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Note: originally written for the course Modern Sociological Theories: Love, Sexuality,

Society; Anglo-American University, Humanities and Social Sciences major, Fall 2011

By Ondřej Šmejkal

The Program, the Process, the Thought

Conceptualizations of Love in Deleuze & Guattari, Luhmann and Nancy

How peaceful live would be without love, Adso, how safe, how tranquil, and how dull.

William of Baskerville

Although Nancy posited that “…love is neither unique nor necessary” (298), it

certainly maintains a strong presence and leaves a distinct impression. We seek it out, crave it,

but it rather tends to come when we least expect it, as if to prove that it cannot be

premeditated, despite all the promises of instant happiness by all those dating services, whose

offers keeps coming back like the proverbial false dime. When confronted with it, it turns our

world and us with it upside down, and we often find ourselves going out of our ways, quite

irrationally, to get deeper into it, as if it were the promised land we always meant to inhabit,

but that kept eluding us, yet finally we have its gates in sight. When we do attain it, we are

compelled to invest in it, hold on to it, as if it cannot maintain itself autopoetically, and even

despite our investment, it does not present a set outcome, for sometimes it holds, sometimes it

leaves. If it leaves, it leaves us devastated, as if we were thrown into a darkened void and

forced to traverse the depths of sorrow and melancholy, but not without a chance of remedy,

for in the end, we usually piece ourselves back together and reemerge our “normality”, yet not

unscarred, not without exit wounds, only to do it all over again, when the moment arrives and

love comes again. However, even if it holds, it never remains the same. Despite all that

investment it shifts overtime from radiant explosion of intensity to a subliminal hum,

routinized and monotonized on the surface, as if we could not withstand its full force in a

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prolonged exposure, which can very well be a forerunner to its eventual departure, yet on the

other hand, as it still holds the same attraction, albeit less pronounced, it can very well keep

remaining with us, bringing lifelong inner happiness and tranquility.

Love certainly complicates matters. It costs us a lot, both literally and symbolically,

and it can end in a heartbeat. One might say it brings an economy that is more trouble than it

is worth, yet it is still worth it, every minute of it. Certainly, one can consciously avoid it on a

thanks-but-no-thanks basis, yet one would miss a lot. Despite its traps and pitfalls, the

experience of love has its merits. It adds another existential register to the subject, the register

of the other, thereby breaking one’s solitary complacency. It takes us out of our comfort zone

in pursuit of something so ephemeral and a priori inconclusive, yet so rewarding. Love goes

beyond the biological drive to procreate and preserve our species, for this it is indeed not

necessary, yet one can say that precisely because of this transcendence of the drives, the

capacity to love is what elevates our consciousness from mere sentience, as it is an investment

that aims to fulfill no existential need, rather a somewhat sublime yearning to traverse the

boundaries of one’s self into a greater unity, which at the same time retains the utmost

intimacy of the self, which thereby distinguishes it from all the other unities one forms in the

course of one’s social existence.

Whatever the case, love is certainly important not only within us, but also without

ourselves in the social and cultural spectrum. As our craving for love is outpoured into the

world we construct, love gets objectified in its fabric, romanticized, narrated and re-presented

in songs and stories, as well as becoming an article in the economic exchange by being

commoditized in products and services for consumption. Love is also proliferated in thought,

explored, pondered upon, analyzed, interpreted – in philosophy, sociology and social theory,

or in psychology and psychoanalysis. In the following sections we shall explore three

accounts of conceptualization of love, those of Deleuze & Guattari, Niklas Luhmann and

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Jean-Luc Nancy. While Delueze & Guattari seek to radically re-posit love made manifest, to

break it away from the dominant imposed normativity and suggest new potentialities of its

actualization, thereby proposing a specific yet cautionary program, Luhmann focuses on the

translation of love into the systemic structure as a medium of communication that gives rise to

a functionally specific subsystem of a relationship which then governs the interpersonal

dynamics of both parties involved, and Nancy takes on a philosophical deliberation, placing

love at the heart of the subject as an ontological determinant that transcends his immediate

condition.

The Program – Deleuze & Guattari

For Deleuze and Guattari, the discussion is not about love per se, but rather about

desire/sexuality and its reformulation, an overhaul. “Deleuze and Guattari seek not to interpret

sexuality, but to change it; not to construct a model of its essence, but to elucidate the

concrete ways in which it functions, and to open up possibilities of its becoming otherwise”

(Shaviro, 122). To do so, the analysis must move past the social and mental structures that

are latched onto it; deconstruct them. “A radical rethinking of sexuality must be concerned not

with Imaginary and Symbolic representations, but with rewriting of the Real itself” (ibid,

123).

The first step is the rejection of heterosexuality, with relation to the desire/sexuality

complex, as the dominant imposed normative structure. Here, D&G are in congruence with a

Foucauldian articulation of a power-knowledge equation, which would precisely posit

heterosexuality as a nexus from which social power is exercised and simultaneously a

medico-psychological knowledge is produced and distributed, when allocating heterosexuality

in their own conceptual framework to a role of a molar segment on the Body without Organs,

that is, a prescribed and preferred norm which exists both as an objectified structure within

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the social rubric as well as an internalized, via socialization, as a standardized behavioral

mode, which then structures, both from within and from without, the entire economy of the

desire/sexuality complex on a binary basis, in terms of pre-established gender behavioral

patterns (maleness vs. femaleness), dyadic orchestration of the relationship (the coupling), as

well as in terms sexuality configuration (heterosexual vs. homosexual) (Deleuze &

Guatarri…). We have here thus not only binary structures, but also, and more importantly,

binary oppositions. Such arrangement however creates inevitably a tension within the subject

itself. Since the norm has to cover the whole social rubric, it has to operate on a fairly general

level without taking into account all the specific conditions of all the subjects to which it

applies, thus being “a standard to which no single identity can never fully correspond”

(Shaviro, 125). Assuming such a generalized schema of a predetermined sexual identity onto

one’s self then means that “we are perpetually split between an outward appearance and an

inner reality” (ibid). It is a split precisely insofar as our own sexual identity does not really

stem from ourselves, that is, from our own realization of what that would be, but rather we are

signified into it, or more specifically, within the linguistic Symbolic, we become the signified

under the application of specific signifiers to us from the outside. From our very birth we are

linguistically constructed, by parents, social institutions, as a particular gender; a construction

we adopt during socialization and acculturation, but still, we can never fit exactly. So, in fact,

we could speak here of a double tension, A) between the outward appearance and inner

reality, and B) even if we utterly identify ourselves with the outward appearance, between its

generalized standards and our inability to meet them exactly.

