The root cause and aggravating factors behind the violence in Patani

Adam John Working Paper

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The Root Cause and Aggravating Factors behind the Violence in Patani

Adam John

[email protected]

Abstract

Southeast Asia’s most violent conflict over the last decade shows no signs of abating despite a

huge military presence and billions of dollars spent on containing the violence. While the

literature focussing on this conflict zone in Thailand has debated over what the true reasons

behind the violence are, it fails to make a distinction between factors which aggravate the

violence and the root cause of the conflict. The paper argues that the Thai government’s refusal

to officially recognise the Patani Malay identity of the majority of the population in the unstable

region is the root cause behind the conflict. In addition, the government’s policy of militarising

civilians and public spaces, a poorly orchestrated counter-insurgency due to national political

rivalries, and military-led development projects which do not address the economic

marginalisation felt by the Malay community in Patani aggravate the situation and only fuel the

violence. The paper therefore concludes that addressing the root cause is necessary to resolving

the conflict but a revision of the government’s policies which exacerbate the situation is also

needed if there is to be any prospect of sustained peace in Patani.

Key Words: Patani, Thailand, insurgency, violence, conflict

mailto:[email protected]


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Introduction

It probably would not come as a surprise to many that Thailand is one of Asia’s top tourist

destinations. Perhaps what many people would be more surprised at is that Thailand has one of

the highest rates of terrorism in the world. The two statements do not sit so comfortably together.

What one may find even more shocking is that the majority of these violent attacks are

happening in a region home to less than five per cent of Thailand’s entire population, and that

this region is only just over 200 miles away from Thailand’s tourist hotspot, Phuket and 100

miles away from Malaysia’s Langkawi Island. Despite this being one of Asia’s most intensive

conflicts over the last decade, it receives very little attention from the international arena. The

conflict, however, receives a lot of attention from the Thai government, with tens of thousands of

security forces stationed in the conflict region and billions of dollars spent on attempts to contain

the violence. However, despite this, bombings and other violent attacks show no signs of abating.

The paper is specifically interested in understanding the reasons behind the violence

through analysing the stock of literature which has focused on this conflict zone over the last

decade. While there seems to be substantial debate over what is driving the violence in these

southern border provinces of Thailand, the paper stresses the importance of distinguishing

between aggravating factors, which exacerbate the violence, and the root cause of the conflict.

The article argues that the government’s determination to erase the identity of the local

inhabitants of this region and assimilate these people into the nationalist model of the Thai

citizen is responsible for the root cause behind the conflict, and that while there are other

significant destabilising factors driving the violence, which are mainly a direct result of

government policy in the region, the root cause has to be addressed by the state if a peaceful

resolution is to be found.

The paper looks at the development of the state’s attitude to the region over the last

hundred years as well as the government’s reaction to the recent surge of violence over the last

decade in order to support the paper’s arguments. However, it is important to begin with

discussing the severity of the violence as well as how one addresses this conflict region,

therefore a justification for why the paper refers to the region as Patani and not southern

Thailand is now discussed.

Referring to the Region as Patani

Most studies refer to the three provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat as southern Thailand or

the Deep South and so when discussing the violence which has grabbed the newspaper headlines

since 2004 it has been labelled as the South Thailand insurgency or the Deep South conflict.

There have been a few studies which have referred to the region as Patani (the Malay spelling

with one‘t’ instead of the Thai spelling ‘Pattani’). This paper follows the latter studies not with

the aim of giving an impression of bias against the Thai government but in order to provide more

accuracy to the region in question.

In agreement with Barter’s (2011) line of thought, ‘southern Thailand’ suggests the

southern region of Thailand up until the Kra Isthmus which consists of 14 of the 76 provinces of

Thailand. The region in question only consists of three of those 14 provinces and 4 districts of a


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fourth province, namely Songkla. Barter (2011) also argues that ‘the Deep South’ is inaccurate

since this suggests that all of the southernmost provinces of Thailand bordering Malaysia are

involved in the conflict which is untrue. The region makes up the former Malay Kingdom of

Patani which was conquered by Thailand (then Siam) in 1786 and formerly annexed into the

Kingdom in 1909 under the Anglo-Siamese treaty (Forbes, 1982). The paper sticks to the

spelling of Patani with one‘t’ so as not to confuse the region with the province of Pattani.

Jitpiromsri, and Panyasak (2006) reported that the population of the three provinces was

just over 1.8 million and that 78 per cent were Muslim and 22 per cent Buddhist. Most studies

separate these two groups as Thai-Muslims and Thai-Buddhists when referring to the conflict.

However, the danger with these distinctions is that it suggests the conflict is primarily religious

when the conflict is in fact restricted to the Patani region and not to other regions of Thailand

where the local population is also predominantly Muslim (Barter, 2011). This paper therefore

distinguishes between the two groups of inhabitants of Patani by referring to them to the ethnic

group they identify with, namely Malays and Thais.

Violence in Patani

To put the intensity of the conflict in recent years into some kind of perspective, one of the

world’s top counter-insurgency experts, David Kilcullen, described the insurgency in Patani as

‘second only to those in Iraq and Afghanistan’ in 2005-2007 (Zawacki, 2012). Even now, the

only country in the world with more IED (improvised explosive device) attacks is Afghanistan

and between the recent phase of violence in 2004 up until January 2012 there were on average

nearly 4 violent incidents everyday (Zawacki, 2012). According to the Global Terrorism Index,

Thailand has suffered from the most terrorism in all Southeast Asia in the last decade and is

ranked 8th

in the world (Global Terrorism Index Report, 2012)1.

