The positions of the I

Palestinian refugee issue resolution

The positions of the Israeli political groups about the

alestinian refugee issue resolution

International Relations, Security and Development

Tesina de final de máster

Tutor: FerranIzquierdoBrichs

Alumno: AritzGarcía Gómez

i political groups about the

tions, Security and Development

Tesina de final de máster

Tutor: FerranIzquierdoBrichs

Alumno: AritzGarcía Gómez

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Abstract The Palestinian refugee issue is a key factor to reach a consistent resolution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In order to accomplish it the first thing to do is to give a perspective on the situation of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, and their descendants, who were banned or had to escape with the war of 1948. Today they are almost five million. Despite of its importance for the peace process, this topic was not considered with the deepness that requires. Palestinians are supported by the resolution 194 of the United Nations General Assembly and request their Right to Return. On the other hand, Israeli part disputes this right to return with three aspects:

- The responsibility upon the escape/expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from their homeland.

- The existential need to be a Jewish state: the return of the Palestinians could represent a loss of the Jewish majority.

- The fact that Israel has already received thousands of Jews from the Arab countries.

This thesis analyses how the Israeli political parties treat this issue and how the “new Israeli historians” can help changing the Israeli point of view with questioning the Zionist discourse of the 48 War.

Keywords Palestinian refugees – Israeli-Palestinian conflict – Right to return – New Israeli historians – Israeli societal security – Arab Jews – LIKUD – KADIMA – Israeli labor party – Israel Beitenu – SHAS – HADASH – Democratic National Assembly – Islamism in Israel

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Índice

Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... 2 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 4 Methodology ................................................................................................................................. 7

Peace Negotiations ................................................................................................................. 10 Classification of positions on the issue of refugees ................................................................ 13

The Israeli positions..................................................................................................................... 15 Zionist History Vs. “New Historians” ....................................................................................... 15 The Right of Return as an existential threat ........................................................................... 16 The exodus of the Arab-Jews .................................................................................................. 17

The discourse of the political parties .......................................................................................... 19 LIKUD ....................................................................................................................................... 20 KADIMA ................................................................................................................................... 23 Labour Party (Ha’Avoda) and Independence (Sia’at Ha’Atzama’ut) ....................................... 25 Israel Beitenu .......................................................................................................................... 26 SHAS ........................................................................................................................................ 27 Arab parties, left wing and social movements for the return of the refugees ....................... 28

Analysis ........................................................................................................................................ 31 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................. 33 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................ 35

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Introduction

The resolution of the situation of the Palestinian Refugees is one of the key issues for the establishment of a strong peace agreement on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Key issue and unresolved since 1948-9, when a Palestinian population estimated around 600.000 or 900.000 people1 were expelled and/or fled from the territories that would eventually constitute the State of Israel.Furthermore, from these refugees arise many of the political movements that later form the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and other Palestinian resistance movements2. Palestinians focus their demands on the resolution 194 (III) of the General Assembly of the United Nations, of the11th of December 1948, reaffirmed over 110 times, which states in Article 11:

“… (The General Assembly) resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for any loss or damage of property to which, under principles of international law or for equity reasons, should be returned by the responsible Governments or authorities.” The Palestinian side considers that the resolutions 242 (XXII) of the Security Council in Article 2, paragraph b, when it speaks of "b) achieving a fairsolution on the refugee problem," and the resolution 338 (XXVIII) of the Security Council, which emplaces the parties to resolution 242 (XXII)again, reaffirm the establishedon the resolution 194, which they consider a fair solution. Palestinians see their "right of return"as inalienable, but as we shall see later, on the exact form of exercise it, they do raise the possibility of negotiations that would establish a limited return. Israeli did not want to talk about the issue in Oslo3 (1993) and it made it to be postponed. This made impossible to address it in official negotiations until Camp David, in July 2000. The issue was also treated in Taba, in January of 2001, but in none of these official meetings any agreement was reached. We only found negotiations and approaches, especially in non-central meetings as during the Refugee Working Group, between 1991 and 1997, one of the five thematic channels to study lateral negotiations, created in Madrid in 1991.Or the agreements between Beilin and Abu Mazen in 1995, which were not officials, but were just explorations to look for a final agreement between the two sides.

1Estimatesvaryaccordingtothesourcesfrom600.000 to 760.000 whichMorris, Benny (1988)

(The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1945-1948. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, pág. 297-298) recognizesto 914.221 recognizedin thestatistics of the UNRWA in 1950 (http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/reg-ref(2).pdf). 2Much of the post-48 Palestinian leaders were refugees: George Habash, AhmaedYassin and even Yasser

Arafat, although born in Cairo before 1948, can be considered as such. The rise of the Palestinian resistance was in the Karamehrefugee camp in Jordan. 3 See Massad, Joseph (1999), Return or Permanent exile? Palestinian Refugee and the End of

Oslo,Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, 8. 14: 5-23. pg. 8

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In this paper I have focused on the Israeli view on this matter. I try to analyze the positions of the different Israeli political parties on the issue of Palestinian refugees. The paper presents a general status of the issue of refugees, analyzing the positions of the main Israeli political groupson the possibility of an agreement on this issue, considering its political evolution as well as the context in which Israeli policiesare.To do this I have studied the positions of the political parties: LIKUD, KADIMA and Labor (Ha'avoda and Independence), major groups of Israeli political system. I have also introduced the positions of some of the groups closest to the extremes, due to its importance in the fragmented Israeli parties system, in which SHAS, the religious right, and Israel Beiteinu, thesecular extreme of right wing, have been necessary to constitute the last governments. Furthermore, I mentioned the positions of the Arab minority groups and the Israeli left wing, isolated because of their non-Zionist positions. I find it interesting because they represent a large part of the Arab minority in Israel, about 20% of the state's population, which has always been marginalized, and small groups of non-Zionist Jews in Israel, very minor but very active, especially amid certain intellectual elite. Due to the short presence of the issue on the Israeli agenda, I have also considered the reasons for this exclusion, both in the media-political discourse as well asa pure theoretical study and the difficulties of scholars who tried to study it.To analyze the speeches and positions of these political groups I have used different papers that have examined this aspect of the conflict. I started with the presentation made by EliaZureik, member of the Palestinian-Jordanian delegation at the Refugee Working Group (multilateral peace negotiations for the Middle East) and one of the scholars who have studied further the issue of Palestinian refugees. In "The Palestinian Refugee Problem: Conflicting Interpretations"Zureik exposes the different positions on the issue, to present the different points of view. I continued with the papers: "Addressing the Palestinian Refugee Issue: A Brief Overview" by Rex Brynen of the McGill University in Montreal (Canada), one of the specialists in the refugee issue. And "The Palestinian Refugees: A reassessment and a Solution" by Alon Ben Meir, professor of International Relations at New York University, and director of the Middle East Project at the World Policy Institute. Both explain the various official and unofficial negotiations that addressed the issue of refugees. Thus I have discussed how far the negotiations reached. As a basis for classifying the positions of the political parties I have used the paper "The Palestinian Refugee Problem and the Right of Return" publishedin the end of the peace process of the 90’s, by the Joint Working Group of the Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution (PICAR), from the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. I've also used other various papers that studied the Israeli political party system since the 70’s. The papers also discussed the difficulties in addressing the issue of refugees, both from the point of view of the political parties and from the academy, given its opposition to the Zionist narrative of the construction of the Israeli state in the 1948 war.

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Finally, I used the approach of the sociology of power to analyze how the issuehas been used by the various elites in their continuous circular competition for power, developed by FerranIzquierdoBrichs in "Poder y Felicidad. Unapropuesta de sociología del poder".The author used this concept in the analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he made with Ignacio Alvarez-Ossorio, in "¿Porqué ha fracasado la paz?". The paper, with the analysis and compilation of information about Palestinian refugees from the Israeli side, will be the basis of the thesis I intend to do later, with a broader view of the possible solutions to the issue of refugees. Therefore I used the form of status of the question and not the model of hypothesis and verification.

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Methodology To analyze the speeches and positions of the various political groups I have used their proposals and political programs. On the Israeli side,the issue of Palestinian refugees as a subject of interest is not usually addressed, and it is generally not exposed in their programs. Therefore to know their positions, I have used their public statements on the issue of refugees, in speeches, news releases and articles. This led me to analyze this scarce or almost irrelevant presence of the issue of refugees in the discourse of political parties and how this affects a possible resolution of the issue within the framework of a general solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Given this irrelevance of the issue of refugees in the public discourse of the political groups, I reviewed the difficulties and troubles of addressing this issue for Israeli leaders as it partly dismantles the Zionist thesis on the War of 1948. To study these difficulties of the elite and Israeli academia I have employed the article of Rafi Nets-Zehngut, "Origins of the Palestinian Refugee Problem: Changes in the historical memory of Israelis / Jews 1949-2004 ", which considers the works on the Nakba, or war of independence of Israel, in the Israeli historical academy. I also used articles of IllanPappé explaining the problems he had in the Israeli academy when he tried to "dig" the events of 1948-49. To explore the position of the Israeli parties I have used different articles about the political parties system in Israel, and studies on how the postures towards the Arab-Israeli conflict were crucial to understand the electoral preferences of Israeli citizens amongst the different parties, especially since 1967.

