THE THEOLOGICAL ORIGINSOF SCIENCE

Nick Brykczynski

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Introduction

Aristotle, as an empiricist, was critical of thePythagoreans, who, he said, “are not seeking fortheories and causes to account for observed facts,but rather forcing their observations and trying toaccommodate them to certain theories andopinions of their own.” … The significance of theBeautiful for the understanding of nature becameclearly visible again only at the beginning of themodern period, once the way back had beenfound from Aristotle to Plato [and Pythagoras].-- Werner Heisenberg1

The popular view of the development of science, and of theplace of religion in this development, is well known toalmost all of us. At the very core of science lies human'curiosity.' In the distant past, the story goes, humanbeings were unable to understand the complex and mysteriousworkings of the universe. Our response to the mysteriousworld we inhabited was to create myths and religion, whichgave us imaginary (but psychologically fulfilling) answersto the burning questions of our existence. Byanthropomorphizing and domesticating the world, religionallowed man to feel at home in it, despite its dangers andunpredictability. In the ensuing millennia, as civilizationdeveloped and our level of knowledge about the worldincreased, we slowly became able to distinguish myths andreligious stories from knowledge and hard ‘facts’ gainedthrough observation and empirical experience. Furthermore,we found it useful to be able to predict natural phenomena.For example, an exact knowledge of the vernal equinoxescould help us determine agricultural seasons with greateraccuracy. Similar practical needs eventually led us tocreate abstract explanations and models for the behaviour of1 Cited in Ken Wilber, Quantum Questions, Mystical Writings of the World’s Great Physicists (Boston: Shambala, 1985), 59-60.

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the heavenly bodies and other natural forces, and toincrease the precision and power of our observations. Thecreation of quantitative analysis and of the experimentalmethod are the final crowning achievements of this process,which created a science that not only allows us to controlour environment but invalidates mythical-religiousexplanations of reality.

Today, armed with the powerful ‘truths’ of modern science,we tend to see religion and myth as primitive forerunners ofscience, which played a part in man’s worldview only untilmore adequate explanations of reality became available. AsMax Weber put it, with the development of modern science,the world became “disenchanted.” Religion, it seems, hadplayed out its historical role and lost its purpose.

In this work, I will put forward an alternate account of thedevelopment of science and of its relationship withreligion. I will argue that the most important branches ofmodern scientific knowledge, astronomy and physics, as wellas the mathematical scientific methodology that underpinsthem, were actually the product of early scientists’ andphilosophers’ theologically inspired intuitions concerningthe nature of the universe. The primary motivation for theearly scientists’ pursuit of knowledge was not simply‘curiosity’ but, rather, the quest to understand the placeand role of man in God’s creation. Needless to say, thisview differs markedly from the one accepted by publicopinion, and by most modern scientists and historians ofscience. In order to understand it, we must first examinehow the orthodox vision of the history of science wasproduced, with special emphasis on the concept of the“scientific paradigm.”

In his seminal work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, ThomasKuhn demonstrated that the historical evolution of science

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is cyclical rather than linear.2 According to Kuhn, eachcycle of scientific development consists of two distinctstages. First, Kuhn describes a stable linear period ofdevelopment, which he refers to as “normal science.” Eachperiod of “normal science” has its own particular“scientific paradigm,” which Kuhn defines as “the sum ofuniversally recognized scientific achievements that for atime provide model problems and solutions to a community ofpractitioners.”3 In other words, the paradigm can be seen asa comprehensive worldview, based on earlier discoveries, withinwhich new problems are formulated, answers are provided, andscientific inquiry takes place. Due to the comprehensivenature of any given paradigm, its flaws cannot be correctedwithin the framework of that paradigm itself.4 At most, thelinear development of “normal science” can uncoverparticular empirical phenomena, which are incongruent withassumptions on which the paradigm is based.

How then do paradigmatic shifts occur? According to Kuhn,the phase of stable, linear, and cumulative growth of“normal science” is inevitably followed by a “scientificrevolution.” However, a revolution isn’t simply the resultof new data becoming available. New data that can’t beincorporated into the existing paradigm, and which questionsits validity, appears so radical that it is often ignored ordisregarded. After all, from within the paradigm, it isperceived as an assault on the whole existing structure ofscientific knowledge and, indeed, on science itself.Therefore, Kuhn argues that a scientific revolution oftenbegins with the insight of a single scientist, which allowshim or her to see the world from an entirely new angle orperspective that lies beyond the boundaries of the old2 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: Universityof Chicago, 1970).3 Kuhn, 7.4 Looking outside of the paradigm is a bit like thinking outside thebox. Of course, one will never think outside of the box if one doesn’t realize one is in a box in the first place.

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worldview. Such paradigmatic shifts are most often the workof young scholars, non-conformists, and those new to theirparticular “discipline” of science. Moreover, as a rule, new“revolutionary” ideas initially fail to win the approval ofthe scientific establishment and are accepted only afterconsiderable time has passed and a new generation ofscholars, less committed to the old paradigm, emerges.

The effects of a paradigmatic shift are momentous; the verydefinition of what the word “science” means changes afterthe revolution. Paradigmatic shifts affect not only themanner in which problems are framed within scientificinquiry but also the question of which problems will fallunder the consideration of science. The language of sciencealso changes as a result of revolutions and this creates theneed for extant scientific knowledge to be re-interpretedwithin the framework of the new paradigm. As a result, muchpre-revolutionary knowledge, and sometimes even thescientific community’s awareness of the revolution itself,is lost over time.

For the purposes of this essay, the key point is the impactof scientific revolutions on our perception of the history of science.Specifically, from inside our current paradigm, the historyof science is inevitably perceived as a series of linearadvancements, which lead, in almost teleological fashion,towards the current state of knowledge. All the pre-revolutionary facts and theories that are incompatible withthe spirit (or ideology) of the current paradigm arerelegated to the margins of the discipline, or passed overaltogether. Therefore, it shouldn’t come as a surprise thatour notions of pre-Enlightenment science and philosophy aregrossly distorted. In particular, we no longer understandpre-Enlightenment man’s vision of the world and,consequently, his very reasons for engaging in scientificinquiry. Rather, we automatically assume that people alwaysthought exactly the way we do now – and that our worldview

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constitutes the natural culmination and perfection of theirefforts at understanding.

This essay constitutes an attempt to step outside theboundaries of the current paradigm and to present thefounders of modern science as they saw themselves, ratherthan as we would like them to appear. In order to accomplishthis task, I will focus on the historical development ofphysics and astronomy and, in particular, on the motivationsunderpinning early scientists’ interest in celestialmechanics. From its very inception in ancient Greece,Western thought was deeply preoccupied with this subject,which was of fundamental importance for the creation ofclassical physics. In my analysis, I will focus on the workand ideas of the early Pythagoreans, Plato, the neo-Platonists of the Renaissance (especially Copernicus), aswell as Kepler and Newton. I will pay special attention tothe key role that religiously-inspired intuition played as amotivating factor for scientific research, and to the impactof theological speculation on the formulation of hypothesesconcerning the nature the universe. Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans

The mathematical structure, namely the numericalratio as a source of harmony, was certainly one ofthe most momentous discoveries in the history ofmankind.-- Werner Heisenberg5

According to tradition, the foundations of Greek astronomywere laid by Pythagoras of Samos (cc. 582-500 BC), who spentmost of his life in the Greek colony of Kroton in southernItaly. There, he founded a mystical brotherhood dedicated toreligious contemplation and mathematical speculation. Thecommunity practiced collective ownership of property andaccepted both men and women, who were treated equally.5 Cited in Wilber, 57.

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However, one could join the community only after a five-yeartrial period. Even mathematical discoveries were treated ascommon property, but they were kept secret from the outsideworld.6

Pythagoreans were convinced of the existence of God on thebasis of their religious experience. This axiom formed thefoundation of their mode of thinking, known as “Pythagoreandeduction,” which involved deducing the structure of theworld from the attributes of its Creator. Thus, according tothe Pythagoreans, the perfection of the Creator necessarilyimplied the harmony and beauty of the creation. Themathematical proportions of the musical scale, which thePythagoreans were first to discover, were seen as the keynecessary for unlocking the divine harmony of the universe.The whole universe was seen as being made up of numbersarranged according to harmonious ratios. Therefore, theworld was deemed ‘knowable’ – the language of mathematicscould describe both the physical and divine aspects ofreality. The Pythagoreans’ four main interests – arithmetic,geometry, astronomy, and music – constituted the so-called“Pythagorean quadrivium.”

