Operations of the 82d Armore Reconnaissanc Bn in Sicilian campaing, 10-22 Jul 43, by Col P. AJI Disney" Cav.' Comraand and Staff

College. 1946-47.

This DOCDlDent IS A HOLDING OF THE

ARCHIVES SECTION LIBRARY SERVICES

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

DOCUMENT NO.N-2253.53 COpy NO. ~_

CGSC Form 160 Army-CGSC-P2-1798-7 Mar 52-5M 13 Mar 51

(

COMMAND AND STAFF COlLmE

FORI' LEAVENWORrH, KANSAS

SCHOOL OF COMBINED AmlS

REGULAR COURSE

1946 - 1947

OPERATIONS OF THE

,82ND ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION

IN /.---- I

SICILIAN CAMPAIGN :

/

JULY 10-22, 1943. \,,_----4

(PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF BATTAUON COMMANDER)

TYPE OF OPERATION DESCRIBED: USE OF RECONNAISSANCE

BATTALION OF HEAVY TYPE ARMORED DIVISION ON RECONNAI­

SSANCE' MISSIONS FOR ARMORED DIVISION AND PROVISIONAL

CORPs.

COLONEL PAUL A. DISNEY

CAVALRY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Par. Page

Index 1

Bibliography 2

Introduction 1 3

Reconnaissance U.S. Cavalry 1nssions 2 3

Technique of Perfonning Reconnaissance

Operations of Reconnaissance Battalion 10-18 July 194~ 4 7

Actions of Company C, 10-18 July 5 8

.p.ctions of Company B, 10-18 July 6 10

Operations of Battalion, 18~21 July 7 11

1\.ctions of Company.B, 18-21 July 8 12

Actions of Company C, 18-21 July 9

Operations of Battalion, 22 July 10 17

Missions 3 7

Lessons Learned 11 19

Conclusions 12 20

CHJI.RT A - Hecommended Organization for Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance Platoon - Annex I

CHAHT B Schematic Diagram of Reconnaissance Battalion (Heavy Type Armored Division) Annex 2

r~~AP OF .31CI1Y Annex 3

OVERLAY 1 - Operations of GELA and LICAT,!\ landing forces and Provisional Corp s

OVERLAY 2 Operations of B and C Companies, July 10-18

OVEHLAY 3 Operations of' B and C Companies, July 18-21

OVER.LAY 4 Operations of Battalion, t.Tuly 22.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Operations, FM 100-5

2. Enployment of Cavalry Units, Mechanized (Tentative) . (TCS 1996) FM 2-10

3. The Cava1lj" Journal, May, June 1944 Article, "Reconnaissance in Sicily".

4. A Riston- of the Second United states Annored Division 1940 to 1946.

5. History 67th Annored Di~on

6. War Letters of Morton Eustis

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ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION

IN ACTION

1. INTRODUCTION

a. As a vehicle for presenting certain characteristics of mechanized

reconnaissance units; the action of an armored reconnaissance battalion

in combat lnthe Sicilian Campaign has been chosen.

b. The subject will be presented by initially discussing some of

the capabilities and limitations of mechanized reconnaissance units

based on their organization, equipment, and training, and the desira­

bility of compensating for these limitations when assigning other

cavalry missions to them. A brief outline will then be given of

possible missions that may be assigned to properly organi zed cavalry

units, and a normal method of performing a reconnaissance or cover­

ing mission. This will be followed by a description of the manner

in which a mechanized reconnaissance unit was actually employed in

combat, utilizing its capabilities to the fullest advantage for the

pr1.mary role of reconnaissance. Finally, certain cone lusions will

be drawn from these actions which will tend to support the fact

that mechanized reconnaissance units as presently organized are

generally suited for reconnaissance missions only, am should be

reinforced for other cavalry missions.

2. RECONNAISSANCE U.8. CIVALRY IISSIOHS

a. The doctrine for employment of reconnaissance units as set forth

in FM 100-5 was generally disregarded in 'World War II as illustrated

by the range of c anbat missions assigned to such units, and the fact

that a recapitulation of all missions assigned s~s that only three

percent were devE>"ted to reconnaissance.

