The Oriental Rebel in Western History

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The Oriental Rebel in Western History1

Govand Khalid Azeez

Abstract: Edward Said’s Orientalism through deconstructing colonial discourses of

power-knowledge, postulates that colonization for the colonized has a particular

ontological finality, reification. I contend here that the process of subjection has a far

more profound effect than merely reifying the colonized, to borrow from Anouar

Abdel-Malek, as customary, passive, non-participating and non-autonomous. Rather,

Western imperial narratives and what Said calls its “evaluative judgments” and

“program of actions” also come to interpellate the reified subject’s cosmovision,

agency and its forms of resistance. Focusing on the Middle East, this study is a

genealogy that exposes how techniques and technologies of imperial power have

symbolically and materially produced the Oriental rebel in Western history. Through

re-reading institutionalized knowledges and resurrecting a counter-history, this paper

reveals a hidden and buried discursive formation, one which I call counter-

revolutionary discourse. I argue that this system of thought is built through dispersed

and heterogeneous but power-laden statements from Aymeric and Comte de Volney to

Napoleon Bonaparte, Ernest Renan, Gustave Lebon, and Thomas Friedman.

To cite this article : Govand Khalid Azeez. "The Oriental Rebel in Western History."

Arab Studies Quarterly 37, no. 3 (2015): 244-63.

Introduction

Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978), adopting Michel Foucault’s formula was a

genealogical attempt to expose an error around Orient history which the West had

adopted as a truth. Said was proclaiming that the Orientalists2 as “shoddy historians”

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utilizing Ursprungsphilosophie4

had manufactured a “system of representations

framed by a whole set of forces that brought the Orient into Western learning,

Western consciousness, and later Western empire.”5 The Orientalists’ and colonial

officials’ customary pursuit of a flawed Ursprung [origin] in the Orient was to

confirm that their imperial ventures rested on rigid historical necessities and erudite

intentions.6 Yet, although unheeded, Said goes one-step further, for him, complex

fabricated mythologies founded and embellished by Eurocentric-Orientalist7 historical

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illusions did not only subjectify8 the Oriental subject but also its weltanschauung

[cosmovision], subjectivity9 and aspirations.

Taking Said’s proposition into perspective, this work exposes another case of

Nietzschean pudenda origo [shameful origins]10

—what I call counter-revolutionary

discourse (CRD). This is a historicized regime of truth and a system of thought with

distinctive but homologous analytical devices which I have previously denominated:

recrudescence of fanaticism, progress fetishism and outsourcing of agency. I

hypothesized that through this regime of truth and its various dispositions, techniques

and functionings, Western colonial apparatus surveils, familiarizes, gauges, labels and

finally subjectifies the colonized subject’s resistance.

Via Foucault’s genealogy, this philosophical historicization aims to further explore

the “archeology of the silence”11

of the Arab and Middle Eastern rebel. The questions I

put forward here are simple, if everything about the Oriental is objectified by imperial

hegemonic discourses, as Said postulates, what does that mean for its resistance? How

have imperial structures of power and its Youngean “white mythologies”12

historically

re-presented the thingified subject’s revolutions? Is there a hidden and buried Saidian

“evaluative judgment” and an “implicit program of action” regarding Middle Eastern

resistance in Western history? If so, what is its specific norm, what are the conditions

of its rise, expansion and variation?

In the first section, I introduce and give a detailed genealogical account of the

emergence of this counter-revolutionary discourse and its three analytical devices. I

investigate the ensembles of this discursive formation through tracking and tracing its

énoncés [discursive statements] from William of Tyre, Louis VII of France, Comte de

Volney and Napoleon to Gustave Lebon, amongst many others. In the process, I

demonstrate how the production of a certain kind of Eurocentric-Orientalist

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savoir13

[institutionalized knowledge] (CRD); an institution of power (colonialism) and

the infinite technicians of evaluation14

(Orientalist scholars, colonial officials, military

officers, journalists, novelists, etc.) conjointly come to symbolically and materially

create a subject (the Oriental rebel).

In the second section, through a close textual reading of British, French and

American archives, declassified government documents, military and intelligence

reports, memoirs, as well as journalistic and scholarly materials, drawing from the

case studies of Urabi (1879-82), Mahdi (1881-89), Egyptian Revolutions of 1919 and

1952, Mossadegh Revolt (1952), Lebanese Revolution (1958), Palestinian Liberation

Organization (PLO 1964), Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK 1978), and the more recent

Arab uprisings (2010), I empirically demonstrate not only how CRD and its three

symbolic instruments of violence, in an Althusserian sense, hail to the Oriental’s

resistance and subjectify it.15

But also reaffirm that the Oriental rebel, in Western

history, is the product of nothing but the nexus of specific techniques of imperial

power and its ever-expanding system of knowledges.

The Genealogy of Counter-Revolutionary Discourse

The disturbing and atomizing of this erected imperial foundation around Middle

Eastern resistance first and foremost requires adopting a critical analysis towards

history. This includes detaching history from its imperialist and bourgeois Eurocentric

ideological foundation and exposing its dual function of naturalizing current forms of

exploitation and negating the possibility of revolutions. Nietzschean-Foucauldian

Wirkliche Historie [effective history]—as the rigorous and collective examination of

Herkunft [descent] and Entstehung [emergence]—allows for the insurrection of the

subjugated knowledges and “historical contents that have been buried or masked in

functional coherences or formal systematizations.”16

History of the present opposes

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and transcends platonic essentialism’s search for origin, the Hegelian teleological

idealism and its linear progress of consciousness of freedom or Ranke’s scientific

objectivist task to “wie es eigentlich gewsen” [simply show how it really was].17

On the other hand, genealogy, through Herkunft, “disturbs what was previously

considered immobile; it fragments what was thought unified; it shows that

heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself.” 18

Whilst, through

Entstehung, it presents the developments, as “merely the current episodes in a series of

subjugations.”19

Accordingly, genealogy exposes CRD as the sordid affair between

dual historicities—the diachronic history of the continuous discursive ensemble and

the synchronic history of the colonizing subject and its cognitive schema—and the

system of power that regulates them.

Traces of this discourse regarding Orient resistance can be discerned in the works

of successive Westerners from Albert of Achen to Volney, Vicomte de Chateaubriand,

Lothrop Stoddard, and imperial officials like Napoleon, Lord Milner, Lord Cromer,

Winston Churchill, and Henry Kissinger. For all these Westerners, like Ernest Renan,

Middle Eastern revolutions were nothing but a “disgrace to civilization.”20

Nevertheless, no other node within this discourse unravels this counter-revolutionary

formula in the West as the paradigmatic Orientalist and first-generation revolutionary

theorist, Gustave Lebon.