Presumably, to alleviate the tension B a bit, as the norm cannot be actualized to the

letter, the molar segment is engaged in a counter-norm installment, that is, the social structure

also determines the proper forms of deviation from those (Deleuze and Guattari…). In other

words, the normative apparatus not only ascribes one the proper way of conduct, but also the

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proper leeway. In the specific case of desire/sexuality complex, this would then translate, in

terms of relationship orchestration, into the option of being a Single or living in a coupling but

not in marriage, in terms of behavioral patterns, into men being empathic and women being

warriors, and in terms of the sexuality configuration, into the binary of socially codified

heterosexuality as the ideal mode of sexual behavior and of the socially codified

homosexuality as the permissible alternative1. Though allowed and tolerated, the molar

structure would still treat those as stigmatized and marginalized, even though now, it would

not do so overtly, rather, maybe, by generating an implicit feeling of guilt when these are

manifested, and yet D&G would argue said maltreatment to be in essence a smokescreen to

hide the social codification and create an outward appearance of a “real” transgression of the

norm, so that anyone who gets past the guilt and ventures into such shady areas could have a

liberating feeling, while being unaware that the perceived break from the social control is still

but a phantom (ibid). A complete negation of tension B would plausibly require re-

codification of the norm, either relaxing it extensively or specifying it utterly to account for

any conceivable contingency. Yet, then it would not be much of a norm.

Overcoming tension A means dealing with the condition that “as males, or as females,

our secret, inner existence – even if we are consciously aware of this – is homosexual” and in

fact, “all desire is homosexual” (Shaviro, 125). The term “homosexual” here however does

not relate to the socially permissible homosexuality we discussed with regards to the tension

B. It may be plausible to view it thus. To reiterate what has previously been said, there is the

outward imposition of the social constructed sexuality on one hand, and on the other hand,

what we really “feel” to be our true sexuality. The conflict between the outward appearance

1 Of course, we must not forget here that we speak here in terms of our current era and of our current culture,

since norms are epoch-specific, or rather, to use the Foucauldian term, episteme-specific, as well as culture-

specific.

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and the inner reality can thus be said to be a contention between two modes of desire – one

that tells us from the outside what and whom we should, or are expected to, desire, vs. what

our drives, the unconscious Real, compel us to desire as the actualization of our jouissance.

Thus, the true desire is homosexual precisely insofar as it stems from the self as such, not

from what the self is molded into, it is the desire of the I not of the They, as well as insofar as

it aims to fulfill again the self as such, not the other, that is, it is only concerned with the

satisfaction of the I. It is therefore the question of the origin of the desire. The true desire

arises from me and fulfills me alone. I am thus the only thing that matters to it, which

therefore makes it homosexual. The object of the desire is irrelevant2. It can be of the other

sex, it can be of the same sex – that has no merit. It is an utter self-centeredness and an utter

selfishness.

Of course, the pursuit of one’s inner desire can be wrought with guilt since it goes

wholeheartedly against the internalized socially normative sexuality and its codified

expressions of desire. “We are held accountable for who we are, expected to conform to the

image of ourselves, bounded into secrecy and tormented by an ascription of guilt because of

our inevitable failure to conform” (ibid, 126). In other words, the social system pressures us to

maintain our outward appearance at all times, even when it leads to tension B discussed

earlier. On the other hand however, most satisfaction comes from the raw forces of the Id,

instead of the refined and distilled “pleasures” of the Superego, where there is too much

restrictions and considerations to take into account to gain any real fulfillment, yet as the

Superego ordains, Id is the place of monsters that has to be kept in check, and to be allowed to

2 Herein may be an echo of an earlier deliberation of Deleuze pertaining to the transcendental unconscious and

its universal primary production fueled by autopoetic desire, which in itself is not directed to a specific object,

but presumably rather to an existential condition of replicating the transcendence as an empirical plane

(Welchman, 110-1). According to Deluze, in the “productive factory machining reality”, the “desire lacks

nothing”, therefore its object is also utterly irrelevant and the desire as such is selfishly concerned only with the

auto-production of its reproduction (ibid), akin to the homosexual desire, which is likewise immanent to the self

and revolves exclusively around it.

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exist in the Symbolic, one must keep the Real suppressed, even though it could mean tearing

up the subject, the self, to pieces inside given the double tension the self is constantly exposed

to. It is a great sacrifice, but one that is necessary for the Symbolic order to exist in the first

place. Furthermore, the pursuit of one’s inner desire can be wrought with danger, since, due to

the permanent presence of the internalized Superego, the self is unfit to withstand a full

exposure to the Id, since he is too much entrenched in the former. And yet, despite all that,

said pursuit is for D&G the Revolutionary act leading to actualization of new possibilities for

our BwO. The apprehension of the homosexuality of desire thus marks “a refusal of guilt, an

escape, a point of resistance, ‘line of flight’ from the heterosexual norm” (ibid). This

immanent homosexuality (again, it is apt to emphasize that in this case, the term does not

refer to its usual connotations, but rather to the self as the heart of the desire) then “no longer

is ‘Oedipal, exclusive, and depressive,’ induced, specified, managed, contained, and

stigmatized by the dominant social order; instead it is ‘anoedipal, schizoid, included and

inclusive,’ an active, revolutionary multiplication of the potentialities of the body” (ibid). In

other words, the recognition of the homosexual desire becomes the act of rejection of the

heterosexuality; a step in traversing the molar segmentation into the creative chaos of the

molecular multiplicities, where the new potentials for the desire/sexuality complex can be

gained.