These ~xtra-curricular" missions were generally accomplished in a

highly satisfactory- manner, but in a majority of cases were successful

because of reinforcements provided to the reconnaissance unit, or be­

cause resistance was light. It must be realized that the doctrine of

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"reconnaissance only" as enunciated in FM: 100-5 is the guiding factor

in the organization, equipment, and training of mechanized reconnaissance

units and that whenever other missions are assigned consideration

should be g:1.ven to this fact.

b. As a result of demands made on mechanized reconnaissance units

for the accomplishment of missions other than pure reconnaissance in

large scale maneuvers prior to our entry into World War II, commanders

of such units instituted "all-round Cavalry training designed to fit

the reconnaissance units for any combat role suitable to an organization

with mobility and firepower, and for the missions they could feel certain

would be assigned them in actual combat. There was little that could be

done, or was done, in t he matter of organization tor cavalry missions.

It is true that the organic light tank troop, assault gun troop, and

the later addition of an infantry company (or dragoon troop) did pro­

vide a partial means of carrying out, cavalry missions, but these ele­

ments were provided essentially to give reconnaissance units the means

of fighting for irtformation, rather than obtaining it through the

"sneak and peep" method - originally, and erroneously, conceived ta

be normaJ..

c. As a matter of fact this organization did not materially assist

in the accomplishment of reconnaissance missions, as there was a ten­

dency to hold these reinforcing elements in reserve instead of making

it standard. operating procedure to reinforee the reconnaissance

platoons upon the start of a mission. Upon encountering resistance

too great to be overcome with the table of organization platoon,

the arrival of rein£ereements usually found the opposition consider­

ably reinforced, all of which resulted in stalemates, lost time and

lack of 1nfonnation. In some too frequent eases, higher commanders

had detached the tank troop, or dragoon troop, or both, for other

missions.

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d. Realiz1.ng the above situation, a cavalry platoon organization

was recommended by representatives 0 f the Cavalry School at' the

Armored Conference held at Fort Knox in 1946, designed to create not

only a more effective reconnaissance unit, but a unit capable of

performing all cavalry missions as well.

e. Considerable experimenting was, done with this type of unit at

Fort Riley, with extremely ,satisfactory results, and favorable

reception by a considerable number of officers and men with mechan­

ized cavalry experience. The recommended organization did two

things. It provided each platoon with sufficient organic strength

both in dismounted personnel and fire power, to overcome considerable

resistance of the "road block" type which was usually initially

encountered on reconnaissance missions, and strengthened the recon­

naissance companies organically to the extent that they could per­

form cavalry type missions with greater ease. It is believed that

this organization will be adopted eventually. If not, reconnaissance

unit commanders can and should improvise such an organization by

utilizing the organic light tank, assault gun, and inf'ant1'7 com­

pany-s to build this type reconnaissance platoon. The point that is

desired to be brought out is that the present type organiz,tion i >"

p.Qes,~~~great part limit mechanized reconnaissance units in their

missions and that proper reinforcements should be provided initially

when cavalry missions, other than reconnaissance against light

opposition, are assigned.

f. The characteristic of mobility which mechanized. reconnaissance

units possess provides considerable temptation to utilize such units

as a "flying reserve". As a consequence, the resulting wear and tear

on "mount If and man somewhat approaches that experienceci by Sordet' s

French Cavalry Corps in World War I. This Corps was rushed from one

end of the French lines to the other to counter expected German

thrusts and was soon rendered almost completely inoperative. This

temptation should be guarded against on the part of higher comman~ers

and every effort made to conserve equipnent and men for employment

at the proper time and place.

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g. In general, the characteristics of mechanized reconnaissance

units are:

(1) Excellent communications

(2) Light armor

(3) Considerable fire power

(4) Minimum number of personnel for dismoUnted employment

(5) Capable of operat ing over an extended radius of action

(6) Self sufficient administratively.

h. Cavalry missions which may be assigned to properly reinforced

mechanized reconnaissance units are:

(1) Offensive missions

(a) Attack

(b) Exploitation

(0) Pursuit

(d) Seizing and holding critical terrain and other

critical points

(2) Defensive missions

(a) Position defense (limited)

(b) Depioyed, (mobile) defense

(c) Delaying action

(3) Reconnaissance missions

(a) Reconnoit~r a. definite zone, area, or route

(b) Establish and maintain observation a nd listening

posts

(4) security missions

(a) Screening

(b) Advance guard

(c) Rear guard

(d) Protecting rear areas and lines of communication

(e) Patrolling

(5) Other JIiissions

(a) Establishing and maintaining liason between

friendly units, and between forward elements

of a Division, Corps or Army and the CF of

such units.