The intense violence in Patani can be described as an insurgency between local groups

from the Malay population and Thailand’s security forces. As in most war zones, civilians are

caught up in the violence. Amnesty International has stated that acts of violence committed in

Patani against civilians constitute war crimes (Zawacki, 2012). Abuza (2011) argues that while

attacks were more indiscriminate before they are now more often considered to be retaliatory

attacks.

Fear is widespread throughout Patani with the number of registered firearms increasing

by 10 per cent every year since 2004 (Sarosi and Sombatpoonsiri, 2011). Generally speaking, for

Thais the fear of attack comes from Malay insurgents whereas for Malays the source of threat

comes from the Thai security forces and especially from the different paramilitary forces (Sarosi

and Sombatpoonsiri, 2011). Many local citizens have reacted to the threat of violence by fleeing

the area, with an estimated 200,000 people moving out of Patani to neighbouring Hat Yai, the

capital of Songkla, alone (Boonchote, 2011). Zawacki (2012) quoted a local source as claiming

that by 2007 15 per cent of the Thai population in Patani had left the region. While it is difficult

to verify these numbers what is certain is that the conflict is having a dramatic effect on the

demographics of the region.


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Armed conflict and social unrest has been a common occurrence in Patani since Thailand

annexed the region. In fact in 1901, Patani’s resistance towards Bangkok, who was imposing its

centralised power across the Kingdom, was joined by minorities in the north and northeastern

regions which were under the control of Siam (Aphornsuvan, 2007). There were numerous

rebellions in Patani for the first half of the 20th

century including very violent ones in 19222 and

another in 19483 which saw clashes between Malay villagers and Thai security forces and

resulted in many deaths (Che Man, 1990).

The first insurgency group, the Barison National Pembebasan Patani (BNPP), was

formed in 1959 which then saw the beginning of the period of regular clashes between insurgent

groups and Thai security forces throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Croissant, 2007). These violent

confrontations peaked in the mid-1970s and then began to drop by the mid-1980s (Zawacki,

2012). The late 1980s and 1990s was seen as a relatively peaceful period. However, from 2001,

the amount of violent attacks intensified with almost 80 per cent of the attacks between 1993 and

2004 occurring from 2001 onwards (Croissant, 2007). Even though violent conflict was not new

to Patani, 2004 marked the beginning of an unprecedented amount of violence in the region.

The Development of the Thai State’s Attitude towards Patani

To understand the tensions between Patani and the Thai state it is necessary to go back to the

reign of King Chulalongkorn during the late 19th

century. During this time, Siam’s existence was

being threatened by the world powers, Great Britain and France. Prior to that period, Siam’s

tributary states, like Patani, had enjoyed substantial autonomy where the different ethnic groups

including the Patani Malays were left to govern themselves. Aphornsuvan (2007) argues that

pressure from the Western powers to take over Siam’s tributary states forced Siam to integrate

Patani as well as all of the other autonomous regions into the centralised authority of Bangkok.

Whereas before, these regions were recognised by their ethnic names they were now

simply seen as south, north and northeast Siam. Likewise, the ethnic groups which were before

recognised as Malays, Lao, Cambodian, etc were now seen as Thais by the state so as to put a

halt to the Western powers’ ambitions of colonising the region. This saw the beginning of the

state’s efforts to assimilate all ethnic groups within the Kingdom to become Thai, including the

Patani Malays.

The Patani Malay elites reacted strongly to their loss of autonomy and requested help

from Great Britain, and for it to annex Patani as part of British Malaya (Dorairojoo, 2004). These

steps actually had the opposite desired effect as Britain informed Siam of Patani’s plans and

demanded that Siam exert greater authority over Patani. Great Britain was concerned that Patani

may contact other rival colonial powers for help which would threaten British interests in the

region.

Religion and language were important parts of the assimilation process. King

Chulalongkorn began by replacing Islamic law with Thai law except in cases related to family

matters and inheritance (Jones, 2007). The Primary School Act in 1921 stipulated that all Malay

children attend Thai primary schools where the medium of instruction would be Thai as opposed

to Jawi (the Patani Malay language). These actions were followed by rebellion as they were seen

as a blatant attack on the Patani Malay’s cultural and ethnic identity. In an attempt to reduce the


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resistance towards the assimilation process in Patani, King Vajiravudh eased the restrictions on

practicing Islam in the predominantly Buddhist state as the King was concerned that Britain, who

occupied the southern Malay peninsula, may intervene in Patani due to the social instability

(Jones, 2007).

The end of the Siamese absolute monarchy and rise of Thai nationalism with the creation

of the land of the Thais saw the assimilation process towards the Malays intensify to new

heights. The same year of the revolution saw the Malay administration in Patani villages

replaced with Thai administrators (Che Man, 1990). Under Prime Minister Phibun Songkram’s

tenure, the concept of “Thai-ness” was pushed to evolve around symbols of Buddhism and the

monarchy (Haemindra, 1976). However, to overcome the fact that the Malay identity was so

strong in Patani, the military junta invented the idea of Thai-Islam whereby Patani Malays would

be seen as Thai-Muslims or simply Thais.

By introducing the creation of Thai-Islam into Thai nationalism, while the state was

allowing religious tolerance to exist it was confirming that there could be no other difference

between Thai citizens (Aphornsuvan, 2003). Porath (2010) describes these new laws as the

beginning of ethnocide which affected all ethnic minorities in Thailand. For the Malays it meant

they had to give up the traditional Muslim dress and stop speaking the Malay language in public.