For D&G, the molecular level of the desire/sexuality complex is “infrapersonal,

composed of multiplicities, becomings, and subjective singularities” (ibid). Its condition is

that of hermaphroditism in a sense that the biological/social sexualities constituted in the

molar regime as fixed and holistic are dissolved into fragmentary singularities of both sexes

being present in the same set; present, yet separated, constituting “partial objects, parts of

machines, micro-organs that remain open to the outside, that cannot function by themselves,

but that also cannot be referred back to any closure, to any organic unity of which they would

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be parts” (ibid). In other words, there is no whole, only an assemblage of parts which are

unable to connect with each other directly. Simultaneously however, there must be interaction

as otherwise the molecular level of desire/sexuality complex would be utterly dead, static, and

therefore unable to present a revolutionary alternative to the molar norm. Plainly put, there

must be dynamicity, and yet, given the whole fragmentary condition intrinsic to the

molecular, the individual parts cannot be its facilitator, as they are only fragments. Therefore,

a third element is required to facilitate the interaction, whose existence leads D&G to posit the

communication between the micro-organs as transversal, that is, dependent on a faculty

exterior to both the source and the receiver which bridges their separation, but in itself is not

part of the interaction (ibid, 127). Since the molecular multiplicity is essentially chaotic, this

channeling element cannot then follow any predetermined codified patter; its condition must

be wholly nomadic and randomized, making the interactions entirely a work of chance. And it

is in these very interactions where the key to the new potentialities of the body lies. As the

parts connect, their capabilities permute to produce a certain outcome. In other words, they

“fertilize” each other to give rise to a more complex synthesis (Deleuze & Guattari), yet since

said connection happens completely at random, entirely according to the whim of the

channeling element, there is no telling what the outcome might be, as there is no rule that

would predicate which parts would connect. The end of the equation thus becomes something

utterly unexpected, something new. Instead of fixed being, the molecular plane therefore

presents a constant becoming – a perpetual opening of new possibilities which then

reconstitute the desire/sexuality complex outside the codification of the molar norm. We can

indeed speak here of a microcosm of “transsexuality”, of “nonhuman sex”, as there is no

unified conception of the self and/or sexuality, only fragments of the machine, where

“desiring production escapes from the codings and classifications of power; am explosion into

‘relations of production of desire that overturn the statistical order of the sexes,’ and that

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move ‘beyond the anthropomorphic representation that society imposes on the subject, and

with which [the subject] represents its own sexuality’” (Shaviro, 126). Herein we definitely

border the universal primary production, since given its randomness, the molecular desiring-

production has no object of desire, and cannot have one if both the act and the outcome of the

production is unpredictable, therefore the object is indefinable, and thus all it can do is

perpetuate its mode of production, replicate its condition.

True, exploring the molecular underside of the desire/sexuality complex, taking this

line of flight, means a good chance of finding one’s jouissance, yet it is a perilous

undertaking. As the molecular flow escapes the molar structure, one is at risk of losing all

ground of signification and sliding into a self-destructive spiral that ends in oblivion (Deleuze

& Guattari). In other words, one can be easily devoured by the monsters of the Id. For this

very reason, the revolutionary rebellion proposed by D&G comes with an added emphasis on

caution. “You don’t do it with a sledgehammer, you use a very fine file” (Deleuze, 120). The

proper way is the slow and gradual experimentation, bit by bit, micron by micron:

This is how it should be done: Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities

it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization,

possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out

continuums of intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times. It is

through meticulous relation with the strata that one succeeds in freeing lines of flight, causing

conjugated flows to pass and escape and bringing forth continuous intensities for a BwO (ibid).

In the permanent contention between the order of the “Tonal” and the creative chaos of the

“Nagual”, between the refined desire/sexuality of the Symbolic and the wild orgies of the

Real, “the tonal must be protected at all cost” (ibid, 121).

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The Process – Luhmann

Concerning the account of Niklas Luhmann on love and relationships, there is, as

opposed to D&G, no traversal of the societal into clandestine domains of new potentialities,

rather a mapping of the Symbolic landscape that accounts for love as a systemic component

performing its specific function, participating in an identity construction.

As the modern social system evolves from stratification to functional differentiation,

that is, attains an increasing amount of intertwined function-specific and operationally closed

subsystems that posit themselves via the system-environment distinction, the effect on the

individual I is an acute social displacement, since the I no longer occupies a single all-

encompassing social stratum, which would then in turn define his standing within the system

and thus his systemic identity (Luhmann, 256 & Schwanitz, 144). In this regard, the

individual then may be seen as indeed relegated into the environment which has “unlimited

horizons” thereby being unfixed and unable to provide a stable identity, hence the

displacement, thus accentuating the non-human character of the system, and within which “all

individuals are now free to sin as much as they like” (Schwanitz, 138 & 143), so one could

easily ask why the systemic identity is even relevant if the social displacement by functional

differentiation is this liberating. Firstly, the liberation is not total, since the individual keep

connecting to the various subsystems to perform within those a specific role; true, said

connection is only temporary and relates to only a limited aspects of the individual (ibid, 145),

but, secondly, given the number of subsystems in a functionally differentiated system to

which the individual is required to connect to, these limited interactions can easily form one

continuous streak. Plainly put, the system needs its agents and the bigger the system, the more

continual presence of the agents is needed. In the modern social system, the individual thus

rarely leaves the systemic landscape and thus has to construct his identity within the systemic

boundaries, since all he knows is pretty much the system. Therefore, “individuals are all the

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more provoked into interpreting the difference between themselves and the environment…in

terms of their own person, whereby the ego becomes the focal point of all their inner

experiences and the environment loses most of its contours” (Luhmann, 256). In other words,

as an agent of system the individual is aware of the unilateral distinction the system makes

between itself and the environment in which the individual should be located, since the

system does not account for an individual only for an agent, yet that remains unattainable and

therefore un-representable given the subsystemic connections the individual is required to

maintain, while simultaneously the system cannot assign him particularity/specific identity, as

due to the number of subsystems under functional differentiation, the need is required to be

functionally universal so that he can switch between subsystems and can therefore multitask.