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Status of the question In order to classify and discuss the positions of the political parties in the state of Israel, I started working with a presentation of the status of the question, exposing the different positions on the issue of refugees. For this, I used the EliaZureik's paper, "The Palestinian Refugee Problem: Conflicting Interpretations". EliaZureik is Professor Emeritus of the Faculty of Sociology at Queen's University in Kingston, Canada; researcher at the Canadian Development and Research Center of Ottawa; former member of the Palestinian delegation to the Refugee Working Group and one of the experts on the issue of refugees. The article analyzed exposes the status of the question of refugees on a political and academic level. He argues that although, for now, on a political level each part continues locked and Israeli politicians continue to deny their responsibility, academically and socially, in the Israeli fieldit has started a timid questioning of these positions, because four factors: 1) The declassification of Israeli official documents after 50 years - the time that Israeli law establishes for the declassification of secret documents - confirmed the role played by Zionist agencies, first by paramilitary and then by the governmental army, in the expulsion of the Arabs from the territory that would end becoming the state of Israel. 2) The Zionist success in achieving its goal of building a state for Jews created enough self-confidence in intellectuals and academics to start being more critics with the conduct of the state in 1948. 3) The Israeli academia has changed with the entry of a new generation more receptive to a theory and methodology much more critical, leaving aside the traditional Orientalism4. 4) The Oslo Agreementspostponed many issues for the final rounds, but it became clear that the refugee issue was central for a definitive resolution for the conflict. In the academic world with the "new history of Israel5" the Academy has begun to accept Israeli responsibility in creating the issue, and today the historical debate is about the exact number of refugees (600,000 to 900,000 according to sources) and in the planning or not of their expulsion by Zionist forces.

4 Western cultural conception that ignores the point of view of the colonized developed by Said,

Edward (1978) Orientalism. On the issue of refugees, Zureik outlined how the Israeli academia began to accept the work of Palestinian academics and even Palestinian narratives. 5 The "new Israeli history" means a number of Israeli historians who published several works in which

challenges the traditional view of Zionist war 48 and emphasize the responsibility Israeli expulsion / flight of much of the Palestinians in what would become the state of Israel. They would be among them: • Morris, Benny (1987). The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949 • Pappé, Ilan (1999). They Were Expelled? The History, Historiography and Relevance of the Palestinian Refugee Problem. To see all this aspect more extensively, GihonMendigutía consult, Sea (2008 May / August). The "new historians" Israelis. Founding myths and demystification. International Mediterranean Studies Journal-REIM, 5, 27-41.

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Zureik also expresses how these new perspectives of Israeli academia have not changed, for the moment, the Israeli political posturing on the resolution of the issue. The non-recognition of Israel's responsibility and the proposed resettlement in Arab states continues to be the majority view among policy makers in Israel. Furthermore, in the legal field, the author highlights a number of legal scholars who question the vision of the Palestinian "right of return". From Ruth Lapidoth6 (which considered not applicable to Palestinian refugees, and would be applicable only to citizens of a nation-state, although in another text suggests that the issue should be subject to the negotiations between the two parties7) toEyalBenvenisti and EyalZamir8, ShlomoGazit9, DomPeretz10, Donna Arzt and Karen Zughaib11, and Antonio Cassese12 linking the right to return to the negotiations and that this return should be given to the future Palestinian state, or LexTakkenberg13 that, without connectingthe negotiations also believes that the return should be to the Palestinian state itself. But John Quigley and Kathleen Lawand14, with a human rights approach and from the humanitarian law perspective, consider that Israel is obligated to accept their return. Zureik also exposes the debate over compensation, which will focus on the questions: How many should receive compensation? How should compensation be calculated? How should they be managed? And where should the money come from? To these questions the Israeli pushes to take into account the losses of the Jewish-Arab when they fled their home countries. On this, the Palestinians say it should be discussed with the responsible Arab countries and do not include it in these negotiations.

6Lapidoth, Ruth (1986). The Right of Return in International Law, with Special Reference to the

Palestinian Refugees.Israel Yearbook of Human Rights, 6, 1, 65–70. 7Lapidoth, Ruth (September 2002). Legal aspects of the Palestinian Refugee Question. Jerusalem Letter

and Jerusalem Letter/Viewpoints, 485. 8Benvenisti, Eyal and EyalZamir (1995). Private Claims to Property Losses in the Future Israeli–Palestinian

Settlement. American Journal of International Law, 89, 2, 240–340. 9Gazit, Shlomo (1994). The Palestinian Refugee Problem [en hebreo]. Tel-Aviv: Jaffee Centre for Strategic

Studies. 10

Peretz, Dom (1993). Palestinian Refugees and the Middle East Peace Process. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press. 11

Arzt, Donna and Karen Zughaib (1993). Return of the Negotiated Lands: The Likelihood and Legality of a Population Transfer between Israel and a Future Palestinian State. New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 24, 4, 399–513. 12

Cassese, Antonio (1993).Some Legal Observations on the Palestinian Right to Self-Determination.Oxford International Review, 4, 1, 10–13. 13

Takkenberg, Lex (1998). The Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law. Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press, 1998. 14

Quigley, John (1996). Displaced Palestinians and a Right of Return. Harvard International Law Journal, 39, 1, 171–229; Lawand, Kathleen (1996). The Right to Return of Palestinians in International Law.International Journal of Refugee Law, 8, 4, 532-568.

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Peace Negotiations

To analyze the views from the different political parties on the issue of Israeli refugees I have also used the paper "Addressing the Palestinian Refugee Issue: A Brief Overview" by Brynen Rex, and "The Palestinian Refugees: A reassessment and a Solution" by Alon Ben Meir, which outlines the positions of the two sides - Israeli and PLO government - during the subsequent peace negotiations, from Madrid 1991 tothe attempts to redirect the peace negotiations with the "Road Map" of 2003, and also includes the "Geneva Agreement"of December 2003. The references to the peace negotiations will help us to see how Israeli parties are more or less distant from the positions to which once reached Israeli representatives in these negotiations. Here I must point out that on refugees, it was never signed anything because as I explained in the introduction, the Israeli preferred to postpone this matter until the final statute, which never came. The first negotiations on refugees were those carried out at the Refugee Working Group between 1991 and 1997, one of the five multilateral working groups - the other four would be Water, Environment, Economic Development and Regional Arms Control and Security - created in Madrid in 1991 to explore the views to face possible agreements. Canada was designated as the mediator, with the participation of Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians, and the notable absence of Lebanese and Syrians. In these first contacts, Palestinians tended to make general declarative statements of refugee rights as Israelis sought to depoliticize the issue and find ways to improve the situation of refugees without accepting the return. It had a positive effect on improving resources and research on refugees, in addition to fostering the liberalization of family reunification of refugees who had been divided by the armistice lines. With the Netanyahu government and its negative stance regard to negotiations in 1996, and the subsequent boycott of the Arab League in 1997, the group dissolved. In the 1993 Oslo agreements, conversations on refugees of 1948 were postponed until an eventual permanent status negotiation that never arrived. There were only rapprochement on refugees of 1967 between Israel, the PLO, Jordan and Egypt, but with the general deterioration of negotiations between 1997 and 1999, the quadripartite negotiation mechanism was eclipsed. The first clear rapprochement on a possible resolution on the issue of refugees were in the understandings between Beilin and Abu Mazen in 1995, unofficial meetings to try to outline the parameters of a peace deal in Israel-Palestine. Here there was an idea of creating an "International Commission for Palestine Refugees" to oversee the efforts to a compensation and the exploration of their resettlement in Gaza and the West Bank, and the exercise of the right of return for a small group within a program of family reunification, which was never really clarified in number and manner. These secret negotiations, made public many years later, raised the possibility of exceeding the red lines on both sides: on the Israeli side regarding the partition of Jerusalem, in the Palestinian regarding a limited return of refugees, and mainly to Palestinian state. Years displayed as both parties were not able to overcome these lines publicly: Jerusalem became indivisible, and Palestinian negotiators could not turn his back on the aspirations of half of the Palestinian population who are refugees, and again claim the application of Article 11 of Resolution 19415.

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SeeÁlvarez-Ossorio, Ignacio y Isaías Barreñada (2001). Negociando el acuerdo final. El Documento Beilin-Abu Mazen. Nación Árabe, 43, 121-145.

