The Supremacy of Dialectic in Plato’s Philebus

George Harvey

Plato’s Philebus receives much attention for its extensive discussion of plea-sure, the Promethean method, the fourfold ontology, and the conception of thehuman good that emerges at the end of the dialogue. By comparison, little atten-tion is given to the treatment knowledge receives in the section of the dialoguedevoted to its examination (55c-59d). This is curious since Socrates’ intention tosubject knowledge to the same degree of scrutiny as pleasure (55c4-9) suggeststhat the examination will reveal as much about knowledge as the prior one didabout pleasure. However, the fact that the examination of knowledge receivesrelatively little discussion in many works devoted to the Philebus is understand-able in light of the interpretive problems it presents.1 For one thing, it involves aseries of distinctions among types of knowledge, but the transitions from one dis-tinction to another are abrupt and without clear explanation. Furthermore,Socrates’ primary concern with the relation knowledge has to truth in the exami-nation stands in contrast to the way he treats knowledge at earlier stages of thedialogue, where the discovery that knowledge functions as the cause of thehuman good establishes its superiority over pleasure (22c5-e3; 31a7-10).

I aim to give an account of one of the examination’s purported accomplish-ments: the identification of dialectic as the type of knowledge superior to all oth-ers in its relation to truth.2 Such an account explicates Socrates’ remarks aboutdialectic as a discipline concerned with ‘what is, what really is, and what is by itsnature in every way eternally self-same’ (58a1-6) and as a state of the souluniquely characterized as ‘a natural capacity in our soul to love the truth and doeverything for its sake’ (58c7-d8).3 I show in part 1 that this task faces consider-

Ancient Philosophy 32 (2012)©Mathesis Publications 1

1 See, e.g., Hackforth 1972, Gosling 1975, Hampton 1990, and Frede 1993. Somewhat longertreatments can be found in Shiner 1974, 53-60, Silverman 2002, 240-246, and Sayre 2006, 191-205,but even these do little to address the questions raised by Socrates’ examination.

2 Due to my exclusive focus on the examination of knowledge, I say relatively little about the ear-lier treatment of dialectic as a Promethean gift and the placement of knowledge within the fourfoldontological scheme. This narrowing of focus follows naturally from Socrates’ insistence that types ofknowledge be examined only terms of their relation to purity and truth. The Promethean Method is aprocedure for identifying the number of kinds that fall between the original form and the indefinitelymany, but it tells us nothing about how insight into true reality is obtained. By instructing the dialec-tician to make use of that insight to obtain knowledge foundational to the technai, the methodassumes the very sort of relation to the truth revealed in the examination. This perhaps explainsSocrates’ remark that the Method is easy to describe but very difficult to use (16c1-2).

3 Frede 1992, 454 envisions a similar exploration of the distinction between pure and applied sci-ences, including an account of Socrates’ description of dialectical knowledge as ‘insight into true

able obstacles in its own right, since Socrates’ remarks reveal little to distinguishdialectic from the philosophical arts of measurement and calculation described inthe previous stage of the examination. I conclude that Socrates’ reference to theexample of pure whiteness from his earlier examination of true pleasures pro-vides an important clue for understanding the difference between dialectic andother arts. Then, focusing in part 2 on the section of the dialogue devoted to thetrue pleasures, I explain how the example of pure whiteness can serve as an indis-pensible guide for understanding this distinction. I then return to the case ofdialectic in part 3, and with the guidance of the example of pure whiteness, Iidentify what it is that distinguishes dialectic as the truest type of knowledge.Comparison between the two cases also advances our understanding of the con-ceptions of purity and truth at work in the examination of knowledge and how theexamination fits within the dialogue as a whole.

I

It will be helpful to begin with a brief synopsis of the whole examination thatruns roughly from 55c to 59d of the Philebus. The stated aim of the examinationis to find the truest (ἀληθεστάτοις, 55c9) types of knowledge in order to con-sider them as possible ingredients in the mixed life.4 Socrates proposes to do thisby first determining what is by nature purest in them (ὡς ὅτι καθαρώτατόν ἐστ᾽αὐτῶν φύσει, 55c7). He begins by dividing all kinds of knowledge into the pro-ductive arts (δημιουργικόν) and those aimed at education and nurture(παιδείαν καὶ τροφήν, 55d1-3). Of the former, he finds a difference in degreeof precision (ἀκριβείας) according to whether an art makes use of measurementor calculation in its practice (ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις, 56c5). This difference in degreegives rise to a division between types of productive art. The next stage of thedivision takes up those ‘primary’ (πρώτας) elements that make certain produc-tive arts more precise than their counterparts, viz., measurement and calculation,but here they are considered as arts in their own right rather than components ofothers (56c8-9). Socrates then distinguishes between arts of measurement andcalculation according to what they take as their units: the arts of the many arethose whose measurements and calculations concern such things as herds andarmies, while the philosophical versions of these arts only consider units that donot differ in any respect from one another (56d1-e3). Socrates describes thesephilosophical arts as infinitely superior in precision and truth (ἀκριβείᾳ καὶἀληθείᾳ) to the non-philosophical versions in their use of number and measure(μέτρα τε καὶ ἀριθμούς, 57c10-d2). When Protarchus accepts the suggestionthat the philosophical arts are the most precise of all types of knowledge,Socrates states that the ‘power of dialectic’ (ἡ τοῦ διαλεγέθαι δύναμις) would

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reality’. I shed light on this distinction between pure and applied sciences but am primarily concernedwith the distinction within the pure sciences.

4 Αlthough the examination appears to be concerned with different disciplines, the real focus is onknowledge understood as a state of the soul. This is made clear at the very outset of the dialogue(11d4-6), with an implicit reminder of this point coming at 58d4-5.

repudiate them if they were to put any other discipline before her (57e6-7).Socrates initially characterizes dialectic as the discipline concerned with ‘what

is’ (τὸ ὄν), ‘what really is’ (τὸ ὄντως), and ‘what is by its nature in every wayeternally self-same’ (τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ πεφυκὸς πάντως, 58a1-6). Heclearly implies that it is due to the fact that dialectic is unique in being concernedwith objects fitting this description that it is the truest (ἀληθεστάτην, 58a4) typeof knowledge. Before pursuing this point further, however, Socrates asks forProtarchus’ assent on this point. In response, Protarchus raises the objection thatthe art of persuasion is superior to all other arts in virtue of its ability to enslaveall others (58a7-b3). Socrates then reminds Protarchus that they are not lookingfor an art whose superiority lies in its grandeur, nobility, or usefulness, but onlyin its possessing clarity, precision, and the highest degree of truth (τὸ σαφὲς καὶτἀκριβὲς καὶ τὸ ἀληθέστατον, 58b10-c4). He allows that rhetoric may besuperior when knowledge is considered in terms of its actual benefits to humanlife (58c5-6), but then recalls the example of whiteness from the earlier discus-sion of true pleasures: just as the quantity of pure whiteness is irrelevant to itspurity, the question of whether a type of knowledge is ‘a natural capacity in oursoul to love the truth and do everything for its sake’ (τις πέφυκε τῆς ψυχῆςἡμῶν δὺναμις ἐρᾶν τε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ πάντα ἕνεκα τούτου πράττειν) canbe considered apart from any benefit or prestige that knowledge provides (58c7-d8). If dialectic is such a capacity, then it is most likely to possess purity of mindand reason (τὸ καθαρὸν νοῦ τε καὶ φρονήσεως εἰ ταύτην μάλιστα ἐκ τῶνεἰκότων ἐκτῆσθαι φαῖμεν ἄν, 58d6-8).

