"To whom my own glad debts are incalculable": St. Augustine and human loves in The Four Loves and...
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Transcript of "To whom my own glad debts are incalculable": St. Augustine and human loves in The Four Loves and...
‘To whom my own glad debts are incalculable’: St.Augustine and human loves in The Four Loves and Till We
Have Faces
Introduction
In The Four Loves C.S. Lewis discusses a passage from
Augustine’s Confessions, where Augustine recounts the death of
a close friend and his intense grief. Lewis takes issue with
a claim that he attributes to Augustine: that we ought to
choose the object of our love based on what will be the
least likely to cause us grief. Lewis claims that
Augustine’s philosophical milieu has obscured his
Christianity; his focus on the individual’s happiness, as a
stable possession of the summum bonum, runs counter to the
sacrificial character of charity and the vulnerability that
accompanies all love. Lewis, I argue, misses the profound
things Augustine is really saying in this part of the
Confessions, and misunderstands the discussion of rest and
security in God’s love. Nonetheless, in Lewis’ Till We Have
Faces, the very things he would later misinterpret and
overlook in his treatment of Confessions IV are woven deep
1
into the fabric of his finest novel. In this respect Lewis
was more Augustinian than he realized.
The Four Loves and Augustine
In the final chapter of The Four Loves, ‘Charity,’ C.S.
Lewis mentions the ‘glad debts’ he owes to St. Augustine. He
does so, however, to contextualize a criticism of the great
bishop of Hippo. It concerns Augustine’s treatment of his
anonymous friend’s death in Confessions IV. On Lewis’ reading,
Augustine reflects on his devastating grief and ‘draws a
moral’: do not love something that will only die and cause
you great pain. ‘This is what comes, [Augustine] says, of
giving one’s heart to anything but God. All human beings
pass away. Do not let your happiness depend on something you
may lose’.1 While he shows much trepidation in disagreeing
with Augustine, Lewis goes on, in a justly famous passage,
to reject utterly the idea that security should guide us in
determining the object of our love.
1 C.S. Lewis, The Four Loves (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1960; reprinted 1991), p. 120.
2
To love at all is to be vulnerable. Loveanything, and your heart will certainly be wrung and possibly be broken. If you want to make sure of keeping it intact, you must give your heart to no one, not even to an animal. Wrap it carefully round with hobbies and little luxuries; avoid all entanglements; lock it up safein the casket or coffin of your selfishness. But in that casket—safe, dark, motionless, airless—it will change. It will not be broken; it will become unbreakable, impenetrable, irredeemable. The alternative to tragedy, or at least to the risk of tragedy, is damnation. The only place outside Heaven where you can be perfectly safe from all the dangers and perturbations of love is Hell.2
The fact that Augustine proposes the faulty moral should be
attributed not to his Christianity, says Lewis, but is
rather ‘a hangover from the high-minded Pagan philosophies
in which he grew up’.3
Lewis, I claim, has misread Augustine, who is up to
something much different, and much deeper, in Confessions IV.
Consider the deathbed scene Augustine describes. His friend
has been baptized while unconscious. When he comes to,
Augustine begins to mock the baptism and expects his friend
2 Lewis, Four Loves, p. 121.3 Ibid.
3
to join in; after all, he received it ‘while entirely absent
in mind and unaware of what was happening’, and while
conscious had fallen in with Augustine’s Manichaeism.4 Much
to Augustine’s surprise, the friend looks on him as upon
‘his enemy’, and tells him to desist, on pain of losing his
friendship. This must inform our reading of Augustine’s
later exclamations, which can seem to justify Lewis’ reading
if taken out of context: ‘Woe to the madness which thinks to
cherish human beings as though more than human! (O dementiam
nescientem diligere homines humaniter!) How foolish the human heart
that anguishes without restraint over human ills, as I did
then!’5 Augustine attributes the depth and pain of his grief
to the fact that he had loved ‘a man doomed to death as
4 Augustine, Confessions, translated by Maria Boulding (Hyde Park, NY: NewCity Press, 1997), IV.4.8. Texts in English from the Confessions are from the Boulding translation unless explicitly noted otherwise. Citations from the Latin are from Augustine, Confessions: Introduction, Text, Commentary, 3 volumes, edited and translated by James O’Donnell (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1992). Texts from the Confessions will be cited by book (Roman numerals), chapter and paragraph number (Arabic numerals), as here. 5 Confessions IV.7.12. Boulding’s translation of the first of these lines is unfortunate, in my view. Augustine laments the madness that does not love humans humaniter; he does not say here that he loved his friend as more than human. The translation encourages the reading that I aim to counter in this essay. F.J. Sheed’s translation (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006) of this line is much more literal: ‘O madness that knows not how to love men as men!’
