Wilks, M. B. (2014). "Theories of Multicultural Toleration: An Examination of Justice as Fairness and Political Theology." Student Pulse, 6(03). Retrieved from http://www.studentpulse.com/a?id=874

Theories of Multicultural Toleration: An Examination of Justice as Fairness and Political Theology By Matthew B. Wilks 2014, VOL. 6 NO. 03

The place of multiculturalism in a liberal democracy continues to be a

contentious question and one with which the liberal democratic state must

constantly grapple. Two differing conceptions of the way the state should

conceive of multicultural toleration can be seen in Justice as Fairness by John

Rawls and Political Theology by Carl Schmitt. In Justice as Fairness, Rawls

details his theory of justice as fairness, a model for a “well-ordered society” and

conceives of reasonable pluralism as being a permanent condition of democratic

society. Rawls deals with the issue of multicultural toleration in the democratic

state by claiming that it is not only ideal, but also possible when linked to his

concept of the overlapping consensus. In Political Theology, Schmitt conceives of

the political “decision” as being the key feature of sovereignty. Using a model of

decisionism, Schmitt determines that multicultural toleration in the democratic

state is facetious at best and that it is not possible for a liberal democratic state to

practice true toleration. It was Schmitt’s belief that his decisionist conception of

the sovereign applied to the citizens and that no person could claim to be truly

unbiased or tolerant. This examination elaborates on Rawls and Schmitt’s

conceptions of multicultural toleration, examining the place of these conceptions

within Justice as Fairness and Political Theology before contrasting their

viewpoints.

What Is Multicultural Toleration?

In order to examine how the issue of multicultural toleration is dealt with by

Rawls and Schmitt, it is necessary to present a general definition of this concept.

Multiculturalism is defined as “the presence and persistence of diverse racial and

ethnic minorities who define themselves as different and who wish to remain so”

(Dewing, 2009: 1) Multiculturalism can be conceptualized as a mosaic, in which

different cultures and ideologies are allowed to maintain their distinct identities

with the sum of this being the state. Tolerance is conceptualized as “sympathy or

indulgence for beliefs or practices differing from or conflicting with one's own”

(Merriam-Webster, 2013) on both the part of the citizens and the state regardless

of whether the object of toleration is approved or not. The idea of the neutral

state is seen as key to multiculturalism, meaning that the state is not to be seen as

biased towards any particular culture or ideology aside from the basic liberal and

human rights espoused by constitutional law. Multicultural toleration can then be

defined as the coexistence of cultures and ideological groups who recognize,

receive, and reciprocate the freedom of groups to live their lives within

constitutional limits according to their beliefs, without bias from the state or

interference at the hands of other comparable group. My aim is to reveal how

ideas within Justice as Fairness andPolitical Theology illuminate this definition,

and to address the question of whether multicultural toleration can truly exist

within the liberal democratic state.

An Overview of Justice as Fairness by John Rawls

John Rawls’ goal in Justice as Fairness was to lay out a conception of political

justice and an ideal model of the state that would be acceptable under the

conditions of reasonable pluralism. Rawls begins with a discussion on the roles of

political philosophy, stating that political philosophy is meant to examine

questions and conflicting issues in society. The aim of this is to see common

ground can be reached that would lead to a political agreement. (Rawls, 2001: 2)

Rawls claims that conflict between conceptions of liberty and equality are a

fundamental part of the democratic tradition, and he finds that the root of this

conflict is in how different philosophical and moral doctrines deal with

competing claims of liberty and equality are understood. (Rawls, 2001: 2) To

solve this problem, Rawls aims to formulate principles of political justice so that

they will fit together into one scheme, making it possible to say that everyone is

free and equal. (Rawls, 2001: 4) Rawls uses “justice as fairness” to describe the

scheme of political justice he creates. Rawls believes that political power is only

legitimate when a constitution is affirmed by reasonable and rational people, and

justice as fairness is meant to warrant this endorsement. (Rawls, 2001: 41) The

purpose of creating these principles would be to establish a “well-ordered

society,” the result of applying the principles of justice to a fair system of social

cooperation.

Rawls’ conception of a well-ordered

society is based upon three principles.

The first principle is everyone

knowing, accepting and knowing

everyone accepts the same conception

of justice. (Rawls, 2001: 8)The second

principle is that society’s “basic

structure” is known and understood

publicly and the third principle

requires that is citizens know enough

about the conception of political

justice to apply it in everyday life.

(Rawls, 2001: 8) Rawls uses the term

“basic structure” to denote “the way

in which the main political and social

institutions of a society fit together

into one system of social

cooperation.” (Rawls, 2001: 10) The

basic structure is also used to describe

how basic rights and duties are allocated in a society, as well as regulating the

division of advantages coming from social cooperation. (Rawls, 2001: 10) Rawls

argues that justice primarily concerns the basic structure, and that a just basic

structure is needed to defend a conception of political justice. (Rawls, 2001: 10)

Rawls finds it to be crucial that citizens be free and equal, and must understand

that they are this way. (Rawls, 2001: 21) In addition, a well ordered society must

have a political conception of justice that is publicly justified, meaning that there

is “a shared basis for citizens to justify to one another their political judgments”

(Rawls, 2001: 27). The public conception of justice when used to regulate society

transforms it into a well-ordered society. (Rawls, 2001: 27) It is Rawls’ goal

in Justice as Fairness to find a public conception of justice that will be feasible

given the reality of pluralism.

