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THE LATIN AMERICAN CHIEF EXECUTIVE

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Authors Conklin, John G., 1939-

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CONKLIN, John Gordon, 1939-THE LATIN AMERICAN CHIEF EXECUTIVE.

The University of Arizona, Ph.D., 1976 Political Science, general

!

i Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

@ 1976

JOHN GORDON CONKLIN

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

THE LATIN AMERICAN CHIEF EXECUTIVE

by

John Gordon Conklin

Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of th

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

In the Graduate College

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

1976

Copyright 1976 John Gordon Conklin

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

I hereby recommend that this dissertat ion prepared under my

direction by John Gordon Conklin

enti t led T H E LATIN AMERICAN CHIEF EXECUTIVE

be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement of the

degree of Doctor of Philosophy

-> *jj *fj £ Dissertation Director Date//

After inspection of the final copy of the dissertation, the

following members of the Final Examination Committee concur in

its approval and recommend its acceptance:'-''

This approval and acceptance is contingent on the candidate's

adequate performance and defense of this dissertation at the

final oral examination. The inclusion of this sheet bound into

the library copy of the dissertation is evidence of satisfactory

performance at the final examination.

STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at The University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library.

Brief quotations from this dissertation are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the copyright holder.

SIGNED:

TO MY

MOTHER AND FATHER

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Paige

LIST OF TABLES viii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS xiii

ABSTRACT xv

1. INTRODUCTION 1

Outline 1 Data and Coding 5

2. THE LATIN AMERICAN CHIEF EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL ISM AND POWER 15

Types of Executives in Latin America 17 Monarchs and Life Consuls. . 18 Parliamentary and Collegial 20

Failure of Non-Presidential Systems 24 Informal Influences on Power 30

Cultural Influence 30 Practical Influences 32 Historical Influences 36 Institutional Influence 39

Formal Bases of Power 44 Chapter Summary 50

3. PRESIDENTIAL RECRUITMENT: FORMAL AND INFORMAL REQUIREMENTS 51

Formal-Legal Qualifications 52 Age, Religious, and Other Requirements ... 52 Other Special Qualifications 58 Special Disqualifications 59

Informal Prerequisites 60 Age 60 Birthplace 62 Education 70 Civilian Occupations 76 Chapter Summary 79

4. PRESIDENTIAL RECRUITMENT: SOCIAL CLASS AND MILITARY OCCUPATIONS 80

Social Class 80 Social Class: Trend Analysis ... 82

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS--Continued

Page

Social Class: Theoretical Considerations. 85 Socio-Racial Theory 85

European Countries 87 Mulatto Countries 89 Mestizo Countries 92 Indian Countries 93

The Emergence of the Middle Sectors ... 98 Summary: Social Class and Executive Recruitment 100

Military Occupations 103 Military Occupations: An Overview .... 104 Militarism: Trend Analysis 107

Rise of Militarism: Independence to 1870 107

Decline of Military: 1870-1920 .... 114 Stabilization and Increase of Military: 1920-1970 115

Militarism: Theoretical Considerations. . 116 Socio-Racial Types 117 Militarism: Literacy 121 Militarism: Socio-Economic Complexity. 126 Militarism: Political Parties 132 Militarism: Summary 142

5. PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION: OVERVIEW AND ELECTIONS. 14 5

Studies of Executive Succession 146 Executive Succession: Overview 147 Executive Successions: Elections 156

Theories of Democracy 156 Democracy in Latin America: Hypotheses. . 162

Socio-Economic Contexts 162 Communications Systems 162 Socio-Political Structures 163 Military and Democracy 163 Independent and Dependent Variables. . 164

Socio-Economic Development and Democracy. 164 Communications and Democracy 168 Socio-Political Structures and Democracy. 171

Military 175 Political Parties 175 Labor 179

Chapter Summary 179

vi


Page

6. PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION: VIOLENCIAS 182

Theories of Instability 182 Instability in Latin America: Hypotheses . . 187

Cultural Bases 188 Economic Bases . 190 Psychological Urbanization Bases 191 Socio-Structural Bases 192

Executive Succession: Violencias and Instability 192

Culture and Instability 193 Socio-Racial Type and Instability .... 197 Economic Opportunities and Instability. . 200 Alienation, Urbanization and Instability. 203 Socio-Political Structures and Ins tab i 1 i ty 211

Militarism 213 Political Parties 215 Labor 2 22

Chapter Summary. 225

7. PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION: IMPOSICIONES AND TENURE PATTERNS 229

Imposicion 230 Tenure 236

Tenure Patterns: Overview 238 The Institutionalization of the Chief Executive 242

Occupations and Tenure 248 Party Systems and Tenure 252 Successions and Tenure 2 56

Chapter Summary 2 58

8. CONCLUSION: FINDINGS AND SIGNIFICANCE 260

Presidential Backgrounds 260 Presidential Successions 267 The Significance of the Study for Understanding and Predicting Trends in Latin American Politics 269

Constitutionalism and Executive Power . . 270 Executive Recruitment and Power: Soldiers vs. Civilians 273 Executive Succession and Power 279

vii .


Page

APPENDIX I: PRESIDENT: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 285

APPENDIX II: PRESIDENTS: TERM OF OFFICE, SUCCESSION,

DEPARTURE 328

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 374

LIST OP TABLES

Table Page

1.1 Number of Unknown Data in Appendix I By Country and Category 7

2.1 Types of Executives in Latin America Independence to 1970 (By Country). ... 29

3.1 Constitutional Qualifications for Latin American Presidents 5 3

3.2 Age of Latin American Executives Upon Eirst Achieving Office (By Number and Percentage 61

3.3 Birthplace of Latin American Presidents (By Si ze) 6 3

3.4 Percentage of Urban Dwellers and Urban Born Executives in Latin America .... 64

3.5 Percentage of Latin American Presidents Born in National and State Capitals 66

3.6 Formal Education of tlie Presidents of Latin America (By Number and Percentage) 71

3.7 Civilian Occupations of Latin American Chief Executives (Bv Country) 77

4.1 Class Origins of Presidents of Latin America By Country and Socio-Racial Type (Number and Percentage). . . 88

4.2 Class Origin of Presidents in Revolutionary and Traditional Indian Countries 95

4.3 Class Origin of Presidents in Revolutionary Indian Countries Before and After Revolution 96

4.4 Presidents Born in Middle Class in Middle Sector and Non-Middle Sector Countries 99

v i i i

ix

LIST OF TABLES--Continued

Table Page

4.5 Civilian, Professional Military and Insurgent Military Presidents: By Country (Number and Percentage 105

4.6 Rank Order and Percentage of Professional, Insurgent and Total Military Presidents 106

4.7 Percentage of Military and Civilian Executives Born in the Unper , Middle and Lower Classes Ill

4.8 Percentage of Executives Born in the Upper, Middle and Lower Classes from Military and Civilian Occupations 112

4.9 Civilian, Professional Military and Insurgent Military Presidents: By Socio-Racial Type (Number and Percentage) 118

4.10 Analysis of Variance: Socio-Racial Type and Militarism. 120

4.11 Literacy and Militarism: Tests of Regression and Correlation 125

4.12 Raw Scores for Socio-Economic Complexity Index by Percentage . 129

4.13 Step-Wise Regression: Militarism and Socio-Economic Complexity. 130

4.14 Correlation Coefficient: Militarism and Socio-Economic Complexity. . , . . . 131

4.15 Partial Correlation Coefficients: Socio-Economic Complexity Index. . 133

4.16 Incidence of Military and Civilian Executives in Systems With and Without Modern Parties (By Country) 137

4.17 Analysis of Variance: Militarism and Party Systems 1920-1970 138

X


Table Page

4.18 Civilian and Military Executives in Strong, Moderately Strong, and Weak Traditional Party Systems Between 1870 and 1920 140

4.19 Analysis of Variance: Militarism and Party Systems 1870-1920 143

5.1 Number of Executive Successions by Violencia, Imposicion, and Election (By Country) 148

5.2 Number of Executive Successions, Provisional and Provisional Violencia (By Country) 149

5.3 Number of Executive Departures by Constitutional and Unconstitutional Means, Death and Health Reasons (By Country) 150

5.4 Rank Order and Percentage of Executives Attaining Office by Violencia, Im-nosiciones, and Elections (Independence to 1970) 154

5.5 Percentage of Executive Departures by Constitutional and Unconstitutional Means (Independence to 1970) 155

5.6 Raw Scores for Communications Development Index 170

5.7 Elections by Number and Percentage of all Turnovers Between 1920 and 19 70 by Countries With and Without Modern Parties 178

6.1 Percentage of Presidents Attaining Office by Violencia, Inmosicion, Election and Provisionally (By Socio-Racial Type and Country) 198

6.2 Analysis of Variance: Socio-Racial Type and Political Instability (Violencias) 199

xi


Table Page

6.3 Ranking of Latin American Countries by Levels of Social Mobilization and Economic Opportunity 204

6.4 Countries Grouped According to Degree of Political Instability and Predicted Level of Economic Opportunity 205

6.5 Percentage of Violencia, Imposicion and Election Used by Military and Civilian Executives 214

6.6 Percentage of Military and Civilian Executives Attaining the Presidency by Violencia, Imposicion and Election 216

6.7 Political Parties and Instability: Violencias as a Percentage of all Turnovers Between 1870 and 1920 by Strong, Moderately Strong and Weak Party Systems. 220

6.8 Political Parties and Instability: Violencias as a Percentage of all Turnovers Between 1920 and 1970 by Countries With and Without Modern Parties ..... 221

7.1 Imposiciones by Number and Percentage of all Turnovers Between 1870 and 1920 by Strong, Moderately Strong and Weak Party Systems 233

7.2 Imposiciones by Number and Percentage of all Successions Between 1920 and 197 0 by Countries With and Without Modern Party Systems 234

7.3 Number of: Years Served by Each Latin American Executive (By Country) 239

7.4 Mean and Median Term of Office for Latin American Chief Executive Per Country . 241

xii


Table Page

7.5 Average Number of Years Served by Each Executive Over Six Twenty-Five Year Periods 244

7.6 Percentage of Presidential Terms Minus One Year, One to Two Years, Two to Four Years , Four to Ten Years and Plus Ten Years Over Six Twenty-Five Year Periods 245

7.7 Latin American Chief Executive Percentage of Years Office Held by Civilians and Military 249

7.8 Number and Percentage of Executives, Civilian - Professional Soldier -Military Insurgent, Serving Four to Ten, Ten to Twenty, and Over Twenty Year Terms 251

7.9 Executive Tenure in Strong, Moderately Strong, and Weak Party Systems Between 1870 and 1920 254

7.10 Number of Presidents Serving Various Terms by Countries With and Without Modern Parties 255

7.11 Executive Tenure by Election, Imposi-cion and Violencia 257

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure Page

3.1 Percentage of Presidents College and Military College Trained Over Six Twenty-Five Year Periods 74

4.1 Class Origins of the Presidents of Latin America Over Twenty-Five Year Periods (By Percentage) 83

4.2 Percentage of Civilian and Professional and Insurgent Military Presidents Over Six Twenty-Five Year Periods. . . . 108

4.3 Relationships Between Illiteracy and Militarism in Latin America 123

5.1 Percentage of Violencia, Imposiciones and Elections by Twenty-Five Year Periods 153

5.2 Socio-Economic Development and Democracy (Elections) 166

5.3 Socio-Economic Development and Democracy (Constitutional Departure) 167

5.4 Socio-Economic Development and Democracy (Elections Controlling for U.S.) 169

5.5 Communications Development and Democracy (Elections) 172

5.6 Communications Development and Democracy (Constitutional Departure) 173

5.7 Communications Development and Democracy (Elections Controlling for U.S .') 174

5.8 Democracy and Militarism in Latin America 176

xiii

xiv

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS--Continued

Figure Page

5.9 Democracy and Labor Organization in Latin America 180

6.1 Cultural Homogeneity and Political Instability 194

6.2 Socio-Racial Type and Political Instability (Violencia) 201

6.3 Political Instability and Psychological Alienation in Latin America 207

6.4 Political Instability in Post-1945 Latin America and Psychological Alienation (By Levels of Urbanization) 209

6.5 Political Instability in Post-1945 Latin America and Psychological Alienation (By Rate of Urbanization) . . , . , 212

6.6 Percentage of Military Presidents and Violencias over Six Twenty-Five Year Periods 217

6.7 Political Instability and Labor in Latin America 226

7.1 Educational Development and Imposi-ciones in Latin America. 237

ABSTRACT

This dissertation concerns executive recruitment

and succession among the twenty Latin American republics

from the Wars of Independence to 1970. The purposes of

the study are two-fold: First, to describe the background

and succession and tenure patterns of the Latin American

chief executive and, second, to analyze this descriptive

data within the context of other societal and political

phenomena. The maior question under consideration concerns

the influence of recruitment and succession upon the ef

fective exercise of executive power.

The data for this dissertation is based upon the

backgrounds of the 978 men who served as a Latin American

chief executive between the Wars of Independence and 1920,

and the modes of succession utilized for the 1,331 turn

overs that occurred over this time period. Five background

variables -- birthplace, social origins, education, occu

pation, and age -- are used to describe the Latin American

presidents. Successions are coded according to three major

categories: violencias (violent turnovers), imposiclones

(electoral charades), and elections.

The "typical" Latin American chief executive was

born to a middle or upper class family .in an urban area,

likely a state or national capital. Historically, most

xv

xv i

executives came from the upper class but, since the turn

of the century, an increasing number have emerged from the

middle sectors. He likely attended college and pursued a

career in one of the professions or the military and as

sumed office in his forties or fifties. The imposicio'n

was the most frequently utilized mode of succession, fol

lowed by violencias and elections. However, since 1920,

the incidence of impos iciones has declined, while elections

have likeivise increased. The incidence of violencias has

remained relatively consistent over the past 50 years

(1920-1970) .

Besides utilizing this data for describing execu

tive backgrounds and successions, social origins, military-

civilian occupations, violencias . and elections are used

as measures of politically significant features of Latin

American society. Namely, social origins is related to

differences and changes among the Latin American repub

lics in class structure; military occupations is used to

measure militarism, and violencias and elections to gauge

instability and democracy, respectively.

The most "open" class structure in Latin America

occurs among so-called Mulatto and Revolutionary Indian

states. Changes in the social class background of Latin

American presidents relate to the size of a country's

middle sector and to political revolution. Namely, where

xvii

middle sectors are large and where revolutions occur,

greater numbers of presidents from the middle class emerge.

The indices of violencia for each country were re

lated to five independent variables: 1) cultural character

istics, 2) socio-racial type, 3) economic opportunity, 4)

psychological alienation due to urbanizations, and 5) three

socio-political structures -- militarism, political parties

and labor organization. Statistically significant rela

tionships occurred between violencias and cultural context,

level of concerbation, and militarism.

Indices of elective presidential successions were

tested against five independent variables: 1) socio

economic development, 2) communications development, 3)

militarism, political parties, and labor organization.

Statistically significant positive relationships were found

between elections and socio-economic and communications

development. A significant negative relationship exists

between elections and militarism.

It is the thesis of this dissertation that the so

cial and economic progress of Latin America will be most

propitious in those societies which evolve effective elec

toral succession systems. Such systems are essentially

civilian and the so-called "modernizing military" is un

likely to emerge as an effective agent of social and eco

nomic growth.

CHAPTER X

INTRODUCTION

The political significance and power of the Latin

American chief executive is routinely noted in the litera

ture on Latin American politics. Indeed, the thesis of

overwhelming executive power is unquestioningly restated

by scholars concerned with Latin America. It is curious,

then, that no general study exists either describing or

1 analyzing the Latin American chief executive. The purpose

of this dissertation is to undertake just such a study by

examining the office and office-holders of the chief exe

cutive in Latin America and placing them into context with

other political and societal phenomena. Three main topics

are considered: (1) what men come to power, (2) how they

come to power, and (3) once in power, how long they keep

it.

Outline

The dissertation is divided into eight chapters.

The first chapter is an introduction, the second chapter

descirbes the character and scope of the office of the chief

-^See Chapter 2 for a discussion of the literature on the Latin American chief executive.

1

2

executive, the third and fourth chapters deal with presiden

tial recruitment, the fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters

discuss presidential succession, and the eighth and final

chapter summarizes recruitment and succession and relates

them to presidential power and its effective use.

Chapter 1 states the purpose of the paper and

briefly outlines the other chapters. It also summarizes

major aspects of data and explains methods of coding uti

lized in the study. Chapter 2 is a descriptive treatment

of the office of the Latin American chief executive. Types

of executives who have held office, failure of non-

presidential systems, and formal bases of power are the main

subiects.

Chapter 3 is also descriptive. It concerns the

formal-legal and informal requisites in presidential re

cruitment, The formal-legal requirements are written into

the individual constitutions. In addition to these formal

requirements, certain socio-economic characteristics greatly

influence the real opportunity for attaining office. This

chapter focuses on age, birthplace, education, and civilian

occupation as they pertain to executive recruitment.

Chapter 4 continues the discussion of the impact of

informal background characteristics upon presidential re

cruitment. The characteristics considered here are social

origins and military occupations. Besides describing their

influence in the recruitment process, they are also used as

3

measures of two politically significant features of Latin

American society. Social origins is utilized to gauge the

rigidity or openness of class systems, and military occupa

tions -- the incidence of soldier-presidents -- is used to

measure militarism. Using these measures to differentiate

among the Latin American countries, Chapter 4 focuses upon

explaining why class structure and militarism vary from

country to country. To find out about class openness and

rigidity, two independent variables are tested: (1) socio-

racial type, and (2) the strength of middle sector elements

in each of the Latin American countries. Regarding mili

tarism in Latin America, the incidence of soldier-presidents

will be measured against four independent variables: (1)

socio-racial type, (2) literacy, (3) socio-economic complex

ity, and (4) political parties.

Chapters 5, 6 , and 7 concern executive succession

in Latin America, Three modes of succession -- violencias,

imposiciones, and elections are discussed. In addition to

their descriptive purposes, violencias and elections are

used as indices to gauge levels of political instability and

political democracy, respectively.

In Chapter 5, elective presidential successions are

identified and utilized as an index of Latin American politi

cal democracy. The purpose of this chapter is to relate to

electoral turnovers those environmental elements which seem

conducive to political democracy. These elements are: (1)

4

level of socio-economic development, (2) the extensiveness

and effectiveness of communications systems, and (3) the

impact of socio-political structures -- again, militarism,

political parties, and labor organization..

Chapter 6 treats succession from the standpoint of

stability and instability. Its maior purnose is to identify

those societal conditions which give rise to unstable suc

cessions; i.e., political instability. Violent, unstable

turnovers are considered a dependent variable and is tested

against five independent variables: (1) cultural character

istics, (2) socio-racial type, (3) economic opportunity,

(4) psychological alienation as a result of urbanization,

and (5) three socio-political structures -- militarism,

political parties, and labor organization.

The final aspect of executive succession in Latin

America, imposlciones and tenure patterns, is dealt with in

Chapter 7. The impos icion, a maior mode of Latin American

succession, refers to those turnovers which are not either

electoral contests or violent overthrows, but are electoral

charades. The impos icion is discussed and analyzed as re

gards its relationship with military-civilian occupations,

political parties, and levels of educational development.

Tenure, the second maior consideration in Chapter 7 , is

used in this study as a measure of individual success of the

executive and of the institutionalization of the office of

the Latin American chief executive. It is assumed that the

5

longer the tenure, the more successful is the executive, and

the shorter, the less successful. Regarding institutionali

zation, the closer tenure patterns conform to constitutional

provisions, the higher is the level of institutionalization,

and the farther the tenure pattern deviates from constitu

tion, the lower the level. Tenure, used as a measure of in

stitutionalization, is related to three variables -- military-

civilian occupations, political parties, and modes of suc

cession .

In Chapter 8 ? executive recruitment and succession

are considered as influences upon executive power. The

thesis of this study is that historical analysis reveals

recruitment and succession characteristics that relate di

rectly to the effective exercise of presidential power. Of

particular importance is the relationship among tenure, suc

cession, civilian and military occupational groups, and the

varying environmental contexts found in the twenty Latin

American republics. Using tenure patterns as estimates of

effectiveness, Chapter 8 analyzes those elements that are

either positively or negatively related to effective execu

tive power.

Data and Coding

The data for this dissertation is summarized in Ap

pendices I and II. Appendix I is a listing of the presi

dents of the twenty republics of Latin America from the Wars

of Independence to 1970. This list includes 991 men and is

7 believed to be complete." Five background variables -- age

upon assuming office, occupation, social class origins, edu

cation, and birthplace -- are listed for each president ex

cept in those cases where the information is unknown. This

data is the basis for the discussion in Chapter 3 and 4

of social background characteristics and their relationship

to presidential recruitment.

Unfortunately, information is not available for all

of the 991 men. Consequently, the data presented in Chapters

3 and 4 are based on samples. As shown in Table 1.1, these

range from 88% in the case of occupation to 50% in the case

of class origins. In some instances, a sample is skewed to

ward a group of presidents from countries for which data was

more available. Generally, information on the presidents of

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,

Cuba, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Mexico, and Uruguay is more ac

cessible and more complete than is the case for the presidents

of Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti,

Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Venezuela. It is also

^In point of fact, only 978 different men have served as a Latin American chief executive. Seven have served as chief executive in more than a single country and, therefore, are counted more than once. These individuals are Simon Bolivar, who was president in five countries, Francisco Morazan in four, Dionisio de Herrera in three, Juan Lindo in two, Diego Vigil in two, Andres de Sanata Cruz in two, and Carlos Salazar in two.

7

TABLE 1.1

NUMBER OF UNKNOWN DATA IN APPENDIX I BY COUNTRY AND CATEGORY

aa o c e b Total

Argentina 0 0 9 0 1 30 Bolivia 1 3 24 15 2 51 Brazil 0 0 6 2 5 28 Chile 3 0 15 9 4 49 Colombia 0 0 14 4 0 67 Costa Rica 7 6 34 25 6 60 Cuba 0 0 0 0 1 16 Dom Rep 8 1 18 12 15 37 Ecuador 12 2 16 7 9 55 El Salvador 44 26 58 43 51 71 Guatemala 22 11 36 28 36 53 Haiti 23 7 26 21 6 40 Honduras 40 27 50 42 44 65 Mexico 1 1 27 6 0 59 Nicaragua 45 27 45 44 40 72 Panama 0 0 10 1 0 37 Paraguay- 15 5 26 20 25 42 Peru 5 0 35 22 9 73 Uruguay- 0 0 19 12 2 39 Venezuela 20 7 30 21 22 47

Total 246 123 498 334 278 991 ^Unknown 24% 12% 50% 33% 29% % Known 76% 88% 50% 67% 71%

aThe column represents the following: a = age, o = occupation, c = class, e = education, b = birthplace.

8

likely that some samples are distorted within some of the

countries. No doubt, more data exists on twentieth century

rather than on nineteenth century executives , and on the

better known men of both eras. While these problems of rep

resentativeness are present, the descriptions and analyses

presented herein are based upon relatively large samples.

Appendix II lists the successions of Latin American

presidents from the Wars of Independence to 1970. Each

president is listed along with the date he took office,

years-months-days in office, the mode used for attaining

office, and the nature of departure from office. Except for

a gap in the first twenty-odd years of Honduran independence,

the codings are virtually complete.

The modes for attaining office utilized in this study

are adapted from William Stokes' classic article proposing

a typology of Latin American executive succession.^ Stokes

divides executive transfers into two basic types -- violent

successions and peaceful ones. Violent takeovers include

machetismo, cuartelazo, golpe de estado, and revolution.

Peaceful procedures are imposicion, candidato unico, contin-

uismo, and competitive election.

The first kind of violent takeover, machetismo, is a

method which relies upon the use of raw physical power to

7.

'William S. Stokes, "Violence As a Power Factor m Latin American Politics," Western Political Quarterly (September, 1952), pp. 445-69.

9

achieve political office and is frequently associated with

the concept of caudillismo.

The cuartelazo is a "barracks revolt", which involves

an internal takeover of a military post, a cuartel, and the

issuance of a manifesto "deposing" the existing government.

Successful cuartelazos requiring extensive planning and

considerable skill in execution are characterized by minimal

loss of life or property. A golpe de estado differs from the

cuartelazo in that it bypasses the cuartel for a direct as

sault upon the government. Revolution is characterized by

mass participation and fundamental changes in public policy.

The imposicion is an electoral charade, a "staged

election" wherein the government oversees the complete

electoral process to a predetermined conclusion. The

candidato unico occurs when there is but one candidate run

ning. Continuismo involves engineering the constitution

in order to permit an incumbent to extend his tenure beyond

the legally proscribed term of office. Elections refer to

competitive contests wherein reasonably honest vote counts

determine the winners and losers.

For the purposes of this study, Stokes' typology is

collapsed into three basic categories -- violencia, imposi-

cion, and election. Violencia refers to any case in which

a presidential aspirant uses armed force directly to achieve

office. The violence can take many forms, from a bloodless

golpe de estado or cuartelazo to a violent revolution. In

10

every case, however, armed action is employed to gain power.

Elections refer to a contest between two or more candidates,

each of whom must have a "reasonable chance" of winning."^

Three types of elections are used in Latin America: (1)

popular elections in which the winner simply receives a major

ity or plurality of the votes, (2) elections in which a leg

islative or constituent assembly chooses an executive, and

(3) elections where legislative bodies select a president

when none of the candidates wins a sufficiently large major

ity of the popular vote.

Imposiciones are all-power turnovers that fall be

tween violencias and elections. Normally, they are elec

toral charades in which there is a single candidate or only

one candidate with a chance to win. For the purposes of

this study, a legislative ratification of a golpe de estado

or another violent form of taking office is not an imposi-

cion. i'his tactic is frequently used by presidential aspi

rants who successfully stage a coup d'etat. If the president

gained office violently and stages a popular election after

ward to ratify his taking office, then an imposicion is con

sidered to have, occurred.

A "reasonable chance" of winning means that more than one candidate must be a serious contender. No formal criteria are used in this study to distinguish elections from impos iciones. Rather, the author has relied upon historical and journalistic accounts and his own judgment to determine when competitive elections occur. The reader can refer to Appendix II to see those 131 cases judged to be elections in this study.

11

Latin American turnovers frequently involve tempo

rary or interim arrangements. To accommodate such successions,

the category "provisional" has been added. Provisional

presidents are frequently appointed by a junta or a legisla

tive body when presidential succession is interrupted. At

other times, they replace a vacationing or ailing president.

Hence, it is useful to distinguish between those provisional

executives who come to power legally and peacefully and

those who talce office in unconstitutional or violent cir

cumstances. As used here, the category "provisional presi

dent" includes those individuals who might legally be

labelled acting or interim chief executives.

Each transfer of the executive office of the twenty

Latin American republics is coded according to the following

formula:

v = violent, forcible, unconstitutional change i = imposicion e = election by popular vote

ec = election by legislative body of constituent assembly

e/ec = popular election followed by election in legislature

p = provisional succession pv = provisional succession under forcible conditions

Presidents who continue in office without interruption are

coded only for their initial assumption of office unless

subsequent extensions of their term involve a different

mode than that initially employed. The conditions under

which individuals leave the presidency is coded according

to one of the following seven categories:

12

c = constitutionally and voluntarily u = unconstitutionally and under duress r = voluntary resignation or withdrawal h = for reasons of health d = death

ds = death by suicide da = death by assassination

Coded data and its use for indices raise questions

of reliability and validity. Reliability refers to the

accuracy of the codings. Validity concerns the indicators

and whether they actually indicate what they are claimed to

indicate. The accuracy of the codings in Appendices I and

II hinges upon the accuracy of the historical and journalis

tic accounts from which they derive, and, in most cases, the

codings are mechanical. Personal judgments are required,

however, for coding some of the categories. For instance,

distinguishing among class backgrounds is, at times, judg

mental. The line between middle and upper class origins is

not always clear. Too, distinguishing an election from an

imposicion presents difficulties.

Validity is, perhaps, a more serious issue. In this

study, four categories are used to measure political phenom

ena. Executive class background is used to measure the

characteristics of class structure, the incidence of

soldier-presidents measures militarism, violent successions

measure instability, and electoral successions measure polite

ical democracy.

It is logical that where relatively large numbers

of people from the lower and middle classes fill elite

positions, the class system could be considered less strati

fied and closed than where such offices are monopolized by

members of the upper class.

The question of whether the incidence of soldier-

presidents is indicative of militarism hinges upon a defi

nition of militarism. In the social sciences, militarism

is frequently associated with notions such as authoritarian

personality, fascism, and a general militarization of

society. In Latin America, militarism has generally had a

more limited meaning. There, as in this study, it refers

specifically to military establishments and to their rela

tionships with the state. For example, Robert Gilmore de

fines militarism as follows:

The military is concerned with the management and use of controlled violence in the service of the state according to terms laid down by the state. When the military institution veers from this role to participate in or to influence other, non-military agencies and functions of the state, including its leadership, then militarism exists in greater or lesser degree.5

In light of this definition, soldier-presidents which repre

sent military participation in non-military institutions,

seem a valid measure of militarism.

Domestic political instability is usually said to

consist of events such as demonstrations, riots, pronouncia-

mientos , golpes de estado, guerrilla actions, and civil

^Robert L. Gilmore, Caudillism and Militarism in Venezuela, 1810-1910, (AthensV Ohio University Press',' 1964) , pp\ 4-5'."

wars. Significantly, the target of these events is gener

ally the existing government; hence, the measure of insta

bility used in this study, violent successions, strictly

speaking, gauges "successful" destabilizing actions.

Majority rule is a keystone of political democracy

and elections provide the institution for determining ma

jorities. Although political democracy involves more than

competitive elections, such elections are, at least, a neces

sary condition for democracy. Hence, the measure used here,

though somewhat limited, is adequate as it is a fundamental

aspect of democracy.

All the background and succession data used in this

study will attempt to provide a better understanding of the

office of chief executive in relation to political power

and the larger societies in Latin America, But, before pre

senting and analyzing this data, it is useful to review the

evolution of the Latin American chief executive, along with

the informal and formal influences conducing to the emer

gence and solidification of presidential systems. This is

the subject of Chapter 2.

CHAPTER 2

Tllf: LATIN AMERICA?,' CHIEF EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIALISM AND POWER

Executive predominance is the salient feature of

Latin American government. Indeed, "the most widely pro

fessed fact in the field of Latin American politics is un-

I questionably the dominant role of the president." Yet,

curiously, there are few studies of the Latin American chief

executive. Only a handful deal with presidency in a general

sense. By far, the best of these is Rosendo Gomez's article,

"Latin American Executives: Essence and Variation." G^mez

discusses the Latin American executive and his relationship

to executive power more generally conceived. He distin

guishes between New and Old World authoritarianism and out

lines a five-fold typology for cataloguing chief executives.

Other general studies are in almost all textbooks on Latin

American government and politics. Two of the better efforts

are by Frank Brandenburg and Alexander Edelmann.

•^Rosendo Gomez, "Latin American Executives: Essence and Variation," Journal of Inter-American Studies, III (June, 1961) , p. 81.

^Gomez, pp. 81-96.

7

Frank Brandenburg, "The Presidency," in Harold E. Davis (ed) , Government and Politics in Latin America (New York: The Ronald Press , 19 5 8) , pp. 2 52 - 89 ; Alexander T. Edelmann, Latin American Government and Politics, revised edition (Homewood: The Dorsey Press, 19 69) , pp. 406-41.

15

16

Both authors cover the formal-legal aspects of presi

dential power and presidential succession. Brandenburg in

cludes an excellent discussion of the cultural and histori

cal bases of presidential power, and Edelmann presents a

useful catalogue of the types of executives found in Latin

America.

The remaining literature on the Latin American exec

utive consists of chapters in country studies and a few

articles that concern a single country. These works tend to

be descriptive and historical in approach. Some do not go

beyond formal-legal arrangements, although most include some

discussion of variables, either political, cultural, socio

logical, or historical, that have influenced the office of

the chief executive.^ a number of studies are thinly dis

guised polemics designed to publicize some perceived "evil"

^For historical treatments almost wholly limited to formal-legal questions see: N. Andrew N. eleven, The Political Organization of Bolivia (Washington: Carnegie Institu-tion, 1940) , pp. 114-67; Herman G. James, The Constitutional System of Brazil (Washington: Carnegie Ins titution, 1923) , pp. 82- 10 5 ; Graham II. Stuart, The Governmental System of Peru, (Washington: Carnegie Institution, 19 2 5) , pp. 36-50 ; and William S. Stokes, Honduras: An Area Study in Government (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press , 19 5 0) . Broader interpre-tations of the executive are found in: Federico G. Gil, The Political System of Chile (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1966), pp. 92-106; Alexander T. Edelmann, "The Rise and Demise of Uruguay's Second Plural Executive," Journal of Politics XXXI (February, 1969), pp. 119-39; Russell IH Fitzgibbon, "Executive Power in Central America," Journal of Politics, III (August, 1941), pp. 297-307. For three studies that emphasize the political bases of executive power see: Frank Brandenburg, The Making of Modern Mexico (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964) ; Leo B. Lott, "Executive Power in Venezuela," American

17

in executive behavior.5 George Blanksten's book on Ecuador

is an interpretation of Ecuadorean politics from the per

spective of the presidency.^ Three recent articles concern

ing presidential recruitment and succession in Chile, Costa

Rica, and Ecuador get away from the approaches and methods

7 that have always dominated this literature. There are em

pirically based studies utilizing quantifiable data to indi

cate patterns of executive selection and tenure.

Types of Executives in Latin America

Presidential government has not always been the sole

executive system in Latin America. Indeed, considerable

experimentation with varying types of executives has occurred

among the twenty republics. These consist of five main types

Political Science Review L (June, 1956), pp. 422-41; and Martin Needier, "Cabinet Responsibility in a Presidential System: The Case of Peru."- Parliamentary Affairs. XVIII (Spring, 1965), pp. 156-61.

^Ernest Hamblock, His Majesty the President of Brazil (New York: E. P. Duttori^ 1936) , and Frank Tannenbaum, "Personal Government in Mexico," Foreign Affairs XXVII (October, 1948), pp. 44-57.

^George I. B1 anks ten ,N Ecuador: N^Cons t^rtu t i oris^ and Caudi 1 los (Berkeley: University of California 'Press , 1'9 51) , Blanksten develops the thesis that the national political life of Ecuador has been greatly affected by the caudillo-pres ident.

^Richard B. Gray and Frederick R. Kirwin, "Presidential Succession in Chile: 1817 to 1966 ," Journal of Inter-American Studies , XI (Jan., 1969), pp. 144-59 ; James ET Busey, "The Presidents of Costa Rica." The Americas. XVIII (July, 1961), pp. 55-70

18

-- moriarchial, life consular, parliamentary, collegial, and

g presidential. Experiments with monarchs and life consuls

were largely limited to the post-Independence era and can be

dealt with summarily. Parliamentary and collegial systems,

which represent a more viable alternative to presidential-

ism, require more discussion.

Monarchs and Life Consuls

Monarchial systems were adopted in the immediate

post-Independence period in Mexico, Haiti, and Brazil. In

Mexico, the reign of Emperor Agustin Iturbide proved tempo

rary lasting less than a year. Some Mexicans believed that

a monarchy would provide a more stable polity than would a

democratic system. But, on the whole, pro-monarchist senti

ment was limited, and the adoption of this particular system

reflected the desire of Iturbide for personal aggrandizement

rather than a desire of society for monarchy. Three Haitian

monarchs were somewhat more successful. Emperor Jacques I

ruled for two years, Henri I, fourteen years, and Faustin I,

twelve years.^ None of these men, however, passed his title

^Edelmann, Latin American Government and Politics, pp. 406-09 .

^The Mexican Agustin I, Agustin Iturbide, governed from 1822 to 1823. The Haitians were Jacques Dessalines, 1804-1806, Henri Christophe, 1806-1820, and Faustin Soulouque, 1847-1859.

19

of emperor to a successor. The Haitian monarchies reflected

the personal inclinations of the rulers themselves who had a

curious infatuation with traditional European governmental

forms.

The Brazilian monarchy was the most durable, lasting

from 1822 to 1889, a period of sixty-seven years, during

which time two men, Pedro I and Pedro II, served as emperors.

The Brazilian monarchy was unique in Latin America because

Pedro I was a leader of the movement to free Brazil from

Portugal. Hence, independence was achieved by a monarchial

government rather than because of a monarchial government.

In Spanish Latin America, independence forces fought against

a monarchial system.

Life consul systems were also adopted during and -J

immediately following the Wars of Independence. Simdn

Bolivar (1825) and Antonio Jose'' de Sucre (1826) were desig

nated lifelong dictators of Bolivia, and Andres de Santa Cruz

assumed the position of "Protector for Life" over the short

lived Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation (1836-1837). The same

position was accorded the Haitian Alexander Petion (1816-1818)

and his successor, Jean Piere Boyer (1818-1843), who ruled for

twenty-five years. A third Haitian, Sylvain Salnave, took

this title and ruled for two years (1867-1869) but then was

deposed and shot by a revolutionary tribunal. More recently,

Francois Duvalier of Haiti provided a variation on this theme

when he took the title of Life President, serving from 1964

until 1971.

Parliamentary and Collegial

A third type of executive, the parliamentary-prime

minister system, has also been utilized in Latin America.

Most countries have required the president to collaborate

with the legislature to some degree in the performance of

his official duties. Carried to an extreme, such "collabo

ration" results in a parliamentary system wherein the presi-

10 dent is nothing but a figurehead. In Latin America, every

republic except Paraguay and Nicaragua has attempted to

force the president to "collaborate," Operating parliamen

tary and semi-parliamentary systems have been used in Mexico,

Chile, Honduras, and Brazil, These experiments grew out of

a desire to bring an end to the overwhelmingly predominant

position of the president in the governmental system.

The Mexican Constitution of 1857 created a parlia

mentary system, but it did not become effective until 1861,

At that time, the legislature and cabinet began to dominate

and did so until 1863 when President Benito Juarez reasserted

the president's control over executive power. During its

two years of predominance, the legislature was "aggressive

and independent," but cabinet instability caused by the lack

•^For a review of parliamentarianism in Latin America, see: William S. Stokes, "Parliamentary Government in Latin America," American Political Science Review, XXXIX (June, 1945), pp~ 522-36 .

11 of a stable majority led to its loss of leadership. The

more successful Chilean experiment with parliamentary govern

rnent spanned thirty-four years from 1891 to 1925. This ven

ture, also marred by cabinet instability, was finally ended

when the military intervened to disband Congress and to in

stitute a presidential system.

Parliamentary government in Honduras lasted six

years, from 1925 to 1931, during which time Congress chal

lenged the President on policy question, executive appoint

ments, and various administration matters through a formal

1 2 parliamentary appartus. In 1932, however, President

Tiburcio Carias Andino restored the traditionally powerful

role of the presidency.

In Brazil, a parliamentary system was created by the

military in order to force President JOao Goulart to share

power with a Prime Minister. As a result, lines of author

ity were obfuscated and immobilismo plagued the government.

The choice between a parliamentarian system and a rcresidenti

system was later given to the people in the form of a refer

endum and the parliamentary system was rejected. The experi

ment, begun in 1961, had lasted only sixteen months. The

"^Frank D. Knapn, Jr., "Parliamentary Government and the Mexican Constitution of 1857: A Forgotten Phase of Mexican Political History," Hispanic American Historical Review XXXIII (February, 1953), p. 84.

-^Stokes, "Parliamentary Government in Latin America p. 5 2 8,

22

current executive system in Cuba might be considered a vari

ation of parliamentarianism. President Osvaldo Do'rticos is

e hands of Prime

have attempted to

rst Venezuelan

11 quickly because

cterized the govern-

, in 1822 and 1823,

signated the junta

al popular support,

were non-Peruvians,

scapegoat when many

suffered by the

e end, the multiple

Undoubtedly, the Uruguayans have undertaken the most

innovative experiments with the multiple executive. They

originated the collegial system whereby executive power was

shared by a nine-man colegiado. The initiator of this execu

tive form, Jose'' Batlle y Ordo'nez, believed that it would pro

mote democracy and lessen the likelihood of dictator presi

dents gaining power. In this sense, the colegiado proved

successful. Uruguay acquired an international reputation

for its adherence to the tenets of liberal democracy and its

avoidance of dictatorial executives. Otherwise, however,

a figurehead, while real power lies in th

Minister Fidel Castro.

A few countries in Latin America

operate plural executive systems. The fi

Republic had such an executive, but it fe

of the indecision and weakness that chara

ing committee. For just over five months

the Peruvians had a multiple executive de

gubernativa. It never elicited substanti

however, because two of the three members

Moreover, the junta gubernativa became a

people began to blame it for the reverses

rebels in the fight against Spain. In th

executive was overthrown by the military.

23

the system proved not so successful. In practice, the members

of the colegiado were often sharply divided into three or four

factions operating much like a parliamentary system without a

stable majority. The nine men needed a majority vote for

policymaking and as the group became more and more divided

by intra-party strife, the "majority" became a shifting

coalition. In some instances, decisions made one day were

reversed the next. At times, the members of the executive

acted irresponsibly, particularly after elections when they

fought over "dividing up the spoils." These squabbles fre

quently continued for weeks leaving the government paralyzed

1 7 and the populace aghast.

The plural executive was tried twice in Uruguay from

1919 to 1933 and from 1952 to 1967. Under the first system,

power was shared by the president and the colegiado. Each

was independently elected and given separate areas of juris

diction. Under the second experiment, the colegiado had all

executive power and the president was simply one of the

colegiado members selected for a one year term. All policy

questions were determined by the whole body. The initial

colegiado system was eliminated by the Dictator Gabriel

Terra as part of a move to consolidate power in his own

13 For critical assessments of the colegiado, see: Edelmann, "The Rise and Demise of Uruguay's Second Plural Executive," pp. 119-39; and Russe Fi'tzgibbon, "Uruguay: A Model for Freedom and Reform in Latin America," Freedom and Reform in Latin America, Frederick B. Pike, ed" (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), pp. 231-55,

24

hands. The second colegiado was done away \\rith by the voters

in a referendum.

Failure of Non-Presidential Systems

Non-presidential experiments have been sufficiently

varied and extensive to provide a useful gauge of their

success and practicality in the Latin American context. By

and large, they have not proven successful. Authoritarian

ism exists and has sometimes provided effective government

in Latin America, but its formal-legal counterparts, monarchy

and life consul, have not proved sustaining. While some in

dividuals have succeeded in assuring a lifelong term of of

fice, in a systemic sense this governmental arrangement has

not evidenced longterm viability or stability, therefore,

not succeeding as an ongoing institution.

Parliamentary, semi-parliamentary, or collegial

systems have been attempted almost universally in Latin

America and have succeeded beyond the term of a single in

dividual, but they have resulted in ineffectual government.

One reason might be that such systems are not related to the

realities of the Latin American political environment. In

most countries where parliamentarianism has been written

into the constitution, it has not been implemented."^ And,

14pnr an interesting account of the Cuban attempt to engineer a functioning parliamentary system, see: William S. Stokes, Latin American Politics (New York: Thomas Y. Crowe 11, 1954] , pp. 437-54 .

25

where it has been implemented, the results have been nega

tive. Collegial systems have proven no more successful. In

essence, parliamentary and collegial executive systems have

severely limited the ability of government to respond to

pressing public problems. Their dismal records point this

out.

In Mexico, two years of parliamentary government

greatly complicated the problem of establishing effective

governmental control outside of Mexico City. Continuous

cabinet crises and challenges from an aggressive legislature

caused President Benito Juarez to concentrate upon maintain

ing the government rather than solving the problems that

15 faced Mexico. In addition, the Congress lacked party dis

cipline and the resultant "fluctuating maiority" left govern

ment without direction. In 1867, Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada,

the first minister in Juarez's cabinet, sought to increase

the executive's power arguing that under a parliamentary

system, the orderly administration of government was impos--| r

sible. Eventually, the position of Lerdo prevailed and

the legislature was brought under presidential control.

•^For summaries of Juarez's problems during these two years, see: Walter V. Scholes , Mexican Politics During The Juarez Regime 1855-1877 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 19 5 7) , pp. 56-91; and Knapp, "Parliamentary Government and the Mexican Constitution of 1857," pp. 65-87.

Frank D. Knapp, Jr., The Life of Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1951) , pp. 126 - 28.

26

The Chilean parliamentary system ushered an unprece

dented era of instability and moral decay in Chilean poli

tics. During the thirty-three years of legislative rule,

121 different cabinets, an average of almost four annually,

governed the country.^ Due to the system of legislative

apportionment, the traditional rural-based oligarchy was

able to retain its control of the political system. Vote-

1 ft buying and bribery became common and accepted practices.

In the words of the historian Hubert Herring, "Easy money

corrupted the politicians. . . . the selling of votes was a

19 general practice." According to Federico Gil, "the govern

ment of Chile reached its lowest ebb during the period of

i . . 2 0 parliamentary rule."

The pariiamentary-presidential government in Brazil

was never more than a political expedient, a compromise ar

rangement between the anti-Goulartistas and the proponents

of a legal solution to the succession crisis. Their exper

iment with parliamentary government was never given an oppor

tunity to work, as President J&ao Goulart, often in concert

l^Gil, The Political System of Chile, p. 50.

l^For poorer families, the sale of the vote became an important additional source of income; see: Alfred Bar-naby Thomas, Latin America: A History (New York: Macmillan § Co., 1956) , p. 400 .

•^Hubert H. Herring, A History of Latin America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960J , p. 558.

^Gil, The Political System of Chile, p. 49.

with the Prime Minister, worked to sabotage the system and

to regain the full powers of the presidency. Apparently,

most Brazilians backed the return of the presidential sys

tem and regarded the parliamentary arrangement as a largely

discordant system.21

In Uruguay, the colegiado was twice introduced under

propitious circumstances; that is, with substantial popular

support and a desire on the part of the government to make

the system work. Under the first plural executive (1919 to

1933) power was divided between a president and a nine-man

National Council, Despite continuous conflict over juris-

? ? dictional questions, the system functioned fairly well.

When the plural executive was reintroduced (1952 to 1967) ,

the independent president was eliminated and all executive

power was placed in the nine-man Council. Evidently, the

Council was overly responsive to group and individual de

mands and as a result, fiscal and productivity problems

2 3 reached catastrophic proportions. At the outset, a colle-

gial system seemed to be an efficacious arrangement within

the Uruguayan context. The country did avoid dictators,

•^Thomas E. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964 (New York: Oxford University Press , 1967) , p. 221.

? ? Philip B. Taylor, Jr., "Interests and Institutional

Disfunction in Uruguay," American Political Science Review (March, 1963), p. 71.

^Taylor, p, 72.

28

considerable stability was achieved, personal liberties were

protected, but the productivity of the economy declined and,

in the end, the colegiado proved incapable of solving public

problems.

The most supportive evidence of the viability of

presidential systems is the failure of non-presidential ex

periments. Overtly authoritarian institutions do not last.

Colegiados and prime ministers are disasters. From a formal-

legal point of view, the problem is one of establishing ef

fective government within a non-authoritarian structure.

Presidential government provides such a framework.

The Latin American experience has been largely with

presidential systems. Table 2.1 summarizes the types of

executives found in Latin America and the number of years

that they have ruled in each of the countries since Independ

ence. Measured in terms of the number of men who have served

within presidential systems as against those who have served

in other executive forms, 971 of all chief executives have

been presidents. Using total years served by presidents and

by other types of executives, presidents held office 91% of

the time. Clearly, presidential government seems effica

cious for Latin America, Clues to the reasons for this lie

in the relationship between presidential systems and histor

ical and societal factors present in Latin America.

29

TABLE 2.1

TYPES OF EXECUTIVES IN LATIN AMERICA INDEPENDENCE TO 1970

(BY COUNTRY)

All Executives Presidents Othera

number years number years number years

Argentina 30 108 30 108 0 0 Bolivia 51 145 48 142 3 3 Brazil 28 148 25 80 3 68 Chile 49 153 40 119 9 34 Colombia 67 151 67 151 0 0 Costa Rica 60 146 60 146 0 0 Cuba 16 65 15 54 1 11 Dom Rep 37 120 37 120 0 0 Ecuador 56 140 56 140 0 0 El Salvador 63 149 63 149 0 0 Guatemala 53 149 53 149 0 0 Haiti"3 40 179 34 121 6 58 Honduras 66 146 64 140 2 6 Mexico0 59 148 58 145 2 3 Nicaragua 72 145 72 145 0 0 Panama 37 66 37 66 0 0 Paraguay 42 159 41 135 1 24 Peru 73 147 72 146 1 1 Uruguay 39 140 36 111 3 29 Venezuela 47 140 47 140 0 0

Total Number 985 2744 955 2507 31 237 Percentage 100% 100% 97% 91 % 3% 9

aOther refers to monarchial, life consul, functioning parliamentary, and collegial executives.

'-'The total number of years for Haiti includes the period from 180 7 to 1820 when the country had two chief executives. Chronologically Haiti has been independent only 166 years.

cThe total number of other executives includes Benito Juarez who was president during the experiment with parliamentary government from 1861 to 1863.

^The number of executives does not include those who served from 1952 to 1967 when the colegiado was tried for the second time.

Informal Influences on Power

Latin America's extensive experience with presiden

tial government is not simply a reflection of the failure of

alternative executive systems. Rather, presidential govern

ment is entwined with the Latin American political culture,

the kinds of problems confronting Latin American governments,

historical factors, and the particular evolution of its po

litical institutions.

Cultural Influence

The political culture of Latin America has been par

ticularly hospitable to a strong executive. The colonial

governments established a 300-year tradition of authoritar

ian government. Throughout that epoch, the relationship

between the government and the governed was rather simple,

The government expected and received obedience from the

governed.^ Moreover, not only were the king and his repre

sentatives in the New World accorded complete fealty, their

intentions were considered above reproach and their actions

beyond public criticism.

The major religious and socio-economic ^nst^tutious

reinforced this relationship between the masses and the

This is not to say that disobedience and rebellion were absent throughout the colonial period. Some significant Indian revolts occurred and a number of conquistadors bridled under the decrees of the monarchs. But, overall, the era was marked by remarkable mass obedience.

political elite. The Catholic church was also founded upon

an authoritarian hierarchy that required unquestioning de

votion and submission to its dogma and life style, encour

aging the individual to "accept his lot." Another pillar

of society, the hacendado, was an autocrat on a local scale.

From his hacienda he controlled the economic, social, and

political life of the area. Like the monarch and the clergy,

he insisted upon compliance with his orders. His words

often carried the power of life and death. Little wonder

that the hacendado became the patro"n in the eyes of the

villagers.

From the perspective of the commoner, the political

officials, religious leaders, and hacendados bestowed all

of life's rewards and penalties, and even the afterlife was

controlled by the Church. They were all powerful men to be

obeyed without question. This indoctrination to submission

to authority has carried over to the present time. Latin

Americans tend to assume deferential attitudes toward those

in control, particularly political officeholders, and more

particularly, the president. Hence, he becomes something

of a "national hacendado," regarded by many as omnipotent

and omniscient. His position is reinforced by a cultural

environment laden with institutions historically based upon

authoritarian relationships that have created and continu

ally reinforce habits of deference and obedience.

Practical Influences

Another influence upon the evolution of the Latin

American executive office relates to the momentous political

and economic problems confronting the area. Initially, the

governments were troubled by serious separatist movements,

continuous rebellion, and periodic anarchical conditions.

A major problem was simply to establish a government that

could last long enough to be effective. Cyclical economic

conditions of depression and prosperity .also greatly compli

cated the task of governing. More recently, significant

groups such as labor and middle sector elements have de

manded a greater voice in the political system, as well as

redistribution of material wealth. This, coupled with the

drive for industrialization and economic development, has

increased the problems of governing in Latin America.

Throughout history, Latin America has encountered a

range of nationbuilding, statebuilding, participation, and

distribution crises, which have required an energetic,

vigorous government. It is frequently argued that execu

tives are best able to provide such government. In his

classic argument, Alexander Hamilton identified the strong

executive with "good government," national security, effi

cient administration, the protection of property, and se-

2 S curity from anarchical assaults upon liberty.

? ^ Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers: Number

70 (New York: Mentor Books, 1961) , pp. 42 3-31.

33

Hamilton's assessment of the necessity for a strong

executive strikes a responsive cord among Latin American po

litical leaders. In a message to the Congress of Bolivia in

1826, Simo'n Bolivar spoke of the crucial role of the chief

executive, even advocating a lifetime term.

The President of the Republic, in our Constitution, becomes the sun which, fixed in its orbit, imparts life to the universe. This supreme authority must be perpetual, for in hierarchical systems, more than in others , a fixed point is needed about which leaders and citizens, man of affairs, can revolve. "Give me a point where I may stand," said an ancient sage, "and I will move the earth." For Bolivia this point is the life-term President.26

Two years later, speaking to the Congress of Ocana in Bogota'",

Bolivar restated his belief in and commitment to a strong

executive government, pointing up its congruence with the

social structure of Latin America.

Our many branches of government are not organized in keeping with our social structure and the needs of our citizens. We have made the legislative branch the sovereign body, whereas it should have only limited sovereignty. We have made the executive branch subordinate to the legislature to which we have given a far greater part in the general administration of the government than the nation's true interest demands. ?

In the early 1900's, a group of Venezuelan intellec

tuals articulated a theory of "democratic caesarism" that

continued Bolivarian thought by arguing for caudillo

Simo'n Bolivar, Selected Writings of Bolivar, Harold A. Bierck, Jr., ed. [New York: The Colonial Press , 1951), p. 598.

Bolivar, Selected Writings of Bolivar, p. 676.

presidents whose authority was founded upon the "unconscious

suggestion of the majority." Since Venezuelan society

lacked the elements needed for a representative democracy,

such democratic caesars were necessary as only they could

harmonize society and bring about growth and progress. In

the words of one disciple of this school, "The mystic doc

trine of democracy is being replaced by love of one's coun

try and the desire to make it great by utilizing all its

forces, organized to function harmoniously through the con-

2 8 trol which can be exerted only by a Supreme Director."

More recently, Jose^F, Estigarribia, the former

President of Paraguay and architect of its current Consti

tution, reissued the Bolivarian argument for the necessity

of a strong president.

The organization of contemporary society demands a strong, expeditious executive power that can immediately resolve many of the questions which daily arise in social life,..,As regards the executive and legislative powers, the specialization of functions made it desireable to give the executive power a wide range, which would cover all that related to the administration of the country, the regulation of the economy, the intervention of governmental direction in conflicts of private interests; and to give Congress the function of providing general standards.

2 8pedro Manuel Arcaya, The Gomez Regime in Venezuela and its Background (Washington, D.C.,: 1936)/ p. 59.

2^Jose^ F. Estigarribia, "Comments on the Constitution of Paraguay," Constitutions of Nations „ revised edition, Amos J. Peas lee, ed. [The Hague: Mart inus Nijhoff, 19 56) , p. 129 .

35

Others have argued that the pressing public problems

to be overcome in Latin America require a powerful executive.

One exponent of this position, the former president of Chile,

Eduardo Frei Montalva, insists that the president must have

"wide powers" in order to meet the "complex conditions of

our times which demand authority, very rapid measures,

total responsibility, and, therefore, considerable freedom

30 of action." In.1969, Frei introduced a reform bill into

Congress which would have increased the power of the chief

executive. This legislation provided for the use of the

plebiscite to determine public policy when the executive

and the Congress reached an impasse, gave the president the

power to dissolve Congress and call new elections once dur

ing his six year term, and granted the president exclusive

power to table appropriations bills and legislation dealing

with social welfare and wage levels. In addition, this bill

allowed the chief executive to introduce legislation as

"emergency laws." Such bills would require a Congressional

decision within thirty days, which, if Congress failed to

31 act, would automatically became laws.

^Cited in: Edward J. Williams, Latin American Christian Democratic Parties (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1967) , p. TO9.

•7 "I "Chile: Constitutional Reform -- For Whose

Benefit," Latin America, January 24, 1969, p. 28.

36

Similar notions are stated and defended in the writ

ings of the Argentine Fernando Cuevillas who, defending the

administration of Juan Peron, wrote, "Nevertheless, when a

caudillo emerges to clean up an anarchic social and politi

cal state, he may feel it does not suit his purpose to co

exist with representatives in a national congress and that

he must transform his government temporarily into a dictator

ship."^

The exigencies of government, then, have reinforced

the position of the Latin American chief executive. Faced

with a bewildering array of problems, the typical republic

has required a firm hand at the helm simply to maintain

order. Perhaps the tremendous problems of governing Latin

America were best put by the former President of Ecuador,

Otto Arosemena. Aslced if he planned to run for the presi

dency, he understated, "Latin America is more difficult to

•z 3 govern than is generally thought."

Historical Influences

From the outset, the executive was the important

center of political power in Latin America. In the colonial

32Fernando N. A. Cuevillas, "El Re"gimen del Caudillaie en Hispanoamerica," Dictatorship in Latin America, Hugh H. Hamill, Jr., ed. (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p. 205.

•^"Ecuador," Latin American Digest (Tempe: Arizona State University, September, 196 8), p. 4^

37

period, a strong executive was instituted and has persisted

throughout the evolution of Latin American political history.

Institutions that might have operated as countervailing

powers to the emergence and solidification of presidential

systems, failed to mature. The audencias had the potential

for growing into a powerful body, and did possess judicial,

legislative, and administrative functions. But, in the

words of Hubert Herring, "The audiencia early proved inade

quate. The conquerors and their heirs were difficult to

handle, and the disputes which multiplied among them and the

clergy and the civil authorities required a sterner disci

pline than any court could impose. Some of the audiencias

were corrupt, more were inefficient.""^ Similarly, the

cabildo, or city council, might have grown into an important

countervailing institution. In the early phase of the Inde

pendence movement, they were, in many colonies, centers of

revolutionary activity and provided leaders. But, they re

mained essentially a local body, and when the opportunity

to govern came during the Wars of Independence, the cabildos

proved inadequate to the task.