Therefore, the only ground where one can gain a distinction is at level of

personality/subjectivity:

[…] individual persons have to find affirmations at the level of their respective personality

systems, i.e. in the difference between themselves and their environment and in the manner in

which they deal with this difference – as opposed to the way others do. At the same time,

society and the possible worlds it can constitute become much more complex and

impenetrable. The need for a world that is still understandable, intimate and close…stems from

this, a world which one can, furthermore, learn to make one’s own (ibid, 256-7).

It is the self that provides the counterpoint to the system, even though the systemic element is

present even there given the socialization into the Symbolic order, yet its interaction with

one’s own character predispositions creates the unique singularity of an individual. By

referring back to this singularity, the individual is now in a position to distinguish his own self

from the system, which is from this standpoint designated as the environment within which

the singularity operates, making said singularity a truly individual identity. However, for that

to pass for real so to speak, that is, move beyond a pure immanent condition, under which the

singularity can easily be accounted as some phantom construct, it needs to be confirmed by a

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faculty external to the individual. In other words, it has to be recognized by something other

than the individual himself so that his individuality can attain exteriority and therefore

actuality, that is, become a real attribute of the person.

This outer faculty however cannot be the system as such, for a) the system registers

the individual only as far as he performs an agent role in it, in its subsystems, b) despite its

functional differentiation, the system as such has to generalize and filter to avoid clogging on

excess inputs, thus it could not take the individuality fully into account even if it were

interested in doing so, for individuality-as-singularity is a priori irreducible to a single

property or set of properties, and c) the system a priori focuses on transitory events, as these

provide fresh input and thus keep stagnation at bay (Schwanitz, 146), while individuality has

to be fixed and stable otherwise it could not provide any meaningful point of

reference/identity for the person, which thereby makes it incompatible with the systemic

priorities. It also cannot be other individuals-as-agents, for herein we are on a strictly

impersonal level of interaction, which, given that as agent the individual follows the systemic

logic, cannot include any affirmation of the self because it is irrelevant to the role and the task

the agent is expected to perform. It would get in the way so to speak. So, all things

considered, the affirmation of one’s own self, one’s own personal system can come only from

another personal system that emerges for and engages in an interaction with the former as the

other, or more specifically, as the significant other, forming the intimate relationship dyad in

which there is an exchange of subjectivities not of systemic tasks, which in turns means

recognition and affirmation of the self for the individual. The reciprocity here is important, if

the affirmation is to reach the core of the self. “Thus, in order for a commonly shared private

world to become a differentiated entity, each person must be able to lend his support to the

world of the other (although his inner experiences are highly individual), because a special

role is accorded to him in it: he appears in the other person’s world as the one who is loved”

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(Luhmann, 257). In other words, the exchange of subjectivities must go all the way and be

invested with deepest meanings in which the self emerges as truly unique and can be

recognized as such. This is not possible on a friendship level, since the intimacy there remains

surface one and cannot penetrate to the true nature of the self. That happens only in an

intimate relationship dyad, which in turn arises only as the exchange of subjectivities is

mutual. Said dyad thus forms a sort of system within the system that provides conditions for

the self/identity to be really affirmed by being differentiated from the landscape of the social

system.

As Luhmann further posited, every system needs a faculty that facilitates

communication within the systemic landscape between its various subsystemic parts, thereby

enabling the whole to function as functionally differentiated, for given their operational

specificity, the parts themselves are not equipped to initiate the interaction by themselves

(258)3. Said faculty is termed by Luhmann as a “generalized symbolic medium of

communication” and defined as “semantic devices which enable essentially improbable

communications nevertheless to be made successfully”, that is, “heightening receptivity to the

communication in such a way that it can be attempted, rather than abandoned as hopeless

from the outset” (ibid). The communication is essentially improbable precisely insofar as the

functional-differentiation is the hallmark of the system, that is, as the subsystems are

constituted for their specific operations, there is in itself no mutual frame of reference and

3 As a matter of fact, this property of the system indeed resembles the transversal communication posited by

D&G on the molecular level of the desire/sexuality complex, in which the separate parts of the machine are also

unable to engage in a direct interaction without an exterior agency that facilitates it. In this regard, the “insect” of

D&G (Shaviro, 127) is Luhmann’s “generalized symbolic medium of communication”. The difference here is

that the medium, as opposed to the insect, cannot connect the subsystems at random. If it was the case, we would

not be able to speak of a system, but rather of a chaos. Presumably, the medium must always already be available

whenever the subsystems need communicating. In this regard, it is therefore not a particularity like the insect,

which floats through the molecular on its own course, connecting parts at its whim, but an omnipresent entity on

permanent hot standby, ready to instantaneously connect those branches of the system that needs connecting. We

may even say that it is the communication that is the system itself, for without it we would only have a

disconnect assemblage of function-specific micro-systems.

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thus it is highly improbable that any communication can occur between them, since the level

of entropy in communication would be so high that the message would not be decoded by the

receiving subsystem. It is then up to the generalized symbolic media to overcome this

improbability by employing a “semantic matrix intimately connected with reality” (ibid),

which then provides the needed common ground since all the subsystems reflect on the reality

in one way or the other, so that redundancy is introduced into the communication process and

the message thus becomes comprehensible.