While Islam was now officially tolerated, religious repression continued. Although many of

Phibun’s draconian laws were repealed after his fall from office his policies left a lasting

impression on what constituted the Thai nation (Porath, 2010).

Resistance maintained and by continuing to argue for autonomy throughout the 1940s,

the Patani leaders led by Hajji Sulong were seen as challenging the government’s vision of a

homogenous Thai state (Porath, 2010). The government was concerned that by giving

concessions to Patani, all ethnic groups in Thailand would demand autonomy (Jones, 2007).

Matters intensified when Malay leaders drew international attention to the political instability in

Patani by requesting for the United Nations to intervene. Thai authorities responded by declaring

a state of emergency and sent military forces to Patani in the guise of combating communism

(Jones, 2007).

The 1960s saw a new turn in the government’s efforts to assimilate Patani. Instead of

simply forcing the Malays to become Thai, the government would physically change the

demographics of Patani by encouraging and financially supporting Thai citizens from other

regions of the country to settle in Patani (Aphornsuvan, 2007). This policy was done under the

Self help Resettlement Programme (nikom sang kong eng in Thai) with the aim of helping

landless Thais and was not restricted to Patani.

Suhrke (1977) pointed out that there was no evidence to suggest that these settlements

were concentrated in Patani4. However, from the comments of the Prime Minister at the time,

Sarit Thanarat, in the Bangkok Post, it is clear that one of the goals of resettling Thais in Patani

was to wipeout the Malay identity of the region. The Prime Minister was deplored by that fact

that the inhabitants of Patani could not speak Thai and so to strengthen the Thai identity in the

region Thais from the north should resettle there in order to increase loyal Thai blood (The

Bangkok Post, 1960).


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Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda who led the country for most of the 1980s is seen a

key orchestrator in resolving the conflict in Patani during his tenure. He set up a new institution

called the Southern Border Provincial Administration Centre (SBPAC) for the purpose of

providing a key communication channel between the Patani provinces and the central

authoritative power in Bangkok. This era was seen as the democratisation period of Thai politics

which, as argued by Liow (2004), gave a voice to the Malay community. Prime Minster Prem

Tinsulanonda was also seen as successfully crushing the insurgency as well as providing

economic development to the region under the supervision of the SBPAC (McDermott, 2013).

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, to understand the tensions between the Thai

state and Patani it is necessary to follow the development of the Thai nation. Anything

challenging the homogeneity of Thai society is seen as a serious threat to Thailand’s existence

even in contemporary times when there are no longer threats from colonial powers. It may seem

as though concessions have been made by the Thai authorities and that assimilation is a thing of

the past. For instance, Wattana (2008) points out that Muslims in Thailand are able to choose

Muslim names, that Muslim prayer rooms exist in many public spaces and Muslim women have

the freedom to wear the hijab in public. However, as stated earlier, the Thai state incorporated

religious tolerance into its idea of what was meant by being Thai through its invention of Thai-

Islam.

As for state tolerance towards the ethnicity and culture of citizens of Thailand, arguably

nothing has changed since King Chulalongkorn made the decision to centralise political power

over a hundred years ago. There is still this fear that granting autonomous powers to the

peripheral regions of Thailand, such as Patani will lead to the break-up of the country

(McDermott, 2013) and the arrogant attitude that all those living in Thailand must only have a

Thai identity is still prevalent in Thai politics.

For instance, when the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), which was set up by

the government to provide a solution for the conflict in Patani, recommended making Malay an

official language in the unstable region, the head of the Privy Council and former Prime Minister

Prem Tinsulanonda rejected the NRC proposal. As far as he was concerned there was no room

for compromise as the country is Thai and the language is Thai (The Nation, 2006). There are

major barriers against advocating autonomy in Thailand. McDermott (2013) points out that

policymakers fear being accused for sympathising with the insurgents if they bring up the idea of

creating an autonomous region in Patani.

What is Driving the Violence in Patani? Root Causes and Aggravating Factors

The literature on the violence in Patani represents most areas of the social sciences and almost all

of the academic work in this field has attempted to explain what the cause of the violence is.

However, what is missing in the literature is a clear distinction between the root causes of the

conflict and the aggravating factors fueling the violence. The reason why it is important to make

this distinction is that by addressing the root cause, one is able to understand how to move

towards bringing stability to the region. While the aggravating factors intensify the violence in

Patani they do not explain on their own how to resolve the conflict.


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The overwhelming consensus amongst academics is that the current conflict is an

insurgency5 against the Thai state. Even skeptics like Marc Askew who question how much of

the violence is due to the insurgency between insurgent fighters and Thai military forces

acknowledges that the violence is by and large insurgency-driven (Askew, 2010). Thai authority

officials do not unanimously follow this consensus. For instance, the National Reconciliation

Commission argued that the insurgency was playing a minor role in the recent wave of violence

in the region (Askew, 2010). Zawacki (2012) reported that the spokesman of the Commander of

the Fourth Army Region6 at an Amnesty International public launch claimed that 80 per cent of

the violence in Patani was due to criminality than rather ideology.

However, the academic consensus not only agrees that the violence is insurgency-driven

but that the insurgency is localised with no evidence of links to international groups (Cline,

2007; Croissant, 2007; Melvin, 2007; Askew, 2010; Barter, 2011; Liow, 2011) Jitpiromsri and

McCargo (2010) go as far as to conclude that the current insurgency is a reconfiguration of the

past insurgency movements in Patani. It is fair to deduce that that the root causes of the violence

are therefore the political struggles of the armed rebellion against the state.