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(6) Quelling civil disturbances

(7) Area, or city patrolling

J. TEelDlIQUE--oFPERFORMING RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS

a. A short, description is gi.ven here on the general method of

accomplishing pure reconnaissance missions in order to make clearer

the later presentation 0 f the use of an armored reconnaissance

battalion in that type of action. When a zone of advance is

prescribed for· the parent unit, the reconnaissance unit will attempt

to reconnoiter the entire frontage of the zone. When no zone of

advance is prescribed the frontage reconnoitered will in general be

determined by the size of the reconnaissaric;eunit and the road net,

and an attempt made to cover all main axes of advance. In assigning

reconnaissance missions to subordinate elements they are in turn

assigned zones and axes of advance. Such axes will include those

assigned for movement of main bodies of troops which are to follow

the reconnaissance elements.

b. Whenever possible, it is desirable to keep one reconnaissance

company in reserve for each squadron or battalion, and one platoon

in reserve for each company. This is necessary for. additional

missions that may be assigned, and to provide relief for lead elements.

c. A reconnaissance squadron or battalion performing a reconnaissance

mission for a corps or armored elivision in an assigned ZOI'l' of advance

might be employed as is schematically illustrated on Chart B. Sub­

zones, axes, phase lines, and checkpoints are indicated.

d. Command posts are 100 ated usually well forward in th e unit zone

of operation, and where subordinate elements are scattered widely, the

command post is established a.t a poil.lt from which control can be

maintained most effectively. Influencing factors are the road net

and radio receptivity. Provisions should be made for radio relay

sta.tions between all command posts.

4. OPERATIONS OF RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION, 10-18 JULY, 1943.

a. With the foregoing preamble on principles of proper e.mploymentof

mechanized reconnaissance units, let us now examine the actual opera­

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tions of an armored reconnaissance battalion in com.bat in which

adherance to t he aforementioned principles was generally the practice.

Due to the changing nature of the operations, continuity in the

narrative may be somewhat lacking but reference to overlays provided

should elarify the sequence of action.

b. The scene of action is Sicily. The terrain is similar to that

of Italy, generally characterized by very rugged, steep, bald vol­

canic hills and mountains separated by a veritable spiderweb of

steep deep valleys and ravines around and through which tortuous

narrow roads wind in snake-like fashion. In general, except where

narrow coastal plains exist in the south, and a fairly large plateau

lies in t he west central portion, vehicles are confined to roads.

Defense is easy and attack is difficult.

c. The action opens with the 82nd Antlored Reconnaissance Battalion,

less Headquarters Company and A Company, setting sail from North

African ports as part of the 2nd Armored. Division, for the invasion

of Sicily.

The use of the Battalion, aB' a unit, was not planned initially. AS

a result, Co. B. was attached. to CCA am Co. C was attached to CCB.

Co. D', the light' tank company, was designated part of the Gela "Task Force ff

reserve. At this time there was no assault gun company as each of the

nine assault ~ns were an organic part of each of the nine reconnai­

ssance platoons. The 2nd Armored Division was a heavy type division

in which it was normal to employ the reconnaissance battalion as a

unit, rather than attaching reconnaissance companies to each combat

command. Ea.ch combat commam usually employed under its control the

reconnaissance company organic to the armored regiment "attached ft to

the combat command.

5. ACTIONS OF COMPANY q, 10 -18 JULY

a. Company C, attached to Combat Comman9- B, landed east of Gela on

D-Day (10 July) and early 11 July. The third platoon received its

vehicles soon after landing and was immediately given the reconnaissance

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masion of locating enemy tanks reported in the vicinity of the

Acate River on the right flank of the bridgehead established by the

1st Infantry Division. These tanks were located and kept under

observation until elements of. Company G of the 67th Armored Regi­

ment engaged them, destroying several, and driving the others off.