Most of the remaining exchanges between Socrates and Protarchus in theexamination of knowledge serve to show how other arts fail to possess purity andtruth, with little offered to account for the superiority of dialectic. WhenProtarchus agrees that dialectic is the superior art with respect to truth (58e1-3),Socrates states that most arts are ‘concerned with this world order’ (περὶ τὸνκόσμον τόνδε), with how it came to be, how it is affected, and how it acts (58e4-59a5). These arts fail to deal with what is eternal and instead have as their objectsthings that come into being (59a7-9). In failing to obtain the requisite clarity(σαφές) and certainty (βέβαιον) about their subject matters, these arts fall wellshort of attaining the highest degree of truth (ἀληθέστατον, 59a11-b8). Socratesdeclares that reliability,5 purity, truth, and ‘what is called unadulterated’ (τό τεβέβαιον καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀληθὲς καὶ ὃ δὴ λέγομεν εἰλικρινές) are foundin things that are forever in the same state and unmixed (ἀμεικτότατα) or inwhat is most akin to it (59c2-6).6 The examination concludes when Socrates

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5 Depending on whether it is attributed to the subject matter of a discipline or the correspondingpsychic state, τὸ βέβαιον is translated as ‘reliability’ or ‘certainty’ respectively. The connectionbetween certainty as a cognitive state with the reliability as a feature of an unchanging subject matteris supported by Socrates’ remark at 59b4-5.

6 There is nothing to indicate what sort of kinship Socrates has in mind here. The declarationincludes Gorgias among its targets, which suggests that its purpose is to signal the end of Socrates’response to Protarchus’ proposal by restating the minimal conditions for true knowledge. What fol-

states that the names ‘reason’ and ‘knowledge’ (νοῦς…καὶ φρόνησις, 59d1) intheir most accurate and appropriate sense are reserved for ‘insights into whatreally is’ (ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὸ ὂν ὄντως ἐννοίαις, 59d4-5), and that these are thevery names put forward at the beginning for their verdict (εἰς τὴν κρίσιν, 59d7-8; cf. 55c8).

Socrates’ treatment of dialectic in the examination of knowledge is one thatmakes clear that there is a distinction to be made. Furthermore, it suggests thatthere are two possible but related ways of distinguishing dialectic from all otherarts. First, Socrates’ initial characterization of dialectic at 58a1-6 suggests that itcan be distinguished in terms of the objects that it takes as its subject matter.Later, however, Socrates raises the question of whether dialectic is a capacity inthe soul to love the truth. The initial characterization of dialectic as concernedwith what has being and eternal sameness creates the expectation that Socrateswill identify the objects that fit this description and explain why the study ofthem results in the truest type of knowledge. As the synopsis above shows,Socrates abandons this path when Protarchus puts rhetoric forward as an alterna-tive candidate for supremacy. The second path, starting with the description ofdialectic as a state of the soul, emerges as part of Socrates’ response toProtarchus, but once again, Socrates frustrates our expectations for a completeaccount when he turns to highlight the inadequacies of disciplines concernedwith the sensible world. In raising our expectations twice and leaving them unful-filled, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that Plato is intent on having us recog-nize that there is a distinction between dialectic and all other types of knowledge,but leaves for us the task of determining what exactly it is.

If we are to take up this task, it seems reasonable to begin by considering theclues contained in Socrates’ remarks about dialectic. There is a clear indicationthat he intends to distinguish it by its relation to truth (ἀλήθεια, 55c7-9). Itseems the best way to proceed would be to follow one of the two paths indicatedabove. Of the two, the more promising path would be the one concerned with theobjects of dialectic. The alternative course of examining dialectical knowledge as‘a certain natural capacity in our soul to love the truth and to do everything for itssake’ (58c7-d8) presents us with the problem of getting clear about what Socratesmeans by such a capacity, about which nothing more is said, and then one ofexplaining how dialectic is exclusively this capacity.

Socrates’ use of ‘what is’ (τὸ ὄν), ‘what really is’ (τὸ ὄντως), and ‘what by itsnature possesses eternal sameness’ (τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ πεφυκὸς πάντως) torefer to the objects of dialectic at 58a1-6 recalls their occurrence in other dia-logues where their reference to the forms is unambiguous.7 This would suggest

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lows at 59d1-8 clearly shows that Socrates has only one type of knowledge in mind as meeting thehighest standards for purity and truth.

7 Forms are indirectly referred to as τὸ ὄν at Republic vi 511c5, vii 533b7, and 533c1; there areseveral references to the forms by means of the adverb ὄντως, including Rep. x 597d2, Phaedrus

247c7, and 247e2-4; Phaedo 78c6-8 refers to the forms as always remaining in the same state. Vlas-tos 1965, 5 identifies the intensified expression ‘really real’ (ὄντως ὄν) as a Platonic innovation, and

that the difference between dialectic and the philosophical arts roughly followsthe distinction between dialectic and the mathematical disciplines found in theimage of the divided line in Republic vi 509d1-511e5.8 However, our present aimis to work within the confines of the examination to see what enables us to differ-entiate the objects of dialectic. The fact that Socrates does not mention the formsin this context is significant in itself, as it suggests that his primary concern is topay special attention to the attributes distinctive of these objects, and then to thequestion of how they give rise to the truest type of knowledge.

This path, however, is not without its obstacles, as there is evidence in thePhilebus itself against the view that the objects of dialectic are unique in possess-ing being and eternal sameness. The prior distinction between philosophical andnon-philosophical arts is based on the fact that the former are concerned withunits that are different from herds and armies. Socrates describes these units asnot differing in any way from any of the others (56e1-3). This absolute unifor-mity implies that the units studied by the philosophical arts are exempt from pro-cesses of change and therefore also possess being and eternal sameness.

Reference to the objects of both dialectic and the philosophical arts occursagain at a later stage of the dialogue. When Socrates and Protarchus begin theprocess of forming the mixed life, there is a brief recapitulation of the findingsfrom the examination of knowledge. Here, Socrates recalls that the differences intruth between types of knowledge in the examination depended on whether a dis-cipline’s subject matter concerns things that are eternal and self-same, or thatcome to be and perish (61d10-e4). Socrates then asks Protarchus to considersomeone who understands what justice itself is (αὐτῆς περὶ δικαιοσύνης), andhas the same kind of knowledge ‘about all the rest of what there is’ (περὶ τῶνἄλλων πάντων τῶν ὄντων, 62a2-5). He then asks whether such a person hassufficient knowledge if he knows the definition of ‘the circle and of the divinesphere itself’ (κύκλου μὲν καὶ σφαίρας αὐτῆς τῆς θείας τὸν λόγον ἔχων) butcannot recognize the human sphere or circle (τῆν δὲ ἀνθρωπίνην ταύτηνσφαῖραν καὶ τοὺς κύκλους ἀγνοῶν, 62a7-b2), to which Protarchus answersthat he does not. This exchange receives attention for the fact that it establishesthe necessity of the practical arts for the mixed life, but its importance for ourpurposes rests in the way that Socrates shifts from justice itself to the divine cir-cle as examples of what there is.9 The divine circle and sphere are examples of

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includes Philebus 58a1-6 alongside these other passages as referring to the forms. Socrates’ laterdescription of the objects of dialectic as what is unmixed (ἀμεικτότατα, 59c4) matches Symposium

211e1, where the Beautiful itself is called unadulterated (εἰλικρινές), pure (καθαρόν), and unmixed(ἄμεικτον).

8 Assuming, of course, that the divided line supports an ontological distinction between the objectsof dialectic and those of the mathematical disciplines. For further discussion of this topic, see Corn-ford 1965, Annas 1981, Burnyeat 1987, Miller 1999 and 2007, Yang 1999, and Denyer 2007.

9 It is also noteworthy that Socrates begins this line of questioning by asking whether the less truetypes of knowledge would be necessary if they first mixed together ‘the most true segments’(τἀληθέστατα τμήματα, 61e6-9). While it is clear from the immediate context that these segmentsare to be contrasted with arts concerned with what comes to be, the use of the plural here sets the

things that have being and are not subject to generation.10 Furthermore, the factthat they are set in contrast with the human sphere and circle, things that Socratescalls the ‘false’ (ψευδοῦς) objects of the uncertain and impure sciences (τήν οὐβέβαιον οὐδε καθαρὰν τέχνην, 62b5-6), recalls the contrast between thephilosophical and non-philosophical arts. If Socrates has this prior distinction inmind, then he clearly means for the divine sphere and circle to be understood asobjects of the philosophical arts. All of these remarks are consistent in placingthe philosophical arts alongside dialectic and in opposition to their non-philo-sophical counterparts as disciplines that study unchanging intelligible objects.Emphasizing the commonality between dialectic and the philosophical arts inthis way (or at least failing to observe the distinction between them) may suitSocrates’ immediate purposes of constructing the mixed life, but it also showswhy the differences between these types of knowledge cannot be articulated interms of the basic ontological distinction between objects that undergo changeand those that do not.