There is a clear correlation with Patani’s historic political struggles and the state’s

assimilation policies. The violent rebellions in the first half of the 20th

century came as a result of

the government’s interventions which were seen as threatening the Malay identity such as the

Primary School Act (Dorairojoo, 2004). In Jones (2007), the violence in Patani over the past

century was categorised into three waves. She saw the assimilation policy of resettling Thais

from the north of the country in Patani as what drove the insurgency activities from the 1960s

and onwards. Parks (2009) argues that the fact that assimilation was forced upon the Malays of

Patani, unlike the Malays of Satun7, was what led to the resistance which still exists today. Liow

(2004) sees the political conflict as always having existed because Malays wish to maintain their

ethnic identity within the Thai nationalist project. In addition, the Malays feel that their identity

is threatened with extinction because of the state’s policies imposed on them (Wattana, 2006;

Storey, 2008).

A call for political change in Patani can explain the root cause of the violence in the

region but perhaps cannot explain the aggravating factors of violence throughout the last century,

especially as to why there has been a huge surge in violence since 2004. Explaining these

aggravating factors is not straightforward as there are many which have been put forward in the

literature. What is more, many of these factors seem to be overlapping. For instance, Askew

(2010) argues that there is a confusing overlap between criminals, local political groups and the

insurgents which adds to the disorder of the region and blocks any realistic chances of moving

towards decentralising political power.

Others also claim that at least in the past there has been a link to insurgent groups and

criminal gangs benefitting from the political instability of the region (Liow, 2004). However,

Melvin (2007) disagrees and expects that to a large degree, the insurgents are not involved in

criminal activity. A former Thai Prime Minster believes criminality amongst certain elements of

the military and police exists which includes killings linked to illegal business activities

(McDermott, 2013). Jitpiromsri and McCargo (2010) admit that Thai security forces are likely to

have been involved in criminal activities for personal gain but believe this phenomenon cannot

explain the majority of the current violence.


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There is also the claim that there are overlaps between local political rivalries and

personal conflicts in Patani (Askew, 2008) which is reiterated by the military (Jitpiromsri and

McCargo, 2010). Abuza (2011) believes that most of the violence between Malays has always

been about local power struggles. At the beginning of the recent surge of violence in Patani a

link was made between the increase in drug and substance abuse and the rise in violence in the

region. However, no evidence was ever found to validate this link (Jitpiromsri, and Panyasak,

2006; Melvin, 2007). Abuza (2011) points out that retaliatory attacks are increasing which

perhaps can be explained by the victimhood that Sarosi and Sombatpoonsiri (2011) believe is felt

by both Thais (from the insurgents) and Malays (from the security forces). This feeling of

victimhood from both ethnic groups then acts as a justification to commit violence.

Unlike the existence of a consensus that the root cause of the violence is driven by an

insurgency movement, the role of poverty and lack of development as aggravating factors is

contested in the literature. However, as for the Thai authorities, a lack of economic development

has often been seen as a reason for the conflict (Melvin, 2007). Dorairojoo (2004) points to the

fact that poverty was seen as a root cause for the support of the insurgency. The government’s

commitment to improving the economic conditions of Patani in the 1980s was therefore seen as a

key part of reducing support for the insurgency which in turn was followed by a relatively

peaceful period in the region (Dorairojoo, 2004; UNICEF, 2004).

The Surayud administration which followed the military coup in 2006 attempted a similar

strategy under the belief that the underlying cause of the conflict was due to the poor economic

conditions of the Malays (Storey, 2008). Development never occurred due to the fact that outside

investments were not attracted to the unstable region and violence actually increased during the

Surayud administration. This does not suggest that economically developing the region can

resolve the conflict. On the contrary, the only way to develop the region is to first resolve the

conflict.

A more convincing argument is that Malays feel economically marginalised. Croissant

(2007) sees this as one of the key factors which have led to local grievances. Suhrke (1977) saw

a skewed economic structure in Patani with Thais and Thai-Chinese dominating the public and

private sector, respectively, as a cause of local grievances. She argued that the two

aforementioned groups make up the higher socio-economic strata whereas the Malays are

restricted to agriculture. One may argue that the socio-economic structure in Patani has changed

since the 1970s, however, Wattana (2006) states that there is a feeling amongst Malays that they

have not benefitted from the recent development projects.

On the other side of the debate, Jitpiromsri, and Panyasak (2006), Melvin (2007),

Jitpiromsri and McCargo (2010), and Abuza (2011) have all indicated that poverty or socio-

economic problems are not root causes of the conflict. Askew (2008) agrees with the latter

studies, however, sees poverty and socio-economic problems as still acting as a barrier to

resolving the conflict. Jitpiromsri, and Panyasak (2006) also admit that socio-economic problems

are contributing factors. Conversely, Jitpiromsri and McCargo (2010) see development projects

as doomed to fail in the current climate while Abuza (2011) urges that development initiatives

will in fact aggravate the situation since insurgent groups often target economic infrastructure.

Jitpiromsri, and Panyasak (2006), Jitpiromsri and McCargo (2010), and Abuza (2011) use

different arguments to invalidate the link between poverty and violence. The former study used

Geographic Information System (GIS) data to see if there was a relationship between the areas


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where most attacks had been committed and the villages where there was a high proportion of

inhabitants living under the poverty line. They found no evidence to suggest that there was a link

between violence and poverty. Jitpiromsri and McCargo (2010) argued that poverty could not

explain the recent surge in violence in 2004 since at this time the rubber industry, which many

Malays operate in, was booming due to high international rubber prices. Another popular

argument which was used by Abuza (2011) is that Patani actually ranks high, nationally

speaking, in certain development indicators. Moreover, Patani surpasses many regions in the

north and northeast of Thailand which do not have major problems with violence like Patani.