According to Rawls, the problem of reasonable pluralism is one that the liberal

democratic state must address in order to become a well-ordered society. (Rawls,

2001: 32) An important distinction is drawn between the reasonable and the

rational; the reasonable has a type of moral backing while the rational is simply

what makes the most sense absent of any moral thought. (Rawls, 2001: 7) This

idea is important because explains how a moral backing legitimates various

societal constructs and circumstances such as pluralism rather than being created

for strictly pragmatic reasons. Reasonable pluralism as Rawls describes it is a

feature of the modern democratic state. Reasonable pluralism occurs when

citizens “affirm deferent… incommensurable and irreconcilable but reasonable in

light of their comprehensive doctrines of the good” (Rawls, 2001: 84).

Reasonable pluralism is viewed by Rawls as a permanent part of democratic

culture, meaning:

“Since reasonable pluralism is viewed as a permanent condition of a

democratic culture, we look for a conception of political justice that takes

plurality as given. Only in this way is the liberal principle of legitimacy

fulfilled: when constitutional essentials are involved, political power, as the

power of free and equal citizens, is to be exercised in ways that all citizens as

reasonable and rational might endorse in light of their common human reason”

(Rawls, 2001: 84).

Rawls’ model of justice as fairness attempts to find a conception of political

justice that will fit with the problem of reasonable pluralism, and he develops his

two principles of justice to answer this question.

The focus of the principles of justice as fairness is to create fair terms of social

cooperation and to regulate the structure of society. (Rawls, 2001: 7)They are the

key to the model of justice as fairness, and everything that the model entails must

be compatible them. (Rawls, 2001: 80) The two principles are:

a. Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of

equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of

liberties for all.”

b. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are

to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair

equality of opportunity and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the

least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle) (Rawls, 2001:

42).

The principles of justice must always be applied lexically, as basic liberties are a

constitutional essential in justice as fairness. (Rawls, 2001: 47) Furthermore, the

basic liberties that the first principle describes cannot be traded off to promote

fair equality of opportunity as entailed by the second principle. (Rawls, 2001: 43)

Fair equality of opportunity according to Rawls means that public offices and

social positions need not only to be open in a formal sense but also in a

substantive sense. (Rawls, 2001: 43) Rawls goes into great detail describing how

the basic structure of society can ensure the first principle is followed, believing

that the basic liberties need to be negotiated by groups under the “veil

ignorance,” shaping the basic structure so that these rights are protected for all.

(Rawls, 2001: 85) A long examination of the second principle of justice is

undertaken, as Rawls explains how fair equality of opportunity can be

implemented in the basic structure of society. Rawls describes that any existing

inequality must benefit the least advantaged in society, calling this “the difference

principle” (Rawls, 2001: 64). Rawls identifies the main problem resulting from

reasonable pluralism is getting diverse groups to agree to a similar conception of

justice while ensuring that both the first and second principles of justice can be

implemented in society.

In presenting the overlapping consensus, a distinction is made between

“comprehensive doctrines” and the political conception of justice. Comprehensive

doctrines are theological, moral or philosophical views on the way the world

works, and are separate from the political conception of justice which only

concerns justice within the state for all individuals. (Rawls, 2001: 33) Rawls finds

it impossible under the reality of reasonable pluralism that people might agree on

one comprehensive doctrine, but it may be possible for them to agree to one

political conception of justice by creating an overlapping consensus. (Rawls,

2001: 33) Rawls recognizes that reasonable citizens often disagree, but that state

power cannot be used to eradicate diversity. (Rawls, 2001: 36) The overlapping

consensus develops from a reflective equilibrium, in which diverse groups realize

that they have conflicting judgments. (Rawls, 2001: 31) In this realization, the

groups withdraw the most incompatible of their views with the aim of finding a

conception of justice that each finds compatible with their comprehensive views.

(Rawls, 2001: 31-32) Overlapping consensus is created from “groups [seeing]

their views as congruent with the political conception of justice, and they come to

agree with it starting from their own views” (Rawls, 2001: 195). Once this

happens, Rawls sees the potential for a type of “slippage” where over time, the

values of the political conception of justice are integrated into the comprehensive

doctrines of people. (Rawls, 2001: 193) This promotes social unity, and allows for

a well ordered and stable society as these values are passed from one generation

to the next (Rawls, 2001: 202).