In the relationship dyad, love, for Luhmann, acts as such a generalized symbolic

medium of communication, which then “is not itself a feeling, but rather a code of

communication, according to the rules of which one can express, form and stimulate feelings,

deny them, impute them to others, and be prepared to face up to all the consequences which

enacting such a communication may bring with it” (ibid, 259). By providing a mutual frame

of reference in being the other’s beloved, love then enables both subsystem of the dyad, that

is, both parties involved, to connect and mutually invest in themselves via the affirmation of

the self/identity of the other, thereby not only imbuing one’s own person with uniqueness, but

also countering the social displacement by providing for the person a support structure in

which the self/identity can be grounded. This affirmation however can never be absolute,

since, despite the intimate proximity, the one is for the other still an external subject and

therefore one cannot completely grasp the totality of the traits constituting the other. Such

idiosyncrasy of the self means then for Luhmann the impossibility of total communication in

love, as parts of the self are forever, consciously or unconsciously, closed to the other’s

recognition. The expectation thereby rests rather on universality, meaning, anticipating all

possible contingencies with regards to the other, which then reveals the essential asymmetry

of love, that is, basing one’s actions on one’s anticipation of the inner experiences of the

other: “…one can orient oneself towards the inner experience of the other person, even if he

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has not actually conveyed that expectation, has not expressed a wish of any kind and not

undertaken to attribute anything to himself” (ibid, 259-60). In other words, for love to truly

differentiate from the social system mechanics, it cannot function on the basic of symmetrical

causality; rather, in the relationship dyad, the effect has to somewhat precede the cause, that

is, one cannot wait for the other to fully articulate his/her feelings/experiences/expectations to

respond/react accordingly, for if love is all about the affirmation of the self/identity of the

other, it then presupposes that despite the impossibility of total communication, one is able to

gauge the other’s feelings/experiences/expectations well enough so that action arises

beforehand, thereby proving with such an anticipation one’s investment in the dyad. Hence,

instead of re-action, there must be universalized pro-action, which then leads Luhmann to

posit that

To put it paradoxically, love is able to enhance communication by largely doing without

communication. It makes use primarily of indirect communication, relies on anticipation and

on having already understood. And love can thus be damaged by explicit communication, by

discreet questions and answers, because such openness would indicate that something had not

been understood as a matter of course (261).

Indeed, given the expectation of proactive involvement in the relationship dyad, implicitness,

as opposed to explicitness, in communication is the unspoken rule, the code, as one does

assume that the other knows him/her well enough to know what to do and what to say without

the need of explaining everything directly. Still, due to the impossibility of total

communication, the expectation of anticipation and pro-activeness remains but a guessing

game which seems to work out for the most part, but can easily backfire miserably.

The ever present misfortune of the intimate relationship going amiss arises for

Luhmann precisely given the stance of the dyad towards the modern social system. In the

past, the social system exercised pronounced regulation over the private sphere, especially

over its intimate aspect, leaving “little leeway” for relationships and no room for their “self-

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problematization” (ibid, 267). With one’s identity being rigidly determined by one’s social

stratum, everything, including intimacy, followed the normative coding of that stratum. Not

only was thus preordained with whom one can enter into an intimate relationship, but even its

course itself was largely already set, all the steps including according to the etiquette of the

stratum. “There was little room for expectations to be enhanced with regard to personal

harmony; it may be that ‘affairs of the heart’ were not as such even present…” (ibid). With

the onset of the functionally differentiated social system, the situation alters dramatically. The

all encompassing social strata that previously acted as the structures for identity construction

are dismantled in favor of more specialized subsystemic units which themselves are however

unable to house the individual in the manner of the previous strata, hence bringing in the

aforementioned social displacement of the self, which is then countered via the formation of

the relationship dyad. Yet, this simultaneously means that there are no longer any exterior

faculties that would orchestrate the relationship. “External supports are dismantled, and the

internal tensions become more acute. The capacity for stability now depends on purely

personal resources – while at the same time being part of the involvement with the other

person” (ibid). In other words, the responsibility for how well or ill the relationship dyad

evolves rests now exclusively on the parties involved, who are simultaneously held

accountable for investing in the interpersonal interpenetration of the dyad, that is, expected to

affirm the other as a unique self/identity and proactively anticipate the inner experiences of

the other.

Given such high and simultaneous demands, it is then no wonder that “Personal

relationships are overburdened by the expectations that one will be in tune with the person,

and this often dooms such relationships to failure – which in turn only serves to intensify the

quest for them and makes the inadequacy of exclusively impersonal relationships all the more

apparent” (ibid, 270). Indeed, to reiterate the recurring point, one can never fully know the

Šmejkal 17

other self and yet one is expected to almost be inside the other’s head; expected not just by the

other but also by oneself, because of the vital role of love and the relationship dyad as the

self/identity affirmation mechanism and structure, which is something a purely impersonal

relationship can never provide; but one cannot be inside the other’s head, all he can do is

guess and approximate, which necessarily leads to mishaps which then generate tension as the

mishap immediately implies the tuning is out of phase so to speak, and as the mishaps keeps

multiplying proportionally to the duration of the relationship dyad, the tension grows and can

cause the dyad to fracture – unless the expectation is relaxed, which is a condition not easily

achievable given the demand for the affirmation, but should be achieved from the start since

utter affirmation is impossible. It is a vicious circle indeed.

Further problem is that what is expected in the dyad is often not the affirmation of the

actual self/identity but rather primarily a “validation of self-portrayal”, that is, our own idea of

what we are like, which of course is in discrepancy with what we are really like (ibid, 271).