Counter-Revolutionary Discourse through Gustave Lebon

Lebon’s groundbreaking texts—The Civilization of the Arabs (1884), The Psychology

of Peoples (1894), The Crowd: A study of the Popular Mind (1895) and The

Psychology of Revolution (1912)—read critically, infer how this regime of truth’s

discursive strategies and technologies of representation interpellate, derogate and

contain Arab and Muslim resistance. Lebon’s counter-revolutionary formula deciphers

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revolutions through two fundamental factors: remote and immediate. Together these

two influences, remote (race, tradition, institutions, education, and time) and

immediate (images, words and formulas, illusions, experience, and reason)

manufacture the “soul of the race” of a revolutionary crowd.21

Whilst these factors all

structure the collective belief, sentiment and actions of the revolutionaries, for him, the

“laws of heredity ensured that race is the fundamental determinant in the peculiar

beliefs of a crowd.”22

Accordingly, Lebon, drawing from the Eurocentric bipolar line

of “civilizational apartheid” of the East and West and its related hierarchical

“metageography of civilizational zones” comes to present his own Darwinian saturated

racial schema.23

At the low end of the Lebonian scale are the primitive races

(animalistic aboriginals), followed by inferior races (Negros with rudimentary

civilization), average races (the Japanese, the Chinese, and the Semitic), and lastly, the

superior races (Europeans).24

Collective discernment, mobilization and revolutionary conduct is decoded, gauged

and adjudicated through the positionality of a revolutionary crowd within this schema.

After all, Lebon insists a revolutionary crowd is a single being created by the past.

Every “race carries in its mental constitution the laws of its destiny…these laws that it

obeys with a resistless impulse, even in the case of those of its impulses which

apparently are the most unreasoned.”25

In time of revolution, agency vanishes under

the weight of this rapidly transmitted contagious mental unity. The lower ranked a

“national soul,” the more degenerating this mental unity, its revolutionary principles

and weltanschaung.

For Lebon, the soul of the race is “the synthesis” of a people’s “entire past,” or “the

inheritance of all its ancestors.”26

Writing entirely within the archive of his time, he

declares that what differentiates the Europeans from the Orientals is that only the

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Europeans have an elite superior men.27

The revolutionary crowd could only be led by

theatrical performance of the demagogue, which impresses and seduces them. The

logical superior European man, as the Hegelian Weltgeist [World spirit], can always

for the sake of progression, play the role of the God that the crowd demands before

everything else.28

Accordingly, through this “phalanx of eminent men”29

there is

always the theoretical possibility of a progressive revolution in Europe.

With the Orient, however, the idea of a progressive revolution is impossible.

“Arabs,” for Lebon, were “prisoners of their fate; forever static their character [soul of

the race] would not allow them to develop further, nor could they make the next step

to become Europeans, for that went against their basic characteristics.”30

In fact, as

Douglas Kerr states, “essentialized, primitive, feminized, incapable of reason,

fetishistic, and in need of a leader, Le Bon’s crowd is ‘Oriental’, and an actual Oriental

crowd would be a sort of tautology.”31

In this sense, Oriental revolutions are at best

the result of an endemic dialectical tension between the always losing, rare and

isolated anomalous desire to change and the all-domineering irrational, uncivilized,

violent and Islamic racial soul of the Oriental herd, who is always yearning for the

past.

Oriental revolutions, a product of the latter, are then destined to be only impulsive,

mobile and highly violent and destructive recurrent episodes. The least excitement

leads the irrational Orient to act with the most fury, time and time again. In these

revolutions, there are no deep mires of ideas, ideologies and principles or even a desire

for a progressive and civilized political system. The Oriental, to reapply Lebon,

“shout[s] because there are men shouting, revolts because there is a revolt, without

having the vaguest idea of the cause of shouting or revolution.”32

The “absurdity of his

belief matters little; for him it is a burning reality.” 33

In addition, lethargic and

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stagnant, the homo islamicus, to borrow the term form Maxime Rodinson, naturally

suffers from a pathological revolutionary disposition, Lebon laments:

…the very conservative peoples are addicted to the most violent

revolutions. Being conservative, they are not able to evolve

slowly, or adapt themselves to variations of environment, so

that when the discrepancy becomes too extreme they are bound

to adapt themselves suddenly. This sudden evolution constitutes

a revolution.34

Lebon proclaims no revolution or even change of government can “transform the

mentality of a people.”35

After all, he writes, a people’s national soul “determines its

destiny within certain limits in spite of all superficial changes.”36

All the revolutionary

changes that contradict the soul and the general beliefs and sentiments of a race are of

“transient duration, and the diverted stream soon resumes its course.”37

Thus,

revolution in the Middle East can overthrow despotic leaders, change regimes, redraw

territorial borders, redesign the color of flags, restructure and rename institutions,

rewrite constitutions, amend political policies, even conceive distinct normative

political visions, but, in reality, in its essence, the revolution is destined to be a definite

failure and the region remaining eternally unmodified.

Counter-Revolutionary Discourse Beyond Lebon

This counter-revolutionary formula, however, is by no means unique to Lebon. The

rise of this discourse illustrates multiple and contingent emergences, convolutions and

discontinuities. Lebon is but one point amongst many synchronic points of intersection

that with time have manufactured a diachronic linear hegemonic historical narrative.

His argumentation and assertions were merely a produce of the normative values, set

of ideas and thinking tools drawn directly from the CRD archive. In fact, tracking the

discursive statements regarding Oriental resistance indicates that the discourse itself

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emerges twice before Lebon. The first indicator of a corpus of knowledge that

presupposes a certain gaze, tradition and practice against forms of resistance in the

Orient roots back to the Crusades, roughly 1118 onwards when eleven knights vowed

to eradicate Oriental resistance against the newly founded Christian Kingdom.