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From the mid-90s, there were a number of initiatives from academia and civil society aimed at supporting the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. Regarding refugees, the most important initiative was supported by Canada and the International Development Research Center (IDRC), known as the "Ottawa process". This led to the development of new research and new approaches on key issues of refugees issue, especially among academic circles of both parties. These new approaches led the World Bank to conduct studies on the economic viability of a resettlement of the refugees in the West Bank. Within the pre-negotiations of May-June 2000, the most important was "the Stockholm channel", which sought to establish the main points of agreement and disagreement on the negotiations. The Israeli side portrayed a draft, the "Framework Agreement on Permanent Status", which wanted to identify agreements and disagreements between the two parties. Regarding refugees it appeared to have a commitment for the creation of an international commission to oversee an agreement, as well as an international fund for compensations. The main differences remained on the right of return, in which Palestinians raised that refugees could choose where to return, if to Israel or to the new Palestinian state, but suggested that most would opt for the second option. The Israelis did not accept the right of return, and only accept the return of some thousands of refugees as a humanitarian gesture and in a family reunification program. So when itcame to Camp David (July 2000), the main issues were territory, settlements, security and Jerusalem. The issue of the refugees remained on "the Stockholm channel" with the Palestinians calling for the recognition of the Israeli responsibility and the right of return. If Israel recognizedits responsibility, Palestinians would try to assure that, in practice, only a few thousands of refugees would exercise this return to the territories of the internationally recognized state of Israel. The Israelis rejected any moral responsibility and admitted that they could recognize a right of return only to the Palestinian state, but not to the state of Israel. Given the collapse in September 2000, with the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the Clinton administration made its proposal to renegotiate from the parameters proposed by the U.S. administration itself. The proposal was that Israel recognized the moral damage and suffering caused to the Palestinian people in 1948. It would establish an international commission to address compensations, resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees. And the right of return would be exercised to the Palestinian statehood and to the territories would be exchanged for Israeli settlements, or to Israel, or to Arab countries, or to third parties, provided that such permitted. The Israeli side accepted these parameters as a possible starting point for future negotiations, while Arafat said that the basis of the right of return is the possibility of choice although later the Palestinians could be flexible in thinking about how to exercise this right of return. Therefore the U.S. proposal failed in the attempt to safeguard the rights of Palestinians to return and compensations. Clinton found that his administration's ideas would be discarded when he came out of his presidency.

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However, in the next meeting, Taba in January 2001, the Clinton parameters were implicitly the reference point to start negotiations. Yossi Beilin, a "dove16", headed the Israeli negotiating team in the section on refugees. He tried to go as far as possible to try to pressure Ehud Barak to reach an agreement to leave for the posterity, because all forecasts gave to the LIKUDthe government in the elections to be held in February. It was now or never. On the Palestinian side there was also a soft negotiator Nabil Sha'ath. Considerable progress was made, it was verbally negotiated the absorption by Israel of 25,000 refugees in the first three years, 40,000 in the next five, and from 25,000 to 125,000 in a total of 15 years. Refugees would be compensated individually by the properties lost in Israel, and the states that hosted them would be compensated too. Although in the end no agreement on the amount of compensation was reached, or on the key issue of the return of refugees, members of the two delegations commented that it was due more to a lack of time than to disagreements. But we must seethe results of the agreement with some skepticism because of the special situation when the negotiations were developed. Ehud Barak was a hostage of an election campaign that was taken for lost, more concerned about looking good to their electorate thanto reach an agreement, looking to appear as hard, against criticism from the right, who accused him of being able to sell Israel.Arafat was afraid of having to negotiate later with Israeli hardliners - LIKUD - and therefore was willing to lower their aspirations. On the Arab Peace Initiative led by Saudi Arabia in 2002, and on the issue of refugees, the inclusion of references to Resolution 194 is considered one of the obstacles to the acceptance of the initiative by Israel. In the "Road Map" of 2003, one of the Israeli objections was that it should be accepted "Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state and the renunciation to any right of return of Palestinian refugees to the State of Israel". Despite the fact that the initial proposal only appointed 242 and 338 UN resolutions - leaving aside the 194 - although it was named the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002. Finally in the Geneva Initiative17 (which is not official, but it was considered as a possible starting point for future negotiations) resolution 194 is appointed, and is spoken of various forms of compensation. It also makes clear that Palestinian refugees could have a right to return, although Israel has complete discretion to decide the number of refugees who hosts, which in practice is to give Israel the ability to veto this return18. The initiative was rejected by Israel.

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Adjectives of doves and hawks are referred _ to the positions on the negotiations _, doves are those who are running for negotiating, however the hawks are the hardest and favorable to continue using military force and fait accompli. 17

The Geneva Initiative, or Geneva Accord is an unofficial settlement proposal, led by Yossi Beilin, one of the negotiators for the different Israeli peace talks, and Yasser AbdRabboh, Palestinian negotiator also featured of the official talks. The agreement was filed in October 2003, three years after the eruption of violence in the Al-Aqsa Intifada, to try to overcome the repeated failures in negotiations. To know the agreements: http://www.geneva-accord.org/ 18

See Álvarez-Ossorio, Ignacio (2003). Claros y oscuros del Acuerdo de Ginebra.Análisis del Real InstitutoElcano, 383.

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Classification of positions on the issue of refugees

Regarding how to classify positions and speeches, I used the paper "The Palestinian Refugee Problem and the Right of Return," written by Joseph Alpher and Khalil Shikaki - but also participated Gabriel Ben-Dor, Moshe Ma'oz, Ibrahim Dakkak ,YezidSayigh, Yossi Katz, Ze'ev Schiff, GhassanKhatib and Shimon Shamir - from the Joint working group of the Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution (PICAR)in the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, a working group of conflicts, focusing on the Arab-Israeli peace process in the 90s, who worked this conflict through interactive problems resolution, a concept developed and implemented by Dr. Herbert C. Kellman. The program was closed in August of 2003 with the stagnation of the peace process, but I thought that was interesting to recover it because it was the joint academic group - participated by Israelis and Palestinians - that deeply attempted to carry out an approach, based always on the two states solution. The Refugee Working Group (1991-1997), the multilateral group created during the peace process to address the issue of refugees, used its analysis and rapprochement of positions between the two sides. It was also used in the subsequent attempts until Camp David negotiations in July 2000. Kellman's work, following the model of interactive problems solving19, was informally meeting of representatives of the two sides under the guidance of an academic panel, to discuss possible solutions to the refugee issue. This group should identify the positions of both parties, recognizing the "red lines", which in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are the ones thatdid not threaten their existence or their feelings of existential insecurity.And see where they could find a rapprochement between the two sides, in order to try to explore new visions that could lead to new solutions in which the two parties would have a high degree of satisfaction of their demands. The group was unable to reach full agreement, but they reached closer positions, creating commitment positions on both sides. The classification made by this group is the following, starting with the maximalist positions: Israeli maximalist position: possible resettlement in the Palestinian state and in the other Arab states. Israel would control the resettlement in the Palestinian state. The compensation would be made by a contribution of the international community, and should be considered or achieve a certain reciprocity for Jewish communities "expelled"20 from Arab states after 1948. The advantage of this arrangement is that it does not threat the condition of Jewish of the state of Israel, a key issue of the Zionist position. The main disadvantage is the need for support of the Arab states to this plan, which does not recognize almost any Israeli responsibility in creating the current situation of the Palestinian refugees, and represents the complete Israeli interference in the decisions on refugees that could realize the potential Palestinian state.

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SeeKellman, Herbert C (2010). InteractiveProblemSolving: ChangingPolitical Culture in thePursuit of ConflictResolution. Peace and Conflict, 16, 389-413. 20

See the paragraph forward “The exodus of the arab-jews”.

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Palestinian maximalist position: Based on the Resolution 194 of the United Nations, which determines the return of the refugees who wish to go back to their old towns with property restitution, and individual compensation for the destruction of property and land tothose who choose not return, as well as collective compensations to the Palestinian state for the resettlement of those choosing to stay in the new Palestinian state. This resolution completely solves the problem but would have the disadvantage of not recognizing the “existential" needs of Israel. It could represent a risk for the Jewish majority of the state. On the other hand, it does not consider the position of strength that the state of Israel has, military victor of the conflict, and that without international pressure would never accept this resolution. From these maximalist positions, the PICAR raised to both sides a rapprochement of positions, which was used in the negotiations of the peace process afterwards from Madrid 1991 to the "Road Map" in 2003, for a possible resolution of the refugee issue. I will start with the Palestinian commitment solution: demand recognition of Israeli responsibility, and a "right of return" implemented in a limited way, but there should not be limits to the massive resettlement of refugees in the new Palestinian state. Regarding compensations should be individually and collectively - to the Palestinian state - to allow the absorption of refugees in the nascent state. The advantages of this solution are that it would not threat the Jewish supremacy of the state of Israel, and it would give economic tools to nascent Palestinian state to the resettlement of the mass of Palestinian refugees. On the other hand, from the moral standpoint, it recognizes the suffering of refugees and Israeli responsibility. The Israeli commitment solution would be: the recognition that both Arabs and Israelis had responsibility for creating the refugee issue, both Palestinian and Jewish-Arab; resettle most of the refugees in the new Palestinian state, always taking into account the actual absorption capacity of this state, without compromising its viability, monitored by a joint control entity; the "return" of refugees that still maintain close family ties with the Arab-Israelis in a program of family reunification; and the creation of an international entity to manage the compensations to Palestinian refugees which should take into account the losses to Jews-Arabs. This commitment must end all Palestinian claims and would dismantle the UN agency for Palestinian refugees (UNRWA). The refugees who could not resettle in the new Palestinian state should be absorbed by the Arab states and would have the right to a Palestinian citizenship. The advantage of this solution is that it completely solves the refugee situation without questioning the Israeli perception that a "right of return" would threaten the Jewish majority in the State of Israel. But it has drawbacks: no moral recognition of the "right of return", which is in resolution 194/1948 of UN (base of Palestinian demands), Israeli interference in the resettlement of the refugees in the future Palestinian state and the necessity of the involvement and approval of the Arab states in this resolution. These papers I found useful to create the coordinates to classify the positions of the different Israelis political groups, using the parameters found in this work. But throughout the analysis we found many other references, as explained at the beginning of methodology section.