A mathematical world was seen as necessarily constituting aunity governed by universal laws. For this reason thePythagoreans believed that the Earth was governed by thesame mathematical laws as other heavenly bodies and theydidn’t accord it a privileged place in the universe. Thisrendered them open to non-geocentric conceptions ofastronomy.7 Despite overwhelming empirical evidence to thecontrary, they believed that the Earth wasn’t fixed in thecenter of the universe but that it moved in the cosmos,revolving around what they called the “central fire or

6 Stephen F. Mason, A History of Science (New York: Macmillan, 1962), 28.7 Edwin A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science (New York:Dover Publications, 2003), 44.

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heart.”8 Their acceptance of this empiricallyunsubstantiated theory, belied their belief that theinterpretation of empirical facts must be subordinated tomathematical structures. The relative size of planetaryorbits, they believed, was determined by the proportions ofthe musical scale. Furthermore, they deduced the sphericalshape of planets and the circular shape of orbits from theaxiom that the universe was geometrically ideal. For thePythagoreans, the constellations weren’t merely a series oftwo-dimensional 'pictures' in the sky. Rather, the heavenswere three-dimensional and filled with moving heavenlybodies. Celestial phenomena could be expressed by harmoniousmathematical rules, just like in modern scientific models ofthe universe.

In sum, Pythagorean thought created the basis for thedevelopment of mathematics, physics, and astronomy, which inturn constituted the foundation of classical physics andmodern science. According to Heisenberg, the Pythagoreans’philosophic outlook “constitutes an anticipation of theentire program of contemporary exact science.”9 For thePythagoreans, however, satisfying man’s 'curiosity' aboutthe nature of the universe was not an end in itself. Rather,their “scientific” endeavors were supposed to help liberatethe immortal soul from the shackles of matter. The ultimategoal of the soul was to return to the cosmos, of which thehuman body was an imperfect replica. Other methods which thePythagoreans used to achieve this end were religiouspractices and a proper lifestyle (which includedvegetarianism). They also believed in the transmigration ofsouls and the unity of life and death.

Many modern scholars tend to divide Pythagorean thought intotwo separate streams: the occultist-religious and the

8 Charles H. Kahn, Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001), 26.9 Wilber, 59.

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mathematical-astronomical. According to those who propoundthis view, Pythagoras himself was sort of “shaman” or acharismatic religious leader. The “scientific” stream ofPythagorean thought supposedly originated separately, at alater time. The notion of two separate strands inPythagorean thought originated in the 19th century and itreflects the Enlightenment-era assumption of a fundamentalincompatibility between science and religion. However,according to Charles Kahn, the main elements of Pythagoreanscience are so close in time to the school’s origins thatsplitting Pythagorean thought into “religious” and“scientific” components is entirely unwarranted from ahistorical point of view.10 I believe that in pre-Enlightenment thought “scientific” and “religious” ideaswere seen not only as complimentary but in fact asinseparable. To attempt to separate them is to impose ourcategories on ancient thought. We can find a furtherexplanation of this phenomenon by examining Plato’s Timaeus.

Plato and Platonism

The colorful multiplicity of the phenomena can beunderstood, according to Pythagoras and Plato,because and insofar as it is underlain by a unitaryprinciple of form susceptible to mathematicalrepresentation. -- Werner Heisenberg11

Pythagoreism had a profound impact on Plato's religious andscientific views, which is especially evident in thedialogue Timaeus, traditionally called “the PythagoreanTimaeus.” The subject of this dialogue is the cosmology,philosophy, and theology of nature. Plato discusses thespiritual benefits of astronomy in the section of textdealing with the human body:

10 Kahn, 18.11 Cited in Wilber, 59.

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I reckon that the supreme benefits for which sight isresponsible is that not a word of all we have said about theuniverse could have been said if we had not seen stars andsun and heaven. As it is, the sight of day and night, themonths and returning years, the equinoxes and solstices, hascaused the invention of number, given us the notion of time,and made us inquire into the nature of the universe; hencewe have derived philosophy, the greatest gift the gods haveever given or will give to mortals. This is what I call thegreatest good our eyes give us. There is no need to recitethe lesser goods, which anyone who was not a philosopher andhad lost his sight might lament in vain; let us rather saythat the cause and purpose of God’s invention and gift to usof sight was that we should see the revolutions ofintelligence in the heavens and use their untroubled courseto guide the troubled revolutions in our own understanding,which are akin to them, and so, by learning what they areand how to calculate them accurately according to theirnature, correct the disorder in our own revolutions by thestandards of the invariability of those in God.12

Indeed this idea must have been particularly important toPlato, as he returns to it again when discussing health andhygiene:

And the motions that are akin to the divine in us are thethoughts and revolutions of the universe. We should eachtherefore attend to these motions and by learning about theharmonious circuits of the universe repair the damage doneat birth to the circuits in our head, and so restoreunderstanding and what is understood to their originallikeness to each other. When that is done, we shall haveachieved the goals set us by the gods and life which is bestfor this present time and for all time to come.13

According to Plato, man is a cosmic being. His soul arrivedhere from the stars and, after overcoming the imperfectionsinherent in earthly existence, will return to the bliss ofits true home.14 Plato’s idea of acquiring internal harmonythrough the imitation of the perfect “revolutions of12 Plato, Timajos Kritias (Warsaw: PWN, 1986), 47.13 Plato, 90d.14 Plato, 90d.

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intelligence in the heavens,” is based on the premise thatthe human microcosm is a copy of the divine macrocosm. Bothman and the universe (which also has a soul of its own) werecreated in the image of God. It is important to note thatPlato was a monotheist, and that he accepted only theplanetary gods of the Zodiac from amongst the numerousdivinities of the Greek pantheon.15 He saw the latter as theactors who embodied “the revolutions of intelligence.”Accordingly, the interpretation of God’s cosmic message tohuman beings was possible through the observation of theheavenly phenomena. Astronomy, according to Plato, was toserve this de facto theological purpose. At the same time,Plato’s methodology was mathematically precise. In Plato’svision of the world “numerical ratios, geometricprogressions, and regular solids represented the cosmicorder as a systematic structure of rational harmony.”16

Among Plato's more interesting conceptions regarding themechanics of heavens, we should note his idea of therotation of planets and stars. However, the seeminglyirregular movement of the planets on the night sky (as seenfrom the Earth) presented a problem for Plato's conceptionsof a harmonious universe. Plato resolved this problem infavor of metaphysics by claiming that, for some unknownreason, empirical data did not accurately reflect the actual(harmonious) movement of the planets. He must have seen thisproblem as being of crucial importance and he argued thatsolving it should be the chief goal of astronomy.17 The keypoint for our purposes is that Plato's theory was based onhis a priori theological assumptions, and was contradicted bysensory data. Paradoxically, these seemingly irrationalassumptions proved extremely fruitful in terms of generating15 The planets were seen beings superior to humans, but also createdby God. Plato, 41d.16 Kahn, 57.17 Noel M. Swerdlow. “Astronomy in the Renaissance,” in ed. Walker, Christopher, Astronomy before the Telescope (London: British Museum Press, 1999), 71.

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new scientific knowledge. In the first place, they promptedscientists to examine the heavens and to measure themovements of planets (thus contributing to the continuedimportance astronomy in Western thought). Even moreimportantly, Plato's assumptions also proved to befundamentally correct and therefore led generations ofscientists “along the right track,” from antiquity right upuntil the 17th century. According to Kahn, “by portrayingthe mathematical order of nature as the work of a creatorGod, Plato becomes the precedent for modern mathematicaltheists like Kepler and Newton, who [claimed] that ‘Godgeometrizes’ [and] that geometry is the instrument by whichGod creates the world.”18

Today, we are reluctant to admit that theologically basedideas may have played an important part in ancient thoughtand in the development of modern science. According to ourview of history, it was precisely the rejection of similarideas (though now associated with Christianity) during theEnlightenment that elevated our view of the world to thelevel of 'real' science. In the last three hundred years,this interpretation of history has become a deeply embeddedpart of our 'rational' cultural identity. In fact, we cannotimagine that the otherwise perfectly rational views ofphilosophers like Plato could have contained elements ofwhat we now see as 'superstition.' Insofar as we acknowledgethis fact at all, we prefer to believe that superstitionconstituted the backdrop, and not the very foundation, ofthe greatest achievements of ancient science and philosophy.Plato's attempt to let us know where his priorities lay19

falls on deaf ears. As a result of our deeply ingrainedprejudices we ignore those aspects of ancient thought thatwere most important to the ancient philosophers themselves.