If the objects of dialectic and the philosophical arts can both be described ashaving being and eternal sameness, then what else is there in Socrates’ commentsin the examination of knowledge that tells us how to distinguish dialectic fromthe other types of knowledge? The only part of Socrates’ characterization at58a1-6 that has nοt received attention is his use of the intensified expression τὸὄντως. Instead of a redundant reference to being (as opposed to what becomes),perhaps Socrates’ use of this expression in his characterization serves to point tothe way in which the objects of dialectic possess being, a way that is significantlydifferent from the way the objects of the philosophical arts do. One might holdthat both the objects of dialectic and the philosophical arts possess being in thelimited sense that they are not subject to change, and thus enjoy the status of

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stage for the remarks that immediately follow, wherein disciplines that study justice itself (dialectic)and those that study the divine circles and spheres (philosophical arts) can be considered differentsegments that possess truth.

10 Socrates might well be referring to the forms in this passage (i.e., the Sphere itself and Circleitself), in which case it would not tell us anything about the status of the spheres and circles that serveas the objects of the philosophical arts. The description of the sphere and circle associated with justiceitself as divine does not by itself imply that they are to be identified as forms. There are numerousinstances in the Philebus where things that are clearly not forms are described as divine, including,among other things, the intelligence that orders the cosmos (30d1-4), the godlike life of knowledgethat is free of pleasure and pain (33b6-9), and, by implication, some of the true pleasures, in compari-son to which the group of pleasures associated with smells are less divine (51e1-2). It is possible tomaintain that Socrates is referring to the forms Sphere itself and Circle itself, but if he is, the distinc-tion he is drawing in this passage is not the same as the distinction in the examination between philo-sophical and non-philosophical arts. To maintain both that Socrates is referring to forms and that thisis the distinction between philosophical and non-philosophical arts would imply that there is no onto-logical distinction to be drawn between the objects of the philosophical arts and the objects of dialec-tic. On this view, the philosophical arts would be disciplines concerned with ‘being’, ‘what really is’,and ‘what is in every way eternally self-same’ (58a1-6). This in turn would raise the question of whySocrates is so insistent on introducing dialectic on this score as superior to all other disciplines,including the philosophical arts.

being eternally self-same, but that the objects of dialectic differ from objects ofthe philosophical arts in that they represent what really is.

Socrates’ concluding remarks in the examination lend support for proceedingin this direction. After declaring that reliability, purity, truth, and what is unadul-terated is to be found in things that are forever the same and unmixed or what ismost akin to it (59c2-6), he proposes that the names mind (νοῦς) and reason(φρόνησις) be reserved for this highest type of knowledge (59d1-2).11 He thenstates that these terms are used in their most accurate (ἀπηκριβωμένα) sensewhen applied to ‘insights into true reality’ (ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὸ ὂντως ἐννοίαις,59d4-5). In these closing remarks, we find the intensified expression used byitself to refer to the objects related to the truest type of knowledge. This gives ussome basis for separating the notion of being ὄντως ὄν from being (i.e., asopposed to becoming) and eternal sameness in the weaker sense. Of equal impor-tance is that Socrates’ reference to mind (νοῦς) and reason (φρόνησις) hererecalls his earlier remark at 58c7-d8, where he states that dialectic can be said topossess purity of mind and reason (τὸ καθαρὸν νοῦ τε καὶ φρονήσεως) if it isby nature a capacity in our soul to love the truth. It would appear, then, that thekey to understanding how dialectic meets the conditions for being associatedwith νοῦς and φρόνησις, and in doing so, discovering what it is to be by naturea capacity in the soul to love the truth, lies in first determining how its objects arewhat really is.

The obstacle to proceeding in this fashion is that we have found very little sup-port in the relevant passages of the Philebus examined thus far for any clear dis-tinction between dialectic and the philosophical arts. Is there any other place inthe text that would support drawing the distinction currently under considera-tion? I think there is. One of the more curious features of the discussion of dialec-tic is Protarchus’ suggestion that rhetoric is the supreme art (58a7-b3), andSocrates’ apparent concession that if considered under different criteriaProtarchus may in fact be right (58b10-c6). As observed above, Protarchus’objection serves (among other things) to frustrate our expectations about a fulleraccount of the objects of dialectic, but it also provides Socrates with an opportu-nity to restate the criterion under which knowledge is considered in the examina-tion. In this restatement we find an important clue about how Socrates intends todistinguish dialectical knowledge from all other types. Let us then examine thisexchange in more detail.

In responding to Protarchus’ suggestion, Socrates’ makes two points. First, he

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11 Socrates’ remark at 59c2-6 can be taken to suggest that two kinds of objects will, in somebroader sense, possess reliability, purity, etc.: both those that are eternally the same and unmixed, andthose that are most akin to them (μάλιστά…συγγενές, 59c5). It is quite possible that Socrates has theobjects of the philosophical arts in mind in mentioning this second group. If he does, it will be neces-sary to understand the nature of this kinship and do so in such a way as to clarify how it is that theobjects of the philosophical arts fall short of being what really is. As we have seen, Socrates is quiteready in other contexts to grant the objects of the philosophical arts the status of eternal sameness. IfSocrates has these objects in mind as possessing this kinship, it would seem reasonable to hold thatthe separation implied by the notion of kinship pertains to their status as unmixed.

says that what he is now talking about in the case of dialectic is akin to what hesaid before about whiteness, namely, that even a small quantity of pure whitenesscan be superior in truth and purity to a large quantity that is impure and untrue(58c7-d1). Second, Socrates states that they are seeking a type of knowledge irre-spective of its benefits or prestige, and with an exclusive view to whether it is ‘anatural capacity in our soul to love the truth and to do everything for its sake’ (τιςπέφυκε τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν δύναμις ἐρᾶν τε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ πάντα ἕνεκατούτου πράττειν, 58d2-8). Even without a clear understanding of what is meantby such a capacity, the connection between these two points appears straightfor-ward. The case of pure whiteness illustrates how considerations of quantityshould not be confused with an object’s purity. In the same fashion, the statusthat a type of knowledge has with respect to truth is independent of the benefits itproduces or its perceived prestige. However, I think there is more to the connec-tion between the two points. For one thing, the example of whiteness marks thesecond time in the examination where Socrates refers back to the examination ofpure pleasures: in the previous treatment of the mathematical disciplines,Socrates suggests that the difference in degree of purity between philosophicaland non-philosophical versions of mathematics and geometry corresponds to thedifference in purity discovered between pleasures (57a9-b2).12 Two referencesback to the examination of pure pleasures are, in my view, more than a coinci-dence, and raise the possibility that we are to find guidance in it for differentiat-ing types of knowledge. These references are also significant because it is theonly other section of the dialogue where truth and purity figure prominently inthe discussion and it is here that Socrates addresses the specific question of whatit is that makes something possess truth.13 I therefore believe that the key to dis-covering the basis for distinguishing dialectic from all other types of knowledgeis to be found in this earlier treatment of true pleasures. By obtaining clarity

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12 It is not exactly clear how Socrates’ envisions the difference in degree of purity to be foundbetween the objects of philosophical and non-philosophical arts, as there seems to be many ways inwhich this difference can be construed. In light of what follows, it is interesting to note that Socrates’selection of herds and armies as examples highlights the greater extent to which unity is mixed withplurality in the objects of the non-philosophical arts, as herds and armies are by their very nature col-lections of other units.

13 Given that Socrates offers the example of pure pleasures as a way to clarify two different sets ofdivisions in the examination of knowledge, one might well wonder whether it can provide guidancein drawing the specific distinction between dialectic and the philosophical arts. It is important to note,however, that in the discussion of dialectic Socrates specifically mentions the example of pure white-ness as providing a way of understanding how dialectic can be distinguished from all other arts,whereas his earlier remark at 57a9-b2 simply recalls the difference between pure and impure plea-sures. The discussion of pure pleasures shows that there are features of pleasures relating to purewhiteness that distinguish them in kind from other pure pleasures, features uniquely suited to the taskof discovering the distinctive character of dialectic. This is not to deny that the example of purewhiteness will be instructive for drawing distinctions between other types of knowledge in terms ofpurity, but given that the example represents objects of pleasure that possess absolute purity, it mostdirectly bears on the question of how we are to understand objects of knowledge that possess absolutepurity.

about the distinctive features of pure whiteness and the pleasures related toobjects of this type, it becomes possible to distinguish dialectic from all othertypes of knowledge both with respect to its objects and as a state of the soul.