!?.' During the early afternoon of 10 July the beachhead was sub­

jected to a severe counter attack by between 30 and 40 tanka of

the Hermann-Goering Panzer Division, which penetrated nearly to the

beaches. Tanks and reconnaissance vehicles of the Light Tank Com­

pany and Company C had been extremely slow in arriving and the

majority. of the personnel of these two companies were placed in

dismounted defensive positions just north of the beaches. How

effective they would have been against the tanks is open to ques­

tion in view of the fact that the only weapons available to these

units were the pistols of the tankers and the rifles or "tommy"

guns of the reconnaissance troopers. However, this was a case of

"grasping a.t straws U - not an example of proper employm.ent.

c. Between the 10th and 12th of July elements of Company C· patrolled

in the area and over routes indicated on overlay 2, maintaining

observation posts and provided securityfor t l'e right flank of the

Gela la.nding forces. A mission of locating and destroying an

enemy gun position believed to be in a rather inaccessible posi­

tion in the hills overlooking the beaches was assigned to a re­

connaissance platoon. Twelve dismounted men located the position

but no gun was found.

d. On the 12th of July a task force consisting of the 1st Ranger

Battalion, 1st Battalion, 41st Annored Infantry, S2nd Armored Rcn.

Battalion (consisting of C and D Companies), and 78th Arrmred Field _

Artillery Battalion, were gi.ven the mission of advancing north to

seize the town of Butera. The attack was launched .at night. The

miss~on assigned C Company was the protection of tm flanks of the

1st Ranger Battalion. The light tank company was placed in task

force reserve. The town was taken during t he night of the 12th

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after enlisti.ng the aid of naval gun fire. The reconnaissance pla­

toons assigned to protect the flanks of the Ranger Ba.ttalion were

forced to perform their missions generally dismounted, due to the

difficult terrain and lack of roads.

:r. Following this action the Battalion withdrew to an assembly

position south of Butera. One reconnaissance platoon was assigned

the mission of gaining contact with elements of the 45th Infantry

Division advancing on the right of the 1st Infantry Division. This

was accomplished at a point about three miles east of Butera. Dur­

ing the night of 14 June this platoon patrolled between Riesi and

Mazzarino maintaining contact between the 45th Division am the 1st

Div. The following day one reconnaissance platoon was ordered to

report to a regimental command post of t he 1st Division for the

purpose of making reconnaissance of tm road designated as the axis

of advance for the regiment to Barrafranca.

!. At about 1000, 15th July the Battalion commander received an

urgent message from the Division Commander to pro~eed to ¥azzarino

with the light tank company to assist in repelling a panzer a.ttack

which elements of the 1st Division were receiving in the valley north

of t he town. The tanks were on the road within half an hour but

upon arrival at the scene of action it was found that the German

tank attack had been successfully beaten off by a light tank battal­

ion attached to the 1st Division.

h. At the. request of the Commanding General of the ,1st Division, one

reconnaissance platoon was assigned the mission of conducting re­

connaissance for a supply route cross country for an infantry regi­

ment northwest of Mazzarino. This mission was accomplished satis­

factorily.

6. ACTIONS OF COMPANY B, 10-18 JULY

!. Up until this time, Company B, attached to Combat Command A,

had been operating 1n the area generally north of Licata. It had

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landed as part of Combat Command A, which in. turn comprised part of

a Task Force consisting chiefly of the 3rd Infantry Division and the

3rd Ranger Battalion. Areas ani routes over which this company

operated are indicated on Overlay 2. It had seen somewhat more

severe action than C Company in that Combat Command A had been em­

ployed'in a rather more aggressive role than had. Combat Command B.

7. OPERATIONS OF BATTALION 18-21 JULY

!_ On the 18th of July the 2nd Azmored Division assembled at

Campobello for the first time since landing in Sicily. This also

was the first occasion for all elements of the Reconnaissance Battal­

ion to be together_

b. At abotL 1200 the battalion commander was directed to contact

Major General Keyes at a designated road junction between Licata

and Palma. Di MonteChiaro. Upon reporting to General· Keyes the

battalion commander was informed that the Battalion would be detached

from the 2nd Armored Division and would become the reconnaissance

battalion for a. provisional corps comnanded by General Keyes. The

Corps would be made up of the 2nd Armored Division, 3rd Infantry

Division, 82nd ,Airborne Division, and other miscellaneous units.

The mission of· the Provisional Corps was to seize Palermo, the

capital of· Sicily, by making a wide end run in true blitzkrieg style.