4
though he were never to die’ (moriturum acsi non moriturum).6 At
first glance, these look like condemnations of excessive love
for a beloved, and would perhaps suggest the moral that
Lewis sees in the text: Augustine ought to have loved his
friend less; he ought to have stayed cool and detached.
In the deathbed scene, though, Augustine was an enemy
to his friend precisely because he mocked his baptism and
tempted him from his eternal destiny. Thus he treated his
beloved, who was really entering eternal life, as if he
would perish utterly, and indeed he was an obstacle to his
friend’s salvation. He loved too little, not too much. His
love was not too exalted for its object, but too low and
impoverished. It is also far from clear that security is
Augustine’s point of emphasis. He recounts how he tried and
failed to comfort himself: ‘If I bade [my soul], “Trust in
God,” it rightly (iuste) disobeyed me, for the man it had
held so dear and lost was more real (verior) and more lovable
than the fantasy in which it was bidden to trust’.7 Here
truth and goodness are the indications of what we should
6 Ibid. IV.8.13. 7 Confessions IV.4.9.
5
love, not security or freedom from harm. Moreover,
Augustine’s false Manichean god was certainly defined as
immortal. Why, then, was it just for his soul to reject that
comfort? If security matters most, if it is ‘our highest
wisdom’ (as Lewis frames the position),8 and if Augustine
was thinking of an undying being under the name ‘god’, it
seems that his soul would have been wrong to disobey. Yet he
says otherwise. To be sure, a false god is a strange kind of
security, but this passage shows at least that Augustine is
not simply talking about security and safety from loss.
Falsehood can anesthetize as well as truth—better in many
cases!
Why, then, does Lewis read Augustine the way he does?
He cites Book IV, Chapter 10 in particular. Here is the text
that seems most congenial to Lewis’ reading:
Let my soul use these [created] things to praise you,O God, creator of them all,but let it not be glued fast to them in love through the sense of the body,
for they are going whither they were always destined to go, toward extinction;
8 Lewis, Four Loves, p. 121.6
and they rend my soul with death-dealingdesires, for it too longs to be, and loves to rest in what it loves.9
The line ‘let it not be glued fast to them in love through
the sense of the body’ is particularly resonant with Lewis’
claim that Augustine is reflecting ‘high-minded Pagan
philosophies’ here: a Stoic or Neoplatonic detachment.
Likewise, in Chapter Nine Augustine writes, ‘Blessed is he
who loves you, and loves his friend in you and his enemy for
your sake. He alone loses no one dear to him, to whom all
are dear in the One who is never lost’.10
Augustine does, of course, point out that we find our
rest only in God. That in itself can hardly be objectionable
to Lewis. He cites, as a greater authority than St.
Augustine, St. Paul, who says he would have had “sorrow upon
sorrow” if Epaphroditus had died.11 But Paul also counseled
the Thessalonians not to ‘grieve as those do who have no
9 Confessions IV.10.15. Boulding has ‘let it not be glued fast to them by sensual love’ for non in eis figatur glutine amore per sensus corporis. I have modified the translation to preserve the integrity of the phrase ‘per sensus corporis’, the importance of which will emerge below.10 Ibid. IV.9.14.11 Philippians 2:27. Revised Standard Version (London: Nelson, 1969), p.183.
7
hope’.12 Lewis cannot be denying that our ultimate happiness
is found in God, or that hope is better than despair, or
that ‘ye shall find rest for your souls’! No, the objection
is more specific, namely that Augustine would have us choose
the object of our love on the basis of unworthy
considerations: security from loss and the avoidance of
suffering. Lewis asks, ‘Who could conceivably begin to love
God on such a prudential ground—because the security (so to
speak) is better? Who could even include it among the
grounds for loving?’13 But the above passages, in which
Augustine praises God for freeing his holy ones from loss
and suffering, are not sufficient as evidence for Lewis’
reading. For on that reading Augustine is offering a ‘method
for dissuading us from inordinate love of a fellow-
creature’.14 The method is to spell out the pain of loss and
then to propose a moral: love only that which will never
bring you pain.