The insurgency is seen as a localised political struggle between Malay insurgents and the

Thai state. However, it has been argued that there is a much larger national political struggle

which is being fought out, among other places, in Patani. This has led Tan-Mullins (2009) to

describe the conflict in Patani as a microcosm of the political contest between two national

political powers. The first has been described by McCargo (2008) as the network monarchy

which is made up of ex-military commanders and royalist supporters from the Privy Council as

well as others connected to the military, and have the backing of the monarchy.

The other group is seen as Thaksin’s political supporters including the Royal Thai police

force. The military, as opposed to the police, has controlled operations in Patani since the

beginning of the 1960s with the creation of the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC)

(Zawacki, 2011). The military’s dominance in Patani continued when Prime Minister Prem

created the SBPAC in 1981. The balance of power changed when Prime Minister, Thaksin

Shinawatra dismantled the SBPAC which effectively handed over power in security affairs from

the military to the police (Tan-Mullins, 2009).

It has been argued that dismantling the SBPAC contributed to the conflict in two ways.

Firstly, Thaksin had taken away a tool of communication between Bangkok and local Malay

leaders which was seen as playing a major role in bringing relative peace to Patani during the

1980s and 1990s. Secondly, power sharing groups in the SBPAC who gained personal benefits

had suddenly had their power taken away from them which led to old political national rivalry

inflaming and which manifested itself in Patani (Tan-Mullins, 2009). Interestingly, after the

military coup of the Thaksin administration, the new installed government re-established the

SBPAC (Zawacki, 2012)8.

Another major factor which is seen as aggravating the violence in Patani is the behavior

of the governmental institutions which operate in the region and adds to the illegitimacy of the

state. Counter-insurgency actions and the role of Thai institutions in the conflict have been

identified as exacerbating the conflict in numerous ways (See Wattana, 2006; Cline, 2007;

Jitpiromsri and McCargo, 2008; Jerryson, 2009; Barter, 2011; Engvall, 2010; Sarosi and

Sombatpoonsiri, 2011; McDermott, 2013).

One source arguably comes from a lack of professionalism. Cline (2007) pointed out that

Patani was seen as a dumping ground for incompetent and corrupt officials sent by Bangkok.

This may have helped fuel constant unrest throughout the years but it does not explain the 2004

surge in violence. Jitpiromsri and McCargo (2008) agree and believe that blunders and missteps

were made by the government around the time of the surge in the violence. One imagines that

they are referring to the heavy handedness of the military in the events which took place at the

Krue Se mosque and Tak Bai. The previously mentioned argument by Tan-Mullins (2009), that


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the dismantling of the SBPAC was a major blow to providing peace to the region, is supported

by McDermott (2013). He added that the Thaksin administration’s disregard of the importance of

the SBPAC led to the Thai state losing allies with links to the insurgency movement.

Some researchers have attacked major components of the counter-insurgency strategy.

Sarosi and Sombatpoonsiri (2011) believe the policy of creating and heavily arming local

civilian militia forces in Patani adds negatively to the conflict and fuels a sense of an ethno-

religious clash between Malays and Thais. Jerryson (2009) condemns the militarisation of

Buddhist temples which brings monks directly and indirectly into the counter-insurgency efforts

and which also adds to the religious tensions in Patani.

Another way in which state institutions in Patani have been criticised is by the fact that

there are simply too many of them which weakens the effectiveness of counter-insurgency

efforts and increases the illegitimacy of the Thai state (Barter, 2011). In fact, trust in the

government prior to the recent surge in violence in Patani was found to be associated with high

rates of violence (Engvall, 2010). This supports the idea that weak state institutions in Patani are

aggravating the conflict. Wattana (2006) agrees that at least in the last decade a distrust of the

Thai security forces has played a major role in fuelling the violence in Patani.

How to Resolve the Conflict: Suggestions from the Literature

Resolving the conflict essentially means addressing the root causes of the violence. Although a

lot of the literature suggests that the Thai state has never had the political will to confront these

causes, there are some which feel that Thailand has successfully achieved this in the past. Storey

(2008) believes that the state tackled these root causes in the 1980s under the Prem Tinsulanonda

administration which switched from strictly military measures to addressing the political disputes

of the region. This involved directly governing Patani through the SBPAC which improved

dialogue between local leaders and Bangkok. While this was seen as resolving political

grievances,

Prem’s steps towards investing in the local economy were seen as tackling the economic

grievances of Patani. Croissant (2007) believes that in order to resolve the current instability the

government needs a counter-insurgency strategy policy which stabilises security in the region

followed by policies which address the economic, political and cultural grievances of Patani.

This sounds very similar to what Storey (2008) believes the government achieved in the 1980s.

Askew (2010) indicates that the different government administrations during the last

decade have tried to follow a similar policy to Prem’s administration by first containing the

security situation and then providing economic development to the region which is seen as the

key to legitimising the state in the eyes of the local inhabitants. However, one has yet to see

whether these development packages hold the key to resolving the conflict as the violence has

yet to be contained.

Counter-insurgency efforts by the security forces are expected to play an important role

in resolving the conflict by others too. Although Jitpiromsri and McCargo (2010) reported that

the root cause of the conflict is due to political grievances, they are not so confident that a


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political solution will bring peace to the region unless an effective counter-insurgency effort puts

enough pressure on the insurgency movement.