II

At 51b-52a, Socrates begins his discussion of true pleasures by identifying twokinds (εἴδη, 51e5), the pleasures of colors, shapes, and sounds, and the ‘lessdivine tribe’ (ἧττον…θεῖον γένος, 51e1) of pleasures connected with smells.14

To these two he adds the pleasures of learning (51e7-52a2).15 All three kindshave the common character of not having any perceived lack or pain associatedwith them (51b5-7, 51e7-52a2). The first group, however, also has some impor-tant distinctive features. In contrast to the pleasures of rubbing (51d1),16 the plea-sures provided by certain colors, shapes, and sounds have a different characterdue to the fact that these objects are not beautiful in a relative sense (πρός τικαλά), but are ‘by their nature forever beautiful by themselves’ (ἀεὶ καλὰ καθ᾽αὑτὰ πεφυκέναι, 51c6-7). The kinds of objects that Socrates has in mind hereinclude sounds that produce a single pure note, shapes that are perfectly straightor round, such as those produced by using a compass, rule, or square (51c3-6),17

and colors like pure white. Socrates contrasts them with shapes found in livingbeings or pictures thereof (51c1-3), which are never purely straight or round, and,

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14 Socrates first introduces the topic by referring to these pleasures as unmixed (τὰς ἀμείκτους,50e6). Protarchus then calls them true pleasures at 51b1-2. Matters get somewhat complicated after52c, where Socrates distinguishes between pure and impure pleasures (καθαρὰς…ἀκαθάρτους;52c2), and then asks about the difference between pleasures in their relation to truth, with the impli-cation that those pleasures that are pure, unadulterated, and sufficient come closer to it (52d6-8).These formulations indicate that a pleasure’s being true is at least closely related to its being pure.

15 The pleasures of learning present a set of distinct but related problems to the issues explored inthis article. To address them fully would require a more complete explication of the respective rolesof pleasure and knowledge in the mixed life than will be developed here. At any rate, it seems reason-able to distinguish the pleasures of learning from those related to pure shapes, colors, and sounds. Forone thing, as an object of pleasure, the activity of learning does not seem to involve the same kind ofsensory component that is central to the other two kinds of true pleasure. It is also a distinctive featureof the pleasures of learning that they are experienced only by a very few (τῶν σφόδρα ὀλίγων,52b8), which suggests that only some cases where knowledge is acquired result in true pleasure. Forexample, training in a productive art may not result in true pleasure, as the pleasure might be relatedto the benefits gained from such knowledge rather than the knowledge itself. For a more detailed dis-cussion of the pleasures of learning and their status with respect to truth, see Ionescu 2008, 453-458.

16 Socrates discusses the false pleasures associated with rubbing at 46aff., and highlights the way inwhich these pleasures are mixed with pain. One consequence is that activities that involve thesemixed conditions can be either pains or pleasures. Moreover, it is because activities like rubbinginvolve a combination of pleasure and pain that they are only conditionally pleasant. Whether rubbingis pleasant or painful can only be determined in relation to the condition of the soul that perceives it:when applied to a person in the appropriate pain-state (e.g., itchiness), the relief the activity bringscan be pleasant; but if the soul is not in the appropriate state, the activity can be irritating or evenpainful.

17 Socrates’ mention of shapes produced in this fashion may well prove instructive in explainingwhy the productive arts can be divided according to whether they produce things with the aid of suchtools (55d5-56c6).

we can reasonably infer, both sounds combining multiple pitches and patches ofcolor that are mixed in some way with other colors. These objects do not neces-sarily lack beauty, but whatever beauty they do possess, they have only in somerelative sense: the shapes occurring in nature may be beautiful only if they are thecontours of a healthy specimen free of deformity;18 the sounds combining multi-ple pitches, either synchronically or diachronically, may possess beauty only ifthe combination is harmonious; and the beauty found in blended colors willdepend on whether, like sounds, the mixture of colors is harmonious, or, perhapslike shapes, the color contrasts produce forms that are beautiful in some way(e.g., ‘perfect’ circles as opposed to irregular splotches).19

To say that pure colors, shapes, and sounds always possess beauty in virtue oftheir own natures also means that they are unique in their standing as objects thatproduce pleasures. These pure objects ‘provide their own specific pleasures’(τινας ἡδονὰς οἰκείας ἔχειν) that ‘belong to them by nature’ (τούτωνσυφύτους ἡδονὰς ἑπομένας, 51c7-d9). It is clear from Socrates’ remarks thatthis capacity is closely related to the way in which they possesses beauty, sinceboth are possessed by nature.20 Because they are not at all comparable to the

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18 Socrates seems to have these cases in mind in his introduction of the fourfold ontology where hementions beauty along with strength as resulting from bodily health (26b5-6). Since all three areexamples of mixtures of peras and apeiron, it follows that at least some objects can possess beauty onthe condition that they exhibit the right combinations of opposites (25e7-8). This is consistent withSocrates’ later description of these objects as πρός τι καλά in the examination (51c6), reserving theattribution of intrinsic beauty (καθ᾽ αὑτά, c7) to those things that are unmixed.

19 Frede 1992, 452 holds that the possession of inherent beauty is a condition for any pleasurebeing true. However, Socrates’ initial remarks at 51b3-7 mentions only the painlessness of the lack.His inclusion of pleasant smells as a distinct kind of true pleasure simply on the basis of the painlesslacks associated with them (51e1-5) shows that the possession of inherent beauty applies only to themore divine class of pleasures related to the pure colors, shapes, and sounds. There is therefore notextual support for the view that pleasures relating to these less-than-pure objects are per se false. Onthe contrary, it is reasonable to hold that many pleasures related to objects that are mixed are never-theless true. To be sure, the beautiful shapes found in the faces and bodies of young boys can give riseto great pleasures when present and equally great pains when absent (cf. Phaedrus 251a-c). Suchobjects, even if they create extreme states only occasionally, are considered immoderate and thereforebelong to the apeiron (Philebus 52c1-d1). However, other shapes, colors, and sounds may lack puritybut nevertheless give rise to only moderate pleasures, and therefore fall into the measured class (τῶνἐμμέτρων, 52d1). Unlike the pleasures of rubbing, there is no reason to think that hearing certainmelodies, or viewing the shapes and colors of living things (e.g., flowers), or artifacts produced intheir likeness would give rise to extreme pleasures or ones mixed with pain. It seems reasonable tothink, therefore, that at least some pleasures related to such objects are more like the pleasures relatedto smells: since they do not involve any perceivable lack and do not give rise to extreme pleasures,they should count as true pleasures, albeit of a less divine kind. Hackforth 1972, 99, regards theseobjects as distinct from the pure objects in that they are beautiful in a relative sense (πρός τι καλά),but also that they are distinct from the pleasures of smells, since the latter are not beautiful at all. Ifthe pleasures of learning were counted as a separate type (see n16 above), this reading would yieldfour distinct types of pure pleasure.

20 It is not exactly clear whether their pleasure producing capacity is a consequence of their inher-ent beauty, or whether both properties result from the purity found in the objects in question.Socrates’ mention of their pleasure-producing capacity immediately after describing these objects as

pleasures of rubbing (51d1), one can infer that minimally, the pleasures naturallyrelated to pure colors, shapes, and sounds are not mixed with pain.21 Moreover,unlike what is found in the activity of rubbing, where pleasure is produced only ifthe soul is in the appropriate state of pain, the pleasure-producing capacity ofthese objects does not require the presence of a corresponding pain state in thesoul. Because their beauty is something they possess in themselves and notmerely in relation to anything else, the capacity to produce pleasure is similarlyunconditional: any perceivable instance of pure straightness, whiteness, etc., willpossess this capacity. This is clearly not the case for shapes, colors, or soundsthat consist of mixed elements, since their pleasure-producing capacity depends(among other things) upon how the elements are mixed. In importing their ownpleasures, the conditions under which the perception of their inherent beautywould result in pleasure are minimal.22 Pure objects therefore have two distinc-tive features: first, the pleasures they produce are unmixed with pain, and second,they are what we might call aesthetically reliable,23 which is to say that suchobjects produce pleasant states in any soul that is capable of perceiving theirinherent beauty.