In this first emergence, CRD arises out of the Milita Dei or Christi; Knight of

Templars, the Knight of Hospitallers and the Christian-Muslim battlefields. One where

monk warrior castes, bishops and aristocrats led by the likes of Hugh of Payens,

Godfrey of Saint Omer, Blessed Gerard Thom and Robert the Monk, for the sake of

domination and self-aggrandizement, come to distort all realities regarding resistance

to the Crusades. This is a discourse erected upon religious zeal, aristocratic pride and

noble rapaciousness. A set of values and cognitive behaviors surfacing shortly after

the First Crusade by the military order out of the necessity to protect not only the Holy

Sepulchre and the pilgrims. But more importantly, the responsibility to defend the new

colony’s frontiers from the Amanus Mountains in the north to Tripoli and down to the

desert fringes in south and East.38

The Knight of Templars and Hospitallers, after the defeat and the disappearance of

the feudal armies in the Holy Land, had become the predominant link between the

Crusader states, the Roman Church and the Orient.39

As the prevalent orthodoxic force

in a Crusader ring of connections, the military order comes to subjectify Muslim

resistance from Kerbogha, Sultan Muhammad I and Tughtikin, Nur ad-Din Abu al-

Qasim, to Selahedine Eyubi and Al-Afdal Eyubi through a dichotomizing gaze. A gaze

that essentializes and disqualifies Muslim resistance according to the developing set of

ethnocentric normative values and interests. In this first emergence, the discourse

arises out of the homogenization of the ahistorical Other, utilizing the supposed

ontological and epistemological distinctions between Orient and Occident and

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annexing the related rhetorics of alterity through what Foucault would later call the

dividing practises. It is a system of thought that flows out of Said’s classic

Orientalism; drawing from theology, occult medieval doctrines, Hellenistic

metaphysics, fears of Mohammadism and Henri Baudet’s “Asiatic tidal waves.”

It is in this way that George VII in 1095 denounced Muslim resistance to the

Crusaders’ plunder and mass murder in the region as merely the pagan’s innate

capability for horrible cruelty and devastation.40

Only two years later, in 1097, an

anonymous Crusader in the Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum

denounces Muslim rebels defending their territory as merely “barbarian hordes.”41

The

anonymous author writes that the Orientals like wild animals, once they “found that

they could resist and hurt us” 42

stopped at nothing. Accordingly, he recounts that these

most “iniquitous barbarians came out cautiously, and rushing violently upon us, killed

many of our knights and foot-soldiers who were off their guard.”43

Similarly, William

of Tyre in 1144 reduces Zengi’s army to merely a horde of Muslim fanatics and “the

enemy of the faith and the foe of the Christian name.”44

By the same token, Aymeric,

the Patriarch of Antioch, in a letter to Louis VII of France in 1164 labels Nur ad-Din

and Shirko’s armies, who were aiming to recapture occupied territories, as merely the

“great devastator[s] of the Christian people.”45

This army of savages, Aymeric writes,

have “devastated the whole country as far as the sea with fire and sword and exercised

their tyranny according to their lusts on everything which met their eyes.”46

The vocabulary and repository of images manufactured by this ring of connections

overtime leads to the formation of a discipline, with its dual Foucauldian

connotation—as a body of knowledge and as a symbolic institution of control and

domination. This cognitive and linguistic structure constitutes what Said calls a

“formidable mechanism of omnicompetent definitions” 47

which ensures itself as the

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only suitable valid foundation when discussing Oriental resistance. As such, Crusade

chroniclers from Ekkehard of Aura, Conrad of Monferrat, Oliver of Paderborn to

Ricaut Bonomel, come to toe the discourse’s epistemological rules and with time give

birth to CRD’s first cognitive tool, the recrudescence of fanaticism—I have borrowed

the term from Edward Dicey’s representation of Egyptian political mobilization and

revolts, particularly Urabi.48

Under the symbolic violence of this CRD notion, as the

next section illustrates, unanimously, the rebel who resists is repeatedly represented

within this Orientalist narrative as a “fanatic Moslem,” “savage mujahid,” “blood

thirsty extremist” and a “destroyer.”

Napoleon’s expedition and the subsequent colonization of Egypt in 1789 marks the

beginning of the second point of emergence of this developing transcendental

discourse. Furious that the Egyptians had the audacity to revolt against the occupation,

Napoleon, through CRD, reminds his posse that they shall not “be the play-thing of

some hordes of vagabonds, of these Arabs who one barely counts among the civilized

peoples, and of the populace of Cairo, the most brutish and savage rogues who exist in

the World.”49

Napoleon—whom Chateaubriand famously called “the last crusader”—

in his early life had come to be acquainted with the supposed racial inferiority and

Otherness of the Orient through classical Orientalists like Abber de Marigny, M.

Savary, C.S Sonnini, Abbe Lcroix, and Montesquieu.

But it was through reading and meeting Comte de Volney that Napoleon came to

internalize not only Orientalism, as Said suggests, but also his counter revolutionary

orientation. Remarkably similar to Lebon, Volney’s republican imperialism and its

theory of invasion drew on existing notions of racial essentialism and centuries of

East-West animosity and indifference from Saint Louis’s Crusade debacle to the

Ottoman peril. Volney, in his work Voyage en Egypte et en Syrie (1807), which

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consequently became an eschatological bible in Napoleon’s army, posited that neither

the Ottomans nor England posed a serious threat to French occupation of Egypt,

Muslim resistance did. Islam, Volney declared, is “in everything and everywhere”50

breeding a “fanatic superstition” which was “the source of innumerable disorders.” 51

Oriental resistance, on the account of this religious fanaticism and local savagery, was

one such disorder. As such, Volney’s texts, in Said’s words, were to be handbooks

“used by any European wishing to win in the Orient.”52

Napoleon publicly did all he could to not be construed by the natives as a Crusader.

Privately however, in an attempt to decipher Oriental resistance, he seems to have

drawn great connection between his campaign and the Crusades. Lavalette’s memoir

illuminates how Napoleon had studied Arab and Muslim resistance to the Crusades in

minute detail. Lavalette writes:

…the commander in chief had a lively desire to know whether

the inhabitants of Mansoura had preserved any memory of their

victorious resistance when the Count of Artois attacked them

with such imprudence during the expedition of Saint Louis. But

it appeared, after all our researches, that the Egyptians neither

knew the name of Saint Louis nor the action that had made their

ancestors illustrious.53

The Orientals may have not paid attention to their ancestors’ actions, Napoleon and

his men however did. Interwoven beyond extrication within an increasingly expanding

yet homogenous web of ideas, dispositions and representations, key figures in

Napoleon’s army—like General Jean Baptist Kleber, General Bertrand, General

Desaix, General Menou and Lieutenant Eugène de Beaucharrahcame—came to further

internalize, utilize, disseminate, and augment these Western notions of Oriental

resistance, stitched together from Roger des Moulis of the Knight of Hospitallers to