18 The phrase “God geometrizes” is cited by Oligarch as “typically Platonic.” Kahn, 57.19 Evinced most clearly by the first excerpt quoted from the Timaeus

in this paper.

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Our refusal to see the ancient philosophers as they sawthemselves leads us to miss the importance of theologicalconcerns in motivating their quest for knowledge.

Plato's thought was cultivated by the Academy, the schoolthat educated the intellectual elites of the ancient worldfor over 900 years (from 388 BC to 529 AD), until it wasshut down by the Emperor Justinian. One of the greatestminds to lead the academy was Proclus (410-485 AD), whocreated a complete synthesis of Neo-Platonism. Keplerpraised Proclus as “the prophet of sun’s central place inthe cosmos.”20 In his biography of Proclus, Lucas Siorvanesnotes the following:

The existence of satellites orbiting around the planetsstands as one of [Proclus'] mysterious metaphysicalspeculations. The unsettling thing is that the case ofsatellites is not the only one. Proclus gives to the planetsa spin-rotation on their own axis in addition to orbitalrevolution. This, in addition to postulating the same withregards to the fixed stars, as Plato had done 800 yearsearlier, [is what] historians of science find amazing andcurious.21

In terms of his motivation for pursuing science, Proclus wasno different from Plato. He saw the physical world as beingcreated on the basis of a spiritual model. For boththinkers, science was a tool in the quest for knowledgeabout an eternal, transcendental reality.22

The Christian World: Antiquity, The Middle Ages, and The Renaissance

20 Lucas Siorvanes, Proclus: Neo-Platonic Philosophy and Science (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), 310.21 Siorvanes, 271.22 Siorvanes, 207.

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[K]nowledge is always a measurement… andnumber is the first model of things in the mind ofthe Creator.-- Nicholas of Cusa23

Long before the Academy was shut down by Justinian, St.Augustine (354-430 AD) introduced Plato's thought intoChristian philosophy. Christian theology was synthesizedwith Neo-Platonism, itself strongly influenced byPythagorean thought, in the early Middle Ages. The onlyPlatonic dialogue available in Europe during the Middle Ageswas Timaeus, the most “Pythagorean” of Plato's works, whichwas translated into Latin in the 6th century AD. Accordingto Burtt:

When Aristotle captured medieval thought in the thirteenthcentury, Neo-Platonism was not by any means routed, butremained as a somewhat suppressed but still widelyinfluential metaphysical current, to which dissenters fromthe orthodox Peripateticism were accustomed to appeal. Theinterest in mathematics evidenced by such freethinkers asRoger Bacon, Leonardo [Da Vinci], Nicholas of Cusa,[Giordano] Bruno and others, together with their insistenceon its importance, was in large part supported by theexistence and pervading influence of this Pythagoreanstream. Nicholas of Cusa found in the theory of numbers theessential element in the philosophy of Plato. The world isan infinite harmony, in which all things have theirmathematical proportions. […] [A]ll certain knowledge, thatis possible for man must be mathematical knowledge. The samestrain appears strongly in Bruno, though in [his work] evenmore than in Cusa's the mistico-transcendental aspect of thenumber theory was apt to be uppermost.24

All the aforementioned thinkers were influential visionaryscientists. Roger Bacon (1214-94), a Franciscan monk,introduced the experiment into the scientific method andanticipated many contemporary inventions. Nicholas, Cardinalof Cusa (1401-64), believed that the earth rotates about its

23 Cited in Burtt, 53.24 Burtt, 53.

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axis, that the sun is a star and that, along with otherheavenly bodies, it travels in an infinite universe, devoidof a central point.25 Dennis R. Danielson notes the a priorismof this fundamentally modern worldview:

It was really Aristotle who was empirical. Forphilosophers like Nicholas, on the other hand, the trulycritical critique of physical reality was possibleprecisely because there is a higher Reality that thephysical may imitate but does not comprise. Not unlikeKepler almost two centuries later, Nicholas employs aform of Platonic or Neo-platonist deduction to undermineAristotelian/Ptolemaic tenets concerning the shape andstructure of the world.26

Nicholas of Cusa accepted and applied the Pythagoreanquadrivium. For example, he wrote that when “creating theuniverse God employed arithmetic, geometry, music andastronomy, arts that we too use when we investigate thestructure of things, including their substance andmotion.”27 At the same time Nicholas accepted the relativityof any point of reference in space and the possibility thatthe ends of a straight line will meet in a sphericaluniverse.28 According to Kahn, “Nicholas’ worldview emergesfrom an authentic Platonic-Pythagorean background, but atthe same time it prefigures the new mathematical science ofnature.”29 This vision is indeed both scientific andmystical. Nicholas of Cusa wrote:

Certainly, one always establishes one's set of fixedpoints relative to oneself, whether one inhabits the sun,or the earth, the moon, or any of the other planets. Thusit is as if the world system had its center everywhere

25 Burtt, 29.26 Dennis Richard Danielson, The Book of the Cosmos (Cambridge: PerseusPublishing, 2000), 96.27 Cited in Danielson, 100.28 Danielson, 97. 29 Kahn, 57.

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and its circumference nowhere, for God is itscircumference and center, and he is everywhere andnowhere.30

Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), who is often seen as a “martyrof science,” is also of interest in this context. ThisDominican monk and Neo-platonic mystic, who believed in amultiplicity of inhabited worlds, was not a heroic defenderof heliocentrism, at least not as the latter is understoodtoday. For him, the sun was primarily the spiritual centerand light of our planetary system. His mysticalexperiences31 and his worldview, were not simply poeticmetaphors, since he decided to lay down his life in theirdefense – he was burned at the stake for his attempt toconvert the Pope to Neo-platonic gnosticism, which he viewedas the fullest expression of Christianity.

Copernicus

Contrary to still-popular beliefs concerningempirical nature of what was to becomeCopernican cosmology, the reevaluation of thePtolemaic system in fact was grounded on acritical refusal to accept the evidence of thesenses.-- Dennis R. Danielson32

30 Cited in Danielson, 97.31 Bruno wrote: “[I] pierced the air, penetrated the sky, toured the realm of stars [and] traversed the boundaries of the world.” Cited in Morris Berman, Coming to Our Senses (New York: Bantam Books, 1990), 226.32 Danielson, 96.

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We are so accustomed to think of the oppositionto the [Copernicus] as being founded mainly ontheological considerations … that we are apt toforget the solid scientific objections that couldhave been, and were, argued against it.-- Edwin A. Burtt33

The accomplishments of Copernicus (1473-1543) can beunderstood only within the context of his time.Paradoxically, the philosophy of the Renaissance is muchmore alien to us, and hence less well known, than Medievalphilosophy. The Renaissance, and its leading FlorentineAcademy, constituted a rebirth of Platonic philosophy,complete with the latter's Pythagorean component. BothCopernicus and Kepler embraced heliocentrism because of whatthey perceived as the “importance and dignity” of the Sun,which expressed itself in both mystical and scientificterms.34 Even before traveling to Italy in 1496, Copernicuswas interested in Neo-platonism. He moved even further inthis direction under the influence of de Novara, his life-long friend and professor at the University of Bologna. Infact, Copernicus believed himself to be the heir of theearly Pythagoreans. He studied ancient Greek in order tolearn their teachings, and adapted their view that “thewhole universe was made of numbers [and] hence whatever wasmathematically true was really, or astronomically, true.”35

During the Renaissance, the conflict between heliocentrismand geocentrism was primarily philosophical. Therefore, itis important to understand just how well grounded theposition of the opponents of heliocentrism seemed at thetime. Initially, heliocentrism was no more accurate inpredicating celestial phenomena than methods based on thegeocentric model. The Aristotelians, who preferredqualitative analysis and logic, defended geocentrism with