12 I Thessalonians 4:13. RSV, p. 189.13 Lewis, Four Loves, p. 120. 14 Ibid., pp. 119-120.
8
Lewis, however, misses the central thrust of this
section of the Confessions, and consequently misunderstands
the import of Augustine’s statements about finding rest in
God. Running through chapters 4-12 of Book IV is an explicit
concern with truth. As seen above, Augustine could not
console himself by trusting God, because his friend was more
true (verior) than the false god of his imagination. In
Chapter 5 he addresses God: ‘you who are truth’.15 In
Chapter 8 he says, ‘I had poured out my soul into the sand
by loving a man doomed to death (moriturum) as though he
were never to die (acsi non moriturum)’—notice how explicit the
Latin text is in pointing out the contradiction, the untruth
in his manner of loving.16 When he recounts how he began to
find comfort in his other friends’ company, he again passes
judgment on himself: ‘This was a gross fable and a long-
sustained lie (ingens fibula et longum mendacium); and as our
minds itched to listen they were corrupted by its adulterous
excitation’.17 This is a reference to 2 Timothy 4:3-4: For the
15 Confessions, IV.5.10.16 Ibid., IV. 8.13.17 Ibid.
9
time is coming when people will not endure sound teaching, but having itching
ears they will accumulate for themselves teachers to suit their own likings, and
will turn away from listening to the truth and wander into myths.18 Augustine
concludes Chapter 9 with this marvelous line: ‘Your law is
truth, as you yourself are truth (et lex tua veritas et veritas tu)’.19
He admonishes his soul in Chapter 11: ‘Fix your dwelling
there, lay up for safe-keeping whatever you have thence
received, if only because you are weary of deceits (fallaciis).
Entrust to Truth whatever of truth is in you…’.20
In keeping with the nature and title of the Confessions,
Augustine is immediately concerned with confessing the truth
about this episode in his life. (It is not clear that he
‘draws a moral’ until Chapter 12: it is quite different, as
I will show, from the one Lewis identifies.) The truth, he
now realizes, is that his love for his friend was riddled
with falsehood. He loved his mortal friend as if he would
never die; on the other hand, he regarded his friend’s true
eternal life as a superstition to be mocked. That much is
18 RSV, p. 196. See O’Donnell, Commentary Vol. II, p. 232, for the version of the biblical text Augustine would most likely have used. 19 Confessions, IV.9.14.20 Ibid., IV.11.16. Sheed has ‘emptiness’ for fallaciis.
10
clear from the deathbed scene. Augustine goes further,
though, in the subsequent meditations on time and eternity.
Indeed, it is striking how much of this part of Book IV
anticipates the celebrated treatment of time in Book XI.
Let us return to the line which is the most likely
candidate for Lewis’ moral: ‘Let my soul use these things to
praise you, O God, creator of them all, but let it not be
glued fast to them in love through the sense of the body
(non in eis figatur glutine amore per sensus corporis)’. The
qualification in the last phrase—per sensus corporis—invites
question. If Lewis’ reading is right, it seems misplaced;
the pain of losing the beloved is not merely a sensory
affliction, as Augustine makes very clear in Chapters 8 and
9, where he describes his friendships so beautifully:
There were other joys to be found in their company which still more powerfully captivated my mind—the charmsof talking and laughing together and kindly giving way to each other’s wishes…Such signs of friendship sprang from the hearts of friends who loved andknew their love returned, signs to be read in smiles, words, glances and a thousand gracious gestures. So were sparks kindled and our minds (animos)
11
were fused inseparably, out of many becoming one.
This is what we esteem in our friends, and so highly do we esteem it that our conscience feels guilt if we fail to love someone who responds to us with love, or do not return the love of one who offers love to us, and this without seeking any bodily gratification from the other save signs of his goodwill. From this springs our grief if someone dies…21
Since even his worldly friendships have to do with the union
of souls (animi), not just bodies, and since this union of
soul is the spring of our grief, why does Augustine pray
that his soul ‘not be glued fast to them’ in love per sensus
corporis?
The answer has to do with time and eternity, and the
kind of existence we creatures have. In Chapter 10 Augustine
reflects on this very matter, and it is worth seeing the
text in full:
Turn us toward yourself, O God of Hosts,show us your face and we shall be saved;for wheresoever a human soul turns, it can but cling to what brings sorrow unless it turns to you, cling though it may to beautiful things outside you and
21 Confessions, IV.8.13.12
outside itself. Yet were these beautifulthings not from you, none of them would be at all. They arise and sink; in theirrising they begin to exist and grow toward their perfection, but once perfect they grow old and perish; or, ifnot all reach old age, yet certainly allperish. So then, even as they arise and stretch out toward existence, the more quickly they grow and strive to be, the more swiftly they are hastening toward extinction. This is the law of their nature. You have endowed them so richly because they belong to a society of things that do not all exist at once, but in their passing away and successiontogether form a whole, of which the several creatures are parts. So is it with our speaking as it proceeds by audible signs: it will not be a whole utterance unless one word dies away after making its syllables heard, and gives place to another. Let my soul use these things to praiseyou, O God, creator of them all,but let it not be glued fast to them in love through the sense of the body,
for they are going whither they were always destined to go,toward extinction; and they rend my soul with death-dealing desires, for it too longs to be, and loves to rest in what it loves. But in them it finds no place to rest,because they do not stand firm;
13
they are transient, and who can followthem with the senses of the body?