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Volney. In fact, the utilization of this discourse had become central to the campaign,

so much so that in the eve of crushing the Cairo revolt, zoologist Saint-Hilarie boasted

that the French had now become the “tutors of the world in how to organize to combat

insurgencies.”54

By late nineteenth century, CRD gradually transforms into a dominant cultural

force and a powerful institution through dual metamorphoses in the knowledge-power

nexus. On the one hand, a stronger imperial and industrializing state with tightly

hinged political connections and increasing ability to administer social life, a rising

and efficient bureaucratized but centralized colonial office, the unregulated

accumulation of capital abroad and a somewhat autonomous and more powerful

military, prompted more sophisticated tactics of conquest and grander imperial

information systems. This meant in the Orient, where in Sartre’s words “truth stood

naked,”55

the new emerging power, the Foucauldian governmentality with its

disciplinary and biopolitics variants, functioned only to bolster and reinvigorate the

old Hobbesian juridical power. This constellation of modes of power, combining the

individualization techniques and totalization procedures, incentivized and incited

diverse discourses to inquire and participate in the materialization of this discursive

formation.

Accordingly, the proto-scientific movement and later, the secular and rational

enlightenment project comes to augment the existing discipline. Here, the discourse is

fostered by the penetration of knowledges from universalizing discourses like

Eurocentric economicism, scientific rationalization (ethnology, philology,

historiography, anthropology, biology), modern Orientalism, developing military

sciences, medicine (phrenology, psychology), eugenics, progress and modernity.

Consequently, CRD, acquiring what Foucault denominates the hierarchical

13

observation56

is given the status of a science. No longer just archaic historicized

scattered socio-cultural notions, this new CRD, as a scientific mechanism of power

and a mode of objectification coerces by means of surveillance, observation, inquiry

and meticulous archiving and writing. CRD had become a machination of power

with the sole intent of exposing and containing the deviant Oriental revolutionary.57

This dual development, as a product of conjoint colonial conquest and acquisition

of knowledge, comes to solidify the discourse’s parameters and discursive practices,

give birth to new modes of objectification, systematize its operations and expand its

cognitive and disciplinary boundary. It is in this historical juncture where other CRD

notions, first, progress fetishism and later, outsourcing of agency emerge.

The emergence of this second CRD outlook, progress fetishism, roots back to what

Samir Amin calls the twofold radical transformation in Europe, namely the

“crystallization of capitalist society…and the European conquest of the World.”58

Immanuel Wallerstein contends, the Europeans erected a resolutely universalist

system of ideological fiction that posited “that whatever happened in Europe in the

sixteenth centuries represented a pattern that was applicable everywhere, either

because it was a progressive achievement of mankind which was irreversible or

because it represented the fulfillment of humanity’s basic needs.” 59

Progress, for

Eurocentrist thinkers from Adam Smith and Turgat to Daniel Lerner and Walt

Rostow, is hypothesized through an economically deterministic meta-theory, which

posits that there are successive developmental stages with each based on a particular

mode of subsistence. Central to this linear historical trajectory is the idea that

Europeans were responsible for scientific revolution, industrialization, capitalism,

bureaucratization, individual liberty and the introduction of non-brutal behaviors. 60

The Other, contributed to none.

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Here, I contend that this Eurocentric equation and its stagist savistic knowledges

did not only dismiss, essentialize and objectify the Oriental’s culture, cosmovision

and history but also, its subjectivity and forms of resistance. The colonial need to

comprehend and pacify the Other’s revolution required a Eurocentric program of

action which familiarized, demystified and with time, reified the revolts. CRD’s

progress fetishism is just another Derridean European hallucination61

that evaluates

and gauges the Other’s subjectivity and resistance through the positionality of a

particular revolutionary crowd’s racial soul. The lower ranked a racial soul and its

consciousness within the stage theory, the higher the underdevelopment and

primitiveness and the more animalistic, backward, irrational, and apolitical its

revolutions.

The latter, outsourcing of agency, comes to the scene out of the concomitance of

the nineteenth century European inter-imperial competition and the Eurocentric-

Orientalist idea that the Other was a non-active, absentminded, docile, and stagnant

historical subject. Under this CRD notion, if an Oriental revolution happened to be

nationalist, secular, tolerant, and democratic, then it was destined to be either a

product of external intervention, support, and resources, almost always European, or

conducted by hopeful naive Orientals, driven by Western ideals, norms and

philosophies.

Lord Milner’s analysis of the Egyptian Revolution of 1919 is one of the first cases

where outsourcing of agency is utilized to ascribe a revolution, product of indigenous

aspiration, energy, and struggle, to external interference, intellect, and influence, i.e.

the Soviets and Germans. Over the next century, this CRD form of subjection seems

to be a recurrent theme. So much so that Oxford historian, Albert Hourani, only three

decades later, was to be the first to not only be cognizant of this Eurocentric-

15

Orientalist technique of power, but was also the first to expose the way outsourcing of

agency reified successive revolutions in the region. Hourani, in his groundbreaking

work The Decline of the West in the Middle East-I (1953), declared:

…having come to the Middle East in consequence of their own

rivalries, the Western Powers naturally tended to interpret

everything that happened to them there in terms of those

rivalries. Thus the Egyptian revolt of 1919 was traced by British

officials to a ‘Bolshevik plot’, and the Arab revolt in Palestine

from 1936 to 1939 to a German plot, while the French still think

of anything that happened in the Levant between 1941 and 1946

as a British plot.62

Collectively, the modern CRD of colonial officials like Lord Cromer, Lord Milner

and Churchill, the military caste with the leadership of the likes of Lieutenant Colonel

Herman Vogt, Lieutenant Casper Goodrich, Colonel Eugène Hennebert, General

William Butler, General Luthar Von Trotha, Major Jean Aujac and doxosophes like

Wilfred Blunt, Thomas Archer and Edward Dicey, reflected that of Lord Milner’s

assessment of the Urabi revolt. In his book, England in Egypt (1902), Milner asks,

could this Arab “revolt have ended up substituting a new and better order for that

which is sought to destroy?” Milner responds by hypothesizing:

I go further and maintain confidently that such a consummation

was never in the range of possibility at all. The Arabist

movement possessed great destructive force, but it had not

within itself elements necessary for the construction of anything

enduring.63

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Traces of CRD and its Analytical Devices in Imperial Practice

In the colonies, where the colonial apparatus met native subjectivity and resistance,

this CRD functioned as an epistemological blinker and a Sartrean instrument of

ideological violence. Unquestioned, internalized and hegemonized, the discourse, its

cognitive schema and dispositions of recrudescence of fanaticism, progress fetishism,

and outsourcing of agency was a manual for not only understanding and evaluating

resistance but more importantly, for justifying the restoration of colonial “order” and

“peace.” Evidence of this can be found throughout Western accounts of Middle

Eastern resistance.