During and immediately following the Wars of Inde

pendence, numerous republics attempted to concentrate power

in the hands of the legislature. These attempts failed and

•Z A

Herring, A History of Latin America, p. 160.

soon most of the newly-independent Spanish American repub

lics cast about for governmental systems that would replace

the king-viceregal system in form, but not in fact. For

example, the first Bolivian Constitution designated the

president a life term. Similarly, Simo'n Bolivar argued for

a lifelong mandate to govern Gran Colombia. In Argentina,

the men who overthrew the Spanish authorities in 1810 even

tually sought a king or queen to replace Ferdinand VII. In

many Latin American countries, an office of Supreme Director

was created. Almost inevitably these Supreme Directors were

given dictatorial powers by the legislatures so that the exec

utive might impose order.

The monarch, then, was succeeded by the caudillo.

Indeed, the 19th century has been aptly labelled the "age

of the caudillos." During that period various local and re

gional caudillos competed for control of the national govern

ment. From this competition there emerged national

caudillos who dominated individual countries over extended

periods of time. The outstanding characteristic of the

caudillo is the personal nature of his power:

35Gran Colombia was a confederation made up of present-day Venezuela, Colombia, Panama', and Ecuador. It split in 1830. Bolrvar advocated life-term executives for all of Latin America.

39

in a political sense I would use 'caudillismo' to apply to that regime which consists of the personification or incarnation of authority, where he who governs acts with an extraordinary charismatic moral ascendancy over his people: advising them, guiding them, leading them paternally. The power of the caudillo is inspired authority before it is iuridical authority.^6

The caudillo is very much the "natural leader" to whom

others look for guidance. His "inspired authority" is widely

accepted. "He is the personification of the people, the

state, the ideals of society, and his authority transcends

? 7 law, constitution, party, flag, and political principle."

The 20th century president is heir to this monarchial and

caudillo tradition. In every country, these traditions

bolster the office of the chief executive and increase the

potential fqr individuals to dominate or control "counter

vailing institutions."

Institutional Influence

The history of Latin America has also been charac

terized by the failure of countervailing institutions to

develop. Latin American judiciaries, legislatures, and

bureaucracies are largely subservient to the executive.

Too, effective pressure groups which constitute countervailing

7 /• Cuevillas, "El Regimen del Caudillaie en Hispano-

america," Dictatorship in Latin America, p. 205.

3?Stokes, Latin American Politics, p. 303.

40

powers elsewhere, have emerged only recently in Latin

America.

The iudiciaries of Latin America have generally been

dominated by the chief executive. The iudiciaries of some

countries during certain periods have manifested consider

able independence but such instances are rare. For the

most part, court systems are inexorably tied to the execu

tive since they usually rely upon a sympathetic chief execu

tive for their autonomous status. Hence, in an ultimate

sense, any independent actions by a Latin American judiciary

reflect the benign attitudes of a president rather than the

7 O strength of a court system.

The Latin American legislature has generally proven

even less autonomous than the judiciary. "In most of the

nations, the legislative body is greatly overshadowed by

the president and does not even enjoy as much independence

39 or influence as the judiciary." Most Latin American

legislatures simply process executive initiatives, frequently

accepting the president's policy proposals en toto. In

part, this is due to a lack of funding for legislative pur

poses and a dearth of staff assistance. With very limited

3 8 An outstanding exception is the Costa Rican judiciary .

7 Q Edelmann, Latin American Government and Politics,

p. 443. Exceptions to this generalization are found in Costa Rica and Venezuela. Formerly, Chile and Uruguay had somewhat powerful legislative branches.

41

resources, congresses find it difficult to compete with the

comparatively well-endowed executive branch. Legislators

are also hindered by the comparatively short duration of

congressional sessions. Typically, they run from sixty to

ninety days annually.

In many countries, the electoral process works

against the emergence of an aggressive, independent legisla

ture. The president and the congress are frequently elected

simultaneously with the presidential contest capturing the

voter's interest and dominating the direction in which

votes are cast. Hence, many presidents come into office

along with a large delegation of loyal supporters. In some

cases, the president can rig the elections in order to en

sure a legislative majority. Then, again, the lack of

party discipline characteristic of most Latin American leg

islative systems results in a fragmented and fluid congres

sional body that finds it difficult to do anything, let

alone challenge the power of the chief executive. Finally,

the president is popularly elected and only he has a national

constituency. Each congressman necessarily represents only

a small sector of society. The president's national man

date increases the inclination of the legislative branches

to give the chief executive considerable latitude.

It is also true that the legislators themselves have

done little to increase the role of the congressional branch

in Latin American politics. Evidently, many Latin American

42

legislators seek office in order to achieve status rather

than to advance programs.^ Oftentimes, the deputy or

senator takes a seat traditionally held by his family and

his legislative responsibility ends after he has gained an

appropriate share of the spoils. Since the chief executive

controls the spoils system, the congressman is careful not

to court presidential displeasure. In this context, the

chief executive's administrative powers are particularly

important for influencing opposition and independent legis

lators. In sum, a variety of legal and practical factors

discourage legislative autonomy and assertiveness.

Similarly, the Latin American bureaucracy is less of

a check upon executive power than are its counterparts else

where. Students of the United States government have fre

quently observed that the bureaucracy constitutes a check

upon executive power.^ There is increasing evidence that

the bureaucracy in Latin America might constitute a

^This is the thesis of a recent book on the Columbian Congress. See: James L. Payne, Patterns of Conflict in Colombia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 196 8). Frank Brandenburg reaches much the same conclusion in his analysis of Mexican legislators; see: The Making of Modern Mexico, p. 153.

41-Of course, the same phenomenon has been found elsewhere.

formidable countervailing force.^2 But, to date, this poten

tial remains only partially realized. Civil service examina

tions are not widely used in Latin America, hence, most bu

reaucratic positions are filled by presidential appointment.

Lach new president causes a virtually complete turnover in

personnel as the chief executive rewards his supporters.

The result is a comparatively loyal bureaucracy that the

president can rely upon to implement executive policy.

Pressure groups are not notably effective as counter

vailing institutions in Latin America. Firstly, they are

few in numbers.^3 Secondly, Latin American groups tend to

operate "defensively," i.e., to protect members from onerous

government decisions rather than to press their policy pre

ferences upon government. Interest groups, then, do not

complete with or balance executive power. To the contrary,

^2xhis is a conclusion of my study of Mexico: John Conklin, An Analysis of the Impact of Interest Groups Upon Mexican Development (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Department of Political Science, Northern Illinois University, 1968). See also: Martin C. Needier, Political Development in Latin America: Instability, Violence, and Evolutionary Change. (New York: Random House, 1968) , p~! 31

^Kalman Silvert, "Political Change in Latin America in Herbert L. Matthews, ed., The United States and Latin America (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-lJall, 1959), p.

44por example, see the Mexican Case: Robert Scott, "Mexico: The Established Revolution," in Lucien W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965) , p~] 363.

44

they seek to ally themselves with that power in order to gain

favorable governmental treatment.

Latin America's political evolution, culture, insti

tutional development, and practical problems are all support

tive of presidential systems. Modelled after the United

States' presidential system, the Latin American executive

has characteristically been a single individual elected

directly or indirectly by the people with substantial powers

derived from a constitution, which renders it substantially

independent of legislative control. In fact, the constitu

tions provide further evidence of the need for strong execu

tive leadership in Latin America.

Formal Bases of Power

The constitutions of Latin America provide a formal-

legal milieu which adds even more to the primacy of the

president. They confer upon him powers typically entrusted

to presidents in other countries. But, more importantly,

most Latin American constitutions go considerably beyond

these "usual" delegations of authority. In addition, the

constitutions are filled with ambiguities and vagueness of

language which provides an avenue for further expanding exec

utive power. His "usual" duties include being head of the

armed forces, chief of state, administrative head of the

executive branch, charged with conducting foreign relations,

empowered to initiate and veto legislation, and authorized

45

to fill a large number of appointive positions in the execu

tive and judicial branches,.^

Concerning the "unusual" constitutional provisions,

the typical Latin American president is constitutionally

entrusted with opening and closing the first and last ses

sions of Congress. A president can use this power to render

the legislature impotent by refusing to convoke its first

meeting. Such a move is not without precedence in Latin

America. Conversely, he can keep Congress in session inde£*-

initely. Some executives also have considerable constitu

tional authority over budgetary matters. In Haiti and Para

guay, only the president can introduce revenue and appropria

tions bills. In Haiti, the legislature cannot increase the

president's budget. The Paraguayan executive has a signify

icant power concerning all bills introduced by him. Specif*

ically, such bills automatically become law if the legisla

ture fails to dispose of them during the session at hand.

Finally, all of the Latin American presidents can veto leg

islative acts, but the Haitian, Chilean, and Mexican execu

tives have the power of item veto. This, of course, greatly

45xhis review of the constitutional powers of the Latin American presidents is based upon the following constitutions: Argentina, 1857; Bolivia, 1967; Brazil, 1967; Chile, 1925; Colombia, 1886; Costa Rica, 1949; Cuba, 1940; Dominican Republic, 1966; Ecuador, 1967; El Salvador, 1962; Guatemala, 1965; Haiti, 1964; Honduras, 1965; Mexico, 1917; Nicaragua, 1950; Panama, 1946; Paraguay, 1967; Peru, 1933; Uruguay, 1967; and Venezuela, 1961.

46

strengthens the hand of a president in his relationship with

the legislature.

While the constitutional powers of the president un

der normal conditions are considerable, during periods of

"emergency," they are sweeping. Fifteen Latin American con

stitutions include an estado de sitio or state of seige pro

vision.1^ While formal rules for its implementation vary a

little from country-to-country, the estado de sitio gives

the president the power to declare martial law, suspend con

stitutional guarantees, and assume dictatorial powers during

periods of foreign threats or domestic crisis. In most

cases, if congress is in session, the executive must ask

the legislature to declare an estado de sitio. However, leg

islative bodies in Latin America are frequently closed and

when congress is adjourned, the president can declare a

state of seige. When in session, congressional compliance

47 is the norm.

Vagueness characterizes the conditions under which

an estado de sitio is declared. Consider Article 197 of the

Nicaraguan Constitution. According to it, the president can

declare an estado de sitio when either a civil or international

The Mexican, Peruvian, Panamanian, Costa Rican, and Ecuadorean Constitutions do not include an estado de sitio c1ause.

47 For two recent examples, consider the behavior of

the Chilean and Uruguayan legislatures in 1973,

47

war occurs, whenever there is a danger of either occurring,

during times of public disaster, or "whenever due to any

other circumstance it is required for the protection, peace,

or security of the Nation or of its institutions or forms of

government." Similarly, Article 52 of the Paraguayan Con

stitution reads in part: "if any grave threat occurs ....the

President of the Republic will declare....a state of seige,"

Every Latin American constitution empowers the presi

dent to suspend constitutional guarantees and to exercise

decree powers. Although the suspension and decree provisions

are technically distinct from an estado de sitio, they have

much the same effect. Again, there is some variation from

country-to-country, but the basic process is for the legis

lature to declare an "extraordinary situation" and to author

ize the president to govern by decree. When the legislature

is adiourned, the president himself can declare the extra

ordinary situation, and issue decrees having the force of

law, although decrees having the force of law must usually

be ratified later by the legislature. Most constitutions do

not mention the substantive areas in which decree law may be

used, other than to specify that decrees might be employed

to suspend constitutional guarantees.

Perhaps the most innovative constitutional treatment

of extraordinary situations is found in the Guatemalan Con

stitution. It allows the president to take certain extra

ordinary powers depending upon the gradation of disorder.

48

According to Article 153, "the Law on Public Order shall es

tablish the measures to be taken, in accordance with the fol

lowing gradation:

1. state of prevention 2. state of alarm 3. state of public disorder 4. state of seige 5. state of war

Hence, the Guatemalan President can assume sufficient power

to deal with the problem at hand. Other Latin American con

stitutions simply distinguish between a president having

limited extraordinary power and complete extraordinary power.

The Constitutions of Latin America contribute sub

stantially to the power of the presidency. This conclusion

is contrary to the frequent assertion that Latin American

constitutions are more aspirational than practical; i.e.,

that the democratic forms outlined in them reflect euphoric

rather than practical goals. Scholars refer to the provision

for separating power between three branches of government,

universal in Latin America, as a long range goal instead of

A O a fact of governmental process. But, a review of the

See: J. Lloyd Mecham, "Latin American Constitutions: Nominal and Real," Journal of Politics, XXI (May, 1959), pp. 258-75. Concerning the executive, Mecham says, "Because of the well-founded belief that it is the executive which will be most prone to irresponsibility and be acquisitive of power, the most numerous constitutional limitations are those imposed on the presidents. Despite all this... the executive overshadows the other two powers." The position taken here is that the typical Latin American constitution increases the president's power vis-a-vis the legislature .

executive's powers does not confirm this interpretation.

Clearly, the constitutions currently in force in Latin

America call for strong executives. True, they also call

for a separation of power among executive, legislative, and

iudicial branches; however, nothing like an equivalent divi

sion of power is envisioned in the terms of the constitu

tions. Every constitution in Latin America makes it possible

during times of legislative recess for a president to take,

upon his own word, dictatorial powers. Constitutionally,

then, all Latin American systems are strong presidential sys

tems. In fact, all are at a minimum strong presidential sys

tems. In the Latin American context, the real issue concerns

iust how strong the president is in relation to the other

branches of government. In 1970, the executive was in con

trol in thirteen countries, dominant in four, and strong in

three. Of course, there is some shifting within these cate

gories. In the mid-1960's, Peru's executive system was strong

and Panama's was dominant. Some might regard the current

Venezuelan president as strong rather than dominant. Today

(1974) , Chile and Uruguay would be considered under Executive

Contro1.

Executive Dominant Executive Control

Mexico

Ecuador

Honduras

Nicaragua

Venezuela

Guatemala

El Salvador

Colombia

Executive Strong

Costa Rica

Chile

Uruguay

50

Executive Control Executive Dominant Executive Strong

Panama

Bolivia

Peru

Paraguay"

Argentina

Brazil

Chapter Summary

The focal point of Latin American government and

politics is the office of the chief executive. In Latin

America, this translates into presidential government.

Generally speaking, no other governmental institution ri

vals the president's power. It is not unusual for the

president to dominate the rule-making and rule - adiudieating

processes in addition to carrying out his traditional func

tion of rule-application. The primacy of the presidency

results from the tradition of omnipotent executive govern

ment, the arrested development of other governmental insti

tutions, the presence of urgent practical problems demand

ing action or remedy, and a cultural context conducive to

the growth of presidencialismo. His extensive formal-legal

power is a reflection of these historical, political, and

cu11ura 1 variab1es .

CHAPTER 3

PRESIDENTIAL RECRUITMENT: FORMAL AND INFORMAL REQUIREMENTS

Studies of elite backgrounds provide another per

spective for describing and analyzing political recruitment

patterns."'" Such data indicates trends in recruitment, mak

ing it possible to retrace the sequence of change. More

over, changes in recruitment patterns are likely to reflect

changes in the polity itself. For instance, the emergence

of new social classes or occupational groups as recruitment

founts may signal changes in the locus of political power.

Also, the social backgrounds of political leaders reflect

basic values in society. In most cases, persons with com

paratively highly-valued characteristics tend to achieve

2 high political offices.

•^For examples of background studies, see: Harold Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, eds . , World Revolutionary Elites : Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge : The MIT Press, 196 5) ; Donald Matthews, The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers (New YorlTi Random House, 1954) ; Donald Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World (New York: Vintage, 1960); Frederick W. Frey, Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1965); and Frank Bonilla, The Failure of Elites (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1970). ~~ '

2 Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World, pp.

44-45.

51

52

The purpose of Chapter 3 is to describe formal-

legal and so-called "informal" qualifications of the office

of chief executive in Latin America. These "informal re

quisites" in this chapter are the age, birthplace, education,

3 and civilian occupation. The formal-legal qualifications,

those written into the Constitutions, will be described

first.

Formal-Legal Qualifications

Executive recruitment in Latin America is subject to

various constitutional qualifications. Some of the most

outstanding ones, as seen in Table 3.1, are age qualifica

tions, religious qualifications, special qualifications, and

special disqualifications. Also, some qualifications not in

the Table but mentioned in the text concern citizenship, res

idency and property.

Age, Religious, and Other Requirements

All countries have minimum age requirements. But,

there is a good deal of variation which will be discussed

more fully later in the chapter. A number of constitutions

have special religious qualifications. In ten countries,

the president must be a layman. Argentina and Paraguay re

quire that he profess a belief in or belong to the Roman

^Two other "informal requisites", social military occupations, are described and analyzed IV.

origins and in Chapter

53

TABLE 3.1

CONSTITUTIONAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR LATIN AMERICAN PRESIDENTS

Age Religious Special Special Qualifications Dis-

Qualifications

Argentina

Bolivia

30 member Roman Catholic Church

35 layman

Brazil

Chile

Colombia

35

30

30

annual income 2,000 pesos or equivalent

incumbent

fulfill military duties and nominee of a party

ex-president pres designate member of

congress cabinet minis

ter minister plen

ipotentiary governor of

department magistrate of

superior court

councilor of state

attorney general of nation

incumbent and relatives

vice president minister of

state active military personnel

incumbent

incumbent

54

TABLE 3.1--Continued



Qualifications

Costa Rica 30 layman

Cuba

Dom Rep

35

30

Comptroller general of nation

university professor (5 years)

practitioner of a liberal profession with a univers ity degree

Literate own property

worth 500 colones or

income of 200 colones


vice president cabinet minister magistrate of

supreme court director of civil

register director of an

autonomous institution

comptroller general

assistant comptroller general

incumbent active military

personnel

active military personnel

55

Table 3.1 --Continued



Oua1if i c at ions

Ecuador 40 layman incumbent and relatives

vice president minister of state state contractors

or concessionaires

El Salvador 30 layman honest and incumbent and learned relatives

minister of state Active military

personnel administrators of public funds until audit persons in debt to state

Guatemala 35 layman incumbent and relatives

vice president and relatives

minister of state active military

personnel head of coup

d'etat

Haiti 40

Honduras 30 layman incumbent and relatives

president of congres s

cabinet members head of armed

forces

56


CONSTITUTIONAL OUALIFICATIONS FOR LATIN AMERICAN PRESIDENTS


Qualifications

Honduras (con'd)

Mexico 35 layman

Nicaragua 25 layman

members of national election council (all relatives of above)

incumbent secretary of state cabinet member attorney general governor


minister of state magistrate of

court head of coup

d'etat or mem-ber of an illegal administration

Paraguay 40 profess Roman Catholic faith

possess moral and intellectual requirements needed for office

two term incumbents

Panama

Peru

35

35 layman

incumbent


minister of state members of judi

cial power active military

personnel

57




Qualifications

Uruguay

Venezuela

35

30 layman

incumbent


cabinet member governor secretary to

pres ident

Catholic Church. Concerning citizenship, all the nations

require that the president be a native born citizen, or if

born abroad, the offspring of native born parents. The

Nicaraguan Constitution specifies, however, that the presi

dent be born in Nicaragua of a Nicaraguan mother or father.

In Mexico, to be President, an individual must be the "son

of Mexican parents by birth." By implication, then, women

are constitutionally barred from becoming president of the

country. All twenty republics have a residency requirement.

In Mexico, the president must have resided in the country

for a full year prior to election. According to the Peru

vian Constitution, the president must have resided ten years

continuously in the republic. In Nicaragua, the president

must have had over five years residency in the country. In

the remaining countries, residency is defined for the pres

idents the same as for qualified voters. Argentina, along

with Costa Rica, has a property and minimum income require

ment .

Other Special Qualifications

The Salvadorean and Paraguayan Constitutions include

moral and intellectual standards. In the same vein, the

President of Costa Rica must be able to read and write.

Only persons who have fulfilled their military duties and

who have been nominated by a party or a coalition of parties

can become president in Bolivia. The Colombian Constitution

specifies that the president must have held one of several

specific occupations.

Special Disqualifications

Some potential presidential aspirants are barred

from office because of disqualifications. Incumbents and

their relatives are disqualified in seventeen and nine

countries, respectively. Ten constitutions have provisions

barring some government officials from executive office un

less they have resigned their post six to twelve months be

fore the impending presidential election. In El Salvador,

persons who have handled or administered public funds are

disqualified until their accounts have been audited. De

linquent debtors to the public treasure are also legally ex

eluded from the presidency. Similarly, the Ecuadorean Con

stitution disqualifies those who have contracts or conces

sions with the State for the exploitation of the National

wealth or the operation of public utilities. Not surpris

ingly, nine countries have constitutional provisions affect

ing military personnel.^ These disqualify anyone who has

served actively in the armed forces for a year or six

months prior to the next election. The constitutions of

Guatemala and Nicaragua disqualify leaders of coup d1etats,

The number is ten if the qualifications to become the president of Colombia are considered to exclude military personnel.

60

revolutions, or other armed movements, from the chief execu

tive office. In Nicaragua, this provision is extended to

anyone who serves as minister of state or in a high ranking

military position for a de facto government that interrupted

a constitutional regime.

Informal Prerequisites

The social background characteristics treated in

this section are age, birthplace, education, and civilian

occupations. The ages of the presidents are simply de

scribed by country. But birthplace, education, and civilian

occupations are described and analyzed as being indicative

of societal values and to show trends over time.

Age

As stated earlier, all countries have a minimum age

requirement. They range from twenty-five years (one coun

try) , to thirty years (eight countries), to thirty-five

years (eight countries), to forty years (three countries).

Although there are slightly varied minimum ages at which a

man might become president, none of the Latin American coun

tries bars anyone forty years of age or over and there is no

maximum or retirement age specified. On the whole, Table

3.2 indicates that the presidents of Latin America have come

to power with some years to spare. Eighty-three percent of

all presidents were at least forty when they first assumed

the presidency, with the greatest number occurring from fo^ty*

61

TABLE 3.2

AGE OF LATIN AMERICAN EXECUTIVES UPON FIRST ACHIEVING OFFICE (BY NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE)

20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Argentina 0 2 5 15 6 2 0 Bolivia 0 11 20 9 9 1 0 Brazi1 0 0 5 12 6 0 0 Chi le 0 3 14 20 7 1 0 Colombia 0 12 25 18 9 2 1 Costa Rica 1 12 22 11 5 2 0 Cuba 0 3 4 2 6 1 0 Dom Rep 0 7 8 6 2 0 0 Ecuador 0 4 10 7 3 0 0 El Salvador 0 1 10 5 1 0 0 Guatemala 0 3 8 6 8 0 0 Haiti 0 2 7 4 0 0 1 Honduras 1 6 5 3 2 0 0 Mexico 2 8 30 15 4 0 0 Nicaragua 0 3 8 5 3 1 0 Panama 0 2 11 14 5 2 0 Paraguay- 0 2 7 3 1 0 0 Peru 2 10 23 22 6 4 0 Uruguay 0 8 12 8 10 1 0 Venezuela 0 3 8 4 2 1 _0

Total 6 102 242 189 95 18 2 Percentage .9% 15,6% 37.0% 2 8.9% 14.5% 2.8% .3

62

years (37%) to fifty years (29%),' Another 16% and 15% were

in their thirties and sixties, respectively. Only a handful

of men in their twenties have achieved the chief executive

office. The same is true for individuals in their seventies

and eighties.

Birthplace

A great majority of the presidents of Latin America

were born in urban settings. Table 3.3 shows that 70% were

born in towns and cities of over 10,000 population, and 36%

of these in cities of over 50,000. In addition, 11% and 8%

of the executives were born in towns of 5,000 to 10,000 and

2,000 to 5,000, respectively. Hence, almost 90% of all

Latin American presidents originated in what are usually de

fined as urban settings.^ In two countries, Argentina and

Chile, all of the presidents have begun life as urban

dwellers (See Table 3.3). Of the twenty republics, only

Guatemala and Haiti have had as many as one-fourth of their

executives born in rural areas. Table 3.4 shows the percent

age of presidents born in urban settings as compared to the

percentage of population living in urban areas. The

^There is no universally accepted criteria for distinguishing between rural and urban populations. However, many countries use a figure of around 2,000 for such purposes. Cuba and Mexico, for example, use 2,000 populations while the United States and Argentina use 2,500, Colombia counts all administrative centers with more than 1,500 inhabitants as urban.

63

TABLE 3.3

BIRTHPLACE OF LATIN AMERICAN PRESIDENTS (BY SIZE)a

under^ 2, 000 5 ,000 10 ,000 over 2, 000 to to to 50 , 000

5, 000 10 ,000 50 ,000 # % tt 0, 0 It '0 tt 0. "0 It 0. 0

Argentina 0 0 3 11 2 1 10 36 13 46 Bolivia 4 8 2 4 3 6 22 46 17 36 Brazil 3 14 1 5 8 36 4 18 6 27 Chile 0 0 6 13 0 0 11 25 28 62 Colombia 11 17 12 18 5 7 20 30 19 28 Costa Rica 1 2 • 1 2 13 24 38 72 0 0 Cuba 1 7 3 13 3 20 4 27 5 33 Dom Rep 4 17 2 13 3 13 8 35 5 22 Ecuador 2 4 3 4 5 11 8 17 29 64 El Salvador 3 15 5 25 1 5 6 30 5 25 Guatemala 7 35 2 10 0 0 3 15 8 40 Haiti 9 26 1 3 2 6 17 50 5 15 Honduras 3 14 2 10 4 19 12 57 0 0 Mexi co 6 10 9 15 9 15 19 33 16 27 N i caragua 3 9 2 6 4 12 10 30 14 43 Panama 2 6 0 0 3 9 8 23 21 62 Paraguay 2 11 1 6 0 0 7 39 8 44 Peru 9 15 7 12 4 7 17 28 23 38 Uruguay 1 3 2 6 3 8 9 26 20 57 Venezuela 4 17 1 4 5 21 4 17 10 41

Total 75 11% 66 8% 77 11% 237 34% 252 36%

aThe size of the town in which the presidents were born was taken from: American Geographical Society of New York, Map of Hispanic America: Complete Set for South America and Central America (New York: American Geographical Society of New York, 19 20) ; except for Mexico which is based upon the census of 1900; Ministerio de Fomento, Censo General de la Republica Mexicana (Mexico: Secretaria de Fomento, 1901-1906).

^The number of presidents born in towns with the population under 2,000, etc., is in the column headed by the symbol //. The number translated into percentage is in the column headed by the symbol %.

64

TABLE 3.4

PERCENTAGE OF URBAN DWELLERS AND URBAN BORN EXECUTIVES IN LATIN AMERICA

population8 presidents urban urban

Argentina 62 100 Bolivia 34 92 Brazil 36 86 Chile 60 100 Colombia 36 84 Costa Rica 33 98 Cub a 55 93 Dom Rep 24 83 Ecuador 28 96 El Salvador 36 85 Guatemala 25 65 Haiti 12 74 Honduras 29 86 Mexico 43 90 Nicaragua 35 91 Panama 36 94 Paraguay 35 89 Peru 36 85 Uruguay 82 100 Venezuela 54 78

Mean 401 89

aThe percentage of urban population for all the countries is around 1950, except for Cuba, Peru, and Uruguay which is taken from 1960. Sources: Harold E. Davis, ed., Government and Politics in Latin America (New York: Ronald Press" 19 5 8J , p . 40 .

difference between the means (49%) reflects the "over-

representation" o L" urban dwellers in executive recruitment.

A high proportion of presidents are born in national

and state capitals. Table 3.5 shows that at least half of

the presidents in four countries (Chile, Honduras, Panama,

and Uruguay) were born in national capitals. A comparison

of columns one and two in Table 3.5 shows the extent to which

national capitals have produced executives disproportionate

to their percentage of the population. Every national capi

tal except Havana, Cuba, has produced a greater percent of

presidents than its population size would warrant given ran

dom chance. The average capital produced 34% of its country's

executives while the average capital's population is only 8%

of its country's population. State capitals have been even

more fecund. The mean for the state capitals of a country

producing presidents is 36%. Such capitals produced over

half of the executives in three countries (Dominican Repub

lic, Ecuador, and Nicaragua). Together, national and state

capitals have supplied 70% of Latin America's executives.

In eighteen countries, they have produced at least half of

the presidents.^

The upper and middle classes which have spawned most

7 of Latin America's executives are basically urban peoples.

^Brazil and Guatemala are the only exceptions.

n See Chapter III for a discussion of class and execu

tive recruitment.

66

TABLE 3.5

PERCENTAGE OF LATIN AMERICAN PRESIDENTS BORN IN NATIONAL AND STATE CAPITALS

Population ina Presidents in Presidents in Nat'l Capital Nat'l Capital State Capital Total

Argent ina 20 20 41 70 Bolivia 4 33 46 79 Brazil 5 14 14 28 Chile 10 51 36 87 Colomb ia 3 21 31 52 Costa Rica 8 47 42 89 Cuba 13 13 40 53 Dom Rer>k 9 21 58 79 Ecuador 6 27 58 85 El Salvador 5 25 44 69 Guatemala 4 31 15 46 Haiti0 4 15 44 59 Honduras 6 50 29 79 Mexico 5 19 32 51 Nicaragua 6 18 61 79 Panama 16 62 24 86 Paraguay- 10 3 3 22 55 . Peru 4 25 45 70 Uruguay 27 57 11 68 Vene zuela 3 33 23 56

Mean 81 31 % 36% 67%

aThe percentage of the total population living in a national capital around 1920 is taken from: W. II. Koebel, ed., Anglo-South American Handbook Including Central America, Mexico" and Cuba for 1922 (London: Federation of British In-dustries, 1922}.

^The percentage of the Dominican population living in the national capital is for 1950.

cThe percentage of the Haitian population living in the national capital is for 1950.

The upper class consists of the old landed aristocracy and

the new urban moneyed class -- industrialists, bankers, and

entrepreneurs. Of course, this latter group is by defini

tion urban, but the old landed aristocracy is also very

urban in its life style. Although it was historically sus

tained by the hacienda, the hacendado and his progeny often

were, and are, urban dwellers. They spend much of their time

living in the capital cities of Latin America and Europe.

Frequently, they take advantage of certain economic oppor

tunities and serve as bank president or as director of a

railroad or as member of a corporation board. Sometimes,

members of the landed aristocracy become internationally known

experts on law, philosophy, or literature. As a group, they

move in cultured circles. Of course, all of these activi

ties are based upon living in urban areas where the econom

ic, cultural, and intellectual outlets are present. Per

haps the most telling evidence of the basic orientation of

the landed aristocracy is the phenomenon of the absentee

owner which has longstanding and widespread application in

Latin America. This, of course, is the owner who operates

his estate from Buenos Aires or Mexico City or Paris or

London through the reports of an overseer. In the words of

two students of agrarian structure in Latin America: "Char

acteristically the larger farm owners have financial and

commercial activities in the large cities, political re

sponsibilities in the capital, and professional or cultural

68

interests far removed from the land. Agriculture, as such,

is often only of secondary interest to them. Typically,

O they maintain residence in the city or even abroad,"

The Latin American middle class is also basically an

urban group. Occupationally, many of its members are doc

tors, lawyers, engineers, teachers, merchants, government

officials, small industrialists, army officers, and techni

cians, but only in a few scattered places does it include

rural occupational groups such as small landowners. Indeed,

the rural areas of Latin America are, for the most part,

without a middle class. Since the colonization almost all

rural dwellers have been slaves, farm laborers, or mini -

fundistas living day-to-day on the margin of life. In ad

dition, the high educational level associated with executive

recruitment also works against rural dwellers.^ Even today,

educational facilities in rural areas are very limited, but

in the years prior to 1930 (when the presidents of Latin

America were of school age), they were practically unknown.

The high incidence of urban born executives also re

flects a long-standing value put upon the city and city life.

When the European conquistadores arrived in the New World,

O Solon L. Barraclough and Arthur L. Domike, "Agrarian

Structure in Seven Latin American Countries" Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movements in Latin America,ed.', p.ondolfo Stavenhagen' (New York':' Doubleday Co.", Inc.) , p. 5 2.

g See below for more extensive discussion.

they immediately set about mapping great cities with enor

mous public buildings and expansive boulevards. They

created replicas of upper class urban life in Europe with

its leisure, cultural milieu, material comforts, and social

swirl. On the other hand, they denigrated manual labor such

as tilling the soil. This point of view is clearly depicted

in Domingo Sarmiento's classic study of the gaucho, Facundo.

Sarmiento contrasts the brutal, barbaric, and authoritarian

rural life with that of the urban dweller who is cultured,

educated, cosmopolitan, and democratic. As president,

Sarmiento emphasized the importance of rural education as

its only road to salvation. More recently, the determination

of the ruling elite of Mexico to make Mexico City, "the most

beautiful capital in the world," reflects the same tradi

tion. Too, the high land values and desirability of living

at the center of the city is indicative of this norm.

Locale of birth is strongly related to executive re

cruitment. That is, a disproportionate percentage of Latin

American executives were born in urban settings. Evidently,

this is, in part, due to the fact that the cluster of char

acteristics in class, education, and employment that charac

terize most Latin American executives are foreign to the

rural areas of Latin America. Moreover, the traditional

value placed on the city and the city way-of-life also works

against the recruitment of rural dwellers. In part, the

backgrounds of individuals in high political positions

70

reflect the basic values of a society. In Latin America,

there has always been high value placed upon the city as

compared to the countryside.

Education

Historically, the presidents have been among the most

highly educated occupational groups in Latin America. One-

half have been university graduates, (See bottom row of

Table 3.6) Another 8% studied under tutors or attended col

lege, 12% graduated from military college, and 28% have had

a secondary or primary education. Only 2% of the Latin

American chief executives have had no formal education. A

single country, Haiti, accounts for over half of this last

group. These figures are particularly significant in the

Latin American context where educational opportunities have

been, and are, severely limited.

Although educational data for the period prior to

1930 (the period when the men under consideration here

were of school age) is very incomplete, it does suggest the

exclusive nature of Latin American educational systems. For

instance, in Chile in 1842, only fifty primary schools

existed and the primary school enrollment of 3,000 was drawn

10 from a primary school-age pool of over 200,000. Roughly,

l9d of all Chilean children had a chance to receive a primary

10 Luis Galdames,- History of-Chile (Austin: Univer

sity of Texas Press, 1941) ,' pV '277.'

71

TABLE 3.6

FORMAL EDUCATION OF THE PRESIDENTS OF LATIN AMERICA

(BY NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE)

ca ct ca cu s P mc n

Argentina 17 0 1 0 2 0 11 0 Bolivia 17 1 2 0 2 1 8 1 Brazi1 16 2 0 0 1 1 6 0 Chile 31 0 1 0 1 1 6 0 Colombia 42 1 8 1 8 3 2 0 Costa Rica 26 1 5 19 0 0 0 0 Cuba 12 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 Dom Rep 5 0 7 8 2 3 0 0 Ecuador 19 1 3 5 2 0 3 1 El Salvador 16 0 0 4 6 0 6 0 Guatemala 17 0 1 2 1 0 7 0 II a i t i 6 0 1 0 0 1 4 8 Honduras 16 0 1 4 1 2 3 0 Mexico 21 1 2 8 10 2 8 i Nicaragua 21 0 3 7 3 1 1 0 Panama 19 1 2 1 8 1 1 0 Paraguay 16 0 0 11 1 1 3 0 Peru 16 3 0 22 18 5 8 1 Uruguay 11 0 3 4 6 2 4 0 Venezuela 9 0 1 0 2 0 4 2

Total Number 353 11 42 96 80 24 85 14 Percentage 50 % 2% 6% 14% 11% 3% 12% V

Explanation: the number in each column indicates the total number of presidents in each category from Independence to 1970. The letter symbols at the head of each column refer to: c = college graduate, ct = tutorial education (equivalent to college), ca = attended college, cu = some formal education but level unknown, s = secondary education, p = primary education, mc = military college, and n = no formal education. The percentages in the bottom row refer only to those executives whose educational level is known.

72

education. As late as 1872 in Brazil, only 6 % of the pri

mary school age population attended school, and by 1890,

their relative numbers had increased to only 7%,^ In

Mexico at the turn of the nineteenth century, roughly 101

1 2 of the children of primary school age were in school.

Assuming that these early statistics are illustrative of

prevailing conditions throughout the continent, it is clear

that a primary school education was available to compara

tively few individuals. More recent data indicates that at

tendance in primary school remains the preserve of a minor

ity. As late as 1950, only 44% of all Latin American chil-

13 dren of primary school age entered school. More impor

tantly, only 8% of those entering completed school at this

14 level. By contrast, Table 3.6 shows that almost all

presidents (98%) have had at least primary training.

Of course, attendance in a secondary school is a

sign of even much greater exclusivity. Again, data for the

years prior to World War II are sketchy. A survey in Mexico,

^UNESCO, World Illiteracy at Mid-Century (Switzerland: UNESCO, 1957) , p. 170. ~

1 ? Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico

(New York: Atheneum Press , 1965) , p . 198.

13' 'Oscar Vera, "The Educational Situation and Re

quirements in Latin America," in Peter G. Snow (ed.), Government and Politics in Latin America: A Reader (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 196 7), pT 96.

^Vera, "The Educational Situation and Requirements in Latin America," p. 96.

however, revealed that only about 5% of the school age popu

lation between the years 1900 and 1930 had had formal edu-

1 cational training beyond the primary level. 0 This figure

would seem to reflect a hemispheric pattern. As late as

1955, only 10% of the secondary school age population of

1 6 Latin America was attending classes. Clearly, even today

access to a secondary education is available to only a few.

In 1950, II of the population between the ages of fifteen

17 and nineteen was engaged in higher education. Assuming a

normal attrition rate, considerably less than 1% could be

expected to earn a college degree. On the other hand, at

least 50% of all presidents since the Wars of Independence

have had a college degree. Figure 3.1 shows the incidence of

college and military college trained presidents from Inde

pendence to 1970. It shows that a college education has

always been an important characteristic of executives and

that the percentage of such presidents slowly increased from

-^Cline, The United States and Mexico, p. 202. The survey cited by Cline was talcen In 1950 and included only those Mexicans over twenty-five years of age.

•^Aldo Solari, "Secondary Education and the Development of Elites," in Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari (eds.), Elites in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press , 1967J , p . 459 . ~~

l^Vera, "The Educational Situation and Requirements in Latin America," p. 97.

74

I nd. -1 8 4 5

1 9 4 5 -1 9 7 0

1 8 4 S -1 8 7 0

] 8 5 5 -1 9 2 0

COLLEGn

MILITARY COLLEGE

College includes college graduates, those who attended college, and individuals who had the equiva

lent of a college education with tutors.

Figure 3.1: Percentage of Presidents College and Military College Trained Over Six Twenty-Five Year Periods

Independence to 1945. For the period 1945-1970, their rela

tive numbers declined slightly. Until the period 1920-1945,

the percentage o£ executives trained in military schools

fluctuated between 3%and 10%. However, since 1920, they have

become an increasingly important institution in the training

and socialization of future presidents. For the period

1895-1920, only 3% of them were educated in a military

academy. This figure rose to 17% for the period 1920-1945,

and to 26% in the twenty-five years since World War II.

This increase is a result of either increased enrollments in

Latin American military schools or an increase in the inci

dence of soldier-presidents. Probably both factors help ex

plain it. More military personnel probably attend military

academies in the contemporary era than was the case pre

viously. Too, the incidence of professional soldier-

1 ft presidents has increased since 1945.

The comparatively high levels of formal education

achieved by Latin American presidents point to the highly

selective nature of the recruitment process. Statisticallyf

a secondary education can be viewed as an "informal" quali

fication for becoming president. Yet, as late as 1950,

only 2 % of the appropriate age group had completed this level

19 of schooling. In a country such as Honduras, this means

18Di scussed more fully later in the chapter.

•^Vera, "The Educational Situation and Requirements in Latin America," p. 97.

that 2,450,000 of some 2,500,000 citizens are effectively

excluded from any reasonable chance of sitting in the presi

dential office. Hence, even today, individuals with this

"informal" requisite are unusual. Given the post-World

War II emphasis upon education that has been almost uni

versal in Latin America, it is reasonable to assume that

educational opportunities were even more limited between

1790 and 1930, the years in which the presidents of Latin

America were of school age.

Civilian Occupations

About half of the Latin American executives come

from civilian occupations and half from the military. This

section describes those from the civilian group. Persons

with civilian occupational backgrounds account for 52% of

Latin America's chief executives. In Table 3.7, the occu

pations of the civilian presidents are listed by country.

A majority of these executives (65%) were public men, that

is, leaders of parties or holders of an elective office.

Considerable numbers (34%) had careers as government offi

cials, particularly as jurists and diplomats. Lawyers

constituted the largest "private" occupational category (38%)

followed by educators (20%), businessmen (14%), journalists

(10%), physicians (8%), landowners (6%), authors (5%), en

gineers (3%), and architects and clergymen (less than 1%).

Most of the civilian presidents, then, have risen from pro

fessional occupations.

77

TABLE 3.7

CIVILIAN OCCUPATIONS OF LATIN AMERICAN CHIEF EXECUTIVES

(BY COUNTRY)

la pin g j e a p b h i z x

Argent ina 74 84 21 16 21 11 5 5 0 0 0 0 Bolivia 52 5 7 4 3 0 30 0 5 24 0 0 0 0 Bra zi1 58 89 21 11 5 0 5 0 10 0 0 0 Ch i 1 e 54 84 5 4 5 27 3 5 11 5 5 0 0 Colombia 51 78 4 0 32 15 20 29 9 5 2 0 0 Costa Rica 39 91 15 4 19 0 10 19 11 2 0 0 Cuba 40 4 6 33 13 0 13 13 13 0 13 0 0 Dom Rep 21 42 21 11 11 21 0 25 5 0 0 11 Ecuador 58 85 10 5 20 5 8 13 10 3 0 0 El Salvador 27 65 19 0 8 0 15 8 15 4 0 4 Guatemala 44 49 28 0 16 11 0 11 0 0 0 0 Haiti 44 78 56 11 33 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 Honduras 27 86 27 5 9 9 14 9 0 0 0 0 Mexico 55 23 61 3 23 0 3 3 6 3 0 0 Nicaragua 21 58 26 37 11 0 18 18 13 0 0 0 Panama 21 24 50 6 21 0 15 35 3 10 0 0 Paraguay 40 69 35 16 32 4 8 0 0 0 4 0 Peru 33 56 30 15 33 0 4 3 3 11 4 4 4 Uruguay 12 5 6 33 21 15 0 3 9 0 3 0 0 Vene zuela 40 66 56 11 22 15 11 6 0 0 0 0

Total 40% 6 5% 33% 10% 20% 5% 8% 14% 6% 3% .4% . 8

aThe letters heading the colomns represent the following occupations: 1 = lawyer, pm = public man, g = government official, j = journalist, e = educator, a = author, p = physician, b = businessman, h = landowner, i = engineer, z = architect, and x = clergyman.

78

This finding generally concurs with occupational

background studies of political elites elsewhere in the

world. In his study of the occupations of the United States

presidents, vice-presidents, and cabinet members between

1877 and 1934, Donald Matthews found that fully 70% were

? f) trained as lawyers. Similarly, he found that 44% of

those British Cabinet members between 1918 and 1935 were

21 professionals. Maxwell Knight's study of backgrounds of

the members of the German executive shows that over half of

those serving in Germany's cabinets between 1890 and 1945

2 2 were from the professions. Political elites elsewhere

frequently have extensive experience with political and/or

governmental occupations. For example, in Germany, 53% of

the members of the German cabinets between 1890 and 1945

2 3 rose to power through the civil service. Studies of the

United States Senate reveal that the "average" Senator had

devoted about ten years to governmental and political office-

2 4 holding prior to arriving in the Senate.

^Donald R. Matthews, The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers, p. 30.

? 1 Matthews, The Social Background of Political

Deci s ion-Makers , p. 44. " ~~

2 2 Maxwell Knight, The German Executive (Stanford:

Stanford University Press) , 1937 , p~

2 3 Knight, The German Executive,p. 33,

^Donald R. Matthews, United States Senators and Their World, p. 52.

79

The occupational backgrounds of Latin American execu

tives seem to be distinctive in at least two ways. First,

the high incidence of individuals with military backgrounds

? s would seem to be peculiar to Latin America. While this

"pattern" seems to be prevalent .in other Third World areas ,

it generally has not occurred in countries that have been

politically independent for an extensive period of time.

Secondly, Latin America is notable for the variety of pro

fessional occupations characteristic of its chief executives.

Along with a preponderance of lawyers, the Latin American

executives include sizeable numbers of educators, journal

ists, physicians, and even authors.

Chapter Summary

The background characteristics of the Latin American

presidents considered in this chapter suggest the highly

selective nature of the executive recruitment process. Most

were born in an urban area. Almost all of them went to

school and had considerable formal training. A sizeable

majority became professional men. Finally, between the

ages of 40 and 60, the "average" executive became president.

The "typical" president, then, differs greatly from the

"typical" Latin American citizen. Indeed, the impact of

"informal" requisites is even greater if social origins and

military occupations are also considered.

2^See Chapter 4 for a discussion of executives with

military backgrounds.

CHAPTER 4

PRESIDENTIAL RECRUITMENT: SOCIAL CLASS AND MILITARY OCCUPATIONS

Chapter 4 concerns the class origins of the Latin

American presidents and the influence of soldier-presidents

upon executive recruitment. The class origins and military

occupations of Latin American executives take on particular

significance because class stratification and militarism

have long been salient features of Latin American political

life. The purposes of this chapter are: (1) to describe

and analyze changing patterns in the class backgrounds of

the Latin American presidents and to place such change pat

terns in societal context, and (2) to describe and explain

the high incidence of soldier-presidents in Latin America

and to place militarism in political context.

Social Class

The Latin American republics are typically charac

terized as always having had stratified social structures

with very little opportunity for upward mobility. The

colonizers of Latin America instituted a kighly stratified

societies which still exist to some degree to this day.

Logically, this stratification would be found in other areas

as well, particularly in the political and executive recruit

ment system. This would certainly be the case in those

80

81

societies acutely aware of class standings and emphasizing

the value of upper class status. They would be likely to

exhibit a preference for upper class individuals to fill the

highest political office in the land. In the words of Asher

N. Christensen:

The colonizers of Latin America developed a highly stratified society having some feudal aspects derived from the homelands .... The Wars of Independence did little to change this basic social pattern, and it changed very little during the nineteenth century. Even in the mid-twentieth century its remnants are visible to some degree in all the nations .... Furthermore , the system has fed upon itself. Wealth, prestige, and political power have been concentrated in a small ruling class, which has either opposed basic social and economic changes, or grudgingly assented to them under pressure. Class structure is breaking down in Latin America today and social mobility is increasing.. . .but the old structure persists with enough strength to retard these transformations and in some countries virtually to prevent them.^

To discover how class structure in Latin America has evolved,

it shall be viewed over time. Latin America was a highly

stratified colony at the outset with the upper classes

enioying special priviledge and control in every respect.

Whether or not this has changed significantly can be seen

in a trend analysis drawn from Independence to the present.

1-Asher N. Christensen, "A Changing Society and Economy," in Harold E. Davis, ed., Government and Politics in Latin America (New York: Ronald Press , 19 5 8), pp. 53- 54.

Social Class: Trend Analysis

Just as there are differences among countries and

socio-racial categories, it is reasonable to assume that

there are differences in class origin over time. It is

commonly argued, as in the quote cited previously, that

throughout the nineteenth century, all aspects of life,

social economic, political, religious, were dominated by

the so-called "oligarchy" headed by the upper classes. This

oligarchy is alleged to have monopolized the political sys

tem and to have resisted any changes in the social struc

ture including measures that might generate socio-political

mobility. In the twentieth century, the political position

of the upper class is said to have declined while that of

the middle class has risen to a point of dominance. If these

assertions are correct, they should be reflected in executive

recruitment. Specifically, there should be a preponderence

of upper class executives throughout the nineteenth century

and increasingly greater numbers of middle class born presi

dents in the twentieth. Concerning the middle class by it

self, we would expect to find the greater number of them in

the twentieth rather than the nineteenth century.

The class origins of the executives of Latin America

over six twenty-five year periods is diagrammed .in Figure

4.1. By and large, it confirms the line of analysis outlined

above. It shows that in the period from Independence to

1845, almost 70% of all the presidents were from the upper

83

I n d . -1 8 4 5

1 8 4 5 -1 8 7 0

1 8 7 0 -1 8 9 5

1 8 9 5 -1 9 2 0

1 9 2 0 -1 9 4 5

1 9 4 5 -1 9 7 0

701

6 0 4

504

4 0 1

> 0 4

UPPER CLASS

MIDDLE CLASS

2 0 4

1 0 4

0 4

LOWER CLASS

£ the Presidents of Latin Ainerica Figure 4.1: Class Origins of the Pres iden t s or Over Twenty-Five Year Periods (By Percentage)

classes. Their relative numbers declined to about half of

all executives over the following fifty years, and then rose

to over 60% for the period from 1895 to 1920. The current

decline of individuals born in the upper class began in the

period 1920-1945 when their relative numbers dropped to 51%.

Their numbers have fallen even more precipitously to 34% of

all presidents since 1945. The recruitment of individuals

originating in the middle class follows a pattern almost

juxtaposed from that of the upper class. The recruitment

pattern for executives born in the lower classes is remark

ably consistent. Their relative numbers hovered around 10%

from Independence to the late 1800's. Since that time,

they have declined slowly until the period 1945-1970, when

only 5% of the executives originated in this class.

The incidence of executives from the upper classes

has declined continuously since Independence, with the ex

ception of the period 1895-1920, when their relative numbers

increased considerably. Similarly, executive recruitment

from among the middle sectors has consistently increased

except for the years 1895-1920, which, from this perspective,

might be regarded as a "deviant" historical period. What

ever, since that time, the increase of executives from the

middle class has been notable with a sizeable majority of

all presidents emanating from that sector since 1945.

85

The decline of the upper class presidents occurring

concurrently with, and exactly opposite to, the increase in

the middle class presidents is shown in Figure 4.1. To ex

plain this phenomenon, social class structure relating to

political life will be examined in more detail.

Social Class: Theoretical Considerations

Recently, Martin Needier and John Johnson have pro

posed two theories relating class structure to political

life in the Latin American republics. Martin Needier has

argued that class structure influenced by socio-racial char

acteristics relates to political life. John Johnson main

tains that the "emergence of the middle sectors" has had

the most profound effect upon class structure which, in

turn, affects political life and executive recruitment. In

the following section, the Needier and Johnson theories are

utilized as organizational and theoretical underpinnings

for the discussion of the impact of class variables on

executive recruitment.

Socio-Racial Theory

Needier makes no explicit ranking of countries in

terms of class stratification as such, but rather, in terms

? Martin C. Needier, Political Development in Latin

Amerlca (New York: Random House, 1968) , pp. 9 8-105; and John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors (Stanford: Stanford University Press , ITF58J .

of socio-racial types, four categories in number:

European Mulatto Mestizo Indian

Argentina Costa Rica Uruguay Dom Rep

Haiti Panama

Brazil Cuba

Chile Colombia El Salvador

Bolivia Ecuador Guatemala

Honduras Nicaragua Paraguay

Mexico Peru

Venezuela

He argues that the socio-racial type of a country can serve

as an independent variable "explaining" the distinctive polit'

ical characteristics found among the countries.

stratification would be the most "open" and would have the

largest amount of diversity in the social backgrounds of the

executives. The socio-racial type that has the largest

amount of stratification would be the least "open" and

would evidence lesser diversity in executive social back

ground, Using this premise, the four types would fall into

this order going from most to least "open": (1) European,

(2) Mulatto, (3) Mestizo, and (4) Indian.

of the presidents and socio-racial groups that is shown in

Table 4.1, it is found that Needler's theory is neither en

tirely borne out nor repudiated. Table 4.2, summarized be

low, shows the total percentage of presidents from each of

the socio-racial categories.

The socio-racial type that has the least amount of

Interpreting data concerning social class origins

87

Lower Class Middle Class Upper Class

European Mulatto Mesti zo Indi an

12 2 % 2 % 5% 9 %

42% 50% 32% 36%

561 38% 63% 5 5%

Total 39% 54%

European Countries. Needier notes that European

countries do not have a large culturally distinct group that

must be integrated into the political system and, therefore,

they are not stratified along ethnic lines. They are, in

stead, oriented toward egalitarianism and mass participa

tion. Me suggests that since class lines are less rigid,

the people "possess the basic skills requisite for partici-

3 pation in democratic politics." Social deference and hier

archy do not involve the deep divisions found in other types

of Latin American countries. Looking at the percentages for

the European countries, which should show the greatest amount

of diversity, it is interesting to note that 56% of the

presidents come from the upper class, 42% from the middle,

and only 2% from the lower class. This suggests less "open

ness" in the European countries than anticipated. One rea

son for the relatively high incidence of upper class presi

dents might be the ability of this class to almost completely

dominate their respective political systems throughout most

of the nineteenth century. Moreover, in Argentina and Costa

p. 99 . •^Needier, Political Development in Latin America,

88

TABLE 4.1

CLASS ORIGINS OF PRESIDENTS OF LATIN AMERICA BY COUNTRY AND SOCIO-RACIAL TYPE

(NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE)

Lower It

Class 0, 0

Middle #

Class 0, "0

Upper It

Cla: 0, "0

European Argentina 0 0 9 4 5 11 55 Costa Rica 0 0 12 46 14 54 Uruguay 1 5 7 35 12 60

Total 1 2 28 42 37 56

Mulatto Brazil 0 0 14 64 8 36 Cuba 1 6 11 61 6 33 Dom Pep 4 21 10 53 5 26 Haiti 5 36 5 36 4 28 Panama 0 0 10 37 17 63 Venezuela 4 24 8 47 5 29

Total 14 12 58 50 45 38

Mestizo Chi le 0 0 15 44 19 56 Colomb ia 6 11 11 21 36 68 El Salvador 1 8 5 38 7 54 Honduras 1 7 5 33 9 60 Nicaragua 0 0 7 26 20 74 Paraguay- 0 0 7 44 9 56

Total 8 5 50 32 100 63

Indian Bolivia 5 18 9 32 14 50 Ecuador 2 5 9 23 28 72 Guatemala 1 6 9 53 7 41 Mexico 4 13 20 63 8 24 Peru 2 5 8 21 28 74

Total 14 9 55 36 85 55

Total 37 7 191 39 267 54

Rica, the upper class was able to maintain and transfer power

along relatively peaceful and constitutional lines.

The fluidity in the European context has tended to

favor middle class elements also, which produced a high per

centage of presidents. A reason for this might be the

changes that occurred around World War I when political

rights, particularly suffrage, were extended to the masses.

Middle class groups led the movement for these reforms and

were quick to capitalize upon them. The Europeans have been

the least hospitable to lower class individuals achieving

the executive office. One possible explanation is that the

unstable conditions that seem to be related to the incidence

of presidents of lower class origins in other Latin American

countries were not present in the European countries, except

for one instance in Uruguay. Prior to the turn of the cen

tury, Uruguay was characterized by instability and militar

ism and that is when a lower class executive was in office.

Mulatto Countries. Politics in Mulatto countries

tend to be "more turbulent, personalist, and violent than

in the other Latin American countries..." but the political

systems are relatively "open" because the upper class is less

entrenched, the social structure less rigid, class divisions

are less deep, and there is greater opportunity for verti

cal mobility. The office of the chief executive in Mulatto

countries has clearly been more open to individuals born in

lower and middle class surroundings than it has in European,

Mestizo, or Indian countries. The Mulatto republics rank

first in the incidence of middle and lower class presidents,

and last in the incidence of upper class executives. The

class patterns of presidential recruitment in Mulatto coun

tries depart sharply from those of the rest of Latin America,

as the distance between this group and the three other groups

under consideration is comparatively wide. This relative

diversity would seem to be explained by the factors outlined

by Needier; i.e., the absence of an entrenched upper class,

a flexible social structure, and the opportunity for verti

cal mobility. Moreover, the violence and turbulence charac

teristic of Mulatto politics implies an inability of elites

to institutionalize succession patterns. As a result, norms

favoring adherence to constitutional practice, which were

successfully utilized by the upper classes of many European,

Mestizo, and Indian countries to maintain control, never

flourished in Mulatto contexts. Freed of these restraints,

the opportunities for individuals of any class outside the

governing elite to seize power increased. This helps ex

plain the high incidence of lower class presidents in Mulatto

countries. Significantly, such presidents have risen to

power in Haiti, Dominican Republic, Venezuela, and Cuba,

the Mulatto countries which have had turbulent, violent

histories. On the other hand, Brazil and Panama, the two

comparatively stable Mulatto countries have had no presi

dents of lower class origin. Within the Mulatto groups

Brazil and Panama are, to varying degrees, special cases.

Over the long history of the Brazilian Empire, an entrenched

political elite did develop. However, by the time of the

passing of the Empire, incipient middle class forces were

already integrated into the political system and a move to

ward middle class control was underway.^ The high percentage

of Brazilian presidents of middle class origin reflects

this integration. In Panama, political events have been

greatly influenced by the overwhelming presence of the

United States in its internal affairs. Generally, the United

States has interceded to the advantage of the status quo

which has strengthened the political position of the Pana

manian socio-economic elite. Hence, Panama has a strikingly

higher incidence of executives of upper class origins than

is the case for the remaining Mulatto states.

Where lower class Mulattos have assumed the presi

dency, it has usually been through the military. Of the

fourteen lower class presidents , only one xvas a civilian.

Hence, the military would seem to provide a particularly

influential institution for mobility from the lower classes

in Mulatto states.