33 Burtt, 36.34 Burtt, 56.35 Burtt, 55.

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convincing empirical arguments (the lack of a discernibleparallax, the vertical direction of the motion of fallingobjects, etc.). The Platonists preferred heliocentrismbecause of its mathematical harmony which, in their eyes,itself constituted proof. (Kepler would later use the sameargument in defending his mathematical ideas against thefollowers of Aristotle.) Therefore, what were Copernicus'reasons for overthrowing the entire body of Aristotelianphysics and cosmology built on the foundations ofgeocentrism? According to Thomas Kuhn:

[Copernicus' arguments] appeal[ed] primarily to that limitedand perhaps irrational subgroup of mathematical astronomers,whose Neo-platonic ear for mathematical harmonics could not beobstructed by page after page of complex mathematics, leadingfinally to numerical predictions scarcely better than thosethey had known before. Fortunately… there were a few suchastronomers.36

It is important to note that Copernicus viewed Philolaus, anearly Pythagorean precursor of Plato, rather thanAristrachos, the most famous ancient proponent ofheliocentrism, as his model. According to Kahn, “the systemof Philolaus taken as a whole seems less like scientificastronomy than like symbolical speculation, an imaginativeexpression of the view that the order of the universe is afunction of musical harmony and meaningful numbers.”37 Theinfluence of Philolaus on Copernicus was so important thathis system was initially called Astronomia Philolaica orAstronomia Pythagorica.38 Copernicus' mystical views found theirexpression in his “Hymn to the Sun.”39 Finally, fully inkeeping with the Platonic tradition, Copernicus believed

36 Cited in Danielson, 120.37 Kahn, 26.38 Kahn, 26.39 In the De Reveolutionibus Copernicus writes: “...Trismigistus calls it the visible God, Sophocles' Electra, the All-seer. And in fact does the Sun, seated on his royal throne, guide his family of planets as theycircle around him.” Cited in Burtt, 56.

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that astronomy led to the “contemplation of the highestgood.”40

In this context, it is important to mention some of ourmodern historical clichés produced by the war betweenscience and religion. According to commonly held wisdom,Copernicus, “a paragon of rational science,” supposedlydelayed the first edition of De Revolutionibus until his oldage, because he was afraid of possible repercussions by thereactionary, dogmatic, and backward authorities of theCatholic Church. The story has its climax in a scene thatportrays Copernicus on his deathbed, receiving the firstcopy of his work. By dying, this rational scientist avoidsprosecution by the fanatical Church authorities. Thehistorical reality, however, is quite different. In fact,the Pope, himself a ‘renaissance man,’ heard Copernicus'lecture on heliocentrism and actually tried to persuade the latter topublish it. Copernicus himself, however, was “almostpathologically reluctant” to publish his work.41 He resistedthe Pope for two reasons. First, he believed thatgeocentrism was too deeply rooted in the human psyche to bealtered.42 His main reason, however, was his loyalty to thesecrecy which characterized the Pythagorean tradition. Thefounder of modern heliocentrism believed that he should“follow the example of the Pythagoreans, and some others,who handed down the secrets of their philosophy only torelations and friends – orally, not in writing – as theletter of Lysis to Hipparchus indicates.”43 His self-proclaimed reason was the “desire to protect beauties andprofundities discovered by great men from the contempt ofthose, who refuse to give any effort to literaryaccomplishment, unless it turns a profit ...”44

40 Cited in Danielson, 120.41 Kahn, 59.42 To put it in Kuhn’s terms, we could say that he believed that the geocentric paradigm wasn’t ready for a revolution. 43 Cited in Danielson, 105.44 Cited in Danielson, 105.

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The common cliché of Copernicus freeing science from theshackles of religious dogma is not only factually incorrect,but it runs counter to the spirit of the Renaissance as awhole. In actuality, the idea of heliocentrism worked withinthe realm of theology, and not against it. Copernicus' viewseasily found their place within Renaissance Christianity,which is illustrated by the authority and respect which hecommanded in Rome. The example of Copernicus is not the onlyone. Galileo, whose “quarrelsome nature led him into anunfortunate controversy with the Church,”45 is oftensubjected to the same stereotypical treatment by modernhistorians of science.

Kepler

Geometry provided God with a model for theCreation, and was implanted in man together withGod’s own likeness. -- Johannes Kepler46

Even during Kepler’s time (1571-1630), heliocentrism wasn’tentirely irrefutable from a purely “scientific” point ofview. Tycho Brache (1546-1601), whose astronomicalobservations were unparalleled until the discovery of thetelescope, was an advocate of geocentrism.47 Kepler foundhis way into the history of science partly by accident. Hewas a deeply religious man, who began his studies withtheology and planned to become a minister. His interest inastronomy was sparked by one of his professors, who was anadvocate of the Copernican system. The rest of Kepler’s lifewas spent on the question: “what plan did God have in mind

45 Concise Encyclopedia of Science and Technology (Oxford: Equinox,

1985), 245.46 Cited in Kahn, 171.47 Burtt, 60.

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when he created the universe?”48 As Kahn put it, Kepler“worshipped two Gods the Lutheran and the Pythagorean.”49

His conception of the immanent Lutheran Holy Trinitymanifested itself in the physical universe. The sunrepresented God the Father; the stars, Christ; and HolySpirit was the ether, through which God moved the planets.50

As the Creator, God was a mathematician, who used geometryand the proportions of the musical scale to create theuniverse. Kepler believed that the divine plan “for theworld can be penetrated by the human mind only if itsucceeds in discovering the mathematical relationshipsrealized in the celestial phenomena.”51 These relationshipscould be established as physical quantities, which can bederived from astronomical observation. Kepler had nodifficulty combining the religious and scientific dimensionsof his worldview. He saw Plato's Timaeus as a commentary onthe creation of the world depicted in Genesis.52 Kepler'stheology, which is so unusual for us, was not uncommonduring this period. Its most prominent adherent was JacobBoehme, one of the greatest modern Christian mystics, whosewritings had a profound impact on Newton’s mysticaltheology.53

Kepler was a conscious and convicted Pythagorean his wholelife.54 In his view, unraveling the mystery of the universe,depended on:

deriving a priori the underlying mathematical structure of theCopernican system of the heavens. Kepler’s clue was toexplain the spatial relations between the orbits of the

48 Noel M. Swerdlow, “Astronomy in the Renaissance,” in Walker, Christopher, ed. Astronomy before the Telescope. (London: British Museum Press,1999), 214.49 Kahn, 171.50 Burtt, 47.51 Kahn, 162.52 Kahn, 162, 171.53 Burtt, 202.54 Kahn, 162.

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earth and the other five planets by means of the fivePlatonic solids. This explanation was essentiallyPythagorean in form: the discovery of a mathematicalstructure, that can account for the empirical regularities,as the Pythagorean ratios account for the audibleconsonances.55

All of Kepler’s laws offer solutions to the eternal problemsof deductive Pythagorean cosmology, according to thePythagorean spirit, if not always the letter. In his firstlaw, Kepler replaced the circular orbit, a dogma of ancientastronomy, by an elliptical one, where the sun occupied onethe two focal points of the ellipse. Even Galileo, who didnot know the mathematical rules of planetary motions,56 tothe end of his life firmly defended the Pythagoreanassumption of circular orbits. Kepler himself was soconvinced of the circular nature of planetary orbits that heformulated his second law before the first, even though thefirst constitutes a necessary precondition of the second.

Kepler’s second law solved the problem posed by the apparentirregularity of planetary movements (as seen from theEarth), which seemingly contradicted the notion that everyplanet is moved by an unchangeable and eternal Cause.57

Plato believed that this problem should constitute theprimary focus of all astronomical endeavor, and Copernicushad unsuccessfully struggled to solve it. However, from thePythagorean point of view, only circular orbits necessitateda constant speed of the planets, due their full radialsymmetry.58 55 Burtt, 163-164.56 Kahn, 166.57 For the Pythagoreans, the unchanging nature of God implied the unchanging nature of planetary motions. Both Copernicus and Kepler adhered firmly to this belief. Burtt, 50. 58 The circle is an extreme (limit) example of the ellipse, and the orbits of most planets only slightly diverge from the circular. The smaller the divergence, the more a planet satisfies the postulate of uniform motion. Therefore, the Pythagoreans’ intuition regarding the nature of planetary orbits was not in principle flawed. A Pythagorean,

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By introducing the elliptical orbit, Kepler substituted theuniformity of motion by the equality of areas swept by thevector59 of a planet in equal time intervals. Note thatthese areas are purely abstract constructs – they have nophysical reference. Kepler was able to discover thisregularity only because he was looking for it, and he was lookingfor it because he was guided by the Pythagorean belief thatthe planetary motions must be harmonious and mathematicallyregular. This axiom, in turn, was underpinned by thetheological assumption that the universe is a manifestationof God's divine order.