The first and most prominent CRD analytical tool, with a long history of

objectifying and misrepresenting Oriental agency and resistance, is recrudescence of

fanaticism. As demonstrated in the previous section, this was the Orientalist notion

responsible for re-presenting resistance in the region as only the cyclical repeat of

Islamic fanaticism. In other words, every revolution in the region through this CRD

ideological gaze was merely the manifestation of the fallacies of “Mohammedanism,”

a repeat of the Muslim’s innate and inherent drive for militant-extremism, bloodshed,

and destruction. To put it simply, in Emile J. Dillon’s words, revolution through

recrudescence of fanaticism was just another “bubble in boiling water, appear[ing]

and disappear[ing]at once.”64

It is under this CRD notion that Thomas Archer, in

1887, declared that the Mahdi rebels were nothing but “a horde of savage foes”65

motivated only by “strong religious fanaticism.”66

For Archer, the Mahdists were not

anti-colonial patriots but only a horde of savages who “swarmed hither and thither

and held the country in constant alarm and almost hopeless disorder, their numbers

enabling them to attack [and] harass.”67

17

Elsewhere, French Lieutenant Colonel Hennebert, dismissing the Urabi rebel’s

nationalist slogan of “Egypt for Egyptians,” comes instead to ascribe the revolution to

the irrational and fanatic Islamic belief of the rebels.68

For him, the anti-British

uprising stemmed from the first Islamic virtue, namely “hatred of the stranger, of the

Christian.” 69

For Hennebert, this hatred was deeply engrafted in the hearts of the

rebels who sternly believed were “fighting on the path of God.”70

The mind of the

votaries of the “Book” (The Koran), Hennebert declares, is haunted by extravagant

Pan-Islamic ideas of greatness, independence, and conquest and what they call a

revolution is just another instance where the barbarous Islamic hordes were preparing

to seize the opportunity to crush and exterminate the civilized nations.71

Similarly, in a secret British report, colonial official H D’Eyncourt, points out that

the Zaghloul revolt was bound to metamorphosize into an outbreak of Islamic

fanaticism.72

D’Eyncourt stresses that the sheik of Azhar was finding it impossible to

enforce “his authority and that religious excitement…would probably spread to

Fellaheen, who had not hitherto been in the movement.” 73

Due to this Islamic

fanaticism, he postulates, “the agitation, combined with sabotage and destruction, was

unlike any previous outbreak.”74

Three decades later, through this same CRD notion,

Michael Clark in a New York’s Times article titled Mossadegh of Iran in Messianic

Role: Premier Mixes Own Destiny With Local Fanaticism on the Oil Question (1951),

writes that Mossadegh and his National Front is a coalition of “wannabe nationalists”

but primarily “Moslem zealots.”75

Despite the fact that Mossadegh had declared there

was “no better way to govern Iran than democracy and social justice.”76

Likewise, Senator Abraham J. Multer, in a U.S. congress session titled Can we

Trust Mr. Dulles Not to Aid Nasser in His Nefarious Schemes (1957), reduces Gamal

Abdel Nasser’s secular Pan-Arabist intentions to merely ancient dreams of Islamic

18

conquest. After all, through this CRD system of thought, Arab nationalism in a

Hoskanian sense was nothing but a cloak for “Mohammedanism.” Accordingly, for

Multer, Nasser “had begun on a large scale an economic, religious, cultural and

ideological penetration of at least eight areas of Africa” with the sole purpose of

fomenting Islamic revolutions “by Moslem elements in these areas.”77

Elsewhere, in a U.S. classified report analyzing the Lebanese revolution of 1958,

Robert McClintock writes that the “chances are great that an anti-Chamoun campaign

would turn into a fanatic anti-Chamoun-cum-anti-US drive on part of certain elements

of Moslem population.”78

This is despite the fact that the revolution was primarily

secular, democratic, and nationalist. In a similar fashion, PLO was seen as a fanatic

movement driven by Islam—that resurgent atavism bent on destroying what Senator

Daniel Patrick Moynihan famously called the democratic order in the Western

world.79

Accordingly, an article titled The PLO’s Burgeoning Islamic Fervor (1986),

alerted that although PLO members “projected themselves as secular,” in reality, the

organization’s grassroots was moved only by religious passion and prejudice. The

article warns the U.S. to be cognizant “[f]or Islam brings with it the concept of

martyrdom, of assassinations and suicide bombings, not aimed simply at the so-called

‘Zionist enemy’ but at anyone else perceived as supporting the enemy, without any

hesitation.”80

Through CRD’s recrudescence of fanaticism, Oriental resistance was reduced to

Islam and Islam was nothing but terror, destruction, and fanaticism. In Said’s words,

this CRD tool was about the menace of jihad, “the mad Islamic zealot”81

and a fear

that the Muslims would take over the world.82

The dispersed and distinct acts of

resistance were not deliberative actions designed to liberate and end colonial

occupation. Nor was revolutionary agency a product of immediate factors like

19

political institutions, socio-economic conditions, hybrid forms of self-determination,

developing belief systems or complex revolutionary interaction between the

politicized vanguard and the masses. Rather, there was merely a Lebonian racial soul

and an overwhelming primordial Islamic militant-fanatic impulse always following

the laws of its natural disposition: destruction and bloodshed.