Rawls moves to discuss the way that the principles of justice must be adopted by

groups with different comprehensive doctrines if they are to be seen as legitimate

by all. Naturally, groups in negotiating the principles of justice will try to attain

conditions most favourable to their group. (Rawls, 2001: 86) In response to this,

the “veil of ignorance” is introduced as a way that diverse groups should negotiate

a political conception of justice. (Rawls, 2001: 86) The purpose of the veil of

ignorance is to allow for an agreement on the political conception of justice to be

reached under fair and equal conditions for all groups no matter their strength or

population. (Rawls, 2001: 86) The veil of ignorance achieves this by making

parties evaluate the principles of justice while limited to the same body of general

facts, and not knowing the comprehensive beliefs of those that they represent.

(Rawls, 2001: 86-87) The aim is to eliminate any bargaining advantages that a

party may have, encouraging them to negotiate with the interests of the whole

society in mind. (Rawls, 2001: 87) When there is an agreement on the political

conception of justice, it must then be made public so the population can

understand and endorse the agreement. (Rawls, 2001: 86) Justice as fairness

aims to be the model that will allow this type of agreement to come about and

endure.

By developing the theory of justice of fairness, Rawls hopes to create a political

conception of justice that can be realistically be adopted. This is done by

appealing towards the overlapping consensus. (Rawls, 2001: 32) Because of the

reality of reasonable pluralism, the endorsement of the overlapping consensus

must be captured in endorsing the principles of justice, allowing for a well-

ordered society. (Rawls, 2001: 32) A significant amount of time is spent by Rawls

in Justice as Fairnessaddressing the overlapping consensus as a concept, as any

agreement of the political conception of justice must capture the overlapping

consensus in order to be viable. (Rawls, 2001: 32) Rawls states that “while in a

well-ordered society all citizens affirm the same political conception of justice,

they [do not] do so for all the same reasons” (Rawls, 2001: 32) meaning the

political conception is a shared viewpoint of consensus between groups. The hope

is that the political conception of justice can be publicly justified by people

sharing and understanding the views of other groups regarding the conception.

(Rawls, 2001: 33) This allows for the creation of social cooperation and an

atmosphere of mutual respect and cooperation among citizens while attempting

to narrow disagreement through thoughtful and reasonable discussion. (Rawls,

2001: 33) The motivating goal for justice as fairness is not to spread the most

good among the citizens under utilitarian reasoning, but rather social

cooperation is viewed as a good in itself, benefitting society and its citizens.

(Rawls, 2001: 107) The ultimate end of justice as fairness is to use social

cooperation to demonstrate the possibilities of tolerance, allowing for an exercise

of moral power in reasonable people that is both morally good and socially good.

(Rawls, 2001: 197) This in turn leads to the final good of a well-ordered society

(Rawls, 2001: 202).

Multicultural Toleration in Justice as Fairness

In presenting the theory of justice as fairness, Rawls addresses multicultural

tolerance in a liberal democratic society. Indeed, the entire aim of justice as

fairness is to provide consensus among groups and to attempt to provide a

conception of political justice that is agreeable to all by capturing the overlapping

consensus. (Rawls, 2001: 117) First, it is accepted that disagreement and a

diversity in comprehensive beliefs as a given in society and seeks to finds a way to

achieve societal unity in spite of them. (Rawls, 2001: 32) The principles of justice

presented by Rawls both provide an endorsement of multicultural toleration. The

first principle of justice ensures basic liberties are protected, and that each person

in society has these same basic liberties. (Rawls, 2001: 42) Furthermore, these

rights are held to be irrevocable, and this promotes multicultural toleration by

protecting minority groups from discrimination and the threat of having their

rights denied to them. Since these rights are drawn up under the veil of

ignorance, they are not biased in favour of any group as they are designed with

the interests of the general society in mind. (Rawls, 2001: 81) This ensures that

the basic liberties of the state are reasonable to all of the diverse groups. The

second principle of justice endorses multicultural toleration by ensuring social

equality of opportunity and this also links into the theory of multicultural

tolerance. (Rawls, 2001: 42) This equality of opportunity makes sure that no

groups are excluded from public position, encouraging a degree of social

cooperation and toleration. For multiculturalism to be tolerated, it is important

that discrimination is removed and this principle of justice legislates on a public

level that all groups are to be treated equally when contending for a position.

The primary affirmation of multicultural tolerance in justice as fairness comes in

the distinction between comprehensive conceptions of justice from political

conceptions of justice. Justice as fairness recognizes that because of the reality of

reasonable pluralism, there is not a single comprehensive doctrine that all groups

will agree on. (Rawls, 2001: 34) Rather, the theory is hinged upon diverse but

reasonable groups being able to all agree on a political conception of justice.

Rawls is careful to make the distinction that the overlapping consensus is not a

“modus vivendi,” meaning that groups do not agree to disagree on the political

conception of justice. (Rawls, 2001: 192) Instead, the fact of the overlapping

consensus encourages a diversity of comprehensive doctrines by allowing people

to hold on to them while finding agreement in the political conception of justice.

This allows multicultural toleration as it provides groups a way to find common

ground in affirming the political conception of justice, while holding on to their

comprehensive doctrine. Furthermore, a public conception of justice allows

citizens to publicly justify it by reasonable discussion of their political beliefs.