The 3rd Infantry Division would advance generally north to Palermo

from Agrigento. .The 2nd ArlOOred Di-gision, initially following the

82nd Airborne Division to Castelvetrano, would then strike northeast

toward Palermo. The S2nd AirbDrne Division was to move west to

Castelvetrano, and thence toward Marsa1~ to protect the left flank / \

and rear of the 2nd Antlored Division. (S~e Overlq I). ,The navy

was to support the operation by placing fire on targets, as required,

as the corps moved'eas:t(, along the southern coast to Castelvetrano.

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c. Two cruisers were assigned the mission of providing this fire

support. Control was to be exercised by a naval officer observer

from a ! ton truck mounting a SCR 193, and a navy relay set at

Gala, or Licata, to the cruisers. The navy observer and his radio

were to advance with t he reconnaissance batta.lion. This incidentally

worked out very well during the actual advance.

!!. The mission assigned the 82nd Annored Reconnaissance Battalion

was to reconnoiter in advance of the Provisional Corps during its

advance on Palemo. The plan for accomplishing this mission wa.s to

-place one reconnaissance compa.ny initially in advance of each of

the two leading divisions, viz, the 3rd Division on the right and

the 82nd Ai.rborne Division on the left. The Battalion command post,

with the light tank company initially, was to follow the reconnai.8­

sance company on the left axis. The Battalion was assembled just

-tonorth of Agrigento during the night of 18-19 J~~ and before daylight

moved out on the assigned mission with Company B preceding the 3rd

Infantry Division and the remainder of the battalion in advance of

the 82nd Airborne Division.

s. ACTIONS OF COMPANY B, 18-22 JULY

.!. For t he sake of continuity the complete .ction of Company B in

the advance will be described before taking up that of Company C.

The 1st Platoon 0 f Company B moving on the right axis of the Divi­

sion located enemyforees north of Comitini shortly after moving

out. These were overcome somewhat later in the morning by infantry

elements of the Division and the platoon was able to move forward

again. It fONed the Platini River and proceeded to Cast~l:t.ermini.

b. The 3rd Platoon proceeded to MU8someli where contact was made

with French-Arabian troops advancing to the north in that vicinity.

It then moved we~t and north to Cammarata with one section proceed­

ing to a point south of Lercara. Both of these towns were objectives

of the 3rd Infantry Division. At Cammarata, a. garrison of 208 mem­

bers of an Italian motorized cavalry unit surrendered to the Platoon.

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The 3rd Platoon was relieved on the 20th of July by the 1st Platoon

which entered the town of Lercara ~inst light resistance and rounded

up 600 prisoners.

c. The 2nd Platoon moving north on the left axis of the Di~sion

arrived at the Platini River without incident, but at that point its

scout cars and half tracks were held up until midnight, due to the

fact that the road had been blown away from the side of the mountain.

The scout section with its *ton trucks did, however, find a way

around this obstacle and proceeded on to the high ground to the

north, protecting the engineers who came fOlWard to rebuild the road. s.

About two miles south oft/Stefano, Italian forces were discovered

camouflaging a position around the railroad station. In coordina­

tion with the reconnaissance troop~ of the 3rd Division it captured

this position, killing about 30 Italians and taking about the same

number of prisoners. Elements of the 3rd Division arriving shortly

therea.fter took approximately 200 prisoners. Following th is action

the 2nd platoon observed a long coluInn of vehicles, including tanks,

moving north from S. Stefano. Upon being fired upon by the 37 mm

guns and assault gun of the platoon the enemy column halted and all

vehicles were hastily abandoned. This action netted 500 prisoners, six

7 light tanks, 25 trucks,/(,75 mm guns ani other miscellaneous items

of equipment. The platoon then moved north to Corleone where 300

prisoners were taken am where it remained outposting the town and

patrolling roads until the 21st of July, when it was joined by the

1st Platoon.