But as illustrated, CRD is not only about recrudescence of fanaticism. A case for

application of the second CRD cognitive instrument, progress fetishism, can be found

in Churchill’s analysis of the Mahdi Revolt. Churchill, in his book The River War: An

Historical Account of the Reconquest of the Soudan (1899), comes to make sense of

the “dervishes” slavishly impulsive savage attitude through the static evolutionary

framework of four-stage theory and the related Enlightenment racial classification

schema. For Churchill, the key to analyzing the Mahdi revolution was to dissect and

investigate the rebel’s soul of the race. He postulates that the Mahdists were more

barbaric than their Egyptian neighbors because they are a “… mixture of the Arab and

negro type.” 83

Echoing Smith, he writes the rebels were part Negroes who as “strong,

virile, and simpleminded savages—… lived as … prehistoric men—hunting

fighting…with no ideas beyond the gratification of their physical desires.” 84

On the

other hand, were the Arabs, who according to Churchill were “an African

reproduction of the Englishman; the Englishman a superior and civilised development

of the Arab.” 85

Churchill postulates that further within the unilinear line of progress, the Arab as

the stronger and more fanatic race, imposed its custom, language, religion, and

manners on the African. The inbreeding of the two races created a “debased and cruel

breed” 86

but nevertheless one that was more “intelligent than the primitive

savages.”87

Accordingly, the rebels had passed the first stage of the development

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model, hence Churchill writes the Sudanese Arabs were “camel herders; some were

Baggaras or cow-herds. But all, without exception were hunters of men.”88

Nevertheless, through progress fetishism, animal husbandry was not just an

occupation. For Europeans, writing within CRD, it was the manifestation of the

inferiority of the rebel’s soul. Stuck in the pasturage stage of Smith’s conjectural

history, the rebels were deemed as sparse and underdeveloped nomadic tribes, the

revolution a manifestation of their stagnating and docile racial soul and their land

regarded terra nullius and open to conquest by Smith’s civilized and thriving nations.

Furthermore, for Churchill, the Sudanese rebels “separated by the desert”89

were

left behind in the linear race for progress. Churchill’s Orient, like that of Hegel’s, was

stuck in childhood. Without Western intervention, for him, “it seemed that the slow,

painful course of development would be unaided and uninterrupted.”90

Accordingly,

through progress fetishism, Churchill, unlike Lebon, seems to have no immediate fear

of the worldwide revolt of inferior Asiatic and African races. He writes that the curse

of Muhammad may have “spread throughout Central Africa, raising fearless warriors

at every step.”91

But, in the immediate term, it was no threat to the West. Because

stages ahead in the caravan of civilizational progress “Christianity is sheltered in the

strong arms of science, the science against which it had vainly struggled, the

civilization of modern European might fall, as fell the civilization of Rome.”92

Elsewhere, in the case of the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925, a mixed European

commission investigating the reasons beyond the rebellion, denounced Sultan Al-

Atrash’s nationalist revolt as a ploy to strengthen his feudal authority, because:

The Jebel Druse is a country of great feudal chiefs [referring to

Al-Atrash], whose efforts are directed to preserving the powers

by which they live. What we call progress means in their eyes

21

the loss of their privileges and later on perhaps the partition of

their lands.93

The utilization of CRD’s progress fetishism is also reflected in a Department of

State classified report, which begins with the central question, “what are the

causes?”94

behind Middle Eastern and PLO “terrorism.” Terrorism, the report

proclaims, is inherently born out of the “frustrations of traditional societies

confronting rapid modernization.”95

The primitive Palestinian—like Churchill’s

animalistic Sudanese rebel and the feudal druze—is left behind in the caravan of

progress and accordingly, its revolution is merely the manifestation of its stagnating

frustrated racial soul.

Yet, Oriental conduct and subjectivity frequently broke free of the neatly packaged

CRD dispositions and representations. Native revolutionary actions and agency were

not only far from predictable and stable but consistently contradicted and shocked the

European counter-revolutionary estimations. But with monopoly over power and the

means to exploit and utilize the mechanisms of discursive production, the colonial

apparatus came to consistently bend and re-engineer reality according to the

discourse’s system of representation. Here, CRD’s third analytical device,

outsourcing of agency, became a fundamental CRD technique of power by the

twentieth century. Through this analytical tool, indigenous rationale and agency is

perceived as inferior and too mediocre to produce a progressive, civic nationalist,

egalitarian, and democratic revolution. Therefore, the source of influence and

incitement must be external, almost always Western.

A case point of the utilization of this strategy of power is the Egyptian revolution

of 1919. After it became evident to the colonial officials that the movement was

secular, ethnically tolerant, democratic, and nationalist, the British came to document

22

in a classified report that surely then the “leading spirits in this agitation are

foreigners.”96

Report after report, the revolution, through CRD’s outsourcing of

agency, was deemed a product of outside interventions, intellect, and influence, like

that of the Kemalists, the Germans or the Bolsheviks.

Elsewhere, in the case of PLO, Senator Charles Dougherty announced to the

Senate that the “the PLO is nothing more than the tool of the Soviet Union.”97

Similarly, Americans and their lackey Turkish clients, through CRD’s outsourcing of

agency, came to the conclusion that the tribal and backward Kurdish psyche and

agency was not sophisticated enough to instigate a progressive and modern leftist-

revolution like the PKK. Therefore, it was assumed that the source of instigation,

strength, and success were not the Kurdish masses and their home-grown

revolutionary vanguard but always an external source. Accordingly, for the denizens

of power, the “fundamental characteristic of the PKK terrorist organization […was]

its dependence on foreign patrons” and that its survival was only due to the economic

and physical support from the Soviets and its surrogate countries like Syria.98

Elsewhere, Chris Morris and his fellow authors reveal that Abdullah Ocalan and “his

group ha[ve] thrived largely because of support from foreign powers.” Here, the

authors list out Soviet Union, Greece, and Armenia as patrons of PKK. 99

While Illnur

Cevik adds Iran100

and the Russian mafia101

to this long list of PKK benefactors.

Another case for the employment of this CRD tool is the Arab uprisings of 2010.

Here, political commentators attributed the revolutions to “social media,” the “shy

American intellectual Gene Sharp,”102

the “Obama factor,” “Google Earth,” “Israel’s

democracy”103

or the know-how of a Serbian organization.104

The racial soul of the

Oriental, backward, irrational, and stuck-behind in history was sooner or later bound

23

to be dominated, governed or influenced by a Westerner of some sort. The question

under CRD’s outsourcing of agency was, whom?

Conclusion

Western authoritative discourses of power-knowledge, or what Césaire refers to as

temporary master’s lies, are not just about the interpellation of the colonized subject.

Colonial discourses are as much about the appropriation of the subject as it is its

cosmovision, subjectivity and aspirations. As Said asserts, the “very designation of

something as Oriental involved an already pronounced evaluative judgment…and an

implicit program of action.” Counter-revolutionary discourse then is this program of

action and pronounced evaluative judgment responsible for dissecting, familiarizing,

detailing, classifying, and misrepresenting Middle Eastern resistance. Just as

“Orientalism overrode the Orient”105

so did this CRD its revolutions. Here too, a

Knight or a colonial official’s representation of Al Afdal and Urabi’s resistance

becomes a template, which gradually snowballs into a grand corpus of knowledge, set

of images, scientific-cultural discourse and a mental schema that derogates,

subjectifies and contains future Middle Eastern revolutions.