(Rawls, 2001: 27) This is concept is quite similar to the idea of a cultural mosaic,

in which various comprehensive doctrines can exist within it as part of a greater

whole. In this model, there is multicultural toleration as groups can coexist

because of their common affirmation of the political conception of justice. Even

though the framework of this mosaic is not achieved through the veil of

ignorance, there is a similar affirmation of a common system of government in

the liberal democratic state today.

Under the principles of justice, Rawls guarantees equal basic liberties for all, and

an equal chance to publicly hold office. In debates about multicultural toleration,

one criticism is that multicultural toleration is often only true in a formalistic

sense and that public office is only accessible to those of economic and social

means above others. (Rawls, 2001: 150-151) Rawls responds by arguing that

under justice as fairness the government should intervene to ensure that all

groups have equal political liberties and have opportunity to reasonably express

their beliefs. (Rawls, 2001: 155) Multicultural toleration is to be ensured by the

government guaranteeing that citizens receive fair value in for their political

liberties, but Rawls stops short of guaranteeing government support for groups

that fail to gather adherents. However, the government has to ensure that there

be equal opportunity for political representation for all groups, “[securing] for

each citizen a fair and roughly equal access to the use of a public facility designed

to serve a definite political purpose” (Rawls, 2001: 150). However, Rawls draws

the line at extending this type of fair value to other basic liberties.

Rawls’ most potent discussion of multicultural toleration comes in his discussion

on what groups are permissible in the model of justice as fairness. Rawls accepts

that reasonable groups holding comprehensive doctrine that are congruent with

the two principles of justice as well as “well-articulated, and highly systematic”

are welcome. (Rawls, 2001: 33) This means that as long as citizens can have a

reasonable discussion about their comprehensive beliefs, then that belief may be

welcome in society. However, it is acknowledged that not all comprehensive

doctrines are compatible with a well-ordered society as:

“the principles of any reasonable political conception must impose restrictions on

permissible comprehensive views, and the basic institutions those principles

require inevitably encourage some ways of life and discourage others, or even

exclude them altogether” (Rawls, 2001: 153)

The main question that Rawls considers is how this type of exclusion can be

justified in justice as fairness.

Within the construct of justice as fairness, Rawls finds there to be two cases

under which the exclusion of a comprehensive doctrine is acceptable. If a

comprehensive doctrine is in direct conflict with the principles of justice, then it

may be justly discouraged. (Rawls, 2001: 154) Secondly, if a comprehensive

doctrine requires constant intervention or effective intolerance on behalf of the

state to survive, it also will cease to exist in a well ordered society. (Rawls, 2001:

154) Rawls discusses the main criticism of the second case which argues that the

reason a comprehensive doctrine may not be able to survive is because the

accepted political conception of justice is biased against it. (Rawls, 2001: 154) In

defence, Rawls states “social influences favoring some doctrines over others

cannot be avoid in any view of political justice. No society can include within

itself all ways of life.” (Rawls, 2001: 154) As long as the comprehensive doctrine

has a fair chance to succeed under the political conception, then its failing is still

just. (Rawls, 2001: 154) Rawls finishes by stating it would be inconsistent with

democratic values for the state to intervene in this case (Rawls, 2001: 155).

The overlapping consensus Rawls sees as necessary to a well-ordered society is

meant to create a sense of societal tolerance by removing comprehensive doctrine

as an obstacle in affirming a political conception of justice. Multicultural

toleration can exist because this consensus allows for divergent views on issues

within reasonable comprehensive conceptions of the world to reach some sort of

understanding and toleration. Justice as fairness is contingent on this type of

toleration being present in the case of most issues as reasonable citizens put aside

divisive issues in order to affirm a political conception of justice. A spirit of

cooperation and compromise is necessary for multicultural toleration to be

workable. However, it is inevitable that extreme issues where compromise is

impossible will arise and test the limits of any scheme of toleration despite an

agreement on the political conception of justice. In these cases, public civility

must be followed, allowing for a rational and articulate discussion between

reasonable parties to try and settle the issue. (Rawls, 2001: 117) Furthermore, it is

critical that political values of justice adjudicate this discussion, separating

arguments from any particular comprehensive viewpoint. (Rawls, 2001: 190) If

this does not solve the conflict, Rawls says that the political conception of justice

will cause slippage through the generations, creating tolerance as viewpoints on

irreconcilable comprehensive issues become tempered to fit a consensus under

the political conception of justice. (Rawls, 2001: 193) This creates stability over

the generations, allowing for multicultural toleration because each groups’

allegiance to the political conception of justice grows to outweigh their

comprehensive doctrine. (Rawls, 2001: 194) This social cooperation creates a

further toleration for divisive ideas and makes them cease to be a problem as the

agreement on the political conception of justice and the good of social

cooperation comes to be more important that any divisive comprehensive

viewpoint (Rawls, 2001: 195).