Or who can seize them, even near at hand?Tardy is carnal perception, because itis carnal; such is the law of its nature. Sufficient it is for another purpose, for which it was made,but insufficient to catch the fleetingthings that rush past from their appointed beginningto their appointed end. In your Word, through whom they are created,they hear your command,“From here begin, and thus far you shall go.”22
Two things should be noted about created things here: first,
even as they grow perfect, becoming most fully what they
are, they pass into non-existence; second, they exist only
as parts of the whole. Each created being, taken as a whole,
includes all the passing moments of its existence, but in
any moment only a part of the being is present. Moreover,
our senses, since they are corporeal, only connect us to
objects moment by moment. Thus to cleave to a beloved thing
‘through the bodily sense’ is to love it piece-by-piece
22 Ibid., IV.10.15.14
rather than as a whole. This is how objects of a love that
cleaves per sensus corporis can ‘rend’ the soul (Augustine’s
verb is conscindere: ‘to tear in pieces’); the lover is
seeking to rest in and find union with something that does
not rest or have unity in itself.
Nor is the soul rent only when our friends die: ‘who
can seize them, even near at hand?’ See also Chapter 6: ‘I
was miserable, and miserable too is everyone whose mind is
chained by friendship with mortal things, and is torn apart
by their loss, and then becomes aware of the misery that it
was in even before it lost them’.23 Augustine’s soul was
broken up, cut into pieces (concisus),24 and Chapter 8
describes how his other friendships patched up (resarcire),
repaired (repare), and remade (recreare) it.25 What sort of a
repair is indicated by his stark judgment: ‘This was a gross
fable and a long-sustained lie’.26 This is the more
surprising since it is followed immediately by the beautiful
depiction of friendship, quoted above, which is not simply a
23 Confessions, IV.6.11. My italics.24 Ibid., IV.7.12.25 Ibid., IV.8.13.26 Ibid.
15
catalogue of errors. This life of friendship, ‘lie’ and
‘fable’ notwithstanding, really was a kind of union of
souls, and Augustine presents it as truly displaying ‘what
we esteem (diligitur) in our friends’. The description of
friendship as fusing many souls together into one continues
the thematic language of dissolution and unification, which
parallels the vocabulary of falsehood and truth.
And yet something about his friendships was thoroughly
untrue. Augustine still did not love his friends according
to the truth about their existence (and his own). The most
obvious untruth was simply that he still loved mortal beings
as if not mortal. The deeper untruth, which emerges from the
consideration of time and eternity, is that Augustine loved
his friends partially, since his soul cleaved to them in
love ‘through the sense of the body’. Or better, he sought
to love them as a whole, and indeed there was a union of
souls between them; since he was in the grip of a false
doctrine of the soul, though, he was torn between the desire
to love in full and the ignorance of what a full human being
really is. The false doctrine, the ‘gross fable’ embraced by
16
Augustine and these friends, is Manichaeism, which did not
acknowledge God’s incorporeality, much less that of the
soul. Thus Augustine accuses himself:
Why follow your flesh, perverted soul? Rather let it follow you, once you are converted. Whatever you experience through it is partial, and you do not know the whole, of which these experiences are but a part, although they give you pleasure. Were your carnalperception able to grasp the whole, wereit not, for your punishment, confined toits due part of the whole, you would long for whatever exists only in the present to pass away, so that you might find greater joy in the totality. … So it is always with the constituent elements of a simple object, constituents which do not all exist simultaneously: in their entirety they give us greater pleasure, provided we can perceive (sentiri) them all together, than they do separately.27
Human beings, insofar as they are temporal things, do not
exist all at once, but always have only a vanishing sliver
of their complete being. A complete apprehension of a human
being would encompass his or her whole life; a still more
perfect apprehension would grasp that life all at once.
Correspondingly, a more complete love for one’s friend would27 Confessions, IV.11.17.
17
encompass his or her whole life; a still more perfect love
would perceive it all at once. Here is how another author
illustrates such an experience:
And yet (this is hard to say) with all this, even because of all this, she was the same old Psyche still; a thousand times more her very self than she had been before the Offering. For all that had then but flashed out in a glance or gesture, all that one meant most when one spoke her name, was now wholly present, not to be gathered up from hints nor in shreds, not some of it in one moment and some in another. Goddess? I had never seen a realwoman before.28
The author, of course, is C.S. Lewis, in perhaps his most
profound work, Till We Have Faces. Psyche is the beloved half-
sister of the narrator, Orual. This text is from a series of
visions that Orual has as she nears death, visions which
reveal to her the truth about her life and loves.