!!. The 3rd Platoon after being relieved by t he 1st Platoon at

Lercara on the 20th of July proceeded to, S. Stefano to assist the

2nd Platoon, but was later withdrawn to the Company Command Post

in reserve.

e. On the 22nd of July the CompfUlY was assembled at Corleone and

the 1st and 3rd Platoons started on the last lap in the dash for

Palermo. The 3rd Platoon in the lead claimed 50 Italian prisoners

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taken from a t~ain of box cars between Cor1eone and Marineo. North

of Mislimeri an enemy 88 .am gun and 75 rom gun were discovered in

positioD. Artillery of the 3rd Division shelled these positions,

after which the two reconnaissance platoons took. the gun positions

and pushed on to Villabate. About 1200 Italian and German troops

surrendered in this town. The 1st Platoon remained to guard these

prisoners until relieved by infantry of the 3rd Division, and then

proceeded east to S. Flavia. The 3rd Platoon, leaving the 1st Pla­

toon in Villabate, proceeded into t he outskirts of Palermo, seized

and destroyed an enemy arsenal, and took an additional 600 prisoners.

9. ACTIONS OF COMPANY C, 18-21 JULY

a. Company C in t he meantime had moved out of Agrigento on the mom­

ing of 19th July, in advance of the 8200 Airborne Division on the

axis Agrigento-Montellegro. One platoon moved on the axis Agrigento­

Raffidali-Montellegro. The first enemy encountered was at the

).{agazzo10 .Hi.ver, where after some firing 55 prisoners were taken.

At Ribera,. after removing mines located in t he road and placing fire

on the town, an additional 70 prisoners were taken.

~. The Company advanced in one column with the 3rd Platoon in the

lead. About five miles from Sciacca an action took place which

will be· discussed in more detail because it illustrates certain

points concerning the training of reconnaissance units that have

been found from experience to be important.

c. In the performance of reconnaissance missions the success of

such missions depends on successful platoon action. Company,

battalion, and group commanders are generally able to exercise

remote control only over subordina.te units because of their wide

dispersion. Platoons are less subject to the close personal control

that an infantry company commander has, for instance, over the pla­

toons- of his company in combat. It should therefore be of primary

concern to Division or Corps commanders to determine the adequacy

of training of the reconnaissance platoons at their reconnaissance

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unts, even though this may seen to .be dropping to a rather low

level of concern for high level commanders..

!. During the training of the 82nd Armored Reconnaissance Battalion

particular stress had been placed on the proficiency of the platoons

in the following combat exercises. Due to considerable maneuver

experience these were considered to be the types of action most likelf

to be engaged in:

(1) Reduction of defended road blocks

. (2) Meeting engagement with hostile tanks and

armored vehicles.

(3) Meeting engagement with ho stile infantry

in position

(4) Passage of defiles (all types)

(5) Delaying action

(6) Defense of a position (limited)

(7) Establishing observation posts

(8) Dismounted night reconnaissance

(9) Removal of mines , demolitions and gapping

and marking of mine fi elds •

All ranks were drilled in the above exercises much as a football

team is drilled in its plays - so m.OB so that required action

became almost automatic for any given situation, with such minor

modifications as might be necessary due to terrain and other

conSiderations.

!. In this particular action, the 3rd. Platoon of C Company was

advancing in column in advance of the company. Because of the

frequency with whic h mines had been encountered on roads, the

heaviest vehicle of the platoon, the assault gun, mounted on an

M-3 half track, was in t he lead. As t he platoon rounded a bend in

the road and started slowly down hill toward a bridge at the f oat of

the hill, fire was opened f"bom an Italian anti-tank gun in a. con­

cealed pill box across the stream. While attempting to back the

a.ssault gun behind the protecting shoulder of the hill, it slipped

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into a fairly deep ditch on t he inside of the curve and so was

placed by accident in perfect firiD.g position with considerable

defilade. From, this, position it continued to fire on the hostile

pill box•

.!. The remainder of the platoon immediately went into its routine

for' the reduction of a road block and passage of a defile. Without

hesitation the platoon leader placed the scout cars in a defilade

position on the high ground to the right of the road, from which

positions they opened fire with 37 mIn guns and .50 caliber machine

guns. Light ma.chine guns were dismounted and placed in position on

the ground to deliver supporting fires. The 60 rom mortars were placed

in position and initially placed fire in the wooded stream-bed to the

immediate front. The scout section, dismounted, advanced in an

enveloping maneuver on the pill boxes, covered by the supporting \ ,

fire of (the assault gun, 37 nun guns, automatic weapons, and mortars. . \

Before they could reach the pill box positions, however, several

whi~e handkerchiefs and improvised Whi-oB fla.gs were displayed from

dug-in positions around the pill boxes and approximately 70 Italians

surrendered. This was one of several instances in which "drill" type

training p~id dividends f0lt this Battalion•

.!. 'As a resalt of a considerable increase in the opposition being

encountered, both the 1st and 3rd platoon were each reinfo reed with

one light tank platoon. The routes over which elements of C Company

moved during the period of 18 - 21 July are as indicated on OVerlay 3.