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The Israeli positions To explain the Israelis positions on the Palestinian refugee issue I think it is important to start by explaining the arguments used by Israel and its political elite to do not accept its responsibility in creating this problem: the expulsion/flight of the vast majority of the Arabs inhabitants between November 1947 and January 1949 from the territory that would become internationally known as the state of Israel, or what is commonly called by Arabs and Palestinians Al Nakba, the disaster.

Zionist History Vs. “New Historians”

Recognition of these facts and of this responsibility implies the unmasking of much of Zionist mythology about the war of '48. As EliaZureikexplained today the historic Israeli academy has accepted the responsibility of Israel, through the work of the "new Israeli historians" - with the opening of the Israelis classified files - and recognition of the work of Palestinian historians, Israelis and foreign, more focused on collecting of oral history, occurred starting from the '70s. What Zionist "history" called "flight of the Arab population by the appeals of Arab states" today has become armed expulsion by the Zionist military and paramilitary formations. A good example of this view is contained in "The War on Palestine", coordinated by the specialists Eugene L. Rogan and AviShlaim. Thus Rafi Nets-Zehngut in "Origins of the Palestinian refugee problem: Changes in the historical memory of Israelis / Jews 1949-2004" analyzes the historical works made by Jews where we can find references to events that occurred between November 47 and January 49 in Palestine / Israel. He classifies as critical of the Zionist narrative the ones that mention the expulsion by Zionist armed groups as the cause of his flight. Shows how in the period 1949-1957, from the five historical works made, four in Israel and one by a Jew abroad, four describe the Zionist narrative and only the outside one mentions the two narratives without judgment. In the period 1958-1976, we found 12 written in Israel and 13 abroad. Of the 12 in Israel, only 2 are partially critical of the Zionist narrative and one begins to be more critical. In contrast of the written abroad, 8 of the 13 speak of expulsion. In the period 1977 to 1987 were 13 in Israel and 2 abroad, 14 critics and only one shows the Zionist narrative. Beginning in 1988 with the opening of the Israeli archives, the sources are no longer the testimonies of refugees and veterans. Studies are beginning to be made with the files as sources. In the period 1988-2004 found 42 jobs in Israel and 5 abroad, of which 43 are critical.Nets-Zehngut mentions especially the work of Benny Morris, "The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem". And pointing reasons similar to those given by EliaZureik for this change of perspective: opening of the Israeli archives, overcoming of Israeli existential security, generational change and critical theories. Although it also targets different reasons as the military mistakes of the Yom Kippur War / October and Lebanon, the change from a collectivist and conformist society towards a more individualistic and critical, political alternation with the end of the Labor governments or the increase of the private press could lead to the opening of cracks between the political and the academic world, which led to the emergence of critical attitudes toward the military and political elite.

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This unfolding of Israeli academia since the late 80s was boosted by the start of the peace negotiations in the 90s. But with the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000 after the breakdown of negotiations in Taba the Israel society was closed again in itself. Palestinians were accused of treason. And in relation to the beginning of the recognition of the Nakba, Israeli elite quickly closed this Pandora's Box that could legitimize the claims of the refugees. This closing of ranks reached the Israeli academia, where the "new historians" had to point out their jobs, denying that there was a deliberate plan of expulsion or talking about punctual massacre, under intense pressure as the case Tantura / Katz21 shows, or even be ostracized. This difficult treatment of the Nakba and the refugee issue in Israeli academia can find more prominent in the mass media. As noted by AkivaEldar22, in the Israelis media the issue of the refugees is not treated, and if at some point it appears, is presented as a security threat, or an obstacle to the advance of any possible negotiations with the Palestinians. These positions are the result of the fear that Israeli recognition of that responsibility in the situation of Palestinian refugees would imply an obligation of compensating, at least to refugees by the Zionist acts committed against Arab civilians. Although under international humanitarian law and humanitarian interpretations of Resolution 194, should be allowed to these refugees the return to their original homes.

The Right of Return as an existential threat

But the acceptance of the right of return of refugees not only clashes with the Zionist narrative. It also clashes with the Israeli concept of societal security. This concept developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Copenhagen School of security studies, not based on the state, but that consider security as "sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom", in the words of Waever23. We must consider what it means in the Israeli case. Whereas security is a social construction, a product of a particular historical and power struggles between social groups and interests, is the Israeli political, economic and social elite that, according to Fernando Navarro24, develops the concept of security as their own interests. And the acceptance of new views on the events in 1948 removed part of the social construction based on the Israeli epic of creation as state and society. In the same manner, the acceptance of the right of return of Palestinian refugees would mean the loss of the religious/social Jewish majority. And the preservation of the Jewish and democratic character of the state is a primary and referential goal of the entire Israeli elite. The return of the nearly 5 million refugees, taking into account the estimates of UNRWA25,

21

SeePappé, Ilan (2008). Los demonios de la Nakba. Madrid: Bósforo Libros. 22

SeeEldar, Akiva (2003). TheIsraeli Media and theRefugeeProblem. StocktakingConferenceonPalestinianRefugeeResearch. Ottawa 2003. 23

SeeWaever, Ole (1993). Societal Security, the Concept. En: Waever, Ole; Buzan, Barry; Kelstrup, Morten; Lemaitre, Pierre. Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe. (1ª ed., p. 17-40) Londres: Pinter. Copenhagen: Centre forPeace and ConflictResearch. 24

SeeNavarro Muñoz, Fernando (abril 2012). Identidad y seguridad en la competición por el poder en Israel. Revista CIDOB d’afersinternacionals, 97-98, 305-324. 25

UNRWA statisticsJanuary 2012 en http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/20120317152850.pdf

17

could threat the Jewish character, because they should add to the already 20% of Israel's population - about a million and a half - which is Arab not Jewish. It could also threat the democratic nature of the state, as it could become a regime where a Jewish minority would rule over a majority of non-Jewish Arabs. While on the other hand probably not all Palestinian refugees decide to exercise their right to return back to their homeswhere they were before 1948, how Palestinian leaders raised during negotiations, as a 'limited' right of return. But even with a huge return, according to calculations made by Philippe Fargues, director of research at Institut national d'étudesdémographiques (France), in "Les conséquencesdémographiques de l’application du droit au retour ", performed with 1998 data, that Palestinian majority is questioned. With the return of all Palestinian refugees living in refugee camps to their former homes inside Israel, Palestinians represent only 32%, and if we consider all Palestinians recognized as refugees by UNRWA, the Palestinians would be a 66%, but majority of Jews districts would remain Jewish (Rehovot, Tel Aviv, Petah Tiqwa and Sharon).Since most of the areas from which Palestinians were expelled are still largely uninhabited, allowing a return without the need to displace the current Jewish population, as is shown in other studies. So Salman Abu Sitta, in "Un paísborrado del mapa"26, shows as 67% of the villages destroyed, today, are plantations, ponds or are completely abandoned, and therefore the return would be possible for many of these refugees. However based on nowadays, taking into account demographic trends of the Palestinian and Jewish populations, very favorable to the Palestinians for their high birth rate- in both: the borders of 48, as in 67-, the fear of losing the demographic majority,is the greatest impediment to the right of return of Palestinian refugees27, remains.

The exodus of the Arab-Jews

Finally I have to mention how Zionist discourse, to emphasize that they are not responsible on Palestinian refugees, used the argument that Israel had to accommodate the hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees from Arab countries. According to Zionist discourse, these had to flee when the governments of these states initiated discriminatory policies in response to the events that took place in Palestine. This argument, which Arab governments are directly responsible for the exodus of hundreds of thousands of the Arab Jews from their countries of origin to the new Israeli state, is also in controversy in Israel itself. The Jewish communities were not expelled directly, but in response to the expulsion of Palestinians from their homes in 1948-49, were attacked by extremists. The states also hindered social and economic development of the Jewish communities that so many Jews chose to immigrate to Israel in search of new opportunities. In states such as Iraq, Yemen and Egypt - this in 1956, after the War from 56, the main Jewish communities in the Mashreq, the government decided to start controlling Jewish property to verify that they were not used in

26

SeeAbu Sitta, Salman (2004). Un país borrado del mapa. En El derecho al retorno. El problema de los refugiados palestinos (1ªed., p. 107-123). Madrid: Ediciones del Oriente y del Mediterráneo. 27

SeeZureik, Elia (2003). “Demogrphy and Transfer: Israel’sroadtonowhere”.ThirdWorldQuarterly; 24:4; 619-630. August 2010.