Till We Have Faces and Augustine
There are several striking echoes of Augustine’s
Confessions throughout Lewis’ novel, and indeed in its entire
narrative structure and main preoccupations. Like Augustine,
28 C.S. Lewis, Till We Have Faces: A Myth Retold (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1956), p. 306. My italics.
18
Orual writes a confession; hers, however, begins as an
accusation against the gods, upon the charge of taking away
her beloved cruelly (as well as unjustly, irrationally, and
inexplicably). It begins as a condemnation of the gods for
their incompatibility with human loves and goods, but ends
up as a confession of the divine love. In the divine love
those human loves find their full being, and in reference to
it the past takes on a completely different light. The last
full line that Orual writes, ‘Long did I hate you, long did
I fear you,’29 instantly brings to mind the great prayer in
the Confessions: ‘Late have I loved you, Beauty so ancient and
so new, late have I loved you!’30
Even the line from which the title is taken, ‘How can
they [the gods] meet us face to face till we have faces?’ is
thoroughly Augustinian: God is nearer to us than we are to
ourselves, and we cannot even know who we are without his
light and grace.31 From the great prayer of X.27.38 again:
‘Lo, you were within, but I outside, seeking there for you,
29 Lewis, Till We Have Faces, p. 308.30 Confessions, X.27.38.31 Lewis, Till We Have Faces, p. 294.
19
and upon the shapely things you have made I rushed headlong,
I, misshapen. You were with me, but I was not with you.’32
Likewise, at the beginning of Augustine’s recounting of his
friend’s baptism and death: ‘Who can of himself alone extol
your deeds, even those you have wrought in him alone?’33
Augustine cannot even call upon God unless God first brings
about a change within him. Thus at the opening of the
Confessions he asks, ‘How shall I call upon my God, my God and
my Lord, when by the very act of calling upon him I would be
calling him into myself?’34 At the beginning of Book XIII he
provides an answer: ‘Into my soul I call you, for you
prepare it to be your dwelling by the desire you inspire in
it.’35 ‘The structure of Till We Have Faces is built around
Orual’s attempt to remember, to recount the truth of her
past life: first to accuse the gods, and finally to confess
God’s goodness and mercy. She finds that not only has she
systematically suppressed the harsh truths that lie within
her—the selfishness at the center of her most cherished love
32 Confessions, X.27.3833 Confessions, IV.4.8.34 Confessions I.2.2.35 Ibid. XIII.1.1.
20
—but that she is consequently unaware of who she truly is.
The veil she wears over her unlovely face is the outward
sign of the veil she has drawn over her soul’s deepest
ugliness. Thus for Orual, as for Augustine, true self-
knowledge cannot be attained without God’s grace.
The question Orual asks—‘How can the gods meet us face
to face till we have faces?’—implies more than a lack of
self-knowledge, however. It implies that the self is not
even formed sufficiently to relate to God in the proper way.
This theme is a definitive one in the Confessions, and Book IV
is no exception. Then there is of course the famous
treatment of the fragmentation of the will in Book VIII: ‘I
was at odds with myself, and fragmenting myself’.36 Much more
could be said about the Confessions and Till We Have Faces; I will
focus mostly on the elements of Confessions IV.4-12 that are
paralleled in Lewis’ great novel. What Lewis missed in the
passage from the The Four Loves is just what he sees and
communicates so marvelously in Till We Have Faces.
36 Ibid. VIII.10.22.21
Augustine confesses the fragmentation of his soul in
his love for his friends. In the texts in question, he
attributes this to his cleaving in love to temporal things
through the senses of the body. Since the objects of his
love, to which his soul is united, are fragmented through
time, he too is fragmented with them. To this spread-out
existence, with each part taking the place of the last,
Augustine contrasts the establishment of things in God’s
eternity. ‘If kinship with other souls appeals to you, let
them be loved in God, because they too are changeable and
gain stability only when fixed in him (et illo fixae stabiliuntur):
otherwise they would go their way and be lost (irent et
perirent)’.37 It is not just that without God they would
eventually be lost to death; even before they perish (perire)
they continually pass (ire). In God the soul and what it
loves have their true firmness and integrity:
Entrust to Truth whatever of truth is inyou, and you will lose nothing … all your labile elements (fluxa tua) will be restored and bound fast to you … [and] shall stand firm with you and abide,
37 Confessions, IV.12.18.22
binding you to the ever-stable, abiding God.38
Just so, Orual finally sees Psyche as complete, as holding
her very self all at once, rather than ‘some of it in one
moment and some in another’. This at last is a ‘real woman’.