Kepler’s third law states that the square of the time takenby each planet to orbit the sun is proportional to the cubeof its mean distance from the sun. In other words, the ratioof the squares of time taken by every two planets to orbitthe sun is equal to the ratio of the cubes of their meandistances to the sun. This law is fundamentally differentfrom the other two – it isn’t intended for calculating thepositions of heavenly bodies. It merely describes therelation between already known values. Kepler himself,however, thought it to be his most important discovery,because it showed the harmonious nature of the solar systemas a whole. The third law, often called “harmonic,” connects“the orbital speeds of the planets with concordant intervalsof musical scale, so that the planets as they revolve cangenerate musical consonances”60 thus fulfilling the dreamsof the early Pythagoreans. Hence, for Kepler, “the heavenlymotions [were] nothing but a perpetual song for severalvoices, perceived by intellect, not by the ear.”61

geometrically ideal orbit is physically possible. 59 An imaginary line segment stretching between a planet and the sun.60 Kahn, 168.61 Cited in Kahn, 168.

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According to Siorvanes, Kepler introduced neo-Platonicheliocentrism to the physical world: “he saw his work as thediscovery of God’s secret design of the universe andexplained it all with Platonic-Pythagorean philosophy andmathematics.”62 In this context, one can understand Kahn’sclaim that “Pythagorean cosmology achieved its greatesttriumphs in the early modern period, with Copernicus andKepler.”63

Just like Copernicus, Kepler was keenly aware of thecontinuity of his own thought with that of his ancientprecursors, such as Pythagoras, Plato (whose Timaeus Keplerconsidered to be the model for his own work), and Ptolemy(also a Pythagorean).64 Modern historians of science oftendislike the somewhat 'occult' character of Kepler’smetaphysics. For example, according to Burtt, “Kepler’smethod had just enough in common with the successfulprocedure of later science, so that out of a vast mass ofpainfully and laboriously won geometrisms in nature, threechanced to become fruitful foundations for the laterstupendous scientific achievements of Newton.”65 However,this formulation can equally well be reversed. It was thesearch for “geometrisms,” motivated by a priori notions of thedivine order of the universe, which allowed for the creation

62 Siorvanes, 310.63 Kahn, 153.64 “[T]he great ancient astronomers had also produced a kind of Pythagorean tract in musical theory, in the tradition begun by Archytas and prefigured in Philolaus. Like Kepler, Ptolemy first develops a mathematical theory of musical harmony and then applies it to ratios in the zodiac and in the movements of the heavenly bodies, in order to givean astronomical account of the music of the spheres (Harmonica, Book III, chs. 8-16). Kepler was delighted to discover that Ptolemy had anticipated his approach (…), even though Ptolemy’s results were quite unsatisfactory because of ‘the crudity of the ancient astronomy’. But their general agreement on celestial harmonies showed that ‘the very nature of things was setting out to reveal itself to men, through interpreters separated by a distance of fifteen centuries.'” Kahn, 166. 65 Burtt, 70.

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of the mathematical basis of modern science. Kepler’sproject was to discover the harmony of the creation aswhole, rather than to pursue any practical or utilitariangoals. It was this that led him to describe reality in themost universal, synthetic, and aesthetic way, thusanticipating the universal theories of modern physics.Indeed, if he were not concerned with finding the Divineharmony of the universe, Kepler would not have gone to workwith Brahe.66 In conclusion, without Kepler’s theologicalinterests and assumptions, his discoveries would not havebeen possible.

Newton

For he is therefore called Almighty, not because hecan do and yet sits and does nothing, or bygeneral instinct only continues the order of naturethat he has before appointed, but because he,governing both heaven and earth, by hisProvidence, so orders all things that nothingchances but by his advised power.-- Sir Isaac Newton67

Kepler’s third law, his most abstract one, was the mostinstrumental for the development of science. In fact, itconstituted a particular case of the law of gravitation, andNewton’s theory of gravity was worked out on its basis. Thetheory of gravity was of paramount importance in classicalphysics, since it reduces the major phenomena in the wholeuniverse of matter to a single mathematical law. The law isalso crucial for seeing the misunderstandings which surroundthe origin of classical physics, and the life of itsfounder, Isaac Newton (1642-1726).

66 J.E.R. Drayer, cited in Kahn, 170.67 Cited in Loup Verlet, “‘F = MA’ and the Newtonian Revolution: anExit from Religion through

Religion,” History of Science, 34 (1996): 332.

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An example of the tendency to dismiss the importance ofreligious thought, characteristic of the modern history ofscience and especially its popular stream, can be gleanedfrom the following quotation from the Encyclopedia Britannica:“the idea of a universal force of gravitation seems to havehovered on the borders of [Galileo’s] mind, but he refusedto entertain it because, like Descartes, he considered it an‘occult’ quality.”68 According to this quote, one couldsuspect that Newton was able to formulate the theory ofgravity because he rejected gravity’s 'occult' aspects. Thereality, however, is quite different. It was preciselyNewton’s 'occult' a priori premise that “the divine arm [actsdirectly] in crude matter,” which allowed him to overcomethe physically absurd notion of attraction over distance andto postulate the theory of gravity in the first place.69

In fact, the force of gravity cannot be explained within theparadigm of classical physics. One could perhaps suspectthat during the Enlightenment a “rational” explanation forgravity was found, which allowed scientists to dispense withthe idea of the divine. Yet, even today we still don't havea proper scientific explanation of gravity. However, as theparadigm of classical physics became firmly entrenched inthe popular imagination (in a process which took about halfof a century), the very question of the causes of attractionover distance, which was of burning importance forAristotelian physics, was eliminated from the consciousnessof mainstream science.70 This informal and largelyunconscious process aptly illustrates the nature ofscientific paradigms and paradigmatic shifts.

Just as it ignored question of gravity, Enlightenmentscience also rejected and even suppressed Newton’stheological writing:

68 Encyclopedia Britannica, 642, macro. vol. 1969 Verlet, 322.70 Kuhn, 148.

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The militants of the Lumi`eres […] considered [Newton] as ahero who, by submitting heaven to natural laws revealed byreason, had opened to humanity an era of unlimited progress.[…] When they enrolled him in their fight against religious‘obscurantism’, they chose to eschew what become obvious withthe discovery of Newton’s manuscripts […]: that he was, in avery rational and somewhat unorthodox way, a deeply religiousman, and that he included his ‘scientific’ activities, howeverdistinct from religion they appeared to be, in a religioussearch, which gave meaning to the whole of his activities.71

Newton’s unorthodox manuscripts […] were examined during theeighteenth and nineteenth centuries by several members of theestablishment who decided against a publication which wouldhave damaged the glorious image of the hero.72

In reality, therefore, the greatest hero of science andrationalism was still a dweller of the age of faith, bothtemporally and intellectually. In terms of his worldview andhis motivation for seeking knowledge, Newton was nodifferent from Plato or Pythagoras. Like Kepler, the mostself-conscious modern Pythagorean, Newton was a“mathematical theist,”73 who sought divine harmony innature. His science was intended to serve the spiritualgrowth of man – “the realm of science was dependent on theGod of religion and led the reverent mind to a fullerassurance of his reality and a readier obedience to hiscommands.”74 According to Newton himself:

So far as we can know by natural philosophy what is the firstcause, what power he has over us, and what benefits we receivefrom him, so far our duty towards him, as well as that towardsone another, will appear to us by the light of nature.75

Newton’s God is the ancient God of St. Augustine, revived byLuther and Calvin; a God who is active in the universe71 Verlet, 306.72 Verlet, 334.73 Kahn, 57.74 Burtt, 284.75 Cited in Burtt, 283.