18

favor of Zionism and forbade Jews of working in refineries, hospitals, schools or the state administration, where had played an important role until then. Some Jews who were accused of promoting Zionism were eventually imprisoned and executed, due to the state of war between Israel and Arab states. Zionism took advantage to make accusations of anti-Semitism against those states before the Western world. In the end, this situation facilitated the Zionist goal of achieving to populate Israel with Jews from around the world - primary objective of Zionism and had had serious difficulties in convincing about it to the Arab Jews. Through the logistical-military operations "Magic Carpet "and" Ezra and Nehemia "managed the transfer of Iraqi and Yemenite Jews to Israel28. Several thousand Arab Jews followedYemeni and Iraqi throughout the decade, due to the facilities gave Israel, although once there, many times, their expectations were not fulfilled29. The debate in Israel is not just about whether it was prior: the expulsion of Palestinians or the anti-Judaism in the Arab countries. We must remember that some of these communities, such as Babylon / Baghdad existed for over 2500 years without having suffered almost anti-Jewish violence, in contrast what had happened in Europe30. The debate is whether they went to Israel because they believed in Zionism, or Zionist actions indirectly forced them to leave their home countries, and Israel welcomed them31. This discussion occurs because, prior to 1948, only 70,000 of the 715,000 Jews living in Palestine were from Arab countries32. After 48, 586,000 Arab Jews immigrated to Israel. This could question the Zionism of ArabJews, since most, until then, had been deaf to the call of Israel. With the clash between Zionism and Arab nationalism, identity broke them in two asthey were forced to choose. Examples of the weakness of Zionism among Arab Jews are Egyptian Jews: as they had British nationality, preferred to migrate to Europe33. Israel needed the Arab Jews - the expulsion of the Palestinians had left many uninhabited areas –and offered them many facilities that managed to get thousands of them to Israel. Moreover, once arrived in Israel, these Arab Jews were installed in arid zones - the desert of the Negev/An Naqab - or near hot borders of the new state, without much concern or respect for their traditions and customs. Their Arab identity was not respected -considering that Ashkenazi society view Arabs as enemies34. Much of Arab Jews communities or Mizrahi (Oriental), as they are called in Israel, did not feel welcomed by the Ashkenazi elite. They were treated as a subclass for hardest physical work and they ended up creating their own

28

ForanexampleShiblak, Abbas (1986). TheLure of Zion. The Case of theIraqiJews. London: Al Saqi. 29

SeeEickelman, Dale F. (2003). Norteafricanos en Israel: continuidad y cambio. En Antropología del mundo islámico (1ª ed., 337-342). Barcelona: EdicionsBellaterra. 30

SeeShenhav, Yehouda (2002). Ethnicity and NationalMemory: TheWorldorganization of JewsfromArabCountries (WOJAC) in thecontext of theNationalPalestinianStruggle. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 29, 1, 27-56. 31

SeeShenhav, Yehouda (2002). Ethnicity and NationalMemory: TheWorldorganization of JewsfromArabCountries (WOJAC) in thecontext of theNationalPalestinianStruggle. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 29, 1, 27-56. andBehar, Moshe (2007). Palestine, ArabizedJews and theElusiveConsequences of Jewish and ArabNationalFormations. Nationalism and EthnicPolitics, 13, 4, 581-611. 32

SeeAharoni, Ada (2003). TheForcedMigration of JewsfromtheArabsCountries. PeaceReview: Journal of Social Justice, 15, 1, 53-60. 33

SeeBeinin, Joel (1996). Egyptianjewishidentities. Communitarism, nationalism, nostalgias. Stanford ElectronicHumanitiesReview. ContestedPolities: Religious Disciplines and Structures of Modernity, 5, 1. 34

SeeShenhav, Yehouda (2006). TheArabJews: A Postcolonial Reading of Nationalism, Religion and Ethnicity. Stanford, California: Stanford UniversityPress.

19

organizations and movements of various kinds, from the Israeli Black Panthers of the 70s, to the SHAS political movement in the '80s. These debates were the ones that would lead, in 1999, to the dismantling of the WOJAC, World Organization of Jews from Arab Countries, created in 1975 linked to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, designed to oppose the demands of the Arab Jews to the Palestinian refugees ones35. For these reasons, the argument that Israel already welcomed its refugees is the weakest, and therefore the less used of the three, although this does not mean that it has been completely abandoned, as we shall see in the analysis of the speeches of the Zionist parties.

The discourse of the political parties Here I start analyzing the proposals and discourses of the political groups, which form the political elite in Israel. It is based on thebasic references, already exposed, of a historical vision regarding 1948, security concepts, Jewish-Arab issue and the problematic acceptation of this question by this elite.

35

SeeShenhav, Yehouda (2002). Ethnicity and National Memory: The World organization of Jews from Arab Countries(WOJAC) in the contexto of the National Palestinian Struggle. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 29, 1, 27-56.

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LIKUD

It is a party created in the 70’s, from a coalition between the more nationalist parts of the labor movement (Nationalist List) and the Revisionist movement36 (Movement for the Great Israel, derived from the Zionist ultra right wing, created from Ze’evJabotinsky and his ideas of an iron wall in the Middle East). Its first conquest was in the elections of 1977, when they reached the government. It was after the weakening of the labors’ alliance, a product of the errors during the Yom Kippur war and many corruption cases. Paradoxically, it was the first Israeli government to sign a peace agreement with an Arab state: Camp David’s peace agreements of 1979 between Menachem Begin and Sadat’s Egypt, sponsored by the U.S. administration of Jimmy Carter. It was Yitzhak Shamir, prime minister of LIKUD in 1991, who attended the Conference of Madrid and initiated the peace negotiations with Palestinians and Jordanians. Although it lost the 1992 elections in favor of a Labour Party led by Isaac Rabin and Shimon Peres, decided to continue the negotiations with the PLO. LIKUD would govern again in 1996, after the assassination of Rabin and the start of Hamas suicide bombings, following the Hebron massacre of 1994. And thereafter, negotiations with the Palestinians remain stalled, with the tough position of Benjamin Netanyahu, until recent attempts by the Labour government of Ehud Barak. Subsequently the LIKUD line, Ariel Sharon and the current government of Benjamin Netanyahu are still considered hard and its continued refusal to freeze West Bank settlement prevents a possible resumption of the agreements, although in theory, they have accepted the equation peace by land. To analyze their position on the issue of refugees I start using the program of Benjamin Netanyahu for the 2009 elections. In the program37, in the security section, we find the following reference to refugees “Responsibility for Palestinian Refugees - belongs with the Arab Countries A LIKUD-headed government will not allow thousands, certainly not millions, of Palestinian refugees to enter Israel. Israel will not take any moral responsibility for those refugees, since their very plight today is the result of the fatal decisions made by the Arab world: the decision to declare war on Israel instead of accepting the right of Jews to have a country of their own, and the decision maintained ever since 1967 to deny those Palestinian refugees the opportunity to rehabilitate themselves and continue their lives in Arab countries.”

This reference is in the section of the safety program, treating refugees as a security issue, as Fernando Navarro has shown in his article. As shown in the paragraph, LIKUD considers that the responsibility for Palestinian refugees belongs to Arab countries, as they declared war on the nascent state of Israel in 1948 and denied them the possibility of rehabilitation living in their countries. There is no reference to the expulsion of the Arabs of Palestine by Zionist forces. It also states that will not allow the entry of thousands, or millions of refugees into Israel, or take any moral responsibility for these refugees.

36

See: Shindler, Colin (Abril 2007). Likud and the search of Eretz Israel: From the Bible to the twenty-first Century.Israel Affairs, 8, 1-2, 91-117. 37