Lewis, like Augustine, sets up a parallel between the
scattered temporality of human existence and the transience
of words; these are set against the completeness of life in
God’s eternity and the eternal Word, which does not depart
as our speech must, and yet is the Truth itself. Orual’s
last lines, broken off in mid-sentence by her death,
acknowledge this:
I know now, Lord, why you utter no answer. You are yourself the answer. Before your face questions die away. What other answer would suffice? Only words, words; to be led out to battle against other words. Long did I hate you, long did I fear you. I might—39
Augustine’s vision of God reaches its highest point in the
vision at Ostia with his mother, Monica. And indeed, he too
38 Ibid., IV.11.16.39 Lewis, Till We Have Faces, p. 308.
23
relates and contrasts temporal words with the eternal life
of God, the eternal Word.
And as we talked and panted for [God’s Wisdom], we just touched the edge of it by the utmost leap of our hearts; then, sighing … we left the first-fruits of our spirit captive there, and returned to the noise of articulate speech, wherea word has beginning and end. How different from your Word, our Lord, who abides in himself, and grows not old, but renews all things.40
I noted earlier that Augustine is principally concerned
with truth (not security) in this part of Book IV. Likewise,
in Orual’s final visions she is told repeatedly that ‘all
here is true’,41 and in particular that her understanding of
her past loves was, to use Augustine’s words, ‘a gross fable
and a long-sustained lie’. The unity of Orual’s life story
as she wanted to tell it turns out to be illusory. Lewis
goes so far as to say (through the revelations given in
Orual’s visions) that the divine can change the past;
hyperbole or not, Lewis shares with (or learns from)
Augustine the idea that the temporal is in the process of
40 Confessions, IX.10.24.41 Lewis, Till We Have Faces, p. 300, 304.
24
being taken up into the eternal. Augustine says to his soul
that its transient things (fluxa) will be reformed and
renewed (reformabuntur et renovabuntur), will ‘stand firm … and
abide’ in God.42 Lewis has a character tell Orual that
‘nothing is yet in its true form’.43 To be sure, Lewis goes
further with the idea that God can change the past. The
import of this striking claim, however, has to do with the
untruth of Orual’s own memory and self-understanding. It is
the story she has told to herself that must be revised; that
is the ‘past’ that God will change. Like Augustine’s,
Orual’s confession is not a mere record or biography, but a
movement of the soul towards God. In writing her charge
against the gods she starts on the inexorable and painful
road to seeing the truth: that a hard kernel of blind,
voracious selfishness lay hidden at the heart of the story
she told herself. She can only understand what she is and
what she has been by suffering, by being broken and
unraveled so as to be transformed in God’s love. She has to
bear, unwittingly, the sorrows of Psyche.
42 Confessions, IV.11.16.43 Lewis, Till We Have Faces, p. 305.
25
Her final vision, when ‘the god’ is approaching, shows
a glimpse of this transformation’s end: ‘The air was growing
brighter about us; as if something had set it on fire. Each
breath I drew let into me new terror, joy, overpowering
sweetness. I was pierced through and through with the arrows
of it. I was being unmade. I was no one’.44 At the end of
the vision Orual sees herself remade as another Psyche, the
same yet subtly different. She had to be unmade through
suffering. She had to have her untrue, self-constructed self
unraveled through confession and revelation, in order to be
remade in God.
Compare this masterfully drawn vision to the end
of Confessions XI:
Now as my years waste away amid groaningyou are my solace, Lord, because you aremy Father, and you are eternal. But I have leapt down into the flux of time where all is confusion to me. In the most intimate depths of my soul my thoughts are torn to fragments by tempestuous changes until that time whenI flow into you, purged and rendered molten by the fire of your love.
44 Ibid., p. 307.26
I will stand still, then, and find firm footing (solidabor) in your Truth who is shaping me to himself (in forma mea, veritate tua)…45
Augustine (the author) and Lewis see so many of the same
truths here: Orual and Augustine (as the character of his
own confession) deeply misunderstand their own loves, even
those which seem, at the time, pure and transparent. They
and their beloveds can only be truly understood and truly
loved in the light of God’s eternity, not in the scatterings
of time and not in the lies they tell to try to stitch
themselves back together. The divine love melts them both
down to remake them in the truth, and yet this new creation
is more truly itself than the partial existence encountered
in this mortal life: Psyche is ‘a thousand times more her
very self’; Christ is Augustine’s true form. Finally, loving
the beloved in God does not mean ‘apathy’ or cool
detachment. On the contrary, it means loving him in his full
being, as he most truly is and ought to be. Though the
falsity in Augustine’s love is more directly tied to an
intellectual shortcoming, while Orual’s is explicitly rooted45 Confessions, XI.29.39—XI.30.40.