All of these movements were characterized by small meeting engage­

ments against 'Scattered light resistance. The 3rd Platoon becoming

overly ambitious on 21 July penetrated to A1camo, where the Italian

garrison surrendered with great pomp. A large milltary gasoline

dump was uncovered outside of town. This later proved to be a life­

saver for C and D Companies in their advance on Palermo. It became

necessary to withdraw this platoon to S. Ninfa due to the fact that (j

it was well north of the established bomb line for the day. However,

a small guard was left on the gasoline dump, and wi. th the prisoners.

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Upon arrival in castelvetrano, which had been taken by the 82nd

Airborne Division against light resistance, a mission was received

to locate an area in whic h t he 2nd Armored Division could assemble

during the night of 21-22 July preparatory to making its dash for

Palermo. Reconnaissance disclosed a wide grassy valley between

Caste1vetrano and S. Ninfa which was recommended to the Division

Commander. The Division closed in this area during the night of

21 July.

h. In oi'der to obtain a maxi.m.um start on the Division on the .morning

of 22 July, C Company was directed to move out of its covering posi­

tiona no rth of S. Ninfa at 0430. All element s were on th e roa.d at

that time, although with scme trepidation due to the tact that the

majority of vehicular gasoline tanks were nearly empty.

!. The light tank company-was unable to move out for this reason.

Gasoline t rucks which had returned to gasoline dumps, at Gela the

preceding day, had failed to reach S. Ninfa during the night, due

to heavy traffic congestion on the roads, and the fact t hat several

over-zealous and somewhat illy advised staff officers' of the Division

were detailed as movement control officers to insure that combat

elements of the Division were assisted forward to the night assembly

area. This resulted in service elements, including the supply tru.cks

of the Battalion, being repeatedly shunted off on to side roads and

open fields to a~ait the passage of combat elements of the Division.

\

10. OPERATIONS OF BfrTAUON, 22 JULY

.!.' In, the final advance on Palermo from S. Ninfa, Combat Command A

proceeded on the axis ~ibellina - Camporeale - San ~seppe - Pioppa ­

Paler~o. Combat Conun.a.nd B- followed Combat Command A to Carnporeale,

where it branched off to the north and followed axis Partinico ­

" Montelepre .,. C8.rini - Palermo.

b. The plan for employment of the Recomaissance Battalion, now

released ,to' the' Division, was to reconnoiter in advance of the Divi­

sion to the ~bjective • \The Battalion Commander decided that Company

C, supported by t he light tank company would be sufficient for this

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mission, and that Company B, still operating in the zone of advance

of the 3rd Division could better remain on that mission. This deci­

sion was made in view of the impractibility of Company B, rejoining

the Battalion at the head of the Division column within a period of

time that would pennit its use. It was decided to take a chance on

using gasoline captured at Alcamo, and such transportation as was

available was dispatched to. the dump in an armed convoy commanded by

the tank company commander. This gasoline arrived during the day and

fortunately no ill effects were suffered by the engines from its use..

c. The 3rd Platoon, proceeded along the axis S. Ninfa - Gibellina ­

Alcamo - Partinico - Monte1epre - Carini - Palermo, an.d encountered

consid erable difficulty soon after leaving Alcamo due to blown bridges,

and road craters which literally removed roads from. the sides of the

hills. By considerable reconnaissance and ingenuity the Platoon was

able to proce~d slowly, generally aloog this axis.

d. Company C, less the 3rd Platoon moved rapidly along its assigned,

axis and arrived at s. Guiseppe without incident. Here several

Italians surrendered and volunteered the information t hat the road

through the mountain pass north of town was mined and covered by

artillery and machine guns.

e. The 1st Platoon, leading t he Company, moved by bounds to the

entrance of the pass. The scout section, upon rounding a sharp

curve in the road, surprised a group of Italians in the act of lay­

ing mines in the road. These inmediately showed white handkerchiefs,

but before they could be collected, the lead scout car of the scout

car section appeared at an undefil8,ded bend further down the road

and was brought under direct enemy anti-tank fire and destroyed.