See: http://en.netanyahu.org.il/Themes-of/security/

21

We see that the position is very hard, both as to assume a moral responsibility, as to the possibility of exercising the refugees’ right of return. We might ask whether the saying "no allow thousands, certainly not millions of refugees into Israel" is not a doubt about a possible acceptance of not millions, but a few thousand refugees to return to Israel. But possibly it could happen within a family reunification process, never accepting Israeli responsibility for the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in 1948-49. In any case, this possibility is nothing more than pure speculation. I have continued the analysis with Netanyahu's speech, studying the paragraphs of the conference at Bar Ilan University held on June 14, 200938, in referring to the refugees. I thought it interesting to use this speech because it could probably be a response to the international community, presenting his own point of view on Obama's speech in Cairo, in which he said throwing a hand to the Arabs, opposing the former U.S. president conflicting policies with the Arab and Islamic world. In Netanyahu's speech we find the following paragraphs on the issue of refugees: “I am yearning for that moment, for when Palestinian leaders say those words to our people and to their people, then a path will be opened to resolving all the problems between our peoples, no matter how complex they may be. Therefore, a fundamental prerequisite for ending the conflict is a public, binding and unequivocal Palestinian recognition of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people. To vest this declaration with practical meaning, there must also be a clear understanding that the Palestinian refugee problem will be resolved outside Israel's borders. For it is clear that any demand for resettling Palestinian refugees within Israel undermines Israel's continued existence as the state of the Jewish people. The Palestinian refugee problem must be solved, and it can be solved, as we ourselves proved in a similar situation. Tiny Israel successfully absorbed hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees who left their homes and belongings in Arab countries. Therefore, justice and logic demand that the Palestinian refugee problem be solved outside Israel's borders. On this point, there is a broad national consensus. I believe that with goodwill and international investment, this humanitarian problem can be permanently resolved.” As we can see in the second paragraph that focuses on refugees, he says that the problem of Palestinian refugees must be resolved outside the borders of Israel, denying the right of return, and recurring to the speech by which Israel hosted its own refugees, the Jews who fled Arab countries. And he says that the humanitarian problem can be solved by goodwill and international investment. But the first thing Palestinians should do is to recognize Israel as a Jewish state, disregarding the demands of return of refugees and the right to live in a secular State which does not discriminate Palestinians of 48 and Israeli Arabs. As shown, he uses the Israeli discourse of societal security, explained by Fernando Navarro in his article. It does not even raise the return of some refugees as a humanitarian measure or within a family reunification program, and about a compensation for the refugeeshe called for international investment. It is a discourse that is pretty close to the Israeli maximalist solution, posed as the origin of Israeli proposals of the PICAR’s work. It also ignores any progress in the negotiations. Maybe in some moment, Netanyahu has accepted the creation of a Palestinian

38

Seehttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2009/Address_PM_Netanyahu_Bar-Ilan_University_14-Jun-2009.htm

22

entity, but according to his speech, he has no intention of accepting any responsibility or making any concessions on the refugees issue.

23

KADIMA

It is a political party created by Ariel Sharon and some of his secular allies39, as TzipiLivni or Ehud Olmert within the LIKUD, in November 2005, following the opposition inside the party to the plan of "disengagement" from Gaza, which represented a break with one of the most important values of the party, the dream of the Greater Israel40. So the sectors most linked to the military secular elite of the party and to certain political groups that had been part of the LIKUD broke with the major sector of it, closest to religious groups and to advocates of a Greater Israel, contrary to withdrawals that could allow the creation of a Palestinian entity in part of the West Bank and Gaza. With the stroke of Ariel Sharon, who remains in a vegetative state since January 2006, Ehud Olmert was presented as a leader for the elections of March 2006; he accompanied the foreign minister and also a member of KADIMA, TzipiLivni, and resumed talks with the Palestinians at Annapolis, from the Arab peace initiative. Regarding the talks and the issue of refugees we found several public statements, onceOlmert left his position as prime minister. The first statements I found interesting to remark are in an article of Bernard Avishai, from May 4, 2009, written on the page of the Geneva Agreement. The author commentsOlmert's statements regarding the offers he made to Mahmud Abbas during meetings held in 2007-2008. These claims are in line with Israeli leaders’ discourse after each unsuccessful negotiation, saying they offered to the Palestinians more than they ever had, in order to justify their failure. We should also note that Olmert said that these offers were made to Abbas verbally, not being written in any case. With respect to refugees, his proposal was accepting 30,000 refugees in Israel, but for humanitarian reasons, not involving Israeli recognition of the right of return. The following statements that I thought interesting to remark were made at a conference of the Geneva Initiative, on September 19th, 201041. In the declarations, Olmertpresented himself as the first Israeli Prime Minister in the government who publicly acknowledged the situation of Palestinian refugees and Israeli responsibility:

39

SeeGoldberg, Giora (January 2010). Kadima goes back: the limited power of vagueness.Israel Affairs, 16, 1, 31-50. 40

See: http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/beginning-of-the-end-of-likud-rule-1.121474 41The news were published in the following media:

http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/olmert-bush-offered-to-absorb-100-000-palestinian-refugees-if-peace-deal-reached-1.314644 http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=188601 http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3956711,00.html http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-09/21/c_13522050.htm http://www.geneva-accord.org/mainmenu/geneva-initiative-conference-israel-and-the-palestinians-%E2%80%93-decision-time

24

“Olmert emphasized that during his address to the Annapolis summit in 2007, he had become the first Israeli prime minister to publicly empathize with the suffering the Palestinians had endured over the years as a result of Israel's operations” He even seems to accept a resolution of the refugee issue in line with the Arab Peace Initiative: “The former premier told a Geneva Initiative conference in Tel Aviv that during negotiations with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in 2008 he had offered a solution to the refugee problem that would have been in line with the Arab League peace plan and promised that any measures would be the result of a coordinated agreement.” The latest news to discuss is of June 13rd, 2012, from the Jerusalem Post42. We have to have in mind that it was a time that opened the possibility of a crisis in Netanyahu’s government, and perhaps with new elections, which was resolved with the entry of KADIMA government under new leadership of ShaulMofaz. The news explains the presentation of a program by KADIMAregarding the expectations of new elections. The proposal about negotiations with the Palestinians is the creation of a demilitarized Palestinian state, but there is no reference to refugees. In the same article, the journalist highlights this detail. He does it, probably because the previous KADIMA leader was one of who most talked about Palestinian refugees, and, according to the reports discussed above, one of who most made "concessions" on this issue. Classifying KADIMA's position accordingly to PICAR’s parameters, it would be in the positions of Israeli commitment. Acceptance of the plight of refugees, but with the Arabs co-responsibility in creating the problem, and accepting a very limited number of refugees on the borders of Israel, under the rubric of family reunification, as no right of return. Moreover they would participate on the compensation fund for refugees. It would be a very serious approach to the positions of the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002, but we have to pick Olmert's statements carefully. These proposals were only verbal and public statements were made after he ceased to be Prime Minister.

42

See: http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=273689

25

LabourParty (Ha’Avoda) and Independence (Sia’atHa’Atzama’ut)

Regarding the position of Labour, we find it more difficult to analyze their position on refugees’ issue, as on the January 17th, 201143the party broke the match between his former leader, Ehud Barak, and part of the traditional apparatus, which was left with 8 seats. Barak created a new centrist and Zionist party, supporting Netanyahu's government, Independence (Sia'atHa'Atzama'ut), and stayed with 5 seats. One reason for the split was the high extent of pressures inside Labour in order to Barak to abandon Netanyahu's government if peace negotiations were still stranded, due to the continued colonization of the West Bank44. Since then there have been no statements on the issue of refugees and therefore I rely on the position of Ehud Barak at Camp David negotiations. So I used the statements and an extensive interview made by Benny Morris, one of the "new Israeli historians", with Ehud Barak. Peace talks were published in The New York Review of Books45 on June 13rd, 2002. About the refugees he said: “…A return of refugees to the prospective Palestinian state though with no “right of return” to Israel proper; and the organization by the international community of a massive aid program to facilitate the refugees’ rehabilitation.” This is the proposal that Arafat refused to accept – according to Barak, a return not to their former villages in the present-day Israel, but to the Palestinian state to be constituted, with an international program to facilitate this resettlement. In another response, later, Arafat was accused of wanting to use the return of refugees to Israel to turn it into an Arab state again and not to recognize Israel as a Jewish state: “Barak believes that Arafat sees the Palestinian refugees of 1948 and their descendants, numbering close to four million, as the main demographic-political tool for subverting the Jewish state.” Barak's position is less close to the Israeli commitment than Olmert’s. Barak was Israeli Chief of State, and his position was closer to that of the hawks, even belonging to the Labour Party. Moreover, it has been one of the reasons for his break with the Labour Party. On the other hand, the current Labour Party, with its new leader Shelly Yachimovich, first wanted to focus towards a third way following the experience of Tony Blair, but the movement for social justice, emerged in the summer of 2011, has unseated with some of its traditional allies such as the Histadrut46, and so far, has no clear pro-peace profile47.

43

The news are on: http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/netanyahu-barak-s-split-from-labor-strengthens-israel-s-government-1.337508 44

The news are on: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201111772831319356.html 45

The interview waspublishedon: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2002/jun/13/camp-david-and-after-an-exchange-1-an-interview-wi/?pagination=false 46

The news are on: http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/histadrut-joins-housing-struggle-asactivists-step-up-protests-in-jerusalem-tel-aviv-1.375624 47

http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/magazine/a-woman-s-place-1.379559

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Israel Beitenu

Israel Beiteinu (Israel Our Home) is a political party created in 1999 by Avigdor Lieberman. Avigdor formed the party after leaving the LIKUD because of the acceptance of the proposal Netanayahu "land for peace" with the Hebron agreement at Wye Plantation in 1997. It is a modern right-wing party, which focuses around themes nationalist discourse, anti-Arab security and Islamophobic - coming to submit a plan to change the Arab populated areas of Israel by Israeli settlements in the West Bank and ask for an oath of fidelity to Israel's Arab citizens to enable them to maintain. On the issue of refugees found the following sentence in your program: “It is obvious that the pursuit of a Palestinian state and the “right of return” is designed to disguise the real purpose, which is to wipe out Israel as a Jewish and Zionist country.” With this statementit shows their opposition to the Palestinian state and the right of return of refugees, which they see as an existential threat to Israel as a Jewish and Zionist state. Also in an article in the Jerusalem Post on June 23, 2010 Avigdor says that Palestinian refugees will settle in the Palestinian state, as did Jewish refugees in the State of Israel: "Just as the Jewish Refugees from Arab lands found a solution in Israel, so too will only be Palestinian Refugees incorporated into a Palestinian state" It is worth remembering that, in addition, Avigdor who proposed the law banning the recallingof the Nakba in Israel. It is also important to note the statements of Deputy David Rotem on negotiations with the Palestinian Authority stating the party's red lines: "Jerusalem is a red line for us, nor for them, the city can not be divided in any way. No Negotiations on Jerusalem, no return of Refugees, and not land for peace; these must be our red lines " We can see that the position of Israel Beiteinu would be in what we qualify as Israeli maximalist positions, naming the Arab Jews who settled in Israel as an example of what to do Palestinian refugees, according to his ideal of seeking ethnically pure communities.