Construction of one’s self-portrayal is in a way unavoidable, since one in oneself does not

have the benefit of an external observation to reach any “objective” determination; that can

come only from the other in fullness on the intimate level, as therein the other have access to

sides of the one’s self that are not normally displayed in the public sphere of the social

system, although not to all of those given the impossibility of total communication. Still, the

other should be in a position to provide a more than fair assessment of one’s personality, and

yet this is exactly what one does not expect from the other. One enters into the relationship

dyad to gain affirmation/validation not contradiction, and it may work at the beginning, for

the formation of the dyad entails a certain levels of mutual idolization of the other. As the

dyad progresses however, the validation gets into conflict with the emphasis on sincerity

coded within love – “how is one supposed to be sincere towards someone who is not sincere

towards himself?” (ibid, 272) – arriving at an increasing paradox. On one hand, one is to

Šmejkal 18

confirm the self-portrayal of the other, while on the other hand one should not misdirect the

other. The mutual incompatibility of both tasks is obvious here. The resolution is, to reiterate,

to relax the expectations, process the disappointment, that is, realize and accept that the

idealized image of the other can never be actualized; the one and the other are forever to

remain imperfect, and one can anticipate the other only approximately, so there are bound to

be unavoidably mishaps along the way (ibid, 168 & Dix). I would say, only when such an

understanding is reached in both parties of the relationship dyad, can this system last;

otherwise it is always already trapped in a circle of opposing tendencies that eventually tear it

apart. As a matter of fact, if we do posit the relationship dyad as a system in itself, then it is

only logical that instead of perfection the system needs the exact opposite – imperfection,

transitory events. “It needs to be fed constantly with fresh disorder, fresh dissent, fresh

unpredictability, fresh impenetrability, if it is not to collapse” (Schwanitz, 147). If everything

in love was as expected, then the dyad would fossilize. The impossibility of total

communication thereby appears as the essential condition for the endurance of the dyad, as it

gives the universality in anticipation only an approximate character, thus allowing the

unpredictability to enter into the system to be processed. Love with its high expectations and

demands hence tend to run counter to autopoetic processes needed to maintain the system,

which might be understandable considering that if the landscape of the social system equals to

social displacement and the relationship dyad is construed as that which truly affirms one’s

self/identity, one can easily envisage those two being in opposition and therefore running on

opposing principles, yet only when love is transformed via the processing of disappointments

and the dyad thus starts to behave as a true system, can there be a lasting interpenetration and

affirmation, albeit incomplete and imperfect, of one’s self/identity, to which the dyad then

acts as an autopoetic support structure.

Šmejkal 19

The Thought – Nancy

The account of Jean-Luc Nancy regarding love and intimacy contains perhaps the

most abstraction of the three conceptualization discussed here, in which love is placed at the

center of ontology and epistemology. The point of ingress for Nancy is thinking, related not to

a specific issue, but rather thinking as such, which is intimately intertwined with love,

inasmuch as “Love does not call for a certain kind of thinking, or for a thinking of love, but

for thinking in essence and in its totality. And this is because thinking, most properly

speaking, is love” (Nancy, 286). There is thus an equation between the two, elucidated by the

literal meaning of the word “philosophy”, which then should have love as its core program,

yet as Nancy posits, paradoxically never has. Philosophy apparently tend to treat love as an

exterior agency, something that is attained from without, entered into, which then suppresses

the self and reconstitutes it in the alterity of the other (ibid, 287). It is a path towards

completion of being; a completion which however entails transference, as the self is

interjected and partially substituted with the self of the other4, which then leads to the

question if we can really speak of a completion given this expulsion of the self from itself and

its grafting upon the other. Is it rather the case that love brings a rupture of the self instead of

its closure, thus foreclosing its ability to be ontological as the self is no longer fully

constituted? Such a line of thought may be why philosophy might tend to navigate its course

around love, for its inclusion may be the end of the inquiry. Therefore, “Philosophy is not

occupied with gathering and interpreting the experiences of love here”, oblivious to that

“Instead, in the final analysis, it is love that receives and deploys the experience of thinking”

(ibid, 286).

4 This is akin to Luhmann’s interpersonal interpenetration under which in the relationship dyad the self of one

incorporates the subjectivity of the other into itself, and simultaneously is incorporated into the other’s

subjectivity, so that the asymmetrical possibility for anticipation can arise.

Šmejkal 20

For Nancy, love is at the heart of being, and “The being of philosophy is the subject.

The heart of the subject is again a subject: it is the infinite rapport to the self” (ibid, 289). In

other words, love is not the mechanism of the external social system in Luhmann’s sense, but

rather stems from the self. It is the internal property of the I. It does indeed posit me as

incomplete, yet the rupture it brings, the outpouring of me outside of myself is not what ends

the inquiry, but quite the opposite, what stimulates it, since my own incompleteness forces me

to think to seek for something which would complete me by transcending my own

immediacy. In this regard, it is then the fully constituted subject which is the end of the

inquiry since he has no lack and thus no need to go outside of himself in search for something

complementary. He can forever remain within its boundaries, his self always already enclosed

in on itself in a pure immanence. Transcendence on the other hand arises from insufficiency.

The heart must therefore always beat “under the regime of exposition” and love must be

“always the beating of an exposed heart” (ibid, 288-9), since exposition precisely means

openness towards alterity and therefore towards transcendence.

This is why Nancy furthermore posits the heart as broken, more so that actually “it is

the break itself that makes the heart” (ibid, 293). Presumably, the subject initially makes no

distinction between himself and any exterior alterity. In his inception all that he can register is

his own being only, which is taken as totality, since the subject precisely cannot distinguish

between himself and anything else. His condition is thus of pure immanence at which he is the

full circle of being. As the subject expands his perception and cognition, the alterity however

enters into view, yet remains unconfirmed as it can easily be taken as another aspect of the

subject’s immanence, since immanence is the only thing the subject knows thus far. Then

however something peculiar happens – the subject forms attachment to the alterity, invests

himself in it, and the alterity responds in kind, investing itself in the subject, whereby in this

mutual transference the subject suddenly has part of his self outside of himself and

Šmejkal 21

simultaneously part of the other self incorporated into himself, or equally importantly does

not respond in kind, not entirely or not at all, whereby the equal chance of acceptance or

rejection affirms the alterity as something truly other, since it can resist the will of the subject

and thus cannot be an aspect of his immanence. In either case, the full circle of subject is

broken, and it is this break that constitutes the subject as a subject, for this division between

the self and the other defines him as an entity within an exterior environment. The break is the

affirmation of the self as a being. It connects the self with that which transcends the self in

itself; the becoming aware of Being. One is then able to ascertain why Nancy posits

transcendence as “the crossing of love” (ibid), for only through love can the self gain

cognizance of the transcendent.