In terms of middle class access to the executive,

the Mulatto and European groups are similar; i.e., both are

^On this point see: Peter Ranis, Five Latin American Nations: A Comparative Political Study .(New York: The Macmillan Company , 1971) , pp. 96-98.

92

relatively "open" in the Latin American context. However,

their respective recruitment patterns are very different

when measured by the incidence of upper and lower class

presidents. In Mulatto countries, the number of lower and

middle class presidents is considerable, while the number of

upper class presidents is relatively small. in European

countries, the reverse is true. In a word, executive re

cruitment in the Mulatto states is quantitatively and quali

tatively more eclectic while any opportunity for political

mobility among the European countries has been largely

limited to middle class elements. The lack of an ongoing

political elite in Mulatto states and the presence of such

an elite in European states helps explain these different

recruitment patterns.

Mestizo Countries. Political life in Mestizo coun

tries is dominated by traditional Liberal and Conservative

parties and characterized by limited popular participation.^

The political organization and the rules of the game

are defined to the advantage of the upper classes who, his

torically, have been able to dominate executive recruitment

patterns. Through the two-party mechanism, socio-economic

elites were able to generate a tradition of political

•'Needier cites the Chilean and Salvadorean party systems as exceptional among the Mestizo countries. Chile's two-party system broke down under the pressure of twentieth century forces and El Salvador never developed a strong party system. Needier, Political Development in

Latin America, p. 48.

93

leadership and inculcate norms supportive of such a tradi

tion. Indeed, in Colombia, such norms have been formalized

in the Constitution of 1886 which disqualifies from the pres

idential office anyone who has not held an important politi

cal post or earned a university degree. Of course, in 1886,

this effectively disqualified almost everyone outside of

the upper class from achieving the chief executive. Over

three-fifths of the presidents of these countries were born

in the upper class and a few in the lower class. The rela

tive prevalence of upper class individuals in the executive

recruitment process would seem to be related to the two-

party systems that currently operate in Colombia, Honduras,

Nicaragua, and Paraguay, and which operated in Chile through

out most of the nineteenth century. Historically, through

the party apparatus, the upper classes in these countries

were able to maintain their position of political dominance.

This was accomplished by monopolizing party leadership roles

and by the incorporation of the masses into the folds of the

party system. As such, the parties became multi-class asso

ciations dominated by the upper class. Within this system,

political conflict was defined in non-class terms and poten

tial class antagonisms muted. Politics, then, rarely pitted

class against class .

Indian Countries. The Indian Countries would seem

to manifest considerably more diversity in their recruitment

94

than suggested by Needier. They rank second in the inci

dence of lower class presidents, and third in the incidence

of middle class presidents. Moreover, fewer upper class

executives are found in the Indian states than in either

the Mestizo or European countries. This relatively high

diversity in the social origins of executives seems to be

explained when the Traditional and Revolutionary Indian

countries are treated as distinct groups.^ The different

class origins of the executives in Traditional and Revolu

tionary Indian countries is summarized in Table 4.2. This

shows the strikingly different recruitment patterns found

in these two Indian groups. The Traditional countries have

had over twice the percentage of upper class executives.

Where no social revolution has occurred, the upper class

has been able to more effectively monopolize the presidency

than where such revolutions have occurred. In Table 4.3,

the class origins of the presidents of the three Revolution

ary countries are compared before and after their individual

revolutions. This shows that between the two periods the

percentage of presidents born in the upper class declined

from 481 to 16% while executives of middle class origins in

creased from 37% to 66%. As shown in Table 4.1, it is

^As noted above, Needier does distinguish between traditional and revolutionary Indian countries. He does not include Guatemala in the revolutionary category.

95

TABLE 4.2

CLASS ORIGIN OF PRESIDENTS IN REVOLUTIONARY AND TRADITIONAL INDIAN COUNTRIES

Lower Middle Upper

Revolutionary Indian

Traditional Indian

13%

5%

49%

2 2 %

38%

13%

96

CLASS ORIGIN OF PRESIDENTS IN REVOLUTIONARY INDIAN

TABLE 4.3

CLASS ORIGIN OF PRESIDENTS IN REVOLUTIONARY INDIAN COUNTRIES BEFORE AND AFTER REVOLUTION

Pre-Revolution Post-Revolution Lower Middle Upper Lower Middle Upper

Bolivia 4 7 12 1 2 2

Guatemala 1 4 6 0 5 1

Mexico 3 8 7 1 12 1

Total Number 8 19 25 2 19 4

Total Percentage 15% 37% 48% 8% 76% 16%

apparent that most presidents of middle class origins in

Indian countries are from Bolivia, Guatemala, and Mexico.

On the other hand, comparatively few middle class presidents

are found in Ecuador and Peru.

The incidence of presidents of lower class origins

in Indian countries falls above the mean and is number two

in the rank order. Indeed, lower class recruitment in the

Indian group is very similar to the recruitment pattern in

the Mulatto countries. However, unlike the Mulatto states,

the Indian republics have an entrenched political elite, an

ossified social structure, and comparatively little opportu

nity for vertical mobility. In this societal context, it is

surprising that relatively large numbers of individuals

born in the lower class would achieve the presidence. Table

4.2 indicates that Revolutionary Indian countries account

for more lower class executives than do Traditional Indian

countries. However Table 4.3 shows that the incidence of

such presidents declined in the post-Revolutionary era. Rev

olution, then, does not explain the high incidence of lower

class presidents.

The basis for the comparatively high incidence of

executives of lower class origin in Indian countries re

mains an open question. It might be that Indian societies

are more politically open than the literature suggests. As

suming accurate samples, the data here indicates that almost

half of the executives, sixty-nine men, in Indian republics

were born in lower or middle class homes. While further

background data is needed, this recruitment pattern is hardly

suggestive o£ a rigid social structure with a closed politi

cal system.

The Emergence of the Middle Sectors

John Johnson argues that, since the late nineteenth

century, momentous changes have begun to occur in the class

structure of the Latin American countries. He describes

this phenomenon as the "emergence of the middle sectors."

He states that:

In the late nineteenth century a number of the republics of Latin America began to undergo technological transformations. By 1920 the impact of those transformations was widely felt. One of the most profound developments to come from them was the emergence of the urban middle sectors of society as an aggressive political force. Today these groups hold a prominent position in the socio-political amalgams that control Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay.'7

The data on the class backgrounds of the Latin American pres

idents support Johnson's contention that the twentieth cen

tury has been characterized by the "emergence of the middle

sectors." Table 4.4 shows the remarkable increase in execu

tives from middle class origins since World War I. Of all

the presidents from the middle class since independence, 40%

served in the 100-odd years prior to 1920 and 60% in the 50

years between 1920 and 1970.

^Johnson, Political Change in Latin America, p. 97.

99

TABLE 4.4

PRESIDENTS BORN IN MIDDLE CLASS IN MIDDLE SECTOR AND NON-MIDDLE SECTOR COUNTRIES

1870-1895 1895-1920 1920-1945 1945-1970

Middle Sector 28% 32% 68% 861

Non-Middle Sector 361 33% 35% 56%

1 0 0

Beyond this, executive recruitment patterns in coun

tries specified by Johnson is those where the middle sectors

took power -- Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay

-- further verifies the Johnson thesis. In the period 1870

to 1920, middle sector countries had a smaller percentage of

executives born in the middle class than did the non-middle

sector countries. However, between 1920 and 1945, the in

cidence of middle class presidents increased by more than

100% in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay, while

their relative numbers remained almost constant in non-middle

sector states. Only in the post-World War IT era did the

non-middle sector countries show an increase in the percent

age of middle class born presidents. In this period, in

both mi.ddl e . sector and non-middle sector countries, the

increase amounted to about 20 percentage points. Hence,

changes in the class structures of Latin American countries

cited by Johnson as occurring in the late 1900's and which

have greatly affected executive recruitment after 1920 may

now be occurring in the rest of Latin America.

Summary: Social Class and Executive Recruitment

Class origins affect executive recruitment consider

ably. Roughly equal numbers were born in the middle and

upper classes, while only a handful originated in the lower

class. Lower class born presidents are found largely in

the Indian, and particularly the Revolutionary Indian, and

Mulatto republics. This is seen in Tables 4.1 and 4.2

ttfhich are summarized below.

101

Percentage of Presidents Lower Class Middle Class Upper Class

Mulatto 12% 50% 38% Revolutionary Indian 13% 49% 38% European 2% 42% 56% Mestizo 5% 32% 63% Traditional Indian 5% 22% 73% Latin America 7% 39% 54%

Their relative numbers have been fairly consistent over time

with a slight decline beginning in the third quarter of the

nineteenth century and continuing to today. Almost all exec

utives originating in the lower classes were soldiers. In

deed, 89% of the executives born in the lower classes were

g soldiers. Of the military presidents from the lower classes,

58% rose through the regular army and 42% through the ranks

of insurgent movements. This finding confirms the observa

tion frequently made that the military in Latin America has

9 played an important role as an agency for vertical mobility.

That is, in Latin America, ambitious individuals from the

lower and lower-middle classes rising up the socio-economic

ladder frequently find civilian institutions closed to them

and, hence, utilize the armed forces to realize their ambi

tions. Executives from the lower classes seem to achieve

power in turbulent, violent political environments. Their

"Twenty-four of the twenty-seven executives original ing in the lower classes were soldiers.

^John J. Johnson, Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), pp. 106-07.

102

success in Mulatto countries would also seem to be a reflec

tion of the relatively fluid social structure in these states.

Executives originating in the middle class are found

mainly in Mulatto, Revolutionary Indian and European coun

tries. Their prevalence in these types of republics seems

to be explained by the comparatively "open" quality of Mulatto

and European societies and by the revolutions in Revolutionary

Indian societies. Moreover, there is a strong relationship

between the incidence of executives born in the middle class

and fundamental socio-economic transformations. Transforma

tions that generate a growing middle class ultimately cause

a basic transformation in executive recruitment, specifically,

a growing proportion of presidents of middle class origin.

Hence, the incidence of middle class born executives is

greatest where such middle groups initially flourished.

Over time, the incidence of presidents born in the middle

class became pronounced after the turn of the century.

Presidents born in the upper class predominate in

Traditional Indian and Mestizo societies, and comparatively

large numbers are also present in European countries. They

seem to flourish where an entrenched elite is able to main

tain its position either through a strong two-party system

or through "upper class democracy." In Mestizo republics,

the two-party apparatus seems to have been the key mechanism

underlying the comparative success of the upper class in

monopolizing the executive. In Traditional Indian countries,

103

it is related to "upper class democracy." In the European

states, such "democracy" gave way to demands for extended

participation and, since that time, the executives of these

10 countries have been predominantly middle class in origin.

Executives born in the upper class declined, but flourished

throughout the nineteenth century and into the initial years

of the twentieth century. However, since World War II, their

fortunes have declined precipitously.

Military Occupations

Militarism has long been a prominent feature of

Latin American politics. The actual and/or proper role of

the military in Latin America is the subject of numerous

11 books and articles. Indeed, it is probable that more is

known about the armed forces than any other Latin American

institution. This section deals with the impact of the Latin

American military upon executive recruitment, and, particu

larly, with where, when, and why military executive flour

ished, and where, when and why they did not.

1 0 Prior to 1920 the mean for upper class executives in European countries was 79% and after 1920, 27%. The mean for middle class presidents before 1920 was 20%, and after 1920, the mean was 73%.

Upor recent reviews of the literature on the Latin American military see: L.N. McAlister, "Recent Research and Writings on the Role of the Military in Latin America," Latin American Research Review (Fall, 1966), pp. 5-33; and Elizabeth H. Hyman, "Soldiers in Politics: New Insights on Latin American Armed Forces," Political Science Quarterly (September, 1972), pp. 401-18.

104

To discover when and, in part, why military presi

dents flourished, a trend analysis was done of incidence of

military -- professional and insurgent -- and civilian pres

idents over time. It began with Independence and continues

up to the present. The executive patterns in six twenty-five

year time periods are described and examined in some detail.

Military Occupations: An Overview

The significance of the soldier-president in execu

tive recruitment in Latin America is shown in Tables 4.5

and 4.6. Since the Wars of Independence, soldiers have ac

counted for 45% of all Latin American chief executives. In

nine countries, over half of all the executives have been

military men, and in fifteen states, over a third. Of the

soldier-presidents , 71% have been professional military men

and 29% military insurgents. Military insurgents refer to

individuals who began their military careers as guerrilla

soldiers or with irregular forces, referred to sometimes as

"civilian-soldiers." Professional soldiers are those who

have usually begun early training at a military cadet

school and have spent adulthood in one of the regular stand

ing military services.

Table 4.6 lists the incidence of professional and

insurgent military presidents by country in rank order.

This Table shows considerable variation from country-to-

country in both the professional and insurgent categories.

The incidence of professional soldiers ranges from 67% in

105

TABLE 4.5

CIVILIAN, PROFESSIONAL MILITARY, AND INSURGENT MILITARY PRESIDENTS: BY COUNTRY


Civilian Professional Insurgent Military Military

if % ii % ii %

Argentina 18 60 12 40 0 0 Bolivia 21 44 25 52 2 4 Brazil 19 73 7 27 0 0 Chile 37 76 11 22 1 2 Colombia 39 58 8 12 20 30 Costa Rica 46 85 7 13 1 2 Cuba 7 41 1 6 9 53 Dom Rep 17 47 12 33 7 20 Ecuador 38 69 14 25 3 6 El Salvador 22 49 21 47 2 4 Guatemala 17 40 23 53 3 7 Haiti 7 21 22 67 4 12 Honduras 21 54 15 38 3 8 Mexico 23 40 18 31 17 29 Nicaragua 27 60 6 13 12 27 Panama 34 92 3 8 0 0 Paraguay 24 65 12 32 1 3 Peru 27 40 32 44 14 16 Uruguay 18 46 9 23 12 31 Venezuela 15 37 15 37 10 26

Total 477 55% 273 32% 112 13

106

TABLE 4.6

RANK ORDER AND PERCENTAGE OF PROFESSIONAL, INSURGENT AND TOTAL MILITARY PRESIDENTS

Profess ional Insurgent Total

Ra Military Military Military

Ra % R % R %

1 Haiti 67 1 Cuba 53 1 Haiti 79 2 Guatemala 54 2 Uruguay 31 2 Venezuela 63 3 Bolivia 52 3 Colombia 30 3 Peru 63 4 El Salvador 47 4 Mexico 29 4 Guatemala 60 5 Peru 44 5 Nicaragua 27 5 Cuba 59 6 Argentina 40 6 Venezuela 26 6 Mexico 58 7 Honduras 38 7 Dom Rep 20 7 Bolivia 56 8 Vene zuela 37 8 Peru 19 8 Uruguay 54 9 Dom Rep 33 9 Haiti 12 9 Dom Rep 53 10 Paraguay 32 10 Honduras 8 10 El Salvador 49 11 Mexico 31 11 Guatemala 6 11 Honduras 46 12 Brazil 27 11 Ecuador 6 12 Colombia 42 13 Ecuador 25 13 Bolivia 4 13 Argentina 40 14 Uruguay 23 13 El Salvador 4 13 Nicaragua 40 15 Chile 22 15 Paraguay 3 15 Paraguay 35 16 Nicaragua 13 16 Chi le 2 16 Ecuador 31 17 Costa Rica 13 17 Costa Rica 2 17 Brazi1 27 18 Colomb ia 12 18 Argentina 0 18 Chile 24 19 Panama 8 18 Brazi1 0 19 Costa Rica 15 20 Cuba 8 18 Panama 0 20 Panama 8

aR = rank order and % = percentage of professional, insurgent, and total military presidents.

107

Haiti to 8% in Panama. Insurgent military presidents range

from 53% in Cuba to 0% in three countries -- Argentina, Bra

zil, and Panama. Total military executives range from 79%

in Haiti to 8% in Panama. In the following sections of this

chapter, these ranks and percentages are utilized as mea

sures of Latin American militarism.

Militarism: Trend Analysis

The recruitment of military and civilian executives

over time is shown in Figure 4.2. The military was the most

important avenue to the presidency over the first fifty-odd

years of Independence. The incidence of military executives

declined rapidly after 1870, however, and sometime between

1870 and 1895, their relative numbers were surpassed by exe

with civilian backgrounds , whose numbers increased

dramatically between 1870 and 1920. Since 1920, the per

centage of military presidents, as with civilians, has

levelled off. The change in their relative numbers between

1920 and 1970 is only 2%. The incidence of insurgent mili

tary executives has, with minor fluctuations, declined con

tinually since the period of Independence. In the period

from Independence to 1845, they accounted for 29% of all

executives. By the period 1845 to 1970, they had declined

to only 21.

Rise of Militarism: Independence to 1870. The com

paratively high incidence of military presidents in this

108

I n d . -1 8 4 5

1 8 4 5 -1 8 7 0

1 8 7 0 -1 8 9 5

1 8 9 5 -1 9 2 0

1 9 2 0 -1 9 4 S

1 9 4 5 -1 9 7 0

701

60?

50%

4 0 $

3 0 \

201

1 0 1

CIVILIAN

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY

MILITARY INSURGENT

01

Figure 4.2: Percentage of Civilian and Professional and Insurgent Military Presidents Over Six Twenty-Five Year Periods

109

period was due to a number of factors. First, the Wars of

Independence had extended for some fifteen years and, as a

result, the new states were left with large standing armies

and large numbers of army officers. Simultaneously, a

situation of institutional flux prevailed. The established

Spanish institutions had been cast aside and replaced by

newly-created legislative, executive, and judicial structures

which were filled by civilians who attempted to establish

the rule of law and bring order to the new political communi

ties. They were not able to do this and the rule of law gave

way to the rule of force with the military gaining control.

The early institutionalization of the military plus the

fragility of governmental structures left the government

prey to the armed forces.

Secondly, some authors have pointed out that much of

12 the officer corps consisted of "civilian amateurs." Edwin

Lieuwen notes that such men possessed neither a professional

tradition nor a professional esprit de corps . Independence

achieved, these men,

...moved easily and naturally into the political vacuum created by the disappearance of royal authority. Thus at the very beginning of nationhood the armed forces assumed extramilitary (that is, political) functions. And as their military mission, that of defending the new nations against reconquest from Europe, became

12see, for example, Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 18-19. Figure 4.2 shows that the percentage of "civilian amateur" or "military insurgent" executives was 29% in the period 1820-1845, and 20% in the period 1845-1870.

110

less meaningful and real, the military rulers, determined to preserve their vested institutional interests, placed more and more emphasis upon politics .13

In time, the military became a vehicle for ambitious young

men from the lower and middle classes who wanted "a share

in the power, wealth, and social prestige enjoyed by the

landed oligarchy and the church hierarchy. The presi

dency became the central position around which opportunistic

military officers flocked for a share of the booty. This

relationship between class, occupation, and executive re

cruitment is quantitatively tested in Table 4.7, which shows

that there was a lower percentage of military presidents

(54%) than of civilian presidents (81%) from the upper

class. But, the middle and lower classes produced more

military presidents (46%) than civilian presidents (19%),

which shows that for middle and lower class persons a mili

tary occupation was a better route to the executive office

than was a non-military occupation. In Table 4.8, the same

question is examined from another perspective; that is, the

percentage of executives originating in the upper, middle,

and lower classes who achieved the presidency from a military

or non-military background. This indicates that whatever the

class, the military did supply a, majority of the executives

•^Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America, p. 19.

•^Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America, p. 20.

Ill

TABLE 4.7

PERCENTAGE OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN EXECUTIVES BORN IN THE UPPER, MIDDLE AND LOWER CLASSES

Military Civilian Total

Upper Class 54 81 65

Middle Class 31 17 25

Lower Class 15 2 10

Total 100 100 100

112

TABLE 4.8

PERCENTAGE OF EXECUTIVES BORN IN THE UPPER, MIDDLE AND LOWER CLASSES FROM

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OCCUPATIONS

Upper Class Middle Class Lower Class

Military 53 75 93

Civilian 47 25 7

Total 100 100 100

113

between Independence and 1870. In the upper class, the

military provided 6% more executives than did civilians, in

the middle class they produced 50% more, and in the lower

class they far outdistanced the civilians with an 86% dif

ference. Taken together, Tables 4.7 and 4.8 confirm

Lieuwen's argument that the armed forces served the lower

and middle classes as a vehicle to political power in the

post-Independence era.

A third factor underlying the high incidence of

military executives in this period was the incompetence of

the civilian leaders and governments and their failure to

adequately distribute material rewards to the armies of

Independence, which engendered bitterness within the ranks

of the military. John Johnson writes:

...the 'largesse' of the new nations was distributed according to who knew whom, not according to a conception of legal justice....There is no question that some other officers, and some civilians as well, came out of the Wars better off financially than when they entered them. But it is not less true that the new states failed to meet their obligations and re- 1 r sponsibilities to most officers and most civilians. D

The widening gulf between military and civilian leaders was

reflected in the words of Bolivar who spoke of "legislators,

more ignorant than evil, more presumptuous than ambitious,

are leading us to anarchy. Those men think that the will

of the people is their opinion, without perceiving that in

1 John J. Johnson, The Military and Society m Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), p~! 31.

114

Colombia the people are the army.""^ The military had come

to regard itself as more representative of the public will,

than the institutions created and designed for that purpose.

This antipathy toward civilians grew until in the end "the

1 7 liberators turned on the liberated."

The soldier-presidents had an additional advantage

in that they were the heroes of Independence, the men who

had tossed off the Spanish yoke. It was a fortuitous time

for soldier-politicians and little wonder that large numbers

of them held the office of the chief executive.

Decline of Military: 1870-1920. The decline in the

number of military executives from 1870 to 1920 is less eas

ily explained. Lieuwen notes that militarism, "partly con-

18 sumed itself through its own outrageous excesses..." In

many countries, strong leaders, often military men, had

risen to power and, therefore, had strengthened the national

government while consolidating their own position. Armies

were coming increasingly under national control. Too, the

public had grown tired of the rapacious nature of Latin

American militarism. Johnson states that by the mid 1800's

•^Quoted in Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America, p. 24.

-^Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America, p. 25.

-^Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America, p. 28.

115

the armies of Latin America were in "near-total disgrace"

and forced to recruit officers from the lower sectors of so-

1 Q ciety.

Another reason for the relative decrease of soldier-

presidents was the almost universal desire among publics for

economic development and industrialization, which do not

2 0 flourish in politically anarchical situations. Agrarian

resources can be replenished with comparative ease. But,

industrial facilities are not so easily reconstituted. The

process is costly and consuming. In Latin America, the

problems of economic growth were multiplied by the key role

played by foreign entrepreneurs who supplied capital and ex

pertise until domestic armies began engaging continually in

internal struggles. The unrealized desire for industry and

economic progress encouraged civilian and professional mili

tary leaders to bring order out of chaos which had been

brought on by the military insurgents.

Stabilization and Increase of Military: 1920-1970.

The steady decline of the professional soldier-presidents,

which had begun in 1845, levelled off then in 1920, and re

mained constant until 1945, at which time it began to increase

and continued to do so until 1970. But, the decline of

•^Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America, p. 106.

20 Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America,

pp. 6 2-66.

military insurgent presidents, which had also begun in 1845,

continued to decline until the present time when it has

reached an all time low. This was an extremely complex

era, both internationally and domestically, characterized

by depression, a world war, emergence of mass-based politi

cal parties, and the development of industrial-scale labor

unions. The real significance from the point of view of

executive recruitment was the stabilization of, and subse

quent increase in, professional military presidents, which

was the first in 100 years. Moreover, the rate of increase

(from 24% to 33%) which was roughly 40% was considerable,

and if it continues, the incidence of professional military

presidents will easily surpass the highest point reached in

the 1845-1870 period. In sum, the professional-soldier has

now become institutionalized in the recruitment process.

The underlying causes of the increasingly promi

nent role of soldier-presidents are treated in the follow

ing section where Latin American militarism is measured

against four specific theories.

Militarism: Theoretical Considerations

A number of theories have been advanced to explain

militarism in Latin America which focus upon race, cultural

propensities, economic deprivation, ignorance, and the in

adequacy of countervailing socio-political institutions.

This section considers four specific theories:

117

(1) socio-racial type, (2) literacy, (3) socio-economic

complexity, and (4) political parties.

Socio-racial type refers, again, to Needler's argu

ment that the socio-racial characteristics of a country are

related to or "explain" its political characteristics. The

countries divided into four socio-racial types are tested

against levels of militarism. Based upon Needler's general

description, it is hypothesized that levels of militarism

will be highest in Mulatto countries, followed by Mestizo,

Indian, and European states.

With illiteracy, the basic argument revolves around

an inferred relationship between educational levels and

overt political behavior by the military. Presumeably,

such behavior is facilitated by mass ignorance; i.e., a

polity largely unable to read or write.

Theories relating militarism and socio-economic

complexity point to the difficulties of taking and re

taining power that soldiers encounter where socio-economic

complexity is high. Finally, political parties are fre

quently cited as discouraging military intervention as

they provide the institutional framework for civilian con

trol of government.

Socio-Racial Types. Table 4.9 lists the incidence

of civilian, professional soldier, insurgent soldier, and

total military presidents by the four socio-racial

118

TABLE 4.9

CIVILIAN, PROFESSIONAL MILITARY AND INSURGENT MILITARY PRESIDENTS: BY SOCIO-RACIAL TYPE


Professional Military Civilian Military Insurgent

European 28 2 31 13 10% 82 67%

Mulatto 60 32 % 30 16% 99 52%

Mestizo 73 26% 39 14% 170 60%

Indian 112 4 2% 30 11% 126 47%

Total 273 32% 112 13% 477 55%

types: (1) European, (2) Mulatto, (3) Mestizo, and (4) In

dian. Looking at total military presidents, the variance

among the four categories is only 20%. Within this range,

the Indian and Mulatto countries manifest the highest in

dices of militarism with 53% and 48%, respectively, followed

by Mestizo and European countries with 40% and 33% militar

ism, respectively. The hypothesized ranking, then, is not

confirmed. Regarding just professional soldier-presidents,

the countries rank in the same order with total military

presidents; i.e., Indian, Mulatto, Mestizo, and European.

But, the Indian countries stand clearly ahead of the other

groups, contributing 42%, while the Mulatto countries con

tribute 32%, the Mestizos contribute 26%, and the Europeans

wind up last with 23%.

To verify this finding of no relationship between

socio-racial type and military presidents, another test was

done in the form of a statistical Analysis of Variance.

The Analysis of Variance, summarized in Table 4.10, indicates

that the relationship betiveen socio-racial type and militar

ism is not significant. The Analysis of Variance is de

signed to show whether there is greater variance in a given

sample between groups or within groups. In this case, the

variance is the incidence of civilian, professional military,

and insurgent military presidents (the dependent variables) .

The test determines whether or not the observed variance is

explained between or within the socio-racial categories

120

TABLE 4.10

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: SOCIO-RACIAL TYPE AND MILITARISM

Source of Variance df Sum of Squares Mean Squares F-ratio

Civilian Presidents Between groups Within groups

3 16_

985 . 17169.

40 09

328. 1073.

47 07 . 31 -ns

Total 19 18154. 49

Military Insurgent Pres idents Between groups Within groups

3 1_6_

233. 1848.

57 62

77. 115 .

86 54 .55 -ns

Total 19 2082 . 19

Professional Military Presidents Between groups Within groups

3 16_

825. 4327.

42 99

275 . 270 .

14 50 1.01 -ns

Total 19 5153. 41

121

(the independent variables). If the differences between the

socio-racial categories are significant, the mean square be

tween will be significantly larger than the mean square

within. Table 4.10 shows that the mean square between is

smaller than the mean square within for civilian and insur

gent military presidents. On the other hand, the mean square

between is larger than the mean square within for profes

sional military presidents. However, the F-ratio from the

data (1.02) is smaller than the tabled F (3.24) so that the

? 1 mean squares difference is not significant. In other

words, the Analysis of Variance shows that the greater vari

ance in each category -- civilian, professional military, and

insurgent military presidents -- occurs within the socio-

racial categories rather than between them. Hence, from a

statistical perspective, socio-racial type does not explain

militarism in Latin America.

Militarism: Literacy. The relationship between il

literacy and militarism has been suggested by a number of

authors. Johnson writes that "In those republics histori

cally dominated by the military, literacy rates are lower

than in republics where civilians have had a greater role in

T abled the significance freedom allowed.

F refers o f any F-

to the Table of score according

F-scores showing to the degrees of

122

2 2 government." Wycoff, speaking of the Latin American states

in which the military is never an overt factor in politics,

points out that, "the bulk of the population lias at least a

primary school education; the overall literacy rate is

2 3 high." Alexander Edelmann also notes a relationship be

tween military intervention in politics and illiteracy.

Speaking of the masses, he notes that, "unable to read, they

knew little if anything about the civil rights established

in the new constitutions, and had not the least conception

of civic responsibilities, so essential if democratic govern-

? 4 -ment is to be effectual." These theoretical arguments,

then, hypothesize a positive relationship between militarism

and illiteracy.

The correlation between militarism and illiteracy

is plotted in Figure 4.3. The observations tend to cluster

in the top right and bottom left quadrants, thereby seeming

to indicate some correlation between militarism and illit

eracy, But more rigorous tools are required to measure the

strength of the relationship and to determine its significance.

^Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America, p. 135.

"^Theodore Wycoff, "The Role of the Military in Latin American Politics," Western Political Quarterly, XIII (September, 1960), p. 755.

^Alexander Edelmann, Latin American Government and Politics (Homewood: Dorsey^ 1969) , p. 165. —

123

9 0 1 I l a i t i

8 0 4

Guatemala • Bolivi a

Honduras

Nicaragua 6 0 4

•El Salvador epublic

5 0 4 Venezuela Brazil

Peru

Ecuador Mexico

4 0 4

Colombia

4 arapuay

Panama Cuba

4 Cos ta. ica

U ruguay Ch i le

Argentina 1 0 4

3 0 4 7 0 4 0

PERCENT MILITARY PRESIDENTS

Figure 4.3: Relationships Between Illiteracy and Militarism in. Latin America

124

By utilizing statistical techniques greater precision

can be brought to this visual impression. For the purpose

o£ this study, .05 will be the point for distinguishing be

tween significant and insignificant findings. That is,

the .95 level will serve as the confidence level, the point

at which a significant relationship is assumed to exist.

This means that the chance of any finding occurring if the

variables were not correlated is no more than five in one

hundred.

A further glance at the scattergram suggests that

estimates of the correlation coefficient and the regression

line may well establish the veracity of the hypothesis. A

simple linear regression and Pearson's correlation coeffi

cient are particularly appropriate statistical tests as

both are designed to assess the strength of linear relation

ships and both accommodate data sets characterized by a

limited number of observations. These tests were calculated

2 5 with the results indicating that the hypothesis is valid.

If there were no correlation, the slope "b" would be zero.

(See Table 4.11) The size of "b", relative to the standard

error, leads to the conclusion that a correlation exists.

The t-test, which measures differences in means and confi

dence levels, further supports this conclusion. The

^All computational analysis in this study was done on the Hewlett Packard Calculator - Computer 9830A and the Hewlett Packard 3867B Mass Memory.

125

TABLE 4.11

LITERACY AND MILITARISM: TESTS OF REGRESSION AND CORRELATION

Regression

a b standard error df t-test significance

14.99 .68 .22 19 3.02 .01

Correlation

Coefficient R coefficient of df significance determination R

.58 .34 19 .005

126

calculated t-ratio (3.02) is larger than the tabled t-ratio

(2.101 at the .05 level). Moreover, the calculated t-ratio

considerably exceeds the stipulated significance level of

.05 reaching the .01 level.

The Pearson's correlation coefficient also exceeds

the stipulated confidence level of .95. Probably, the most

useful application of the correlation coefficient is achieved

by squaring it (R^). This coefficient, also referred to as

the coefficient of determination, specifies the proportion

of the variance of one measure (militarism) which is ac

counted for by another measure (illiteracy). With a coef

ficient of determination of .34, we can conclude that il

literacy "explains" 34% of the variance in militarism found

among the countries of Latin America. However, this does

not establish the direction of the relationship. It does

not indicate whether illiteracy gives rise to militarism

or. militarism gives rise to illiteracy. Of course, both

arguments can be made. It might be that military presidents

curb government investments in education and, hence, cause

illiteracy. On the other hand, illiteracy might be indic

ative of a socio-economic environment that is particularly

susceptible to militarism.

Militarism: Socio-Economic Complexity.. Samuel

*7 A Huntington argues that this is, indeed, the case. He

•^Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,

1968) pp. 220-50.

127

claims that socio-economic complexity makes it more diffi

cult for military officers to either seize power or to wield

it effectively.

As society becomes more complex it becomes more difficult for military officers, first, to exercise power effectively and then to seize power successfully... As the praetorian society becomes more complex and differentiated, the number of social groups and forces multiplies and the problems of coordination and interest aggregation become increasingly complex. In the absence of effective central political institutions for the resoltuion of social conflicts, the military become simply one of several relatively insulated and autonomous social forces. Their capacity to elicit support and to induce cooperation declines. In addition, of course, military officers are not necessarily skilled in the esoteric arts of negotiation, compromise, and mass appeal which are required for political action in a complex society. '

According to this theory, then, the level of socio-economic

complexity is an independent variable discouraging mili

tarism where complexity is "high" and encouraging militarism

where it is "low".

For the purpose of this test, eight variables --

literacy, per capita Gross National Product, non-agricultural

workers, labor force in manufacturing and construction,

school-age children 7-14 attending school, school-age chil

dren 15-19 attending school, labor unionization, and urban

ization -- have been combined to develop an index of

^^Huntington, p. 229.

Political Order in Changing Societies,

128

socio-economic complexity. The underlying assumption of this

index is that the higher the incidence o£ a variable the more

complex a given socio-economic system. The indicators and

their dollar and percentile values are listed in Table 4.12.

These figures, along with the measure of militarism --

percentage of military executives -- were converted to Z-

scores and submitted to a multiple linear correlation test

with the following results:

correlation coefficient coefficient df significance of

de termination

.821 .67 11 .01

The correlation coefficient (significant at the .01

level) and the coefficient of determination indicate a sig

nificant relationship exists with 671 of the variance in

militarism "explained." But, a step-wise regression and the

partial correlations listed in Tables 4.13 and 4.14 suggest

an alternative conclusion. Table 4.13 shows that only two

independent variables, literacy and percentage of students

15-19 attending school, are correlated with militarism at

the specified significance level (.05). Similarly, in Table

4.14, these are the only two variables attaining this confi

dence level. The multiple correlation coefficient of .82

would seem to reflect a relationship between educational

systems and militarism rather than socio-economic complexity

and militarism.

129

TABU! 4.12

RAW SCORES FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC COMPLEXITY INDEX

BY PERCENTAGE

la 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Argent i na 87 562 81 29 9 0 3 5 12.2 68 Bolivia 31 134 37 13 59 14 5.4 30 Brazil 49 300 48 17 56 18 3.8 39 Ch i 1 e 81 324 72 24 76 31 6.5 63 Colombia 61 309 53 17 5 4 19 2 . 2 46 Costa Rica 7 9 370 51 15 9 4 32 2 . 1 38 Cuba 7 3 517 58 18 113 18 22 . 0 55 Dom Rep 43 288 39 11 85 7 6. 6 29 E c it a d o r 56 186 44 25 71 16 2.0 35 El Salvador 41 247 40 14 57 14 1 . 5 33 Guatemala 30 287 35 10 37 7 0.4 31 I! a i t i 11 7 9 17 7 30 4 0 . 3 13 Honduras 34 203 3 3 9 52 8 0.9 22 Mex i co 57 386 46 15 65 14 6.1 54 Nicaragua 37 • 303 40 13 58 7 1 . 1 34 Panama 82 466 54 10 78 38 1 . 4 41 Paraguay 68 199 45 17 94 17 1.2 34 Peru 51 236 50 17 • 70 20 5.1 36 U ruguay 81 520 82 28 89 4 2 7.1 82 Venezuela 4 9 768 68 11 72_ 21 21.6 62_

Total 1100% $6684 993% 324% 1400% 3 82% 109.5% 845' Mean 55 334. 2 50 16 . 2 70 19 5.575 42 S.D. 18 165 16 6 21 11 6.3 171

al = percent literate (cl960), 2 = per capita Gross National Product (cl963) , 3 = percent non-agricultural workers (cl960), 4' = percent of labor force engaged in manufacturing and construction (c'1960), 5 = percent of children 7-14 in school (cl960), 6 = percent of children 15-19 in school (cl960), 7 = percent of labor force unionized (cl960) , 8 = percent urban (cl960).

^All of the original data was taken from: J. Gomez-QuLnones, ed., Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 1964 (Los Angeles: Latin American Center, TTCUfT, 196 5) ; Martin Needier, Political Development in Latin America, p. 96; and Jorge V. Arevalo, Population Growth and Education," in J. Mayone Stycos and Jorge Arias, ed., Population Dilemma in Latin America (Menasha: George Banta Co. , 1966) , pp~ 131-33.

130

TABLE 4.13

STEP-WISE REGRESSION: MILITARISM AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC COMPLEXITY

regression a b standard error df t-test significance

la .053 .68 . 22 19 3.01 .01

2 - .020 .07 .23 19 0 . 31 ns

3 - .015 . 28 .22 19 1. 27 ns

4 - .037 .24 .23 19 1.03 ns

5 - .024 .34 .22 19 1.51 .20

6 .045 .48 .21 19 2.34 . 05

7 - .020 .28 .22 19 1. 24 ns

8 - . 020 .11 . 24 19 0.45 ns

al = percent literate (cl960), 2 = per capita Gross National Product (cl963), 3 = percent non-agricultural workers (cl960) , 4 = percent of labor force engaged in manufacturing and construction (cl960), 5 = percent of children 7-14 in school (cl960) , 6 = percent of children 15-19 in school (cl960) , 7 = percent of labor force unionized (cl960), 8 = percent urban (cl960).

131

TABLE 4.14

CORRELATION COEFFICIENT: MILITARISM AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC COMPLEXITY

correlation coefficient-R coefficient of determination-R^

df significance

la .580 .34 19 .01

2 .072 .005 19 ns

3 .286 .08 19 ns

4 .236 . 06 19 ns

5 . 334 .11 19 ns

6 .483 .23 19 .05

7 -.283 .08 19 ns

8 .105 .01 19 ns

al = percent literate (cl960), 2 = per capita Gross National Product (cl963), 3 = percent non-agricultural workers (cl960) , 4 = percent of labor force engaged in manufacturing and construction (cl960), 5 = percent of children 7-14 in school (cl960) , 6 = percent of children 15-19 in school (cl960), 7 = percent of labor force unionized (cl960), 8 = percent urban (cl960).

Table 4.15, however, shows that literacy and school

age children age 15-19 attending school are strongly related

to the other five variables used in the socio-economic com

plexity index. Again, the correlation between literacy and

the other variables is particularly high. Socio-economic

complexity, then, is a complex index best measured by liter

acy in the first instance, and children age 15-19 attending

school in the second instance.

In a word, the hypothesis is accepted. Theories

postulating a relationship between socio-economic complex

ity and militarism are verified by the data. Too, the hy

pothesized direction of the relationship is confirmed. The

greater the level of socio-economic complexity, the lower

is the level of militarism.

Militarism: Political Parties. It is frequently

argued that the high incidence of militarism in Latin Amer

ica is due to structural weakness within the civilian sectors

of society. According to this argument, the military repre

sents one of the few well-organized groups in Latin America

and, naturally, fills the political vacuum resulting from

institutional desarray characteristic of the civilian

sphere. In the words of Theodore Wycoff:

The political role of the military is not a 'political disease1; rather it is but a symptom of a condition of political immaturity... it would appear that where democracy flourishes -- and even where it flourishes with occasional military

133

TABLE 4.15

PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: SOCIO-ECONOMIC COMPLEXITY INDEX

la 2 34 56 78 9

1D .832 .968 .749 . 743 .536 .701 .935 .580

2 .779 . 351 . 505 .371 . 760 .788 . 072

3 .782 .618 . 567 . 563 .945 .286

4 .492 .304 .311 .743 .236

5 .423 . 542 .537 . 334

6 .077 . 533 .483

00

*3

.603 .283

. 105

9

a The horizontal and vertical numbers 1 through 9 re

present the following: 1 = literacy, 2 = per capita GNP, 3 = non-agricultural workers, 4 = labor in manufacturing and construction, 5 = children age 7-14 attending school, 6 = children age 15-19 attending school, 7 = unionization, 8 = urbanization, and 9 = militarism.

^Number 1 correlates all data more than the original dependent variable.

134

intervention -- there also is to be found the conditions of powerful countervailing forces.^

On the other hand, military intervention in politics is

most frequent where there "also is to be found an absence

? Q of countervailing forces." Wycoff goes on to cite the

Blanco and Colorado parties of Uruguay as examples of such

countervailing forces. If this argument is valid, the ma

turation of civilian institutions such as the modern par

ties should reduce the incidence of military presidents.

Modern political parties began to emerge in Latin

America in the post-World War I era. In Uruguay, for ex

ample, "it was not until the close of the century that

the two political parties began to take fast form, and

it was first in 1919 that permanent parties appeared."

Similarly, the Argentine and Chilean Radicals first be

came broadly based organizations only around the turn of

the century. The development of a modern party in Peru

and Mexico occurred in the 1920's. Finally, the emer

gence of the Christian Democrats in the 1930's and their

growth in the post-World War II period illustrates the

increasing maturity of party systems in Latin America. This

28wycoff, "The Role of the Military in Latin American Politics, p. 762.

^^Wycoff, "The Role of the Military in Latin American Politics, p. 762.

•^Goran G. Lindahl, Uruguay's New Path: A Study in Politics During the First Coleglndo, 1919-33 (Stockholm: Library and Institute of Ibero-American Studies, 1962), p. 13.

135

position, that modern party systems began to appear in Latin

America around 1920, is echoed by Robert Alexander. He ar

gues that:

The kind of political party that has evolved in Latin America since World War I differs fundamentally from the parties of the first century of independence. It is an organization with reasonably well-defined programs and ideologies. The various parties represent the widest spectrum of political philosophy... It is upon the basis of their appeals to special interest groups , rather than on the grounds of allegiance to a particular political leader, that they recruit their membership... The new political party in Latin America also has a much more intensive internal life than did the older kind ...These parties involve relatively large numbers of citizens drawn from various classes.

If the countervailing powers hypothesis is valid,

the incidence of military presidents should decline in the

period after World War I. Figure 4.2 shows that this is

not the case. Instead, the incidence of professional

soldier-presidents remained constant after World War I and

even increased after World War II. The number of civilian

presidents has remained fairly consistent since 1920.

Hence, the evidence seems to indicate that the emergence of

modern party organizations in Latin America coincided with

an increase in professional-soldier executives. This could

be interpreted to mean that modern parties have contributed

to an increase in professional military presidents, while

having had little impact upon civilian presidents.

•^Robert J. Alexander, Political Parties in Latin Ame Government and Politics in Lat

"The Emergence of Modern rica," in Peter G. Snow, ed., in America: A Reader (New

York: Holt', Rinehard and Winston, Inc. , 1'96 7)",~ pp. 387-88.

136

The data in Figure 4.2, however, conceals consider

able diversity among the twenty republics of Latin America.

Obviously, not all of them have modern party systems, and

in some, their development did not occur until the 1940 ' s.

Nor have the numbers of professional military presidents in

creased in all twenty countries. It might be that the rising

incidence of professional military executives occurred in

systems that lacked such parties and their countervailing

effect.

In Table 4.16, the countries of Latin America are

categorized as being with or without modern parties between

1920 and 1970. This Table indicates that the development

of modern parties does not decrease the incidence of mili

tary executives. To the contrary, such parties seem related

to an increase in the number of soldier-presidents, as was

the case in Figure 4.2. Where modern parties were present,

60% of the executives were civilians whereas 70% were civil

ians where these parties were not present. The distinction

is almost nil when the civilian and military insurgent cate

gories are considered as a single group. Then, the gap be

tween systems with and without modern parties declines to

IS. However, the incidence of professional soldier presi

dents still remains greater in systems with modern parties.

An Analysis of Variance, summarized in Table 4.17,

shows that the mean squares within groups are larger than

the mean squares between groups. This indicates that more of

137

TABLE 4.16

INCIDENCE OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN EXECUTIVES IN SYSTEMS WITH AND WITHOUT MODERN PARTIES

(BY COUNTRY)

Civilian Total Professional Insurgent Military Military Military

With Modern Parties Argentina l9"20-7"0" 7 10 10 0 Bolivia 1945-70 7 5 5 0 Brazi1 1945-70 9 4 4 0 Chile 1920-70 17 5 5 0 Colombia 1920-70 15 3 3 0 Costa Rica 1945-70 7 0 0 0 Cuba 1920-70 6 8 1 7 Guatemala 1945-70 3 7 7 0 Honduras 1945-70 3 2 1 1 Mexico 1920-70 6 6 0 6 Paraguay 1920-70 11 6 5 1 Peru 1920-70 8 7 7 0 Uruguay 1920-70 10 3 3 0 Venezuela 1945-70 5 _3 _3 _0

Total 114 79 54 15 Percentage 601 40% 2 8% 12%

Without Modern Parties Bolivia 1920-45 5 6 6 0 Brazi1 1920-45 4 0 0 0 Costa Rica 1920-45 10 0 0 0 Dom Rep 1920-70 10 3 3 0 Ecuador 1920-70 21 4 4 0 El Salvador 1920-70 4 11 11 0 Guatemala 1920-45 1 5 5 0 Haiti 1920-70 6 4 4 0 Honduras 1920-45 2 3 2 1 Nicaragua 1920-70 10 3 1 2 Panama 1920-70 25 3 3 0 Venezuela 1920-45 _0 _3 __2 1

Total 98 45 41 4 Percentage 701 30% 27% 3%

138

TABLE 4.17

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: MILITARISM AND PARTY SYSTEMS

1920 - 1970


Countries With Modern Parties" Between groups Within groups

13 1

8892.71 4224.43

684,05 714.28 95 ns

Total 14 13117.14

Countries Without Modern Parties' Between groups Within groups

Total

11 484.18 1 270.32

12 754.50

37. 24 53.32 1.45 ns

the variance occurs between the countries with and without

modern parties than within these categories. However, each

of the calculated F-ratios is smaller than the tabled F-

ratios and the mean squares differences are not statisti

cally significant.

Although modern parties seem to contribute nothing

toward decreasing the incidence of militarism, it is curi

ous that the great decline in military executives between

1870 and 1920 coincides with the presence of more tradi

tional parties in Latin America. Where they existed, these

party systems usually took the form of elitist Conservative

and Liberal parties vying for power. Too, in some countries

reformist movements such as the Radicals in Chile were be

coming prominent. Of course, it is very difficult to ac

curately assess the strength of these partisan organizations

and their impact upon the political life of Latin America.

Be that as it may, in Table 4.18, the countries of Latin

America are divided into three groups according to whether

the traditional parties were relatively strong, moderately

strong, or weak.

If the traditional party systems did affect mili

tarism in the manner suggested by the countervailing powers

theory, then the incidence of military presidents should be

greatest in the countries with weak party systems and least

in the countries with strong party systems. The data in

Table 4.18 supports the argument. The incidence of civilian

140

TABLE 4.18

CIVILIAN AND MILITARY EXECUTIVES IN STRONG, MODERATELY STRONG, AND WEAK TRADITIONAL PARTY SYSTEMS BETWEEN 1870 AND 19 20a

Civilian Total Professional Insurgent Military Military Military

Strong Argentina 11 2 2 0 Chile 12 2 2 0 Colombia 14 11 1 10 Ecuador 10 4 2 2 Nicaragua 6 9 3 6 Paraguay 11 6 6 0 Uruguay _9 _JL _£ JL

Total 73 39 20 19 Percentage 65% 35% 18% 17:

Moderately Strong Bolivia 8 6 6 0 Costa Rica 18 5 5 0 Guatemala 3 5 3 2 Honduras 6 6 6 0 Peru II _9 __8 _1

Total 46 31 28 3 Percentage 60% 40% 36% 41

Weak Dom Rep 8 11 6 5 El Salvador 6 6 5 1 Haiti 1 11 10 1 Mexico 8 7 4 3 Venezuela _1_ n _5 __6

Total 30 46 30 16 Percentage 39% 61% 39% 23-

aBrazil, Panama, and Cuba are not included in the Table because Brazil was under a monarchial system until 1889 and Cuba and Panama were not independent until after 1900.

executives is 65% in countries with strong party systems,

60% in those with moderately strong party systems, and 39%

in the groups with weak party systems. If professional and

insurgent military presidents are considered as separate

groups, the relationship remains strong. When the civil

ians are combined with the military insurgents, the distance

between the countries with strong party systems and those

with moderately strong and weak systems is wider, 821, 64%,

and 62%, respectively. Hence, the impact of traditional

parties upon militarism would seem to be significant. While

they seem organizationally primitive by today's standards,

they may well have provided the institutional basis for

civilian organization and for civilians to more successfully

compete for the office of the chief executive than was the

case in earlier years. The evidence here indicates that the

growth of parties as countervailing powers do not, of them

selves, curb militarism. In fact, it seems that such powers

can either generate overt military intervention into the

political system as has been the case since 1920, or curb

it, as was the case between 1870 and 1920. Hence, the argu

ment that countervailing powers in the form of political

parties constitute a check upon militarism is not verified

or falsified by the data. Parties might either increase or

curb military interventions.

The essential element in the relationship between

militarism and parties may have to do with the policy

orientation of such institutions rather than their simple

presence or absence. It is frequently argued that the

policy ends of militarism are predominately oriented toward

preserving the status quo. Our findings can be interpreted

as being supportive of this argument. That is, in the peri

od 1870-1920, existing parties were basically committed to

preserving the existing socio-economic order. On the other

hand, the mass-based parties that arose in the post World

War I era were fundamentally committed to socio-economic

reform. As it relates to political parties, policies rather

than institutions may well be the basis of Latin American

militarism.

However, Table 4.19 shows that the differences among

party systems outlined in Table 4.18 are not statistically

significant. The mean squares between groups are all larger

than the mean squares within groups. Hence, more of the

variance in military executives is explained within each

group than between them. But, this finding is not statisti

cally significant as the calculated F-ratios are smaller than

the tabled F-ratios.

Militarism: Summary. Historically, the incidence of

military executives has declined. However, this decline has

become almost imperceptible in the twentieth century, and

professional-soldier presidents have increased considerably

since 1945. Quantitatively, the incidence of military presi

dents is greater in Indian and Mulatto countries than in

143

TABLE 4.19

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: MILITARISM AND PARTY SYSTEMS

1870 - 1920


Strong Between groups 6 1775.00 487.50 Within groups 1 1377.17 266,67 1.83 ns

Total 7 3152.17

Moderately Strong Between groups 4 5479.00 826.33 Within groups 1 2918.50 486.42 1.59 ns

Total 5 8397.50

Weak Between groups 4 5352.67 676.34 Within groups 1 1553.33 438.72 1.54 ns

Total 5 6906.00

144

European and Mestizo countries. This is true for both pro

fessional and insurgent military executives. Statistically,

however, the socio-racial type of a given country does not

explain the variance found in militarism among the countries

of Latin America. There is a relationship between militar

ism and illiteracy. A relationship between militarism and

socio-economic complexity exists. In quantitative terms,

party does have an effect upon executive recruitment. That

effect might be either toward greater or lesser numbers of

military executives, depending upon the era under observa

tion. Statistical tests, however, indicate that the rela

tionship between political parties and militarism is not

significant.

CHAPTER 5

PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION: OVERVIEW AND ELECTIONS

The transfer of political power from one ruler, or

group of rules, to the next is a focal aspect of political

processes. Few political acts so capture the national at

tention nor the intense concern of political elites. This

would seem to be particularly true in the Latin American

context where the transfer of political authority is often

"irregular" in that executive successions frequently occur

without regard to formal-legal parameters. Specifically,

judged against constitutional norms, Latin American succes

sion tends to be erratic as regards both timing and mode.

Chapters 5, 6, and 7 deal with executive succes

sion in Latin America. Chapter 5 concerns electoral, demo

cratic turnovers, Chapter 6 violent, unstable successions,

and Chapter 7 imposiciones and tenure patterns. The main

purpose in each of these chapters is to systematically de

scribe the pattern of transfer and place these succession

patterns in the framework of existing succession theories.

Pursuant of this, these three chapters examine how the Latin

American presidents achieve office, their length of time in

office, and the conditions surrounding their departure.

145

146

Studies of Executive Succession

Executive succession is the subject, albeit indi

rectly, of numerous books and articles. Most of this liter

ature focuses upon the extreme modal poles of succession --

competitive elections and overtly unconstitutional transfers.

Too, the bulk of this material consists of descriptive case

studies which trr.ee the participant elements of an electoral

i battle or a polpe de estado to their respective conclusions.

The maior purpose of this chapter is to describe and analyze

patterns of electoral succession, but first it is useful to

outline the basic features of Latin American succession.

The Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems has now been publishing case studies of elections and coups in Latin America for many years. A number of these appear with other case studies in: Richard E. Fagen and Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr., eds., Political Power in Latin America: Seven Confrontations (Englewood Cliffs", N. J . : Prent ice -Hal 1 , 1970) , Par t s I and I~I . For additional examples of the case study of golpe de estado literature see: Martin C. Needier, "Ecuador,'19 6 3 , " Wi11iam G. Andrews and Uri Ra'anan, eds., The Politics of the Coup d'Etat (New York: Van Nostrand Re i.nhold, 1969) ~ pp. 5-42; Edwin Lieuwen, Generals vs. Presidents: Neo-Mi1itarIsm in hatin America TNew York: Praeger, 1964) ; and Martin CT. \T e e dTer^ "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America," American Political Science Review (September, 1966), pp. 616-626. Othe r case studies of the electoral process include: William S. Stokes, Latin Americnn Politics (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1959), Chapters 14 niict 15; Leo B. Lott , "The 1952 Venezuelan Elections: A Lesson for 1957," Western Political Quarterly, X (September, 19 57), pp. 541 - 581 Peter Ranis, "Pe ron nTm Without Peron: Ten Years After the Pall," Journal of Inter-American Studies (January, 1966), pp. 112-28; and_

Phi 1ip B. Taylor, Jr. , "The Mexican Elections of 1958: Affirmation of Authoritarianism?" Western Political Quarterly, XI11 (September, 1960), pp. 722-44.

147

lixecutive Succession: Overview

Since Independence, the twenty executive offices of

Latin America have changed hands well over 1,300 times. The

raw scores listed in Appendix II, and summarized in Tables

5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 shows that of 1,331 coded turnovers, 7 54

(56%) involved "regular" successions and 577 (44%) were of a

provis ional nature. Mos t "regular" success ions were imposi-

ciones (52%), followed by violencias (31%) , and elections

(17%). A sizeable majority (70%) of the provisional changes

occurred without violence. Just over a tenth of the depar

tures were due to death or poor health (12%), with the re

mainder divided between constitutional and unconstitutional

separations (44% each).

The Latin American chief executive is hardly a

"safe" occupation. Almost half are forcibly eiected. Con

siderable numbers die in office, particularly in Haiti. One

quarter (10 of 40) of the presidents of that country died

while holding office. Indeed, only four (10%) of the Haitian

executives left their office under constitutional conditions.

Three of these occurred between 1915 and 1934, years when

Haiti was occupied by the United States Marines and indirectly

governed by representatives of the United States government.

The direct influence of the United States government

upon succession patterns is also apparent in four other

Caribbean states. Nicaragua, Haiti, Cuba, and the Dominican

Republic have had a total of fourteen popular elections, of

148

TABLE 5.1

NUMBER OF EXECUTIVE SUCCESSIONS BY VIOLENCIA, IMPOSICION, AND ELECTION

(BY COUNTRY)

va i e ec e/ec

Argentina 9 11 5 0 0 Bolivia 20 21 5 0 0 Brazil 3 12 4 0 0 Chi le 9 11 16 1 0 Colombia 6 26 8 3 4 Costa Rica 10 20 8 4 2 Cuba 5 8 3 0 0 Dom Rep 18 17 5 0 0 Ecuador 14 21 7 2 0 El Salvador 14 36 0 1 0 Guatemala 14 21 5 1 0 Haiti 14 19 2 0 0 Honduras 15 28 3 2 0 Mexico 15 27 3 1 0 N icaragua 10 24 2 4 0 Panama 3 6 10 1 0 Paraguay 5 24 0 0 0 Peru 26 21 3 3 1 Uruguay 9 18 10 0 0 Venezuela 11 19_ _3 _0 _0

Total 233 390 101 23 7 Percentage 311 52% 13% 3% r

aThe headings represent the following: v = violencia; i = imposicicfn; e = election; ec = election by a legislature or assembly; and, e/ec = popular election followed by a legislative election.

149

TABLE 5.2

NUMBER OF EXECUTIVE SUCCESSIONS, PROVISIONAL AND PROVISIONAL VIOLENCIA

(BY COUNTRY)

Pa Pv

Argentina 5 3 Bolivia 13 9 Brazil 6 5 Chile 22 3 Colombia 31 7 Costa Rica 32 5 Cuba 3 1 Dom Rep 7 10 Ecuador 14 8 El Salvador 44 15 Guatemala 25 9 Haiti 1 6 Honduras 50 12 Mexico 20 22 Nicaragua 38 14 Panama 20 7 Paraguay 12 11 Peru 31 19 Uruguay 16 9 Venezuela _8 _4

Total 398 179 Percentage 681 32'

ing : pv =

aThe headings of the columns represent the follow-p = provisional, acting, or interim successions and

provisional succession under forcible conditions.