27

SHAS

Shas is a political party created in 1984 by Rabbi OvadiaYosef. It is a haredi party (ultraOrthodox Jewish) of the Sephardic and Mizrahi community. But, unlike haredis parties, for their Sephardic component, does not have a purely defense of Jewish orthodoxy, understood as the clash between state and religion from the Western point of view. In the same way that Western social scientists have failed to understand the Islamist movements in Arab countries, likewise fail to try to classify the Shas party48. In order to understand it, we must first comprehend how the synagogue in the Sephardic/Mizrahi tradition was not only a religious center but also the center of social life where Jewish communities in North Africa and the Middle East were organized around. When Jewish immigrants from these areas arrived in the 50's to Israel, they felt abandoned by the Ashkenazi elite that settled them in outlying developmental towns. Then they began to recreate their model of organization of their places of origin and, similarly to Islamist organizations, developed an entire civil society with educational, health and social support organizations around their synagogues. When they were disappointed by Labour's Westernized secular model, they switched their vote to the LIKUD, taking it to power in 1979 with Menachem Begin, who disappointed them as well because he did not break the Ashkenazi hegemony. Then they began to organize themselves politically around the Shas Party, founded in 1984. So, it has also been considered a far-right party by the defense of eastern conservatism - as have been the Islamist parties - with an"anti-political" speech, against Western democracy, and its xenophobia, which unlike Israel, does not focus on the Arabs. We have to keep in mind that they are Arab Jews – not the new Russian Jewish immigrants, of whom they question their status as Jews, and African and Asian labor migrants who came to respond the needs of cheap labor after the closure of the West Bank and the end of cheap Palestinian labor49. Regarding the peace process, we find a dichotomy: on one hand Rabbi OvadiaYosef was pragmatic and supportive of negotiations, because of the obligation of saving lives, but on the other hand, part of the electorate is closer to hawks50. Regarding refugees, SHAS always tries to introduce the exodus of the Arab Jewish into the debate. This is given because of the origin of many of its leaders and voters, Jews native from Arab countries, many of whom fled when they began to experience serious difficulties in their home countries because of the conflict between Zionism and the Palestinians, already discussed in the section on the exodus of the Arab Jews from Arab countries. This means that its parliamentary group is the one who takes initiatives for the Jewish exodus from Arab countries is taken into account51.

48

SeeKamil, Omar (2001). TheSinagogue, civil society, and Israel’sShasparty. Critique: CriticalMiddle Eastern Studies, 18, 10, 47-66. 49

SeePedhazur, Ami (2001). TheTransformation of Israel’s Extreme Right. Studies in Conclict&Terrorism, 24, 1, 25-42. 50

SeeCharbit, Myriam (2003). Shasbetweenidentityconstruction and clientelistsdynamics: thecreation of an “Identityclientelism”. Nationalism and EthnicPolitics, 9, 3, 102-128. 51

http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/157985#.UCTiwk3N8rI

28

Arab parties, left wing and social movements for the return of the

refugees

To finish, we will review Arab parties in Israel and the movements made up of Jews and Arabs who support the claims of the refugees. We must remember that 20% of Israel's population is Arab/Palestinian, Christians and Muslims - Sunni and Druze. This minority has been marginalized since the creation of the state of Israel. In fact were those who, for various reasons, were not expelled, but lost much of their land, even many of them became internal refugees and, today, still suffer discriminatory policies and the destruction of their villages52. For this reason the Nakbais still alive in their memory, and they endorse the claims of the refugees53with whom often have family ties. This marginalized minority, over time, has managed to organize. Today, only one third of Arab voters continue voting Zionist parties. The others votes to 3 major parties:

1. HADASH, a coalition around the former Communist Party (MAKI / RAKAH), which traditionally had defended the rights of Arab citizens within Israel, as they are not allowed to organize themselves until the 70s. They lived under military authority until 1966. But the fact that in 1948Communists accepted the division into two states, their uncritical submission to the dictates of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union during the Cold War - more concerned with Soviet interests than with those of the Palestinians, their own divisions, for being a mixed party - Jews and Arabs, and that clearly has not defended nationalist postulates, they were considered a party not clear in their demands for the Arabs. However, on their program, since 1955, is the return of the refugees54.

2. BALAD, the National Democratic Assembly, around AzmiBishara, nowadays exiled, a

nationalist and leftist party, with the message of a state for all its citizens, which clearly include refugees and the return on their claims55. This party was born from the process of "Palestinization" or consciousness and political action of the Arabs of 48, which occurred as a result of the encounter between the Palestinians who had remained within the borders of the 48 and the Palestinians from West Bank and Gaza, occupied since the '67 war. And also influenced their appearance the end of the "militar diktat" on the Arabs 48, that allowed them to organize autonomously within

52

Seehttp://www.alternativenews.org/english/index.php/news/news/4276-uprooting-30000-bedouin-in-israel-.html 53

SeeFrisch, Hilel (2005). Israel and itsArabsCitizens. Israel Affairs, 11, 1, 207-222. 54

SeeBarreñada, Isaías. Identidad nacional y ciudadanía en el conflicto israelí palestino. Los palestinos con ciudadanía israelí, parte del conflicto y excluidos del proceso de paz [en línea]. Madrid: Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociología, 2004. http://www.tdx.cat/handle/10803/46481 [ Accessed: 29 August 2012], p. 326-342. 55

SeeBarreñada, Isaias, Identidad nacional y ciudadanía en el conflicto israelí palestino. Los palestinos con ciudadanía israelí, parte del conflicto y excluidos del proceso de paz [en línea]. Madrid: Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociología, 2004. http://www.tdx.cat/handle/10803/46481 [ Accessed: 29 August 2012], p. 682-684.

29

Israel. It was born of the union of nationalists (Abna-na-Balad56 and the Progressive List for Peace57) and the nationalist split from the communist party.

3. Islamists or Islamist Movement, presented electorally in the last election (2009) in the

United Arab List, which, although its flag is the defense of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the right of return of the refugees is also part of their demands. Emerged from the contacts resumed in 1967 with Islamic religious institutions, and strongly supported by the Islamic social associations, it was initially a local movement.It has managed to become national, largely due to their fight for Al-Aqsa. It has failed to be fully united and we find divisions, with a moderate sector deciding to participate in elections and close to Arafat, and another that prefers to stay out of the system that does not consider theirs, closer to Hamas58.

All these political parties have the claim of right of the refugees; there is eve the Association for the Defense of the Rights of the Internally Displaced in Israel. They carry out a work of preservation of the historical memory of the destroyed villages, calling for the possibility of returning to these villages, whether in specific activities such as summer camps for children and youth where they transmit to the next generation their historical memory, or as permission to rebuild and continue using the cemetery59. Even the fact that the PLO has left refugees demands a little aside, as it did with the Palestinians of 48, has made the ties between these communities stronger, conducting international meetings between the two groups. But we must consider that due to the discrimination they face, their first fight, almost basic, is the recognition of their existence and rights, given the discriminatory policies that they are increasingly suffering, as the prohibition of remembering the Nakba or the attempt to create a civil service to the state that seeks the reform of the Tal-Law. I also find interesting to show the until now very minority position of the post-Zionist Israeli left, which, given the ongoing colonization and the difficulties in establishing a viable Palestinian state, resumes the positions that had defended the Palestinian left (PFLP and DFLP) and Matzpen60 about a single state, secular and binational, where refugees could return. This position was seen as a chimera, but due the continued colonization and unstoppable progress towards a situation of apartheid61, where even a former U.S. President, Jimmy Carter, 56

Abna-na-Balad is a lawlesspoliticalorganizationdefined as nationalist and Marxist, closetothe Popular Front fortheLiberation of Palestine. 57

Front of differentnationalistpoliticalforces emerged in the '70s. 58

SeeBarreñada, Isaías, Identidad nacional y ciudadanía en el conflicto israelí palestino. Los palestinos con ciudadanía israelí, parte del conflicto y excluidos del proceso de paz [en línea]. Madrid: Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociología, 2004. http://www.tdx.cat/handle/10803/46481 [Accessed: 29 August 2012], p. 600-618. 59

SeeBarreñada, Isaías, Identidad nacional y ciudadanía en el conflicto israelopalestino. Los palestinos con ciudadanía israelí, parte deI conflicto y excluidos del proceso de paz [en línea]. Madrid: Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociología, 2004. http://www.tdx.cat/handle/10803/46481 [ Accessed: 29 August 2012], p. 727-728. 60

IsraelileftistAssociation of the '60s and '70s whoadvocatedfor a single state, secular and binational. 61

SeeBondia, David y Luciana Coconi (Marzo 2010). Apartheid againstthePalestinianPeople.DocumentpreparedbytheCommittee of Experts of theRuseell Tribunal of Spain and Catalonia and Proceedings of theFirst International Session of the Russell Tribunal onPalestine. Barcelona: ICIP.