Pure whiteness is an example of the kind of object that possesses inherentbeauty and imports its own kinds of pleasures, and its very purity (καθαρότης),understood as the complete lack of admixture (τὸ ἀκρατέστατον) with anyother color, is what makes it an object of this specific type of true pleasure (53a5-7). Even a small quantity of pure whiteness can be said to be whiter(λευκότερον) than a large quantity of impure whiteness, such that it is the truest(ἀληθέστατον) and most beautiful (κάλλιστον) of all instances of white (53a9-b6). What the example clearly shows is that the purity in a color, shape, or soundnot only accounts for its beauty and capacity to produce pleasure, but also

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intrinsically beautiful on three occasions (51c7-8, d2-3, d7-9) does, however, suggest that the plea-sure-producing capacity of these pure objects stems from their inherent beauty.

21 Socrates’ repeated claims that these objects give rise to their own pleasures (51d2-3, d8-9) goesfurther to suggest that the pleasure itself is distinct in character from the other true pleasures. Thisanticipates what he reveals in the subsequent passages (53aff.), to the effect that pure objects, in beingmost true and beautiful, give rise to pleasures that are themselves most pure and true.

22 Such conditions might include a conscious act of selective attention on the part of the perceiverso as to make the relevant character the object of perception (e.g., the whiteness in the marble tile, orthe roundness in the bronze sphere). Another condition would be that the soul not be in a state of painor pleasure that is of such a degree as to interfere with the soul’s capacity to take pleasure in suchobjects. Environmental factors also come into play (proper lighting, minimal background noise, etc.).There may be other conditions specified here, but even so, the idea is that whatever conditionsapplied in the case of pure objects would also apply to impure (mixed) objects, with the latter classhaving the added condition that they represent some proper combination of elements.

23 This serves as an analogue to the notion of ‘cognitive reliability’, which Vlastos 1965, 49attributes to the forms as a consequence of their being ‘really real’ (ὄντως ὄν). My interest here isonly to use aesthetic reliability as a term that captures the distinct features of the sensible qualities ofpure whiteness, et al., mentioned above, but this is not to suggest that aesthetic reliability is only to befound in objects of sense experience, much less to suggest that all forms of aesthetic experience arerelated to sensible objects.

explains why such objects are more true than their mixed counterparts: just aspure whiteness is whiter than any quantity of white that is mixed with anothercolor (53b4-6), so too all other pure objects, in possessing some character (e.g.,roundness, straightness, uniformity in pitch, etc.) that is unmixed with anythingof the relevant type, can be said to have that character to a greater degree thanany objects that are mixed in this way.24 In being truest and most beautiful, thereis the further implication that the pleasures associated with these pure objects dif-fer not only from the pleasures of rubbing in being moderate and unmixed withpain, but also from the less divine pleasures of smelling in giving rise to thepurest, and therefore truest, pleasures possible.

Socrates’ purpose in discussing the example of pure whiteness is to make amore general point about pleasures, namely, that those that are free of admixturewith pain are true (53b8-c2). In doing so, he answers the earlier question as towhich type of pleasure—pure or impure—stands in a closer relation to truth(52d6-8). Seen in this light, Socrates’ use of this example is a bit curious: if hisaim is to establish the relative truth of pure pleasures over the impure, why shiftfocus away from the pleasures themselves and toward the objects related to them,and especially to an object of a specific type of pure pleasure? One way toanswer this is to acknowledge what is implicit both in the discussion of purepleasures as well as the examination of knowledge, namely, that the character ofthe psychic state in question, be it pleasure or knowledge, is determined to a largedegree by the character of the objects related to it. This correspondence is alsoassumed in the later stages of the examination of knowledge, where Socrates’comments clearly indicate that the status that a type of knowledge has in terms ofcertainty, purity, and truth is to be determined by the character of the objectsrelated to it (58e4-59c6). In showing that objects like pure whiteness are truest,one can then infer that the type of pleasure generated by these objects are corre-spondingly the truest of all.

While this correspondence between object and psychic state is clearly impliedin Socrates’ remarks about both pleasure and knowledge, appeal to pure white-ness complicates the matter of showing how all pure pleasures, even those notrelated to pure shapes, colors, and sounds (e.g., the less divine pleasures ofsmelling), are more true than any of the impure pleasures. If pure whiteness is toprovide an adequate answer about all pure pleasures, then it must be seen not asrevealing something about the character of the psychic state specifically relatedto it, but instead as serving a more general point about the nature of purity andtruth. What is most relevant to the immediate context, then, is not the fact that

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24 By itself, the example of pure white does not make clear whether the purity of any color is suffi-cient for this status, or whether there is a limited set of specific colors whose purity is inherentlybeautiful. The first option would be to allow any patch of color not contaminated by another color(e.g., pure brown) to count as an object of this kind of pleasure. The second, and I think more plausi-ble, option, is that only a limited number of colors that are not themselves mixtures of other colors(e.g., primary colors, white, and black) can have the purity necessary for possessing beauty by theirown nature. This second option also makes the most sense when considering shapes and sounds.

pure whiteness is an object of pleasure, but rather that it is simply an example ofsomething that is absolutely pure, whose unmixed character is evident even tosomeone lacking in philosophical sophistication like Protarchus. The fact thatpure whiteness is an object of pleasure and is used to support a point about statesof pleasure obscures the fact that it can be considered simply with respect to itspurity and apart from its connection to pleasure or beauty. When considered injust this way, we see that pure whiteness is whiter than any other shade of white.This is to say that it possesses the character of being white in a way that differsfrom any other color containing whiteness as part of its mixture preciselybecause it just is whiteness and nothing else. It is in this sense that it is truest(ἀληθέστατον) of all instances of whiteness, in addition to and apart from beingthe most beautiful (53a9-b6). The example of pure whiteness therefore serves toillustrate the general claim that a thing’s status with respect to the truth is ulti-mately explained by the degree of purity it possesses. This claim is generalenough to apply to states of pleasure and establish that any pure pleasure, regard-less of the object related to it, is truer than any impure pleasure. The very puritymakes such pleasures possess the character of being a pleasure in a way that dis-tinguishes them from any impure pleasure, however intense, just as pure white-ness is whiter than any other shade of white regardless of quantity. In revealingan important connection between purity and truth at this level of generality, it ispossible to see how the example of pure whiteness can be of service in an attemptto understand the relation between purity and truth in the case of knowledge.

Before proceeding, it would be helpful to gather together the findings aboutpure colors, shapes, and sounds obtained thus far. Pure whiteness is representa-tive of this special class of objects whose common character is the possession ofpurity, understood as the lack of admixture with a contrary. This purity accountsfor their possessing beauty by nature, and not merely in relation to other things.In possessing beauty in this way, they have a natural capacity to produce theirown distinctive pleasure in the souls that perceive them. Furthermore, their purityalso accounts for the fact that these objects are most beautiful and most true,which carries with it the implication that the type of pleasures connected to themare the truest of all the unmixed pleasures. Perhaps the most striking feature ofthis account of such pure objects is the claim that they are always beautiful bynature and not so merely in relation to anything else. This appears to run contraryto the notion famously expressed in Republic v 478e7-479b2 to the effect thatbeautiful colors, shapes, and sounds, just because they are sensible objects, arenot intrinsically beautiful and can possess beauty in such a way that they can justas easily be called ugly. Furthermore, Socrates’ description of them as being for-ever beautiful by themselves (ἀεὶ καλὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ πεφυκέναι, 51c7) is remi-niscent of the descriptive language usually reserved for the forms, where thecharacterization of a form as ‘itself by itself’ (αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτό) conveys thenotion that, among other things, a form possesses the character it has by itself andnot in virtue of any relation in which it stands to anything else (see, e.g., Sympo-

sium 211b1-2, where the form in question is the Beautiful). It is important to see

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that Socrates’ remarks about pure colors, shapes, and sounds in the Philebus neednot be taken as marking an upgrade in their ontological status such that they nowpossess form-like characteristics. Rather, what must be kept clear is that the attri-bution of purity, and with it, inherent and unchanging beauty, comes only whenthese colors, shapes, and sounds are considered as objects of sense experience.This explains why such things as shapes formed by compasses, rules and squarescan be said to be purely straight, round, etc. It suffices that the imperfections con-tained in these objects fall below the threshold of sense perception, just as theimperceptibility of the lack of which all pleasures are a fulfillment suffices forthose pleasures being counted as pure. To be pure as an object of sense experi-ence is therefore consistent with being impure when considered as an object ofcognition. When later considered as objects of knowledge, Socrates’ reference tothe human yardstick and circle as ‘false’ reflects this difference (65b5-6).