TABLE 5.3

NUMBER OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTURES BY CONSTITUTIONAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS,

DEATH, AND HEALTH REASONS (BY COUNTRY)

ca u d 4 a ds h

Argentina 17 10 1 0 0 3 Bolivia 16 24 1 3 1 1 Brazil 12 5 1 0 1 3 Chile 22 13 2 0 0 4 Colombia 39 11 1 0 0 1 Costa Rica 26 18 1 0 0 1 Cub a 7 5 0 0 0 0 Dom Rep 8 25 1 2 0 0 Ecuador 21 29 2 1 0 0 El Salvador 27 26 1 1 0 2 Guatemala 8 22 3 3 0 1 Hai t i 4 19 5 4 1 0 Honduras 15 25 2 1 0 4 Mexico 16 26 2 0 0 0 Nicaragua 21 16 6 3 0 1 Panama 15 8 3 1 0 2 Paraguay 20 19 5 1 0 0 Peru 19 35 3 4 0 0 Uruguay 27 13 2 1 0 1 Vene zuela 19 17 3 1 0 0

Total 359 366 45 26 3, 24 Percentage 44% 441 6% 3% n 3!

aThe column headings represent the following: c = constitutional, u = unconstitutional, d = death, da = death by assassination, ds = death by suicide, and h = health reasons, which represent types of executive departures.

^The number of deaths by suicide, three, was so small that the percentage was negligible, n.

which eight have been under direct United States tutelage.

Two of the three Cuban elections that have occurred over

the past seventy-odd years took place under United States

supervision (1909 and 1913), The United States conducted

two elections in Panama (1908 and 1920), two in the Domini

can Republic (1914 and 1924), and two in Nicaragua (1929

and 1933). In Nicaragua, these have been the only free

elections in the history of the country.

Provisional successions are common throughout most

of Latin America, but the six Central American republics

have the greatest propensity for provisional executive ar

rangements. Forty-six percent of all provisional succes

sions occur in this area. They were particularly prevalent

during the nineteenth century when invasions among the states

of Central America were common. Such incursions frequently

resulted in the placing of a provisional executive in office

either by a victorious invader or a president rushing off at

the head of an army to defend the patria against invaders.

Too, in these early years, it was not uncommon for presidents

to seek health and/or recreation away from the capital, leav

ing a brother, father, uncle, or comrade to manage the af

fairs of state. But, of course, such actions were not limited

to the Central American area. In a number of countries,

Panama and Colombia for example, the incidence of provisional

turnovers is enlarged by constitutional articles requiring

152

that a provisional president be appointed whenever the "regu

lar" executive might be out of the country.

The incidence of violencias, impos iciones, and elec

tions over twenty-five year time periods is summarized in

Figure 5.1. This shows that in the early years of indepen

dence (Independence to 1845) , violencias and impos iciones

were used at the same rate. Then the rate of imposiciones

increased sharply, levelled off, and has declined since the

period from 1895 to 1920. Violencias declined sharply after

the period from 1845 to 1870, but since 1895, they have con

sistently accounted for about twenty-five percent of all

successions. Elections occurred at an almost constant rate

for the first one hundred odd years of independence, but have

increased greatly since 1920.

The percentage of violencias. impos iciones . and elec

tions by country is listed in Table 5.4. This shows that the

incidence of violencias range from 48% in Peru to 131 in

Colombia. The greatest incidence of imposiciones occurs in

Paraguay (831) and the least in Chile and Panama (30% each).

Elections are most frequently utilized in Panama (55%) and

least used in Paraguay (0%). Beyond describing successions

in each country, these percentages and rankings will serve

as indices of stability-instability and democracy-non-democracy.

Similarly, the percentage of constitutional and non-

constitutional turnovers is listed in Table 5,5. This, too,

will serve as an index of a dependent variable, democracy.

153

I n d . - 1 8 4 5 - 1 8 7 0 - 1 8 9 5 - 1 9 2 0 - 1 9 4 5 -1 8 4 5 1 8 7 0 1 8 9 5 1 9 2 0 1 9 4 5 1 9 7 0

7 0 4

IMPOSICIONES

6 0 *

5 0 4

40*

3 0 4

2 0 4

\ VIOLENCIAS

ELECTIONS

10*

Figure 5.1; Percentage of Violencia,, Inmosiciones and Elections by Twenty-Five Year Periods

%

55 47 32 32 28 21 20 20 2 0 15 13 12 12 11 10 9 7 6 2 0

154

TABLE 5.4

RANK ORDER AND PERCENTAGE OF EXECUTIVES ATTAINING OFFICE BY VIOLENCIA, IMPOSICIONES, AND ELECTIONS

(INDEPENDENCE TO 1970)

Ra Violencia

O. Q R

Impos icion O. 0 R

Election

1 Peru 48 1 Paraguay 83 1 Panama 2 Dom Rep 45 2 El Salvador 71 2 Chi le 3 Bolivia 43 3 Brazil 63 3 Colombia 4 Mai ti 40 4 Mexico 60 3 Costa Rica 5 Venezuela 39 4 Nicaragua 60 5 Uruguay 6 Argentina 36 6 Honduras 59 6 Brazil 7 Guatemala 35 7 Colombia 55 7 Argentina 8 Mexico 33 8 Haiti 54 7 Cub a 9 Ecuador 32 9 Guatemala 53 7 Ecuador 10 Cuba 31 10 Venezuela 52 10 Nicaragua 10 Honduras 31 11 Cub a 50 11 Dom Rep 12 El Salvador 27 11 Uruguay 50 12 Guatemala 13 Nicaragua 25 13 Ecuador 48 12 Peru 14 Chile 23 14 Bolivia 46 14 Bolivia 14 Costa Rica 23 15 Costa Rica 45 15 Honduras 16 Uruguay- 22 16 Argentina 44 16 Venezuela 17 Paraguay 17 17 Dom Rep 42 17 Mexico 18 Brazil 16 18 Peru 40 18 Haiti 19 Panama 15 19 Panama 30 19 El Salvador 20 Colombia 13 20 Chi le 30 20 Paraguay

aR = rank order and % = percentage of executives attaining office by violencia, imposicion, and election.

155

TABLE 5.5

PERCENTAGE OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTURES BY CONSTITUTIONAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS

(INDEPENDENCE TO 1970)

ca u

Argentina 63 37 Bolivia 36 64 Brazil 67 33 Chile 63 37 Colombia 79 21 Costa Rica 59 41 Cuba 59 41 Dom Rep 23 77 Ecuador 41 59 El Salvador 50 50 Guatemala 24 76 Haiti 14 86 Honduras 36 64 Mexico 38 62 Nicaragua 5 3 47 Panama 63 37 Paraguay 50 50 Peru 33 67 Uruguay 66 34 Venezuela 51 49

letter

aThe letter "c" represents constitutional and the "u" represents unconstitutional executive departures.

156

Executive Successions: Elections

This section considers electoral turnovers, those

successions deemed democratic. Electoral successions will

be employed as a measure of political democracy. Beyond

describing such successions, the purpose of this section is

to explain why electoral democracy occurs where it does in

Latin America.

Theories of Democracy

Presidential succession goes right to the heart of

political democracy. Indeed, distrinction between democratic

and non-democratic systems inevitably hinge upon the manner

in which transfers of the executive office occur. Politi

cal democracies are characterized by competitive elections,

where all political oppositions are unfettered and the votes

are counted with reasonable accuracy. A continuing question

in the social sciences concerns the relationship between elec

toral democracy and other aspects of the political community.

This question has resulted in a number of theories that pur

port to describe those environments or processes related to

democratic systems.

Undoubtedly, the most influential theory, in terms

of the academic response it has engendered, is S. M. Lipset's

theory that a relationship between political democracy and

157

2 socio-economic development exists. To test this theory,

Lipset devised a study wherein dependent variables -- coun

tries -- are measured against independent variables -- indi

cators of socio-economic development. The countries were

divided into two major categories with each of these two

subdivided into two more categories: (1) European and

English-speaking Nations, a) Stable Democracies, b) Unstable

Democracies and Dictatorships; and (2) Latin-American Na

tions, a) Democracies and Unstable Dictatorships, b) Stable

Dictatorships. The indicators of socio-economic development

were: (1) Wealth, (2) Industrialization, (3) Education, and

(4) Urbanization. The results of his study were that a posi

tive relationship does exist between political democracy and

the wealthier, more industrial, urban and educated polities.

Daniel Lerner's theory of democracy centers upon the

concept of empathy. He argues that democratic man is char

acterized by his ability to empathize with others, "to put

himself in the shoes of another person." To do this, man

must have an "open ego"; that is, the socio-psychological

state of mind most conducive or "open" to individual be

havior as a democrat. Traditional man, the villager living

in a centuries-old life style, lacks an open ego. He is a

^Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (New York: Doubleday § Co., 1959), chapter T~, ~

7.

Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe: The Free Press^ 1958).

158

captive o£ the village and its life style, not incapable of

being anything but what he is, probably n conservative, re

ligious farmer. Traditional man cannot visualize or is not

interested in a life beyond his personal universe. Lerner

poses the questions: How does man become "modern", and how

is it that man's vision might look beyond the confines of

the village?

Using data from Middle Eastern countries, Lerner

says that the shift from tradition to modernity involves a

fourfold process, which begins with urbanization and ends

with political participation. It is worthwhile quoting

Lerner at some length on this proposal:

The secular evolution of a participant society appears to involve a regular sequence of three phases. Urbanization comes first, for cities alone have developed the complex of skills and resources which characterize the modern industrial economy. Within this urban matrix develop both of the attributes which distinguish the next two phases -- literacy and media growth. There is a close reciprocal relationship between these, for the literate develop the media which in turn spread literacy. But, literacy performs the key function in the second phase. The capacity to read, at first acquired by relatively few people, equips them to perform the varied tasks required in the modernizing society. Not until the third phase, when the elaborate technology of industrial development is fairly well advanced, does a society begin to produce newspapers, radio networks, and motion pictures on a massive scale. This, in turn, accelerates the spread of literacy. Out of this interaction develop those institutions of participation (e.g. voting) which we find in all advanced modern societies.^

^Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, p. 60.

159

This progression, then, involves urbanization giving rise to

education, which leads to the growth of mass communication,

which causes demands for political participation.

Either Lipset and/or Lerner is the point of departure

for much of the literature dealing with empirical democratic

theory.*' Following Lerner's lead, Phillips Cutwright has

elaborated a communication's theory of political democracy.

He hypothesizes that:

...political institutions are interdependent with educational systems, economic development, communications systems, urbanization, and labor force distribution. A nation's economic system can develop only if its educational system keeps pace, if people concentrate in urban areas, if communication and transportation systems emerge and if changes occur in family and social life that induce people to fit into the demands of the unfolding system.

Cutwright developed four indices -- measuring levels of com

munication, urbanization, education, and employment in agri

culture -- as independent variables and computed the Pearson

^These and other empirical theories of democracy are available in a single volume: Charles F. Cnudde and Deane E. Neubauer, ed., Empirical Democratic Theory (Chicago: Markham, 1969j^ pp ~ 14 3-327.

^Phillips Cutwright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," American Sociological Review (April, 1963), pp. 253-64. Cutwright avoids the term demo-cracy in his study, preferring to term his index of political democracy, political development. Yet, the criteria he uses for determining levels of national political development --i.e., the size of parliamentary oppositions, the conditions surrounding executive elections, and subseauent executive behavior -- would seem to be indices of characteristics widely assumed to be descriptive liberal democracy.

7 Cutwright, "National Political Development: Mea

surement and Analysis," p. 255.

160

Product Moment correlation coefficient for each with the de

pendent variable -- political democracy. He found that the

strongest of his independent variables was the communica

tions index. The correlation coefficient between level of

democracy and level of communications was .81, accounting

for 65% of the variance in levels of political democracy. A

regression test further strengthens his argument establish

ing the linear nature of the relationship between communica

tions development and democracy, and specifying the residual

error of prediction for each observation. Cutwright recog

nizes a strong relationship among communication development,

economic development, urbanization, and education, but shows

that none of these variables predict political democracy

levels as well as communications systems.

Donald McCrone and Charles Cnudde provide a fuller

test of Lerner's progress-toward-democracy communications

O model. Using Cutwright's data and employing causal model

ing techniques, they test six theoretical models postulating

a relationship among urbanization, education, communications

and democracy. By calculating the correlation coefficient

for each potential relationship among the variables, the

authors show the correlational strength between each of the

^Donald J. McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde, "Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model," American Political Science Revie\\r (March, 1967], pp. 72-79." ' ' ' '

161

variables. But, to establish the impact of each independent

variable upon one another and upon the dependent variable --

political democracy -- they employ path correlations. The

advantage of the path correlation technique lies in the fact

that it measures "changes in the dependent.variable produced

9 by standardized changes in the independent variable."

The results confirm the validity of Lerner's original

model.That is, they found significant causal links in the

evolution toward political democracy. The developmental se

quence involves a direct relationship between the development

of mass media and democracy. Media growth is conditioned by

educational development which tends to occur in urban en

vironments. Expressed figuratively, the McCrone and Cnudde

study posits the following model.

^ E

C

Finally, numerous democratic theorists relate demo

cracy to groups. Groups, it is argued, provide the institu

tional base for popular participation in political life.

Too, individual participation in a number of groups is said

^McCrone and Cnudde, "Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model," p. 73.

-^The authors refer to the "remarkable correspondence" between their finding and Lerner's theory. See: McCrone and Cnudde, p. 78.

162

to encourage a "democratic outlook," one which is "moderate"

and accommodative of alternative views. Multiple group mem

bership generates cross-pressures and enables an individual

to view an issue from all sides, thereby facilitating com

promise, an essential element in democratic political life.

Democracy in Latin America: Hypotheses

Democratic theory indicates that some environments

are more conducive to democratic government than are others,

and that the effective elements which produce these environ

ments are mainly socio-economic, communications, and socio

political .

Socio-Economic Contexts. Socio-economic theories of

democracy focus upon levels of "development and underdevelop

ment" as determinents of democratic and non-democratic sys

tems. Generally speaking, democratic regimes are found in

highly developed socio-economic societies. Conversely, non-

democratic systems tend to occur where underdeveloped socio

economic conditions exist. The countries of Latin America

offer a wide variety of socio-economic levels of development,

and the hypothesis here is that a positive relationship exists

between democratic successions and highly developed socio

economic areas.

Communications Systems. Democracy involves citizen

participation in public issues. Participation requires a

163

communications system through which the government and

governed can interact. Communication, then, is necessary

if there is to be effective participation, which is essen

tial for democratic societies. It is anticipated that the

more developed the communications system, the greater the

likelihood for political democracy.

Socio-Political Structures.(Participatory Groups.)

A necessary condition for democracy seems to be a large

number of participatory groups such as labor and management,

consumer and producer, conservative and liberal political

parties, and civilian and military. These groups provide a

"check and balance" system which is a necessity for politics

of the large nation-states. Where an extensive group struc

ture exists, individuals are subject to the moderating influ

ence of cross pressures, which many observers feel broadens

an individual's perspective, raises his tolerance level, and

increases his capacity to compromise and settle disputes

amicably. The prevailing hypothesis states a positive rela

tionship between the presence of participatory-group struc

tures and democracy. The groups considered in this section

are political parties and labor organizations.

Military and Democracy. One group, the military, is

frequently cited as being inimical to democratic politics.

The military is cast as a danger to democracy. Hence, it is

164

anticipated that a negative relationship exists between

militarism; i.e., incidence of soldier-nresidents, and

democracy; i.e., incidence of elections.

Independent and Dependent Variables. Empirical stud

ies of democracy identify certain elements in a society which

makes it more susceptible to democratic or to non-democratic

government. Briefly, these elements are: (1) Socio-economic

development, (2) Communications systems, and (3) Socio

political structures, and they are the independent variables.

It is hypothesized that relationships exist between these

independent variables and elections and constitutional de

partures, the dependent variables.

Socio-Economic Development and Democracy

The level of socio-economic development runs the

gamut in Latin America from very highly developed areas to

areas so underdeveloped as to be thought primitive by modern

standards. The hypothesis being tested is that a positive

relationship exists between the levels of socio-economic

development and the succession patterns -- the higher the

level, the greater the chance of democratic successions,

elections and constitutional departures. To test this hy

pothesis, it is necessary to determine the level of socio-

development in each country. The index of Latin American

socio-economic development is taken from an earlier section

165

of this study. This index uses eight variables, all of

which relate to those elements identified by Lipset as

1 ? causes of democracy. Using the index, each country is

ranked according to its level of socio-economic development

and compared it with a rank order of the incidence of elec-

tions and constitutional departures in Latin America.

The results are summarized in Figures 5.2 and 5.3.

Spearman's rank order correlation test provides a technique

for calculating the strength and direction of the relation

ship in these Figures. A perfect positive or negative cor

relation exists when the calculated coefficient is either

+1.0 or -1.0, respectively. A coefficient of zero means

that the variables are not related. The coefficients for

Figures 5.2 and 5.3 are .44 and .60, respectively, both of

which are significant. Hence, the findings verify the theory

relating democracy to levels of socio-economic development.

11See Chapter IV, Table 4.12.

1 ? Lipset cites wealth, industrialization, urbaniza

tion, and education as correlates of democracy. The eight variables in the index used here are: (1) Percent literate, (2) Per Capita Gross National Product, (3) Percent non-agricultural workers, (4) Percent of labor force engaged in manufacturing and construction, (5) Percent of children age 7-14 in school, (6) Percent of children age 15-19 in school, (7) Percent of labor force unionized, and (8) Percent urban.

l^For the ranking of Latin American countries according to percentage of election, see Table 5.4, and for the ranking of countries by constitutional departures, see Table 5.5.

166

20

1 5

>-

< OS 2 10

W Q

xParaguay

xEl Salvador

xllaiti xMexico

xVenezuela

xPeru

xDom Ren

x!!ondiiras

xBoliv ia

xGua temala

xNicarapua

xArgentina xCuba xEcuador

xBrazil

xUruguay xPanana

xCosta Rica

xChile

xColopibia

s

, 4 4

1 0

Socio-Econonic Deve lopn>ent

n

20

1 5 20

significance

. 0 5

Figure 5.2: Socio-Economic Development and Democracy (Elections)

167

xDon Rep xHaiti

xGuatemala

xPeru

xMexico xEcuador

Bolivia x x

Honduras

xVenezuela x x Paraguay El Salvador

xNicaragua

x x Costa Rica Cuba

x x xPanama Argentina Chile

xtJ ruguav

xBrazil xColombia

s

.60

10

Socio-Econonic Development

n

20

1 5 2 0

s igni f icance

. 0 1

Figure 5.3: Socio-Econonic Development and Democracy (Constitutional Departure)

168

As rioted earlier, the United States has directly

controlled elections in Panama, Haiti, Nicaragua, Cuba, and

the Dominican Republic. To test the impact of the United

States, Figure 5.4 compares levels of socio-economic develop

ment and incidence of elections from each country excepting

the above-mentioned ones controlled by the United States.

The calculated Spearman's coefficient, .38, is still signif

icant, but not as significant as the coefficient of .44 in

Figure 5.4. This indicates that United States control over

elections in Latin America does increase their effectiveness.

But, even without that assistance, there is a positive cor

relation between higher levels of socio-economic development

and democratic successions.

j Communications and Democracy

A number of studies of democracy have established

| that a relationship exists between communication systems

j and democracy. The relationship found is positive; that is,

the higher the level of communications development in a so

ciety, the greater is the likelihood for democracy. To test

this theory, an index was devised using four indicators to

measure the communication system: (1) Newspapers delivered

per 1,000 persons, (2) Radio receivers per 1,000 persons,

(3) Television sets per 1,000 persons, and (4) Percentage of

literacy. The numbers of these indicators for each country

which is listed in Table 5.6 were converted into Z-scores

169

20

1 5

xCuba

xMex ico

xParaeuav

xEl Salvador

xllaiti

xNicaragua

xDon Rep

>, u a y* <->10 c E o O

xVenezuela

xPeru

xHonduras xBolivia

xGua tercala

xArpentina

xUruguay

xEcuadnr

xBrazil

xCosta Rica xColombia

xPanaina

xChile

10 IS 2 0

Socio-Econonuc Development

s . 3 8

n

20

s ipni f icarice

. 0 5

Figure 5.4: Socio-•Economic Development anc! Democracy (Elections Controlling for U.S.)

170

TAB LI:! 5.6

RAW SCORES FOR COMMUNICATIONS DEVELOPMENT INDEX

Newspapers Radio Television Percent Delivered3 Receivers Sets Literacy

Argentina 146 282 68 95 Bolivia 26 137 0 40 Brazil 54 95 29 71 Chile 118 187 7 90 Colombia 52 183 17 73 Costa Rica 77 89 25 84 Cubab 88 181 74 96 Dom Rep 27 40 6 53 Ecuador 52 104 2 70 El Salvador 47 140 11 49 Guatemala 18 54 12 38 Haiti 6 13 1 22 Honduras 19 58 3 45 Mexico 112 184 33 84 Nicaragua 49 63 6 50 Panama 75 198 41 82 Paraguay 12 86 0 68 Peru 47 169 15 68 Uruguay 314 309 65 91 Venezuela 78 196 70 74

Total 1417 2769 485 1343 Mean 71 139 24 67 S. D. 66 78 21 2 1

aNewspapers, radios, and televisions are all measured per 1,000 persons.

'•'All Cuban data is taken J'rom: Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 197 2) , pp. 244 -245. The data for all of the other countries is taken from: For Columns 1, 2, 3: Ernest A. Duff and John F. McCamant, "Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Stability in Latin America," p. 1134; for Column 4: inter-American Development Bank, Socio-Economic Progress in Latin America, 197 0 (Washington: Inter-American Development Bank, 19713.

171

and totaled to establish a ranking of Latin American coun

tries' level of communications development. The first three

indicators -- newspapers delivered, radios owned, and tele

vision sets owned -- measure the extensiveness of the system

and are the same as those used by Cutwright in his study of

communication and political development. The fourth indi

cator -- literacy -- is included to measure the "effective

ness" of the system, the assumption being that literacy is

a measure of the "effective audience" available for a media

system, particularly printed media.

The ranking of each country's communications level

is plotted against three dependent variables: (1) Percentage

of electoral successions, (2) Percentage of constitutional

departures, and (3) Percentage of elections controlling for

United States. The results, seen in Figures 5.5, 5.6, and

5.7, show that the relationship between constitutional de

partures and communications development is significant at

the ,01 level, total elections and communications relate

significantly at the .05 level, and elections controlling for

United States are not significant.

Socio-Political Structures and Democracy

This section concerns three groups, the military,

political parties, and labor, and their impact, if any, on

democratic successions; i.e., elections. It is anticipated

that the military will not contribute to Latin American

172

20

1 5

u CO

uio c e CD p

xMexico

xVenezuela

x xCuba Argentina

xUruguay

xParaguay

xEl Salvador

xEcuador

xBrazil

x xColombia Costa Rica

xChile

xPanama

x l l a i t i

xllondur as

xBolivia

xGuatemala

xDnm Rep

xNicaragua

10 1 5 20

Communications Development

s

, 4 1

n

20

significance

. 0 5

Figure 5.5: Communications Development and Democracy (Elections)

173

xPeru

x Bolivia

xllaiti

XDOIT ReD

xGuntemala

xHonduras

xMexi co

El Salvador x

xEcundor

xParaguay

xVenezuela

xN.icaragua

xCuba xCosta Rica

xArgentina x xPanama Chile

xUruguay xBrazil

xColombia

5 10 IS

Communications Develonpicnt

2 0

.65

n

20

significance

. 0 1

Fipure 5.6: Communications Development an^ Democracy (Constitutional Departure)

174

xCuba

xParaguay

xEl Salvador xHaiti

5

xMexico

xVcnezuela

.0

xDom Rop

xNicarapua xHonduras

xBolivia

xPeru xGuatemala

xArgentina xEcuador

xllruguay

xBrazil

x xColombia Costa Rica

1 I

XPanama xChile

10 1 5 2 0

Communications Development

s

. 3 5

n

20

significance

ns

gure 5.7: Communications Development and Democracy (Elections Controlling for U.S.)

175

democratic succession. On the other hand, mass participatory-

organization -- represented here by political parties and

unionization -- are expected to relate positively to democ

racy .

Military. Since Independence, a total of 131 elec

toral turnovers have occurred in Latin America, Of these,

twenty-one (16%) involve professional soldiers and seven

(5%) military insurgents. Moreover, of the military presi

dents, only 17% utilized elections to gain power. In a

word, military presidents, whether insurgent or profes

sional, have come to power through elections infrequently.

To estimate the relationship between elections and

militarism on a societal level, the incidence of elections

(controlling for those conducted by the United States) and

militarism (percentage of years served by military presidents)

are plotted in Figure 5.8. If the correlation between mili

tarism and elections runs in the direction of the hypothe

sized relationship, the Figure would show an inverted matrix

and a negative coefficient. Snearman's rank order correla

tion coefficient, -.91, strongly confirms the presence of a

negative relationship between militarism and electoral democ

racy. .

Political Parties. Figure 5.1 shows a sharp rise in

elections after 1920. This year was also a benchmark in the

176

20

15

u CT?

tio c • E 4J n

xUruguay

xParaguay

xEl Salvador

xNicar.ip.ua

xCuba

xDom Rep xMexico

xVenezuela

xllonduras

xBolivia

xGuatemala xPeru

x xArgentina Ecuador

xBrazil

xUruguay

xColombia xCosta Ric

Panamax

xChile

1 0 15 2 0

Militarism

(Years Military Presidents)

s

-.91

n

20

significance

. 0 1

Fipure 5.8: Democracy and. Militarisin in Latin America

177

evolution of party systems in Latin America.Specifically,

modern party organization has occurred since that time. The

question here is whether this signifies a relationship be

tween the evolution of parties and elections or a coinci

dence .


categorized according to whether or not they have modern

1 S parties. This Table shows that the incidence of elections

is higher in those countries with modern parties, but the

margin of difference is only 9%. When those elections di

rectly organized and implemented by the United States are

removed from the sample, the margin of difference increases

to 12%, but this range hardly constitutes a basis for as

serting that a significant relationship exists. The t-test,

which calculates the difference of means for two independent

samples, shows that the finding in Table 5.7 is not statis-

1 A tically significant. The data moves in the hypothesized

direction but not to any significant degree.

•^See above, Chapter 6, for a full discussion of political parties and 1920 as a pivotal year.

"^The placement of Latin American parties into modern and non-modern categories is based upon the author's judgment.

-^Results of difference of means test for Table 5.7: t-test df significance 1.15 13 n.s.

178

TABLE 5.7

ELECTIONS BY NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF ALL TURNOVERS BETWEEN 19 20 AND 19 70

BY COUNTRIES WITH AND WITHOUT MODERN PARTIES

Elections Total Turnovers

Countries With Modern Parties Argentina 1920-1970 3 16 Bolivia 1945-1970 3 10 Brazil 1945-1970 4 7 Chile 1920-1970 11 16 Colombia 1920-1970 2 13 Costa Rica 1945-1970 6 7 Cub a 1920-1970 1 13 Guatemala 1945-1970 3 8 Honduras 1945-1970 1 5 Mexico 1920-1970 0 11 Paraguay 1920-1970 0 15 Peru 1920-1970 3 12 Uruguay- 1920-1970 8 9 Venezuela 1945-1970 _3 _J_

Total 48 149 Percentage 32% 100%

Countries Without Modern Parties Bolivia 1920-1945 0 9 Brazil 1920-1945 0 4 Costa Rica 1920-1945 4 8 Dom Rep 1920-1970 3 11 Ecuador 1920-1970 5 18 El Salvador 1920-1970 0 11 Guatemala 1920-1945 0 8 Haiti 1920-1970 2 9 Honduras 1920-1945 2 4 Nicaragua 1920-1970 2 14 Panama 1920-1970 9 15 Vene zuela 1920-1945 _£ _3

Total 27 113 Percentage 23% 1001

Labor. The organization of labor is the second par

ticipatory structure to be measured against electoral democ

racy in Latin America. Again, as in the case with parties,

it is anticipated that a positive relationship exists between

labor organization and elections. To gauge the correlation

between them, compared levels of unionization by percentage

of workers organized into unions, and incidence of elections

by rank order, is seen in Figure 5.9. The results do not

verify the hypothesis. Indeed, the data in Figure 5.9 in

dicates that if a relationship exists, it is a very weak

negative one.

The findings here do not support the hypothesis that

democracy is related to the presence of mass participatory

groups in society. Neither political parties nor labor or

ganizations contribute significantly, if at all, to elections.

On the other hand, militarism is related, negatively, to elec

toral democracy. By two tests -- the behavior of soldiers and

the correlation between militarism and elections -- the data

supports the contention that the military does not contribute

to democracy in Latin America.

Chapter Summary

Imposiciones are the most frequently utilized mode of

succession in Latin America, followed by violencias and elec

tions. Electoral turnovers, however, have occurred with in

creasing frequency since 1920 , while impos iciones have

180

20 xParaguay

15

x xBolivia Mexico

xVenezuela xPeru xEl Salvador

xDom Rep xHaiti

x Guatemala

>, xNicaragua

CC y 10 xArpentina c xEcuador § xBrazil o

xHonduras

xUruguay xColombia

xCosta Rica

xCuba

xChile

xPanama

10 15 20

Labor Unionized

n significance

-.07 20 ns

Figure 5.9: Democracy and Labor Organization in Latin America

181

declined since that date. The incidence of violencia has

remained almost constant since the period 1870-1895,

A positive relationship exists between elections and

socio-economic development even when those elections conducted

by the United States in Latin America are controlled for. A

positive relationship also exists between elections and com

munications development. But, when those elections conducted

by the United States are controlled for, the relationship is

not significant.

A strong, negative relationship exists between mili

tarism and electoral democracy. The data shows no relation

ship between elections and the two mass , participatory or

ganizations considered in this study -- political parties

and labor organizations.

These findings suggest a propitious future for elec

toral democracy in Latin America. The trend toward electoral

turnovers has continued for fifty years. If comparable in

creases in the rate of elective successions continue, elec

tions will account for about 67% of all turnovers between

1970 and 1995.

Significantly, elections occur with greater frequency

where communications systems are most extensive and effective

and in the more socially and economically developed Latin Ameri

can societies. Given the commitment of Latin American govern

ments to development, it is likely that the area will become

more developed in the future. This bodes well for electoral

democracy in Latin America.

CHAPTER 6

PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION: VIOLENCIAS

Chapter 6 deals with violent successions in Latin

America. The purpose of this chapter is to explain why

violent, unstable successions occur with great frequency in

some Latin American countries and less often in others. In

order to pursue this question, incidences of vlolencias are

used as a measure of political instability. The concept of

instability is central to a number of general theories of

Latin American executive succession. Indeed, much of the

theoretically significant literature of Latin American poli

tics maintains that executive instability is the salient fea

ture of Latin American political life.

Theories of Instability

Perhaps the most significant general theory of exe

cutive succession is contained in Charles Anderson's group

theory of Latin American politics. Anderson describes Latin

American politics as "tentative." In tentative systems,

"government is based on a flexible coalition among diverse

power contenders which is subject to revision at any time if

^Charles W. Anderson, Politics and Economic Change in Latin America (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 196 7), pp. 87-TTT.

182

183

the terms under which the original government was formed are

2 deemed violated." Anderson likens the coalition to a "liv

ing museum", in which feudal landlords, medieval churchmen,

and civilian and military caudillos interact with leaders of

mass-based parties, trained economists, government techno

crats, labor leaders, professional soldiers, industrialists,

and representatives of various middle sector occupational

organizations.

The basic terms of the "coalition contract" is that

no power contenders be denied a voice in the policymaking

process. Presumably, the coalition shifts according to the

policy area under consideration. Some groups intensely con

cerned about one public question might be mildly interested

in another and completely oblivious to yet a third. However,

any attempt to change the basic composition of the coalition

by eliminating a contender or denying hiin access on perti

nent policy questions violates th.e contract a,nd leaves the

government liable to deposition. The peculiar characteristic

of Latin American politics is that no member is ever fully

purged from the coalition. His status within the coalition

O Anderson, Politics and Economic Change m Latin

America, p. 10 3.

3When exceptions to this rule occur, Anderson refers to them as valid revolutions. As do most observers, he points to Cuba (1960) , Mexico (1911) , and Bolivia (1952) as cases of revolutionary change in Latin America.

184

might decline, but he is never eliminated. Coalitional

change occurs when status realignments take place or when new

members are added. Membership expansion is due to the rise

of a power contender who is able to organize a power capa

bility sufficient to threaten the stability of the coali

tion. The system is tentative in that no single power ca

pability is held to be universally valid. Hence, no govern

ment has a guaranteed term of office. An election, for

example, is not universally binding upon all power contenders.

Maintaining this coalition or bolstering it with other ele

ments in the face of these conditions is a iob of consider

able magnitude. Anderson points up the leadership problem

inherent in such a system.

In the classic or evolutionary styles of Latin American statesmanship, politics is supremely the art of the possible, the art of combining heterogeneous and incompatible power contenders and power capabilities together in some type of tentative coalition, one in which the various members feel no obligation to maintain the combination intact for any prescribed term of office.^

Latin American political instability's connection

with the difficulties the chief executives face in maintain

ing control of presidential office is also argued by Merle

Kling. He theorizes that this executive inability to main

tain control in Latin America is related to the absence of

^Ander son, Politics and Economic Change in Latin America, p. 113.

economic bases for vertical mobility.^

185

According to this

theory, the economic resources of Latin America are con

trolled by a small number of domestic and foreign monopolists

whose control over the economies of Latin America precludes

any significant opportunity for individual mobility through

economic modes and efforts.

Since ownership of land or mines does not pass readily from the hands of one group to another, control of conventional bases of power cannot be secured by the ambitious mestizo, mulatto or Indian without a maior social upheaval. The systems of land tenure dooms to frustration amibitious individuals in search of a new agrarian base of power. Foreign exploitation of mineral resources effectively blocks the possibilities of shifts in the possession of mineral bases of power. And at its current pace of development, industrialization had failed to expand into a broad, substantial base of power.^

Unlike the economic system, the apparatus of government and

its formal and informal sources of gain provide a viable

avenue for the ambitious. Coupled with a basically colonial

economy is an "independent" political system with consider

able opportunity for public power and personal enrichment.

With the number of available public posts limited, competi

tion is understandably keen, giving rise to the chronic in

stability characteristic of executive politics in Latin

America. As Kling notes, "In the distinctive power structure

5Merle K1 ing, "Toward a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America," Western Political Quart e r l y ' , T X ( M a p c h . , 1 9 5 . 6 ) ? p p . 2 1 - 3 5 , —

^Kling, "Toward a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America," p. 33.

186

of Latin America, government serves as a special transformer

through which pass the currents of economic ambition."

Kenneth Johnson's treatment of Latin American polit

ical instability emphasizes the destabilizing impact of

socio-psychological variables.^ Namely, instability results

from a psychological state of alienation which, in turn, re

sults from three general factors: (1) entrepreneurial de

ficiencies, (2) high degrees of role substitutability, and

(3) urbanization. Johnson is particularly intrigued by ur

banization which in Latin America could be approaching "a

'threshold of criticality' as far as urbanization as an in-

g dicator of political instability is concerned."

Other writers focus on the significance of cultural

variables in Latin American political instability. Charles

Cumberland, for example, feels that cultural heterogeneity

1 0 gives rise to instability. Latin America, he notes, in

cludes two major cultural patterns, the Iberian and Indian,

^Kling, "Toward a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America," p. 33.

O Kenneth F. Johnson, "Causal Factors in Latin Ameri

can Political Instability," Western Political Quarterly, XVII (September, 1964), pp. 432-65^ ~~

^Johnson, "Causal Factors in Latin American Political Instability," p. 445.

-'-^Charles C. Cumberland, "Political Implications of Cultural Heterogeneity in Latin America," Frederick B. Pike, ed., Freedom and Reform in Latin America (Notre Dame: Uni-versity of Notre Dame Press, 19 59) , pp. 59-80 .

187

plus elements of the Northern European and North American

cultural traditions. The Iberian culture emphasizes indi

vidualism, a trait which reaches its fullest expression in

the concept of personalising. On the other hand, indigenous

cultures stress the importance of the collectivity and the

need for individuals to recognize their place in the social

whole. Politically, the Iberian tradition is authoritarian

and absolutist, and public office is undertaken in the spirit

of the Conquest; i.e., to acquire booty. Gerontocracy is

the Indian mode of government. Holding public office has

strong religious overtones and is undertaken as a solemn

duty to the community.

Martin Needler's concept of socio-racial type would

seem to be a variant of cultural theories.-'--'- Needier speci

fies four types of socio-racial societies in Latin America,

arguing that each is characterized by a distinctive political

life. With regard to instability, Needler's discussion sug

gests that political instability is most pronounced in the

Mulatto states, followed by the Mestizo, Indian, and European

countries.

Instability in Latin America: Hypotheses

Broadly speaking, four factors seem to affect politi

cal stability -- cultural, economic, psychological, and

socio-structural.

^Martin Needier, Political Development in Latin

America (New York: Random House,"1968), pp. 9 8-116,

188

Cultural Bases

Cultural theories argue that such qualities contrib

ute substantially to stabilizing or destabilizing environ

ments. The direction of the relationship is determined by

patterns of homogeneity and heterogeneity. Cultural homo

geneity encourages stable politics while heterogeneity gives

rise to instability. We can, then, hypothesize the follow

ing relationship:

cultural v political ^ political homogeneity ^ compromise stability

cultural cultural political heterogeneity clash ^ instability

Socio-racial theories are a variant of the cultural

environment argument. However, the emphasis here is upon

type rather than variation.

Martin Needier!s descriptions of political life in

these four socio-racial groups -- European, Mestizo, Mulatto,

and Indian -- includes some discussion of patterns of stabil

ity and instability. Mulatto politics, which Needier cites

as being the most "turbulent and violent" in Latin America,

would logically have the greatest incidence of unstable

changes in office. Violence in Mestizo countries centers

upon the partisan divisions that characterize politics in

most Mestizo states. These divisions polarize the populace

into two warring camps armed for combat rather than one that

189

is engaged in peaceful competition,^-^ Their violence level

is comparable to that of the Mulatto group. In the Indian

republics, politics often operate peacefully, controlled by

the upper classes. Indeed, Indian societies "tend to exhib

it greater constitutional stability than those of predomi

nately Mestizo or Mulatto character."-^ However, the potential

for violence is ever-present with the large, unintegrated,

oppressed Indian masses, needing only a catalytic leader or

event to marshal an attack upon the "white government."

The brutal fury of the occasional revolts of desperate Indians, however, serve to remind the upper class Peruvian or Ecuadorean from time to time of the fragility of his political order and of the limited value of its guarantee of the safety of his life and property. The specter of Indian revolt is raised anew by threats to expand political participation, which raise the possibility of political changes in unknown directions that may possibly get out of hand and lead eventually to 'stirring up' the Indians.

According to Needier, it is difficult to generalize about

15 political life in the European countries. But, an impli

cation of his claim that these countries have participant

publics is the notion of relatively effective institution

alized civilian politics operating constitutionally with

^^Needier, Political Development in Latin America p. 111.

1 Needier, Political Development in Latin America p • 106.

^^Needier, Political Development in Latin America p • 106.

^^Needier, Political Development in Latin America p . 115.

190

peaceful changes in office rather than violent, unconstitu

tional turnovers. Presumably, the potential for violence

is considerably greater where the masses lack a participa

tion tradition and are politically apathetic and docile. As

the European states have the most politically astute popula

tions, logically violence levels would be comparatively low.

Employing Needler's four socio-racial categories, it is an

ticipated that each socio-racial type will fall along a

1 A stability-instability spectrum in the following manner:

Stable Unstable Politics European Indian Mestizo Mulatto Politics

= >

Economic Bases

Economic theories of instability argue that a rela

tionship between economic deprivation and political insta

bility exists. This relationship hinges upon the availabil

ity of economic avenues for mobility. Where such avenues

are not available for the amibitious, the political system

becomes an alternative route for upward mobility. On a

societal level, this involves levels of congruity between so

cial mobilization and economic opportunity. Where social

mobilization levels exceed economic opportunity levels, we

hypothesize highly unstable politics. Where economic oppor

tunity is greater than social mobilization, we anticipate

•^Needier, Political Development in Latin America, pp . 9 8-116.

191

stable politics. These hypothetical relationships can be

expressed in terms of the following formulae:

minimal economic maximum social _ political opportunity + mobilization instability

maximum economic minimal social _ political opportunity mobilization ~ stability

Psychological Urbanization Bases

A continuing theme of the literature of our own

epoch concerns frustration and alienation. According to this

argument, contemporary society is marked by the breakdown of

traditional structures and mores leaving individuals rootless

and bewildered. This is particularly pronounced in so-called

"transitional societies" where the processes of change seem

to be much accelerated in comparison with similar processes

that occurred earlier in the Northern European and North

American areas. Central to this process has been a quicken

ing urbanization which seems to be at the heart of the frus

tration/alienation thesis. The political ramifications are

very significant. As Kenneth Johnson says:

As Latin American overpopulation continues, pressure mounts upon the already inadequate rural land forcing more and more persons into the great cities where entrepreneurial deficiencies make it doubtful that their wants will be gratified. Growing popular frustration and alienation are manifest in popular support for aggressive radical movements which voice mistrust of government and hatred for the dominant classes. At this point, opportunities for usurpation of government roles may be seized upon by armies,

192

bureaucracies, or other power groupings and political instability moves across the continuum from latent to overt.

This hypothesis can be formulated in the following terms:

urbanization > Frustration/alienation -> instability

Socio-Structural Bases

The structure of groups and group behavior are fre

quently cited as causal variables in Latin American politics.

The most explicit discussion of the impact of groups in Latin

America is contained in Charles Anderson's theory of Latin

American politics. He implicitly argues that the group con

stitutes the most salient aspect of the political system.

However, he treats groups as a singular phenomenon and does

not specify the political consequences of variation among

group structures and behaviors. While a relationship be

tween group structures and instability exists, the direction

of that relationship remains an open question. This study

is particularly concerned with three groups in Latin American

politics -- the military, political parties, and labor organ

izations -- and patterns of stability and instability.

Executive Succession: Violencias and Instability

Culture is a very nebulous concept, which does not

lend itself to rankings, categories, and precise measurement.

•^Johnson, "Causal Factors in Latin American Political Instability," pp. 440-41.

Yet, to systematically test ideas regarding the impact of

cultural variance upon political life, it is necessary to

specify some basis for distinguishing among societies ac

cording to cultural criteria.

Culture and Instability

In Latin America, cultural variation can be asso

ciated with ethnicity. Numerous socio-anthropological

18 studies point to this relationship. Consider the respec

tive world-views of an isolated Andean Indian, a black

favela resident, and a member of El Salvador's "fourteen

families."

It is widely acknowledged that cultural heterogeneity

varies from country to country in Latin America. In the

columns of Figure 6.1, the countries of Latin America are

categorized in three groups distinguishing among culturally

homogeneous, transitional, and heterogeneous societies. The

rows in the Figure catalogue the measurement of instability,

violencias into three groups -- high, moderate, and low -- -

indicating the number of violent turnovers in the countries.

A perfect relationship would find all of the observations

(countries) in the upper left, lower right, and center cells

•'• For a comparison of the cultures or world-views of Mexican Indians, Mestizos, and Europeans see: Ricardo Pozas, Juan, the Chamula (Berkeley: University of California Press , 1956) ; Oscar Lewis , Five Families (New York: Basic Books, 1959); and Flavia DeRossi, The~Mexican Entrepreneur (Paris: OECD, 1971).

194

Cultural Dimension

Homogeneous Transisitional Heterogeneous

Chile

Costa Rica Brazil Colombia

Low

Paraguay

Uruguay-

Panama

i

e o • H c <U (= c3 <D Cuba

G U CC Honduras El Salvador Ecuador

Political

0> l-H c >

O r3 £

Mexico

Nicaragua

i i

Bolivi a

High

Argen tina Venezuela

Dam Ren i Guatemala j

Haiti I !

Peru j

Fi.gurq 6,1; Cu^tura.J, llornogqrXQ.it/ qn4 Political instability

195

of the matrix (Figure). This is not the case; the correla

tion is not perfect. Kendall's Tau statistic is a useful tool

to calculate the significance of these groupings. This test

provides a basis for determining whether or not placement of

the observations in the Figure occur randomly. A perfect

relationship for Kendall's Tau would result in a +1.0 or -1.0.

The further the calculated Tau is from these figures, the less

significant the relationship. The calculated Tau for Figure

6.1 is .61, indicating that cultural homogeneity and violencia

are related.

Frankly, this finding is rather surprising. The

foundations of the "culture clash-leading - to-political in

stability" theories are not supported by logic. This argu

ment assumes that members of culturally antagonistic com

munities compete for power within and control of the politi

cal system. Yet, patterns of cultural dominance rather than

competition would seem to characterize Latin America. His

torically, the Indian and black elements in Latin America

have been inert, rarely engaging in politically relevant

behavior. Mestizos and Mulattos have typically existed on

the margins of society. Only occasionally have members of

those communities achieved positions or engaged in behavior

of political consequence. Rather, such positions tend to be

monopolized by individuals predominently European in appear

ance and culture.

196

There are exceptions, however. Some Indians, Blacks,

Mestizos and Mulattos have been and are politically interested

and active. But, their existence is not a result of open

cultural clash. Take the cases of Benito Juarez and Porfirio

Diaz of Mexico, Iloracio Vasquez of the Dominican Republic,

and Luis Sanchez Cerro of Peru are examples of political

leaders rising out of the ranks of the Indian, Black, Mes

tizo, and Mulatto groups. These men achieved power only

after having adopted the perspective of the dominant European-

based culture. They reflect a comparatively casual attitude

toward race. Certainly, they are not manifestations of a

cultural clash. In fact, political battles in Latin America

tend to involve members of the same culture. It would be

difficult, then, to support the contention that political in

stability relates directly to a clash among cultures.

Perhaps the findings in Figure 6.1 reflect the indi

rect impact of cultural diversity. That is, cultural hetero

geneity might provide an environmental context that encour

ages political instability. If an atmosphere of fear and

mistrust destabilize political life, the presence of large

numbers of socially, economically, and politically suppressed

people who also possess distinctive racial and cultural

characteristics may well engender a climate of fear mis

trust, thereby contributing to instability. Whatever, the

findings at the very least leave the issue open.

197

Socio-Racial Type and Instability-

Utilizing Martin Needler's theory of socio-racial

type, the hypothesis is that the incidence of violencias,

and political instability will be greatest in Mulatto coun

tries, followed by the Mestizo, Indian, and European states.

The data in Table 6.1 does not confirm the hypothesis. The

incidence of violencia as a means for attaining office occurs

most frequently in Indian countries, followed by Mulatto, •

European, and Mestizo countries.

When the Indian countries are divided into Traditional

and Revolutionary categories, and the Mulatto states that

achieved independence late -- Brazil, Cuba and Panama --

are controlled for, the rankings do not change.

By comparing the variance in total violencias, impo-

s iciones , and elections among the socio-racial categories, it

can be shown where the most variance occurs, within or between

the categories."^ The Analysis of Variance, summarized in

Table 6.2, shows that the mean square between columns is

greater than within columns indicating that much of the vari

ance in Table 6.1 occurs between rather than within socio-

racial categories. Moreover, the F-ratio for the data within

the categories is not significant.

^This test gives a general indication of variance occurrence (whether within or between) in the categories, as the test measures the variance among all three succession categories and the concern here is, specifically, with violencias .

198

TABLE 6.1

PERCENTAGE OF PRESIDENTS ATTAINING OFFICE BY VIOLENCIA, IMPOSICION, ELECTION AND PROVISIONALLY

(BY SOCIO-RACIAL TYPE AND COUNTRY)

/ 3. Violencia Imposicion Election

European Argentina 36 44 20 Costa Rica 23 45 32 Uruguay 22 50 28

Total 27 46 27

Mulatto Brazil 16 63 21 Cuba 31 50 20 Dom Rep 45 42 13 Haiti 40 54 6 Panama 15 30 55 Venezuela 39 52 9

Total 34 49 17

Mestizo Chile 23 30 47 Colombia 13 55 32 El Salvador 27 71 2 Honduras 31 59 10 Nicaragua 25 60 15 Paraguay 17 83 0

Total 23 60 17

Indi an Bolivia 43 46 11 Ecuador 32 48 20 Guatemala 35 53 12 Mexico 33 60 7 Peru 48 40 12

Total 40 47 13

aElections includes stituent assembly votes.

popular, legislative, and con-

199

TABLE 6.2

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: SOCIO-RACIAL TYPE AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY

(VIOLENCIAS)


Socio-Racial Type

Between groups 3 302.50 108.83

Within groups __2_ 621 . 16 246. 5 8 .43 ns

Total 5 923.66

200

The findings here do not verify the general observa

tions made by Needier in his discussion of the political

characteristics of different socio-racial societies. Needier

connected that these societies rank from most-to-least stable

in the following manner: (1) European, (2) Indian, (3) Mes

tizo, and (4) Mulatto. Actually, the data indicates that the

ranking would be as follows: (1) Mestizo, (2) European, (3)

Mulatto, and (4) Indian.

Further, the validity, as well as the accuracy, of

the theory remains open to question. The four categories

are not clearly related to instability. To the extent that

a relationship might exist, it seems limited to combinations

of the socio-racial categories. By casting the four socio-

racial groups against the index of instability on a four-by-

four matrix, the countries tend to cluster in the upper left

half and the lower right half cells, as shown in Figure 6.2.

Were the relationship between instability and socio-racial

type perfect, all of the countries would be in the four

cells going diagonally from the upper left to the lower right.

The calculated Kendall's Tau for Figure 3.4 is +.58, indica

ting a relationship exists.

Economic Opportunities and Instability

Theories of political instability and economic depri-V '

ation focus upon the lack of economic opportunity for those

personally ambitious. Logically, this is a very persuasive

201

Socio-Rncial Type

Mestizo European Mulatto Indian

Paraguay

Colombia

Uruguay Brazil

Panama

Honduras

El Salvador

Nicaragua

Chi le

Costa Rica

i

1

1 i

Argent ina Cuba

i

Mexico ' 1

Guatemala j

Ecuador j

i i i i »

•

Haiti

Venezuela

Don Rep

Peru |

Bolivia

Figure 6.2: Socio-Racial Type and Political Instability (Violencia)

202

argument, but difficult to test on a societal level. One

technique for assessing the extent to which economic avenues

for vertical mobility exist is to develop a scale measuring

economic opportunities and compare this with an estimate of

the numbers of economically ambitious persons in each coun

try .

This raises the question of what stimulates desires

for money and power. Some scholars argue that such desires

result from social mobilization. For example, Duff and

McCamant assert in their study of Latin American instability

"with economic growth and the passing of traditional society

both the objective needs and the population's consciousness

of these needs increase. The process that brings this in

crease in the level of political demands is called social

2 0 mobilization." The authors of the study iust cited have

developed indices of both social mobilization and economic

9 1 opportunity in Latin America. By comparing the ranking of

each country in these indices, the gap between mobilization

and opportunity provide a basis for predicting which coun

tries will be stable and unstable.

20Ernest A. Duff and John F. McCamant, "Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Stability in Latin America," American Political Science Review (December, 1968) , p. 1133.

^Duff and McCamant, "Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Stability in Latin America," pp. 1138-39.

203

In Table 6.3, the first column lists the ranking of

each country according to social mobilization levels. Column

two shows each country's rank on the economic opportunity

scale. Wherever mobilization is greater than economic oppor

tunity, the predicted outcome is political instability. Where

economic opportunity outstrips mobilization level, the pre

dicted outcome is political stability. If the differential

between the two rankings is three or more, the anticipated

result is either a very stable or a very unstable situation.

The results are shown in Table 6.4. Disregarding

the category "unstable" as only one country falls into it,

the results generally support the hypothesized relationship

between economic opportunity and political instability. The

incidence of violencias is greatest in those countries pre

dicted to be very unstable, and least in those countries

predicted to be very stable. The difference among the cate

gories, however, is not too great, at least not great enough

to show a strong relationship exists between economic develop

ment and stability. In order to test the hypothesis conclu

sively, much more refined and specific data is required.

Alienation, Urbanization and Instability

Any test of the urbanization-alienation-political in

stability hypothesis necessitates an estimate of the relative

number of rural-to-urban migrants in each Latin American coun

try. This is a problem, as comparable data on population

204

TABLE 6.3

RANKING OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES BY LEVELS OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY3

Social Economic Stability Mobilization Opportunity Prediction

Argentina 3 14 vu Bolivia 11 11 s Brazil 8 7 s Chile 4 3 s Colombia 9 15 vu Costa Rica 12 10 s Cuba0 nm nm nm Dom Rep 15 16 u Ecuador 13 13 s El Salvador 10 4 vs Guatemala 16 9 vs Haiti 19 19 s Honduras 18 12 vs Mexico 5 2 vs Nicaragua 14 6 vs Panama 7 1 vs Paraguay 17 17 s Peru 6 5 s Uruguay 2 18 vu Venezuela 1 8 vu

aSource for rankings: Duff and McCamant, "Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Stability in Latin America," pp. 1134-35.

bin this column, stability is represented by the following: vu = very unstable, u = unstable, s = stable, and vs = very stable. The one exception is Cuba where nm = not measured.

cDuff and McCamant do not include Cuba in their study; therefore, "nm" has been placed in each column, meaning "not measured".

205 TABLE 6.4

COUNTRIES GROUPED ACCORDING TO DEGREE OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND

PREDICTED LEVEL OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

Degree of Level of Political Instability Economic Opportunity

Group 1 - 31% Violencias3-Argentina vu° vlc

Colombia vu vl Uruguay vu vl Venezuela vu vl

Group 2-0% Violencias Dom Rep u 1

Group 3 - 22% Violencias Brazil ~~ s h Chile s h Costa Rica s h Ecuador s h Haiti s h Paraguay s h Peru s h

Group 4 - 16% ViolenciaSi El Salvador ' vs vh Guatemala vs vh Honduras vs vh Mexico vs vh Nicaragua vs vh Panama vs vh

aThe violencias here are listed as percentages of all successions^

^Degree of political stability-instability is indicated by the following: vu = very unstable, u » unstable, s = stable, and vs = very stable.

The level of economic opportunity is indicated by the following: vl = very low, 1 = low, h = high, and vh = very high.

206

movement in the Latin American republics is not available.

Lacking such precise information, this study will use two

measures of urbanization -- the level of urbanization in

each country (c 1960) and rates of urbanization between 1950

and 1970.

By ranking urbanization levels and violencia levels

in Latin America, the relationship between the two can be

2 2 assessed. The correlation between the rankings is plotted

in Figure 6.3. Spearman's rank order correlation coefficient

provides a test for calculating the strength and direction of

the relationship.^ a perfect positive or negative correla

tion exists when the calculated coefficient is either +1.0

or -1.0, respectively, A coefficient of zero means that the

variables are not related. The Spearman's correlation co

efficient for Figure 6.3, -.369, shows that a negative rela

tionship exists, although not at the established significance

level, .05.

However, this finding might result from the widely

disparate time frames represented in the dependent and inde

pendent variables. The measure of political instability

involves observations from Independence to the present era.

The measure of urbanization is a "snapshot" of the percentage

2^See Chapter 4, Table 4.12, column 8, for the urbanization data used in the index in Figure 3.6.

^See: John T. Roscoe, Fundamental Research Statis-tics (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 196 9) , p~! 81".

207

xColombia xPanama

xBrazil

xUruguav xParaguay

xChile xCosta Rica

xNicaragua

0 xCuba xEcuador

xEl Salvador

xMexico

xArgentina

xVenezuela

xGuatenala

xPeru

xHaiti

xBolivia

xDom Rep

1 0 15 20

* s

-.369

Psychological Alienation

(Urbani zat ion)

n

2 0

significance

ns

ure 6,3: Political Insta.bil.lty and Psychological Alienation in Latin America

208

of Latin American urban dwellers circa 1960. It might be

more realistic, then, to measure the incidence of violencias

since 1945 against the level of urbanization, particularly

since the shift toward urbanization in Latin America has been

a largely twentieth century and, even more, post-World War

2 4 II phenomenon. By calculating the incidence of violencias

in Latin America since World War II, the index of instability

coincides with the most intensive period of rural-to-urban

movement, 1945-1970. This relationship is plotted in Figure

6.4. Again, the calculated Spearman's correlation coeffi

cient is negative; however, in this case, the relationship is

significant. Only the Venezuelan, Cuban, and Argentine cases

are "outliers" in what is clearly an inverted correlation.

When these three countries are controlled for, the coeffi

cient rises to -.94.

The data, then, refutes the urbanization-alienation-

political instability hypothesis. This conclusion is sup

portive of at least two other studies that consider urbaniza-

tion and alienation in Latin America. In his case study of

Numerous studies of Latin American urbanization malce this point. Only Argentina and Uruguay had consequential urbanization in the 19th century. But, this was due to migrations from Europe rather than from the rural areas of Argentina and Uruguay. See, for example: Walter D. Harris, Jr., The Growth of Latin American Cities (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1971), pp. 39-5T:

^The Feierabend's reach the same conclusion in their study of political violence within politics. See: Ivo K. Feierabend and Rosalind C. Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviors Within Politics, 1948-1962, A Cross-National Study," Journal of Conflict Resolution (September, 1966), pp. 249-271.