An Overview of Political Theology by Carl Schmitt

The goal of Carl Schmitt in Political Theology is to give a justification of a strong

sovereign state and to examine the conditions under which this sovereign would

draw its power from. Schmitt’s analysis begins with the statement “sovereign is

he who decides on the exception” (Schmitt, 1985: 5). Schmitt’s theory of

sovereignty inPolitical Theology revolves around his idea of the decision and the

exception. Schmitt does not give an abstract definition of sovereignty but rather

looks into the concrete application of sovereign power. The exception as Schmitt

sees it is not a codified occurrence, but is a case of peril and danger to the

existence of the state which requires the sovereign to act. (Schmitt, 1985: 6) The

exact details of this type of emergency cannot be foreseen, and therefore there is

no judicial competence to deal with the exception. (Schmitt, 1985: 7) Sovereign

power is demonstrated in deciding in a situation of conflict where the public

interest and the interest of the state lies (Schmitt,

1985: 6).

As the exception is not formally codified in law,

the sovereign is also the one who decides if there

is an exception. (Schmitt, 1985: 13) In addition,

the sovereign may stand outside the legal system

to deal with an exception if necessary. (Schmitt,

1985: 12) Schmitt claims that in an exception “the

law recedes while the state remains” (Schmitt,

1985: 12) meaning that while the sovereign may

stand outside the legal system when deciding on

an exception, the apparatus of the state remains

as the sovereign must still suspend the

constitution. In the event of an emergency, the

only thing a constitution has the power to do is describe who can act in response

to it. (Schmitt, 1985: 7) Because of this, Schmitt saw modern constitutional

development as trying to eliminate the sovereign by giving no one extrajudicial

power in the case of an emergency. (Schmitt, 1985: 14) While the case of the

emergency is used to demonstrate the decision on the exception, the exception is

not limited just to emergencies but is a general concept in the theory of the state.

(Schmitt, 1985: 5) This means that the sovereign consistently decides on

situations that may constitute exceptions while not being emergencies. (Schmitt,

1985: 12) As Schmitt puts it, “every legal order is based on a decision.” (Schmitt,

1985: 10) This idea of decisionism is gives power to the sovereign and by

extension, the government.

Schmitt makes a clear distinction as to the exception being different from

anarchy and chaos. In the case of the exception, it is only the norm that is

removed to protect the state but order is still present. (Schmitt, 1985: 12) This

removal of the norm is what separates a normal legal order from the exception.

(Schmitt, 1985: 13) Decisionism is still shown in the normalcy of a legal order as

the sovereign is still the one who makes the decision as to whether a normal

situation exists. As Schmitt states, “every general norm demands a normal”

(Schmitt, 1985: 13) and the sovereign is the one who decides the normal. Schmitt

sees this decision of legal normalcy as a crucial function and indication of

sovereignty as “all law is “situational law”… the sovereign produces and

guarantees the situation in its totality… he has the monopoly over this last

decision.” (Schmitt, 1985: 13). The power to define legal normalcy is the core of

Schmitt’s sovereign decisionism, with true sovereign power being “not as the

monopoly to coerce and rule, but as the monopoly to decide” (Schmitt 13). To

Schmitt, the decision in the case of an exception is “most clearly the essence of

the state’s authority” (Schmitt, 1985: 13) as “the exception is that which cannot be

subsumed” (Schmitt, 1985: 13) and it is for this fact that it shows the decision at

its most pure level. (Schmitt, 1985: 13) Schmitt finds that the exception is much

more relevant than the normal because it proves both what is considered normal

as well as proving that an exception exists. (Schmitt, 1985: 15) This is why

Schmitt determines that decision in the case of an exception is the true indicator

of sovereignty.

Schmitt characterizes the sovereign as “of all juristic concepts… the one most

governed by actual interests.” (Schmitt, 1985: 16) This is important because of

the sovereign’s place in making the decision and amplified because of the

“influence this conception of personality and its connection with formal authority

[arise] from a specific juristic interest” (Schmitt, 1985: 30). Schmitt points out

that “such a decision in the broadest sense belongs to every legal perception”

(Schmitt, 1985: 30), making the interests that influence the sovereign of key

importance in the application of sovereign power by making the decision. In the

third part of Political Theology, Schmitt states that “All significant concepts of

the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts” (Schmitt,

1985: 36) This means that all the apparatus of the state have an origin in

theological ideas but became secularized over time. Over the course of this

secularization, the legitimacy of a legal order has come to be judged through a

type of natural morality rather than by a single religious doctrine. (Schmitt, 1985:

48) However, Schmitt comes back to the idea that proof of sovereignty in the

secularized state is still always most purely demonstrated in the deciding of the

exception.

Multicultural Toleration in Political Theology

Schmitt’s decisionist theory as presented in Political Theology presents a

compelling take on multicultural toleration when it is applied to this subject.

Schmitt believed that all facets of the modern state come from theology and have

merely been secularized, and this has huge implications for multicultural

toleration. First, a theological construct in the sense that Schmitt means it does

not strictly apply to religious beliefs, but rather can be extended towards any

preexisting theological conception of the world. Multicultural toleration deals

with the coexistence of a diversity of beliefs and conceptions of the good.