The comparison between the pure objects of pleasure and the forms is helpfulhere, in that it leads us to anticipate how the former reveals what is distinctiveabout the objects of dialectical knowledge. One might reasonably expect that thelatter’s purity and status with respect to truth will be similar to what is revealed inthe case of the pure objects of pleasure, with the crucial difference that theseattributions are not confined to the domain of sense experience. The next sectionshows that the purity and truth characteristic of the objects of dialectic are notfeatures of how they present themselves in sense experience, but rather reflecttheir ontological structure as things that are ὄντως ὄν.

By giving careful attention to the example of pure whiteness, we can now seethat it can serve as a useful guide in making a number of important determina-tions that will serve to distinguish dialectic from other types of knowledge. Infact, there are three ways in which pure whiteness can serve this function: first asexhibiting the character of absolute purity at a level of generality sufficient tocover both objects and psychic states; second, as a representative of a class ofobjects that possess a character inherently (viz., beauty) as a consequence of theirpurity; and third, as possessing a distinct type of pleasure-producing capacity invirtue of its inherent beauty. In the next section, each of these aspects of purewhiteness will be examined with a view to revealing the distinct character ofdialectic as the truest type of knowledge.

III

We begin by considering pure whiteness simply as an object possessing purityin virtue of lacking any admixture. Socrates uses it to establish that anythingwhose distinguishing characteristic (whiteness) is unmixed is not only pure, butalso possesses that character to a greater degree than anything else (e.g., purewhite is whiter than any other shade of white). From the context in which itoccurs, it is clear that the maximal possession of a character can be ascribed tothe fact that the character does not occur as part of a mixture of the relevant sort:pure whiteness is maximally white because it consists of whiteness and no othercolor. Thus, to possess a character maximally is just to possess it absolutely, both

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in the sense that nothing else possesses that character to an equal or greaterdegree, and in the sense that its having its character so does not depend on how itrelates to other things. The comparative language in describing pure white aswhiter than any other shade can therefore be misleading. We commonly speak ofone shade of white as being more white than another shade of white, and to theextent that one (mixed or unmixed) shade contains more whiteness than another(mixed) shade, this kind of talk would be consistent with the view consideredhere. When Socrates claims that pure whiteness is more white than any othershade of white at 53a-b, it can be taken in just this way. In this sense, pure white-ness can be considered as part of the continuum of mixed colors and serve as alimiting case against which all other shades of white can be compared. But incomparing pure whiteness to other shades of white in this way, one should notoverlook the crucial difference that it is not a mixture at all. What distinguishespure whiteness from other shades is not so much the degree to which it possessesits character, but rather the way it which it does so. In this sense, one can main-tain that the only color that (really) is white is pure white. Shades of color that weoften call white (and describe as more or less white than other colors) are not(really) white because they contain some admixture with other colors. The abso-lute possession of this character is in turn what constitutes that thing’s status asmost true. That Socrates applies this example of pure whiteness to establish justthis for the case of all pure pleasures illustrates the general applicability of theseconnections. On this basis, it seems reasonable to hold that the correlationsbetween purity and the absolute possession of a given characteristic on one hand,and between purity and truth on the other, can be applied to the case of dialectic.We can do this by considering both the objects of dialectic and their correspond-ing psychic states.

Socrates’ remarks in the examination of knowledge show that the objects ofdialectic possess purity (59c2-6). We therefore have reason to think that theseobjects feature a lack of admixture that reflects the way they possess their charac-ters absolutely and makes them most true. To borrow an example from the dia-logue, consider Justice itself (62a2-3) as an object of dialectical knowledge. Wecan understand how Justice itself meets the standards of purity by following theprecedent set by the example of pure whiteness. Justice itself would be pure invirtue of the fact that it is unmixed, just as pure whiteness is unmixed with anyother color. It would follow that in virtue of this purity Justice itself can be said tobe absolutely just because there is nothing in it that is unjust and because itsbeing just does not depend on anything else. Accordingly, Justice itself wouldalso have the status of being true, and the discipline that takes things like Justiceitself as its objects of study will be concerned with what is most true.

In the case of dialectical knowledge considered as a psychic state, we find anumber of Socrates’ remarks in the examination receiving some clarificationthrough the comparison with pure whiteness. At the outset of the examination,Socrates makes it clear that the method of identifying the truest type of knowl-edge involves determining which type is by nature purest (55c4-9). What is now

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clear is that the method employed in the case of knowledge is the very same oneapplied to the case of pleasure. As the example of pure whiteness shows, thetruest type is identified by determining which type possesses purity. The connec-tion between purity and truth would also be the same here: what makes the puresttype of knowledge also the truest is that in virtue of not being mixed, the pureststate of knowledge possesses the character of being knowledge in a way that allother types of knowledge do not. When the discussion turns to dialectic, Socratesreminds Protarchus that they are seeking the type of knowledge that is mostlikely to possess ‘purity of mind and reason’ (58d6-7). But in what sense canknowledge be understood as possessing purity? In the case of pleasure, purityconsists in the lack of admixture with pain, but is it possible to differentiate typesof knowledge in a similar way?

The clearest indication that they can is found at an earlier stage of the examina-tion. When distinguishing the more and less precise productive arts, Socratesuses the art of flute playing as an example of an art devoid of measurement. Oneconsequence of this absence of measurement, Socrates says, is that such an arthas much unclarity and little certainty mixed up in it (πολὺ μεμειγμένον ἔχειντὸ μὴ σαφές, 56a6-7). This description makes the specific point that imprecisearts can be understood as somehow contaminated with unclarity (τὸ μὴ σαφές),but more generally, it sets the precedent that types of knowledge can be regardedas psychic states that can, like pleasures, feature a mixture of contraries. Pureknowledge will therefore feature a lack of such an admixture, consisting entirelyof what is clear or certain, in the same way that a pure pleasure contains noadmixture with pain.25 Socrates’ later dismissal of all arts concerned with ‘thisworld order’ can now be seen as highlighting the fact that these arts fall short ofthe standard of purity required for the truest type of knowledge: the lack of clar-ity (σαφές, 59a11) and certainty (βέβαιον, 59b4-5) found (to varying degrees)in all these arts is indicative of the kind of impurity most evident in the art offlute playing.

There is a close association between certainty (τό…βέβαιον), purity (τὸκαθαρόν), truth (ἀληθές), and what is unadulterated (εἰλικρινές) suggested bySocrates’ declaration at 59c2-6, but the nature of the connections among theseterms only now becomes clear.26 As is already established in the discussion ofpure pleasures, to be pure just is to be unadulterated, since purity is defined as theabsence of any admixture. Being pure in this way is what accounts for truth,since being pure and unadulterated makes the thing in question possess the rele-

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25 The setting of unclarity against certainty (τὸ βέβαιον; see n5 above) suggests that clarity andcertainty are roughly synonymous in this context. This connection between the two terms is supportedby Socrates’ later remarks, where the absence of clarity (σαφές) in arts concerned with what comesto be directly leads to the implication that such arts (and their subject matters) are also lacking in cer-tainty (59a11-b5).