30

denounces, the debate on one or two states is beginning to appear in the public arena62. This solution consists on the creation of a state with two nations, Israel and Palestine, where everyone have the same rights. The fact that many of the areas where the Palestinians were expelled remain uninhabited could allow the return of most of these refugees63. On the other hand, also appointed Zochrot64 work (remembering in Hebrew), an Israeli organization that seeks to introduce and explain to the Jewish/Israeli public the Palestinian Nakba, to make them aware of what represented the creation of the state of Israel, and recognizes the right of the refugees to return, in their work of historical memory.

62

Even Dr. John Mearsheimertalksaboutit: http://www.ipsnews.net/2011/02/dead-peace-process-could-be-national-suicide-for-israel/ 63

SeeAbu Sitta, Salman (2004). Un país borrado del mapa. En El derecho al retorno. El problema de los refugiados palestinos. Madrid: Ediciones del Oriente y del Mediterráneo. 64

Seehttp://www.zochrot.org/en

31

Analysis

Once observed the speeches of political parties in Israel, I analyze to whom and for what purpose these speeches are made. The first thing we notice is the separation between the Zionist parties: LIKUD, KADIMA, Labor, Israel Beiteinu and Shas, which make it clear they will not allow a right of return, at best, a "limited"return, less than 100,000 refugees under the name of family reunification. And, on the other hand, non-Zionist parties that I included as Arab parties and left, they do recognize the right of return.

Using the sociology of power65, we find how the Zionist parties are political elites, linked to economic or religious elites as appropriate, struggling for political power, which give them the vote in a representation election system. It is a circular struggle for power. In this case, for political power, in which each party would represent elite interests or linked to some other - some economic sectors, security and religious - and also, according to those interests, seeking a constituency or another. Or convince voters to seek some other needs – a negotiator profile or based on security - to get more votes and therefore more political power.

However, Zionist parties do not intend to carry out a linearstruggle forspecific targets: the right to be equal in the state of Israel, and in the case of this study, the right of refugees to return to their villages and towns, where they were expelled from. Arguably, the political leaders of these parties are an elite within their communities, whether economic or cultural ability. But the differential power regarding Zionist elites is so great, and the benefits of being elected as a Member of the Knesset for the moment unable to achieve any real power are so low (regardless the damage to be deputy of a non-Zionist party in Israel), we cannot speak of an economic or political power among not Zionists party leaders. Thus we speak of groups, at least for now, that have a linear relationship of power.

Returning to the Zionist parties, we could differentiate between closest economic elites or others. Thus, intuitively and probably we find a relationship with certain economic sectors as weapons and agricultural and industrial investments in the colonies on the LIKUD and Israel Beiteinu programs, staunch advocates of colonization and the "no return". Avigdor Lieberman himself lives in the colony of Nokdim, between Bethlehem and Hebron, and amongthe members of LIKUD there are 9000 settlers66.

KADIMA and Labour are likely to have more to do with economic sectors with an interest in internationalizing its economy, and therefore, more concerned that Israel does not have an image of settler and warrior, as this at some point may complicate their international economic interests. So they look for that "negotiator"profile.

Another element to analyze would be its relationship with the military elite. In the four parties we can find - although Israel Beiteinu has not had high officials among its members - a significant number of former officers among their ranks that may be linked to an interest in maintaining the conflict open, by economic and social benefits obtained from the high investment made in public and private security that develops the Israeli state. Here we must remember that many Israeli officials after finishing his army service are investors and workers

65

See: Izquierdo, Ferran (2008). Poder y felicidad. Una propuesta de sociología del poder. Madrid: Los libros de la catarata. y Álvarez-Ossorio, Igancio y FerranIzquerdo (2007) ¿Por qué ha fracasado la paz? Claves para entender el conflicto palestino-israelí.Madrid: Los libros de la catarata. 66

Seehttp://www.haaretz.com/news/national/how-the-settlers-embarrassed-netanyahu-again-1.428581

32

ofprivate security companies that are hired later by the state67.

On the other hand it is clear the relationship between SHAS and a religious elite that wields power through its religious institutions68 - synagogues, rabbinical schools and religious social organizations - and who is also interested in a conservative electorate of Mizrahi origin.

But these intuitions are too far from this thesis, which only focuses on the discourses on refugees.

If we think about whom their audience speeches are directed to, we find that the LIKUD and Israel Beiteinu head for settlers sectors, and to those who defend options oriented to toughest security situations. Although it will probably differ on thatLIKUDgets closer to the religious - not haredi - and Israel Beiteinu to more secular, with particular regard to the new Soviet immigrants69. And KADIMA and Labour may have a less concerned profile about security, but in wartime its profile continues to be hard, as shown in the Lebanon war in 2006 or the invasion of Gaza in 2009.

In the speeches we found only minor differences between the Zionist elites: between definite no return to a really timid acceptance of no more than a few tens of thousands of refugees in the territories of Israel. Indeed, we find that the issue of refugees, converted in a matter of great concern for safety, for a while has become a red line for all parties that advocate a predominantly Jewish Israel.

67

Hever, Shir (2010). The Political Economy of Israel’s Occupation.Repression beyond Exploitation. London: Pluto Press. 68

SeeKamil, Omar (2001). The Sinagogue, civil society, and Israel’s Shas party.Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, 18, 10, 47-66. 69

See Horowitz, Tamar (2003). The Increasing Political Power of Immigrants from the Former Soviet Union in Israel: From Passive Citizenship to Active Citizenship. International Migration, 41, 1, 47-73.

33

Conclusions After observing the positions of the main Israeli parties on the resolution of the refugees’ situation, we note no progress, and we could even say that it has gone backwards compared to approaches that took place during the negotiations of the 90. The position of the LIKUD, Israel Beiteinu and Ehud Barak from the Labour Party, is very close to the Israeli maximalist positions. In their speech, the security argument for the preservation of the current state, or "existential" danger to Israel with a possible return of refugees, are central. The refugees should return to the Palestinian state or entity. And the international community should financially support such resettlement. Furthermore, both LIKUD and Israel Beiteinu, with SHAS, continue wielding the issue of Jewish-Arab refugees/migrants as opposed to the situation of the Palestinian refugees. Only Ehud Olmert, from KADIMA, and once abandoned their governmental responsibilities, discussed verbal proposals made toMahmud Abbas in Annapolis. These offers got close to the Israeli compromise positions: acceptance of joint responsibility in creating the refugee issue; accepting a limited number of refugees on the borders of Israel, but under the name of "family reunification" and not as a "right of return" and financial support to the resettlement of refugees in the Palestinian state. But the conditions under which such statements were made prevent to consider the proposals as firm. The positions of the Arab minority are very weak and their own freedoms are continually threatened by drift and very distinctly ethnic religious Israeli society, so it should only be considered as the position of this minority within a state that excludes them politically. As described by FerranIzquierdo and Ignacio Alvarez-Ossorio, a minimally fair peace is possible only in the case that "in Israel power relations change or Israeli society decides to demand peace to their rulers and their elites." Israeli political elites do not seem to work to find a solution to the conflict that currently allows them to continue gathering resources in their circular struggle for power70. From the major parties, only KADIMA has shown a willingness to reach a commitment in recent years. It was in 2007 and very cautious. The current situation with the Arab Spring, especially changes in Egypt and the dramatic situation in Syria have raised the American and European light pressure to keep the negotiations completely stalled. Although a democratization in the Arab states can make the Arab public, well aware of the plight of the Palestinians, press its elites to support more importantly, not instrumentally as usual, Palestinian claims. On the other hand the issue of Iranian nuclear development has been used once again for Israel to appear as a victim and endangered, fueling the hawks.

70

See Álvarez-Ossorio, Ignacio y Ferran Izquierdo (2007). ¿Por qué ha fracasado la paz? Claves para entender el conflicto palestino-israelí. Madrid: Los libros de la catarata.

34

Only the appearance of the "new Israeli historians" who have tried to explain the events in Palestine in 1948, gives us a little glimmer of hope that they can change things in Israel. For now the Israelis who have become aware of these facts are minorities, but have initiated projects in order to reach more people. If that consciousness extends in an important way among a sector of Israeli Jews they could join the Arab marginalized minority and start pressuring elites, but their power springs are still very limited, and without other pressures, such as the attitude changing of the international community, this change seems to be far away.

35

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