209

xChile xllruguay xMsxico

xColomb ia

xBrazi1

xPanama

xParaguav

xCosta Rica

El Salvador

xNicaragua

x xHonduras Guatemala

xVene zuela xPeru xDom Rep

xEcuador

xCuba

xArgent ina

xBolivia

xHaiti

1 0 15 20


(Urbanization)

s •.534

n

20

significance

.01

Figure 6,4: Political Instability in Post-1945 Latin America and Psychological Alienation (By Levels of Urbanization)

210

a barrio in Mexico City, Oscar Lewis argued against the "root-

lessness" hypothesis that is the pumice for much of the urban

ization-alienation-instability literature.^ He found that

rural-to-urban migrants re-established village institutions

and relationships upon arrival in the city. He designated

this phenomenon "urbanization without breakdown." The find

ings of Joseph Kahl in his survey of the attitudes of work

ing class people in Brazil and Mexico are also contrary to

2 7 the urbanization-alienation hypothesis. He found that

rural-to-urban migrants were generally satisfied and content

with their lives. As a group, they responded that their lives

had improved since moving to the city and that they had posi

tive expectations for their children's futures, particularly

in the areas of education and subsequent opportunities for

socio-economic mobility. Moreover, when the responses of

migrants were compared with those of life-long city dwellers

and persons living in the provinces, Kahl stated that "we

detect no major differences between metropolitans, provin-

J - M 2 8

cials , and migrants..."

The findings here also support an alternative propo

sal; to wit, the lower the level of urbanization, the greater

^Oscar Lewis, "Urbanization Without Breakdown," Scientific Monthly (April, 1948), pp. 327-334.

2 7 Joseph Kahl, The Measurement of Modernism (Austin:

University of Texas PreslTJ 1968J , p~! 94. ' ~

2 8 Kahl, The Measurement of Modernism, p. 145.

211

the probability for political instability. This relation

ship can be pursued further by assessing the correlation

between rates of urbanization and violencias since World War

II. Rates of urbanization were calculated by comparing lev

els of urbanization between 1950 and 1970 for each country.

The proportion of urban dwellers in every Latin American

country increased during this period. The countries were

ranked according to the magnitude of the increase and com

pared with levels of violencia between 1945 and 1970. The

results are plotted in Figure 6.5. Once again, the variables

are negatively correlated. Although the strength of the re

lationship is not as strong as in Figure 6.4, the correla

tion is significant at the .05 level.

However the dependent and independent variables are

designed, the urbanization-alientation-ins tabi1ity hypothesis

is not verified by the data. Moreover, two of the three

tests used here support the conclusion that a negative corre

lation exists between levels of urbanization or rates of ur

banization and political instability.

Socio-Political Structures and Instability

It is assumed here that a relationship exists between

group structures and instability. Further, certain socio

political groups seem to have more effect upon the stability

or instability of the society, than do other groups. In Latin

212

2 0

IS

10

c Oh

xMexico xChile

xBrazil

xPanama

xColonbia

xHonduras

xNicaragua

xVenezuela xPeru xDom Rep

xEcuador

xCuba

xUruguay

x?aragua;.

xCosta Rica

xEl Salvador

xBolivia

xArgentina

xHaiti

10 15 2 0


CRate of Urbanization)

s -.411

n

20

significance

.05

Figure 6.5: Political Instability in Post-1945 Latin America and Psychological Alienation (By Rate of Urbanization)

213

America, the military, political parties, and labor organi

zation would be likely to have an impact upon executive suc

cession .

Militarism. The military is frequently cited as a

causal factor in executive turnovers, particularly violent,

unstable ones in Latin America. It is logical .that chief

executives with military backgrounds , those who directly con

trol the tools of violence, will utilize violencias more fre-

? Q quently than will executives with civilian backgrounds.

Certainly, it is anticipated that military insurgents will,

since they are, by definition, engaged in politically vio

lent and unstable activities, thus contributing to political

ins tab i1i ty.

Table 6.5 lists the percentage of all violencias, im-

pos iciones, and elections involving military, insurgent mili

tary, and civilian presidents. It shows that professional

soldiers are responsible for 611 of all violent turnovers,

while comprising only 37% of the executives. But, military

insurgents account for 15% of all violent changes which ap

proximates their percentage of all executives. Finally,

civilians, who constitute 48% of all presidents, contribute

29rrhe concern in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 is to describe and analyze the modes of succession through which, military men gain office. In fact, most studies show that violent successions involve both civilian and military elements .

214

TABLE 6.5

PERCENTAGE OF VIOLENCIA, IMPOS1CION, AND ELECTION USED BY MILITARY AND CIVILIAN EXECUTIVES

Total Violencia Imposicion Election Presidents3

Military Professional 37% 61% 31% 16

Military Insurgent 15% 16% 17% 5

Civilian 48% 23% 52% 79

Total 100% 100% 100% 100

aThese percentages do not include provisional presidents. Therefore, they do not coincide with those totals presented in Chapter 2.

215

only 23% of the violencias. Military presidents are account

able for 77% of all violencias or unstable turnovers which,

by the measure employed here, indicates a positive relation

ship does exist between militarism and instability. This

relationship might further be shown by using another criteri

on; namely, usage frequency. Table 6.6 shows that profes

sional soldiers attain the presidency through violencias

half of the time and the military insurgents, a third.

Another indication of the positive relationship be

tween the Latin American military and violencias is seen in

a comparison of Figure 4.2 and Figure 5.1, which show the

incidence of military executives and violencias over time.

If a relationship between the two exists, logically their in

cidence over time would be similar. A comparison of Figures

4.2 and 5.1 is presented in Figure 6.6. Their patterns are,

indeed, very similar, the only point of difference occurring

between Independence-1845 and 1945-1870 when military presi

dents rose slightly while violencias declined, also, slightly

The data, then, warrants the conclusion that a strong rela

tionship exists between military executives and violencias;

i.e., unstable turnovers, i.e., instability.

Political Parties. Political parties are the second

of the three groups chosen to measure the effect of socio

political structure on the stability or instability of a

society in Latin America and executive succession. The

216

TABLE 6.6

PERCENTAGE OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN EXECUTIVES ATTAINING THE PRESIDENCY BY

VIOLENCIA, IMPOSICION, AND ELECTION

Total Military Military Civilian Successions Professional Insurgent

Violencia 31% 501 34% 14%

Imposicion 52% 42% 57% 53%

Election 17% 8% 9% 33%

Total 100% 100% 100% 100%

217

6 0 %

50*

Ind. -

1845

1 84 5-18 70

1870-1895

1895-1920

1920-1945

1945-1970

404 'A

MILITARY

PRESIDENTS

30 *

VIOLENCIAS

2 0 1

10%

Figure 6,6: Percentage of Military Presidents and Violencias over Six Twenty^Five Year Periods

n

218

literature on Latin American political parties is unclear re

garding this relationship between parties and succession.

Some studies argue that political parties contribute to po-

7 n litical violence and instability. Others conclude that

parties constitute a basis for stability and constitutional

31 government. The concern here is whether mature parties in

Latin America operate as a countervailing element providing

opportunity for political participation and the orderly

transfer of political office. The hypothesis here is that

the strong party systems in Latin America do provide the

means of orderly power transfer for the politically active

segments of society, thereby stabilizing the polity and dis

couraging unstable successions -- violencias.

Following this train of thought, it would be logical

to assume that those countries with strong party systems

would not be characterized by a high incidence of violencia.

Similarly, those countries with weak party systems would use

A number of authors relate Colombian parties with patterns of violence found in Colombia, e.g., Richard S. Weinert, "Violence in Pre-Modern Societies: Rural Colombia," American Political Science Review (June, 1966), pp. 340-47. And see: Vernon Lee Fluharty, Dance of the Millions (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press , 19 57).

31-This argument is frequently made both implicitly and explicitly. For example, see Fitzgibbon's concluding statement in his article: Russell II. Fitzgibbon, "The Party Potpourri in Latin America," Western Political Quarterly (March, 1957), pp. 3-22.

219

violencias more frequently. And, the countries with moder

ately strong party systems might lie anywhere between these

extremes.

In this section, the impact of parties upon stability

is tested for two time periods -- 1870 to 1920 and 1920 to

1970. In Table 6.7y each country is put into one of the three

abovementioned groups: (1) Strong party systems, (2) Moder

ately strong party systems, and (3) Weak party systems. The

number of violent turnovers -- violencias -- is given for

each country individually, the percentage of violencias is

given per group, and the total number of successions is given

per country and per group, from 1870 to 1920, The results

are mixed. The percentage of violencias in strong party sys

tems (14%) is considerably lower than that occurring in

moderately strong (30%) and weak (31%) party systems, But,

there is not sufficient evidence to either verify or refute

the hypothesis.

For the period from 1920 to 1970, the strength of

any party system is determined by the presence or absence of

modern parties. In Table 6.8, the countries of Latin America

are divided into two groups: (1) Countries with modern poli

tical parties, and (2) Countries without modern political

parties. According to the hypothesis, the level of violencias

should be greater among those countries without modern part

ies. The results show that this is not the case. In fact,

the percentage of violencias is higher in those countries with

220

TABLE 6.7

POLITICAL PARTIES AND INSTABILITY: VIOLIiNCIAS AS A PERCENTAGE OP ALL TURNOVERS

BETWEEN 1870 and 1920 BY STRONG, MODERATELY STRONG AND WEAK PARTY SYSTEMS

Violencias Total Successions

Strong Parties Argentina 0 9 Chile 2 12 Colombia 0 16 Ecuador 3 15 Nicaragua 1 10 Paraguay 3 15 Uruguay 4 1_7

Total 13 94 Percentage 14%

Moderately Strong Parties Bolivia 4 14 Brazi1 1 8 Costa Rica 4 15 Guatemala 2 9 Honduras 9 23 Peru J5 19_


Weak Parties Cuba 0 5 Dom Rep 11 21 El Salvador 4 17 Haiti 8 16 Mexico 3 18 Panama 1 6 Vene zuela 11


2 2 1

TABLE 6.8

POLITICAL PARTIES AND INSTABILITY: VIOLENCIAS AS A PERCENTAGE OF ALL TURNOVERS

BETWEEN 1920 AND 1970 BY COUNTRIES WITH AND WITHOUT MODERN PARTIES

Violenci as Total Successions

With Modern Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colomb i a Costa Rica Cuba Guatemala Honduras Mexico Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela

Parties F97IP 1945-1945-1920-1920-1945-1920-1945-1945-1920-1920-1920-1920-1945-

'1970 1970 1970 1970 1970 1970 1970 1970 1970 1970 1970 1970 1970 1970

1 4 1 1 5 2 2 0 1 5 1 3

15 10 7

16 13 7

13 8 5

11 15 12 9 7

Total Percentage

38 2 6 %

148

Without Modern Parties Bolivia 1920-1945 5 9 Brazil 1920-1945 1 5 Costa Rica 1920-1945 1 8 Dom Rep 1920-1970 1 11 Ecuador 1920-1970 5 18 El Salvador 1920-1970 2 11 Guatemala 1920-1945 3 10 Haiti 1920-1970 1 9 Honduras 1920-1945 1 7 Nicaragua 1920-1970 2 14 Panama 1920-1970 2 14 Venezuela 1920-1945 _0 _3

Total 24 119 Percentage 2 01

2 2 2

modern parties (26%) than in those without modern parties

(20%). Even more importantly, the distance between the two

groups (6%) is not sufficiently large to support the hypoth

esis that a relationship exists between political parties

and violencias. A test of the difference of means shows that

the variance between the two columns is not statistically

3 2 significant.

Taken together, these tests suggest that the "strength"

of a party system has little to do with patterns of executive

succession instability. Although, the finding for the 1870-

1920 period does leave the question somewhat open, as the

strong party systems had half the amount of violenci as that

the moderately strong and weak party systems had (14% -- 30%,

31%).

Labor. Worker organizations have long been a feature

of Latin American society. These organizations of labor were

largely limited to skilled trade unions, members of which

banded together into "mutual assistance" leagues. However,

since the twentieth century, movements have emerged with po-

3 3 litical overtones with mass-industrial-workers at the core.

Results of the difference of means test for Table 6.7: T-test df Significance

1.22 13 ns

•^^Almost all studies of Latin American labor point this out; e.g., Victor Alba, Politics and the Labor Movement in Latin America (Stanford: University of Stanford Press', 196 8) , p. 2 7". Slba argues that industrial unions as a political force did not emerge until after the world-wide depression of 1929.

2 2 3

The political force of organized industrial labor in Latin

America was first felt in Argentina where, during the first

decade of the twentieth century, workers fought for the es

tablishment of a radically reformed society along anarcho-

syndicalist lines. Subsequently, workers' movements became

politically significant in many countries in Latin America.

But, labor as a strong political force did not develop until

after World War I. Therefore, to establish the existence of

a relationship between labor and unstable successions -- vio -

lencias -- this discussion is confined to the period from

1920 to 1970.

While there is some controversy over labor and its

political influence, the prevailing interpretation definitely

casts labor as an agent of change in Latin America. The best-

known proponent of this position, Robert Alexander, argues

that the labor movement in Latin America constitutes a revo

lutionary force seeking fundamental social, economic, and po

litical change. He states that, "Organized labor in Latin

America has had an essentially revolutionary role...Labor is

^Robert J. Alexander, Organized Labor in Latin America (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1965). For a somewhat contrasting view see: Henry A. Landsberger, "The Labor Llite: Is It Revolutionary," in Seymour Martin Lip-set and Aldo Solari, ed., Elites in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967) , pp. 2 56-300. Landsberger1s thesis is that Latin American labor is not ideologically oriented. He disclaims himself, however, from "differing at all categorically or fundamentally from Alexander," and concludes that "many sectors of labor seem to have more political than economic power... partly because of labor's rapid political involvement, through the ballot box or by violence, between 1920 and I960."

2 2 4

part of the movement for basic economic, social, and politi

cal change, and has represented a group which was seeking a

7 C larger role in the general life of the community." In

Alexander's view, such changes focus upon achieving social

equality, freedom from economic want, and political democracy.

Given the social, economic and political milieu found in Latin

America, it is little wonder that Alexander concludes that

organized labor is a revolutionary force, and as such, could

be considered a destabilizing element, a contributor to polit

ical instability.

Just such a theory has been postulated by James L.

Payne in his study of Peruvian labor, According to Payne,

systemic market forces lead to inevitable and violent labor

demands which focus on the presidency, causing political in

stability. Payne argues that labor surpluses make labor's

conventional weapon -- the strike -- relatively ineffective.

No strike can successfully force management to compromise

with workers or accede to their demands when huge labor sup

plies provide a bottomless labor pool. Therefore, labor's

strategy is to press for government intervention in labor-

management disputes. To gain the attention of the govern

ment, workers resort to physical demonstrations and disruption

^Alexander, Organized Labor in Latin America, p. 12.

36james l. Payne, Labor and Politics in Peru (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

2 2 5

of the system, thereby forcing confrontation with the state.

The "target" of these demonstrations and riots is the presi

dent. Physically controlling the situation is, at best, un

pleasant and, at the worst, dangerous. The military, in

charge of this task, constitutes an additional threat with

the possibility of golpe de estado. All this encourages

the president to arbitrate in favor of the workers so that

order can be restored as soon as possible.

The hypothesized relationship posits a positive cor

relation between labor organization and violent successions.

In Figure 6.7, the ranking for each country of the percentage

of workers unionized is correlated with the ranking of each

country's violencia level between 1920 and 1970. The cal

culated Spearman's correlation coefficient, .08, is not sig

nificant, thereby, not verifying the hypothesized relation

ship between labor and instability.

Chapter Summary

Violencias and political instability were treated as

dependent variables and tested against seven independent

number of studies of Latin American labor use the percentage•of workers organized into unions as a measure of worker's strength. See: Martin Needier, Political Development in Latin America, p. 96; Duff and McCamant, "Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Stability in Latin America," p. 1134; and Irving Louis Horowitz, "Electoral Politics, Urbanization, and Social Development in Latin America," Urban Affairs Quarterly, I (March, 1967), p. 18. The ranking used in this section is taken from the Horowitz art icle.

2 2 6

20 xMexico

xParaguay xColombia

xDom Ren

xUruguay xlla i t i

IS xCostn Rica

.O es

-10 xBrazil

Nicaragua

xPanama

xEl Salvador

o p-

xCuba

xChile

xVenezuela

xBolivia

xHonduras

xEcuador

xPeru

xbuate:naia

^ xArgentina

10 15

Labor Unionization

* s .08

n

20

significance

ns

Figure 6.7: Political Instability and Labor in Latin America

2 2 7

variables -- cultural context, socio-racial type, economic

opportunities, urbanization, militarism, political parties,

and labor organizations. Theories postulating a positive

relationship between cultural heterogeneity and violencias,

instability, are supported by the findings. While varia

tion in succession and instability occurs among countries of

differing socio-racial type, the range of variance is not

extensive and the socio-racial characteristics themselves do

not seem to be related to violencia, instability. Rather,

violencias occur more frequently in both Mulatto and Indian

countries and less often in Mestizo and European countries.

Theories focusing upon the lack of economic oppor

tunity as a source of violencia - instability are not veri

fied by our findings, A relationship exists between urbani

zation and violencias- instability, but not in the hypothe

sized direction. Theories of psychological alienation point

to large numbers of rural-to-urban migrants as a dissatisfied,

anomic mass prone to political violence and giving rise to

political instability. Whatever the measure of urbanization,

the relationship between these variables remained negative.

In two of three tests , the negative relationship is statisti

cally significant.

Not surprisingly, a positive relationship exists be

tween the behavior of soldiers and the incidence of violencia-

instability. The impact of parties upon violencia is mixed.

During the period 1870-1920, violencia-instability occurred

2 2 8

more often in countries with weak or moderately strong party

systems than in countries with strong party systems. Between

1920 and 1970, the proportion of violencias was greater in

countries with modern parties than in those countries with

out such parties. In the first period, 1870-1920, strong

parties seem to have encouraged violencia-instability, while

in the second period, 1920-1970, the opposite occurred. In

both cases, however, and particularly from 1920-1970, the

impact of parties was not considerable. Labor organization

is not related to violencia-instability.

Since the latter half of the nineteenth century, vio

lent successions have consistently accounted for about 25%

of all turnovers. Violencias , however, occur most frequently

in the more rural Latin American societies. Simultaneously,

Latin America is engulfed in an urban explosion as rural-to-

urban migrants and high birthrates enlarge the proportional

size of urban populations. If conurbation does directly in

fluence violencia, violent successions should decrease in

the future.

CHAPTER 7

PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION: IMPOSICIONES AND TENURE PATTERNS

Chapter 7 considers the imposicion and tenure pat

terns in Latin America. The impos icidn and its variants,

continuismo and the candidato unico, constitute a peculiarly

Latin American contribution to systems of executive succes

sion. Nowhere else has such a succession mode become an in

stitutionalized feature of executive politics. No systematic

descriptions of this phenomenon exist, let alone any theo

retical explanations. This treatment is limited to describ

ing and analyzing the relationship between impos iciones and

occupation, political parties, and educational development.

Tenure patterns relate to the successes and failures

of individual chief executives and, in the long run, to the

successes and failures of political systems. Briefly,

longer tenures mark individual success and shorter terms, in

dividual failure. From the perspective of the political sys

tem, however, successful tenures relate to constitutional

parameters. Extremely short tenure patterns indicate a lack

continuity in the executive office, suggesting little op

portunity for ongoing policy formulation and implementation.

Latin America's experience is mixed with regard to extremely

lengthy tenures.

2 2 9

2 3 0

Extremely lengthy tenures bring continuity to the ex

ecutive office and, at time, effective policy implementation

for some social and economic growth. But, such patterns are

also frequently associated with large scale personal corrup

tion and harsh political repression, even to the point of

government-sponsored terrorism.

The implications of tenure patterns roughly corre

sponding to constitutional terms are two-fold. First, they

indicate that a chief executive will have time to gain con

trol of government and effectively implement policies. Sec

ond, such tenures signify the absense of long-term dictators

The section on tenure in this chapter treats tenure

of four to ten years as optimal, designating the absense of

problems that attend extremely short and long tenure pat

terns. This time span allows for both the six-year terms

and those instances where re-election is constitutionally

sanctioned. Constitutional terms have varied widely through

out Latin American history. Today, however, the minimum

single legal term is four years and the maximum six years.

The purpose of the discussion of optimal tenure patterns is

to describe where they occur and to determine the conditions

conducing their occurrence.

Impos i cion

Table 5.1 shows that the imposicion is the most fre

quent kind of Latin American succession, accounting for 52%

2 3 1

of all turnovers. Figure 5.1 shows that the incidence of

imposiciones has varied considerably over time. It shows

that, basically, impos iciones were most prevalent between

1870 and 1920. Since 1920, they have continually declined.

Table 6.4 indicates that the imposicion occurs, roughly, in

proportion to the number of civilian, professional soldier,

and military insurgent executives. Civilians, constituting

48% of the executives , account for 52% of all impos iciones.

Professional military men who make up 37% of the presidents

were involved in 31% of the impos iciones. Military insur

gents, with 15% of the executives, account for 17% of the

impos iciones. Table 6.5 lists the percentage of civilians,

professional and insurgent soldiers attaining the presi

dency by way of impos icion. Military insurgents utilize

impos icion most frequently (57%), followed by civilians (53%)

and professional soldiers (42%).

Table 5.4 ranks the countries of Latin America ac

cording to incidence of impos icion. The variance among

countries is considerable, ranging from 83% in Paraguay to

30% in Panama and Chile. The incidence of impos icion, then,

varies both over time and among countries. To explain the

variation in use of imposicion over time, the following anal

ysis examines the impact of political parties from 1870

to 1970 . To analyze the variation of impos icion from coun

try to country, the influences of occupation and educational

development are considered.

It is anticipated here that the imposicion is posi

tively related to strong party systems in the period 1870-

1920. Jose" Medina Echeverria has pointed out that beginning

in the 1880's and 1890's, many Latin American countries em

barked on eras of stability that, in some cases, extended

for several decades.''" Perhaps the impos icion became the

vehicle for stable succession in those countries with rela

tively stronger party systems. Too, the decline in imposi-

ciones following World War I may be related to the political

instability that, Edwin Lieuwen argues, resulted from the

2 emergence of new, disruptive social groups and institutions.

Here, modern political parties are assumed to represent such

disruptive forces and to contribute to the decline in impo-

sicion in the period from 1920 to 1970 ,


listed according to the strength (strong, moderately strong,

and weak) of party systems between 1870 and 1920. The inci

dence of impos icion is roughly the same for all three cate

gories, indicating that party systems have no impact upon the

use of impos icion. In a word, the hypothesis is not verified.

Table 7.2 deals with the period 1920 to 1970 and the impact

parties upon impos icion, using as a measure countries with

"'"Jose'' Medina Echeverria, "Relationship Between Social and Economic Institutions: A Theoretical Model Applicable to Latin America," Economic Bulletin for Latin America (March, 1961), p. 30.

^Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1961) , pp. 4 2 -58 .

2 3 3

TABLE 7 .1

IMPOSICIONES BY NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF ALL TURNOVERS BETWEEN 1870 AND 19 20

BY STRONG, MODERATELY STRONG, AND WEAK PARTY SYSTEMS

Imposiciones Total Turnovers

Strong Parties Argentina 7 9 Chile 5 12 Colombia 13 16 Ecuador 9 15 Nicaragua 8 10 Paraguay 12 15 Uruguay 11_ 1_7_


Moderately Strong Parties Bolivia 8 14 Brazil 7 8 Costa Rica 8 15 Guatemala 6 9 Honduras 13 23 Peru 1_2 19


Weak Parties Cub a 3 5 Dom Rep 8 21 El Salvador 13 17 Haiti 8 16 Mexico 15 18 Panama 3 6 Venezuela 1_2_ '15_


2 3 4

TABLE 7.2

IMPOSICIONES BY NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF ALL SUCCESSIONS BETWEEN 1920 AND 1970

BY COUNTRIES WITH AND WITHOUT MODERN PARTY SYSTEMS

Imposicion Total Successions

Countries With Modern Parties Argentina 1920-1970 4 15 Bolivia 1945-1970 3 10 Brazil 1945-1970 2 7 Chile 1920-1970 1 16 Colombia 1920-1970 10 13 Costa Rica 1945-1970 0 7 Cuba 1920-1970 7 13 Guatemala 1945-1970 3 8 Honduras 1945-1970 2 5 Mexico 1920-1970 11 11 Paraguay 1920-1970 14 15 Peru 1920-1970 4 12 Uruguay 1920-1970 0 9 Vene zuela 1945-1970 JL JL Total 62 148 Percentage 41%

Countries Without Modern Parties Bolivia 1920-1945 4 9 Brazil 1920-1945 4 5 Costa Rica 1920-1945 3 8 Dom Rep 1920-1970 7 11 Ecuador 1920-1970 8 18 El Salvador 1920-1970 9 11 Guatemala 1920-1945 7 10 Haiti 1920-1970 6 9 Honduras 1920-1945 4 7 Nicaragua 1920-1970 10 14 Panama 1920-1970 3 14 Venezuela 1920-1945 JL _3


2 3 5

and countries without modern party systems. These findings

weakly support the argument that modern party systems are

negatively related to imposicion. In countries without mod

ern parties, imposiciones account for 571 of all succes

sions, whereas in countries with modern party systems, the

comparable figure is 41%. A test of the difference of means

shows that these differences are not statistically signifi

cant .

Variations in the incidence of imposiciones from

country to country may also be related to levels of develop

ment. The impos icion is an elaborate charade designed to

dupe the polity, or, at best, to provide the polity with some

4 sense of, though no real, political participation. Presum

ably, such a charade is most effective where the polity is

least sophisticated. To test this hypothesis, it is neces

sary to gauge sophistication levels in the Latin American

polities. Political sophistication is understood to mean the

degree to which the voting public is aware of and understands

the electoral systems. This is linked to education, so levels

•^Results of the difference of means for Table 7.2: t-test df significance 1.34 13 ns

^Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little Brown, 1965), p. 108, report that 34 % of the Mexican respondents in their study "feel satisfaction when going to the polls." This percentage is similar to the response from citizens in the U. K. (43%), Germany (35%), and Italy (30%). This is a rather remarkable finding, as British, German, and Italian elections are competitive, while those in Mexico are not.

2 3 6

of educational development will be used as the independent

variable against which imposicioli will be tested.^ If the

educational levels do affect impos icion usage in the manner

indicated above, the decline of imposicion following World

War I should occur most noticeably in countries with high

levels of educational development and least noticeable in

countries with lower levels. This relationship is tested

in Figure 7.1, which shows that a positive relationship ex

ists between education and imposicio'n. The Spearman's rank

order correlation coefficient, .50, is significant at the

.05 level, verifying the proposed hypothesis.

Tenure

Tenure is a good indicator of the potential success

of a chief executive and the political system. The longer

the tenure, the more successful is the executive control,

the shorter the tenure, the less successful. From a sys

temic viewpoint, successful tenures relate to constitutional

terms of office. At the outset of this discussion, tenure

patterns are described and used to measure the institution

alization of the Latin American chief executive. Then, the

influence on tenure of occupation, party systems, and modes

of succession is described and analyzed.

^To develop an index of educational development, the scores for literacy and the percentage of school age children 6-14 and 14-19 were taken from Table 4.12 in Chapter 4 converted to Z-scores and totalled.

2 3 7

20 xUruguay

xChile

xCosta Rica

xPanama

xArp.entina

xPeru

15

xBolivia

xVenezuela

xEcuador

10

xHonduras

xGuatemala xBrazil

xCuba

xDoro Rep

xHaiti

xNicaragua

xColombia

xEl Salvador

xParaguay

xMexico

10 1 5 20

Level of Educational Development

. 5 0

n

20

significance

. 0 5

Figure 7.1; Educational Development and Iinpos iciones in Latin America

2 3 8

Tenure Patterns: Overview

The tenure of the chief executives of Latin America

has varied widely. Twelve presidents served only a single

day, while one man had a term of office which lasted 26

years. Table 7.3 shows that, of the 980 Latin American ex

ecutives, 412 or 42% served a total of less than one year.

An addition 102, 10%, served less than two years, and 181,

19%, did not total four years in office,^ Of the Latin Amer

ican presidents, 694, 72%, served fewer than four years.

At the other extreme, six men served for total peri"

ods of over twenty years. The Mexican Porfirio Diaz holds

the record for the longest total years in office -- thirty

years, three months, nine days -- and the longest continuous

term of office -- twenty-six years, five months, and twenty-

7 five days. Another 37 men held office for ten or more

years, but less than twenty years. Finally, 226, 23%, Latin

American presidents held office for a total of four years to

nine years, eleven months, and thirty days.

^The data in Table 7.3 reflects the total number of years served by each Latin American executive. In effect, it treats the years in office of each executive as having occurred continuously.

''The other five men with plus twenty are Jose'' Gaspar Rodriquez de Francia of Paraguay, 25 years, 10 months, 20 days; Juan Vicente Gomez of Venezuela, 25 years, 6 months, 17 days; Jean Pierre Boyer of Haiti, 24 years, 11 months, 13 days; Manuel Estrada Cabrera of Guatemala, 22 years, 2 months, 6 days; and Carlos Antonio Lopez of Paraguay, 21 years, 5 months , 28 days.

2 3 9

TABLE 7.3

NUMBER OF YEARS SERVED BY EACH LATIN AMERICAN EXECUTIVE

(BY COUNTRY)

-la 1-2 2-4 4-10 10-20 +20

Argentina 4 3 13 9 1 0 Bolivia 13 4 19 15 0 0 Brazil 7 2 10 8 1 0 Chi 1 e 24 2 3 14 6 0 Colombia 31 9 7 20 0 0 Costa Rica 31 3 8 17 1 0 Cuba 5 1 2 6 2 0 Dom Rep 14 8 7 5 3 0 Ecuador 22 3 9 11 3 0 El Salvador 28 6 12 16 1 0 Guatemala 31 3 7 10 3 • 1 Haiti 19 1 5 9 5 1 Honduras 34 6 10 15 1 0 Mexico 33 7 3 14 1 1 Nicaragua 33 12 15 10 2 0 Panama 15 6 7 6 0 0 Paraguay 16 7 8 8 1 2 Peru 35 4 23 8 3 0 Uruguay 11 5 6 16 1 0 Venezuela 6 10 7 9 9

(-! 1

Total 412 102 181 226 37 6 Percentage 43% 10% 19% 2 3% 4% -1

aThe term of office goes up to but does not include the last number in each category. For example, in column two the data includes executives who served between 1 year and 1 year, 11 months, and 30 days.

2 4 0

Most Latin American presidents served for a period

less than the constitutional term of office. In Latin Amer

ica, formal constitutional terms have varied greatly, from

one year to life. But, in the main, the constitutions of

Latin America have specified the term of chief executive at

two, four, five, or six years. Two year terms were quite

common in the nineteenth century in the Central American re

publics and in Colombia, but most countries have always had

at least a four year constitutional term. Table 7.4 shows

that all of the Latin American constitutions presently call

for at least four year terms, and the "average" legal term

in Latin America is four years, eight months. Table 7.3 in

dicates that 53% of all executives served a total of less

than two years. Beyond this, the Table shows that 12% of

all executives served a total of less than four years.

Since the constitutions stipulating a five or six year term

probably more than balance those calling for a two year term,

it is reasonable to speculate that at least 75% of all Latin

American presidents did not complete a full constitutional

term. But, even this figure probably underestimates the ex

tent to which actual terms have fallen short of constitu

tional terms.

Table 7.4 outlines the mean and median terms in of

fice in each country. The mean term was computed by dividing

the number of years each country has been independently se

lecting its chief executive by the total number of presidents

2 4 1

TABLE 7.4

Ml;AN AND MEDIAN TERM OP OFFICE FOR LATIN AMERICAN CHIEF EXECUTIVES

PER COUNTRY

Constitutional Mean Term Med i an Term Terma Years 5 Months Years § Months

Argentina 6 3 6 2 $ 11 Bolivia 4 2 8 2 f. 1 Brazil 4 2 $ 8 2 $ 6 Chile 6 3 1 0 § 6 Colomb ia 4 2 § 2 1 $ 0 Costa Rica 4 2 § 4 0 5 7 Cuba 4 4 $ 0 3 a 9 Dom Rep 4 3 § 2 1 § 0 Ecuador 4 2 $ 9 0 $ 11 El Salvador 5 2 $ 3 0 § 9 Guatemala 4 2 $ 7 0 6 Haiti 4 4 § 1 0 § 8 Honduras 6 2 2 0 § 5 Mexico 6 2 5 0 $ 9 Nicaragua 5 2 $ 0 0 § 7 Panama 4 1 S 9 0 9 Paraguay 5 3 § 7 1 $ 5 Peru 6 2 0 0 § 6 Uruguay 4 3 5 1 § 0 Venezuela 5 4 § 0 2 $ 0

Total

OO *3*

2 $ 8 1 § 2

aIn this column are the constitutional terms of office (number of years) per country as of 1970. The average constitutional term of office for Latin America is 4.8 years.

2 4 2

in each country. The results indicate that the "average"

president served a total of two years, eight months, which

is two years less than the current "average" constitutional

term. However, like the data in Table 7.3, the mean term

does not accurately reflect the length of time of each term

because it does not account for individuals who have served

more than once. That is, it treats all the time spent in of

fice by a given individual as a single term when in reality

some presidents have served more than one term. The median

term was computed for each country by locating the mid-point

in the terms of office listed in Appendix II. Hence, it ac

counts for instances when a president's time in office is

interrupted and another individual takes the presidency. It

shows that half of the presidents of Latin America served

less than one year, two months. Moreover, in twelve of the

twenty republics, half of the presidents completed less than

one year. Most Latin American chief executives, then, serve

terms of about one year and only twenty to 251 serve a term

at least equal to that specified in the constitution.

The Institutionalization of the Chief Executive

Tenure patterns measure institutionalization. Logi

cally tenure patterns from Independence to 1970 should show

a shift toward longer terms; that is, they should indicate

a trend toward the institutionalization of the Latin American

chief executive. Since Independence, the various countries

of Latin America have confronted the primary problem of build

ing effective national governments, With the establishment

of such governments, the rapid turnover in executive person

nel should diminish. The problems of extending effective

state control and inculcating national loyalties were most

pronounced in the early phases of independent Latin America.

During most of the nineteenth century, national governments

remained weak vis-a-vis other institutions and systems and

national executive tenures would logically be comparatively

short. Changes would occur with the subsequent institution

alization of national systems and the redirection of mass

loyalties toward national entities. The national chief ex

ecutive should be a major beneficiary of these changes and

his ability to remain in office should be greater.

One way to test this theory is to calculate the aver

age number of years each executive served in various time

periods. This has been done in Table 7.5, and the results

confirm a movement toward longer terms. The average tenure

of each president within six twenty-five year periods has

increased from 1.1 years for the period Independence-1845 to

3.7 years for the period 1945-1970. More evidence from

another perspective is provided in Table 7.6. This Table

catalogues the term of each Latin American executive in one

of five time spans over six twenty-five year periods. It

shows that the greatest percentage of presidents in any time

period have served for less than one year. The incidence of

2 4 4

TABLE 7.5

AVERAGE NUMBER OF YEARS SERVED BY EACH EXECUTIVE OVER SIX TWENTY-FIVE YEAR PERIODS

Total Years

Total Executives

Average Term

Indep -1845

348

306

1 . 1

1845-1870

400

250

1.6

1870-1895

433

229

1.9

1895-1920

485

192

2.5

1920-1945

500

206

2.4

1945-1970

505

186

3.7

2 4 5

TABLE 7.6

PERCENTAGE OF PRESIDENTIAL TERMS MINUS ONE YEAR, ONE TO TWO YEARS, TWO TO FOUR YEARS, FOUR TO TEN YEARS AND PLUS TEN YEARS OVER SIX TWENTY-FIVE YEAR PERIODS

Years Indep 1845- 1870- 1895- 1920- 1945--1845 1870 1895 1920 1945 1970

-1 68% 54% 41% 381 45% 36%

1-2 13% 15% 12% 12% 9% 14%

2-4 11% 16% 24% 16% 16% 17%

4-10 6% 12% 21% 32% 28% 31%

+10 2% 3% 1% 1% 2% 2%

100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 10 0%

246

year, however, has consis-

on of the period 1920-1945.

s holding office from one

atively constant from Inde-

e between the periods Inde-

0 is only 1% . While many

id so under strictly consti-

ce of executives in the two

and one to two years -- is

institutional underdevelop-

evalence of short terms of

1 executives had little time

direction. It might also

lity on the part of elites

to agree upon the rules to govern executive succession. As

the incidence of presidents serving such short terms had de

clined from 81% in the period Independence -1845 to 50% in the

period 1945-1970, the conclusion is that institutional devel

opment has occurred.

The number of presidents serving terms of two to four

years rose until the period 1895-1920, but declined and lev

elled off after that point. This incline until the period

1895-1920 probably reflects the comparatively extensive use

of two-year terms from the mid-1800's to the late - 1800's.

Moreover, during this era, many executives serving longer

terms left the presidency in the hands of a designate while

presidents serving less than one

tently declined with the excepti

The relative number of executive

to two years has remained compar

pendence to 1970. The differenc

pendence to 1845 and 1945 to 197

executives serving short terms d

tutional conditions, the inciden

categories -- less than one year

a fairly accurate indication of

ment. At the very least, the pr

office suggest that many nationa

to provide policy continuity and

be taken as evidence of an inabi

2 4 7

vacationing or retreating to healthier climates. As a re

sult, some executives who might have served out four-year

terms did not do so. Presidents in this category were not

always removed prior to the end of their constitutional

term. This category does not, then, necessarily reflect

institutional fragility.

The number of executives whose tenure falls between

four and ten years has increased from 6% in the post-

Independence era to 311 in the contemporary period. This

strongly suggests evolving institutional maturity. Greater

staying power provides a basis for policy continuity and in

dicates, then, a general strengthening of the national gov

ernment and the executive office particularly.

The incidence of executives who have served contin

uous terms of ten years or more has been remarkably consis

tent throughout the history of Latin America. Their relative

numbers equal two or three percent in each of the time peri

ods under consideration. Such lengthy terms probably do

not reflect institutional development; rather, they suggest

personal strength, the rise of the overwhelmingly powerful

individual able to dominate over a remarkably long time. The

continuity of this tenure pattern suggests neither institu

tional development nor underdevelopment. The findings in

Tables 7.5 and 7.6 indicate a long term move in the direc

tion of greater executive stability and institutionalization.

They suggest that this process has been continuous except for

2 4 8

the period 1920-1945 when the consistent shift toward longer

tenures was interrupted. This interruption supports the fre

quently heard argument that the twin problems of economic

depression and political mobilization which occurred together

in the post-1920 period, destabilized the Latin American

area.

Occupations and Tenure

Occupation and tenure considers the impact, if any,

of soldier and civilian presidents upon tenure patterns.

Logically, it is anticipated that soldiers have advantages

over civilians in a political milieu characterized by vio

lence. They, of course, possess the "tools of the trade";

i.e., arms, that are frequently determinative in violent

Latin American political life and power turnovers.

To ascertain a rough estimate of the comparative

tenures of civilians and soldiers, it is necessary to estab

lish their respective indices. In Table 7.7, the percentage

of years the executive office was held by civilians, pro

fessional soldiers, and military insurgents is listed by

country. A comparison of the total percentage of years

these occupational groups held office with their relative

numbers will indicate the "success" of each group in main

taining office. Table 7.7 shows that civilians have held

the presidency of Latin America 52% of the time, followed

by professional soldiers with 32% and military insurgents

2 4 9

TABLE 7.7

LATIN AMERICAN CHIEF EXECUTIVE PERCENTAGE OF YEARS OFFICE HELD

BY CIVILIANS AND MILITARY

Civilian Professional Insurgent Military Military

Argentina 65 35 0 Bolivia 41 56 3 Brazil 70 30 0 Chile 71 25 4 Colombia 59 11 30 Costa Rica 92 8 0 Cuba 35 16 49 Dom Rep 29 47 24 Ecuador 64 27 9 El Salvador 47 53 0 Guatemala 38 40 22 Haiti 28 59 13 Honduras 41 40 19 Mexico 36 40 24 Nicaragua 52 8 40 Panama 95 5 0 Paraguay 59 41 0 Peru 45 47 9 Uruguay 69 11 20 Venezuela 16 24 60

Latin America 52 32 16

2 5 0

with 16%. Correspondingly, the percentage of civilian

Latin American executives is 55%, followed by professional

soldiers with 32% and military insurgents with 13%. On a

hemispheric basis, then, soldiers do not exhibit greater

staying power than civilians. Indeed, civilians have been

slightly more successful in these terms, although the margin

of difference is too small to warrant the conclusion that

occupation affects tenure patterns.

By talcing only those individuals who have managed to

serve comparatively lengthy tenures, it can be ascertained

whether soldiers or civilians have greater success, by Latin

American standards, at staying in office. Table 7.8 shows

the percentage of civilian and military presidents that have

served terms of over four years. The total incidence of ci

vilian executives is 3% greater than the incidence of civil

ian presidents serving over four years. The total incidence

of professional soldier presidents is 2% greater than the in

cidence of soldiers serving over four years, and the insur

gents serving over four years show an increase of 5% over

the total insurgents. Of the three occupational groups,

only the insurgents manifest tenure lengths proportionately

larger than their numbers, though the margin, 5%, is small.

Insurgents show their greatest staying power in tenures of

ten to twenty years, where they account for 30% of all exec

utives in the category. Beyond this, the sub-categories

251

TABLE 7.8

NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF EXECUTIVES, CIVILIAN, PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER, MILITARY INSURGENT,

SERVING FOUR TO TEN, TEN TO TWENTY, AND OVER TWENTY YEAR TERMS

4-10 10-20 +20 Total

Civilian Number Percentage

126 56 %

13 3 5%

3 50%

142 52%

Professional Soldier Number Percentage

65 29%

13 35%

2 33%

80 30%

Military Insurgent Number Percentage

35 15%

11 30%

1 17%

47 1 8 %

252

in Table 7.8 show very little variance. Occupation does not

seem to affect tenure patterns. While there is some vari

ance in tenure patterns among the three occupational groups

being considered, the variance is so minimal as to be insig

nificant .

Party Systems and Tenure

Political parties should contribute to lengthening

tenures to, at least, constitutional maximums. They provide

the institutional basis for sustaining mass support for an

incumbent and serve as a counterweight to any threat of de

position by civilian or military opponents. To assess the

impact of Latin American parties upon tenure, this section

will consider two historical periods -- 1870-1920 and 1920-

1970 -- and use them as times to test the relationship be

tween tenure lengths and the strength of party systems.

Tenures ranging between four and ten years are of particular

concern, as they are defined here as being most significant

from the standpoint of institutional development. Also,

tenures of less than a year are of special interest as they

evidence institutional underdevelopment.

As in previous sections of this study, the countries

of Latin America are catalogued according to party system

characteristics of strength -- strong, moderately strong,

and weak -- and to the presence or absence of a modern party

system. The first category, the strength of party systems,

is used in Table 7.9. The findings are partially supportive

of the hypothesis. They show that 33% of the tenures in

strong party systerns were between four and ten years. In

systems with moderately strong parties, the figure drops to

181. In countries with weak party systems, however, 27% of

all tenures are between four and ten years. Table 7.9 also

indicates that tenures of less than one year are least fre

quent in countries with strong parties (31%) , most frequent

in countries with moderately strong parties (49$), while

the countries with weak parties fall in between (42%). These

findings suggest that while the presence of strong parties in

the years from 1870 to 1920 did contribute to lengthening

executive tenure, the presence of weak parties was also con

tributory. Weak parties are, perhaps, indicative of a hos

pitable political climate for the well-known Latin American

caudillo-president who reigns supreme over considerable

time periods. The argument is supported, albeit weakly,

by the last row in Table 7.9, which shows that tenures of

over ten years are most often found in countries with weak

party systems.

In Table 7.10, the categories for the division of

countries is the presence or absence of modern party systems.

The data in this Table is, also, somewhat supportive of the

theory that parties contribute to tenure length. In coun

tries with modern parties, 33% of all tenures fall into the

254

TABLE 7.9

EXECUTIVE TENURE IN STRONG, MODERATELY STRONG, AND WEAK PARTY SYSTEMS BETWEEN 18 70 AND 19 20

Y E A R S S E R V E D

minus 1 1 to 2 2 to 4 4 to 10 over 10

Strong Parties

Argentina 0 1 7 7 Chi le 5 0 1 9 Colomb ia 13 5 5 6 Ecuador 4 0 3 7 Nicaragua 8 3 4 4 1 Paraguay 9 5 7 4

Total 43 17 31 41 1 Percentage 31% 12% 23% 33% 1%

Moderately Strong Parties

Bolivia 2 1 6 6 Costa Rica 17 2 5 6 Guatemala 2 0 0 2 2 Honduras 26 4 9 2 Peru 11 4 6 5

Total 58 11 26 21 2 Percentage 49% 9% 22% 181 2%

Weak Parties

Dom Rep El Salvador Haiti Mexico Venezuela

11 6 8 9 4

5 1 1 2 3

6 1 2 1 3

1 9 6 3 5

1 1

Total Percentage

33 42%

12 131

13 14%

24 27% 4%

TABLE 7.10 255

NUMBER OF PRESIDENTS SERVING VARIOUS TERMS BY COUNTRIES WITH AND WITHOUT MODERN PARTIES

Y E A R S S E R V E D


Countries With Modern Party or Parties

Argentina 1920-1970 4 3 7 3 Bolivia 1945-1970 7 2 3 3 Brazil 1945-1970 6 1 4 2 Chi le 1920-1970 16 1 0 7 Colombia 1920-1970 3 3 2 9 Costa Rica 1945-1970 1 1 0 5 Cuba 1920-1970 6 1 2 5 1 Guatemala 1945-1970 5 0 3 3 Honduras 1945-1970 0 1 0 3 Mexico 1920-1970 1 1 2 8 Paraguay 1920-1970 9 3 3 3 1 Peru 1920-1970 9 3 1 5 1 Uruguay 1920-1970 5 2 1 5 Venezuela 1945-1970 1 2 2 3

Total 73 24 30 64 3 Percentage 38% 12% 15% 33% 2%

Countries Without Modern Party or Parties

Bolivia 1920-1945 4 2 4 2 Brazil 1920-1945 1 0 1 1 1 Costa Rica 1920-1945 4 0 2 5 Dom Rep 1920-1970 5 6 1 5 1 Ecuador 1920-1970 18 3 6 4 El Salvador 1920-1970 6 0 2 7 1 Guatemala 1920-1945 5 0 0 2 1 Haiti 1920-1970 7 0 0 4 2 Honduras 1920-1945 2 0 0 3 1 Nicaragua 1920-1970 6 2 4 4 1 Panama 1920-1970 15 4 7 4 Venezuela 1920-1945 0 0 2 2 1

Total 73 17 29 43 9 Percentage 43% 101 17% 2 5% 5%

256

four to ten year range, while only 251 of the tenures in

countries without modern parties fall into this range.

Similarly, "countries with" have fewer tenures of less than

a year (38%) than do "countries without" (45%). In both

cases, however, the margins are small and do not allow any

clear conclusion. Rather, the data suggests that the direc

tion of the hypothesis that political parties relate posi

tively to long tenure may be valid but not in any definitive

sense .

Successions and Tenure

This section concerns the relationship between tenure

patterns and modes of succession. It is hypothesized here

that electoral democracy is significant in Latin America.

Furthermore, a manifestation of this is that presidents at

taining office through election will serve longer terms than

those executives using violencias or imposiciones. To test

this argument, a calculation was made of the relationship

between tenure and type of executive succession. The number

and percentage of each type of succession was given for the

periods of tenure used previously and the results are seen

in Table 7.11. It shows that 58% of the men elected and 47%

of those using imposi'cirfh served, four years or more, while

only 18% of those coming to power by way of violencia served

such a term.

257

TABLE 7.11

EXECUTIVE TENURE BY ELECTION, IMPOSICION AND VIOLENCIA

Y E A R S S E R V E D 8


Election number percentage

Impos icion number percentage

Violencia number percentage

Violencia/ Imposicion number percentage

Total number percentage

10

52

78 411

12

140 211

9%

40 12%

30 1 6 %

2 7%

84

33 25%

85 25%

48 2 5%

5 17%

171 2 5%

12 55%

139 42%

30 1 6 %

19 63%

260 38%

3%

16 5%

2 %

4 13%

28 3%

aThe column categories the written number. In column includes executives who served 11 months, and 30 days.

are to, but do not include, two, for example, the data between 1 year and 1 year,

258

This data suggests that the tenure of any non-

provisional executive is related to electoral democracy. The

closer an executive comes to approximating the democratic

ideal to attain office, the greater his chances for a longer

term. Interestingly, those who came to power through vio

lent change and then conducted an imposjcion to legitimize

their position, fared better than the men in any of the

other categories. Whatever the situation, the hypothesis

relating succession mode and tenure positively is valid.

Chapter Summary

Historically, the imposicion occurs with greater

frequency than either elections or violencias in Latin

America. In the twentieth century, however, it has de

clined sharply. The phenomenon of imposiciori is only weakly

related, if at all, to party systems. It does relate posi

tively to educational development; the greater the level of

educational development, the less propitious and educational

is the environment for impos icion. Both historical trends,

then, indicate that the impos icion will become less signify

icant mode of succession.

Using tenure as a measure of institutionalization,

the evidence indicates that the Latin American executive

office is become more institutionalized. Mean terms are

moving toward congruence with constitutional terms. Occu

pation has almost no affect upon tenure. The relationship

259

between political parties and tenure is unclear. Con

sidering parties and tenure in the period 1870-1920,

longer term patterns occurred in both the strongest and

weakest party systems, while moderately strong party sys

tems had the shortest tenures. Perhaps the relationship

between parties and tenure is not linear. If this is the

case, it would explain the fact that the tests showed par

ties in the period 1920-1970 had no impact UDon tenure.

The relationship between tenure and modes of succession

is very clear. The longer tenures occur with elections

and the shorter with violencias. Imnos iciones fall in

between, closer to electoral levels than violencia levels.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION: FINDINGS AND SIGNIFICANCE

The purposes of this study are two-fold; first,

to describe the backgrounds of Latin American chief exec^

utives and their patterns of succession; and second, to

utilize this descriptive data to quantitatively measure

and statistically test causal relationships frequently

ascribed to Latin American political life. This chapter

reviews the basic findings of the study and analyzes the

significance of the findings for understanding and pre

dicting trends in Latin American politics.

Presidential Backgrounds

The backgrounds of persons achieving the office

of the chief executive in Latin America indicate that

"informal requisites" constitute rigorous parameters for

determining effective access to the presidency. This is

not unusual. Studies of elite backgrounds inevitably

find that individuals with certain characteristics are

consistently favored in the process of elite selection.

While individuals without the "preferred" characteristics

do achieve office, quantitatively speaking, their real

opportunities are extremely limited. Again, this is true

of political elites everywhere. In Latin America, however,

260

2 6 1

elite recruitment occurs in a highly stratified context,

and the findings here suggest that the "necessary cluster

of informal requisites" encourage an orientation toward

predominantly upper class values and preferences. That

is, individuals who pass through the institutional ma

trix common to the experience of most chief executives

are likely members of the upper classes. For those who

are not, the institutions themselves purvey values con

gruent with upper class orthodoxy. Taken as a whole, the

backgrounds of the Latin American chief executives point

toward stratified socialization processes likely to re

sult in a particular outlook.

Presidential recruitment is influenced by age,

place of birth, education, class origin, and occupation.

The process favors individuals who are older, urban-born,

educated, upper and middle class, with professional oc

cupational careers. The data in Chapter III shows that a

sizeable majority of Latin American presidents achieve

office between the ages of forty and sixty. This is

hardly surprising. Political elites everywhere tend to

reach positions of national prominence during these years.

The high incidence of urban-born presidents is a

more distinguishing feature of executive recruitment in

Latin America. Historically, Latin American demography

was overwhelmingly rural. Yet, since the period of polit

ical independence, fully 89% of all presidents were born

262

in towns and cities. Even more striking is the high in

cidence (67%) of executives born in capital cities, both

national and state. This finding indirectly supports the

argument that in Latin America national governments have

"governed the cities" leaving the governance of the coun

tryside to the power machinations of regional hacendados

and caudillos. This is particularly likely in light of

the traditional disdain with which Latin American urban

elites view rural life and rural peoples, especially im

poverished rural dwellers. This pattern likely reflects

and/or contributes to the megacephalic quality that char

acterizes national government in Latin America.

The high educational levels achieved by Latin

American chief executives is not unusual among political

elites. Background studies inevitably find that such

elites are drawn from the better educated sectors of so

ciety. However, in Latin America, the implications

are more manifold because access to quality education has

been and is very limited. As detailed in Chapter III,

roughly half of all primary school age children enter

school, and only eight percent of those entering complete

school at this level. By contrast, fully 98% of all Latin

American chief executives completed primary school.

Stated alternatively, 96% of the primary school age chil

dren receive either no education or such limited educations

263

that their opportunities for achieving a presiden

tial office are practically nil. The influence of edu

cation upon executive recruitment is further seen in the

high proportion of college trained presidents. Roughly

70% of all Latin American presidents received some col

lege education or training in a military college. Of

course, opportunities for a university education in Latin

America are extremely limited and include strong class

preferences. Particularly, in the nineteenth century

college was available for members of the upper class and

a handful of persons from the "middle sectors."

Given this relationship between educational op

portunity and class structure, it is hardly surprising

that 93% of all Latin American chief executives come from

the upper and middle classes, with a maiority (54%) from

the former. Over time, individuals from the upper classes

predominated in the nineteenth century, while persons from

the middle class predominate in the twentieth century.

When class and recruitment are considered by country ac

cording to socio-racial type, upper class presidents tend

to occur most frequently in Traditional Indian, Mestizo,

and European countries. Middle and lower class chief

executives are found in greater numbers in Mulatto and

Revolutionary Indian states. The incidence of presidents

of middle class origin in Revolutionary Indian countries

increases dramatically in the post-Revolutionary period.

264

Similarly, countries where the middle sectors have most

fully evolved -- Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and

Uruguay -- draw a greater proportion of chief executives

from that sector than is the case in the rest of Latin

America.

These findings indicate that executive recruit

ment is affected by both revolutionary occurrences and

evolutionary changes in class structure. In the area

as a whole, a middle class "revolution" in recruitment

appears to have occurred since 1920. Most Latin American

chief executives now come from the middle class. But,

the emergence of middle class presidents is most strik

ing in contexts characterized by significant change.

The influence of abrupt change upon recruitment is seen

in Guatemala, Bolivia, and Mexico. In all three countries,

the incidence of presidents of middle class origin in

creased dramatically following revolution. Of course,

Mexico is also one of the countries designated by Johnson

as having a "mature" middle sector. However, the social

structures of Bolivia and Guatemala remain largely tradi

tional and undifferentiated. They are basically two-class

societies consisting of large numbers of lower class pea^

ants and laborers and a miniscule upper class. No mid

dle sector of any size has emerged in either Bolivia or

Guatemala. Hence, the revolutionary experience would seem

to be a basis for changes in executive recruitment.

265

Elsewhere, fundamental socio-economic transformations are

reflected in changes in executive recruitment.

Occupationally, about half of the presidents in

Latin America come from civilian careers and half from

the military. Most civilians are from the professions,

particularly law, education, journalism, and medicine.

Too, most had previous experience in public life as

legislators, party leaders, or government officials.

Historically, the incidence of civilian executives has

increased, although this increase has become almost im

perceptible in the twentieth century. By the same token,

the incidence of soldier-presidents has decreased slightly

since the turn of the century. However, when professional

and insurgent soldier-presidents are considered separately,

the incidence of professional soldier-presidents has in

creased noticeably in the post World War II period. Mili

tary presidents occur with greatest frequency in countries

with high illiteracy rates and undifferentiated socio

economic contexts.

The particular cluster of background characteris

tics found among the presidents of the twenty Latin Amer

ican republics are markedly homogeneous and persistently

reflective of upper class values. The similarity in

presidential backgrounds suggests that Latin American

chief executives arise out of very similar institutional

contexts. Most, as we have seen, are born in middle or

2 6 6

upper class circumstances, live in towns and cities, had

lengthy formal educations, and pursued professional ca

reers, Executive recruitment systems in Latin America

are basically alike in the sense that people exposed to

similar socializing institutions achieve executive office.

Whatever the country, recruitment processes involve a

common institutional network. Access to this network is

largely limited to those who are socially and economi

cally powerful or to those who have been exposed to in

stitutions traditionally supportive of powerful societal

elements.

The Latin American militaries provide alternative

recruitment systems. Soldier-presidents need only achieve

success within the military and, hence, are not exposed

to the same institutions as civilians. This is reflected

in the findings on educational and class backgrounds out

lined in Chapters III and IV. All of the presidents with

no formal education achieved the office of the chief exec-:

utive following insurgent or professional military ca

reers. Moreover, soldier-presidents account for 891 of

the Latin American chief executives born in the lower

class.

Latin American presidential recruitment, then,

involves two separate systems, civilian and military.

Access to the civilian recruitment system is limited

largely to upper and middle class citizens who are also

267

city dwellers and professionals. In the nineteenth cen

tury, this system was highly elitist in that access to

the institutions through which presidents emerged was

available to very few other than the socially and eco-

nomically powerful. In the twentieth century, the oppor

tunities for political mobility have expanded to incor

porate a larger portion of society; i.e., middle class

elements. On the other hand, the other background vari

ables common to civilian presidents have persisted. Ac

cess to the presidency through the military provides op

portunities for those who would otherwise likely be ex

cluded from any chance to achieve executive office.

Presidential Successions

Executive succession in Latin America involves

three modes -- elections, violencias , and imposiciones.

The imposicion has been the most frequently utilized

mode, although its usage has declined markedly since

1920. Historically, violencias have occurred with less

frequency than impos iciones and greater frequency than

elections. However, while the impos icion has declined

in the twentieth century, violencias have consistently

accounted for about 25% of all turnovers. Elections have

been the least utilized mode, but their incidence has

increased since 1920 at a rate roughly paralleling the

decline in irrmosi clones .