26 Cf. 53a8, where Protarchus refers to pure whiteness as the most unadulterated (τὸ μαλιστ᾽εἰλιρινὲς ὄν). It is worth noting that the declaration focuses on the objects related to the truest type ofknowledge, but given the ease with which Socrates shifts between the objects and the psychic state,one can assume that the terms are interrelated in the same way when applied to either.

vant characteristic absolutely. Certainty (or clarity) is specific to knowledge andits subject matter as the component that can either be mixed with its contrary ornot. There is a sense in which some degree of certainty can be found in all typesof knowledge, including the most imprecise—just as there is some degree ofpleasure to be found even in those mixed with pain, but the sense of ‘certainty’intended by Socrates’ declaration has to do with those cases where certainty istotally free of admixture. Thus, anything possessing certainty in this strict sensewill also be pure, unadulterated, and therefore true.

In addition to illustrating the connection between being pure and being true,the example of whiteness can also be considered as belonging to a special classof objects. The pure colors, shapes, and sounds that belong to this class are dis-tinct in giving rise to their own types of pleasure (51c6-d2, d7-8). The explana-tion for this is that they are always beautiful and possess this beauty by nature.27

The fact that these objects share the common character of inherent beauty raisesthe question of whether the objects of dialectic possess a corresponding generalcharacter in virtue of the way in which they possess purity and truth. It seems rea-sonable to hold that they do. As noted in the previous section, the manner inwhich Socrates describes pure colors, shapes, and sounds bears a striking similar-ity to the manner in which he describes the forms in other dialogues. The crucialdifference between these pure objects and the forms is that the former are objectsof sense experience: when Socrates attributes purity, truth, and inherent beauty towhiteness, roundness, et al., it is understood that the objects in question possessthe relevant quality only within the limits of sense perception. This is whySocrates calls these same objects false when he considers them as objects ofknowledge (62b5-7). Considered in this way, these objects fail to be pure andtrue because they exhibit all the limitations found in sensible particulars, not leastof which is the fact that, as part of ‘this world order’ (59a3) they undergo changeand therefore do not provide the degree of reliability (τὸ βέβαιον) necessary forobjects of true knowledge. These limitations highlight the fact that even thepurest colors, shapes, and sounds that serve as the objects of sense experiencestill fail to be in reality what they present in appearance. Their falsehood whenconsidered as objects of knowledge signifies the fact that what the soul experi-ences are (perfectly) white or round things, but not what whiteness or roundnessreally is.28

By contrast, the purity, absoluteness of character, and truth attributed to theobjects of dialectic are not subject to these limitations. The purity attributed to an

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27 This need not imply that the objects involved in the pleasures of learning are only beautiful inrelation to other things. It seems likely that they are inherently beautiful, like the pure shapes, colors,and sounds, but that they also possess some other distinguishing characteristic that makes the plea-sures related to them different in kind from the ones experienced with the pure sensible objects.

28 Perhaps the most relevant feature of these pure objects considered as objects of knowledge isthat they reside in other things. The pure whiteness in the marble tile or the roundness in the bronzesphere fail to be what whiteness and roundness really are (as objects of knowledge) because theyoccur in other things, whereas a true object of knowledge must be ‘itself by itself with itself andalways one in form’ (Symposium 211a8-b2).

object like Justice itself indicates an unqualified lack of admixture. What thisrequires is that Justice itself contain nothing that would render it in any wayunjust. Justice itself meets this requirement by being Justice itself. It is not a justthing, such that its nature resides in something else; rather it just is that nature,and as such enjoys the kind of unqualified purity distinctive of an object ofdialectic. Similarly, Justice itself possesses truth in a different manner from anyjust thing (persons, acts, laws, etc.). Without the qualifications that hold for theobjects of pure pleasure, it follows that an object like Justice itself can providethe degree of certainty required for pure knowledge. Minimally, in being unqual-ifiedly pure, an object like Justice itself cannot undergo change, and thereforelacks the deficiencies related to sensible particulars. But the exemption fromchange seems to reflect a more important feature of Justice itself that makes it anobject of pure knowledge, namely, that being pure, true, and maximally just aresimply different ways of expressing the fact that Justice itself is what justicereally is. The status of being something that really is would therefore be some-thing all the objects of dialectic possess in virtue of their absolute purity andwould be something each object always possesses by itself and not merely inrelation to other things. Thus the common character possessed by the objects ofdialectic that corresponds to the inherent beauty found in pure colors, shapes, andsounds is the character of being what really is (ὄντως ὄν). Socrates’ concludingremarks in the examination confirm that ὄντως ὄν is the character common to allthe objects of pure knowledge: reason (νοῦς, 59d1) and knowledge (φρόνησις,59d1) in their most accurate (ἀπηκριβωμένα, 59d4) sense and use are to bereserved for the discipline that involves ‘insight into what really is’ (ἐν ταῖς περὶτὸ ὂν ὄντως ἐννοίαις, 59d4-5).

It is also here that we begin to see what it is that distinguishes objects of dialec-tic from the unchanging objects of the philosophical arts. Unlike the arts of themany, the philosophical arts make use of units that do not exhibit any differencesamong themselves, which implies that they possess being and eternal sameness.However, Socrates’ remarks also point to the ways in which these units fail to bewhat unity really is. For one thing, these units are posited (θήσει, 56e2) by math-ematicians to serve the limited purposes of counting and calculating with preci-sion.29 These disciplines therefore require an indefinite multiplicity of

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29 The positing of units for these purposes recalls Socrates’ remarks about the mathematician andgeometer’s reliance on hypotheses in Republic vi 510b4-511a8. The dialectician seeks the unhypo-thetical first principle, and is able to give an account of what is merely hypothesized by the other dis-ciplines (511b3-c2). Some (Miller 2007, 330-332 and Denyer 2007) have suggested that theseaccounts will have a normative component not found in the mathematical disciplines: due to theirrelation to the Good, the forms establish the ‘normative specifications’ for their proper instantiation—including those that might be considered perfect instances, e.g., the geometer’s triangles understoodas perfect instantiations of Triangularity (see also Yang 2010). The accounts furnished by dialecti-cians will also show that the hypotheses relied upon by mathematicians and geometers have a teleo-logical dimension. E.g., in knowing the forms, the dialectician will understand that in having fourright angles, the ideal Square is the best way such a figure can be (Denyer 2007, 306-308). Conse-quently, the dialectician will possess an understanding of why, as perfect instances of these forms, the

indistinguishable units. At the very least, it seems reasonable to hold that what-ever fits the description of being what unity really is would be numerically oneand not indefinitely numerous. One would also expect what unity really is to be asingle form, Unity itself; but even without insight into the nature of this particularform, it is possible to appreciate how the unity exhibited by the objects of thephilosophical arts is inferior to that found in forms generally. For one thing, theunity of the forms is not stipulated the way it is for the units of pure arithmeticand calculation. Socrates’ discussion of the Promethean Method reveals thatinstead, the dialectician is required to search for and the discover the unities thateach form possesses by nature (16c10-d4). While the Method reveals that theforms are also many, they are so only in ways that do not involve a multiplicity ofindistinguishable units: a form can be seen to contain definite numbers of formsthat are themselves units, or conversely, they are part of a multiplicity containedby another form. In these ways of being many, however, each form possesses itsown character that distinguishes it from all other forms. This uniqueness is some-thing possessed by forms but not by the objects of the philosophical arts, and forthis reason it can be said that forms bring the dialectician closer to what unityreally is, even as they are distinguishable from Unity itself.30

Socrates’ remarks about pure colors, shapes, and sounds also show that theinherent beauty they possess has important implications for how these objectsrelate to the souls that perceive them. Specifically, they possess what I calledabove aesthetic reliability: since their pleasure-producing capacity is related insome fundamental way to their being beautiful, and their being beautiful is some-thing they possess always and by nature, it is reasonable to conclude that thecapacity to produce these distinct pleasures is something they also possess at alltimes and by nature. One can then ask whether the objects of dialectic, in beingὄντως ὄν, have a corresponding capacity to produce their own distinct psychicstates. Since being ὄντως ὄν accounts for the unconditional way in which theobjects of dialectic possess truth, one can infer that as objects of cognitive expe-rience, they have the capacity to produce a corresponding epistemic state in anysoul that properly grasps them. Just as a proper perception of pure whitenessnever fails to result in the soul’s taking pleasure in the object’s inherent beauty,the proper apprehension of the objects of dialectic would result in the soul’sgrasp of the truth. In grasping Justice itself, for example, the soul perceives whatis eternally just, absolutely just, and more importantly, what justice really is.Such an experience, therefore, is one where the soul is in contact with absolutetruth with respect to justice. Thus, the objects of dialectic could be said to be cog-

nitively reliable in the same way that pure objects of pleasure are aesthetically

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objects hypothesized by mathematicians have the characters they do. None of this is made explicit bySocrates in the Philebus, but it does suggest a way of understanding how the truth possessed by theforms reflects its relation to the Good revealed at the end of the dialogue.