Furthermore, a neutral and unbiased state is seen as a requirement for this type

of coexistence to persist. Schmitt’s theory would refute this because if all concepts

of the modern state are developed from some strain of theology, the question is

raised as to which political conception out of the diversity was secularized to

create the political constructs. This influence makes it difficult to say that the

state is truly unbiased as at its core, it still bears a secularized theological

influence. In a multicultural society, is it likely that the values of some groups

conflict, causing societal tension. The problem that having dominant theological

influence on the political machine creates is that at some point, the values of one

of the societal groups will likely conflict with those of theology that was

secularized to form the state. When the concept of multicultural toleration is

applied to Schmitt’s theory of the theologically secularized state, it is clear that

the theological backing of the state would potentially be a source of tension

between the government and diverse groups.

In the essence of Political Theology, it can be construed that the idea of the

neutral state is impossible because in making the decision, the sovereign will

always be influenced by the theological conception that was secularized to create

the political apparatus. (Schmitt, 1985: 6) The theological influence in the

secularized state shown by Schmitt poses a significant problem for an

endorsement of multiculturalism by the state when coupled with the sovereign

power of the decision. The sovereign decision is seen as an indication of the

power of the sovereign, and that the most pure form of the decision is in deciding

the exception. (Schmitt, 1985: 6) These decisions have a strong effect on the

running of the state and the quality of life for its citizens as “every legal order is

based on a decision.” (Schmitt, 1985: 10) Decisionism would seem to create a

conditional endorsement of multicultural toleration, as groups would be free to

have their own conception of how to live their lives but this conception would be

subject to the sovereign decision. Schmitt’s belief in the sovereign being “of all

juristic concepts… the one most governed by actual interests” (Schmitt, 1985: 16)

makes it clear that the sovereign is governed by a specific theology, and that this

theology would have a role in making the decision. The idea of multicultural

toleration can work with the idea of a neutral sovereign making the decision in

order to protect the state, but would not be compatible with a sovereign decision

maker under the influence of a theological construct as it would likely conflict

with one of the diverse groups existing in the mosaic. This is not multicultural

toleration as groups are not truly free when their ideas are tolerated merely as

long as they are compatible with the sovereign decision.

This influence of a dominant theological conception can also be extended to the

condition of normalcy in society. In Schmitt’s conception of society, normality is

only as it is defined by the sovereign, not how it is viewed by the people. (Schmitt,

1985: 13) This poses a problem for multicultural tolerance because in order to be

considered the norm in a state, it must be deemed normal by sovereign decision.

Schmitt placed utmost importance on the decision in the case of the exception

and in the case of an exception, said that “the law recedes while the state

remains” (Schmitt, 1985: 12) meaning that sovereign is allowed to step outside of

the boundaries of law to deal with it. This would pose a problem for multicultural

toleration in the case that a belief or action on the part of a minority group

became considered an exception requiring a decision. Even in a society where

multicultural toleration was a codified part of the law, this would not matter

under Schmitt’s theory as the sovereign would still have the ultimate power to

step outside of the law in the case of the exception. This is problematic as the

sovereign is influenced by interest, and at its core the sovereign will be biased in

making any decision where the values that influence it conflict with the values of

another group. Since the law is removed in an exceptional situation, this puts

minority groups at risk to be harmed by whatever decision is made by the

sovereign.

A Comparison of Schmitt and Rawls on Multicultural Toleration

The viewpoints on multicultural toleration taken by John Rawls and Carl Schmitt

in their work appear to conflict with one another. Multicultural toleration would

seem to be the natural result of the theory of justice as fairness, as Rawls aims to

create a society based around social cooperation and toleration. Rawls’ idea of a

well-ordered society can be seen as conditional upon multicultural toleration to

truly exist because social cooperation is one of the essentials of a truly just

society. (Rawls, 2001: 7) In contrast, multicultural toleration is largely presented

as a fallacy by Schmitt in that it would always be dependent on the sovereign

decision. In Rawls’ theory the nature of the state is largely decided and

legitimated through the conception of political justice agreed upon by society.

When Schmitt’s viewpoint is applied, multicultural toleration largely exists on the

whim of the state but this toleration is merely a façade as the sovereign will

always be biased towards a particular group in making the sovereign decision.

The exception shows the decision and the sovereign at its root because ultimately

it will show that the sovereign will support the values that it is interested in

rather than those of others in society. This is different than Rawls’ conception of

the state as decisions in the model of justice as fairness must follow the principles

of justice, ensuring a sense of tolerance for all groups.

Another point of contrast between the theories of Schmitt and Rawls is in the way

that the basic institutions of the state are created, and the manner in which these

institutions affect multicultural toleration. Schmitt views basic institutions of the

state as secularized theological concepts, meaning that every part of the modern

state has a theological origin. (Schmitt, 1985: 38) This poses a problem for

multicultural toleration because since the state has a theological origin, it will

reflect the interests of the theology that was secularized to create it at the expense

of opposing views. The mechanisms of the state would end up being biased

towards groups that share its interests, and this is a situation that is incompatible

with multicultural toleration. In this environment, true multiculturalism could

never exist as one group would always have its interests elevated above the rest of

society in the passing of the sovereign decision. On the other hand, Rawls

understands the basic institutions and mechanisms of the state as the “basic

structure” and the purpose of it is to secure background justice for society.