2 6 8

The relationship between elections and four inde

pendent variables -- socio-economic development, communi

cations development, militarism, and participatory groups

(political parties and labor organization) -- was consid

ered in Chapter V. The tests show a positive correlation

between elections and socio-economic and communications

development, a negative correlation with militarism, and

no correlation with participatory groups. That is, elec

tions occur more frequently where social, economic, and

communications systems are more developed, and less fre

quently where militarism occurs. The presence of partic

ipatory groups has no impact upon the incidence of elec

tions .

In Chapter VI, violencias were treated as a de

pendent variable and tested against seven independent

variables -- cultural context, socio-racial type, econom

ic opportunities, urbanization, militarism, and partic

ipatory groups. A positive relationship between the in

cidence of violencia and militarism exists. The rela

tionship between violencia and urbanization is negative.

Violencias, then, occur with greater frequency in the

more rural societies of Latin America and where militarism

is more prevalent. Otherwise, no statistically signifi

cant correlations were found.

Chapter VII concerned imposiciones and tenure

patterns. Impos iciones are positively related to levels

2 6 9

of educational development; i.e., the higher the level of

educational development, the less likely imposiciones will

occur. Executive tenures are lengthening in Latin Ameri

ca, moving closer to constitutional norms. Longer tenures

are positively related to elections and negatively related

to violericias ; that is , tenures are longer where elections

are more frequent and shorter where violencias are more

frequent.

The Significance of the Study for Understanding and Predicting Trends

i-n Latin American Politics

In recent years a growing body of theoretical

literature has argued that politically-relevant behavior

is the proper focus of political inquiry. Proponents of

a behavioral approach argue that analytically it is im

practical to cast politics in a formal-legal framework

because constitutionalism is not the modal pattern for

political interaction, From a methodological point of

view, this argument is persuasive. Unfortunately, how

ever, a behavioral focus tends to treat formal-legal

variables summarily, if at all. This is particularly

true where polities are characterized by continued vio

lation of constitutional rules. Of course, Latin Ameri-\£f '

ca is characterized by precisely such violations and con

temporary interpretations of politics there usually yiew

repeated abuses of constitutional provisions as accepted

270

features of the political system which operate indepen

dently of formal rules. The problem with a behavioral

focus is that it includes a strong tendency to dismiss

formal-legal rules as irrelevant to the operation of the

"real system" and to ignore the influences of either con

stitutional compliance or violation upon behavior.

Constitutionalism and Executive Power

It is likely, however, that constitutionalism

does make a difference. Although no studies of the in

fluence of constitutionalism upon behavior exist, it is

logically a major influence. This is especially true for

the Latin American chief executive. The institutionali

zation of recruitment and succession patterns that are

unconstitutional seriously impairs the effective exer

cise of executive power because it implies a highly ten

tative nature of tenure in Latin America. In the con

temporary nation-state with its varied interests and ex

tensive bureaucratic apparatus policy formulation and

implementation are difficult enough. Tentative tenure

systems contribute to these difficulties by introducing

the element of the unknown with all its attendant practi

cal and psychological implications.

Consider the implications of the theories by

Charles Anderson and James Payne which were discussed

earlier and are suggestive of the consequences of the

2 7 1

tentative tenure systems upon the effective power of

Latin American presidents. Having described the linkages

between groups, power capabilities, and the threat of im

minent deposition, Anderson concludes:

Revolution requires exceptional leadership of a certain style to succeed, and those who have possessed it, the Maderos, Zapatas, Castros , and Bolivars and San Martins , have entered the ranks of the vivid personal heroes of Latin American history. But there is another style of leadership relevant to the conduct of Latin American government, and there is no reason to believe that it is less available in this culture than that represented by the revolutionary politician in arms. The skills at the craft of politics, of working within the system to the end by transcending it, have been exemplified by men like Betancourt, Frondizi, Figueres, Lleras Camargo, Lopez Mateos , and many others. They had their historic predecessors in such figures as Sarmiento -and Juarez. Their skills and capabilities are not to be despised. In fact, set within the context of the system in which "they have operated, and against the background of man's efforts to govern himself, they often appear as little short of incredible.

A similar conclusion can be drawn from Payne's

study of the political system of Peru. lie notes that ex

ecutive behavior is strongly conditioned by the continu

ing threat of military intervention. The chief executive,

Payne argues, is all-responsible but by no means all-

powerful. "He is situated between a ravenous opposition

on the one side and an ambivalent military on the other.

As the political temperature rises -- strikes, solidarity

•'-Anderson, Politics and Economic Change in Latin America, p. 114, emphasis addecH

272

strikes, demonstrations, clashes, deaths, protest demon

strations --the tenure of the chief executive becomes in

creasingly uncertain.

Although the policy consequences of tentative

tenure is a highly speculative topic, it is logical that

they are negative. This negative influence is at least

two-fold. First, all decisions must be made within the

context nf potential deposition. This likely limits the

options available to the president. Second, tentative

tenure likely influences the policy levels and areas ad

dressed by the chief executive. Payne notes that the

president, acting as arbiter, becomes deeply involved in

Peruvian labor-management negotiations. That is, his

attention is consumed by tactical questions rather tha,n

general policy considerations.

This has important consequences for Latin America

because the social and economic evolution of the area is

linked to the performance of the state which is led by

the president. The extensive role of the state in economy

ic matters is widely acknowledged. Evidently, Latin

America's financial and economic relations with the

economically developed areas are perennially disadvanta

geous to the Latin Americans. Market mechanisms, allowed

2Payne, Politics and Labor in Peru, p, 163,

273

to operate freely, results in undevelopment., or, in the

severest of cases, virtual retrogression. Whether or

not this observation can be empirically verified is moot.

Latin American elites accept this thesis and the economic

role of the state will likely increase throughout the

continent. An effective state, able to implement poli

cies consistently and effectively, is crucial to the

overall evolution of the region.

Effective government in Latin Ame

nate from the presidency. Chapter 2 of

tails experiments with alternative execu

Monarchies and life consuls have not thr

mentary and collegial systems have been

over, cultural, historical, and institut

with formal-legal provisions are support

government.

Executive Recruitment and Power: Soldiers vs. Civilians

A striking aspect of executive re

America is the prominent role of the mil

history, the military has served as a ma

presidents. Students of Latin America h

capacity of the military to make use of

the single most organized institution pr

under consideration. The military as an

rica will ema- '

this study de-

tive systems.

ived. Parlia-

ineffectual. More-

ional factors along

ive of presidential

cruitment in Latin

itary. Throughout

ior fount of future

ave long noted the

its power as perhaps

esent in the societies

institution is in an

274

enviable position in Latin America. It can command obedi

ence through the threat and use of force as well as through

organizational competence. But the future impace of the

military in executive recruitment is unclear.

Trend analysis shows that the incidence of soldier-

presidents has increased sharply in the twenty-five year

period since 1945. Military presidents, however, occur

most frequently in environments characterized by illiter

acy and undifferentiated socio-economic systems. Cur

rently, a trend exists in Latin America toward higher

educational and literacy levels and greater social and

economic complexity. If the historical trend observed

since 1945 continues, the incidence of military presidents

will increase. If societal changes prevail as causal

variables, they will decrease with the socio-economic

development of the region.

Countervailing civilian political institutions

are another dimension of socio-economic differentiation.

Presumably, as persons organize on a socio-economic basis

political institutionalization also occurs. Chapter 4

shows that the presence of countervailing civilian in

stitutions, i.e., political parties, affects the influ

ence of the military in executive recruitment. Around

the turn of the century, such civilian organizations

lessened the significance of the military. Contrarily,

the emergence of more modern, mass-based parties since

275

1920 had no such impact, and may even have contributed to

the military's prominent role in recruitment.

This suggests that countervailing civilian in

stitutions, in and of themselves, do not have a direct

bearing upon the incidence of military presidents. An

alternative explanation focuses upon the values and poli

cies such institutions represent. Accordingly, the in

cidence of soldier-presidents would be more directly re

lated to matters of policy than organizational structure.

The political parties that existed in the later nineteenth

and early twentieth centuries were extremely elitist.

Programmatically, they were supportive of the existing

social structure. With the appearance of these parties,

Latin American militarism declined.

The political parties that emerged after World

War I were reform movements that sought to.incorporate

the masses into national political life and which rhetor

ically threatened to redistribute the wealth of the upper

classes among the masses. Typical of such movements were

the various Aprista parties, Mexico's PRI, and the Argen

tine Radicals. They were dominated largely by middle

sector elements. The emergence of these parties with

their threat to the status quo coincides with increasing

militarism. It seems likely, then, that during this peri

od the military intervened in response to the destabiliz

ing impact of mass political movements and their

276

programmatic implications. Hence, countervailing civilian

institutions relate to militarism, but the direction of

the relationship results from matters of policy. Indeed,

policy issues are the maior factor underlying the increas

ing incidence of soldier-presidents since 1945.

This seems a propitious era for the Latin Ameri

can military. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, a

rash of military governments took power. The United

States, a maior influence in Latin America, placed its

seal of approval on the military alternative in the

Rockefeller Report. But, more than anything else, the

alluring notion of a "modernizing military" provided a

much more impressive rationale for military rule than

those traditionally offered. Indeed, this modernizing

role is most likely crucial to the future impact of the

Latin American military upon executive recruitment.

No longer is military intervention seen as merely

a stop-gap measure to prepare the way for a return to

civilian government. As the contemporary Brazilian and

Peruvian cases most vividly point out, the military has

achieved a new level of competence in its understanding

of political, social, and economic problems. The phenom,-,-

ena of the "cientificos" of another era has been reborn

under the guise of a "modernizing military", -justifying

long term military rule as the path to social and economy

ic progress.

277

Over the short run, the military may well be an

effective modernizer, especially in commanding the econ

omy. On the other hand are the long term social and po

litical consequences certain to arise under conditions

of protracted military dominance of society. Military

governments face the very serious problem of legitimizing

the new order. The legitimacy of such regimes rest upon

a successful modernization program or, in a more ultimate

sense, the threat or use of armed force. These are very

shaky underpinnings for any regime. Modernization pro

grams are perceived chiefly in economic terms , and the

Latin American economies are notoriously volatile. In

deed, Latin America illustrates the fact that the paths

of development are not necessarily always toward growth

or linear in nature. Since the Wars of Independence, the

economies have fluctuated from periods of heady expansion

to periods of stagnation to periods of retrogression.

Sustained growth lias proven an elusive goal.

In the absence of strong economic performance,

the military applies force to reduce the possibility of

challenge to its regime and, in doing so, reduces com

munication and participation among the groups of society.

To further its own survival, military government follows

a calculated program of "militarizing" society. Such a

context is hardly propitious for modernization. Moderni

zation involves expanding the opportunity to participate.

278

While military regimes may well expand the opportunities

for economic participation, they greatly restrict the

opportunities for political participation. Socially,

military regimes seem to represent middle sector ele

ments. They have demonstrated little responsiveness to

the entire spectrum of class needs. The chances that the

military in Latin America will prove successful as a

modernizer are remote, at best. Over the long run,

modernization involves changing society by expanding the

opportunities for participation. Just as change is a

requisite for Latin America's modernization, so too is a

flexible social, economic, and political environment

necessary to promote conditions conducive to change.

It is likely, then, that the phenomenon of the

soldier-president will decline. The Latin American mili

taries will become less significant in executive recruit

ment. In Chapter IV, it was shown that the incidence of

military regimes relates to levels of social, economic,

and communications development. It is in precisely the

more developed socio-economic environments that civilians

flourish. Logically, successful modernizing military re

gimes sow the seeds of their own passing. Unsuccessful

regimes lack the political base for lengthy existence.

Over a protracted period, effective government,

even one committed to change and modernization, requires

levels of support that transcend the vagaries of the

279

economy. The notion of the military as a modernizer has

contributed to a surge of military presidence in the peri

od 1945-1970. But this should prove a transitional

phase. The key is political legitimacy which is precisely

what military regimes lack.

Executive Succession and Power

As noted above, Latin America lacks effective

government. The experience of the region seems to verify

Samuel Huntington's argument that a precondition of

socio-economic growth is effective government, and,

specifically, the building of effective nolitical insti-

tutions. Unfortunately, the most effective political

institution, in Latin America, the presidency, is akin to

a "revolving door." A maiority of all Latin American

presidents serve less than two years. Tncleed, 43% serve

terms of less than a single year. The whole of Latin

American history, however, indicates a gradual shifting

toward longer presidential terms. This is a very hope

ful sign.

At a minimum, effective government requires some

prospect for continuity in office. Without time to es

tablish control and "oress policy alternatives with con

sistency, government is largely immobilized and subsequently

^Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press" 1968) .

2 8 0

rendered ineffective. In Latin America, lengthier tenure

patterns are strongly related to non-coercive turnovers,

and particularly, to elections. Ironosiciones also relate

to longer tenures, but this is largely due to its use

during lengthy dictatorial regimes. Violencias, on the

other hand, are characterized by short tenures.

Fully 5 7% of all violencias end in tenures of

less than two years. By far, the greatest user of vio-

lencia is the military which accounts for 84% of all

violencias. Moreover, the incidence of soldier-presidents,

as seen in Chapter IV, is related to illiteracy and less

complex socio-economic environments. The finding here,

then, is that violencias result in short terms and occur

in environments that are socially and economically "under

developed." If such phenomena are related to absolute

levels of development, violencias should decrease in the

future. On the other hand, if they are "pathological" to

the area and their frequency is a relative matter, the

violencia is here to stay. If this is so, violencias

will continue as a maior mode of succession, and frequent

turnovers will, also, likely occur along with ineffective

government.

The fact that ijiyposicjones are related to length

ier tenures must not be misconstrued, Host long-term

dictators in Latin America have utilized the i mp o s i c ion

or one of its variants to clothe dictatorship in the

281

fabric of democracy. Pnrfirio Diaz, dictator of Mexico,

used the iirposicion seven times over a span of twenty-

five years. More recently, Alfredo Stroessner, dictator

of Paraguay since 1954 , has used the i nm o s i c i on five

times. Finally, the evidence in Chanter VII shows that

the imposicirin is related to low educational levels.

Presumably, with the large amount of government spending

now going into education in Latin America, the incidence

of the imposicion will decline.

The election is the efficacious succession mode

for the evolution and development of Latin America. It

is strongly related to longer tenure patterns. Chapter

V shows that elections tend to occur in precisely those

environments which Latin Americans are attempting to de

velop; i.e., environments that are socially and economi

cally developed with extensive communications networks.

Too, history seems supportive of the electoral process.

Throughout the nineteenth century, it remains a "token"

mode of succession, but in the twentieth century, its

use has increased markedly.

The evidence here supports Martin Needier's con

tention that Latin America suffers a "legitimacy gap."

According to Needier, democratic ideology is present in

Latin America, but historical circumstances around the

period of the IVars of Independence gave rise to authori

tarian ideologies which continue to compete with

282

democracy. As a result:

Stability on the basis of a nondemocratic official ideology is not possible. Attempts to achieve such stability are made from time to time but today they are bound to fail. Short of a totally democratic stability, there can only be either a state of permanent instability or an unstable state steadily modified in the direction of greater fidelity to democratic norms. It has been repeatedly made evident that politically conscious Latin Americans accept without question the norms of the complex of democratic public ideas, at least as_ norms /

The comparatively successful performance of elec

ted executives in terms of tenure supports the statement

that democratic elections are the most legitimate mode

of succession in Latin America. As democratic elections

are based upon a constellation of democratic norms, it

is likely that additional democratic tenets are prevalent

in Latin America. Democracy may well be the prevailing

Latin American ideology.

Unfortunately, it is difficult to systematically

explore the question of ideology in Latin America and the

place of electoral democracy in the hierarchy of values.

Consider, however, Teodoro Petkoff's analysis of the

]963 Venezuelan elections. Petkoff, a Marxist who was

a member of the Venezuelan Communist Party until 1971

and who fought as a guerrilla against the Betancourt and

^Martin Needier, Political Development in Latin America (New York: Random House, 196 8), p~ 2 7.

283

Leoni governments, argues:

The 1963 elections took place in the period when the armed struggle reached its climax and, nevertheless, the electoral process became the most important political phenomenon in the country, absorbing the interest and passion of the masses. We did not understand that under the conditions of the time, in a country shaken by the armed struggle, with a democracy still unstable, with the army restless, these elections could have aggravated the contradictions in Venezuelan society and our movement could have emerged much stronger by participating in them.0

More evidence is needed, but the tentative conclu

sion here is that electoral democracy is very salient to

the evolution of Latin America. In practical terms,

this means that effective government is related to the

electoral process. In recent years, formal-legal mecha

nisms, and elections in particular, have been treated as

"irrelevancies" in the literature on Third World countries.

The thrust of this literature has maintained that democ

racy is fine where economic abundance and a modicum of

social welfare are present, but that such political nice

ties are irrelevant where masses of people live in econom

ic want and soci

literature focus

leading the unwa

abundance. Curr

^Norman G the Professional Field Staff Repo

al despair. This same developmental

es upon the utility of a tutelary elite

shed toward the cornucopia of economic

ently, it is widely argued that the

all, "Teodoro Petkoff: The Crisis of Revolutionary," (American Universities

rt, August, 1973), p. 4.

284

institution of the military possesses characteristics

which make it efficacious for undertaking iust such a

tutelary role. The findings here contradict such a view.

Effective government in an institutional sense requires

some consideration of prevailing political values. In

Latin America, elections seem to make a difference. In

the long run, they may well be the most utilitarian in

strument for establishing effective government and address

ing social and economic problems.

APPENDIX I

PRESIDENT: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

aThe occupations are designated by the following: a = author, b = businessman, e = educator, g = government official, h = landowner, i = engineer, i = iournalist, 1 = lawyer, m = military, mi = military insurgent, p = physician, pm = public man, uk = unknown, x = clergyman, and z = architect.

^The class is designated by the following: u = upper class, m = middle class, and 1 = lower class,

cThe education is designated by the following: c = college graduate, ct = tutorial education (equivalent to college), ca = attended college, cu = some formal education but level unknown, s = secondary education, p = primary education, mc = military college, u = no formal education, and uk = unknown.

Argentina

Age Occu.a Class^ Ed. ° Birthplace

Mitre, Bartolome 40 m/i/a/pm u mc Buenos Aires Paz, Marcos 52 l/pm uk c Tucuman, Tucuman Sarmiento,

Domingo F. 57 e/a/j/pm m s San Juan,Cordoba Avellaneda, 37 m u c Tucuman, Tucuman

Nicolas Roca, Julio

Argentine 37 m u s Tucuman, Tucuman Juarez Celman, 42 l/pm u c Cordoba, Corboda

Miguel Pellegrini , 44 l/pm u c Buenos Aires

Carlos Pena, Luis Saenz 70 l/pm u c Buenos Aires Uriburu, Jose 63 1/pm/gd u c Salta, Salta

Evaristo Quintana, Manuel 68 l/pm uk c Buenos Aires Figueroa Alcorta 45 l/pm u c Cordoba, Cordoba

Jose Saenz Pena, Roque 59 1/gd u c Buenos Aires de la Plaza, 73 1/g uk c Salta, Salta

Victorino Irigoyen, 66 m u mc Buenos Aires

Hipolito

285

286

Argentina--Continued

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Torcuato, Marcelo 54 1 /pm u c Buenos Aires Uruburi, Jose F. 62 m u 111C Salta, Salta Justo, Agustin P. 55 m uk mcc Concepcion de

Uruguay, Entre Rios

Ortiz, Roberto M. 51 1/b/pm uk c Buenos Aires Castillo, Ramon S. 69 g.i/e uk c Catamarca, Raws on, Arturo 58 m uk mc Santiago del

Es tero, Santiago del Estero

Ramirez, Pedro P. 59 m m mc LaPaz, Entre Rios

Farrell, Eldemiro 57 m uk mc Avellaneda, B. A.

Peron, Juan Domingo 50 m m mc Lobos , Buenos Aries

Lonardi , Eduardo 59 m m m.c uk Aramburu, Pedro 52 m uk mc Rio Cuarto,

Cordoba Frondizi, Arturo 49 1/e/pm m c Paso de los 1/e/pm

Libres , Corrientes

Guido, Jose Maria 51 1/pm uk c uk Illia, Arturo 63 p/pm m c Pergamino, B.. Ongania, Juan Carlos 52 m m mc Marcos Paz,

B. A. Levingston, Roberto 50 m m mc uk

M.

287

Bolivia


Bolivar, Simon 42 mi u ct Caracas, Venezuela

de Sucre, Antonio 30 m u s Cumana, Jose Vene zuela

de Urdininea, Jose"' 44 uk uk uk LaPaz M. Perez

de Velasco, Jose'' 33 m uk uk Santa Cruz, Miguel Santa Cruz

Blanco, Pedro 33 uk uk uk Cochabamb a, Cochabamba

Santa Cruz, Andre's 35 m u s Huarina, LaPaz Serrano, Jose" 51 uk uk uk Sucre,

Mariano Chuquisaca Ballivian, Jose 37 mi u - ca LaPaz Guillarte, Eusebio 48 m uk uk LaPa z Belzu, Manuel Isidoro 39 m 1 P LaPaz Cordova, Jorge 33 m uk uk LaPaz Linares , Jose" Maria 47 1/gd u c Potosi, Potosi de Acha, Jose" Maria 51 m uk uk Cochabamba,

Cochabamba Melgarejo, Mariano 44 m 1 n Tarata ,

Cochabamba Frias, Tomas 68 pm/g uk c Potosf, Potosi Morales , Agustin 63 m uk uk LaPaz Ballivian, Adolfo 41 m u mc LaPaz Daza, Hilaron 36 m 1 P Sucre,

Chuquisaca Campero, Narciso 67 m u c Toio, Tarija Pacheco, Gregorio 61 b m uk Potosi, Potosi Area, Aniceto 64 b m uk Tariia, Tarija Baptista, Mariano 60 b/pm uk c Cochabamba,

Cochabamba Fernaxtdez Alonso, 47 1/gd m c Sucre,

Servo Chuquisaca Reyes Ortiz, Serapio 76 pm uk uk LaPaz Pando, Jose" Manuel 50 m uk uk Araca, LaPaz Montes, Ismael 42 m/l/g m c LaPaz Villazon, Eliodoro 61 1/pm uk c Sacaba, 1/pm

Cochabamba Gutierrez Guerra, 47 b u - ca Sucre,

Jose" Chuquis aca Saavedre, Bautista 49 1/e/pm uk c LaPaz Guzman, Felipe 46 e uk uk LaPaz Siles , Hernando 44 1/e/gd u c Sucre, Siles , Hernando 1/e/gd

Chuquisaca Blanco Galindo, 48 m uk uk Cochabamba,

Carlos Cochabamba

288

Bolivia--Continued

Age Occu. C] ass Ed. Birthplace

Salamanca, Daniel 68 e/pm u c Cochabamba, e/pm Cochabamba

Teiada Sorzano, Jose 52 b m c LaPaz Toro Ruilova, David 37 m m mc Sucre,

Chuquisaca Busch, German 33 m m mc San Javiar de

Chiquitos , Santa Cruz

Quintanilla, Carlos 51 m uk mc Cochabamba, Cochabamba

Penaranda, Enrique 47 m 1 mc Sorata, LaPaz Villarroel, Gualberto 34 m uk mc Villa Rivero, Villarroel, Gualberto

Cochabamba Arenas , Damaso uk m uk uk uk Guillen, Nestor 56 1/gi/pm uk c. uk Monje Gutierrez, 61 1/gi/pm uk c Coroico

Tomas Hertzog, Jose Enrique 49 p/e/pm u c LaPaz Urriolagoitia, 54 g/pm/gd u c Sucre ,

Mamerto Chuquisaca Ballivian, Hugo 50 m uk uk LaPaz Siles Zuazo, Hernan 42 1/pm u c LaPaz Paz Estenssoro, 44 1/e/pm m c Tariia, Tarija

Victor Barrientos Ortuno, 44 m m • mc Tarata,

Rene" Cochabamba Siles Salines, Luis 44 1/e u c LaPaz Ovando Candia, 51 m uk mc Cobij a

Alfredo ^ Torres , Juan Jose"' 49 m 1 mc Cochabamba,

Cochabamba

Brazil

289


Dom Pedro I 24 uk u ct Lisbon, Portugal Dom Pedro 11 16 uk u ct Rio de Janeiro Foriseca, M. 62 m m mc Alagoas, Alagoas

Deodoro da Peixoto, Floriano 52 m m mc hacienda near

Maceio Morais, Prudente de 53 1/pm u c Itu , Sao Paulo Campos Salles, 57 1/prn uk c Campinas,

Manuel de Sao Paulo Rodrigues Alves, 54 1/pm/g u c Guaratingueta,

Francisco Sao Paulo Penna, Alfonso 59 1/pm/j u c uk Pecanha, Nilo 42 1/pm m s Rio de Janeiro Fonseca, Hermes da 55 m uk uk uk /

Braz, Wenceslau 46 pm uk c Itajuba, Minas Gerais

Moreira, Delphim 50 1 m c uk Silva Pessoa, 54 1/pm/gi uk c uk

Epitacio da Silva Bernardes, 47 1/pm m c Vicosa, Minas

Arturo 1/pm

Gerais Luis, Washington 50 1/pm m c Rio de Janeiro Vargas, Getulio 47 1/pm u c Sao Boria,

Rio Grande do Sul

Linhares 59 1/gi uk c Baturite, Ceara Dutra, Eurico 60 m m mc Guiaba, Mato

Gaspar Grosso Cafe Filho, Joao 55 i /pm m P Natal, Rio Grande

do Norte Luz, Carlos 59 h/pin u uk Tres Corac'oes , h/pin

Minas Gerais Ramos, Nereu 67 1/pm uk c Lagos, Santa

Catarina Kubitschek, 53 p/pm m c Diamantina,

Juscelino p/pm

Minas Gerais Quadros, Janio 44 e/pm m c Campo Grande,

Mato Grosso Mazzilli, Raniere 51 g/pm m c Caconde , S3o Paulo Goulart, Joao 43 h/pm u c Sao Borja, Rio

Grande do Sul Castello Branco, 64 m m mc Fortaleza, Ceara

Humberto Taquari, Rio Costa e Silva, 64 m m mc Taquari, Rio

Arthur da Grande do Sul Garrastazu Meclici, 63 m m mc uk

Emi1io

Chile 290

Ape Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

0'Higgins , 38 mi' u - ca Chilian, Nuble Bernardo

Freire Serrano, 37 m uk mc Santi ago Ramon

Blanco Encalada, 36 m uk mc Buenos Aires, Manuel Argentina

Eyzaguirre, Agustin 58 b/pm u uk Santiago Pinto Diaz, 52 1/pm/e u c Santi ago

Francis co VicuHa Larrain, 51 pm uk uk Santiago

Francis co Errazuri z, 54 pm u uk Santiago

Fernando de Ruiz Tagle , uk b/pm u uk uk

Francisco Ovalle, Jose' Tomas 42 1 uk uk Santiago Prieto Vial, 44 m uk uk Concepcion,

Joaquin Concepcion Bulnes Prieto, 41 m uk P Concepcion,

Manuel Concepcion Montt Torres, 41 e/l/g/pm m c Pe torca,

Manuel Aconcagua Pe'rez Mascayano, 60 gd/pm u c Santiago

Jose" Errazuriz Zanartu, 46 1/e/g/pm u c Santiago

Federico Pinto Garmendia, 51 e/g/pm u c Santiago

An lb a 1 Santa Maria G., 56 e/g/pm u c Santiago

Domingo Balmaceda, Jose'' 46 .i/g/pm u s Santiago

Manuel Baquedano Gonzales, 65 m uk uk Santiago

Manue1 Montt Alvarez, 45 m m mc Cas ablanca,

Jorge Valparaiso Errazuriz, Federico 46 h/pm u c Santiago Fernandez Albano, 55 1/g uk c Santiago

El ias Zanartu Zanartu, 54 1/pm uk c Concepcion,

Anibal Concepcion Riesco Errazuriz, 47 1/g i/pm u c Rancagua,

German 0'Higgins Montt Montt, Pedro 60 1/g/pm u c Santiago Figueroa Larrain, 44 1/gd/pm uk c Santiago

Emi1i ano Barros Luco, Ramon 75 1/g/pm uk c Santiago

291

Chile- - Continued

Sanfuentes, Juan Luis

Alessandri, Arturo

Altamirano Talavera Luis

Bello Codesido, Emilio

Barros Borgono, Luis

Ibaffez del Campo, Carlos

Opaso Letelier, Pedro

Montero Rodriquez, Juan

Trucco Franzani, Manuel

Puga Vega, Arturo Grove Valleio,

Marmaduke Davila Espinosa,

Carlos Blanche Espejo,

Bartoloine Ovanedel Urrutia,

Abraham Aguirre Cerda,

Pedro Mendez Arancibia,

Jeronimo Rios Morales, Juan

Antonio Duhalde Vazquez,

Alfredo Iribarren Cabezas,

Juan Gonzales Videla,

Gabrie1 Alessandri, Jorge Frei Montalva,

Eduardo Allende, Salvador

Age Occu. Class

56 1/b/g/pm u

52 1/g/pm m

uk m m

55 1/pm u

69 1/g u

49 m/pm m

55 b/h/g/pm u

52 1/e/pm uk

57 i/e/gd/pm m

uk m m 53 m m

45 j/fid m

53 m m

58 1/gi uk

59 1/e/pm u

57 p/pm uk

53 1/pm uk

47 h/pm u

62 e/g m

47 1/gd/pm m

62 i/b m 53 1/e/a/pm m

62 p/pm m

Ed. Birthplace

c Santiago

c Linares, Linares

uk uk

c Santiago

c Santiago

mc Linares, Linares

c Talca, Talca

c Santiago

c Cauquenas, Maule

uk uk mc Copiapo,

Atacama c Los Angeles,

Bio Bio mc La Serena,

Coquimbo c Copiapo,

Atacama c Los Andes,

Aconcagua c uk

c Canete, Arauco

c Rio Bueno, Valdavia

c Vicuna, Coquimbo

c La Serena, Coquimbo

c Santiago c Santiago

c Valparaiso, Valparaiso

Bolivar, Simdn

Santander, Francisco de P.

Caicedo, Domingo Mosquera, Joaquin Urdaneta, Rafael

Obando, Jose" Maria Marquez, Jose"

Ignacio de Alcantara Herran,

Pedro Dios Aranzazu,

Juan de Mosquera, Tomans

Cipriano de Cuervo, Rufino Lo'pez, Jose'' Hilario Melo, Jose" Maria

Herrera, Tomas Obaldia, Jose" de Mallarino, Manuel

Maria Ospina Rodriquez,

Mariano Calvo, Bartolome

Largacha, Froila'n Uricoechea, Juan

Agustin Murillo Toro, Manuel Riascos, Joaquin Acosta, Santos

Gutierrez, Santos

Camacho Roldan, Salvador

Salgar, Eustorgio Perez, Santiago

Parra, Aquileo

Truiillo, Julia"n Ramirez, Manuel

Mar fa

292

Colombia

Age Occu. Class Ed.. Birthplace

36 mi u ct Caracas, Venezuela

30 mi u s Rosario de Cucuta, Norte de Santander

46 mi/pm u c Bogota 42 mi/1/e/a u c Popayan, Cauca 41 m 1 s Maracaibo,

Venezuela 35 m 1 s Guengue, Cauca 38 1/gj/pm u c Ramiriqui, Boyaca

40 mi/pm u P Bogota''

43 1/i/pm u c LaCeia, Antioquia

46 m/pm u p Popayan, Cauca

46 g/gd/j u c Tunia, Boyaca 51 mi/pm 1 p Popayan, Cauca 53 mi m uk Chaparrel,

Tolima 53 mi/pm 1 uk Panama" City 45 1/pm u c Panama City 46 1/e/g/pm u c Cali, Valle

51 1/j/pm u c Guasca, Cundinamarca

45 1/a/g uk c Cartagena, Bolivar

39 e/i/gi uk c Popayan, Cauca 39 1/gi u c Bogota'

41 1/pm uk c Agrado, Huila 33 m/pm uk uk Chorrera, Panama 38 p/mi/pm uk c Miraflores ,

Boyaca 47 1/mi/pm uk c El Cocuv , 1/mi/pm

Boyaca 41 1/i/e/pm u c Nunchia, Boyaca"

38 l/g/pm uk c Bogota 43 l/.i/g.i uk c Zipaquira, l/.i/g.i

Cundinamarca 49 b/pm 1 s Barichara, b/pm

Santander 50 1/mi uk c Popayan, Cauca 60 1/e/pm m c Llaneros,

Santander Norte

293

Colombia--Continued

A^e Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Camargo, Sergio 43 1/pd/mi ulc c Iza, Boyaca" Nunez, Rafael 54 1/h/mi/pm u c Cartagena,

Bolivar Zaldua, Francisco 70 1/gi/pm u c Bogota"

Javier Calderon, Climaco 30 e/j / g.i /h/pm uk c Santa Rosa de e/j / g.i /h/pm

Vi terbo, Boyaca

Otalora, Jose' 54 e/g/mi/pm u c Fomeque, Euseb io

e/g/mi/pm Cundinamarca

Hurtado, Ezequiel 58 1/mi/pm m c Silvia, Cauca Campo Serrano, Jose" 54 g/mi/nm u s Santa Marta,

Mar fa Magdalena Pay an, Eliseo 61 1/g/mi uk c Buga, Valle Holguin, Carlos 56 1/gd/i/a/pm u c Novita, Choco Caro, Miguel Antonio 48 e/i/a/pm m c Bogota" Quintero, Guillermo 64 mi/pm uk s Gamarra, mi/pm

Magdalena Marroquin, Jose" 71 h/a/pm u ca Bogota"

Manuel Sanclemente, 84 1/gi/pm u c Buga, Valle

Manuel A. Reyes, Rafael 54 b/a/ini/pm m s Santa Rosa de b/a/ini/pm

Viterbo, BoyacEf

Angulo, Euclides de 66 mi/pm u ca Popayan, Cauca Holguin, Jorge 60 i/b/pm m s Cali, Valle Gonzalez Valencia, 58 m uk c Chitaga,

Ramo"n Santander Restrepo, Carlos E. 42 j/a/pm u ca Medellfn, j/a/pm

Antioquia Concha, Jose" Vincente 47 1/i/gd/pm u c Bogota" Suarez, Marco Fidel 63 a/pm 1 ca Bello,

Antioquia Nel Ospina, Pedro 63 m/gd/pm u ca Bogota'' Abadia Mendez, Miguel 58 1/pm u c Piedras,

Tolima Olaya Herrera, 50 1/i/gd/pm m c Guateque,

Enrique Boyaca'' Lopez Pumarejo, 48 i/b/a/pm u ca Honda, Tolima

A1fonso i/b/a/pm

Santos , Eduardo 49 j/a/pm u c Bogota" Echandia, Dario 46 1/pm u c Chaparral,

Tolima Lozano y Lozano, 38 1/gd/pm u c Fusagasuga",

Carlos Cundinamarca Lleras Camargo, 39 i/g/pm m ca Bogota'

Alberto

294

Colombia--Continued

Age Occu. Clas s Ed. Birthplace

Ospina Pe~rez, 54 e/i/pm u c Medellin, Mariano Antioquia

Gomez, Laureano 61 i/a/pm u c Bogota'' Urdaneta, Roberto 61 1/g/pm u c Bogota'* Roias Pinilla, 53 m m mcc Tunja, Boyaca

Gustavo Parf*s , Gabriel 45 m m mc Ibague, Tolima Leon Valencia, 57 pm u ca Popayan, Cauca

Guillermo Lleras Restrepo, 58 b/j/pm m uk Bogota

Carlos Pastrana Borrero, 46 1/pm u c Neiva, Huila

Misael

295

Costa Rica

Mora Fernandez, Juan

Gallegos, Jose' Rafael de

Gutierrez L. , Agustfn

Lara Arias, Juan Jose'

Fernandez Chacon, Manuel

Carrillo Colima, Braulio

Mora Fernandez, Joaquin

Aguilar Chaco'n, Manuel

Bonilla Nava, Manuel

Morazan, Francisco

Age

40

48

uk

uk

uk

35

uk

39

36

50

62

43

Pinto Suarez, Antonio.

Alfaro Zamora, Jose'' Maria

Oreamuno, Francisco 43 Moya Murillo, 44

Raf ae1

Occu.

b/pm

e/h/pm

1/pm

uk

h/pm

g/pm

uk

1/g/pm

pm

mi

m

uk

g/pm pm

Class Ed.

u

u

uk

uk

u

u

u

uk

uk

m

uk

uk

u uk

• ca

s

c

uk

uk

• ca

uk

c

uk

s

uk

uk

ct uk

Birthplace

San Jose''

Cartago

uk

Ala j uela

Cartago

Cartago

San Jose

San Jose

uk

Tegucigalpa, Honduras

Oporto, Portugal

Alajuela

Cartago San Antonio_

de Bele"n, Heredia

Castro Madriz, 29 g/pm m c San Jose"' Jose' M.

g/pm

Carazo, Manuel J. 40 pm uk uk Cartago Mora Porras, Miguel 33 uk uk uk San Jose'' Mora Porras, Juan 35 b uk uk San Jose"'

Rafael Escalante Nava, uk m uk uk Cartago

Rafael Montealegre, 44 P u c San Jose"

Jose'" Maria Jime'nez Zamora, 39 p/pm u c Cartago

Jesus Figueron Oreamuno, 42 1/e/pm u c Cartago

Euseb io Carranza Ramirez, 47 1/e/i/pm uk c San Jose'

Bruno Uuardia Gutierrez, 37 m uk uk Bagaces,

Tomas Guam

296

Costa Rica--Continued


Pinto Castro, uk 1/gj/pm uk c San Jose" Jose A.

Gonzales Ramirez, 42 uk uk uk uk Salvador

Barroeta Baca, 60 b u s Cartago Rafae1

Lizano Gutierrez, 45 e/pm uk uk Heredia Joaquin

Esquivel Saenz, 52 1/pm uk c Cartago Aniceto

Herrera Zeledon, 55 e/pm uk c San Jose Vicente

Lara Zamora, 41 pm uk uk uk Salvador

pm

Lizano Gutierrez, 55 pm uk uk uk Saturnino

Fernandez 0., 47 m uk - ca San Jose Prospero

Soto Alfaro, 31 1/pm m c San Jose Bernardo

Soto Quesada, 59 m/h/b/pm m uk Alajuela Apo1inar /

Duran Cartin, 36 p/pm u c San Jose Carlos

Rodriquez , Jose 52 1/pm uk c San Jose Joaquin

Iglesias Castro, 33 pm uk uk San Jose Rafael

pm

Iglesias Llorente, uk 1 uk c uk Demetrio

Esquivel Ibarra, 41 1/pm uk c Rivas, As cens ion Nicaragua

Gonzales Viquez, 48 1/g/pm uk c Barba, Heredia Cleto

Jime"nez Oreamuno, 51 1/h/pm u c Cartago Ricardo

Gonzales Flores, 36 1/b uk c Heredia A1fredo

Tinoco Granados, 46 m uk uk San Jose Federico

Quiros, Juan 66 m uk uk San Juan de Bautista Tibas , San

Jose' Aguilar Barquero, 62 1/pm uk c Cartago

Francisco Acosta Garcia, 47 g/pm uk uk San Ramon,

Julio Alaiuela


Age

Corte's Castro, 53 Leon

Caldero"n Cuardia, 40 Rafael

Calderon Guardia, 35 Francisco

CaldercSn Munoz, 73 Rafael

Mine Saborio, 64 Jorge

Picado Michalski, 44 Teodoro

Picado Michalski, 42 Rene''

Herrera, Santos 73 Leon

Figuere's , Jose 41

Ulate Blanco, 58 Otilio

Echandi Jimenez, 42 Mario

Orlich, Francisco 55 J.

Treios Fernandez, 50 Jose""

Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

1/e/pm m c Alaiuela

p/pm m c San Jose

b/pm m uk San Jose'

P m c San Jose'

b uk uk San Jose'

1/e/pm m c San Jos^

uk m uk San Jose'

i/e/pm m c San Jose

h/b/pm m -ca San Ramon, h/b/pm Alaiuela

j/pm uk s Ala juela

1/pm u c San Jose'

b/pm u -ca San Ramdn, b/pm Alajuela

e uk c San Jose"

298

Cub a


Estrada Palma, 67 1/pm m c Bayamo, Oriente Tomas

Gomez, Jose Miguel 50 mi u s Sancti Spiritus, Gomez, Jose Miguel Santa Clara

Menocal, Mario G. 46 mi/i u c Hanabana, Matanzas Zayas v Alfonso, 60 mi/l/g m c Havana

Alfredo Machado Morales, 54 mi/b m s uk

Gerardo Cespedes , Carlos 62 gd/a/mi u c New York, New York

Manuel de San Martin, Ramo'n 45 p/pm m c Pinar del Rio

Grau Hevia, Carlos 33 i/b/mi/pm m c Havana Marquez Sterling, 62 i/gd/a u -ca Lima, Peru

Manuel Mendieta Montefur, 60 mi/p/pm m c San Antonia de

Carlos mi/p/pm

las Vuelt.as Barnet y Vinageras , 71 gd m c Barcelona, Spain

Jose'' A. Gomez, Miguel 46 1/pm u c Sancti Spiritus,

Manuel Santa Clara Laredo Bru, 61 1/g/mi m c Remedios, Las

Federico 1/g/mi

Villas Batista, Fulgencio 39 m/pm 1 s Banes, Oriente Prio Socarras , 45 l/j/pm m c Bahia Honda,

Carlos l/j/pm

Pinar del Rio Castro, Fidel 31 1/pm/mi m c Mayari, Oriente

299

Doininican Republic

Santana, Pedro Jimenez, Manuel Baez, Buenaventura Regla Mota, Manuel

de Valverde, Jose

Des iderio Pimentel, Pedro

Antonio

Cabral, Jose'' Maria Gonzales, Ignacio

Mar 1 a Espaillat, Ulises

F. Guilermo, Cesareo Luperon, Gregorio

Merino, Fernando A. de

Ileureaux, Ulises

Billini, Francisco G.

Woss y Gil, Alejandro

Figuereo, Wencesla( Vasquez, Horacio Jime"nez, Juan

Is idro Morales, Carlos F.

Caceres, Ramon Victoria, Eladio Nouel , Adolfo A. Bordas , Jose Baez , Ramon llenriques , Francisco56 Burgos, Vicini Estrella, Urena

Rafael Truiillo, Rafael

Leonidas Peynado, Jacinto

B. Troncoso, Manuel


42 m uk - cu Hincha. 37 m m - cu uk ^ 39 pm/g m - cu Azua, Azua uk m uk uk uk

uk uk uk uk uk

51 mi m - cu Las Matas de Santa Cruz, Monte Cristi

48 mi uk - cu Santo Domingo 34 m ) uk uk uk

53 i/a/pm uk uk Santiago

31 m m - cu Ilato Mayor 37 mi 1 p Puerto Plata,

P.P. 47 X uk c Antonci, Distrito

Nacional 36 mi 1 p Puerto Plata, p

P.P. 40 m i / j / a uk - cu Santo Domingo

uk mi/pm m s Santa Cruz de mi/pm Seibo

i uk m uk uk uk 39 m m uk uk 53 h/b u uk uk

36 m uk uk Puerto Plata, P.P.

39 mi uk -cu Moca, Espaillat uk pm

X uk uk uk

50 pm X uk c . uk

uk m uk uk uk uk p/e/pm u c uk

:o 56 P uk c uk uk b u uk uk 41 1/e/pm m ca Santiago

38 m 1 P San Cristobal

60 1/pm uk c uk

61 1/e/g uk c Santo Domingo

300

Dominican Republic--Continued


Truiillo, Hector 42 m 1 ca. San Cristobal Balaguer, Joaquin 52 gd/e/a m c Villa Bisono,

Santiago Bonnelly, Rafael 58 1/e/pm uk c Santiago de los Bonnelly, Rafael 1/e/pm

Caballeros Bosch, Juan 53 a/pm m ca La Vega Reid Cabral, Donald 41 b m uk Santo Domingo Imbert Barrera, 44 b u s uk

Antonio Garcia Godov, 44 gd/b u c Moca, Espaillat

Hector

301

Ecuador


Flores , Juan Jose' 30 m 1 n Puerto Cabello Venezuela

Bolivar, Simon 47 mi u ct Caracas, Venezuela

Valdivisso, Felix uk uk uk uk uk Rocafuerte, 51 e/a/pm u c Guayaquil

Vicente Roca, Vicente 53 pm u ct Guayaqui1 Ascazubi, Manuel de 45 m u uk Quito Noboa, Diego 61 pm uk s Quayaquil Urvina, Jose Maria 40 m u mc Ouito Elizalde, Antonio uk m uk uk uk Robles , Francisco 45 m uk mc Guayaquil Franco, Guillermo uk m uk uk uk Garcia Moreno, 38 1/e/pm u -ca Guayaquil

Gabriel Havier Leon, uk l/pm uk c uk

Francisco Carrio"n, Jero'nimo 61 pm uk uk Lo j a Arteta, Pedro 70 1/e/pm uk c Quito

Jose" de Espinosa, Javier 53 l/pm u c Quito Borrero, Antonio 55 1/pm u c Cuenca Veintemilla, 46 m m mc Cuenca

Ignacio de Placido Caamano, 46 m/l/pm u c Guayaquil

Jose Flores Jijon, 55 1/gd m c Qui to

Antonio Cordero, Luis 59 l/pm u c Cuenca Salazar, Vicente 62 l/pm uk c Quito

Lucio Alfaro, Eloy 53 mi/pm m s Montecristi, Alfaro, Eloy mi/pm

Manab i Plaza Gutierrez, 37 mi m uk Charapoto,

Leonidas Manabi Garcia, Lizardo 63 b u s Guayaquil Estrada, Emilio uk b/pm u s Quito Freile Zaldumbide, uk h uk uk uk

Carlos Andrade Marin, uk l/pm uk c uk

Francisco Baquerizo Moreno, 56 1/a/pm u c Guayaquil

Alfredo Tamayo, Jose Luis 61 l/pm uk c Guayaquil Cordova, Gonzalo S. 61 1/gd/pm m c Cuenca Ayora, Isidro 46 p/e/pm 1 c Lo i a

302

Ecuador--Continued

Larrea Alba, Luis Guerrero Martinez,

Alberto Martinez, Juan de

Dios Montalvo, Abelardo Velasco Ibarra,

Jose' Maria Pons, Antonio Paez, Federico Gallo, Alberto

Enriquez Borrero, Manuel

Maria Mosquera Narvaez,

Aurelio Arroyo del Rio,

Carlos Cordova, Andres F, Moreno, Julio E. Mancheno Caj.as ,

Carlos Suarez Veintemilla,

Mariano Arosemena Tola,

Carlos Julio Plaza Lasso, Galo Ponce Enriquez,

Camilo Castro Jijon, Ramon Arosemena Monroy,

Carlos Julio Yerovi Indaburu,

Clemente Arosemena Gomez,

Otto

Age Occu, Class

35 m u uk 1/pm uk

57 1/pm uk

uk 1/pm m 41 1/e/pm u

uk P u 58 i/e/pm u 43 m u

uk 1/pm u

54 p/e/pm u

46 1/e/pm u

41 1/pm m 51 1/pm uk 45 m u

50 j/1/pm m

53 b/pm u

42 h/gd u 44 h/l/pm u

47 m m 42 1/pm u

63 h/b/gd u

41 b/pm u

Ed. Birthplace

mc Guayaquil c Guayaquil

-ca Guayaquil

c uk c Quito

c uk c Quito

mc Tanicuchi, Leon

c Cuenca

c Quito

c Guayaquil

c Canar -ca Quito mc Riobamba

c Otavalo, Imbabura

c Guayaquil

c Quito c Quito

mc Esmeraldas c Guayaquil

s Barcelona, Spain

c Guayaquil

30

El Salvador

Age Occu. Clas s Ed. Birthplace

Barriere, Pedro ulc 1 uk : c Delgado, Matias 54 X uk c San Salvador Rodriquez, Juan M. uk uk uk uk uk Villacorta, Juan 61 b m s Zacatecoluca

Vicente Cornejo, Jose Maria ulc uk uk uk uk Morazan, Francisco 46 mi m s Tegucigalpa,

Honduras San Martin y uk uk uk uk uk

Ulloa, Joaquin Salazar, Carlos uk m uk uk uk Prado, Mariano uk pm uk c uk Salazar, Gregorio 41 uk uk uk uk Escalon, Joaquin uk uk uk uk uk Silva, Jose" Maria uk uk uk ulc uk Herrera, Dionisio S3 1/e/g/pm u c Choluteca, 1/e/g/pm

Honduras Espinosa, Nicolas uk uk uk uk uk Gomez, Francisco uk uk uk uk ulc Vigil, Diego 36 uk uk uk uk Menendez, Timoteo uk uk uk uk uk Canas, Antonio J. uk uk uk uk uk Morazah, Francisco uk uk uk uk uk Ramirez, Norberto uk 1 uk c uk Lindo y Zelaya, 51 g m c Tegucigalpa,

Juan Honduras Arce, Pedro uk uk uk uk uk Marin, Escolastico uk uk uk uk uk Guzman, Juan Jose"' uk pm uk c uk Villacorta, uk uk uk ulc uk

Dionis io Malespfn, Francisco uk m uk uk uk Guzman, Joaquin uk m uk uk uk

Eufras io Palacios , Fermm uk pm uk uk uk Aguilar, Eugenio uk P uk c uk Medina, Tomas uk uk uk uk uk Vasconcelos, uk ulc uk uk ulc

Doroteo Rodriquez, Ramon uk uk uk uk uk Duenas, Francisco uk 1/pm uk c uk Quiroz, J, Felix uk 1/pm uk c uk San Martin, Jose" uk uk uk uk uk

Maria Campo, Rafael 42 b uk s Sonsonate

304

El Salvador--Continued

Age Occu, Class Ed. Birthplace

Gomez, Vicente uk uk uk uk uk Hernandez, Mariano uk uk uk uk uk Zededa, Lorenzo uk uk uk uk uk Santin, Miguel uk uk uk uk uk Barrios, Gerardo 49 m uk uk uk Peralta, Jose' Maria uk uk uk uk uk Gonzales, Santiago uk m uk uk uk Mendez, Manuel uk uk uk uk uk Valle, Andres uk pm uk uk uk Zaldivar, Rafael 41 p/pm u c San Alejo, La p/pm

Union Guirola, Angel uk 1/pm uk c uk Figueroa, Fernando 35 m uk uk uk Rosales , Jose'' uk uk uk uk uk Menendez, Francisco uk m uk uk uk Ezeta, Carlos 35 M uk uk uk Gutierrez, Rafael

A 45 M uk uk uk

A • Regalado, Tomas 34 m uk uk uk Escalon, Pedro Jose'" ' 42 mi/pm uk uk uk Araujo, Manuel 45 p/h/pm u c Juayua

Enrique Juayua

Melendez, Carlos 51 h/pm u s San Salvador Quinonez Molina, 41 p/h/e/pm u c Suchitoto

Alfonso p/h/e/pm

Melendez, Jorge 47 h/pm u s San Salvador Romero Bosque, Pio 35 1/gj/pm uk c Zacatecoluca, 1/gj/pm

LaPaz Araujo, Arturo uk i/h/pm u c Suchitoto Hernandez 49 m/pm m mcc San Salvador

Martinez, M. m/pm

Menendez, Andre's 46 m m s Santa Ana, Ignacio Santa Ana

Aguirre Salines, uk m/g uk uk uk Osmin

Castaneda Castro, 56 m/g uk mc Cojutepeque, Salvador Cuscatlan

Cordova, Manuel uk m uk uk uk de J

Osorio, Oscar 37 m 1 mc Sonsonate Bolanos, Oscar uk m uk uk uk Lemus, Jesus Maria 45 m uk mc Puerto Oriental

La Union Rodolfo Cordo'n, uk m uk uk uk

Eusebio

305


Age Occu. Class Ed. ' Birthplace

Rivera Carballo, 41 m uk mc Zacatecoluca, Julio A. LaPaz

Sanchez Hernandez, 49 m uk mc El Divisadero, Fidel Morazan

306

Guatemala


Rivera Paz, Mariano 34 pm uk uk uk Gainza, Gabino 53 m m uk uk Filisola, Vicente 33 m uk uk Naples, Italy Codallos, Felipe uk m uk uk uk Cabeza de Vaca, uk m uk uk uk

A. Diaz Barrundia, Juan uk pm uk c uk Flores, Cirilo 51 uk uk c uk Area, Manuel Jose" 4 8 mi uk uk San Salvador,

Salvador Estrada, Jose'' uk uk uk uk uk

Domingo Aycinena, Mariano de 37 b u c uk Zenteno, Mariano uk uk uk uk uk Barrundia, Jose" 45 a/pm uk c Guatemala City

Francisco a/pm Guatemala City

Molina Flores, Pedro 51 p/a/pm uk c Guatemala City Rivera Cabezas, uk m u uk uk

Antonio Marquez, Gregorio uk uk uk uk uk Flores, Francisco X. uk uk uk uk uk Galvez, Mariano 37 1/e/pm m c uk Vasconcelos, Simon uk uk uk uk uk Valenzuela, Pedro J. 34 uk uk uk uk Martinez, Juan uk b u uk uk

Antonio Sanchez de Leon, uk uk uk uk uk

Mariano Salazar, Carlos uk m uk uk uk Lo'pez, Venancio un gj uk c uk Carrera, Rafael 30 mi 1 n Guatemala City Escobar, Jose'' uk 1/a/pm uk uk uk

Bernardo 1/a/pm

Paredes, Mariano 49 m uk uk uk Aycinena, Pedro de uk 1/g u c uk Cerna, Vicente uk m uk uk uk Garcia Granados, 62 m uk uk uk

Miguel Barrios, Justo 36 mi m -ca San Lorenzo

Rufino Orantes, Jose"'Maria uk m uk uk uk Sinibaldi, Alejandro uk 1 uk c uk Barillas, Manuel 41 1 uk c uk

Lisandro Reyna Barrios , Jose'' 36 m u uk uk

Maria

307

Guatemala--Continued

Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Estrada Cabrera, 41 1/g m c Quetzaltenango Manuel

Herrera, Carlos 64 uk uk uk uk Orellana, Jose Maria 47 m uk mc Jicaro Chacon, Lazaro 53 m uk s Teculutan Palma, Baudilio 46 1 uk c uk Orellana, Manuel uk m uk uk uk Reyna Andrade, uk uk uk uk uk

Jose' Maria Ubico, Jorge 58 m u mc Guatemala City Ponce Vaide"s , 55 m/g uk uk uk

Federico Arevalo, Juan Jose" 41 e/a/pm m c Taxisco Arbenz Guzman, Jacobo 37 in m mc Quetzaltenango Diaz de L. , Carlos uk m uk uk uk

Enrique Castillo Armas, 39 m m mc Santa Lucia

Carlos Cotzumalguap; Gonzalez Solis, uk 1 uk c uk

Luis A. Flores Avendano, 59 m uk uk uk

Guillermo Ydigoras Fuentes, 62 m/gd u mcc Retalhuleu

Manue1 Peralta Azurdia, 54 m uk mc Guatemala City

Enrique Mendez Montenegro, 50 e m c Guatemala City

Julio Cesar Arana Osorio, 51 m m mc Barberena

Carlos Manuel i

308

Haiti

Age Occu. C1 a s s Ed. Birthplace

Dessalines, Jean uk mi 1 n Cormiers Jacques

Christophe, Henri 39 mi 1 n uk Petion, Alexandre 36 m m mc Port -au-Prince Boyer, Jean Pierre 42 m m mc Port-au-Prince Ilerard, Charles uk m uk P Port Salut Guerrier, Philippe 87 mi 1 n Marmelade Pierrot, Jean Louis 84 m uk n Cap Haitien Riche, Jean Baptiste 60 m uk n Grande Riviere Soulouque, Faustin 62 m ; ;uk n Petit-Goave Geffrard, Fabre uk m uk uk Anse-a-Veau Salnave, Sylvain uk m uk uk Cap Haitien Nissage-Saget uk m uk uk St. Marc Domingue, Michel uk m uk n Aux Cayes Boisronde-Canal uk m uk uk Aux Cayes Felicite Salomon, uk pm u uk Aux Cayes

Etienne Legitime , F. Deus uk uk uk uk Jeremie Florvil Hippolyte, uk m uk uk Cap Haitien

F.M. Simon Sam, P.A. uk m 1 n Grande Riviere

Tiresias Alexis, Nord uk m uk uk Cap Haitien Simo'n, F. Antoine uk m uk uk Aux Cayes Leconte, Michel uk uk uk uk Cap Haitien

Cincinnatus Auguste, Tancrede uk uk uk uk Cap Haitien Oreste, Michel 43 mi/pm/1 uk c Jacmel Zamor, Oreste uk m uk uk Gonaives Theodora, Joseph uk m/pm uk uk Fort Liberte

Davilmore m/pm

Sam, J. Vilbrun uk m uk uk Cap Haitien Guillaume

Dartiguenave, P. uk uk u uk Anse-a-Vesu Sudre

Borno, Joseph Louis 56 1/gd/pm u c Port-au-Prince Roy, Eugene uk uk uk uk uk Vincent, Stenio 56 1/i/e/g/pm uk c Port-au-Prince Lescot, Elie 57 g/gd u s le Cap Lavaud, Frank uk m uk uk uk Estime, Dumarsais 46 1/e/pm m c Verrettes Magloire, Paul 43 m uk c Cap Haitien Memours Pierre-Louis uk uk uk uk uk

J . Cantave, Leon 46 m m mc Mirebalais Sylvain, Franck uk uk uk uk uk

309

Haiti-- Continued


Fignole, Daniel 44 e/pm 1 - ca Pestel Kebreau, Antonio Th. 45 m uk mc uk Duvalier , Francois 50 p/g m c Port-au-Prince

310

Honduras

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplaci

Ilerrera, Dionisio 42 1/e/g/pm u c Choluteca Justo Milla, Jose'' uk m uk uk uk Bendena, Cleto uk uk uk uk uk Zelaya, Jose' J . uk uk uk uk u k Bustamante, Miguel

"P uk uk uk uk uk

n . Morazan, Francisco 35 mi m s Tegucigalpa Vigil, Diego 29 uk uk uk uk Arias, Juan A. uk "uk uk uk uk Santos deleValle, uk uk uk uk uk

Jose' MzCrquez, Jose uk m uk uk uk

Antonio Milla, Francisco uk pm uk uk uk Rivera, Joaquin 37 b/pm u - ca Tegucigalpa Ferrera, Francisco 39 mi m P San Juan de

Bustillo, Jose Maria Flores

Bustillo, Jose Maria uk uk uk uk uk Martinez, Jose' Maria uk uk uk uk uk Ilerrera, Jose' J. uk uk uk uk uk Matute, Lino uk uk uk uk uk Molina, Juan F. de uk uk uk uk uk Medina, Felipe N. uk uk uk uk uk Alvarado , Jose'' uk pm uk uk uk Guerro, Jose''Maria uk uk uk uk uk Garriga, Mariano uk uk uk uk uk Zelaya, Francisco uk uk uk uk uk Chavez, Coronado 38 pm uk uk uk Lindo, Juan 56 g/pm m c Tegucigalpa Bustillo, Felipe uk uk uk uk uk Gomez, Francisco uk uk uk uk uk Cabanas, Trinidad 46 m uk mc Tegucigalpa Bueso J., Santiago uk uk uk uk uk Aguilar, Francisco uk pm uk uk uk Guardiola, Santos 39 m 1 mc Tegucigalpa Montes, Francisco uk uk uk uk uk Medina , Jose' Maria 35 m uk p Sensenti,

Gracias Cas tellano, uk uk uk uk uk

Victoriano Inestroza, Francisco uk uk uk uk uk Go'mez, Cresencio 32 1/pm uk uk Tegucigalpa Lo'pez, Juan uk m uk uk uk Cruz, Francisco uk a/gd uk uk Comayagua Rodriguez, Inocente uk uk uk uk uk Xatruch, Florencio uk uk uk uk uk

311

Honduras --Continued


Arias , Celeo 37 1/pm uk c Goas coran Leiva, Ponciano uk m uk uk uk Zelada, Jose'' Maria uk uk uk uk uk

Mejia, Marcelino uk uk uk uk uk Soto, Marcos 27 1/pm u c Tegucigalpa

Aurelio Bogran, Luis uk m uk uk uk Aguero, Rosendo uk pm uk uk uk Vabsque z, Domingo uk m uk uk uk Bonilla, Policarpo 35 1/gd/pm u c uk

Sierra, Terencio 59 m u c Comayagua Arias, Juan A. uk uk uk c uk Bonilla, Manuel 53 m uk uk Juticalpa Davila, Miguel R. uk m uk uk uk Bertrand, Francisco 41 pm uk c uk Membreno, Alberto 54 a/gd/pm uk c uk

Bogran, Francisco uk uk uk c uk

Lopez Gutierrez, 65 m uk uk uk Raf ae1

Tosta, Vicente uk m uk uk uk

Paz Barahona, 61 p/pm u c Santa Barbara Miguel

Mejia Colindres, uk p/pm/g/i uk c La Esperanza

Vicente Carias Andino, 56 mi/e/pm u c Tegucigalpa

Tiburcio mi/e/pm

Galve'z, Juan Manuel 62 1/pm u c Tegucigalpa

Lozano Diaz, Julio 69 b/pm m c Tegucigalpa

Villeda Morales, 49 p/pm u c Ocotepeque

Ramon p/pm

Lopez Arellano, 42 m m mc Danbi

Oswaldo

312

Mexico

Age

Iturbide, Agustin 38 Victoria, 38

Guadalupe Guerrero, Vicente 45 Bocanegra, Jose'' 42

Maria" Velez, Pedro 42

Bustamante, 49 Anastasio

Muzquiz, Melchor 42

Gomez Pedraza, 42 Manuel

Gomez Farias, 52 Valentin

Santa Anna, A. 38 Lopez de

Barragan, Miguel 45

Justo Corro, Jose"' 42 Bravo, Nicolas 52

Echeverria, 44 Francisco J.