Nonetheless, CRD, built through that Nietzschean army of metaphors, metonyms,

and anthropomorphisms, is not necessarily just Orientalist. It is a distinct system of

thought but by no means uniform, monolithic or isolated. Despite its coherent result

(subjection of the rebel), CRD is a heterogeneous discourse. A discourse made up of a

multiplicity of dispersed socio-political processes, bits and pieces of contradictory yet

homologous hegemonic knowledges, systems of references and set of representations

drawn from the likes of Dante and Volney to Smith, Hegel and Lebon. These diverse

and numerous currents and crosscurrents flowing into, and overlapping one another

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form a psychological, socio-cultural discursive amalgam and a repetitious practicizing

creed that Middle Eastern revolutions, due to occult and Eurocentric-Orientalist

factors, are Islamic, impulsive, conservative, irrational, violent, tribal or ethnic. Or at

best, the revolutions are mere attempted failures at capitalist modernity and

nationalism by few hopeful Westernized or Western-supported Orientals importing

foreign philosophies, ideals and concepts. Accordingly, under the epistemic violence

of this CRD, every Western discursive utterance from Aymeric to Volney, Napoleon,

Churchill, Lebon, or Senator Charles Dougherty, regarding Oriental resistance

becomes functional and generative designed to strengthen the tentacles of Western

power and deny the Oriental the right to resist.

1 I would like to thank the late Professor Ernesto Laclau at Essex, Professor Rashid Khalidi at

Columbia University and Dr. Noah Bassil at Macquarie University for their input and insightful

comments. 2 Here, I am drawing from Said’s definition of the Orientalist as anyone who is “dealing with it

[Orient] by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it,

ruling over it.” E. Said, Orientalism: Western Concepts of the Orient (Harmondsworth: Penguin), 69. 3 E. Said, The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-Determination (New York:

Pantheon, 1994), 338. 4 Translated as the philosophy of origins, Ursprungsphilosophie is the philosophy of looking for the

origins or the essentials of an element. 5 Said, Orientalism, 203.

6 M. Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in P. Rabinow, ed., The Foucault Reader (New York:

Penguin Books, 1984), 77. 7 Here, I use the term “Eurocentric-Orientalist” to denote the long list of Renaissance, Enlightenment

and contemporary systems of knowledges (notions of culture and civilization, capitalist-economicism,

modernity, progress and development, eugenics, racial doctrines and liberalism) that collectively

function as ideological mystifiers. Exuding symbolic violence, this system of thought functions to

presents the Western-self to itself through the negation of the epistemologically and ontologically

inferior Orient-Other. 8 I adopt Foucault’s definition of subjection here. As both a process of turning a soul into a subject

through setting a set of attributes and characteristics to it. And subjected, as in subjected to authority

and power. 9 In this paper, I am leaning towards a rather loose conceptualization of subjectivity, which refers

somewhat to the incipient stages of agency—that moment before action where the subject’s conscious

experience of an event, its perspective and cognitive approach to it, is freer from the influences of

diverse modes of power.

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10

Pudenda origo is the Nietzschean idea that most of society’s absolute truth and highest values and

ideals were built on nothing but shameful origins or historical lies. 11

M. Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (New York:

Random House Inc, 1965), xiiixiii. 12

R. Young, White Mythologies: Writing History and the West (New York: Routledge, 2004). 13

For Foucault, savoir is the institutionalized, structured and systemic knowledge that is a product of

institutions of power. 14

M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 10. 15

Louis Althusser theorizes the concept of “haling to or interpellate.” This is the process whereby

power and its ideology functions to “recruit” subjects and actions thereby transforming it for its precise

operations and interests. L. Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” in L. Althusser,

ed., Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971). 16

M. Foucault, Society Must be Defended (New York: Penguin, 2003), 7. 17

Leopold von Ranke, influenced by Thucydides, theorized that historians should be scientifically

objective and should only be concerned with strict presentation of the facts. That is, in approaching

history positivistically they should simply “wie es eigentlich gewsen” (simply showed how it [the

historical event] really was). E. H. Carr, What is History? (London: Penguin, 1990), 8. 18

Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 82. 19

Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 83. 20

Said, Orientalism, 170. 21

G. Lebon, The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind (London: Digireads Publishing, 2005), 47-67. 22

J. W. Bendersky, “Panic: The Impact of Le Bon's Crowd Psychology on U.S Millitary Thought”,

Journal of History of the Behavioral Sciences 43:3 (2007), 260. 23

J. Hobson, “Back to the Future of Nineteenth-Century Western International Thought?,” in G.

Lawson, C. Armbruster, and M. Cox, ed., The Global 1989: Continuity and Change in World Politics

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 28. 24

G. Lebon, The Psychology of Peoples (Indiana: G.E. Stechert, 1912). 27. 25

Lebon, The Crowd, 106, 67. 26

L. Sun, The Chinese National Character: From Nationhood to Individuality (New York: East Gate

Book, 2002), 49. 27

G. Lebon, The Psychology of Revolution (New York: Putnam, 1980), 43. 28

Lebon, The Crowd, 20. 29

D. Perziosi and J. Lamoureux, In the Aftermath of Art: Ethics, Aesthetics, Politics (New York:

Routledge, 2006), 107. 30

F. Quinn, The Sum of All heresies: The Image of Islam in Western Thought (New York: Oxford

University Press), 100. 31

D. Kerr, Eastern Figures: Orient and Empire in British Writing (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University

Press, 2008), 69. 32

Lebon, The Psychology of Revolution, 40. 33





Lebon, The Crowd, 100. 38

M. Barber, “The Knight Templars,” Historian 60 (1998), 5. 39

R. Hiestand, “Some Reflection on the Impact of the Papacy on the Crusader States and the Military

Orders in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries,” in Z. Hunyadi and J. Laszlovszky, ed., The Crusades

and the Military Orders: Expanding the Frontiers of Medieval Latin Christianity (Budapest: Kepiro

Ltd, 2001), 16. 40

J.P. Migne, Patrologia Latina, (New York: Scribner, 1905). 512-13. 41

A. C. Krey, The First Crusade: The Accounts of Eye-Witnesses and Participants (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1921), 101. 42

Krey, The First Crusade, 133.