Given that love brings the alterity and generally operates towards it, it is easy to

perceive as coming to the self from without, yet if it is the self that forms the attachment to

the alterity and if he is able to respond to its allure, then the capacity to love must already be

present within the subject from the onset. Love is thus always already within. It is also easy to

see “why one would want to separate oneself from love, free oneself from it” (ibid, 290),

since love breaks the initial full circle of the self. It wounds the self; makes it incomplete, and

yet paradoxically this shattering of the self brings it more closer to completion, since the self

traverses its being in itself and moves towards becoming-into-Being, in which the immediacy

of the self is transcended by the alterity, which is precisely the promise of attaining

completion by becoming something greater than the self in itself, by merging with the Being.

In this regard, love does indeed cut across finitude as Nancy posited (293), since becoming-

into-Being signifies that the part of the self, which is via love translated outside of itself,

becomes preserved in Being. In plain terms, the subject leaves a mark in the great assemblage

of human potentialities that D&G termed as the Body without Organs; a mark which is then

replicated again and again for as long as BwO exists; something the subject could never

Šmejkal 22

achieve, should he have remained enclosed in his own immanence. There is a catch, however.

The completion is never complete. One cannot truly become the Being, since that would mean

being no longer a subject. It would entail crossing beyond the threshold and becoming truly

transcendental, that is, unattainable for any conceptualization. Love then is indeed always but

a promise (ibid, 294); a promise of becoming, but never of Being. Therein in the slippery

elusiveness of love – equal chance of acceptance and rejection. The subject in love is always

becoming. Love thus for Nancy is not the same as desire. “Desire lacks its object”, that is, is

always directed towards a specific object, and is thereby ontic rather than ontological, and

“lacks it while appropriating it to itself”, that is, desire cannot transcend as it is always

directed inwards, always towards negating the lack from which it stems (ibid, 293).

Love on the other hand is ontological. It traverses the self towards Being and although

it never fulfills its promise, it nevertheless enables the self to think of Being, to consider that

part of itself that is outside of itself, grafted upon the alterity. In this regard, love indeed is

thought, insofar as the division of the self opens the inquiry about the alterity to which we are

attached and to the allure of which we respond. In the Heideggerian sense, it is then love that

transfigures Sein into Dasein, and it is the Eros rather than the Thanatos that enables the

Dasein to ask the question of Being. As far as I can tell, love for Nancy thus plays the role of

an ontological determinative of the subject. Finitude is universal; cognition of love is the

property of Dasein alone.

Love Enough

Each of the three conceptualizations covered here, the program of D&G, the process of

Luhmann and the thought of Nancy, approaches love from its specific angle. For D&G it is all

about what the body can do; about unlocking new possibilities, revolutionary, yet cautiously,

subverting the tyranny of molar norms into a flight into the molecular where the

Šmejkal 23

desire/sexuality complex thrives on new potentialities until such time that it is recaptured or

destroyed, consumed by its own experimentation. It is a program indeed, a call to arms, yet

there are questions though. Firstly, what exactly are those new potentialities? What awaits us

in the molecular? Herein D&G do not seem to escape, at least for me that is, from one of the

fundamental shortcomings of postmodernism. The postmodernist thinkers are quite adamant

in demanding the deconstruction of the status quo, thereby calling for something better.

Baudrillard speaks of “a future of relativistic, reversing ironies; of temporalities that reverse

linearity and teleology – and then themselves” (Jenkins, 45); Derrida posits a “new type of

future freed from older logics of economy, coupled with notions of an irreducible justice, a

non-ossifiable morality…to think, beyond binary oppositions and stable identities, fresh

emancipatory hopes that pull on the ineffable nature of the sublime, a chaotic ‘nothingness’

that can promise everything…” (ibid, 41); Lyotard extends “an iconoclastic invitation to go

beyond old rules (and rulers) in emancipatory and democratizing ways through imagining

new imaginaries ‘without end’” (ibid, 53). Such claims are indeed grandiose, yet

simultaneously vague. Apparently, none of the thinkers is able to really explain what that

something new is actually like and looks like. Similarly, D&G are unable to reveal what

actually awaits us on the molecular level. True, one can argue that it is not the job of

postmodernism, that in itself it is a pure and endless critique, yet since it has been running its

deconstructivist course for quite some time now, one could at least a bit expect that we should

be able to see at least some contours of that something. Yet, still we revolve around

ephemeral concepts with little of concrete meaning. Secondly, if D&G are revolutionary, what

kind of revolution is that which dictates caution as its method? For me revolution has always

been laced with a greater degree of spontaneity, an eruption of discontent which cannot be

contained any more – “Liberty Leading the People” by Delacroix, that for me is the

paramount image of revolution. Careful step-by-step subversion belongs more to coup or

Šmejkal 24

conspiracy, not to revolution. In revolution, one marches head on. Thirdly, what kind of

revolution is that, whose program entails either surrender or self-annihilation? The line of

flight must either be recaptured, in which case the status quo is preserved, albeit with some

novelties, but fundamentally the same, thereby making the revolutionary move a failing, as

true revolution should change the status quo radically, or if it is not recaptured, it destroys the

subject, in which case the revolution is also a failing, since although the ancient régime is

dismantled, one is no longer around to enjoy the fruits of the liberation. Why then bother?

Finally, “Ah. Are you not confusing love with lust” (The Name of the Rose)? D&G speak of

desire and sexuality. But, is it love what they mean by that? Nancy would say no, neither

would Luhmann I think.