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“always and everywhere.”76 This universe is excellent andharmonious since, according to Calvin, it wasn’tcontaminated by the fall of Adam and Eve. Therefore, Newtonsaw his laws not as the products of fallible human reason,but as the mathematical expression of the constant divineaction in nature.77 Newton’s world is in some senseanimistic, since God “is omnipresent not virtually only, butalso substantially: for virtue cannot subsist withoutsubstance.”78 The unification of the divine and the materialin the theory of gravity is analogical, according to Newton,to the incarnation of the Son of God. According to Verlet:“the mystery of Incarnation, expressed by the Church insacramental terms, is thus translated into physicalterms.”79 God binds the world together, just like inKepler’s system, where the Holy Spirit constitutes theether, which conducts the energy of the sun that in turnanimates the heavenly bodies. According to Burtt, “absolutespace for Newton is not only the omnipresence of God; it isalso the infinite scene of the divine knowledge andcontrol.”80 Thus, Newton saw the universe as a whole asbeing intelligible in terms of religion rather thanmechanics.81

The animism of Newton’s worldview also found anotherexpression. Like Kepler, Newton was an astrologer. Hebelieved that human beings were deeply and holisticallyinterconnected with the universe, not only on the biologicaland psychological level, but also in terms of synchronicity.In this sense, Newton was the last great founder of sciencewho used eyesight in the manner intended by Plato: to watch“the revolutions of intelligence in the heavens.”

76 Newton cited in Verlet, 307.77 Verlet, 308.78 Newton, cited in Verlet, 325.79 Verlet, 325.80 Burtt, 260.81 Burtt, 202.

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Roughly during Newton’s life, the consciousness of Westerncivilization was deeply transformed. This la crise de la conscienceeuropenne witnessed the end of traditional society, in whichlife was hierarchical and subordinated to the holisticworldview of religion, and the birth of modernity, whereinhuman beings were 'freed' from the shackles of tradition byreason, science, and 'enlightenment.' Newton’s last greatendeavor, an attempt to synthesize hermetic and scientificknowledge, can be seen as a response to this transformation.Yet, this is not why we remember him today. How then couldNewton, who saw the divine in every natural phenomenon, haveplayed such a prominent role in displacing God from theuniverse?

Newton left modern science in its mature form. His PrincipiaMathematica (1687) became the basis of the scientific method.Paradoxically, the quest for divine harmony of the universeturned out to be a more powerful tool for changing thatuniverse than any knowledge derived from practicalexperience. How did this happen? In some ways, the triumphof modern science can be seen as a confirmation ofCopernicus' worst fears concerning the “beauties andprofundities discovered by great men” falling into the handsof “those, who refuse to give any effort to literaryaccomplishment, unless it turns a profit.” In the 18th

century, the wisdom of a few “mathematical theists” becamepublic knowledge. The method revealed by Newton and hispredecessors ended up playing the role of an instructionmanual for exploiting the natural world, and was used tothat end by people who did not share Newton’s philosophicaland religious interests. The theological aspect of Newton’sthought, which resulted from his contemplation of nature hadno practical application in subduing and exploiting nature.After the death of Newton and Leibnitz, the universe indeedbecame empty, dark, and dead. Man lost hope for regainingparadise – no longer the child of God, he became anaccidental result of blind physical forces. This was

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probably the most dramatic paradigmatic shift ever to occurin Western consciousness.

The God of the Mystics

In the beginning was the word: the word waswith God and the word was God.-- John 1:1

Geometry existed before the Creation, iscoeternal with the mind of God, is Godhimself…-- Johannes Kepler82

I suspect that the most important concept taken byChristianity from Greek philosophy is the logos. In Greekphilosophy and theology the term logos, literally translatedas 'word,' 'reason,' or 'plan,' denoted the divine reasonimplicit in the cosmos, which gave the latter meaning andorder. The logos was incorporated into Christianity, where itbecame equated with the Christ, expressed both as Word madeflesh (the Jesus of the Gospels), and as the divineprinciple constantly structuring the universe, maintainingits order and revealing God’s plan of salvation to man.

The idea of logos played an important role in shaping theidentity and continuity of the Pythagorean tradition forover two millennia, and it embodied the continuous traditionof mystical theology in Greek, Christian, and early modernscience. This becomes evident if one compares the openingpassage of the Gospel of John with the quote from Keplerprovided as the motto for this chapter. Kepler's thoughtcontains the Platonic conception of the God-mathematician-geometer, and it closely resembles the opening passage fromJohn, which was strongly influenced by the Greek mysticaltradition. Kepler's 'geometry,' which replaces John's'word,' refers to a different aspect of logos, which is most

82 Cited in Kahn, 171.

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important from the standpoint of astronomy. Specifically, itdenotes 'the rational plan' of the cosmos, which bearstestimony to the Creator's perfection, and which can bediscerned from nature through geometry.

Two properties of logos are particularly important forunderstanding the history of science. First, logos refers to'reason,' both in its divine and human manifestations. Thispoint is crucial for understanding the theologicalassumptions behind Pythagorean deduction, the methodologywhich underpinned scientific endeavor in the Platonic-Pythagorean tradition up to and including Kepler and Newton.The rationale behind Pythagorean deduction was theassumption of a symmetry between divine and human reason.83

According to Kepler “geometry provided God with a model forthe Creation and was implanted in man, together with God’sown likeness.”84 The above quote, if stripped of itstheological dimension, essentially means that human reasonand the universe work along the same (mathematical) lines.The practical implication of this theological assumption isthat the world is discernible to human reason – hence theelegant harmony of mathematical equations describingcelestial mechanics.85 Without the theological assumptionswhich allowed the Pythagoreans and their heirs to expect tofind harmony in the cosmos, looking for any kind of order inthe universe would have been presumptuous and logicallyunwarranted. Therefore, the methodology of Pythagoreandeduction, which laid the foundations of modern science up

83 Cited in Kahn, 171. Both of these were denoted with the Greek termlogos, in accordance with the mystical principle of the affinity betweenthe micro-cosmos and macro-cosmos. 84 It is important to note Kepler’s combination of Platonic and

Biblical language.85 Newton’s theory of gravity is expressed in the following formula:

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to and including Newton, cannot be understood without itstheological background.

The postulate of harmony in the physical universe, held bythe early modern scientists, was based on the belief in theperfection of the Creator. Kepler discarded all calculationswhich could not be expressed in terms of simple mathematicalrelations. Even though Kepler’s strategy was ultimatelyirrational and impossible to define precisely, it proved souseful that it is retained by modern science in the presentday. Every scientist instinctively knows what this postulateentails, and any theory which fails to satisfy it is nottaken seriously.86

Another key Platonic-Pythagorean axiom, which states thatwhatever is true mathematically must also be true physicallyand astronomically, also proved to have tremendous practicalimportance for the development of science. This notion wasbased on the metaphysical doctrine of the earlyPythagoreans, which claimed that geometrical space was thereal astronomical space of the universe.87 While this rulewas attacked for centuries by the Aristotelians, who saw itas irrational and groundless, it was defended by Copernicusand Kepler and ultimately triumphed in modern theoreticalphysics.

The second attribute of logos which is important for ourpurposes is that it is not only transcendent (as divinereason) but also immanent – it permeates, organizes, andanimates the universe. Ironically, it is this fact whichallows us to understand the process by which modern sciencewas eventually able to expel God from the cosmos. I willnow turn to Galileo's thought in order to illustrate how the

86 Lawrence Leshan & Henry Margenau, Einstein’s Space & Van Gogh’s Sky (NewYork: Macmillan, 1982), 81.87 Burtt, 45.

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immanent conception of God allowed science to eventuallyseparate itself from theology. According to Burtt:

The Neoplatonic background of the mathematical andastronomical development of the times has strongly penetratedthe mind of [Galileo], as in the case of so many lesserfigures [of the Italian Renaissance]. By his free use of theword “nature”, [Galileo] does not mean to deny an ultimatelyreligious interpretation of things. God by his immediatelycreative knowledge of nature, thinks into the world thatrigorous mathematical necessity which we reach onlylaboriously through resolutions and demonstrations – God is ageometrician in his creative labors he makes the world throughand through a mathematical system.88

Even though human knowledge is incomplete, according toGalileo “the truth of [...] mathematical demonstration givesus the knowledge, [which] is the same [as] the Divine Wisdomknoweth.”89 In other words, the immanent God of the mystics,who permeates the whole world, always functions with idealprecision and, under particular conditions would always actin the same manner, becomes indistinguishable from 'nature'in which he manifests himself. As Nicholas of Cusa put it,“God is everywhere and nowhere.”