Another aspect of counter-insurgency efforts as stated by Askew (2008) is that it must be

done in a way which does not marginalise the majority of the population who are not involved in

the insurgency. Others believe this is exactly where the government is failing. Barter (2011)

argues that it is not a lack of security agencies; on the contrary, his concern is that there are too

many. Sarosi and Sombatpoonsiri (2011) agree and call for the government to bring an end to

civilian militia forces as well as reversing the proliferation of arms in Patani which has occurred

since 2004. They pointed to other conflict zones around the world where using civilian militias

as part of counter-insurgency efforts actually blocked future possibilities of peace and caused all

sorts of social problems in society.

Proposing some form of autonomy to Patani seems like a suitable prescription since it

was when the Siamese monarchy took away Patani’s autonomous rights over a hundred years

ago that the rebellions against the state began. It is not surprising then that some researchers

(Horstmann, 2008; Engvall, 2010; Jitpiromsri and McCargo, 2010; Barter, 2011) have

recommended some degree of political decentralisation for Patani. However, one can see why

the idea of giving autonomy to Patani is almost unthinkable to many of Thailand’s political

elites. One only has to look back at the development of Thailand’s nationalist roots starting with

King Chulalongkorn’s decision to centralise power and homogenise the nation for the sake of

keeping the Kingdom together. McDermott (2013) sees this unwillingness for contemplating

decentralising power as one of the major barriers towards progress in Patani and what is more

disappointing is Abuza’s (2011) concern that this issue cannot seriously be addressed by

Bangkok until national political rivalries can be solved.

Even with the hypothetical political will on the government’s side, McDermott (2013)

doubts that governance reform on its own will resolve the conflict in Patani. On the contrary, if

concessions were made prematurely, for instance, he even sees such reforms as increasing

insurgent attacks as the insurgent groups may consider the concessions as indicating that the

pressure of the insurgency is strengthening.

It is a fair point to make that autonomy on its own is unlikely to reduce violence. Barter

(2011) points to the experiences of Aceh in Indonesia where peace did not come until several

years after the region was granted autonomy from Jakarta. He states that peace did not come

until the popular insurgency movement made a ceasefire with the government, formed a political

party, and took over office from the old guard. Barter (2011) does not believe the Patani

insurgency movement has the support to re-enact the success of Aceh therefore he does not

expect that autonomy will resolve the situation in Patani. Instead, he thinks that certain areas

should be decentralised such as the local education system and allowing the medium of

instruction to be in Malay.

Horstmann (2008) agrees and thinks decentralisation should go further by supporting

village economic networks as well as increasing the number of Malays in local governmental

jobs to at least 50 per cent9. Jitpiromsri and McCargo (2008) insinuate that agreeing to at least

some form of autonomy is the best solution to bringing peace to Patani as it often makes up part

of the negotiations between insurgency movements and states. Parks (2009) believes that

Thailand has in fact its own example of where it gave a degree of decentralised power to another


12

Malay province, namely Satun and as a result conflict was avoided. Unlike in Patani, there has

never been a military presence in Satun and local Malay elites were left to govern the region.

The Government’s Reaction to the Violence in Patani

Since violence in Patani reached unprecedented levels in 2004, there have been several

administrations representing both sides of the political factions in Thailand. While policies

towards Patani have differed between governments, there have been general trends which are

important to acknowledge as these trends will affect how violence in the region progresses. In

many ways, the government’s policy towards Patani seems to be business as usual, namely a

heavy military presence in counter-insurgency and development projects with the desire of

containing the situation in Patani so as not to internationalise the conflict. There has, however,

been a further development in the government’s policy which is the use of vast numbers of

militarised civilians in the counter-insurgency initiative.

Forty five per cent of the country’s entire military forces are stationed in Patani which

makes up just 4 of the 76 provinces of Thailand (Amnesty International, 2009). The professional

military forces in Patani are made up of 30,000 soldiers, 10,000 rangers, and 20,000 police

(Abuza, 2011). Entire battalions occupy between one and two districts (Askew, 2008).It is

expected that there will eventually be over 100,000 paramilitaries that will make up the rest of

the counter-insurgency forces which is the equivalent of 5.7 per cent Patani’s entire population

(Sarosi and Sombatpoonsiri, 2011).

However, these security forces are not exactly operating alongside one another. Quite the

contrary, these state forces fall under different competing authorities including the police,

military and Ministry of the Interior, which have a reputation of poor co-operation with each

other (Barter, 2011). In fact, the rivalry between these agencies has led to intelligence failures

(Barter, 2011). Jerryson’s (2007) criticism of the military forces is that many of them come from

other parts of the country and lack knowledge about the Patani region which adds to tensions

between locals and security forces.

Comparing the military budget in Patani with the size of the Patani economy helps put

things into perspective. The combined size of the Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat’s economy in

2007 was just over 120 billion Baht (UNDP, 2009). Between 2004 and 2012 the government

spent 161 billion Baht on resolving the conflict in Patani. Approximately 70 per cent of this (110

billion Baht) was spent on counter-insurgency operations (Zawacki, 2012). The amount spent on

counter-insurgency operations in 2007 alone was the equivalent of just over 14 per cent of the

entire economy of the three Patani provinces10

. Despite so much being spent on resolving the

conflict, Sarosi and Sombatpoonsiri (2011) describe how a new ‘security economy’ is growing in

Patani where due to the government’s relaxation of gun laws since 2004 and the failure of the

counter-insurgency to contain the violence, a lucrative gun economy is growing.