Canalizo, Valentin 49

Herrera, Jose*' 52 Joaquin de

Paredes y A, 48 Mariano

Salas , Jose'' Maria 49

Anaya, Pedro Maria uk Pena y Pena, 58

Manuel de la Arista, Mariano 48

Ceballos , Juan 41 Bautista

Lombardini, Manuel 51 Maria

Carrera, Martin 4 8 Diaz de la Vega, 54

z Romulo A1varez, Juan 6 5 Comonfort, Ignacio 43

Occu. Class Ed.

m m s mi m c

mi In 1 u c

1 uk c

mi/pm m s

mi uk uk

m uk p

p/pm u c

m u mc

mi uk uk

1 uk c mi m uk

b/g/pm u -cu

m uk uk

m uk mc

m uk mc

m uk -cu uk uk - cu 1/e/gi uk c

m uk mc

1/gi uk c

mi m -cu

m uk mc m uk mc

mi m p m/1 m c

Birthplace

Morelia, Michoacan Tamazula, Durango

Tixtla, Guerrero Troie, Aguascalientes

Zacatecas, Zacatecas

Jiquilpan, Michoacan

Ciudad Mozquiz, Coahuila

Queretaro, Queretaro

Guadalaiara,Jalisco

Jalapa, Veracruz

Valle de Maiz, San Luis Potosi

Guadalajara, Jalisco Chilpancingo,

Guerrero Jalapa, Veracruz

Monterrey, Nuevo Leon

Jalapa, Veracruz

Mexico City

Mexico City Iluichapan, Hidalgo Tacuba, Mexico

San Luis Potosi, San Luis Potosi

Durango, Durango

Mexico City

Mexico City Mexico City

Atoyac, Guerrero Puebla, Puebla

313

Mexico--Continued


Zuloaga, Felix 54 m ulc uk /

Alamos, Sonora Robles Pezuela, 41 m uk - cu Guanaj uato,

Manuel Guanaj uato Miramo'n, Miguel 26 m u mc Mexico City Pavon, Jose'' 69 1/gi uk c Veracruz, Veracruz

Ignacio Lerdo de Teiada, 49 1/e/gi/pm uk c Veracruz, Veracruz

Sebastia'n 1/e/gi/pm

Iglesias , Jose'' 53 l/j/g/pm uk c Mexico City Maria

Juarez, Benito 51 1/g/pm 1 c San Pablo Guetatao Oaxaca

Diaz, Porfirio 46 m 1 s Oaxaca, Oaxaca Mendez, Juan N. 5 2 m uk uk Ocampo, Puebla Gonzalez, Manuel 47 m uk s Matamoros,

Tamaulipas Leo'n de la Barra, 47 gd u -ca Queretaro,

Francisco Queretaro Madero, Francisco

T 38 h u -ca Parras, Coahuila

1 . Lascuram, Pedro 54 1/e uk c Mexico City Muerta, Victoriano 6 7 m m mc Colotlan, Jalisco

Carvai al , 43 1 uk c Campeche, Campeche

Franci s co Carran za, 54 h/pm u s Cuatro Cienegas,

Venustiano h/pm

Coahuila

Gutierrez , 34 mi m - cu Santo Domingo, Eulalio Coahuila

Gonzales..Garza, 29 mi uk - cu Saltillo, Coahuila Roque

/

Lagos Chazaro, 36 1/gi uk c Tlacotalpan, Francisco Veracruz

Muerta, Adolfo 39 mi/g m s Hermosillo, Sonora

de la Obrego'n, Alvaro 40 mi m n Siquisiva, Sonora

Calles, Plutarco 47 mi/e m s Guaymas, Sonora

Elias Portes Gil, 38 1/g m c Ciudad Victoria,

Emi1io 1/g

Tamaulipas

Ortiz Rubio, 53 mi/i/g uk c Morelia, Miehoacan Pascual

Rodrique z, 44 mi/g m s Guaymas, Sonora

Abelardo L. Cardenas , Lazaro 40 mi/g 1 p Jiguilpan de

Juare z, Michoacan

314

Mexico--Continued


Avila Camacho, Manuel

Alemah, Miguel Ruiz Cortines,

Adolfo L6pez Mateos,

Adolfo

43 mi/g

44 1/g 60 g

48 1/e/g/pm

54 1/e/gi/g Diaz Ordaz, Gus tavo _

Echeverria Alvarez, Luis 48 1/e/g

m s Tezuitlan, Puebla

m c Sayula, Veracruz m s Veracruz, Veracruz

m c Atisapan de Zaragoza, Mexico

m c Ciudad Cerdan, Puebla

m c Mexico City

315

Nicaragua


Cerda, Manuel A. 45 h/pm u uk Granada de la

h/pm

Arguello, Juan uk uk m uk uk Espinosa, Juan uk uk uk uk uk Herrera, Dionisio 48 1/e/g/pm u c Choluteca, 1/e/g/pm

Honduras Ruiz y Bolanos, uk uk uk uk uk

Carlos Morales, Benito uk uk uk uk uk Nunez, Jose'' uk P u c Leon

Zepeda, Jose"' uk m uk uk uk Juarez, Gregorio uk uk uk uk uk Rubio, F. X. uk uk uk uk uk

Rocha, Evaristo uk uk uk uk uk

Cosio, Joaquin uk pm uk uk uk Rivas, Patricio uk pm uk uk uk

Ullo'a, Hilario uk uk uk uk uk

Valladares, Tomas uk uk uk uk uk

Orozco, Juan de uk uk uk uk uk Dios

Leon Buitrago, Pablo 34 1/e/gi u c Leon

Pe'rez, Manuel uk uk uk uk San Jorge, Rivas

Madriz, Emiliano uk uk uk uk uk Saenz, Bla"s uk uk uk uk uk

Antonio Sandoval, Jose' Leo^n 36 h/b/mi u uk Granada

Morales, Miguel R. uk uk uk uk uk

Guerrero, Jose" uk 1 uk c uk

Teran, Toribio uk uk uk uk uk Rosales, Benito uk uk uk uk uk

Ramirez, Norberto uk 1/pm uk c uk

Torcuato, Jose'' uk uk uk uk uk

Abaunza, Justo uk uk uk uk uk

Pineda, Laureano 49 1/pm uk c Rivas

Montenegro, uk uk uk uk uk

Francisco del Alfaro, Jesus uk uk uk uk uk

Vega, Fulgencio uk uk uk uk uk •

Chamorro, Fruto 47 l/b/mi u c Granada

Estrada, Jose'' Mar ia uk m uk uk uk

Escoto, Nazario uk pm uk c uk

Castello'n, Francisco uk 1 uk c u k

Martinez, Tomas uk b/mi m P uk

Solorzano, Federico uk ulc uk uk Managua

Guzmali, Fernando uk b/mi uk uk Granada

Silva, Antonio uk g uk uk uk

316

Nicaragua--Continued

Age Occu. Class Ed. • Birthplace

Chamorro, Pedro 51 h/pm/mi u uk Granada Joaquin

Cuadra, Vicente uk b uk uk Granada Balladares , Pedro uk uk uk uk uk Zavala, Joaquin uk m uk uk Managua Cardenas, Adan 47 p/mi/gd/pm u c Rivas Carazo, Evaristo 64 mi/pm uk uk Rivas Osorno, David uk g ulc c uk

Sacasa, Roberto 49 p/pm u c El Vie j o ,

Chavez, Ignacio

p/pm Chinandega

Chavez, Ignacio uk m uk uk uk Machado, Salvador uk uk uk uk uk Zelaya, Jose"" Santos 39 mi/pm m uk Managua Madriz, Jose'' uk 1/g m c Leon Estrada, Jose Dolores uk m uk uk Managua Estrada, Juan Jose" uk mi/g uk uk Managua

Diaz, Adolfo 36 pm uk uk uk Chamorro, Emiliano 45 mi/i/pm u s Acoyapa',

Chontales

Chamorro, Diego 59 mi/g/pm u -ca Nandaime,

Manuel Granada Chamorro, Rosendo uk uk u c uk

Martinez, Bartolome 63 h/b u s Jinotega

Solorzano, Carlos 64 h/b u - ca Managua

Sacasa, Juan 51 p/e/pm u c Leon Bautis ta

Moncada, Jose" Maria 58 mi/e/j/h/pm u s Masatepe, Mas aya

Irias , Julian uk uk uk c uk

Brenes Jarquin, 51 p/pm uk c Masaya

Carlos A. Somoza, Anastasio 40 g m -ca San Marcos,

Carazo Argiiello, Leonardo 72 P/P m uk c Leon

Lacava Sacasa, 59 b/pm u uk uk

Beni amin Roman y Reyes, Victor 70 iik m uk uk Somoza Debayle, Luis 34 pm u c Leon

Schick, Rene"" 53 pm m uk uk

Guerrero Gutierrez, 66 p/gd/pm u c Granada

Lorenzo Somoza Debayle, 41 m u mc Leon

Anastasio

Panama

Age Occu. Class Ed.

Amador Guerrero, 71 p/pm uk c Manuel

p/pm

Obaldia, Jose"' 63 b/gd u c Domingo de

b/gd

Mendoza, Carlos A. 54 1/pm u c

Boyd, Federico 62 b/gd u s Arosemena, Pablo 74 1/pm uk c Chiari , Rodolfo 42 h/b/g u ct Porras , Belisario 55 1/e/j/gd u c

Valdes,Ramon M. 48 1/e/gd uk c Urriola, Ciro L. 55 P uk c Diaz, Pedro A. 63 b/pm uk s Lefevre, Ernesto

T 44 b/pm u s

1 • Duque, Tomas 39 b/j/g u s

Gabriel Arosemena, 57 i u c

Florencio H. Arias , Harmondio 45 1/e/gd u c Alfaro, Ricardo J. 48 1/e/gd uk c Arosemena, Juan 57 1/e/gi uk c

Demons tenes Fernandez Jaen, 53 gi m p

Ezequie'l Boyd, Augusto 60 P/gd u c

Samuel Arias Madrid, 39 p/pm u c

Arnulfo Ja'en Guardia, 50 i/e/gd uk c

Ernes to Guardia, Ricardo 41 g m uk

A. de la Jimenez, Enrique 57 gd m s

^ Adolfo Diaz Arosemena, 58 b/pm m - ca

Domingo Chanis , Danie1 57 p/e u c Chiari, Roberto F. 44 b/pm u c Arosemena, 67 b/gd uk s

Alcibiades Remon, Jose'' 44 m m mc

Antonio Guizado, Jose 55 i u c

Ramon

Birthplace

Turbaco, Bolivar, Colombia

David, Chiriqui

Panama'' City Panama"' City Panama' City Aguadulce, Cocle Las Tables, Los

Santos Penonome', Cocle Panama'' City Panama City Panama City

Panama' City

Panama City

Penonome"', Cocle Panama City Panama City

Penonome'', Cocle

Panama City

Penonome', Cocle

Penonome'', Cocle

Panama City

Panama City

Panama City

Panama City Panama' City Los Santos, Los

Santos Panama City

Panama City

318

Panama- -Continued


Arias Espinosa, 42 b u -ca Panama' City Ricardo M.

Panama' City

Guardia, Ernesto 52 b/gd m c Panama City

de la Gonzalez Ruiz, 59 p/a/pm u c Las Tables, Los

Sergio p/a/pm

Santos

Bazan, Jose 44 pm m s Colon

Dominador pm

Gonzalez Ruiz, 52 p/pm u c Las Tables, Los

Bernardino Santos

Robles, Marcos 58 g uk s Aguadulce, Cocle

Aurelio Pinilia, Jose M. 49 m m s Panama City

Urrutia, Bolivar 50 m m s La Palma, Los Santos

Takas Bahas, 44 b m c Colon Demetrio

i !

319

Paraguay


Francia, Jose' G. 48 1/e u c As unci o'h Rodrique z

Asuncion Lopez, Carlos 50 1/e m. c Asuncion Antonio

Lopez, Francisco 34 m u P Asuncion Solano

Rivarola, Cirilo uk uk uk uk uk Antonio

Jovellanos, Salvador 38 uk uk uk Asunci on G i l , J u a n B a u t i s t a uk g uk uk uk Uriarte, Higinio uk uk uk uk uk Barreiro, Candido uk pm/gd uk uk uk Caballero, Bernardino 32 in uk uk Ibiqui Escobar, Patricio uk m uk uk Asuncion Gonzales, Juan uk pm uk uk uk

Gualberto Morinigo, Marcos uk pm uk uk uk Eguzquiza, Juan 39 m uk s uk

Bautista Aceval, Emilio 44 pm uk -ca uk Carballo, Hector uk pm uk uk uk Escurra, Juan uk m uk uk uk Gaona, Juan Bautista 58 uk uk uk uk Baez , Cecilio 43 i/e/a uk c Asuncion Ferreira, Benigno 61 m uk uk uk Jara, Albino 32 m uk uk uk

Roi as , Liberato uk uk uk uk uk Pena, Pedro 44 p/e uk c uk Schaerer, Eduardo 39 pm m c Caazapa Franco, Manuel 41 1/e/pm uk c uk Montero, Jose uk pm/gd uk c uk Gonzalez Navero, 46 pm/1 uk c uk

Emiliano Gondra, Manuel 38 mi/e/gd/pm u c Asuncion Alaya, Eusebio 46 1/e/g/pm m c Barrero Grande

Ayala, Eligio 42 a/g/pm uk c Mbuyapey

Riart, Luis Alberto uk j/l/pm u c uk Guggiari, Jose P. 44 j/1/pm u c Asuncion Franco, Rafael uk m uk uk uk Paiva, Felix 62 1/e/gj/pm uk c Caazapa

Estigarribia, Jose^ 51 m u mc Caraguatay Felix

Morinigo, Higinio 43 m m mc Paraguari' Frutos, Juan Manuel uk ' /gi m uk uk Gonzalez, Juan 50 i/gd u uk Villa Rica

Natalicio

320

Paraguay--Continued


Rolo'n, Raimundo 45 m m uk uk Molas Lopez, Felipe 48 p/pm uk c uk Chaves , Federico 71 I/pm u uk uk Romero Pereira, Tomas uk z/pm u c uk Stroessner, Alfredo 41 m m mc Encarnacion

/

321

Peru


Riva Aguero, Jose'' 39 m u ct Lima de la

San Martin, Jose^de 43 m u P Yapeya,

Argentina Tagle, Jose'' 44 m u s Lima

Bernardo de Bolivar, Simon 40 mi u ct Caracas,

Venezuela Santa Cruz, Andre's de 32 m u s Huarina, LaPaz

Bolivia

Nieto, Domingo 23 mi u uk Moquegua, Moquegua

Sanchez Carrio"n, 39 1/pm uk c Iluamachuco ,

Jose' F. 1/pm

Trui illo

Unanue, Hipolito 71 p/i/e/pm uk ct Arica, Huanuco

Salazar, Manuel 59 g uk uk Lima

Gutierrez, Antonio 32 mi uk uk Huantaj aya, T arapaca, Chile

LaMar y Cortazar, 48 m u s Cuenca, Ecuado

Jose'' de Gamarra, Agustin 44 m u s Cuzco, Cuzco

Reyes , Andres 49 mi/h uk uk Chancay

Telleria, Manuel 43 pm uk uk uk

Braulio Del C, Jose^ 50 pm uk uk uk

Orbegoso, Luis Jose 36 mi/b u uk Chuquisongok Huanachuco

Bermudez, Pedro 40 m uk P Tarma, Junin

Salaverry, Felipe 28 mi u s Lima

Santiago Bujanda, Juan Angel 42 mi uk uk Cuzco, Cuzco

Salas, Juan Jose"" uk mi uk uk uk

LaValle, Juan 56 mi u uk uk

Bautista de Tristan, P10 64 m uk uk uk

Herrera, Ramon uk mi uk uk uk

Galdeano, Jose Maria uk g uk uk uk

Menendez, Manuel 48 m uk uk Lima

Torrico, Juan 34 m uk s Lima

Crisostomo Vidal Laos , Juan 42 mi uk s Supe, Lima

Francisco Figuerola y Estrada, 72 1/e/pm uk c Lambayeque,

Justo Lambayeque

Vivanco, Manuel 37 m u uk Lima

Ignacio de

322

Peru-- Continued


Elias , Domingo 37 b/h/gd u s Ica, Ica Castilia, Ramon 48 m m s Tarapaca', Chile Echenique, Jose'' 42 mi u p Puno, Puno

Ruf ino San Roman, Miguel 60 mi m p Puno, Puno

Medina, Miguel 54 m uk p Huancabamba Raygada, Jose'' Maria 62 m uk s Piura, Piura Mar, Juan Manuel del 54 1/pm uk c Cuzco, Cuzco

Canseco, Pedro Diez 48 m u uk Arequipa, Arequipa

Pezet, Juan Antonio 52 m u s Lima Prado, Mariano 38 m u s Huanuco,

Ignacio Huanuco Puerta, Luis de la 56 m uk s Cuzco, Cuzco

Balta v Montero, Jose' ' 54 m m mc Lima

Gutierrez, Toma"s uk mi uk n uk Zevallos, Mariano 52 m uk uk Cuzco, Cuzco

Ilerencia Pardo y Lavalle, 37 j/b/pm u c Lima

Manuel Costas, Manuel uk b/pm uk uk uk

Pierola, Nicola's de 40 1/b/pm m s Arequipa, 1/b/pm Arequipa

Garcia Calderon, 46 1/e uk c Arequipa,

Francisco Arequipa

Montero, Lizardo 49 m u c Ayabaca

Iglesias y Pino, 53 m u uk Cai amarca,

Miguel Caj amarca

Arenas Merino, 77 1/e/g uk c Lima

Antonio Caceres , Andre's 53 m uk s Ayacucho,

Ave lino Ayacucho

Morales Bermudez, 53 m uk s Pica, Tarapaca,

Remigio Chile

Borgono, Justiniano 57 m m uk Lima

Candamo, Manuel 53 b/i/gd u uk Lima

Lopez de Romana, 52 i u c Arequipa,

Eduardo Arequipa

Calderon, Serapio 60 1/e/pm uk c Cuzco, Cuzco

Pardo y Barreda, Jose 40 1/e/pm u c Lima

Leguia, Augusto B. 45 b/g m s Lambayeque, Leguia, Augusto B. Lambayeque

Billinghurst, 61 b/.i/pm m s Arica, Huanuco

Guillermo E. Benavides, O'scar R. 37 m u mc Lima

Peru--Continued

323


Ponce, Manuel Maria 56 m uk mc Arequipa, Arequipa

Holguin, Mariano 70 X uk c Arequipa, Arequipa

Arias, Ricardo Elias 56 g.i uk c Pisco, lea Jimenez, Gustavo A. 44 m uk mc Cerro de

Pasco, Junin Sanchez Ocampo, David 44 h/pm u uk Hu amb o ,

Apurimac Sanchez Cerro, Luis 41 m 1 mc Piura, Piura Matias Manzanilla, 63 e/pm uk c I ca, Ica

Jose'' e/pm

Prado y Ugarteche, 50 b/e/pm u c Lima Manuel

Bustamante, Jose"' Luis 51 1/e/gd uk c Arequipa, Arequipa

Noriega Aguero, Zenon 48 m u mc Villa Jesus,

Cai amarca Odris, Manuel A. 50 m m mc Tarma, Junin Belaunde Terry, 50 z/pm u c Lima

Fernando Velasco Alvarado, 58 m 1 mc Piura, Piura

Juan

324

Uruguay

Rivera, Fructuoso

Pereira, Gabriel Antonio

Anaya, Carlos

Oribe, Manuel Suarez, Joaquin

Age Occu.

42 mi

39 mi/pm

56 mi/b/pm

42 m 57 mi/pm

Class Ed. Birthplace

u s PeTlarol, Montevideo

u s Montevideo

uk s San Pedro, Buenos Aires

m uk Montevideo u uk Villa de

Canelones, Canelones

Berro, Bernardo 48 mi/j/pm u s Montevideo Prudencia

mi/j/pm

Giro, Juan Francisco 61 mi/pm u - ca Montevideo Flores , Venancio 45 mi u s Trinidad,

Flores Varela, Pedro 30 b/pm m s Villa de la

Florida, Florida

Bustamante, Manuel B. 69 mi/pm uk uk San Carlos, mi/pm Maldonado

Lamas, Luis 61 mi/b uk uk Montevideo

Aguirre, Anastasio de 62 mi/pm uk uk Montevideo la Cruz

mi/pm

Villalba, Tomas 59 mi/g m uk Dolores, Soriano

Vidal, Francisco 38 p/pm u c San Carlos, Antonio

p/pm Maldonado

Batlle, Lorenzo 57 m u mc Montevideo

Gomensoro, Tomas 62 mi/pm uk uk Dolores , Soriano

Ellauri, Jose'' Eugenio 38 1/g uk c Montevideo

Latorre, Lorenzo 35 m 1 p Montevideo

Santos , Ma'ximo Benito 34 m m P Canelones, Canelones

Tales, Maximo 34 m uk mc Montevideo

Herrera y Obes, Julio 49 i /g u c Montevideo Borda, Juan Idiarte 49 pm m uk Mercedes,

Sori ano

Cuestas , Juan Lindolfo 60 g uk uk Paysandu, Paysandu

Batlle y Ordonez, Jose 46 i /pm u - ca Montevideo

Williman, CI audio 43 e/pm uk c Montevideo

Viera, Feliciano Brum, Baltasar

42 g/pm uk c Salto, Artigas Viera, Feliciano Brum, Baltasar 35 1/g u c Salto, Artigas Serrato , Jose'' 54 i/g/pm uk c Montevideo

Camisteguy, Juan 67 e/i/pm uk c Montevideo

Uruguay --Continued


Terra, Gabriel 58 e/i/gd uk c Montevideo Baldomir, Alfredo 5 3 m uk mc Montevideo Charlone, Cesar 42 1/e/a uk c Montevideo Amezaga, Juan Jose 61 1/e/gd uk c Montevideo Berreta, Tomas 71 m/g/pm m uk Arroyo m/g/pm

MiguiL

Montev Batlle Berres, Luis 49 i /pm u -ca Montevideo Martinez Trueba, Andrews 66 urn uk uk uk Gestido, Oscar Daniel 65 m/g m mc Montevideo

Pacheco Areco, Jorge 47 1 uk - ca Montevideo

Venezuela

326


Pa"ez, Jose" Antonio 40 mi 1 n Acarigua, Barinas

Vargas, Jose' Maria 48 p/e/gi/pm u c Caracas Narvarte, Andre's uk pm uk c uk Soublette, Carlos 48 mi m uk Caracas

Monagas , Jose'' Tadeo 63 mi m n Maturin, Cumana Monagas , Jose" 56 mi m uk Maturin, Cumana

Gregorio Castro, Julian uk m uk uk uk Carreno, Jose" Maria uk m uk uk uk Gual, Pedro 76 pm/gd uk c Caracas Tovar, Manuel Felipe 56 uk uk uk Caracas

de Falcon, Juan 43 m uk uk Paraguana,

Falcon

Bruzual, Manuel E. uk m uk uk uk Monagas , Jose" uk m m uk uk

Ruperto Tell Villegas, uk 1/pm uk c uk

Guillermo Palacios, Esteban uk uk uk uk uk Pulgar, Venancio uk mi uk uk uk

Arvelo, Rafael uk g/a uk uk uk

Gil, jyiiguel uk uk uk uk uk Guznutn Blanco, 41 mi/j/g u c Caracas

Antonio Linares Alcantara, 50 m uk uk uk

Francis co Gutierrez Coll, 42 a uk uk uk

Jacinto Urbaneia, Diego uk uk uk c uk

Bautista Diez, Manuel uk uk uk c uk

Antonio Valera, Jose'" uk mi uk uk uk

Gregorio Crespo, Joaquin uk m uk uk uk

Villanueva, Laureano 37 p/.i/pm uk c Caracas

Lopez y Guzman, uk m uk uk uk

Hermo''genes Rojas Paul, Juan 59 g/gi/pm/1 uk c Caracas

P ab 1 o Andueza Palacio, 47 1/pm/g uk c Guanare

Raimundo Villegas Pulido, 38 1/gi/pm u c BariTias

G. Tell

3 2 7

Venezuela--Continued


Andrade, Ignacio 47 mi 1 uk Cucuta Castro, Cipriano uk 1/mi 1 n Capacho,

Tachira Guzman Alvarez, uk m uk uk uk

Manuel Rodriquez, Victor uk m uk uk uk Go'mez, Juan Vicente 49 b/g/mi 1 n San Antonio,

Perez, Juan Bautista

b/g/mi Tachira

Perez, Juan Bautista uk uk uk uk uk Marquez Bustillo, V, uk uk uk c uk Lopez Contreras, 52 m uk s Queniquea,

Eleazar T achira Medina Angarita, 43 m uk mc San Cristobal,

I s afas Tachira Betancourt, Romulo 37 pm m - ca Guatire, Mirand Gallegos, Romulo 63 e/a uk c Caracas Delgado Chalbaud, 39 m u mc Caracas

Carlos Suarez Flamerich, 43 1/e/gd/pm uk c Caracas

German Pe'rez Jimenez, 38 m m mc T achira

Marcos Larrazabal, Wolfgang 46 m u mc uk Leoni, Raul 58 pm m c Upata, Bolivar Caldera, Rafael 53 1/e/pm m c San Felipe,

Y aracay

APPENDIX II

PRESIDENTS: TERM OF OFFICE, SUCCESSION, DEPARTURE

aThe tenure is designated by the following: y = year, m = month, and d = day.

^Succession (In) is designated by the following: v = violent, forcible, unconstitutional change, i = imposicion, e = election by popular vote, ec = election by legislative body or constituent assembly, e/ec = popular election followed by election in legislature, p = provisional succession, pv = provisional succession under forcible conditions.

cDeparture (Out) is designated by the following: c = constitutionally and voluntarily, u = unconstitutionally and under duress, r = voluntary resignation or withdrawal, h = for reasons of health, d = death, ds = death by suicide, and da = death by assassination.

Argentina

President Date Took Office Tenure a In Out c

Mitre, Bartolome 4-12-1862 3y 2m Od V Paz, Marcos 6- 12-1865 2y 6m 20d P r Mitre, Bartolome 1- 2- 1868 0y 10m 1 Od c Sarmiento, Domingo 10-12-1868 6y 0m Od e c

Avellaneda, Nicolas 10- 12-1874 6y 0m Od i c

Roca, Julio A. 10-12-1880 6y 0m Od i c

Juarez Celman, Miguel 10- 12-1886 3y 9m 26d i u Pellegrini, Carlos 8- 8-1890 2y 2m 4d pv c

Pena, Saenz 10- 12-1892 2y 3m lOd i h

Uriburu, Jose Evarista 1- 22-1895 3y 8m 20d P c

Roca, Julio A. 10-12-1898 6y 0m Od i c Quintana, Manuel 10- 12- 1904 ly 5 m Od i d

Alcorta, Jose Figueroa 3-12-1906 4y 7m Od P c

Saenz Pena, Roque 10-12-1910 2v 11m 24d i h

Plaza, Victorino de la 10- 6- 1913 3y 0 m 6d P c

Irigoyen, Hipolito 10-12- 1916 6y 0m Od e c

Alvear, Marcelo T. de 10-12-1922 6y 0m Od i c

Irigoyen, Hipolito 10-12-1928 lv 10m 2 4d e u

Uriburu, Jose F. 9- 6-1930 iy 5 m 14d V c Justo, Agustin P. 2- 20-1932 6y 0m Od i c

Ortiz, Roberto M. 2- 20- 1938 2y 4m 13d i h

Castillo, Ramon S. 7- 3-1940 2y 11m Id P u

Raws on, Arturo 6- 4-1943 Ov 0m 3d V r

328

329

Argentina--Continued

Pres iclent Date Took Of f ice Tenure In Out

Ramirez, Pedro P. 6- 7-1943 Oy 9m, 2d V u Farrell, Edelmiro 3- 9-1944 2v 2m,2 5d V c Peron, Juan 6- 4- 1946 9y 3m,15d i u

Lonardi, Eduardo 9-23-1955 Oy 1 m, 2 0 d V u Aramburu, Pedro E. 11-13- 1955 2y 5m,17d V c

Frondizi, Arturo 5- 1- 1958 3y 11m, Od e u Guido, Jose Maria 3-30- 1962 ly 7m,12d pv c Illia, Arturo 10-12-1963 2y 8m,lOd e u

Ongania, Juan Carlos 6-28-1966 • 3y 11m,lOd V u

Military Junta 6- 8- 1970 Oy 0m,lOd pv c Levingston, Roberto M. 6-18- 1970 Oy 9m, 4d V u

330

Bolivia

Pres ident

Bolivar, Simon Sucre, A. Jos£" de Urdininea, J.M. Perez

de Velasco, Jose' Miguel

de Blanco, Pedro Velasco, Jose'Miguel

de Santa Cruz, Andre's Velasco, Jose Miguel

de ^ Serrano, Jose Mariano Ballivan, Jose' Guillarte, Eusebio Velasco, Jose' Miguel

de Belzu, Manuel Isidoro Co'rdova, Jorge Linares , Jose" Maria Acha, Jose" Maria de Melgarejo, Mariano Morales, Agustin

Frias , Tomas Ballivian, Adolfo Frias , Toma"s Daza, Hilaron Campero, Narciso Pacheco, Gregorio Arce, Aniceto Baptista, Mariano Fernandez Alonso,

Severo Pando, Jose' Manuel Reyes Ortiz^, Serapio Pando, Jose Manuel Montes, Ismael Villazon, Eliodoro Montes, Ismael Gutierrez Guerra,

Jose' Saavedra, Bautista Guzman, Felipe Siles , Hernando Blanco Galindo, Carlos

Date Took Office Tenure In Out

8-11-1825 3y 2m Od V r 1- 1-1826 2v 7m Od p/i u 8- 1-1828 Oy 0m 12d PV r

8-12-1828 Oy 4m 12d P r

12- 25-1828 4y Oin 6d P da

1- 1- 182 9 Oy 5m 2 Id P u

5- 24-1829 9y 9m 26d i u

2- 22- 1839 Oy 2m Od P r

4- 1839 Oy lm Od V u

9- 22-1841 6y 3m Id i u 12- 23- 1847 Oy 0m lOd v/i u

1- 2-1848 Oy 11m 4d pv r

12- 6-1848 6y 8m 27d i u

8-15-1855 2y 0 m 2 4d V c 9- 9-1857 3y 4m 4d i u

5- 6- 1861 3y 7m 23d V u

12- 28-1864 6y 0m 17d v/i u

1-15-1871 ly 10m 12d V u

11- 28- 1872 Oy 5m lid V da

5- 9-1873 Oy 8 m 3d p c

1- 31- 1874 2y 3 m 5d e h 5- 4- 1876 3v 7m id P u

1-19-1880 4y 4m 15d V u

9- 4-18 84 3y 11m lid V c

8-15-1888 3y 11m 2 8d e c

8-11-1892 4y 0 m 8d i c

8- 19-1896 2y 7m 23d i c

12-12-1898 0y 10m 7d i u

4-12-1899 Oy 6m 13d v/ i

10- 25- 1899 4y 10m 17d p r

8- 14- 1904 4y 11m 2 8d c

8- 12-1909 4y 0m Od i c

8- 14-1913 4y 0m Od i c

8-15-1917 2y 10m 27d i c

7-12-1920 5y 2m 2 Id i u

9- 3-1925 0y 4m 7d pv c

1-10-1926 4y 4m 18d i u 6- 28- 1930 0y 8m 7d V r

331

Bolivia--Continued

President Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Salamanca, Daniel 5- 5-1931 Ov 4m 20d i u Teiada Sorzano, Jose'' L. 11- 28-19 34 ly 5m 19d pv u Toro Ruilova, Jose' David 5- 17- 1936 ly 1m 2 6d v u Busch, German 7-13- 1937 2y lm lOd V ds

Quintanilla, Carlos 8- 23-1939 Oy 7m 2 2d P c Penaranda, Entrique 4-15-1940 3y 8m 5d i u Villarroel, Gualberto 12- 20- 1943 2v 7m Id V da Arenas , Damaso 7- 21-1946 Oy 0m Id pv r Guillen, Nestor 7- 21- 1946 Oy 0m 2 6d pv r Monje Gutierrez, Tomas 8-17- 1946 Oy 6m 23d pv c Hertzog, Jose Enriquez 3-10-1947 2y lm 2 7d e r Urriolagoitia, Mamerto 5- 7-1949 2y Oin 9d P r Ballivian, Hugo 5-15-1951 0y 11m Od V u Siles Zuazo, Hernan 4- 9-1952 Oy 0 m 6d PV r Paz Estenssoro, Victor 4-16-1952 4y 3m 2 Od e/v c Siles Zuazo, Hernan 8- 6-1956 4y 0m Od i c Paz Estenssoro, Victor 8- 6-1960 4y 2m 2 8d i u

Ovando Candia, Alfredo 11- 3-1964 0y 0m 3d pv r Barrientos Ortuno, Rene 11- 6-1964 ly lm 2 4d P r Ovando Candia, Alfredo 1- 1-1966 Oy 7m 5d P c

Barrientos Ortuno, Rene 8- 6-1966 2y 8m 2 Id e d

Siles Salines, Luis A. 4- 27-1969 0y 5m Od P u Ovando Candia, Alfredo 9- 26-1969 ly 0m lOd V u

Torres , Juan Jose' 10- 7-1970 Oy 9m 2 Od V u

332

Brazil

Pres ident Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Fonseca, Manuel 11-15-1889 2y , Om , 8d V u Deodoro da

2y

Peixoto, Floria.no 11- 23- 1891 2y 11m 2 2d P V c Morais Barros, 11-15- 1894 4y 0m Od i c

Prudente de Campos Salles, Manuel 11-15-1898 4y Om Od i c

F. de 4y

Rodrigues Alves, F. de 11-15-1902 4y Om Od i c Morelra Penna, Affonso 11- 15-1906 2y 7 m Od i d Pecanha, Nilo 6-14-1909 i y 5m Od P c Fonseca, Hermes da 11-15-1910 4y Om Od i c Persira Gomes, 11-15-1914 4y Om Od i c

Wenceslau Bras 4y

Moreira, Delfim 11-15-1918 0y 8m 13d P h Pessoa, Epitacio 7- 28-1919 3y 3m 17d i c Silva Bernardes, 11- 15-1922 4y Om Od i c

Artur da 4y

Sousa, Washington 11-15-1926 3y 11m 9d i u Luis P. de

Junta 10-24-1930 Oy Om 9d pv r Vargas, Getulio 11- 3-1930 14v 11m 26d v/i u Linhares , Jose'' 10- 29- 1945 Oy 3m 2d pv r Dutra, Eurico Gaspar 1- 31-1946 5y Om Od e c Vargas, Getulio 1- 31-1951 3y 6 m 2 4d e ds Filho, J'oao Cafe' 8- 24-1954 lv 2m 14d P h Luz, Carlos Soimbra da 11- 8- 1955 Oy Om 3d P u Ramos , Nereu 11-11-1955 Oy 2m 19d pv c Oliveira, Juscelino 1-31-1956 5y Om Od e c

Kubitschek de 5y

Silva Quadros, 1-31- 1961 Oy 6m 25d e r Janio da

Oy

Mazzilli, Raniere 8 - 25-1961 Oy Om 13d P r Goulart, Joao 9- 8-1961 2 y 6m 23d P u Branco, Humberto 3- 31-1964 2y 11m 15d V c

Castelo 2y

Silva, Artur Costa e 3-15-1967 2y 5m 16d i h Junta 3-31-1969 Oy 2m Od P r Medici, Emilio 10- 30-1969

Oy i

Garras tazu

3 3 3

Chile


O'Higgins, Bernardo 2- 14-1817 5y, llm, 14d v/i u Military Junta 1- 28-1823 Freire Serrano, Ramon 5-31-1823 2y, lm 6d V Vicuna Larrain, 5- 5-1825 oy, 0m lOd P r

Francis co oy,

, Freire Serrano, Ramtm 5-16-1825 i y , lm 23d r Blanco Encalada, 7- 9-1826 o y , 2m Od P r

Manuel o y ,

Eyzaguirre, Agustin 9- 9-1826 o y , 4 m 17d P u Freire Serrano, Ramon 1- 27- 1827 o y , 3 m 8d ec r Pinto Diaz, Francisco 5- 25- 1827 2y, lm 19d P .Vicuna Larrain, 7-16-1829 o y , 3 m 3d P r

Francisco o y , P

Pinto Diaz, Francisco 10-19-1829 o y , 0m 13d u Vicuna Larrain, 11- 2- 1829 o y , lm 12d P u

Francisco o y ,

Junta 12- 24-1829 Errazuriz, Fernando de 2- - 1830 o y , 0m lOd P V r Ruiz Tagle, Francisco 2-17-1830 o y , 2m Od P T Ovalle, Jose Tomas 4- - 1830 o y , llm Od P h Errazuriz, Fernando de 3- 21-1831 o y , 5m 27d P r Prieto Vial, Joachim 9-18-1831 10y, 0m Od v/i c Bulnes Prieto, Manuel 9-18-1841 lOy, 0m Od i c Montt Torres, Manuel 9-18-1851 lOy, 0 m Od i c Pe'rez Mascavano, Jose'' 9-18-1861 lOv, 0m Od i c

Errazuriz Zanartu', 9-18- 1871 5y, 0m Od i c

Federico 5y,

Pinto Garmendia, Anibal 9-18-1875 5y, 0m Od i c

Santa Mar fa G., Domingo 9-18-1881 sy, 0m Od i c

Balmaceda, Jose'' Manuel 9- 18-1886 4y, llm 12d i u

Baquedano Gonzales, 8- 29- 1891 o y , 0 m 2d V u

Manuel Montt Alvarez, Jorge 8-31- 1891 5y, 0m 16d v/e c

Errazuriz Echaurren, 9-18-1896 3 y , 8m 23d e

Federico Fernandez Albano, Elias

Federico Fernandez Albano, Elias 6-11- 1900 0y, 4m Od P r

Errazuriz, Federico 10-11-1900 o y , 6m 2 Od h

Zanartu Zanartu, Anibal 5- 1-1901 o y , 4m 17d P c Riesco Errazuriz, German 9-18-1901 5y, 0m Od e c

Montt Montt, Pedro 9-18-1906 3y, 8m 20d e h

Fernandez Albano, Elias 7- 8- 1910 0 y, lm 2 8d n d

Figueroa Larrain, 9-16-1910 o y , 3m 17d P c Emiliano

Barros Luco, Ramon 12- 23- 1910 5y, 0m Od i c

Sanfuentes , Juan Luis 12- 2 3- 1915 5y, 0m Od e c

334

Chile--Continued


Alessandri, Arturo 12- 23- 1920 3y 8m 15d e u Altamirano Talavera, 9 - 8-1924 Oy 4m 15d pv u

Luis Oy

Bello Codesido, Ernilio 1- 23- 1925 Oy 2m 7d pv u Alessandri, Arturo 3- 21- 1925 0y 6m lOd r Barros Borgono, Luis 10- 1-1925 Ov 2m 2 2d P c Figueroa, Emiliano 12- 23- 1925 iy 4m lid e u Ibanez del Campo, 5- 4- 1927 4y 2m 2 2d v/i u

Carlos Opazo Letelier, Pedro 7- 26- 1931 Oy 0m 2d pv r Montero Rodriquez, 7- 27-1931 Oy 0m 2 9d P r

Juan " Trucco Franzani, Manuel 8- 22-1931 Oy 3m 12d P r Montero Rodriquez, 12- 4-1931 Oy 6m Od e u

Juan Oy

Puga Vega, Arturo 6- 4-1932 Oy 0m 8d V r Grove Valleio, Marmaduke 6-12-1932 0y 0 m 4d V u Espinoza, Carlos Davila 6-17-1932 Oy 2m 26d V u Blanche Espejo, Bartolome 9-13-1932 Oy 0m 19d pv r Oyanedel Urrutia, Abraham 10- 2-1932 Oy 2m 2 2d P c Alessandri, Arturo 12- 24-1932 6y 0 m Od e c Aguirre Cerda, Pedro 12- 24- 1938 2y 10m 16d e h Mendez Arancibia, 11-10-1941 Oy 4 m 2 2d P c

Geronimo Rios Morales, Juan 4- 2- 1942 4y 2m 2 5d e d

Antonio Duhalde Vazquez , Alfredo 6- 27- 1946 0y 3 m 20 d p r Irabarren, Juan Antonio 10-17-1946 Oy 0m 16d P c Gonzalez Videla, Gabriel 11- 3-1946 6y 0 m Od e c

Ibanez del Campo, Carlos 11- 3-1952 6y 0m Od e c

Alessandri Rodriquez, 11- 3- 1958 6y 0m Od e c

Jorge Frei Montalva, Eduardo 11- 3-1964 6y 0m Od e c

Allende, Salvador 11- 3-1970 2y 9m 21d e da

335

Colomb ia


Bolivar, Simon 8-10-1819 3y 0m Od V r Santander, Francisco 1822 5y 0m Od P r Bolivar, Simon 9-10-1827 2y 5m 20d r Caicedo, Domingo 3- 1-1830 0y lm 13d P r Mosquera, Joaquin 6-13-1830 Oy 2m 2 2d ec u Urdaneta, Rafael 9- 5-1830 Oy 7m 27d V u Caicedo, Domingo 4-14-1831 Oy 7m 9d pv r Obando, Jose' Maria 11- 23-1831 Oy 3m 17d P r Ma'rquez, Jose" 3-10-1832 Oy 6m 23d p c

Ignacio de Oy

Santander, Francisco 10- 7-1832 4y 5m 2 3d ec/e c Ma'rquez, Jose" 4- 1-1837 4v 0 m Od e/ec c

Ignacio de Caicedo, Domingo 4- 1-1841 Oy lm Id P r Alcantara Herra'h, 5- 2-1841 Oy 2m Od e/ec

Pedro Oy

Dios Aranzaztf, Juan de 7- 2-1841 Oy 10m 17d P r Alca'ntara Herran, 5-19-1842 2y 10m lid c

Pedro Mosquera, Tomas 4- 1- 1845 2y 4m Od e/ec

Cipriano de Cuervo, Rufino 8- -1847 Oy 4 m Od P r Mosquera, Tomas 12- -1847 iy 4m Od c

Cipriano de Lopez, Jose" Hilario 4- 1-1849 2y 6m Od i Obaldia, Jose" de 10- -1851 0y 3m Od P r Lopez, Jose' Hilario 1- -1852 iy 3 m Od c

Obando, Jose" Maria 4- 1-1853 iy 0m 16d i u

Me 1 o , J os e" Mar fa 4-17-1854 0v 7m 17d V u Herrera, Tomas 4- 21- 1854 0y 3m 14d pv r Obaldia, Jose" de 8- 5-1854 Oy 7 m 26d pv c

Mallarino, Manuel 4- 1-1855 2y 0m Od e c

Maria Ospina, Mariano 4- 1-1857 4y 0m Od e c Calvo, Bartolome 4- 1-1861 0y 3m 18d P u

Mosquera, Tomas 7-18-1861 ly 6m 13d V r Cipriano de

Largacha, Froilan 2- 1-1863 Oy 4m Od P c

Mosquera, Tomas 5-31-1863 Oy 7m 2 8d i

Cipriano de Uricoechea, Juan A. 1- 29- 1864 Oy lm Od P r

Mosquera, Tomas 2- 29-1864 Oy 2m Od c Cipriano de

Od Murillo Toro, Manuel 4- 1-1864 2y 0m Od i c

Roias Garrido, Jose" 4- 1-1866 Oy lm 19d P r

Mosquera, Tomas"" 5- 19-1866 iy 0m 4d i u

Cipriano de

336

Colombia--Continued


Riascos, Joaquin 5-12-1867 Oy 2m 16d pv r Acosta, Santos 5- 23-1867 Oy 10m 7d V c Gutierrez, Santos 4- 1- 1868 Oy 8 m 20d i Camacho Rolda"h, 12- 21-1868 Oy Oin lid P r

Salvador Oy

Gutierrez, Santos 1- 2-1869 iy 4m Od c Salgar, Eustorgio 4- 1-1870 Oy 5 m Od i Trujillo, Julian 9- 1-1870 Oy 0m 8d P r Salgar, Eustorgio 9- 8- 1870 iy 6m 2 2d c Murillo, Manuel 4- 1-1872 2y 0m Od i c

Perez, Santiago 4- 1-1874 2y 0m Od i c Parra, Aquileo 4- 1-1876 iy lm 19d ec Camargo, Sergio 5-19-1877 0y 2 m 24d P r Parra, Aquileo 8-13-1877 Oy 4m 9d Ramirez, Manuel Maria 12- 22-1877 Oy 0m 3d P r Parra, Aquileo 12- 24-1877 Oy 3m 6d c Trujillo, Julian 4- 1-1878 2y 0m Od i c Nunez, Rafael 4- 1-1880 2y 0m Od i c Zaldua, Francisco 4- 1-1882 Oy 8m 20d i d

J avier Caldero'n, Climaco 12-21-1882 Oy 0 m 2d P r Otalora, Jose"Eusebio 12-22-1882 ly 3m 9d P c Hurtado, Ezequiel 4- 1-1884 Oy 4m lOd P r Nunez, Rafael 8- 11-1884 ly 7m 20d i c Campo Serrano, Jose" 4- 1-1886 Oy 9m 5d P r Payan, Eliseo 1- 6-1887 Oy 4 m 2 8d P r Nufiez, Rafael 6- 4-1887 Oy 5m 8d i P ay an, Eliseo 12-13-1887 Oy lm 24d P r

Nunez, Rafael 2- 8-1888 Oy 5 m 2 8d r

Holguin, Carlos 8- 7-1888 4y 0m Od i c

Caro, Miguel A. 8- 7-1892 3y 7m 5d i

Quintero, Guillermo 3-12-1896 0y 0m 5d P r

Caro, Miguel A. 3-17- 1896 2y 4m 2 Od c

Marroquin, Jose" Manuel 8- 7-1898 0y 2m 26d P r Sanclemente, Manual A. 11- 3-1898 lv 8m 2 8d i u

Marroquin, Jose" Manuel 7-31-1900 4y 0m 7d pv c

Reyes, Rafael 8- 7-1904 3y 7 m 9d i

Angulo, Euclides de 3-16-1908 Oy lm Od P r

Reyes, Rafael 4-16-1908 iy lm 2 Id u

Ifolguin, Jorge 6- 7-1909 Oy lm 26d pv r

Gonzalez Valencia, Ramon 8- 3-1909 ly 0m 4d P c

Restrepo, Carlos E. 8- 7-1910 4y 0m Od ec e

Concha, Jose Vicente 8- 7-1914 4 v Oin Od i c

Sua'rez, Marco Fidel 8- 7-1918 3 V 3m 5 D e u

Holguin, Jorge 11-12-1921 Oy 8m 26d P c

Ospina, Pedro Nels 8- 7-1922 4y 0m Od i c

337

Colombi a-- Continued


Mendez, Miguel Abadia 8 - 7-1926 4y 0m Od i c Olaya Herrera, Enrique 8 - 7-1930 4y 0 M Od e c Lopez Pumarejo, Alfonso 8 - 7-1934 4v 0 M Od i c Santos, Eduardo 8 - 7-1938 4v 0 M Od i c Lopez Pumareio, Alfonso 8 - 7- 1942 Oy 2 M 2d i Lozano v Lozano, Carlos 10 - 9-1942 0 Y 0m lOd P r Lopez Pumareio, Alfonso 10 -19-1942 ly lm Od Echandia, Dario 11 -19-1943 0v 7 m 2 Id P r Lopez Pumareio, Alfonso 7 -10-1944 ly 0 M 2 7d

P r

Lleras Camargo, Alberto 8 - 7-1945 i y 0 M Od P c Ospina Perez, Mariano 8 - 7- 1946 4y 0 M Od e c Gomez, Laureano 8 - 7- 1950 i y 2m 24d i h Urdaneta Arbelaez, 10 -31, 1951 i y 7m 13d P u

Roberto Roias Pinilla, Gustavo 6 -13-1953 3v 1 lm 3d V u Paris , Gabrie1 5 -10-1958 0v 2m 2 7d pv r Lleras Camargo, Alberto 8 - 7-1958 4y 0m Od i c

Leon Valencia, 8 - 7-1962 4y 0m Od i c Gui1lermo

Lleras Restrepo, Carlos 8 - 7-1966 4y 0m Od i c

Pastrana Bor.rero, Misael 8 - 7- 1970 4y 0m Od i c

338

Costa Rica

Pres ident Date Toolc Office Tenure In Out

Fernandez, Juan Mora 9 - 8 -1824 8y 6m Id i c Gallegos , Jose'' 3 - 9 -1833 iy 3m 18d i

Rafael de iy

Gutierrez, Agustfn 6 -27 -1834 0y lm 21d P r Gallegos , Jose'' 8 -18 -1834 Oy 6 m 16d u

Rafael de Oy

Lara Arias, Juan Jose" 3 - 4 -1935 Oy 0m 13d P r Fernandez Chacon, 3 -17 -1835 Oy lm 18d P r

Manuel Oy

Carrillo Colima, 5 - 5 -1835 iy 9 m 26d i c Braulio

iy

Fernandez, Joaquin 3 - 1 -1837 Oy lm 17d P r Mora

Aguilar Chacon, 4 -17 -1837 iy lm lOd ec u Manue1

iy

Carrillo Colima, 5 -27 -1838 3y 10m lid V r Braulio

3y

Bonilla Nava, Manuel 4 - 8 -1842 Oy 0m 4d P u Antonio

Morazan, Francisco 4 -12 -1842 Oy 5m Od V u Pinto Suarez, Antonio 9 -11 -1842 Oy 0m 6d pv r Alfaro Zarnora, Jose"" 9 -17 -1842 2y 2m 12d i c

Maria Oreamuno Bonilla, 11 -29 -1844 Oy 0m 18d i u

Francisco Oy

Murillo, Rafael Moya 12 -17 -1844 Oy 4m 13d P r Gallegos , Jose'' 4 -30 -1845 iy lm 7d P u

Rafael de iy

Alfaro Zamora, Jose'" 6 - 7 -1846 Oy 11m Od i u

Maria Castro Madriz, Jos£" 5 - 8 -1847 ly 10m 5d i

Maria ly

Carazo Bonilla, 3 -13 -1849 Oy 0m 21d P r

Manuel Jose Castro Madriz, Jose 4 - 4 -1849 Oy 7m lid u

Maria Oy

Mora Porras , Miguel 11 -15 -1849 Oy 0m lid PV r

Mora Porras, Juan 11 -26 -1849 Oy 3m 26d V Rafael

Oy

Mora Porras, Miguel 3- 22-1850 Oy 0m 14d P r

Mora Porras, Juan 4- 6-1850 8y 0m lid i Rafael

8y

Escalante Nava, Rafael 4- 17-1858 Oy 2m 13d P r Mora Porras, Juan 6- 30-1858 Oy 9m 13d u

Rafael Escalante Nava, Rafael 4-13-1859 Ov 0m 21d P u

Montealegre, Jose''Maria 5- 4-1859 4y 0m 4d V c

339



Jimenez Zamora, Jesus 5- 8-1863 3y 0m Od i c Castro, Jose''Maria 5- 8- 1866 2y 5 m 2 2d i u Jimenez Zamora, Jesus 11- 1-1868 0y 6 m 20d V Figuero'n Oreamuno, 5- 21- 1869 Oy 0m 2d P r

Eusebio Oy

Jimenez Zamora, Jesus 5- 22- 1869 Oy 11m 5d u Carranza Ramirez, 4- 27- 1870 Oy 3m lid V u

Bruno Oy

Gutie'rrez, Tom as 8- 9-1870 iy 10m 16d V Guardi a

Castro, Jose' Antonio 6- 27- 1872 Oy 7m Id p r Pinto

Oy

Gutierrez, Tama's 1- 26- 1873 Oy 9 m 26d c Guardia

Oy

Gonzales Ramirez, 11- 21-1873 Oy 0 m lOd p r Salvador

Oy

Barroeta Baca, Rafael 12- 2-1873 Oy 2m 26d P r Gutie'rrez, Tomas 2- 28-1874 iy 2 m 2 Id i

Guardi a iy

Lizano Gutierrez, 5- 21- 1875 Oy 5m 14d P r Joaquin

Gutierrez, Tomas 11- 5-1875 Oy 6m 3d c Guardia

Oy

Saenz, Aniceto 5- 8- 1876 Oy 2m 2 2d i u

Esquive1 Herrera Zeledon, 7- CaI

O

1 1876 iy lm lid pv u

Vicente Gutie'rrez, Tomans 9-11-1877 3y 8m Od V

Guardia 3y

Lara Zamora, Salvador 5-10-1881 Oy 7m 13d P r Gutierrez, Tomas 1- 23-1882 Oy 4m 2 4d h

Guardia Oy

Lizano Gutierrez, 6-17-1882 Oy lm 3d P r Saturnino

Fernandez, Pro"spero 7- 7-1882 2y 8m 5d p/i d

Soto Alfaro, Bernardo 3-12-1885 iy 7m 2 4d P/i Soto Quesada, Apolinar 11- 6 - 1886 Oy 0m 2 8d P r Soto Alfaro, Bernardo 12- 4-1886 Oy 7m 3d

Soto Quesada, Apolinar 7- 7-1887 Oy lm 6d P r Soto Alfaro, Bernardo 8- 13- 1887 iy 2m 19d

Soto Quesada, Apolinar 11- n _ i-< 1888 Oy 4m 13d P r

Soto Alfaro, Bernardo 3-15-1889 Oy lm 15d

Esquivel Ibarra, 5- 1- 1889 Oy 3 m. 1 Od P r

As cencion Soto Alfaro, Bernardo 8- 10-1889 Oy , 2m 2 7d c

340


Pres ident D;

Duran Cartin, Carlos Rodriquez, Jose' Joaquin Iglesias Castro, Rafael Iglesias Llorente,

Demetrio Iglesias Castro, Rafael Iglesias Llorente,

Demetrio Iglesias Castro, Rafael Esquivel Ibarra,

Ascencion Gonzalez Viquez, Cleto Jimenez Oreamuno,

Ricardo Gonzalez Flores, Alfredo Tinoco Granados,

Federico Quiros, Juan Bautista Aguilar Barquero,

Francisco Acosta Garcia, Julio Jimenez Oreamuno,

Ricardo Gonzalez Viquez, Cleto Jimenez Oreamuno,

Ricardo Corte's Castro, Leon Calderon Guardia, Rafael Caldero'n Guardia,

Francisco Caldero'n Guardia, Rafael Calderon Munoz, Rafael Caldero'n Guardia, Rafael Mine Saborio, Jorge Calderon Guardia, Rafael Picado Michalski,

Teodoro Picado Michalski, Rene Picado Michalski,

Teodoro Ilerrera, Santos Leon Figuere's , Jose Ulate Blanco, Otilio 7 / Figueres, Jose Echandi Jimenez, Mario Orlich, Francisco J.

e Took Office Tenure In. Out

11- 7-1889 Oy 6m Id P r 5- 8-1890 4y 0m Od ec c 5- 8-1894 4y 6m Od i

11- 8-1898 0y 7 m 13d P r

6- 21-1889 2y 6 pi 17d 1- 8-1902 Oy 2m 7d P r

3- 15-1902 Oy lm 23d c 5- 8-1902 4y 0m Od i c

5- 8-1906 4y 0m Od i c 5- 8-1910 4y 0m Od ec c

5- 8-1914 2y 10m 19d e/ec u 1- 27-1917 2y 6m 1 5d V u

8- 12-1919 0y 0m 2 Od pv r 9- 2-1919 0y 8m 6d P c

5- 8-1920 4y 0m Od v/i c 5- 8-1924 4y 0m Od e/ec c

5- 8-1928 4y 0m Od e c 5- 8-1932 4y 0m Od ec c

5- 8-1936 4v 0m Od e c 5- 8-1940 iy 6m 23d i

12- 1-1941 0y 0m 6d P r

12- 6-1941 iy lm 19d 1- 25-1943 0y 0m 9d P r 2- 4-1943 Oy lm Od 3- 4-1943 Oy 0m lid P r 3-15-1943 lv lm 23d c 5- 8-1944 Oy 4m lOd i

9-18-1944 0Y 0m 2d P r 9-19-1944 3y 7m Od

P u

4-19-1948 Oy 0m 19d pv c 5- 8-1948 iy 6m Od V T.