(Rawls, 2001: 10) Rawls’ basic structure of society is not saddled with the bias

resulting from a theological origin. Instead, the basic structure is regulated by the

principles of justice agreed upon under the veil of ignorance. (Rawls, 2001: 18)

The veil of ignorance is designed by Rawls to ensure that the interests of all

groups are represented fairly in the hopes that an agreement can be made on

principles of justice that can capture the overlapping consensus. Therefore, the

basic structure of society is congruent with multicultural toleration as it is created

under conditions that are fair to all groups through the principles of justice.

(Rawls, 2001: 18 ) Under this basic structure, the state is unbiased and

committed to ideals of toleration associated with multiculturalism.

For multicultural toleration to properly exist, it must be a part of the normative

situation of a given society. Rawls and Schmitt have differing ideas on how the

norm is decided upon and legitimated in society. The idea of the normal situation

is important to multicultural toleration because it ensures the conditions

required for multicultural toleration exist on an everyday basis in the state.

Under Rawls’ conception of justice as fairness, the normal situation is created by

the political and social institutions that make up the basic structure. (Rawls,

2001: 10) Since the basic structure is concerned with ensuring “background

justice” in society, it also is charged with ensuring that multicultural toleration is

proliferated as a normal situation in society. (Rawls, 2001: 10) Because the basic

structure is regulated by the principles of justice, the basic structure must then be

structured to ensure multicultural toleration is a societal norm. Rawls is very

clear that in order to achieve a well-ordered society, multicultural toleration and

social cooperation are necessarily present in the principles of justice and this

makes it part of the norm as these principles regulate the normative basic

structure of society. Schmitt takes an opposing view, believing that the normal

situation is dictated only by the sovereign. (Schmitt, 1985: 13) According to

Schmitt, a legal order requires a normal situation to exist. (Schmitt, 1985: 13)

Furthermore, all law is situational law to Schmitt and the sovereign has a

monopoly over creating the situation, making the sovereign the authority over

how law is applied. (Schmitt, 1985: 13) Essentially, multicultural toleration in

Schmitt’s state is wholly conditional on the sovereign. While the sovereign could

attempt to implement a multicultural state, it could never truly endorse

multicultural toleration as it still has a monopoly over the decision. In the event

that a decision needed to be made between the beliefs of the sovereign and the

views of another group, the views of the sovereign would ultimately win by the

virtue of sovereign power. There would be no guaranteed liberties in Schmitt’s

state, as all of them would be conditional on the sovereign decision and

potentially taken away to deal with the exception. This possibility for oppression

is not congruent with a state that includes multicultural toleration.

While Schmitt can be perceived as taking a pessimistic stance towards

multicultural toleration, Rawls takes a much more positive stance through his

principles of justice as fairness. Firstly, the principles of justice as fairness that

Rawls lays out convey ideals that are congruent with multicultural toleration.

Specifically in his first principle, he protects the basic liberties and freedoms of all

groups equally. (Rawls, 2001: 42) These liberties ensure a degree of tolerance as

each group has protection of their basic liberties regardless of whether they are

the majority or minority. (Rawls, 2001: 42) Most importantly, Rawls makes these

rights indefeasible as they cannot be taken away under any circumstances. This is

critical because multicultural toleration means nothing if it does not persist in the

case of an emergency. An emergency is when diverse viewpoint are most likely to

clash, and Rawls’ first principle ensures that groups will not have their liberties

threatened or taken away during a potential exceptional circumstance. This

ensures the preservation of multicultural toleration and protects groups from

oppression by the majority or the state using the emergency for justification. In

Schmitt’s view when a decision needs to be made between the dominant values of

the sovereign and any conflicting views, the sovereign values would win out. This

would go against any sort of pure and real multicultural toleration as it would

allow for potential oppression of groups not sharing the view of the sovereign.

While a similar scheme of basic liberties could fit within Schmitt’s conception of

the state, they would not be indefeasible because they would recede just like the

rest of the law in the case of the exception. When Schmitt’s theory of the

emergency and the exception is applied to multicultural toleration, it is clear that

he would believe true multiculturalism could never exist in the state because

multiculturalism would always be conditional on the decision made by the

sovereign.