Therefore, even though the idea of the Divine explained theharmony of natural phenomena, it wasn't necessary forunderstanding their actual workings or mechanics.Furthermore, God was not necessary to applying the laws ofnature once the latter had been discovered. Enlightenmentscientists, who were interested in the mechanics rather thanthe causes of natural phenomena, were thus able todisassociate theological concerns from science (whichincidentally involved sweeping the unexplained problem ofthe causes of gravity under the carpet). Since theology wasthe foundation rather than the specific methodology of science,it could be removed from scientific thought without any

88 Burtt, 82.89 Cited in Burtt, 82. Newton's position was essentially the same.

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consequences for science. In short, Enlightenment scienceretained Cusa's notion that God “was nowhere” but rejectedhis contention that he was also “everywhere.”

Religion’s impact on science can be seen in two ways,because theology itself was divided into two quite differentstreams. On the one hand, we are dealing with a mystical,unorthodox, hermetic, theology, which laid the foundationsfor abstract thought and which motivated and guided thecreators of science on their quest. On the other, we mustdistinguish the theology of Church as an institution,expressed in terms accessible to the whole body ofbelievers, which was dependent on politics and frequentlyrepressive of dissenting voices. It is my contention thatrelations between science and religion were ultimatelyshaped by the conflict between scientists and the secondtheological stream, embodied by institutionalized religionand the Church. Science became the enemy of religion becausethe Church became radically conservative following itsdefeats during the Reformation – recall that during theRenaissance, Copernicus’ ideas were welcomed by the Pope. Inthe modern era, the Church rejected those aspects of naturalscience which question a literalist interpretation of theBible. Furthermore, in the political upheavals which shookearly modern Europe, the Church stood against thebourgeoisie, a group instrumental in the development ofscience, and supported the old feudal order. While a fulltreatment of this problem lies beyond the scope of thiswork, it seems that the conflict between science andreligion did not reflect a fundamental incompatibilitybetween them, but rather contingent historical factors.

At any rate, the importance of theology for the developmentof science is frequently neglected in contemporary Westernthought. On the one hand, orthodox science is not interestedin revealing its own theological roots. On the other, fororthodox religion, Kepler's mystical views regarding the

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Holy Trinity being physically manifest in the cosmos arejust as heterodox and unacceptable as Plato's planetarygods. As a result, we read the distinctly modern separationof religion and science into the thought of the founders ofscience themselves. However, if Copernicus, Kepler, orNewton had thought of science as being separate fromtheological concerns, they would have lacked both themotivation and the theoretical assumptions which made theirgreatest discoveries possible.

The Dialectical Development of Science

The depreciation of historical facts is deeply, andprobably functionally, ingrained in the ideology ofthe scientific profession, the same profession thatplaces the highest of all values upon factualdetails of other sorts. -- Thomas Kuhn90

The conflict between science and the Church is not the onlycause of our inaccurate understanding of the history ofscience. Another critical factor pertains to the veryprocess thorough which scientific progress is made. To graspthis process, we must first examine the two main modes ofscientific thinking: Platonic (a priorist and deductive) andAristotelian (empiricist and inductive). The relationshipbetween these two modes is one of dialectical conflict.According to Heisenberg:

Pure mathematical speculation becomes unfruitful because fromplaying with the wealth of possible forms it no longer findsits way back to the small number of forms according to whichthe universe is actually constructed. And pure empiricismbecomes unfruitful because it eventually bogs down in endlesstabulation without inner connection.91

It is the dialectical tension between these two modes ofthought that results in the progress science and,90 Kuhn, 138.91 Cited in Wilber, 60.

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ultimately, in the creation of new scientific paradigms. TheAristotelian mode prevails during periods of what Kuhn calls“normal science,” when progress is linear and knowledge iscreated within the bounds of the existing paradigm. On theother hand, the Platonic mode, deductive and a priorist, iscrucial during crises and revolutions in scientificdevelopment, when, as Einstein put it, one feels “as if theground had been pulled out from under one’s feet, with nofoundation to be seen anywhere upon which one could havebuilt.”92 During these periods, progress is made throughirrationality, intuition, decisions based on belief, and theacceptance of new ideas which initially do not have greaterpredictive powers than the old ones which are beingdiscarded.93 The gaps in the new vision of the world createdby this burst of Platonic-Pythagorean activity willeventually be filled by another period of Aristotelian“normal science.”

Scientific revolutions change not only the way in which theworld is understood, but even the way in which it is seen.According to Kuhn: “what were ducks in the scientist’s worldbefore the revolution are rabbits afterwards.”94 Therefore,the new reality demands a new scientific language, and thewhole existing body of science must be translated into thisnew idiom. Through this process, not only the significanceand meaning of the revolution, but indeed the awareness ofits very existence is lost.95 As a result, only thoseaspects of pre-revolutionary science which have importancefor the new dominant paradigm are retained by “normal92 Cited in Verlet, 331. Furthermore, according to Verlet, “there must be in the founder’s mind, some quiet places, where he could rest, some fixed markers by which to orient himself, some unmovable points on which to support his thoughts; and these invariant elements seem a posteriori to be bizarre or archaic.” Verlet, 332. This statement gives a good illustration of how strange are the irrational foundations of scientific revolutions from the perspective of “normal science”. 93 Kuhn, 158.94 Kuhn, 11.95 Kuhn, 137.

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science.” From the contemporary vantage point, earlierrevolutions are perceived as a series of smooth and seamlesssteps, which lead inevitably to the current state of “normalscience.” In this manner, the intuitive, Platonic-Pythagorean element is effectively removed from the historyof science. Hence, the deprecation of the role of the non-empirical component of scientific development, includingreligiously guided intuition, in the history of science, isfunctionally ingrained in the dynamics of paradigmaticchange.

As a result, we project the attributes of the contemporaryperiod “normal science” not only into the past, but alsointo the future. All scientific development appears to usas having been cumulative and Aristotelian. At the sametime, we are falsely convinced that the future developmentof science can be predicted by extrapolating currentscientific trends. This systemic feature of “normal science”acutely limits the horizon of reflection of modern man. Italso forms the basis for the view, so popular in modernWestern thought, that the death of religion is inevitable.

In short, “normal science” identifies itself with science assuch, and its current scientific paradigm with the universeas a whole. Kuhn frequently points out that work of thescientist is limited to solving “puzzles” within the currentparadigm, but does not include questioning the paradigmitself. The scientific establishment treats any attempt toquestion or correct the paradigm as an assault on the wholeenterprise of science. This is why any fundamentalscientific change requires a revolution. As Max Planck putit: “the new scientific truth does not triumph by convincingits opponents and making them see the light, but ratherbecause its opponents eventually die and a new generationgrows up that is familiar with it.”96 This attitude is notlimited to modernity and modern “normal science.” Galileo's

96 Cited in Kuhn, 151.

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troubles with the Inquisition began when universityprofessors, devotees of Aristotelian physics, accused him ofheresy before the Church authorities. These scholars,representatives of “normal science,” were naturally hostileto the Pythagorean revolutionary. In a letter to Kepler,Galileo laughs at a professor of philosophy from theUniversity of Padua, who refused to look in his telescope inorder not to have to change his mind. In the same vein, aprofessor from the University of Pisa tried “with logicalarguments as if with magical incantations, to charm the newplanets out of the sky.”97

Towards Modernity

We have learned that the exploration of theexternal world by the methods of physical scienceleads not to a concrete reality, but to a shadowworld of symbols beneath which those methodsare unadapted to penetrating. -- Arthur Eddington98

The positivists have a simple solution: the worldmust be divided into that which we can say clearlyand the rest, which we had better pass over insilence. But can anyone conceive of a morepointless philosophy, seeing that what we can sayclearly amounts to next to nothing?-- Werner Heisenberg99

In actual fact, the history of reductionist science and,more specifically, of the mechanistic worldview, is limitedto one cycle of “normal science.” This period de facto endedwith the relativist-quantum revolution. However, itdominates Western consciousness to this day through sheerinertia. Just as with the Copernican revolution, the processof assimilating the implications of quantum physics and97 Galileo cited in Burt, 77.98 Cited in Wilber, 8.99 Cited in Wilber, 37.