With Luhmann, love is very organized, as opposed to D&G. It has its precise function,

rules and definition. It is a medium that facilitates the connection of two personal systems,

whereby countering the social displacement experienced by either in the larger social system

by enabling the formation of a substitutive system in which either personal system is affirmed

as a constituted identity. In a way, there is also a program, although perhaps not apparent at

first glance, since if the relationship dyad is to last, it needs to be reconstructed as a true

system, that is, as relying on transitory events to provide fresh unpredictability so that it does

not fossilize. After a fashion, the union of personal systems must become a reflection, a micro

version, of the social system, against which it emerges. One can perhaps translate this to a

very layman’s advice – if you want your relationship to last, you better keep it interesting, as

well as be content with what you have, there are no ideals. In my opinion, these may be far

more useful observations than all the revolutions of D&G, although with D&G one can detect

emphasis on novelty as a path towards improvement. The question with Luhmann is can love

be conceptualized in such a technocratic manner, reduced to a communication apparatus, a

systemic agency? Is love truly only about regaining our lost social stability? It is a valid

Šmejkal 25

function, certainly in today’s mad world, and yet I cannot help but wonder if love still holds

its appeal if it is voided of any mystery. What of the emotional charge of love? From a purely

systemic standpoint, it should be redundant, and yet, there it is. Yes, one can argue that, as

emotions come and go, fluctuate, alter their intensities, this but an example of the transitory

events that maintain the dyad, akin to actions on part of the one or the other or shared

experiences, but why then would such an emphasis be placed on the emotional charge, so

much so that we speak of triumph or tragedy of love? Being in love strikes the very core of

one’s self, his very heart as Nancy would say. It is joy without measure, exhilarating,

invigorating, or sorrow without limits, paralyzing, devastating. And I have not yet seen a

medium that would account for such intimate feelings. Simply put, there is something in love

that simply escapes the tangible concepts and definitions of the Systems Theory.

With Nancy, we move to the truly poetic. With D&G we had the visceral carnal

pleasures, with Luhmann there are the clockwork algorithms of the systemic operation, that is,

the exact opposite of D&G, and in Nancy there is the poetry, the mystery of love. Perhaps too

much of it, inasmuch as, admittedly, the meaning of his deliberation escapes me and I cannot

see the internal logic of his argument. Yet, perhaps that might be the precise point of his

argumentation – love as the unfathomable, the sublime which cannot be defined. As far as I

can ascertain, love for Nancy deploys an ontological function, making us consider the Being

as such as in love we embrace the multifaceted nature of the otherness, to which we are

willing, who knows why, to give our very selves. Our capacity to love and to consciously

experience and articulate love may very well be unique in Being. Then again it may be not.

Still, I wonder, what of the other strong feelings we harbor? Can we equally vehemently

consider the nature of Being out of fear or downright hate for the alterity? Being is not always

pleasant to be around so to speak. It is like the two-faced deity Janus of ancient Rome, who

presides over transitions, which however are never guaranteed to be smooth. The promise

Šmejkal 26

may, and indeed does, end in disaster. What then? Are we in our darkest moments cut off

from ontology or equally receptive, as we face the dark sublime of the underside of the Being,

the sheer magnitude of negativity? And love may very well lead one to hate, as there is a thin

line between the two, so its function is like a double-edged sword. I wonder if Nancy is

placing perhaps too much emphasis on love. If Being is of endless diversity, there surely must

be more than one key to its gates.

In the final analysis, there are many assertions as to what love does, what brings and

provides. On the other hand, there is less certainty as to what love actually is. It is many

things and none exactly. In the end, that might be the way to go. Not every mystery needs to

be solved. Sometimes, it is enough to simply appreciate it. I think one cannot err in agreeing

with Nancy that “Love is what it is, identical and plural, in all its registers or in all its

explosions, and it does not sublimate itself, even when it is ‘sublime’” (289). Sublime is to be

experienced rather than comprehended. Best leave it at that, and let everyone decide for

himself. Period. Besides, “if I knew the answer to everything, I would be teaching theology in

Paris” (The Name of the Rose).

Šmejkal 27

Work cited

“Deleuze & Guattari: Molecular Sexualities.” Modern Sociological Theories course notes.

Professor Douglas S. Dix. Anglo-American University. Fall 2011.

Deleuze, Gilles. Felix Guattari. “How Do You Make Yourself a Body without Organs?” 20th

Century Social Theory course reader. Professor Douglas S. Dix. Anglo-American

University. Fall 2008.

Dix, Douglas Shields. “Niklas Luhmann: Love as Passion”. Modern Sociological Theories

course. Anglo-American University. Fall 2011.

Jenkins, Keith. Why History: Ethics and Postmodernity. London & New York: Routledge,

1999.

Luhmann, Niklas. “Society and Individual: Personal and Impersonal Relationships”. Modern

Sociological Theories course reader. Professor Douglas S- Dix. Anglo-American

University. Fall 2011.

Nancy, Jean-Luc. “Shattered Love.” Modern Sociological Theories course reader. Professor

Douglas S. Dix. Anglo-American University. Fall 2011.

Shaviro, Steven. “Appendix: Deleuze and Guattari’s Theory of Sexuality.” Modern

Sociological Theories course reader. Professor Douglas S. Dix. Anglo-American

University. Fall 2011.

Schwanitz, Dietrich. “Systems Theory According to Niklas Luhmann: Its Environment and

Conceptual Strategies.” Cultural Critique, No. 30, The Politics of Systems and

Environments, Part I. (Spring, 1995), pp.137-170.

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0882-

4371%28199521%290%3A30%3C137%3ASTATNL%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F>.

Šmejkal 28

The Name of the Rose. Dir. Jean-Jacques Annaud. Perf. Sean Connery, Christian Slater, F.

Murray Abraham, Ron Perlman, Elya Baskin, Michael Lonsdale, Helmut Qualtinger

and Feodor Chaliapin Jr. Neue Constantin Film, ZDF, 1986.

Welchman, Alistair. “Into the Abyss: Deleuze.” 20th

Century Social Theory course reader.

Professor Douglas S. Dix. Anglo-American College. Fall 2008.