One of the problematic aspects of liberal democratic society is in how it deals

with the controversial issues where positions are so entrenched that no consensus

can easily be reached. Issues such as abortion are particularly poignant examples

of this type of moral debate, and resolution of some kind is needed to ensure that

such issues do not cause a great deal of societal tension. This makes it a

particularly relevant point of comparison between Rawls’ and Schmitt’s

conception of multicultural toleration by looking at how they would deal these

conflicting viewpoints that exist in a multicultural society. Rawls’ uses abortion as

an example of this type of debate because of the many entrenched viewpoints

associated with it, and acknowledges that divisive issues can challenge social

cooperation and toleration. (Rawls, 2001: 117) These types of issue pose an

interesting problem in the Rawlsian conception of the state, as they do not

necessarily conflict with the accepted political conception of justice, but are

comprehensive issues not easily ignored by the populace. In order for the

multiplicity of viewpoints to be properly addressed while maintaining social

cooperation and tolerance, Rawls believes it necessary to appeal to political

values in dealing with a comprehensive debate that borders on a constitutional

essential. (Rawls, 2001: 117) According to Rawls, the way to do this is by

attempting to reach a free agreement through clear and understandable

discussion. (Rawls, 2001: 117) If one cannot be reached, Rawls simply hopes that

people can set aside their differences to focus on the political conception of

justice, and that “slippage” through the generations will soften these differences.

(Rawls, 2001: 193) This is a good example of Rawls’ viewpoint on multicultural

toleration, as he believes that the political conception of justice can ensure a level

of tolerance on even the most divisive issues through clear and measured

discussion using the agreed conception of political justice. (Rawls, 2001: 193)

In comparison to Rawls, Schmitt would view debates on divisive topics such as

abortion as simply another decision to be made by the sovereign. In addition,

similar issues that could cause serious societal tension would most likely be

considered to be exceptions by the sovereign. Schmitt would view a strong

sovereign decision as a solution to this type of issue by keeping the state strong

and free from conflicting views. This is a stark contrast to Rawls’ belief that

difficult issues can be settled through thoughtful and clear discussion using the

agreed political conception of justice. Schmitt’s philosophy demonstrates his

interpretation of multicultural toleration, as difficult moral debates would be

deemed to be an exception and a threat to the state, with a sovereign decision

being the answer to this problem. Since these types of debates are largely

unavoidable in a diverse society, this demonstrates Schmitt’s belief that tolerance

is not possible because groups holding different viewpoints are a direct threat to

the state. Again, multicultural toleration in Schmitt’s state can only exist at the

will of the sovereign, and could only exist as long as it is not deemed to be the

source of an exception.

How Schmitt and Rawls deal with the divisive issues that come along with any

sort of multicultural toleration provides a useful gauge of their view on

multicultural toleration altogether. On the whole, Rawls’ conception of

multicultural toleration is easily applicable to the modern liberal democratic

state. In the modern liberal democratic state, citizens are allowed to keep their

own beliefs as long as they endorse the legitimacy of the state and its laws. This is

similar to Rawls’ theory of the comprehensive doctrine and the political

conception of justice, and this system allows for a large but imperfect toleration

of multiculturalism. This multicultural toleration has indeed led to a broad social

cooperation in the vein of what Rawls’ conceives of. Rawls’ principles of justice as

fairness are also relevant, with his first principle being reminiscent of the basic

liberties and civil rights presently afforded in the constitutions of many states.

However, these rights are not bargained for under a “veil of ignorance” and

largely come into being through the government deliberation and deciding on

which rights should be protected. This is much closer to the Schmittian decision

than it is to Rawlsian theory as most groups in a multicultural society do not have

any influence over this process, and inevitably some groups will hold different

views on what basic liberties and core values need to be protected. In the event

that the core values of a state of challenged, measures such as a constitution are

used to justify and protect the core values over any different conceptions. This

can be viewed as an element of the sovereign decision at work in the modern

impersonal state, where constitutions are a tool used to make decisions on

divisive issues that challenge the state. While Rawls’ conception of multicultural

toleration is still much more relevant to modern liberal democratic society,

Schmitt’s conception of the sovereign decision is still pertinent at the core of how

multicultural toleration exists in the modern liberal democratic state.

Multicultural toleration remains extremely important to the functioning of the

modern liberal democratic state. It seens probable that most citizens who grow

up in this type of state would choose to aspire to John Rawls’ relatively optimistic

conception of multicultural toleration, and this ideal can be seen reflected in

many ways in liberal democracy. Undoubtedly, social cooperation and a belief in

tolerance are a virtue in any state, and one that is a worthy aspiration. However,

elements of Carl Schmitt’s decisionist viewpoint are also visible at the core of

liberal democracy, and will likely remain no matter how attractive any alternative

is. This element of the decision makes it impossible to say that pure toleration of

multicultural toleration can or ever has existed liberal democracy. This debate is

one that is of critical importance to liberal democracy because of the way in which

it affects every part of the state as well as its citizens. John Rawls and Carl

Schmitt provide two very different but compelling accounts of multicultural

toleration, and the contrast that can be seen in their theories helps to provide a

lens into this complex and ceaseless debate.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Matthew McManus at York University for his

advice and guidance during the writing of this article.

References

Dewing, M. (2009). Canadian Multiculturalism. Ottawa: Library of Parliament.

Merriam-Webster. (2013). Webster's Third New International Dictionary. Merriam-Webster.

Rawls, J. (2001). Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Schmitt, C. (1985). Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty.Cambridge: The MIT Press.