11- 8-1949 4y 0m Od e C 11- 8-1953 4y 6m Od e c 5- 8-1958 4Y 0m Od e c

5- 8-1962 4y 0m Od e c

341



Tre i os Fernandez, Jose' 5- 8-1966 4y, Om, Od e c Figuere's , Jose'' 5- 8- 19 70 4y, 0m, Od e c

342

Cuba


Estrada Palma, Tama's Gomez, Jose' Miguel Garcia Menocal, Mario

5-20-1902 4y 4m 8d i u Estrada Palma, Tama's Gomez, Jose' Miguel Garcia Menocal, Mario

1-28-1909 4y 3m 2 2d e c Estrada Palma, Tama's Gomez, Jose' Miguel Garcia Menocal, Mario 5-20-1913 8y Orn Od e/i c Zayas y Alfonso, 5-20-1921 4y 0m Od i c

Alfredo 4y

Machado y Morales, 5-20-1925 8y 2m 2 2d i u Gerardo

Cespedes, Carlos

8y Gerardo

Cespedes, Carlos 8-12-1933 0y 0m 23d pv u Manuel de /

Grau San Martin, Ramon

pv Manuel de /

Grau San Martin, Ramon 9-10-1933 Oy 4m 5d V r Hevia, Carlos 1-15-1934 Oy 0m 3d V r Marquez Sterling, 1-18-1934 Oy 0m Id p r

Manuel Mendieta Montefur, 1- I—

1

CO

I 1934 iy 10m 23d V r Carlos

Barnet y Vinageras, 12-11-1935 Oy 5m 9d p c Jose A.

Gomez y Arias, Miguel 5-20-1936 Oy 7m 4d i r Mariano

Laredo Bru, Federico 12-24 = 1936 3y 9m 16d P c Batista y Za.ldivar, 10-10-1940 4y 0m Od i c

Fulgencio Grau San Martin, Ramon 10-10-1944 4y 0m Od e c Prio Socarras, Carlos 10-10-1948 3y 5m Od i u Batista y Zaldivar, 3-10-1952 6y 9m 20d v/i u

Fulgencio Castro Ruz, Fidel 1- 1-1959 14y , 0m, Od V

343

Dominican Republic


Santana, Pedro 11-13-1844 3v 8m 21d V u Jimenez, Manuel 9- 8-194 8 Oy 8m 2 Id V u Baez, Buenaventura 9-24-184 9 3y 4 m 2 Id i u Santana, Pedro 2-15-1853 3y 3 m lid V r Regla Mota, Manuel de 5-26-1856 Oy 4 ?!; 12d P r Baez, Buenaventura 10- 8-1856 Oy 9m Od i u Valverde, Jose" 7- 7-1856 iy 3m Id pv

Des iderio iy pv

Santana, Pedro 1-31-1859 2y lm 18d V r Pimentel, Pedro 3-25-1865 0y 4m 18d pv

Antonio 0y pv

Cabral, Jose' Maria 8-13-1865 Oy 3m 2 5d Baez, Buenaventura 12- 8-1865 Oy 5m 2 Od i u Cabral , Jose" Maria 8-22-1866 iy 5m 9d V u Baez, Buenaventura 5- 2-1868 5y 7 m 29d V u Gonzalez, Ignacio 1- 2-1874 2y lm 19d V u

Mar 1 a Espaillat, Ulises 5-29-1876 Oy 4 m 6d i u

Francis co Gonzalez, Ignacio 10- 5-1876 Oy 2m 22d V u

Maria Oy

Baez, Buenaventura 12-27-1876 lv 2m 5d V u Gonzales, Ignacio 7- -1878 Oy lm Od V u

Mar la Guillermo, Cesareo 2-27-1879 Oy 9 m 8d V u Lupero'n, Gregorio 12- 6-1879 3y 8 m 25d pv r Merino, Fernando 9- 1-1880 2y 0m Od e c

Arturo de 2y

rieureaux, Ulises 9- 1-1882 2y 0m Od i c Billini, Francisco 9- 1-1884 Oy 8m 15d i r

Gregorio Woss y Gil, Alejandro 5-16-1885 lv 7m 2 2d P r Heureaux, Ulises 1- 6-1887 12v 6m 2 Od i da Figuereo, Wenceslao Vasquez, Horacio

5-26-1899 Ov lm 4d P r Figuereo, Wenceslao Vasquez, Horacio 8-30-1899 Oy 2m 15d pv . r Jimenez, Juan Isidro 11-15-1899 2y 5m 15d v/i u Vasquez, Horacio 5- 1-1902 0y 11m 18d V u Woss y Gil, Alejandro 4-18-1903 Oy 6m 16d V u Morales, Carlos F. 11- 4-1903 2y 2m 9d v/i u Ca'ceres , Ramon 1-13-1906 5y 10m 6d V/i da Victoria, Eladio 11-19-1911 iy 0m 7d p r Nouel, Adolfo A. 12- 2-1912 0y 3m 2 9d i r Bordas , Jose" 4-14-1912 lv 4m 13d V u Baez, Ramon 8-27-1914 Ov 3m 8d PV r Jimenez, Juan Isidro 12- 5-1914 iy 5m 2d e u Ilenriquez, Francisco 7-26-1916 0y , 4m 13d P u

344

Dominican Republ ic--Continued


Burgos, Juan Vicini 10- 1-1922 ly, 5m,15d P c Vasquez, Horacio 3-15-1924 5y,11m,18d e u Estrella, Rafael Urena 3- 3-1930 Oy, 2m,13d pv r Truiillo, Rafael 5-16-19 30 8y , 3m, Od v/i c

Leonidas Peynado, Jacinto B. 8-16-1938 ly, 6m,21d i d Troncoso de la Concha, 2-27-1940 2y, 2m,2 4d P c

Manuel Trujillo, Rafael 5-16-1942 lOy, 3m, 2d i c

Leonidas Truiillo, He'ctor 8-16-1952 7y,11m , 16d i c Balaguer, Joaquin 8- 4-1960 ly, 5m,12d i u Bonnelly, Rafael 1-18-1962 ly, lm,lld pv r Bosch, Juan 2-27-1963 Oy, 7m, Od e u Cabral, Donald Reid 9-27-1963 ly, 7m, Od PV u Imbert Barrera, 4-25-1965 Oy, 4m,•8d pv u

Antonio Garcia Godoy, Hector Balaguer, Joaquin

9- 3-1965 Oy, 9m,28d pv c Garcia Godoy, Hector Balaguer, Joaquin 7- 1-1966 e/i

345

Ecuador


Flores, Juan Jose' 5-13-1830 Oy 6m, 15d v/i u Bolivar, Simon 11-28-1830 Oy 0m, 9d V u Flores , Juan Jose-' 12- 7-1830 3y 6m, 5d V u Valdivieso, Felix 6-12-1834 0y 2 m, 2 8d pv r Rocafuerte, Vicente 9-10-1834 4y 4m, 2 Id V/i c Flores , Juan Jose' 1-31-1839 3y 11m, 2 2d i Provisional Junta 1-22-1843 0y 2m, 9d Flores , Juan Jose"' 4 - 1-1843 i y 11m, 6d u Provisional Junta 3- 6 -1845 0v 9m, 2d Boca, Vicente Ramo'n 12- 8-1845 4y 0m, 1 d ec c Ascazubi", Manuel de 12-15-1849 Oy 2m, 17d P r Noboa, Diego 3- 2-1850 0y 3m, 13d v Elizalde, Antonio 6 - 15-1850 Oy 8m, lid P r Noboa, Diego 2 - 26-1851 Oy 4m, 2 8d u Urvina, Jose'' Maria 7-24-1851 4y 4m, 2 Id v/i c Robles , Francisco 12-16-1856 2y 4m, 15d i u Provisional Junta 5- 1-1859 Oy 4m, 17d Franco, Guillermo 9-17-1859 i y 0m, 7 d pv u Garcia Moreno, Gabriel 9-24-1860 4y 11m, 13d v/i c Carrion, Jeronimo 9- 7-1865 2y 4m, 13d i u Artete, Pedro Jose"" de 1- 1868

2y pu r

Espinosa, Javier 1- 20-1868 0y 11m, 27d pv u Garcia Morena, Gabriel 1-17-1869 5y 10m, 2 2d i da Javier Leon, Francisco 12- 9-1875

5y

P r Ascazubf, Manuel de 1876 P c Borrero, Antonio 1876 e u Veintimilla, Ignacio 9- 8-1876 6Y, 4m, 6d v/i u

(J "

Provisional Junta 1-14-1883 iy 0m, 26d Pla'cido Caamano, Jose'' 2-10-1884 4y 4m, 2 3d ec c

Maria Cevallos, Pedro Jose"' 7- 1-1888 0y lm, 13d P r Flores Jiion, Antonio 8-17-1888 3y 10m, 17d e c Cordero , Luis 7- 1-1892 i u Salazar, Vicente Lucio 1893 pv u Alfaro, Eloy 6- 5-1895 6y 2m, 26d v/i c Plaza Gutierrez, 9- 1-1901 4y 0m, Od i c

Leonidas 4y

Garcia, Lizardo 9- 1-1905 Oy 4m, 15d i u Alfaro, Eloy 1-16-1906 5y 0m, Od v/i u Freile Zaldumbide, Carlos 1911 PV c Estrada, Victor Emilio 9- 1-1911 Oy 3m, 2 3d i d Freile Zaldumbide, Carlos 12-25-1911 Oy 0m 3d P u Andrade Marin, Francisco 12-28-1911 0y 8m 2d pv c Plaza Gutierrez, 9- 1-1912 4y 0m, Od i c

Leonidas

346

Ecuador-- Continued


Baquerizo Moreno, 9- 1-1916 4y , 0m, Od i c Alfredo

Tamayo, Jose Luis 9- 1-1920 4y 0m Od i c Cordova, Gonzalo S. 9- 1-1924 Oy 10m 9d i u Provisional Junta 7-10-1925 Oy 8m 20d Ayora, Isidro 4- 1-1926 5y 4m 2 4d v/i u Larrea Alba, Luis 8-24-1931 0y lm 2 Id pv u Baquerizo Moreno, 10-15-1931 Oy 10m 17d p u

Alfredo Guerrero Martinez, 9- 2-1932 Oy 3 m 3d p u

Alberto Oy

Martinez, Juan de 12- 5-1932 Oy 10m 15d i i Dios

Montalvo, Abelardo 10-20-1933 Oy 10m lOd P c Velasco Ibarra, Jose 9- 1-1934 Oy 11m 21d i u

Maria Pons , Antonio 8-21-1935 Oy 0m 5d pv r Paaz, Federico 9-26-1935 2y 0m 2 7d P r Gallo, Alberto 10-23-1937 0y 9m 17d P r

Enriquez Borrero, Manuel Maria

Enriquez Borrero, Manuel Maria 8-10-1938 Oy 3m 2 2d P c Mosquera Harvaez, 12- 2-1938 Oy 11m 14d i d

Aurelio Arroyo, Carlos Alberto 11-16-1939 Oy 0m 2 5d P r Cordova, Andres F. 12-11-1939 Oy 8m 6d P r Moreno, Julio E, 8- -1940 Oy 0m 2 Od p c Arroyo, Carlos Alberto 9- 1-1940 3y 9m Od i u Junta 5-28-1944 0y 0m 3d Velasco Ibarra, Jose

Maria 6- 1-1944 3y 2m 23d v/i u Velasco Ibarra, Jose

Maria Mancheno Can as, Carlos 8-23-1947 Oy 0m 9d V u Suarez Veintimilla, 9- 2-1947 Oy 0m 15d pv r

Mari ano Arosemena Tola, Carlos 9-17-1947 Oy 11m 13d p c

Jul io Oy

Plaza Lasso, Galo 9- 1-1948 4y 0m Od e c Velasco Ibarra, Jose 9- 1-1952 4y 0m Od e c

Maria Ponce Enriquez, Camilo 9- 1-1956 4y 0m Od e c Velasco Ibarra, Jose 9- 1-1960 iy 2m 8d e u

Maria Arosemena Tola, Carlos 11- 9-1961 iy 8m 2d PV u

Julio Castro Jiion, Ramon 7-11-1963 2y 8m 18d V u Yerovi Indaburo, Clemente 3-29-1966 0y 7m 17d PV r

347

Ecuador--Continued

Pres ident Date Toole Office Tenure In Out

Arosemena Gomez, Otto 11-16-1966 ly, 9m,16d p c Velasco Ibarra, Jose'' 9- 1-1968 3y, 5m,15d e/v u

Maria

348

El Salvador

Pres ident

Barriere, Pedro Delgado, Jos^ Matias Rodriquez, Juan

Manue1 Prado, Mariano Villacorta, Juan

Vicente Prado, Mariano Cornelo, Jose' Mar fa Morazan, Francisco Prado, Mariano Villacorta, Dionisio Prado, Mariano San Martin, Joaquin Salazar, Carlos Salazar, Gregorio Escalon, Joaquin Silva, Jose Maria Ilerrera, Dionisio de Espinosa, Nicolas Gomez, Francisco Vigil, Diego Menendez, Timoteo Vigil, Diego Menendez, Timoteo Canas , Antonio Jose Morazan, Francisco Silva, Jose' Maria Canas, Antonio Jose Ramirez, Norberto Lindo y Zelaya, Juan Marin, Escolastico Guzman, Juan Jose Villacorta, Dionisio Marin, Escolastico Guzman, Juan Jose' Arce, Pedro Guzman, Juan Jose"' Palacios, Fermin Malespin, Francisco Guzman, Joaquin

Eufrasio Malespin, Francisco Guzman, Joaquin

Eufrasio Palacios, Fermin

e Took Office Tenure In Out

9-22-1821 o y , 2m Od V u 11- -1821 2 y , 5m Od V

3- -1824 o y , 6m Od P r

9- -1824 o y , 3 in Od P c 12-13-1824 2 y , 0m Od ec h

12- -1826 2 y , lin Od P u 1-15-1829 3 y , 4m Od i u 4- -1832 o y , lm Od V c 5-13-1832 o y , lm 17d i 6-30-1832 0 v , 0m 19d P r 7-19-1832 l v , 0m 6d u 2- -1833 i y , 4m Od pv u 6-23-1834 o y , 0m 2 Od V r 7-13-1834 o y , 2m Od V u 9-13-1834 0v, lm Id pv r

10-14-1834 o y , 5m 26d p r 4- -1835 0v, 0m 5d p r 4-15-1835 o y , 6m 2 7d p u 11-13-1835 o y , 4m 17d p c 4- 1-1836 i y , lm 2 3d i 5-23-1837 o y , 0m 14d P r 6- 7-1837 Ov, 7 m Od c 1- 6-1838 o y , 4 m 17d P r 5-23-1839 o y , lm 18d p r 7-11-1839 0v, 7m 5d i r 2-16-1840 o y , lm 19d P r 4- 5-1840 O y , 5m 15d P u 9-20-1840 o y , 3m 17d pv u 2- 1-1841 i y , 0m Od v/i u 2- 1-1842 o y , 2m lid pv c 4-12-1842 o y , 2m 18d i 6-30-1842 o y , 0m 19d P r 7-19-1842 o y , 2m 7d P r 9-26-1842 o y , 4m Od 1-26-1843 o y , lm 12d P r 3- 8-1843 o y , 10m 23d u 1-31-1844 o y , 0 m Id pv r 2- 1-1844 o y , 3m 8d i 5-19-1844 o y , lm 7d P r

6-16-1844 o y , 4m 9d 10-25-1844 o y , 3m 2 Id P r

2-16-1845 o y , 2m 9d P r

349



Guzman, Joaquin Eufras io

Pal acios, Fermm Aguilar, Eugenio Palacios , Fermin Aguilar, Eugenio Medina, Tomans Quiroz, Felix Vasconcelos, Doroteo Rodriguez , Ramo"n Santin del Castillo,

Miguel Vasconcelos, Doroteo Duenas, Francisco Quiroz, Felix Duenas, Francisco Gomez, Vicente San Martin, Jose'' Maria Hernandez, Mariano San Martin, Jose" Maria Duenas, Francisco Campo, Rafael Duenas, Francisco Campo, Rafael Zepeda, Lorenzo Santin del Castillo,

Miguel Barrios , Gerardo Santin del Castillo,

Miguel Guzman, Joaquin

Eufrasio Peralta , Jose"'Maria. Barrios Espinosa,

Gerardo Peralta, Jose''Mar fa Barrios Espinosa,

Gerardo Duenas , Francisco Gonzales , Santiago Mendez, Manuel Gonzalez, Santiago Valle, Andres Zaldivar, Rafael

Guirola, Angel

4-25-1845 oy, 9m 5d p/v c

2- 1-1846 oy, 0m 2 Id P r 2-21-1846 0y, 4 m. 2 Id i 7-12-1846 oy, 0m 9d P r 7-21-1S46 iy, 6m 9d c 2- 1-1848 oy, 0m 2d P r 2- 3-1848 Oy, 0m 4d P r 2- 7-1848 iy, 11m 19d i r 1-26-1850 oy, 0m 4d P c 2- 1-1850 oy, 0 m 3d P r

2- 4-1850 oy, 11m 8d i u 1-12-1851 oy, lm 18d pv r 3- 1-1851 oy, 2m 13d P r 5-13-1851 2y, 8 in 17d P/i c 2- 1-1854 oy, 0m 12d P r 2-12-1854 oy, 7m 14d i 9-26-1854 oy, lm 17d P r 11-13-1854 iy, 2m 17d c 2- 1-1856 oy, 0m 12d P r 2-12-1856 oy, 3 m 4d i 5-16-1856 oy, 2m 2d P r 7-18-1856 iy, 6m 12d c 2- 1-1858 oy, 0m 6d P r 2- 7-1858 oy, 4m 17d i

6-24-1858 oy, 2 m 26d P r 9-20-1858 oy, 4m Od u

1-19-1859 oy, 0m 26d pv r

2-15-1859 oy, 0m 24d p r 3- 9-1859 iy, 9m 6d v/i

12-15-1860 0v, lm 24d p r 2- 9-1861 2y, 8m 17d u

10-26-1863 sy, 5m 19d pv/i u 4-15-1871 iy, 0m 15d pv/i 5- 1-1872 oy, 2m 8d P r 7- 9-1872 3v, 6m 2 Id c 2 - 1-1876 oy, 3m Od i u 4-30-1876 7y, 11m 6d pv/i 7y,

(2i) 4- 6-1884 oy, 4m, 15d P r

350



Zaldivar, Rafael 8-21-1884 Oy 8 m. 24d u Figueroa, Fernando 5-15-1885 Oy lm 3d pv u Rosales , Jose^ 6-18-1885 Ov 0m 4d P r Menendez, Francisco 6-22-1885 5y 0m Od v/i d Ezeta, Carlos 6-22-1890 3y 11m 2 4d v/i u Gutierrez, Rafael 6- 9-1894 5y 4m 27d v/i u

Antonio 5y

Regalado, Tomas Escalon, Pedro Jose

11-13-1898 4y 3m 15d v/i c Regalado, Tomas Escalon, Pedro Jose 2-28-1903 4v 0m Od i c Figueroa, Fernando 2-28-1907 4y 0 m Od i c Arauio, Manuel 2-28-1911 l y 11m 9d i da

Enrique Melendez, Carlos 2- 8-1913 ly 6m 2 Id P r Quinonez Molina, 8-28-1914 0y 6m Od P c

Alfonso Melendez, Carlos 2-28-1915 3y 9m 2 Id i h Quinonez Molina, 12-21-1918 Oy 2m 7d P c

Alfonso Melendez, Jorge 2-28-1919 4y 0m Od i c Quinonez Molina, 2-28-1923 4y 0m Od i c

A1fonso Bosque, Pio Romero 2-28-1927 ^ y 0m Od i c Arauio, Arturo Hernandez Martinez,

2-28-1931 0y 9m 2d i u Arauio, Arturo Hernandez Martinez, 12- 2-1931 2y 8m 26d V r

Maxmi1i ano 2y

Menendez, Andres I. 8-28-1934 0v 6 m Od P c Hernandez Martinez, 2-28-1935 9y 2m 8d i (3)u

Maxmi1i ano Menendez, Andres I.

Maxmi1i ano Menendez, Andres I. 5- 8-1944 0y 5m 13d pv u Aguirre y Salinas, 10-21-1944 Oy 4m lOd pv c

Osmin Castaneda Castro, 2-28-1945 3y 9m 14d i u

Salvador 3y

Cordova, Manuel de 12-15-1948 0y Oirv 19d V u Jesus/

Osorio, Oscar 1- 4-1949 Oy 9m 18d pv r Bolanos , ,0scar 10-22-1949 Oy 10m 2 2d P c Osorio, Oscar 9-14-1950 6y 0m Od i c Lemus , Jose' Maria 1-25-1956 4y lm 12d i u Rodolfo Cor doll, 1-25-1962 0y 5m 5d pv c

Eusebio 0y

Rivera Carballo, 7- 1-1962 5y 0m Od i c Julio

Sanchez Hernandez, 7- 1-1967 5y 0 m Od i c Fidel

351

Guatemala


Gainza, Gabino 9-15-1821 Oy 9m 7d V u Filisola, Vicente 6-22-1822 Oy 5m Od i r Codallos, Felipe 11- -1822 iy 10m Od P Diaz, Alejandro 9-15-1824 Oy 0m 2 Sd P r Barrundia Jose"' 10-12-1824 ly 10m 24d ec u

Francisco, Juan ly

Flores , Cirilo 9- 6-1826 Oy lm 7d pv da Arce, Manuel 10-13-1826 Oy 3m Od P r Estrada, Jose 1- -1827 Oy 3 m Od P r Aycinena, Mariano de 3- 1-1827 2y lm 13d i u Zenteno, Mariano 2-11-1829 0y lm Od pv u Barrundia, Jose 4-13-1829 Oy 4m Od pv r

Juan Oy pv

Molina Flores, Pedro 8- -1829 Oy 7m Od i u Rivera Cabezas, 3- 9-1830 Oy 9m Od PV r

Antonio Oy PV

Marque'z, Gregorio 2- -1831 0y lm Od P r Martinez, Juan Antonio 2- -1831 Oy 0m 5d P r Vasconcelos, Simo'n 2- -1831 Oy 0m 5d P ' r Valenzuela, Pedro J. 2- -1831 0y 0m 5d P r Marquez, Gregorio 3- -1831 Oy 5m Od P r Flores, Francisco X. 8- -1831 Oy lm Od P r Galvez, Mariano 8- -1831 4y 8m Od i c Sanchez de Leon, 5- -1836 0y 0m 5d P r

Mari ano 0y

Galvez, Mariano 5- -1836 i y 10m Od i u Valenzuela, Pedro J. 2- 2-1838 0y 5m 20d V u Rivera Paz, Mariano 7-22-1838 Oy 6m 8d v/i u Salazar, Carlos 1-30-1839 Oy 2m 13d V u Rivera Paz, Mariano 4-13-1839 2y 8m Od V u Lopez, Venancio 12-14-1841 Oy 5m Od pv r Rivera Pas, Mariano 5-14-1842 2y 6m 27d i u Carrera, Jose Rafael / ' Martinez, Juan

12-11-1844 3v 8m 4d v/i u Carrera, Jose Rafael / ' Martinez, Juan 8-15-1848 Oy 3 m 13d P r

Antonio Oy

Escobar, Jose Bernardo 11-28-1848 Oy 0m 3d p r Paredes, Mariano 1- 1-1849 2y 9m 2 Id i u Carrera, Jose Rafael 10-22-1851 13y 5m 22d V d Aucinena, Pedro de 4-14-1865 Oy lm Od P r Cerna, Vicente 5 -14-1865 6y lm 16d p/i u Garcia Granados, Miguel 6 -30-1871 Oy 10m 8d V

Barrios, Justo Rufino 5- 8-1872 Oy lm 2d P r Garcia Granados, Miguel 6 -10-1872 0y 11m 24d

P c

Barrios, Justo Rufino 6 -14-1873 9y lm Od i (2) Orantes , Jose'' Maria 7- -1882 0y 5 m Od P r Barrios, Justo Rufino 12- -1882 ly 5 m Od d

352

Guatemala--Continued


Sinibaldi, Alejandro 4- 3-1885 Oy 0m 5d P r Barillas, Manuel 4- 8-1885 4y 1 lm 23d P/i c

Lis andro 4y P/i

Reyna Barrios, Jose 3-15-1892 5y 10m 23d e/v da Maria

Estrada Cabrera, 2- 8-1898 2 2y 2 m 6d P/i (3) u Manue1

Herrera, Carlos / S

Orellana, Jose Maria 4-14-1920 Oy 7m 21d pv/ i u Herrera, Carlos

/ S Orellana, Jose Maria 12- 5-1920 5y 9m 16d v/i d Chacon, Lazaro 9-26-1926 4y 2m 16d p/i h Palma, Baudilio 12-12-1930 Oy 0 m 5d P u Orellana, Manuel 12-17-1930 Oy 0m 15d V r Reyna Andrade, Jose 1- 2-1931 Oy lm 12d p u

Maria" Ubico, Jorge 2-14-1931 13y 4m 17d v/i u Ponce Vaides, Federico 7- 1-1944 0y 3m 19d i u Military Junta 10-20-1944 Oy 4m 2 5d pv c Arevalo, Juan Jose 3-15-1945 6y 0m Od i c Arbenz Guzman, Jacobo 3-15-1951 3y 3m 12d i u Military Junta 6-27-1954 0y 0m 6d pv r Castillo Armas, Carlos 7- 3-1954 3y 0m 23d v/i da Gonzales Solis, Luis 7-26-1957 Ov 2m 28d P r Military Junta 10-24-1957 Oy 0m 2d pv r Flores Avendano, 10-26-1957 Oy 4m 6d P c

Guillermo Oy

Ydigoras Fuentes , 3- 2-1958 5y 0m 2 9d e u

Miguel Peralta Azurdia, 3-31-1963 3y 3m Od v c

Enrique Od Mendez Montenegro, 7- 1-1966 4y 0m Od e c

Julio Arana Osorio, Carlos 7- 1-1970 e

353

Haiti

President Date Took 0 f f : i . c e Tenure In Out

Dessalines, Jean Jacques 1- 1-1804 2y 9m 1 7d V da Christophe, Henri 10-17-1806 13y 11m 2 Id i ds Petion, Alexandre 3- 9-1807 lly 0m 20d i d Bover , Jean Pierre 3-30-1818 24v 11m 13d i u Ilerard, Charles 12-30-1843 Oy 4m 3d V u Guerrier, Philippe 5- 3-1844 Ov 11m 12d V d Pierrot, Jean Louis 4-16-1845 Ov 10m 12d i r Riche, Jean Baptiste 3- 1-1846 0y 11m 26d i d Soulouque, Faustin 3- 1-1847 lly 10m 15d i u Geffrarc1 . Fabre 12-23-1858 8y 2 m 2 Od V u Salnave, Sylvain 6-14-1867 2v 6m 4d' V u Nissape-Saget 3-19-1870 4y lm 2 4 d V r Domingue, Michel 6-11-1874 lv 10m 4d i u Bo is ronde- Canal 7-17-1876 3y 0m Od i u Felicite Salomon, 10-23-1879 8y 9m 18d i u

Etienne 8y

Boisronde-Canal 8-10-1888 Oy 4m 4d pv r Legitime, F. Deus 12-16-1888 Oy 8m 7d V u Florvil Ilippolyte, F.M. 10- 9-1889 6y 5m 14d V d Simon Sam, P.A. Tiresias 3-31, 1896 6y lm 15d i r Alexis , Nord 12-21-1902 5y 11m 12d i u Simon, F. Antoine 12-17-1908 2v 7m 16d V u Leconte, Michel 8-14-1911 Oy 11m 24d V da

Cincinnatus Auguste, Tancrede 8- 8-1912 Oy 8m 2 4d i da Oreste, Michel 5- 4-1913 Ov 8m 2 3d i u Zamor, Oreste 2- 8- 1914 0y 8m 20d V u Theodore, Joseph 11- 7-1914 Oy 3m 15d V u

Davilmar Sam, Jean Vilbrun 3- 4-1915 Oy 4m '2 3d V da

Gu i1laume Dartiguenave, Philippe 8-12-1915 6y 9 m 4d i c

Sudre Borno, Joseph Louis 5-15-1922 8y 0m Od i (2) c Roy, Eugene 5-15-1930 Oy 6m 3d P r Vincent, Stenio 11-18-1930 lOy 5m 2 7d ec/i c Lescot, Elie : 5-15-1941 4y 7m 26d i u Junta 1-11-1946 Ov 7m 5d Estime, Dumersais 8-16-1946 3y 8m 24d i u Magloire, Paul 5-10-1950 6v 7m 2d v/ i u Memours Pierre- 12-12-1956 Uy lm 2 2d pv u

Louis , Joseph Cantave, Ledin 2- 4-1957 0y 0m 3d pv r Sylvain, Franck 2- 7-1957 Oy lm 2 4d PV r Fignole, Daniel 5-25-1957 Oy 0 m 19d pv _.u Kebreau, Antonio T. 6-14-1957 Oy 4 m 8d pv c Duvalier, Franqois 10-22-1957 13y 6m Od e d

354

Honduras


Herrera, Dionisio Mills , Jose" Justo Bendena, Cleto Zelaya, Jose J. Bustamante, Miguel Morazan, Francisco Zelaya, Jose J. Vigil f/ Diego Morazan, Francisco Arias , Juan Angel Morazan, Francisco Valle, Jose Santos del Marquez, Jose Antonio Mills, Francisco Rivera, Joaquin Ferrera, Francisco * / Rivera, Joaquin Ferrera, Francisco Rivera, Joaquin Bustillo, Jose Maria Rivera, Joaquin Martinez, Jose' Maria Herrera, Jose' J. Martinez, Jose Maria Matute, Lino Molina, Juan F. de Medina, Felipe N. Alvarado, Jose Guerro , Jose Maria Garriga, Mariano Bustillo, Jose Maria Ministros, Consejo de Zelaya y Reyes,

Francisco Ferrera, Francisco Ministros, Consejo de Ferrera, Francisco Ministros, Conseio de Ferrera, Francisco Chavez, Coronado Ministros, Consejo de Lindo, Juan Bustillo, Felipe Lindo, Juan Go'mez, Francisco Cabanas , Trinidad

9-16-1824 2y 5m 24d v/ec u 3-10-1827 0y 6m Od V u 9- -1827 Oy lm Od P

10- -1827 Ov lm Od P 11- 5-1827 Oy 0m 2 2d P 11-27-1827 0y 6m 2 Id x> 6-18-1828 Ov 0m 12d P 6-30-1828 lv 5m 2d p 12- 2-1829 Oy 0m 2 2d p 12-24-1829 0y 3m 2 8d p 4-22-1830 Oy 3m 6d p 7-28-1830 Ov 7m 12d p 3-10-1831 iy 0m lid p 3-22-1832 0y 9m 15d p 1- 7-1833 Oy 8m 17d i 9-2.4-1833 Oy 4m Od P r 1- -1834 Oy 8m Od 9-20-1834 Oy 2 m Od P r

11- -1834 Oy 10m Od 9-10-1835 Oy lm Od P r

10- -1835 iy 2m Od u 12-31-1836 Oy 4m 2 8d pv 5-28-1837 ly 3m 5d P 9- 3-1838 Oy 2m 9d P

11-12-1838 Oy lm 2 7d P 1- 9-1839 Oy 3 m 4d P 4-13-1839 0y 0m 2d P 4-15-1839 0y 0m 13d P 4-28-1839 Oy 3m 12d P 8-10-1839 Oy 0m lOd P 8-20-1839 Oy Oin 7d P 8-27-1839 Oy 0m 4d 9-21-1839 iy 3m 10 d

1- 1-1841 2y 0m Od i c 1- 1-1843 0y lm 2 8d P c 2-28-1843 ly 8m Od i

10- -1844 Oy lm Od P r 11- -1844 Oy 2m Od c 1- 1-1845 2y 0m Od i c 1- 1-1847 Oy lm 12 d p r 2-12-1847 0y 7 m 9 a i r 9-21-1847 lv 2m 16d P c

12- 8-1848 3y lm 2 2d i h 2- 1-1852 Oy lm Od P c 3- 1-1852 ly 2m 8d i u

355



Gomez, Francisco CabafTas , Trinidad Bueso J., Santiago Aguilar, Francisco Guardiola, Santos

Montes , Francisco, Medina, Jos</ Maria Castellano, Victoriano Montes , Francisco Medina, Jose'' Maria Inestroza, Francisco Medina, Jose'" Maria Golnez, Cresencio Medina, Jose''Maria Gomez, Cresencio Medina, Jose Maria Lopez, Juan x Medina, Jose Maria Ministros, Consejo de Cruz, Francisco Medina, Jose Maria Rodriguez, Inocente Xatruch , Florencio Medina, Jose Maria Rodriguez, Inocente Medina, Jose Maria Gomez, Cresencio Arias , Celeo Leiva, Ponciano Medina, Jose Maria Zelada, Jose Marfa Leiva, Ponciano Meiia, Marcelino Gomez, Cresencio Ministros, Consejo de Medina, Jose Maria Soto, Marcos Aurelio Ministros, Consejo de Soto, Marcos Aurelio Ministros, Consejo de Bogran, Luis Ministros, Consejo de Bogran, Luis Leiva, Ponciano Bogran, Luis

5- 9-1853 Oy 7m 22d pv r 12-31-1853 iy 9m 18d i u 10-18-1855 0v 0m 16d pv h 11- 8-1855 Ov 3m lid pv u 2-19-1856 5y 10m 2 2d v/i da 5y

(2i) 1-11-1862 0y 0m 24d P r 2- 5-1862 Ov 0 m 12d P r 0 -17-1862 Ov 9m 17d p d

12- 4-1862 0v 6m 17d P u 6-21-1863 Oy 6m lOd pv r 1- 1-1864 Oy lm 15d P c 2-15-1864 Iv 3m Od i h 5-15-1865 Oy 3m 15d P r 9- 1-1865 Oy lm Id i

10- 2-1865 Oy 4m Od P r 2- 1-1866 ly 3 m 2 7d 5-27-1867 Oy 5m 24d P r

11-21-1867 Oy 6m Od r 5- -1868 lv 4m Od 9- 5-1869 Ov 4m 9d P c 1-14-1870 iy 0m Od i u

1871 0y 2m Od pv 3-26-1871 Ov lm 21d P 5-17-1871 Oy lm 15d v u 7- 2-1871 Oy 3m 1 8d v u

10-20-1871 Ov 5 m 15d v u 4- 5-1872 Oy lm 7d p r 5-12-1872 iy 6 m* lid pv/i u

11-23-1873 2y 0m 23d pv/i u 12-16-1875 0y 0m 2 4d pv u 1-13-1876 Oy 0m 20d pv r 2- 3-1876 Oy 4 m 5d V r 6- 8-1876 Ov 0m 5d p r 6-13-1876 Oy 2m Od p r 8-12-1876 Ov 0m 4d 8-16-1876 Oy 0 m lid V r 8-27-1876 3y 9m 13d p/ec c 6-10-1880 Ov 3m 2 Od

p/ec

9-30-1880 2y 7m 9d i h 5- 9-1883 0y 6m 2 Id

11-30-1883 Oy 9m Od i (2) 8-30-1884 Oy 2m 17d

11-17-1884 Oy 4m 4d 3 -21-18 85 Oy 3m 6d P r 6-27-1885 Oy 9 m 18d

356



Leiva/} Ponciano 4-15-1886 Oy 4m 13d P r Bogran, Luis 8-28-1886 5y 3m 2d c Leiva, Ponciano 11-30-1891 lv 2m 9d i r Aguero, Rosendo 2- 9-1893 Oy 2m 9d P u Vasquez, Domingo 4-18-1893 Oy 10m 2d V u Bonilla, Policarpo 2-22-1894 4y 11m 9d V/i c Sierra, Terencio 2- 1-1899 3v 11m Od i u Ministros, Consejo de 12-30-1902 Oy lm 18d Arias , Juan A. 2-18-1903 Oy lm 2 5d i u Bonilla, Manuel 4-13-1903 3y 10m 12d V u Ministros, Consejo de 2-25-1907 0y lm 23d Davila, Miguel R. 4-18-1907 3v 11m lOd v/i u Bertrand, Francisco 3-28-1911 Oy 11m Od pv r Bonilla, Manuel 2- 1-1912 ly lm 2 Od i d Bertrand,Francis co 3-21-1913 Oy 4m 7d P r Membreno, Alberto 7-28-1913 2y 5m 2d P c Bertrand, Francisco 2- 1-1916 3y 7m 8d i u Ministros, Consejo de 9- 9-1919 Oy 0m 26d Bogran, Francisco 10- 5-1919 Oy 5m 26d PV r Lo'pez Gutierrez, Rafael 2- 1-1920 4y lm lOd v/i u Ministros, Consejo de 3-10-1924 0y lm 2 Od Tosta, Vicente 4-30-1924 Oy 9m Od P r Paz Baraona, Miguel 2- 1-1925 4y 0m Od i c Meiis Colindres, Vicente 2- 1-1929 4y 0m Od e c Carias Andino, Tiburcio 2- 1-1933 15y 11m Od e/i Galvez, Manuel 1- 1-1949 5y 11m 16d i u Lozano Dias, Julio 11-16-1954 i y 11m 5d P h Military Junta" 10-21-1956 i y 2m Od u Villeda Morales, Ramon 12-21-1957 5y 9m 12d v/e Lopez Arellano, 10- 3-1963 7y 8m 3d v/i u

Oswaldo

357

Mexico

Pres ident D;

Iturbide, Agustin de Vivanco, Marquis de Junta Victoria, Guadalupe Guerrero, Vicente Bocanegra, Jose Maria Velez, Pedro Bustamante, Anastasio Muzquiz, Melchor Gomez Pedraza, Manuel Santa Anna, A. Lopez

• c1"e Gomez Farias, Valentin Santa Anna, A. Lopez

• c e Gomez Farias, Valentfn Santa Anna, A. Lopez ^ de ^

Gomez Farias, Valentin Santa Anna, A. Lopez ^ d e ^

Gomez Farias, Valentin Santa Anna, A. Lo'pez

de Barragan, Miguel

. Corro , Jose' Justo Bustamante, Anastasio Santa Anna, A. Lo'pez

de Bravo, Nicolas Bustamante, Anastasio Echeverria, Francisco

Javier Santa Anna, A. Lopez

de /

Bravo, Nicolas Santa Anna, A. Lopez

de Canalizo, Valentin Santa Anna, A. Lopez

de ^ ^ Herrera, Jose' Joaquin de Canalizo, Valentin Herrera, Jose'' Joaquin de Paredes y Arrillaga,

Mari ano


5-21-1822 Oy 9m 2 8d V u 3-19-1823 Oy 0m 13d pv r 4- 2-1823

10-10-1824 4y 6 m lOd e c 4-11-1829 0y 8m 17d i u

12-18-1829 Ov 0m 5d pv u 12-23-1829 Ov 0 m 8d pv r 1- 1-1830 2y 8m 13d V u 8-14-1832 Ov 4 m lOd Pv r

12-24-1832 Ov 4 m 6d p c 4- 1-1833 Oy 0 m lOd i

4-10-1833 Oy lm 5d P r 5-16-1833 Oy 0m 14d

6- 2-1833 Oy 0m 1 5d P r 6-18-1833 Oy 0m 17d

7- 6-1833 Oy 3 m 2 Id P r 10-28-1833 Oy lm 6d

12- 5-1833 Oy 4m 18d P r 4-24-1834 Oy 9m Id r

1-28-1835 i y lm 2d P d 3- 2-1836 Oy lm 16d P r 4-19-1837 i y 11m 2 8d i u 3-18-1839 Oy 3m 21d V u

7-10-1839 Oy 0m 7d pv r 7-17-1839 2y 2m 4d • i u 9-22-1841 Oy 0m 17d pv r

10- 9-1841 J y 0m 16d V

10-26-1842 Oy 4m 9d P r 3- 5-1843 Oy 6 m 2 8d

10- 4-1843 Oy 8 m Od P r 6 - 4-1844 Oy 3m 7d r

9-12-1844 Oy 0m 9d P r 9-21-1844 Oy 2m 14d P u 12- 6-1844 i y 0m 24d pv u 1- 3-1846 Oy 6m 2 5d V u

358

Mexico--Continued

Pres ident

Bravo, Nicolas Salas, Jose Mariano Gomez Farias, Valentin Santa Anna, A. Lopez

de ^ Anaya, Pedro Maria Santa Anna, A. Lopez

de Pena y Pena, Manuel

de la Anaya, Pedro Maria Pena v Pena, Manuel

de la Merrera, Jose Joaquin de Arista, Mariano Ceballos, Juan Bautista Lombardini, Manuel Maria Santa Anna, A. LcTpez

d e

Carrera, Martin Diaz de la Vega, Romulo Alvarez, Juan Comonfort, Ignacio Zuloaga, Felix Robles Pezuela, Manuel Zuloaga, Felix Miramon, Miguel Pavon, Jose Ignacio Miramon, Miguel Juarez, Benito

Lerdo de Teiada, Sebastian

Iglesias, Jose'' Maria Diaz, Forfirio Mendez, Juan N. Diaz, Forfirio Gonzales, Manuel Diaz, Forfirio Leon de la Barra,

Francisco Madero, Francisco Lascurain, Pedro Huerta, Victoriano Carvaial, Francisco Gutie'rrez, Eulalio

e Took Of f ice Tenure In_ Out

7-28-1846 Ov 0m 6d pv r 8- 5-1846 Oy 4m 17d v r

12-24-1846 Oy 2m 26d P r 3-21-1847 Oy 0m lOd v

4- 1-1847 Oy lm 2 Od p r 5-20-1847 Oy 3m 2 Sd u

9-16-1847 Oy lm 28d pv

11-14-1847 Oy lm 23d p r 1- 8-1848 Oy 4m 2 8d c

6- 2-1848 2y 7m 12d e c 1-15-1851 iy 11m 19d i u 1- 5-1853 Ov lm 2d pv r 2- 7-1853 0y 2m 13d P r 4-20-1853 2y 3m 2 Id i r

8-14-18 55 Oy 0m 28d P r 9-12-1855 Oy 0m 2 Id P r 10- 4-1855 Oy 2m 6d pv u 12-11-1855 2y lm 9d V u 1-21-1858 Oy 11m 3d V u

12-23-1858 Oy 0m 2 8d V u 1-24-1859 Oy 0m 6d pv r 2- 2-1859 iy 6m 2d V

8-13-1860 Oy 0m 2d p r 8-15-1860 Oy 4m 9d u 1-21-1858 14y 6m 2 7d p/v/e 14y

i (3) d 7- 8-1872 4y 3m 1 Od P/i u

10-28-1876 Ov 2m 19d p/i r 11-28-1876 Ov 0m 8d pv r 12- 6-1876 Oy 2 m lid P r 2-16-1877 3y 9m 14d P/i c

12- 1-1880 4y 0m Od i c 12- 1-18 84 26y 5m 2 5d i(7)u 5-25-1911 Oy 5m lid pv r

11- 6-1911 iy 3 m 12d v/i u 2-18-1913 Ov 0m Id pv r 2-18-1913 lv 4m 2 8d V u 7-15-1914 Oy 0m 28d pv r

11- 6-1914 Ov 2m lOd i u

359

Mexico--Continued

Pres ident

Gonzalez Garza, Roque Lagos Chazaro,

Francis co Carranza, Vemistiano Huerta, AdoIfo de la Obregon, Alvaro Calles , Plutarco

Elias Portes Gil, Emilio Ortiz Rubio, Pascual Rodriquez, Abelardo Cardenas, Lazaro Avila Camacho, Manuel Aleman, Miguel Ruiz Cortines, Adolfo Lopez Mateos, Adolfo Diaz Ordaz, Gustavo Echeverria yClvarez,

Luis

Date TooV. Office Tenure In Out

1-16-1915 Oy 4m, 24d i u 6-10-1915 Oy 6m, Od i u

7-15-1914 5y 10m, 6d v/i u 6- 1-1920 Oy 6m, Od pv r 12- 1-1920 4y 0m, Od i c 12- 1-1924 4y 0m, Od i c

12- 1-1928 iy 0m, 2 8d i c 12-21-1929 2y Sm, lid i u 9- 4-1932 2y 2m, 4d pv c

12- 1-1934 6y 0m, :0d i c 12- 1-1940 6y 0m, Od i c 12- 1-1946 6y 0m, Od i c 12- 1-1952 6y 0m, Od i c 12- 1-1958 6y 0m, Od i c 12- 1-1964 6y 0m, Od i c 12- 1-1970 i

360

Nicaragua


Cerda, Manuel de la Argiiello, Juan Espinosa, Juan Herrera, Dionisio Ruiz y Bolance, Carlos Herrera, Dionisio Morales, Benito Herrera, Dionisio Morales, Benito Nunez, Jose'' Zepeda, Jose'' Juarez, Gregorio Zepeda, Jose"' Nunez, Jose^ F. X. Rub io Nunez, Jose' Rocha, Evaristo Cosio, Joaquin Rivas, Patricio Cosio, Joaquin Ulloa, Hilario Valladares, Tomas Rivas, Patricio Buitrago, Pablo Orozco, Juan de Dios Perez, Manuel Madriz, Emiliano Saenz, Bla's Antonici Sandoval, Jose'' Leon Triunvo ^ Sandoval, Jose'' Leon Morales, Miguel R. Guerrero, Jose'' Teran, Toribio Rosales, Benito Ramirez, Norberto Torcuato, Jose Ramirez, Norberto Abaunza, Jus to Pineda, Jose'Laureano Abaunza, Jus to Montenegro, Francisco del Alfaro, Jesds Pineda, Jos£ Laureano Vega, Fulgencio Pineda, Jose'' Laureano

4-20-1825 3y 6m 18d V u 4- 8-1826 3v 6m 2 3d V c

11- 1-1829 Oy 6 m 12d P u 5-12-1830 iy 3m Od v/i 8- -1831 0v lm Od P r 9- -1831 iy 5m Od 3- 1-1833 0y 0m 4d p r 3- 4-1833 0y lm 2 6d u 5- 1-1833 Oy 10m 1 Od pv r 3-10-1834 ly lm 13d P r 4-23-1835 Ov lm Od i 5- -1835 Ov lm Od P r 6- -1835 ly 7m Od da 1-25-1837 ly 0m Od P 1- -1838 Oy lm Od P 2- -1838 Oy 3m Od P 5- -1838 Oy 2m Od P 6- -1838 lv 0m Od P 6- -1839 Oy lm Od P 7- -1839 Oy 3m Od P

10- -1839 Oy 2m Od P 11- -1839 Ov 10m Od P 9- -1-8 40 Oy 5m Od P 3- 4-1841 2y 0m 26d ec c 4- 1-1843 Oy lm Od P r 5- -1843 iy 8m Od i u 1-25-1845 Oy 0m 5d pv da 1-20-1845 0v 2m 14d pv r 4- 4-1845 iy 2m 21d i

9- 2-1846 0y 6m 10d' c 3-12-1847 Oy 0m 24d P r 4- 6-1847 ly lm 2 5d ec c 4- 1-1849 Ov 0m Id P r 4- 1-1849 Oy 0 m Id P r 4- 1-1849 ly 0m 2d 4- 3-1850 Oy 2m 4d P r 6- 7-1850 Ov 9m 24d c 4- 1-1851 Oy lm 5d P r 5- 5-1851 Oy 3m Od ec u 8- 5-1851 0v 2m 2 7d pv u 8- 5-1851 Oy 0m 14d pv d 8-19-1851 Oy lm 13d p r

11- 2-1851 Ov lm 18d V

12-20-1851 Ov lm 23d p r 2-13-1852 lv lm 18d c

361



Chamorro, Fruto Castellon, Francisco Estrada, Jose' Marfa Escoto, Nazario Rivas , Patricio Martinez, Tomas

Solorzano, Federico Silva, Antonio Guzman, Fernando Chamorro, Pedro Joaquin Guzmali, Fernando Cuadra, Jose" Vicente

• y Chamorro, Pedro Joaquin Balladares, Pedro 7

Chamorro, Pedro Joaquin Zavala, Joaquin Cardenas , Adan Chamorro, Pedro Joaquin Ca'rdenas , Ad an Carazo, Evaristo Osorno, David Sacasa, Roberto Chavez, Ignacio Sacasa, Roberto Machado, Salvador Zelaya, Jose"Santos Madriz , Jose"" Estrada, Jose Dolores Estrada, Juan Jose" Diaz, Adolfo Chamorro, Emiliano Chamorro, Diego Manuel Martinez, Bartolome Solorzano, Carlos Sacasa, Juan Bautista Chamorro, Emiliano Uriza, Sebastian Diaz, Adolfo Moncada, Jose Maria Sacasa, Juan Bautista Brenes Jarquin, Carlos A. Somoza, Anastasio

Argdello, Leonardo Sacasa, Benjamin Lacaya

4- 1-1853 iy 11m 13d i d 6-11-1854 iy 2m 2 Id v d 3-12-1855 0y 7 m lid P u 9- 2-1855 0y lm 2 Id pv u 10-13-1855 ly 9 m lid pv u 11-15-1857 9y 3m Od v/i 9y

C3i) h 2- -1867 0y 0m lOd P r 2- -1867 Oy 0 m 5d P r 3- 1-1867 2y 6 m lid i 9-12-1869 Ov 2m 13d P r

11-25, 1869 iy 3m 6d c 3- 1-1871 4v 0m Od i c 3- 1-1875 iy 0m Od i

1876 0y 3 m Od P r 1876 2y 9m Od c

3- 1-1879 4v 0m Od ec c 3- 1-1883 2y 0m Od i 3- -1885 0y 2m Od P r 4- -1885 ly 10m Od

P c

3- 1-1887 2y 5m Od i d 8- 1-1889 0y 0m Id P r 8- 1-1889 ly 4m 2 4d P r

12-25-1890 0y 2m 6d P c 3- 1-1891 2y 3 m 5d i u 6- 6 -1893 Oy 3m 9d pv u 9-15-1893 16y 3m 12d v/i u

12-27-1909 Oy 7m 23d pv u 8-20-1910 Ov 4m lid pv r 1- 1-1911 Oy 4m lOd V r 5-11-1911 5y 7m 2 Od P/i c 1- 1-1917 4y 0m Od i c 1- 1-1921 2y 9m lid i d

10-12-1923 iy 2m 19d P c 1- 1-1925 IV 0m 15d i u 1-16-1926 0y 0m Id PV r 1-16-1926 Oy 10m. Od V r

10- -1926 Oy lm Od P r 2- -1927 2y 11m Od P c 1- 1-1929 4y 0m Od e c 1- 1-1933 3y 5m Od e u 6- 9-1936 0y 6m 2 Od pv c 1- 1-1937 lOy 4m Od v/i lOy

(2i) c 5- 1-1947 Oy 0m 2 5d i u 5-26-1947 Oy 2 m 19d pv r

362


Pres ident Date Toole Office Tenure In Out

Roman y Reyes, Victor Somoza, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, Luis Schick, Rene"' Guerrero Gutierrez,

Lorenzo Somoza Debayle, .•

Anas tas io

8-14-1947 2 y , 8m,22d i d 5- 7-1950 6 y , 4m,22d p/i da 9-29-1956 6 y , 7m, 2d p/i c 5- 1-1963 3 y , 3m, 2d i d 8- 3-1966 O y , 3m,2 8d p c

5- 1-1967 6 y , 2m, 7d i c

363

Panama


Amador Guerrero, Manuel Obaldia, Jose'" Domingo

d e

Amador Guerrero, Manuel Obaldia, Jose''Domingo

de Mendoza, Carlos A. Boyd, Federico Arosemena, Pablo Chiari, Rodolfo Arosemena, Pablo Porras, Belisario Valde's , Ramon M. Urriola, Ciro L. Diaz, Pedro A. Porras, Belisario Lefevre, Ernesto T. Porras, Belisario Chiari, Rodolfo Porras, Belisario Chiari, Rodolfo Duque, Tomcfs Gabriel Chiari, Rodolfo Arosemena, Florencio

Harmodio Arias , Ilarmondio Alfaro, Ricardo Arias, Ilarmondio Arosemena, Juan

Demos tenes Fernandez Jaen,

Ezequiel Boyd, Augusto Samuel Arias , Arnulfo Pezet, Jose'' Jaen Guardia, Ernesto Guardia, Ricardo

Adolfo de la Jimenez, Enrique Adolfo Diaz Arosemena, Domingo Chanis, Daniel Chiari, Roberto F. Arias, Arnulfo Arosemena, Alcibiades Remon Cantera, Jose"' Guizado, Jose"Ramon

2-20-1904 3y 3m 13d v/e 6-24-1907 Oy 6m 5d P r

12-30-1907 Oy 9m Od c 10- 1-1908 i y 5 m Od i d

3- 1-1910 Oy 7m Od P r 10- 1-1910 Oy 0m 4d P r 10- 5-1910 ly 3m 27d P r 2- 2-1912 Oy lm 4d p r 3 - 7-1912 Oy 6 in 23d p c

10- 1-1912 4v 0 m Od e c 10- 1-1916 iy 8m 2d i d 6- 3-1918 0y 3m 2 7d P u

10- 1-1918 Oy 0m lid PV r 10-12-1918 l y 3m 17d i r 1-30-1920 Oy 8m Od P c

10- 1-1920 2y 8 m 5d e 6- 6-1923 Oy 0m 6d P r 6-12-1923 ly 3m 18d c 10- 1-1924 3y 11m 7d e . 9- O u 1928 0y 0m 17d P r 9-25-1928 0y 0m 6d c

10- 1-1928 2y 3m 2d e u

1- 2-1931 Oy 0m 14d pv r 1-16-1931 ly 8m 14d P c

10- 1-1932 4y 0m Od e c 10- 1-1936 3y 2m 15d V d

12-16-1939 0y 0m 2d P r

12-18-1939 Oy 9m 13d p c 10- 1-1940 ly 0 m 8d i u

7-14-1941 Oy 0m 5d P r 10- 9-1941 0y 0m Id PV r 10- 9-1941 3y :8m 6d ec u

6-15-1945 3y 3m 15d P c 10- 1-1948 Oy 9m 27d i h

7-28-1949 Oy 3m 2 2d p u

11-20-1949 Oy 0 m 5d PV r 11-25-1949 ly 5m 15d V u

5-10-1951 ly 4m 2 Id pv c 10- 1-1952 2y 3m Id i da 2- 3-1955 oy 0m 12d P i

364

Panama--Continued

Pres ident

Arias Guardi Chi ari Ru i z , Chiari Bazan, