. 292 (about the prophecy).

30 Simon affirms that this duplex locutio (analogica and methonimica, i.e. proper and impro-per) may be found in all the three species of speech: fabula, argumentum, and historia. Referringto the biblical exegesis, Simon remarks that we may find in the biblical text both historia analogicaand historia methonimica. In the historia analogica words signify according to their «sensus quemfaciunt», which is their proper meaning, while in the historia methonimica, words signify accord-ing to the «sensus ex quo fiunt», which is their improper sense, sensus transumptus. Cf. SIMON OF

TOURNAI, Institutiones in sacram paginam, Introduction, ed. cit., p. 97, 3.6.: «In sacra pagina admit-titur utraque historia, ut hec ‘‘In principio creauit deus celum et terram. Terra autem erat inanis etuacua’’. Historia analogica concipitur si uerba ex sensu quem faciunt intelliguntur, ut nomine ‘ce-li’ celum, nomine ‘terre’ terra. Historia methonomica est ut in libro Regum dicitur: ‘‘Carduus agriuenit ad cedros libani’’, id est humilis ad sublimes. Nomen ‘cardui’, id est uilis herbe, transumiturad significandum humilem et abiectam personam; nomine ‘cedri’, alte arboris, ad significandumsublimem, non allegorice, sed metaphorice ob similitudinem quam habet uilis herba ad humilem,et alta arbor ad sublimem personam. Non enim ipsa herba et ipsa arbor, set earum nomina obdictam similitudinem significant personas. Est igitur historia ex significatione uocum uel propriauel transumptiua». It has to be remarked that Simon distinguishes, in the biblical exegesis, be-tween the «allegorical sense» and the «metaphoric narration» (transumptiua historia). We have anallegorical sense when the things (res) signified by the words, signify in turn; we have a metapho-ric narration when the words (voces), and not the things, are transferred. The distinction sensus al-legoricus vs. historia transumptiva was not always clear to 12th century authors, while in the 13th

century Thomas Aquinas insisted particularly on it; cf. L. VALENTE, La pluralité des sens dans lesSaintes Écritures, in Sprachtheorien in Spätantike und Mittelalter, ed. S. Ebbesen, Tübingen, G.Narr, 1995 («Geschichte der Sprachtheorie», 3), p. 12-32, part. p. 18 ff. The same thing did theauthor of the Apparatus anonymi cuiusdam scholastici, ed. J. B. Pitra, Paris, Firmin Didot, 1895(«Spicilegium Sacrum Solesmense», III), p. 436-455. This author not only distinguished the «pro-per» literal sense from the «transumptive» literal sense, using for the first one the term analogia,but he also makes the connection with the distinction «sensus quem faciunt verba» vs. «sensus exquo fiunt verba». Thomas of Chobham could depend on Simon of Tournai when, in the prologueto his Summa de arte praedicandi (ca. 1220), he distinguishes, within the historia, the analogia andthe metaphora. Cf. THOMAS OF CHOBHAM, Summa de arte praedicandi, ed. F. Morenzoni, Turnhout,Brepols, 1988 («Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis», 82), p. 6. Thomas of Chobhamalso considers the allegoria, which is based on the meaning of the res, as different from the tran-sumptive literal meaning. Adapting the terminology «intellectus» vs. «sensus quem faciunt verba»to the classical augustinian distinction between «significatio vocum» and «significatio rerum»,Thomas describes the allegory as that «significatio rerum» which doesn’t transmit the «intellectusquem vox facit», but the «intellectus quem res significata facit».


taken into account and another way if level two is taken into account.There are propositions which may be true in one sense and false in theother one. This is the case of figurative assertions, as Simon explains in hisDisputatio LIX, answering the question «An qui peccat voluntate peccatactu». Since there are two senses of propositions, there is also a doubletruth, says Simon: «Verborum sensus duplex est: sensus quem faciunt ver-ba, et sensus ex quo fiunt verba. Veritas ergo verborum duplex est». Some-times, a proposition is true considering the «sensus ex quo fiunt verba»,and not true considering its «sensus quem faciunt verba». «Pratum ridet»,for example, is true considering the «sensus ex quo fiunt verba», since itmeans that the meadow is full of flowers, which is the cause of our smiling.«Pratum ridet» is not true, on the other hand, if we consider its propermeaning, since in this case it means that the fact of laughing is a property ofthe meadow, which is impossible. In a similar way, Simon remarks, theproposition «iste peccat actu», said of one who commits a sin only in hiswill, is true considering its «sensus quem», since will is an act; but it is falseaccording to its «sensus ex quo, secundum quod soliti sumus dicere», sinceusually by ‘act’ people understand only exterior acts, and will is not an ex-terior act:

Redditur. Verborum sensus duplex est: sensus quem faciunt verba, et sensus exquo fiunt verba. Veritas ergo verborum duplex est. Quandoque enim verba sunt veraex sensu ex quo fiunt, non ex sensu quem faciunt: ut hec, pratum ridet. Qui enimhoc dicit, significare intendit pratum esse causam ridendi. Tamen falsa sunt ex sen-su quem faciunt: significant enim risum inesse prato; quod est impossibile, cum ri-sus sit proprie proprium hominis. A simili, cum dicitur: iste peccat actu, sensu exquo fiunt verba agitur de actu exteriori. Sic enim soliti sumus dicere aliquem actupeccare, cum exteriori actu peccat. Si vero intelligatur ex sensu quem faciunt verba,potest intelligi etiam de actu interiori. Cum ergo dicitur, qui peccat sola voluntatepeccat actu: vera est locutio sensu quem faciunt verba, falsa tamen sensu ex quofiunt verba. Sed omnis qui respondet, satisfacere debet interroganti, non interrogatis.Ergo iudicare debet verba ex sensu ex quo fiunt ab interrogante, secundum quod solitisumus dicere, non tamen secundum aliquem inusitatum sensum quem infert verbis.Nec iudicanda sunt verba ex sensu quem faciunt ex institutione, nisi ex eodem sen-su fiant quem faciunt, quod sepe contingit: ut Symon sedet; hec enim verba ex eo-dem sensu fiunt quem faciunt. Iudicantes ergo verba ex sensu quo fiunt, absoluterespondemus: eum qui peccat sola voluntate non peccare actu.31

Note the description of the «sensus ex quo fiunt verba» as «secundumquod soliti sumus dicere». The formula «secundum quod soliti sumus

31 Disputatio LIX, ed. cit., p. 167, l. 25 - p. 168, l. 14.

178 Luisa Valente

dicere» makes the connection between the sensus ex quo and the idea of theusual way of interpreting ambiguous assertion, and at the same time it testi-fies to the knowledge of the Sophistical Refutations of Aristotle. In fact, wefind the formula «secundum quod sic soliti sumus dicere» in the boethiantranslation of the Sophistici Elenchi as the second mode which is commonto equivocation and amphibology.32

3.1.3. The truth of «nihil est Deus»

If some propositions are true according to their sensus ex quo and falseaccording to their sensus quem, there are also others which are true accord-ing to their sensus quem, but false according to their sensus ex quo. This isthe case for example of the propositions «nihil est Deus» or «nulla res estDeus». These propositions, writes Simon in the Disputatio XCI, are true ifwe consider the «sensus quem faciunt verba», since nihil and nulla resproperly speaking refer only to created things. But they are neverthelessfalse if one considers the improper meaning which is the reason of their be-ing pronounced, and which is the usually intended sense («ex sensu ex quofiunt, secundum quem soliti sumus dicere»). In fact, taken according to thesensus ex quo, these propositions seem to deny the existence of God:

Redditur. De quolibet rerum verum est ut non sit Deus, et omnium rerum nul-la est Deus; nec tamen concedimus quod nichil sit Deus. Duplex est enim iudiciumpropositionum. Quandoque enim iudicamus propositiones ex sensu quem faciunt ver-ba, quandoque ex sensu ex quo fiunt, secundum quod soliti sumus dicere. Licet ergohec verba: nulla res est Deus, nichil est Deus, sint vera ex sensu quem faciunt, utcontraria his: quelibet res est Deus, quidlibet est Deus; non tamen sunt vera ex sen-su ex quo fiunt, secundum quod soliti sumus dicere. Est enim sensus: nichil est Deus,id est, Deus non est. Hoc autem absurdum. Plus enim negat hec negatio: nichil estDeus, ex sensu ex quo fiunt verba secundum quod soliti sumus dicere, quam ponateius contraria affirmatio: quidlibet est Deus. Ponit enim quidlibet creatum esseDeum, sed negatio negat et omne creatum et increatum esse Deum. Hoc autem fal-sum.33

32 Simon and Alain in fact also mention a certain number of fallaciae in their theological wri-tings (fallacia ex aequivocatione, f. ex amphibolia, f. ex compositione et divisione etc.). Cf. L. VALEN-TE, Fallaciae et théologie dans la seconde moitié du XII e siècle, in Medieval Analyses in Languageand Cognition. Acts of the symposium ‘The Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy’, January10-13, 1996, ed. S. Ebbesen and R. L. Friedmann, Copenhagen, The Royal Danish Academy ofSciences and Letters, 1999 («Historisk-filosofiske Meddelelser», 77), p. 207-236.

33 Disputatio XCI, ed. cit., p. 265, l. 6-21.


3.2. Alain of Lille

3.2.1. «Sensus quem faciunt verba», «sensus ex quo fiunt verba» and negative theolo-gy in the Regulae caelestis iuris

The distinction between the «sensus quem faciunt verba» and the «sensus exquo fiunt verba» is very important also for another Porretan master, Alain of Lille.For him, in fact, these notions are strictly involved in the theory of the theologicaltransferred language (translatio in divinis), and Alain uses them for explaining thecentral nucleus of his theological thought: the fact that on one hand every wordsaid affirmatively of God has an improper, transferred meaning, but that on theother hand it is possible to build a theological science. Theology is made up by ‘re-latively’ improper, affirmative propositions, which may be accepted or refused onthe basis of a list of tendentially clear criteria.34

In his «theological rule» XVIII the negative theology of Ps. Dionysius is inter-preted by Alain applying to it the Gilbertin theory of predication as well as thetheory of the two senses. Alain is explaining the Dionysian assert which forms thetext of the rule: «Omnes affirmationes de deo dicte incompacte, negationes vere».35

Every theological affirmative proposition, says Alain, is «uncomposed» since itdoesn’t signify any composition, even if it seems to do so, being «composed» by apredicate and a subjet. In fact, theological assertions express identity and not inher-ence («potius significatur [sc. deus] esse iustitia quam iustus»). On the contrary,negative theological propositions are proper and true since they remove from Godany composition and inherence. This is why Ps. Dionysius, when he asserts af-firmative propositions about God as «Deus est iustus», doesn’t take into accountthe «sensus quem faciunt verba» (i.e., the composition and inherence of justice inGod, which is signified by these words taken in their proper meaning), but the«sensus ex quo fiunt verba» (the identity of God and justice):

Inconpacta uero siue inconposita affirmatio, cum non significat conpositionemquam significare uidetur ut cum dicitur: Deus est iustus. Non enim ibi significaturconpositio iustitie ad deum. Non enim ei conponitur uel inheret sed pocius signifi-catur esse iusticia quam iustus. Negationes uero de deo dicte proprie et uere, se-cundum quas remouetur a deo quod ei per inherenciam non conuenit. Vnde Dioni-sius attendens quid de deo dicatur per causam, potius attendens sensum ex quofiunt uerba quam sensum quem faciunt uerba, potius considerans quid ex quo dicatur

34 Cf. J. JOLIVET, Rémarques sur les Regulae theologicae d’Alain de Lille, in Alain de Lille,Gauthier de Châtillon, Jakemart Giellé et leur temps, Actes du Colloque de Lille, octobre 1978, ed.H. Roussel and F. Suard, Lille, Presses universitaires de Lille, 1979, p. 279-294; L. VALENTE, Lan-gage et théologie dans la seconde moitié du XII e siècle, in Sprachtheorie in Spätantike und Mittelal-ter cit. note 30, p. 33-54.

35 Cf. PS. DIONYSIUS, De caelesti Hierarchia II 2, ed. P. Chevallier, Dionysiaca, cit. note 9,vol. II, p. 759.

180 Luisa Valente

quam quid de quo dicit: Deus est iustus, pius, fortis. Item potius considerans quiddeo non conueniat per proprietatem quam quid de deo dicatur per causam dicit:Deus non est pius, fortis, misericors, potius remouens proprietatem dicendi quamueritatem essendi.36

3.2.2. «Virtus nominum» and the impropriety of theological talking in theLiber in distinctionibus dictionum theologicarum

The radical impropriety of every theological proposition is also the cen-tral idea of the prologue to Alain’s Liber in distinctionibus dictionum theo-logicarum:

Quoniam iuxta Aristotelicae auctoritatis praeconium, qui virtutum nominumsunt ignari cito paralogizantur, in sacra pagina periculosum est theologicorum nomi-num ignorare virtutem, ubi periculosius aliquid quaeritur, ubi difficilius invenitur,ubi non habemus sermones ⟨cognatos rebus⟩ de quibus loquimur, ubi rem ut estsermo non loquitur, ubi vocabula a propriis significationibus peregrinantur et no-vas admirari videntur; ubi divina descendit excellentia ut humana ascendat intelli-gentia; ubi nomina pronominantur, ubi adjectiva substantivantur, ubi verbum nonest nota ejus quod de altero dicitur, ubi sine inhaerentia praedicatio, ubi sine mate-ria subjectio, ubi affirmatio impropria, negatio vera, ubi constructio non subjacetlegibus Donati, ubi translatio aliena a regulis Tullii, ubi enuntiatio peregrina abAristotelis documento, ubi fides (PL: fidei) remota a rationis argumento.37

In this prologue, Alain gives a very impressive list of particularities ofthe theological language which distinguish it from natural language. Alainexplains each of these particularities in his Summa and his Regulae, and Iwill not go through them now.38 Which is important from the present pointof view is that we find in the Prologue, and this is rare at this point of time,the notion of «virtue» enclosed in a context of hermeneutic reflections.

Opening his long list of irregularities, Alain quotes Aristotle in order toinvite the reader to take into account the «virtue of the theological nouns».The quoted passage is the following one, coming from the SophisticiElenchi: «In orationibus qui nominum virtutis sunt ignari paralogizantur et

36 ALAIN OF LILLE, Regulae caelestis iuris, Rule XVIII, ed. N. M. Häring, «Archives d’histoiredoctrinale et littéraire du Moyen-Âge», 48, 1981, p. 97-226: p. 137.

37 ALAIN OF LILLE, Liber in distinctionibus dictionum theologicarum, PL 210, 685-1012, Prolo-gus alter, col. 687-688.

38 Cf. L. VALENTE, Langage et théologie cit., p. 40-44; G. R. EVANS, Alan of Lille’s Distinctio-nes and the Problem of Theological Language, «Sacris Erudiri», 24, 1980, p. 67-86.


ipsi disputantes et alios audientes».39 It is clear from the context that by vir-tutes nominum Alain intends to refer to the general abilities of words to ac-cept, when needed, syntactically, logically as well as semanticallly deviantforms. The notion of virtus nominum seems here to be taken in a very widesense, meaning every ability of using the language in irregular ways whennecessary, as is the case when talking about God.40

3.2.3. «Virtus significationis» and «violentia usus» in the analysis of «nullares est Deus»

But in another work of Alain, the Summa Quondam homines, we find adifferent linguistical «virtue». While Simon of Tournai, as we have seen,treats the phrase «nulla res ⟨est⟩ Deus» by means of the distinction «sensusquem» vs. «sensus ex quo», Alain in his Summa analyses the same proposi-tion by contrasting the «virtus significationis» and the «violentia usus». Theproposition «nulla res ⟨est⟩ deus», according to his explanation, is correctand true if we take into account just the proper meanings of the terms –«ex virtute significationis» –, since in the expression ‘nulla res’ only createdthings are denied, and not the creator. But the common use forces themeaning of these words and extends it (a sort of parallelism with theGilbertin cohartatio) to signify even the Creator. Therefore the proposition«nulla res ⟨est⟩ Deus» has to be refused, even if – literally understood – it istrue:

Si vero quis sic instet: quelibet res non est Deus; ergo ⟨n⟩ulla res est Deus; pro-positionem concedimus, conclusionem negamus. Quia sub hac universalitate «que-libet res» non comprehenduntur nisi creature. In conclusione autem negatio plu-rium est negativa quam in positione universalitatis collectiva; negationes enim plu-rium sunt negative quam positiones positive. Ut enim hoc nomen homo, cum sittantum hominum positivum, nemo est abnegativum deorum et hominum. Cum er-go dicitur ⟨n⟩ulla res Deus, vel nihil est Deus, nimis vehemens est negatio, ubi pre-dicatum removetur tam a creatore quam a creatura. Vel etiam quamvis ex virtute si-gnificationis non sit ibi (scil. in: ⟨n⟩ulla res Deus) negatio nisi creaturarum, tamen exviolentia usus videtur esse abnegatio tam creature quam creatoris.41

39 165 a 15-17, tr. Boethii, De sophisticis elenchis, ed. B. J. Dod, Leiden-Bruxelles, Brill, 1975(«Aristoteles Latinus», 6, 1-3), p. 6, 11-12.

40 Cf. I. ROSIER, Res significata et modus significandi. Les enjeux linguistiques et théologiquesd’une distinction médiévale, in Sprachtheorie in Spätantike und Mittelalter, cit. note 30, p. 134-168;L. VALENTE, Langage et théologie cit., p. 39 ff.

41 ALAIN OF LILLE, Summa Quoniam homines, ed. cit., p. 147 f.

182 Luisa Valente

While in the prologue of the Liber in distinctionibus dictionum theologi-carum the notion of «virtue of names» («virtus theologicorum nominum»)was used to mean the possible irregular uses of words, here the notion of«virtue of the meaning» («virtus significationis») is clearly used to mean theragularity and property of speech,42 and is opposed to the stronger force ofuse, called violentia usus.

3.2.4. «Usus» and criteria of admissibility for the theological propositions.The condemnation of linguistic novelties

In fact, in the immediately following lines, Alain quotes the passagefrom which we began this essay, Priscian’s Institutiones grammaticae VII,28, in order to assert that the criterion of use is stronger than the criterionof regularity: «Maxime autem in omni facultate usus emulandus est, analo-gia scienda». After this, Alain lists a group of four criteria which help at de-ciding whether a theological proposition may be admitted or not in the theo-logical science. The fact that the proposition has to be true is not sufficient:it also has to be commonly used in the same sense according to which it istrue (if a literally true proposition is used in a sense according to which itis not true, as we have seen for «nulla res Deus», it has to be refused). Inaddition, in it the speech has to be harmonic with its object, since «profanenovelty has to be refused». Finally, the causa dicendi has to be clearly aswell as easily identifiable:

Unde ad hoc ut aliqua locutio in theologia recipiatur, quatuor concurrunt: utsubsit veritas; ut a veritate usus non dissonet; ut rei sermo sit consonus, profaneetiam verborum novitates vitande sunt; et ut causa dicendi evidens sit et aperta.43

A similar list of criteria is also given in the Regulae caelestis iuris, ruleXXXIV, where the criterion of respect for use is directly connected to thecondemnation of terminological novelties:

OMNIS SERMO THEOLOGICUS DEBET ESSE KATHOLICVS, GENERALIS, VISITATVS, AB IN-TELLECTV NON DISSONVS, REI DE QUA LOQVIMUR CONSONUS. Catholicus, inquam, debetesse quia, si contrarius est fidei catholice, admitti non debet ut si tres essentie ueltres dii esse dicantur. Vsitatus etiam quia profanas uerborum nouitates deuitat eccle-

42 This distinction seems to be similar with the one probably made by William of Ockhambetween the virtus verborum and the virtus sermonis. Cf. R. LAMBERTINI, C. MARMO, A. TABARRONI,Virtus verborum cit. p. 233.

43 ALAIN OF LILLE, Summa Quoniam homines, ed. cit., p. 148. Cf. SIMON OF TOURNAI, Disputa-tiones, Disp. XCII, ed. cit. (n. 20), p. 265, passage quoted supra. About the notion of causa dicendiby Hilary of Poitiers, cf. here note 3.


sia. Generalis ut ab omnibus intelligentibus recipiatur ut Christum esse aliquid se-cundum quod homo. Vt etiam intellectu sit perceptibilis. Debet enim uerboruminuolucra cauere katholicus. Vt etiam rei de qua loquimur sit consonus. Debetenim theologus habere sermones cognatos rebus de quibus loquitur.44

The fact of insisting on the criterion of refusing terminological noveltiesbut respecting the universal and common use of words makes a great differ-ence between these texts and the idea of theology which was expressed byBoethius in the prologue to his De trinitate, which is nevertheless one of themain sources for Alain. As we have seen, Boethius declares that he has con-sciously chosen «new words» in order to obscure his theological tractate topeople who can’t understand it, and could be mistaken by it.45 On the con-trary, Alain says that theology has to be clearly comprehensible to every-body in order to avoid deceiving people with unusual terminology. In orderto reach the same aim, not to deceive readers, Boethius and Alain chosetwo opposites ways: the «last of the Romans», the way of a cryptic, esoterictheology; the master of Lille, the way of a tendentially universal, under-standable theology.

It has to be said nevertheless that the «profane neologisms» («profanaenovitates verborum») are probably condemned by Alain of Lille not somuch because they are «new», but because of their being «profane». This isvery clearly said by Thierry of Chartres, one of the masters of Alain, in hisCommentum super Boethii librum De trinitate. Thierry mentions explicitlythe source of the principle «Profanae novitates verborum vitandae sunt»,which is Paul, I Tim. 6, 20. Paul would have written not that new words assuch have to be refused, but only «profane» new words. And this becausethe Nicene Council has in fact instituted a new word, which wasn’t usedbefore, the word ‘omousion’. The Church had accepted this new word inits use though it was a novelty since it was not a «profane» novelty, andtherefore it was not possible that people could deduce a wrong sense from it:

Illud tamen sciendum est quod profanas uerborum nouitates sicut Apostolusdicit summopere uitare debemus. Profanas inquit quia in Nicena sinodo prius insti-

44 ALAIN OF LILLE, Regulae caelestis iuris, ed. cit., p. 148. The formula «theologus debet habe-re sermones cognatos rebus de quibus loquitur» is an almost literal quotation from BOETHIUS, Deconsolatione philosophiae III, 2, ed. cit., p. 306, l. 111 f.: «Cum Platone sanciente didiceris cognatosde quibus loquuntur rebus oportere esse sermones» – a phrase which very likely derives fromPLATO, Timaes 29b (I am grateful to Alfonso Maierù for calling this to my attention). Boethius’passage from the De consolatione is often quoted by theologians from the 12th century. Cf. L. VA-LENTE, ‘Phantasia contrarietatis’ cit. note 3, p. 71 ff.

45 BOETHIUS, De trinitate, in ID., Opuscula sacra, ed. cit. (note 12), p. 1-129; p. 4, l. 16-18. Thepassage is quoted here, at the level of n. 12.

184 Luisa Valente

tutum est hoc uocabulum omousion i.e. unius substantie quod prius in usu non erat.Et quia profana non fuit uerbi nouitas eo uidelicet quoniam prauus intellectus habe-ri inde non poterat ideo in usum recepit illud ecclesia.46

It seems, finally, that at least the Church has the authority of introduc-ing linguistical innovations, following nevertheless the most powerful criter-ion of not choosing words which may produce a doctrinal error (pravus in-tellectus).

Conclusions

Summing up, I think that from the texts, which we have seen, we mayconclude a number of points:

– The distinction between «sensus quem faciunt verba» and «sensus exquo fiunt verba», common in grammar and logic in the 13th and 14th cen-turies, may be an original contribution of the 12th century Porretan mastersSimon of Tournai and Alain of Lille, who could have been developing somehints coming from Gilbert of Poitiers.

– Both Simon and Alain declare the superiority of the criterion of res-pecting the use to the criterion of respecting the property of meanings andthe analogical regularity, when one has to decide about the acceptability ofa proposition in sacra pagina. A litterally true proposition has to be refusedif in the way it is used it asserts a false meaning. Alain quotes, to supportthis thesis, a text from Priscian VII, 28: «analogia scienda, usus aemulandus».

– The later notion of virtus sermonis doesn’t appear as such in Porre-tan hermeneutics. Nevertheless, we have a relevant precedent of it in Alainof Lille. On the one hand, under the suggestion of the Sophistici Elenchi, heuses the notion of virtus nominum to mean the possibility that words areused in many improper and irregular ways when necessary, as when speak-ing of God. On the other hand, Alain expresses the contrast between the«sensus quem faciunt verba» and the «sensus ex quo verba fiunt» by con-trasting the interpretation of a proposition «ex virtute significationis» andits interpretation «ex violentia usus». And the formula «ex virtute significa-tionis» cannot fail to remind us of the later famous expression «de virtutesermonis».

46 THIERRY OF CHARTRES, Commentum super Boethii librum De trinitate, ed. N. M. Häring,Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and his school, Toronto, Pontifical Institute ofMedieval Studies, 1971 («Studies and Texts», 20), p. 101-102. Cf. PAUL, I Tim 6, 20: «Timotheedepositum custodi devitans profanas vocum novitates et oppositiones falsi nominis scientiae».

Virtus significationis, violentia usus. Porretan views on Theological Hermeneutics

Documents

Transcript of Virtus significationis, violentia usus. Porretan views on Theological Hermeneutics