30 For more on the different conceptions of number operative in the Promethean Method and theexamination of knowledge, see Yang 2010.

reliable.31 The psychic state in question, consisting of an insight into what reallyis (ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὸ ὂν ὄντως ἐννοίαις, 59d4-5), would be the result of the soulhaving direct experience of what is absolutely true, such that nous can be consid-ered the same as truth itself or as what is most like it (νοῦς δὲ ἤτοι ταύτον καὶἀληθειά ἐστιν ἢ πάντων ὁμοιότατόν τε καὶ ἀληθέστατον, 65d2-3). It is justthis sort of state that Socrates seems to have in mind when he describes dialecticas the type of knowledge most likely to involve purity of mind and reason (58d6-8).

With these results in hand, it is possible to make some progress toward under-standing Socrates’ characterization of the purest knowledge as what is ‘a naturalcapacity in our soul to love the truth and to do everything for its sake’ (58d4-5).The context in which this remark occurs makes it clear that Socrates has dialecticin mind (58c7).32 In contrast to the case of the pure pleasures, we are given someindication of what dialectic as a state of knowledge is like, but we are not givenany explanation of how dialectical knowledge uniquely fits this description. Weare told that the discipline associated with this capacity will most likely possesspurity in mind and reason. Clearly, such a capacity to value truth for its own sakeis in contrast to a one that values truth for the benefits it produces, which is pre-cisely what Socrates seeks to exclude from consideration in response theProtarchus’ proposal that rhetoric is the supreme art. The question of whethersuch a capacity exists is never explicitly resolved in the dialogue, but a plausibleanswer can be found by considering the conditions under which such a capacitycould arise. Generally speaking, it seems reasonable to hold that to value some-thing for its own sake and not merely for its benefits requires an experiencewhere the inherent value of the thing in question is evident. It would follow thatthe capacity consisting of a love for truth for its own sake would only occurthrough a direct experience (i.e., a psychic state) of truth as something that isinherently valuable. Presumably, all disciplines present the soul with objects thatpossess some degree of truth. However, there are important respects in whichdisciplines other than dialectic fail to provide the soul with an appreciation of theinherent value of truth. First, most disciplines are concerned with objects thatmix clarity/certainty with unclarity/uncertainty, and therefore fail to present thesoul with truth in its unadulterated (εἰλικρινές) form. These experiences do notprovide the soul with an adequate understanding of what truth is, and therefore

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31 Vlastos 1965, 49-50 attributes cognitive reliability to the forms to reflect their status as the‘objects of knowledge par excellence’—a status they enjoy precisely in virtue of their being ὄντωςὄν.

32 His description of this discipline in terms of a capacity (δύναμις, 58d4) to love the truth appearsto be at odds with his stated concern to consider types of knowledge as psychic states correlated withtheir respective objects. The question is an important one when considered as a question about thetypes of knowledge available for inclusion in the good human life. For the present purposes, however,the context makes clear that the presence of such a capacity within a discipline serves merely to indi-cate that the psychic state constituting knowledge within that discipline features possesses purity ofmind and reason. Moreover, as I go on to show, the attainment of such a capacity can only occurthrough the achievement of a state of knowledge that presents the soul with the unadulterated truth.

cannot result in an appreciation of its inherent value. Second, in the case of allproductive arts, truth is experienced in connection with some generative processthat results in human benefit. Consequently, in these arts truth is experienced asvaluable only in relation to some good aimed at by the art and not as valuable initself. The only way to achieve a love for the truth for its own sake is to experi-ence it in its purest form and apart from any productive process.

While both dialectic and the philosophical arts satisfy the latter condition, itwould seem that only the objects of dialectic, in being ὄντως ὄν, can be said tosatisfy the former.33 The objects of dialectic, in virtue of being ὄντως ὄν, are theonly things that possess a degree of truth that satisfy the conditions for producinga capacity in the soul that values truth for its own sake.34 This brings us to thequestion about the value truth possesses apart from the benefits it providesthrough the productive arts. Whatever intrinsic value it has, it has in virtue of itskinship (alongside beauty and proportion) with the Good itself (65a1-5). Truth’sintrinsic value far outstrips its instrumental value, and achieving the psychic statecharacteristic of dialectic, i.e., purity of mind and reason, occurs only through adirect apprehension of what is only one step removed from the Good itself. Fur-thermore, Socrates holds that this psychic state is either the same as truth, or whatis most like it (65d2-3). This explains why mind and reason are set above allother ‘so-called sciences and arts’ (66b9) in occupying third place in the rankingof goods. In assimilating itself to the truth to this degree, dialectic distinguishesitself from all other arts in representing the highest possible achievement in thesoul’s pursuit of goodness.

IV

As I hope the preceding sections have shown, considerable progress is made bytaking up Socrates’ suggestion and referring to the example of pure whiteness as

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33 One might even say that if the value of the philosophical versions of the mathematical disci-plines consists solely in their being propaedeutic to dialectic (cf. Republic vii 525a-534b), then theexperience of truth that characterizes these disciplines would be subordinated to the instrumental rolethey play in preparing the soul for experiencing the truth itself.

34 The fact that objects that are absolutely pure and true can account for a psychic state that con-sists of an appreciation of the inherent value of truth also gives us some indication of the character ofthe distinct kinds of pleasures produced by pure objects in the aesthetic domain. All pleasures are bytheir nature generative processes, but what distinguishes the pure from impure pleasures is the factthat the former involve the fulfillment of unperceived lacks. In the case of a pure pleasure, the objectin which one takes pleasure is not perceived as connected with any generative process, even thoughsuch a process underlies the experience. Unlike the pleasure one takes in eating, drinking, or relieffrom cold, where the object of pleasure is essentially related to a process that is simultaneously analleviation of pain, the pleasure taken in the experience of pure color, shape, or sound is one wherethe beauty possessed by these objects is not perceived as related to any restorative process. Thus theexperience of pleasure that is produced by the pure colors, shapes, and sounds, seems to be onewherein the beauty these objects possess inherently is appreciated for its own sake. If this is correct,then there is a closer correspondence between the pure objects of pleasure and the objects of dialectic,both in the way in which they possess their respective characters, as well as in their capacities to pro-duce psychic conditions that involve an appreciation of these characters as inherently valuable.

a guide for discovering the distinct character of dialectical knowledge. Not onlyis it now possible to identify the features that set the objects of dialectic apartfrom the objects of other disciplines, but some understanding is also gained withregard to Socrates’ description of dialectical knowledge as a psychic state relatedto truth. What the comparison with pure whiteness brings to our attention is therelation between the status these objects have as being ὄντως ὄν and their beingabsolutely pure and true. Consequently, the objects of dialectic possess cognitivereliability in that those who grasp them will be in possession of the truth, and as aresult of such experiences can one come to possess a capacity to love it for itsown sake.

In the course of arriving at these findings, we have also made some progresstowards understanding the conception of truth operative in the Philebus. We

have come to appreciate the consistency with which the notions of truth andpurity are employed in both the examination of pleasure and knowledge. At thevery least, we come to recognize the limitations in regarding truth as a purelyepistemic notion (cf. Cooper 1999, 335-338). More importantly, the discoverythat the notions of truth and purity have a character that makes them applicable topsychic states and objects in both the domains of pleasure and knowledge servesas further evidence of the dialogue’s internal cohesion, and suggests that progresstoward resolving many of the other interpretive problems related to specific por-tions of the Philebus might best be achieved by approaching the dialogue as anintegrated whole.

Department of PhilosophyIndiana University SoutheastNew Albany IN 47150

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