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in a grasping self-love, nonetheless Augustine’s was not
merely an intellectual error.
A final point of convergence cannot be overlooked, and
it clarifies how Augustine’s love was untrue in both the
intellectual and the moral senses of the term. Orual’s love
for Psyche was increasingly marred and transformed by
possessiveness. Indeed, this is what her condemnation of the
gods becomes in the end: a bare assertion that Psyche is
hers, and that no happiness that the gods can give Psyche
could reconcile her, Orual, to losing her possession. This
is the reductio of her charge against the gods. In the course
of the story, however, two moments stand out. The first is
when she visits Psyche on the night before she is to be
offered up as a sacrifice to the gods. Orual finds her
strangely resigned and even joyful at her coming death, and
she resents this in Psyche. Orual thinks she has come to
comfort Psyche, but even in her first telling she reveals
that she has also, or instead, come to experience how much
Psyche needs her. For a moment Psyche succumbs to fear, and
as they weep together, Orual confesses that this was ‘a kind
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of sweetness in our misery for our first time. This was what I
had come to her in her prison to do’.46 When Psyche recovers and
reveals that she has a joyful hope about going to be the
god’s bride, Orual ‘grudged her that courage and comfort’.47
She cannot encourage Psyche in a hope and happiness that
involve departing from her, from Orual. She will have
possession of the beloved over the beloved’s happiness.
And this is only a foreshadowing of the climactic
moment when Orual forces Psyche to choose between her love
for Orual and her new life as the god’s beloved. Orual
cannot or will not see the palace where Psyche dwells, and
is unable or unwilling (she cannot at the time determine
which it is) to believe Psyche’s story. Since Psyche will
not consent to leave or to break the god’s command by
bringing a lamp to their bedchamber, Orual forces her by
vowing to commit suicide if Psyche does not carry out the
‘test’. She makes herself into the enemy of Psyche’s
happiness. It is at this moment that Lewis strikes a note
46 Lewis, Till We Have Faces, p. 70. My italics.47 Lewis, Till We Have Faces, p. 75.
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strongly reminiscent of the friend’s deathbed in the
Confessions:
The look in her face now was one I did not understand. I think a lover—I mean, a man who loved—might look so on a womanwho had been false to him. And at last she said, “You are indeed teaching me about kinds of love I did not know. It is like looking into a deep pit. I am not sure whether I like your kind betterthan hatred. Oh, Orual—to take my love for you, because you know it goes down to my very roots and cannot be diminished by any other newer love, and then to make of it a tool, a weapon, a thing of policy and mastery, an instrument of torture—I begin to think Inever knew you. Whatever comes after, something that was between us dies here.”48
This is the moment when a human love, set in opposition to
the divine, ceases to become love: this is Lewis’ main
concern in The Four Loves. Consider again the deathbed scene
between Augustine and his friend. The former does not
explicitly wish to deny his friend the greatest good, but
that is precisely what his mocking tends towards.
Augustine’s love, though not entirely false, is riddled with
falsehood and incompleteness: he acknowledges neither his 48 Ibid., p. 165.
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friend’s true nature nor his newfound grace. Consequently he
not only loves falsely but, in part, fails to love, since he
is an obstacle to the greatest good for his beloved. His
friend is right to look on him as if upon an enemy. And this
is exactly the great sin of Orual: her love, which she sets
in opposition to the divine, shrivels into itself until only
the desire to possess remains. She wants no happiness for
Psyche that lessens her possession.
Drawing a Moral
What has become of the moral that Lewis attributed to
Augustine? It should be apparent by now that it was a
misreading, but exactly where it went wrong deserves some
attention. Augustine does praise the firmness, completeness,
and yes, the security of the love of God. He does bless the
man who loves all others in God and for God, since ‘he alone
loses no one dear to him’. And yet Augustine is not talking
at all about a guide to choosing one beloved over others.
Rather, he is presuming (correctly, I think) that the lover
always desires to be and to remain unified with the beloved,
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and points out how deeply impossible this is unless he is
loved in God. Again, this is not a guide for choosing one’s
object of love, as if Augustine were giving us a criterion
for shopping among the possible things we might love. God is
not simply another item on the list of possible loves. He is
Love itself and Life itself, and our very existence tends
into nothingness without him. To love each other in
accordance with what we truly are, and what we are to be,
requires us to love in God.