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relativity into mainstream consciousness is slow anddifficult. Our culture still identifies itself with theEnlightenment, and we are reluctant to give up the familiarand readily applicable truths of classical physics in thename of, what to the majority of scientists appears to be, auseless abstraction which offends our “common sense.” Thepopular perception of modern science is created not by thesmall number of visionaries with tendencies towardsmysticism, such as Einstein, Pauli, Heisenberg, orSchroedinger. Rather, the scientific establishment isconstituted by a historically new class – the vast throng ofprofessional researchers whose main preoccupation is notpushing the frontiers of science, but finding solutions topractical problems within the current paradigm. This classis highly conservative for a number of reasons. In the firstplace, modern science requires an unprecedented degree ofspecialization, which is inherently the antithesis of widehorizons. Second, it has little use for the relativist-quantum paradigm, because the latter is not readilyapplicable to the human environment. Third, modern scienceis actively engaged in transforming the human environmentand “improving the estate of man,” which gives it a sense ofpower, competence, and a sense of importance stemming fromits role in humanity's historical mission of “progress.”Finally, the spectacular successes of science in the realmof technology seem to confirm this sense of mission. Thesefactors combine to cement the materialist and mechanisticworldview of the scientific establishment, which seduces uswith its promise of progress even as it destroys the hopeoffered by religion.

Therefore, modern philosophic pessimism stems, to a largeextent, from the outdated paradigm of classical physics. Ina world where there is nothing but indivisible rigidspheres, all processes, including psychological ones, can bereduced to classical mechanics. While we have not yet beenable to bring this process to a successful fruition, “normal

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science” assures us that due to the linear growth ofknowledge, reducing all of nature to mechanical processes isonly a matter of time. However, this vision is outdated byover one hundred years. Max Weber's belief that that worldhas been disenchanted, and that the death of religion isonly a matter of time, is intimately connected with theassumption of 19th century physicists who claimed that almostall the fundamental problems of physics (and of hence of theuniverse) had been solved. This arrogant assertion, whichresulted from blind faith in the linear progress anduniversal validity of a historically specific trend inscience, was perhaps one of the greatest blunders in thehistory of human thought.

At the turn of the 19th century, our image of the universeunderwent a tremendous change. Suddenly, “unquestionable”foundations of physics lost their relevance. The rigid cageof Cartesian rectangular coordinates melted away just likethe clocks in Salvador Dali’s paintings. The world nowbecame an irreducible unity – a field of energy. The newmodel of the universe is a hologram, in which the part is animage of the whole, just like in Pythagorean and Platonicthought. One of the main accomplishments of modern physicsis the notion that science cannot fully penetrate reality,because it is fundamentally limited to the Platonic cave andits world of shadows and images. According to Schroedinger:“the very recent advance [of quantum and relativisticphysics] does not lie in the world of physics itself havingacquired its shadowy character; it had [this character] eversince Democritus of Abdera and even before, but we were notaware of it; we thought we were dealing with the worlditself.”100 This is why the longing to escape the shadowyworld of the cave has reappeared, along with a new interestin mysticism, among the leading physicists of the quantum-relativist revolution. For example, Einstein himselfcombined the mysticism of Pythagoras and Spinoza who

100 Cited in Wilber, 9.

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believed that “there is a central order to the cosmos, anorder that can be directly apprehended by the soul inmystical union.”101

Contrary to Weber and Habermas, the universe was never more“enchanted” than it is today.102 The notion of the universeexploding from a single point is impossible to fathomrationally, and can only be perceived on an intuitive level.According to scientific terminology, the Big Bangconstitutes a “singularity” in which the laws of physicshave no application; this state is not so much unknown asunknowable. And we are not talking about some anomalyoccurring on a small planet on the periphery of one of aninsignificant galaxy, but about the point of origin of thewhole cosmos. In short, we shouldn’t need convincing toaccept the fact the Big Bang is a greater miracle than allthe creation stories contained in the world’s sacredreligious texts put together. If we were to accept the maximthat religion rules where reason fails, then the post-reductionist vision of the origins of the universe shouldresult in a mass return to religion.

Conclusion

I maintain that the cosmic religious feeling is thestrongest and noblest motive for scientificresearch.-- Albert Einstein103

Let us imagine a wholly pragmatic and rational human race,which has no longing for Truth or Beauty, and which lacksthe irrational conviction that the far-off points of lightin the night sky contain an important message for theconduct of human life. Rather, let us imagine that earlyhuman beings used the stars solely for determining the101 Wilber, 100.102 See Habermas, Jurgen. “Wierzyć i wiedzieć,” Znak 9 (2002): 8-30.103 Cited in Wilber, 103

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agrarian calendar and other pragmatic purposes. Thedevelopment of science based on abstract mathematicalknowledge would be severely retarded in these circumstances;most likely it would never take place at all. In reality,thanks to the irrational element of cognition, many crucialideas that underpinned the development of science appearedhundreds (or even thousands) of years before they could beempirically verified. This fact, which poses a puzzle forhistorians of science, lies at the very core of thePythagorean tradition, from antiquity all the way into themodern era.104 According to Burtt:

Fortunate indeed it was for Kepler’s historical importancethat his venture proved pragmatically successful. Theacquisition of further empirical facts in astronomy by Galileoand his successors showed that the astronomical and physicaluniverse was enough like Copernicus and Kepler dared tobelieve, for them to became established as fathers of theoutstanding movement of human thought in modern times, insteadof being consigned to oblivion as a pair of wild-minded apriorists.105

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of religiousmotivation for man’s interest in astronomy and mathematics.

Similarly, it is difficult to grasp the effort expandedby early scientists in their quest for knowledge which hadneither practical application nor social acceptance. Tryingto understand “what plan God [had] in mind when he createdthe universe”106 is infinitely more compelling than figuringout fundamentally meaningless puzzles such as “what revolvesaround what.”

Over a period of two thousand years, across differentcultures and religions, religious intuition prompted thegreatest thinkers to hold similar views concerning thestructure of the universe. This structure contained

104 Siorvanes, 270.105 Burtt, 70.106 Swerdlow, 214.

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propositions inaccessible or even contrary to sensualperception, such as heliocentrism or the regularity ofplanetary motions. The very same intuition suggested thedirection for research and the methodology. Moreover, italso hinted at the nature of possible answers – the earlyscientists sought to describe natural phenomena in terms ofharmonious patterns, which could be simply and elegantlydescribed using mathematics.107 The skeptics of theEnlightenment received science in a ready-to-use form, fromsages seeking the nature of God.

The most irrational and dangerous relic of 19th centurythought is the notion that science renders religionirrelevant. This view rests on the outdated paradigm ofclassical physics, on the illusion of a linear(Aristotelian) growth of knowledge, and on the ahistoricalassumption that religion is by nature incompatible withscience. However, given the importance played by themystical tradition in the development of science, I see noreason to conclude that religious intuition will not onceagain play a meaningful role in the quest for knowledge.

Works Cited

Berman Morris. Coming to Our Senses. New York: Bantam Books,1990.Burtt, Edwin A. The Metaphysical Foundations of ModernScience. New York: Dover Publications, 2003.Danielson, Dennis Richard. The Book of the Cosmos. Cambridge:Perseus Publishing, 2000.Habermas, Jurgen. “Wierzyć i wiedzieć,” Znak 9 (2002): 8-30.Kahn, Charles H. Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans. New York:Hackett, 2001.Kuhn Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1970.107 These assumptions are reflected in the formulae employed by modern

physics.

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Leshan, Lawrence and Henry Margenau. Einstein’s Space & Van Gogh’sSky. New York: Macmillan, 1982.Mason Stephen F., A History of Science. New York: Macmillan, 1962.Plato. Timajos Kritias. Warsaw: PWN, 1986.Siorvanes, Lucas. Proclus: Neo-Platonic Philosophy and Science.Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966.Swerdlow, Noel M. “Astronomy in the Renaissance,” WalkerChristopher, ed. Astronomy before the Telescope. London: BritishMuseum Press, 1999. Verlet, Loup. “‘F = MA’ and the Newtonian Revolution: anExit from Religion through

Religion,” History of Science 31 (1996): 303-346.Walker, Christopher. Astronomy before the Telescope. London:British Museum Press, 1999.Wilber, Ken. Quantum Questions: Mystical Writings of the World’s Great Physicists. Boston: Shambala, 1985.

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