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43

Krey, The First Crusade, 133. 44

William of Tyre, Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum [History of Deeds Done Beyond

the Sea], trans. James Brundage, vol. XIV (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1962). 45

Patriarch of Antioch, “Letter from Aymeric, Patriarch of Antioch, to Louis VII of France,” in D. C.

Munro, ed., Letters of the Crusaders: Translations and Reprints from the Original Sources of European

History (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1896), 14-17. 46

Patriarch of Antioch, “Letter from Aymeric,” 14-17. 47

Said, Orientalism, 3, 156. 48

E. Dicey, The Egypt of the Future (London: William Heinemann, 1907), 131. 49

J. Cole, Napoleon's Egypt: Invading the Middle East (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 204. 50

M.C.F. Volney, Travels Through Egypt and Syria in the Year 1783, 1784 & 1785, vol. II (New

York: Duyckinck & Co. Booksellers, 1798), 273. 51

Volney, Travels Through Egypt and Syria, 273. 52


Cole, Napoleon's Egypt, 255. 54

Cole, Napoleon's Egypt, 211. 55

J. P. Sartre, “Preface,” in F. Fanon, ed., The Wretched of the Earth (London: Penguin Books, 1961),

7. 56

Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 170. 57

P. Rabinow, The Foucault reader (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1984). 189. 58

S. Amin, Eurocentrism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988). 171. 59

I. Wallerstein, “Eurocentrism and its Avatars: The Dilemmas of Social Science”, New Left Review

I:226 (1997), 95. 60

I. Wallerstein, “Eurocentrism and its Avatars”, 97. 61

Jacques Derrida, analyzing Western discourses around Chinese writing, comes to the conclusion that

the Europeans constructed a representation of the language that fluctuated between “hyperbolic

admiration” or “ethnocentric scorn.” In any case, for Derrida, the representations were a “European

hallucination,” completely divorced from reality. J. Derrida, Of Grammatology (London: Johns

Hopkins University Press, 1976). 62

A. Hourani, “The Decline of the West in the Middle East-I”, International Affairs 20:1 (1953), 39. 63

A. Milner, England in Egypt (London: Edward Arnold, 1902), 14-15,15. 64

L. Stoddard, The New World of Islam (London: Chapman and Hall, Ltd, 1922), 145. 65

T. Archer, The War in Egypt and The Soudan: An Episode in the History of The British Empire, vol.

III (London: Blackie & Son, Bailey E.C., 1887), 35. 66

Archer, The War in Egypt and The Soudan, 126. 67

Archer, The War in Egypt and The Soudan, 228. 68

E. Hennebert, The English in Egypt: England and The Mahdi, Arabi and the Suez Canal (London:

W.H. Allen, 1884), 14. 69

Hennebert, The English in Egypt, 14-18. 70



H. D'Eyncourt, “British Empire and Africa Report No.111,” ed. Records of the Cabinet Office, War

Cabinet and Cabinet: Memoranda GT, CP and G War Series (British National Archives, 1919), 92. 73

D'Eyncourt, “British Empire and Africa Report No.111”, 92. 74

D'Eyncourt, “British Empire and Africa Report No.111”, 92. 75

M. Clark, “Mossadegh of Iran in Messianic Role: Premier Mixes Own Destiny With Local

Fanaticism on the Oil Question,” New York Times, 8th of July 1951. 76

House of Representatives, “Support for Dr. Haleh Esfandieri” (Washington D.C.: Congressional

Records, 2007), 1063. 77

United States Senate, “Congressional Record. Hon. Abraham J. Multer: Can we Trust Mr. Dulles

Not to Aid Nasser in His Nefarious Schemes?” ed. United States Senate (Washington D.C.:

Congressional ProQuest, 1957), A1525.

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78

R. McClintock, “Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State” ed. United

States Embassy in Lebanon (Beirut: U.S Department of State: Office of the Historian, 1958). 79

E. Said, “Islam through Western Eyes”, The Nation 230:16 (1980),1. 80

Z. Kashmeri, “The PLO's Burgeoning Islamic Fervor,” Los Angeles Times 1986. 81

E. Said, “Conspiracy of Praise,” in E. Said and C. Hitchens, ed., Blaming the Victims: Spurious

Scholarship and the Palestinian Question (Verso: New York, 1988), 3. 82


W. S. Churchill, The River War: An Historical Account of the Reconquest of the Soudan (London:

Longmans, Green and Co, 1899), 8. 84

Churchill, The River War, 7. 85









M. Provence, The great Syrian revolt and the rise of Arab nationalism (Austin: University of Texas

Press, 2005), 1. 94

D. Long, “The Middle East and Terrorism,” ed. Department of State (Washington D.C: United States

Government, 1985). 95

D. Long, “The Middle East and Terrorism”. 96

Foreign Office, “British Empire Report No.1,” ed. Records of the Cabinet Office, War Cabinet and

Cabinet: Memoranda GT,CP and G War Series (London: British National Archives, 1919), 5. 97

Senator Charles F. Dougherty, “Negotations with the PLO,” ed. United States Senate (Washington

D.C.: Congressional Records, 1979), S27958-S58. 98

A. Karaca, “Disrupting Terrorist Networks: An Analysis of the PKK Terrorist Organization” (Naval

Postgraduate School, 2010), 31. 99

C. Morris et al., “Kurdish Prince of Terror Gives up His War: Death Squad Harem's Commander

Flies to Italy in Search of Asylum”, The Observer, November 15 1998. 100

I. Cevik, “PKK and its Friends Should be Very Happy,” Hurriyet Daily News, June 9 1997. 101

———, “PKK is Not a Simple Terrorist Organization,” Hurriyet Daily News, January 15 1998. 102

S. G. Stolberg, “Shy U.S Intellectual Created Playbook Used in a Revolution,” New York

Times(2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/world/middleeast/17sharp.html?pagewanted=all. 103

T. L. Friedman, “This is Just the Start,” New York Times(2011),

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/02/opinion/02friedman.html. 104

D. D. Kirkpatrick and D. E. Sanger, “A Tunisian-Egyptian Link That Shook Arab History,” The

New York Times(2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/14/world/middleeast/14egypt-tunisia-

protests.html?_r=3&scp=1&sq=otpor&st=cse. 105

Said, Orientalism, 208, 96. Emphasis is mine.

The Oriental Rebel in Western History

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