Moreover, it is not simply or even principally the
avoidance of suffering that is at issue, but rather the
fullness and completeness of love. Indeed, it would be a
strange lover who would prefer to love partially rather than
completely, and would prefer a partial and sorrowful
existence for his beloved to the perfection of joy and
fullness of life. Lewis reads Augustine as ‘drawing a moral’
in Chapter 10. Grammatically, however, Augustine does not
begin issuing imperatives until Chapters 11 and 12, where he
addresses commands to his soul and to all his fellow
sinners. And there we find, not a solipsistic guide for
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building one’s happiness by selecting the safest beloved;
rather, these injunctions transcend the individual focus of
the first-person narrative and speak of a communion of love.
First he addresses an imperative to his soul:
Entrust to Truth whatever of truth is inyou, and you will lose nothing; your rotten flesh will flower anew, all your diseases will be healed, all your labileelements will be restored and bound fastto you; they will not drag you with them in their own collapse, but will stand firm with you and abide,binding you to the ever-stable, abiding God.49
Then, in Chapter 12, he tells his soul to bring others to
God and, in a beautiful and extended passage, gives the
words the soul should say to those it loves. I quote part of
it here; it is evident that Augustine is not giving his soul
calculating advice about achieving maximum freedom from
heartbreak. Rather, he is commanding his soul to bring other
souls to their true good, their true life:
If kinship with other souls appeals to you, let them be loved in God, because they too are changeable and gain stability only when fixed in him; otherwise they would go their way and belost. Let them be loved in him, and
49 Confessions, IV.11.16. My italics.33
carry off to God as many of them as possible with you, and say to them:
Let us love him, for he made these things and he is not far off … There is no repose where you are seeking it. Seek what you seek, but it is notthere where you seek (quaerite quod quaeritis, sed ibi non est ubi quaeritis)… He whois our very life came down and took our death upon himself … Impatient ofdelay he ran, shouting by his words, his deeds, his death and his life, his descent to hell and his ascensionto heaven, shouting his demand that we return to him. Then he withdrew from our sight, so that we might return to our own hearts and find himthere. He withdrew, yet look, here heis … Life has come down to you, and are you reluctant to ascend and live?[…]
This is what you must tell them, to movethem to tears in this valley of weeping,and by this means carry them off with you to God, because if you burn with thefire of charity as you speak, you will be saying these things to them by his Spirit.50
Though Augustine speaks of seeking repose here, he is not
using security as a criterion to choose the object of love.
We already are seeking to rest in the beloved; that’s what
50 Ibid., IV.12.18. My italics. Boulding has ‘Search as you like, it is not where you are looking’; I have given my own translation of that line, with the Latin supplied for comparison.
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love seeks. We are already seeking happiness--that’s what
humans do—but we are seeking it not just for ourselves but
for the beloved as well. Here, in the culmination of this
episode in the Confessions, Augustine tells us that we should
love our friends in God and bring them to God out of love
for them. He does not tell us, who love mortal beings, to
find a different beloved, but to love our friends in God,
‘who is our very life’. God is so intimately present to us
that loving the friend in Him does not take us away from our
friend; on the contrary, it is the only way to love our
friend as he or she ought to be loved. We cannot turn our
face in love towards the beloved till we have faces.
Conclusion
Lewis mistakes Augustine’s aim in Confessions IV when he
comments on the passage in The Four Loves. This is striking in
light of the deep convergence between Till We Have Faces and this
section of the Confessions. Till We Have Faces, which is riddled
with the very Augustinian themes that Lewis missed in The
Four Loves, was written shortly before the latter book. So it
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seems that he simply missed something he should have seen.
(Indeed, Lewis misidentifies Augustine’s friend as
Nebridius, which makes it perhaps more plausible that he
missed the context here.) And yet he spoke the more
important truth by saying that his ‘glad debts’ to Augustine
were ‘incalculable’. We ought not to blame him too much for
losing count of the incalculable on this occasion,
especially since he makes such marvelous use of these very
ideas in the novel. The argument presented here is one small
indication of the depth of Till We Have Faces, which to my mind
has no equal in Lewis’ writings. The debts it owes to
Augustine’s Confessions, whether known or unknown to Lewis,
are glad indeed for us who are fortunate enough to read it.
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Works Cited
Augustine. Confessions: Introduction, Text, Commentary. 3 volumes.
Edited and translated by James O’Donnell. Oxford:
Oxford UP, 1992.
_________. Confessions. Translated by F.J. Sheed.
Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006.
_________. Confessions. Translated by Maria Boulding. Hyde
Park, NY: New City Press, 1997.
The Holy Bible. Revised Standard Version: Old Testament, New
Testament and Apochrypha. London: Nelson, 1969.
Lewis, Clive Staples. The Four Loves. New York: Harcourt,
Brace, 1960. Reprinted 1991.
________________. Till We Have Faces: A Myth Retold. New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1956.
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