The assault gun of the platoon was immediately placed in defilade

position and opened fire. The scout section advanced dismoUnted,

firing on withdrawing Italian soldiers who had not previously surren­

dered. The assault gun. succeeded in locating the enemy gun, which

continued to fire down the pass, and succeeded in killing its crew.

As soon as the hostile gun had been silenced the dismounted scout

-18­

sections of the 1st Platoon, reinforced by the scout section of the

2nd Platoon, moved dismounted up the pass until warned by prisoners

that an 88 rrun. gun was in posi tion to t heir front. Two guns were

located, and in conjunction with elements of the reconncllssance

company of the 66th Armored Regiment (operating under control of

Combat Cormnand A), these guns were neutralized, using combined

assault gun fire.

f. The 2nd platton then replaced the 1st Platoon in leading the

advance. Following an advance of about two miles, the leading element

again came under fire of an anti-tank gun. Combined action of the

two assault guns of the 1st and 2nd Platoons and the three assault

guns of the 66th Armored Reconnaissance Company again was successful

in neutralizing the oppos.ition. While organizing a task force to

be supported by light tanks for t he further advance toward Palermo,

the reconnaissance elements t;vere passed through by tank and infantry

elements of Combat C9PP~Y A, which had now reached the reconnaissance

elements. Company C proceeded into Monreale, where it VlTa.S passed

through by Comba.t Comma.nd A on its way into Palermo that night.

11. lESSONS IEAHNED

a. Reconnaissance :missions must generally be accomplished by fight­

ing for information rather than by If sneaking and peeking".

b. Within the larger reconnaissance units such as the squadron,

battalion, or group, supporting elements of light tanks, infantry

(dragoons) and assault guns should in general be an organic part of

each recon...naissance platoon, or attached to the platoons prior to

the start of a mission.

c. Supporting elements should not be held in unit reserve where they

will seldom be used - or detached by higher comnanders for other assign­

ments.

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d. Tables of organization prescribed for t: he purpose of performing

one type of mission, should be altered wherever possible by unit

commanders to fit t he missions assigned and should not be blindly

adhered to where found to be unsuitable.

e. Platoon training consisting of drills in proper action to be

taken when confronted with lttype U situations increases the efficiency

and speed with which opposition can be overcome.

, 12. CONCLUSIONS

a. Mechanized reconnaissance units are at present organized and

equipped to perform reconnaissance missions against light opposition.

b,. nCa,!alrylt missions, other than reconnaissance, and reconnaissance

missions in the face of heavy resistance, require that reconnaissance

units be reinforced to give them t he fire power and personnel for

dismounted action that true cavalry unit should have •

....20­

Overlays left out due to scanning limitations.

CHART A - Recom.mended Organization for Meohanized Ca:valry­Reconnaissance Platoon - Annex I

CHART 13 - Schematic Diagram of Reconnaissance Battalion (HeavJ7 Type A.rmored Division) - Annex 2

'-'~-~

MaRr~R. SE<;:lr"OM

' .. ,CAV RCN PLAT, MECZ - PRESENT ORG'

UI\TFAVORABLE CHARACTERISTICS

Lack of heavy support weapons , .. Lack of di,$.D10unted personnel

Lack of cros8-country mobility Lack of flexible organization

'RECOMMENDED ORG

FOR

CAV RoN PLAT MECZ~~

FAVORABLE CHARACTERISTICS

Heavy spt. Weapons Dismoun~ed Personnel Cross-CountryJIJIobility Flexible Organization

~- Slightly modified .1' by author I

ANM&}< 'J.,.CHA)I~lT A

I••• .1 8(-)

••

DIAMOND

-L.eG-eND ­o SCOCJT sec.T'O~

SCO<1T CA~ Sec.Tl6n

I ASSAVI-T C.U N

I ASSIIULT (;..uN TSNCJe* CHART a

RCM Pl.-It T - RerN1=! WiTH I..T TANI'fS

Lor TANK'

MA'NTeNANc.a CREw