Guns are not only easier to purchase now (for Thais), they are also being subsidised by

the government as well as being freely distributed to local Thais and officials in particular

(Sarosi and Sombatpoonsiri, 2011). What is more, ammunition can be bought in unlimited

quantities from police stations as well as from civilians who command local militias (Sarosi and


13

Sombatpoonsiri, 2011). Ammunition can also be bought from village headmen where there are

no age limits on purchases (Zawacki, 2012).

Access to firearms for Malays, however, is not only legally restricted but owning a

firearm arguably puts Malays in more danger as Malays who are found to be owning a weapon

are accused for being involved in the conflict by the security forces (Sarosi and Sombatpoonsiri,

2011). The aforementioned authors believe that this policy of arming civilians is adding to the

feeling of discrimination felt by many Malays. However, McDermott (2013) argues that the

Malay community actually supports these militias as there are many Malays operating in these

forces. If anything, the presence of civilian forces not only increases tensions between Malays

and Thais but also within the Malay community.

Civilians who are seen as collaborating with the government are often targeted by the

insurgents. Village chiefs and Buddhist monks fit this category. The responsibilities demanded

from village chiefs by the state include mobilising and providing intelligence to some of the

militia forces. Therefore, as Barter (2011) puts it, rather than being seen as representing the

village to the state, village chiefs are viewed as representing the state to the village.

The relationship between security forces and monks is controversial. Jerryson (2009)

accuses the state of using former military personnel as militant monks to defend Buddhist

temples as well as working alongside security forces. In addition, temples are turned into military

compounds for housing security forces and Amnesty International has accused the military of

using temples as unofficial detention centers where suspects have been reportedly tortured

(Amnesty International, 2009). The government’s decision to turn Buddhist temples into military

spaces is exacerbating relations between Malays and Thais in Patani (Jerryson, 2009).

A policy of impunity for security forces remains strong in Patani. On August 1 2013, the

Supreme Court found all of the military personnel who were involved in the events in Tak Bai in

2004 not guilty of 85 Malay civilians who died while in custody of the military (Amnesty

International, 2013). The court concluded that the military was simply doing its job. The court’s

decision did not come as a surprise since legally under the Emergency Decree and Internal

Security Act, security forces are granted near full immunity for their actions (Abuza, 2012). The

Emergency Decree allows anyone suspected by security forces of being involved in the

insurgency to be held for 30 days without charge (McDermott, 2013). The only justice for the

victims and their families of the conflict therefore comes in the form of financial compensation

from the government. In 2012, the Minister of Justice reported that victims of violence in Patani

could receive 7.5 million Baht in compensation (McDermott, 2013).

In the 1990s, the government initiated its new security strategy in Patani which was based

on a ‘development as security’ approach (Rahimmula, 2003) which is perhaps why it is

sometimes difficult to distinguish between military operations and development programs. To

begin with, the government places ISOC in charge of the disbursement of most of the 63 billion

Baht funds which have been allocated for development programs in Patani (Abuza, 2011). In

many instances, it is the military themselves who perform the development activities (Askew,

2008). When interviewing a local journalist, Zawacki (2012) reports how the army’s

implementation of these unsustainable development projects is distorting the local economy.

UNICEF also reported how government development projects are seen as disregarding local


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input and how much of the benefits of these projects go to business interests outside of the

region.

The economic status of the Patani population adds to the bad sentiments felt about these

development projects. Jitpiromsri and McCargo (2010) believe the government’s policy of using

development projects to enhance military operations is failing as official statistics show that

poverty in the region has not dropped. Sarosi and Sombatpoonsiri’s (2011) concern is the type of

economic activity the government is helping to support in the region. They stress how the

majority of the jobs available to Patani youth in the name of development are as security

volunteers. This only brings yet more civilians into the conflict.

Containing the violence is a concern of the government, but perhaps just as important is

ensuring that the conflict remains a domestic dispute of Thailand without interference from

international parties. Askew (2008) notes how negative media reporting of the situation in Patani

is a major concern for the government as they wish to avoid foreign intervention. He also adds

that negotiations between insurgent groups and the government have been blocked by the latter

as the government accused the insurgents of internationalising the situation.

Zawacki (2012) believes that the conflict in Patani meets all of the requirements to be

defined as a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) which under international humanitarian

law would give Patani civilians more legal rights as well as holding security forces more

accountable for their actions. Zawacki (2012) suggests that Thailand’s refusal to recognise the

situation in Patani as a NIAC leads the state to blame the violence on criminal activity and

banditry so as to confine the conflict to Thai criminal law, which is much more politically

convenient for the Thai state.

Conclusions

The paper has attempted to illuminate the reasons behind the surge in violent attacks which has

made Patani one of the most unstable regions in the world. It argues that while the literature has

suggested numerous drivers behind the violence, it is important to distinguish between the root

cause of the conflict and aggravating factors which are fuelling the violence. The paper will end

with concluding remarks concerning addressing the root cause of the instability which is

necessary for resolving the conflict. However, since addressing the root cause is unlikely to be

sufficient in resolving the conflict without confronting the aggravating factors, important points

on the latter are now raised.

The major aggravating factors extracted from the literature and reported in this paper

include; 1) the militarisation of the region including the use of civilian militia and public spaces,

such as Buddhist temples, 2) an excess of illegitimate state institutions which lack

professionalism and undermine one another, 3) national political rivalries whose competition

channels through the local state institutions and manifests into poor collaboration in areas such as

counter-insurgency, and 4) economic marginalisation felt by the Malay community. Ironically,

all four of these factors are a direct result of the government’s policies towards resolving the

conflict. The solution to alleviating these destabilising policies is, as Barter (2011) argues, for the

government to do less, not more, which I would add, includes the military especially.


15

Sarosi and Sombatpoonsiri’s (2011) call for disbanding civilian militias and restricting

gun ownership along with what one would naturally infer from Jerryson (2009), which would be

for security forces to stop using Buddhist temples as military spaces, would be the most positive

form of action for de-militarising the region.

An effective way to reduce the excessive number of inefficient institutions would be to

follow Barter’s (2011) recommendation of getting rid of overlapping administrative bodies and

intelligence agencies. This links in with confronting the destabilising effect of competition

between different political forces, which undermines counter-insurgency operations.

Conglomerating these different political factions into one institution would force the different

groups to collaborate as resources and intelligence would have to be shared and these parties

would not be able to function separately. Currently, the balance of power and control of

resources is too much to the advantage of the military which adds to tensions within the security

forces.

Finally, the military or any other security force should not be involved in development

projects in the region, let alone conducting them themselves without participation from the local

community. Resources for development should be in the hands of local community organisations

which are made up of the Patani inhabitants. If the government is truly concerned about the poor

state of education and health in Patani11

then improving the access of Patani Malays to working

in these sectors as well as providing a better service in these areas for Patani Malays can be

facilitated in allowing the local language, Yawi, to be used in these public sectors.

There are many options available to the government in attempting to resolve the conflict

in Patani. However, for any real chance of resolving the conflict, the government has to be

seriously committed to tackling the root cause of the conflict. Without this political will, any

other peace initiatives will have been made in vain. The Thai state has to officially recognise the

existence of the Patani Malay identity, to give it an equal status to the Thai national identity

within the Patani region, and to stop trying to assimilate the Patani Malays into Thais. This may

seem trivial to outsiders but it has serious symbolic meaning to Patani Malays and especially to

those involved in the Patani insurgency movement.

Likewise, this recognition is anything but trivial for the Thai state as it means a complete

revision of the government’s attitude to its ethnic minorities since the beginning of the Thai

nationalist project over a hundred years ago. This brings us back to the argument held by many

state officials that giving such concessions to the Patani Malays will attract demands from other

ethnic groups within Thailand for the same recognition. The simple answer to this is yes, and of

course it should if the country is to live up to its self-proclaimed status as the land of the free.

In reality, however, many ethnic minorities may show no interest in forming a distinct

identity to the Thai identity. For instance, the ethnic Malays in Patani’s neighboring province of

Satun have never showed any interest in differentiating themselves from Thais, apart from

stating that they are Muslim. Likewise, the 9.4 million ethnic Chinese who make up 14 per cent

of Thailand’s population (The CIA Factbook) are also unlikely to show much interest in adopting

another identity other than Thai or Thai-Chinese. The point is that all citizens of Thailand should

have the choice to decide their own identities, whether it be simply Thai or another ethnic

identity, such as Malay, Lao or Northern Khmer, for example.


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Sooner or later, Thailand will have to address its attitude towards its ethnic minorities

whether it decides to seriously commit itself to resolving the conflict in Patani or not. Although

there is no longer a strong resistance to Thai hegemony amongst the Isan (meaning

northeasterners in Thai), the majority still refer to themselves as Lao privately, use their own

language, which is distinct from Thai and the Lao language which is spoken in neighbouring

Laos, and have a strong feeling of being treated as second-class citizens in Thailand (McCargo

and Hongladarom, 2004). On the other hand, according to Vail (2007), the northern Khmer, of

which there are over one million speakers in Thailand, do not show any interest in conserving a

distinct identity from Thai. However, they still face major social stigmatism and choose to hide

their Khmer roots through fear of denigration from the Thai populace.

The treatment of ethnic minorities as inferior to ethnic Thais is problematic as they make

up a substantial proportion of the country’s population. The Lao, from the Isan region represent

over 20 million of all Thai citizens (McCargo and Hongladarom, 2004) which means they are an

important source of political support for anyone who aims to lead the country. Unlike the Thai-

Chinese, it was the Thai state which came to the Malays, Lao, Northern Khmer and other ethnic

groups and not the other way around. Thailand fails to officially recognise and respect this, and

the ethnic minorities should not forget this either.

Notes

1The Global Terrorism Index is a product of the Institute for Economics and Peace and is calculated by taking into

account; 1) the total number of terrorist incidents, 2) the total number of fatalities caused by terrorism, 3) the

number of injuries caused by terrorism, and 4) the approximate level of property damage caused by terrorist

incidents. The index defines terrorism as violent acts committed by non-state parties. 2 This was known as the Baan Namsai Rebellion in response to the Primary School Act in 1921.

3 This was the Dusun Ynor Rebellion where 400 Malays and 30 Thai police were killed.

4 There were 49 settlements in total nationally which were supported under the Self Help Resettlement

Programme. Six of these settlements were in Patani (Suhrke, 1977). 5 The term ‘insurgency’ describes the armed rebellion of a non-state party against the constituted authority of the

Kingdom of Thailand. 6 The Fourth Army Region covers South Thailand.

7 Satun is a province of Thailand where the majority of the population is ethnic Malay but who generally identify

themselves as Thai and has effectively assimilated into Thai society (Parks, 2009). 8 Zawacki (2012) indicates that ISOC, a military dominated agency, commands most power when it comes to

counter-insurgency in Patani. 9 According to NSO (2003), only 30 per cent of civil service positions in Patani are currently filled by Malays.

10 The counter-insurgency budget for 2007 was taken from Abuza (2011).

11 According to the UNDP’s Thailand Human Development Report 2009, the Patani provinces perform poorly in

education and health relative to the other provinces of Thailand.

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The root cause and aggravating factors behind the violence in Patani

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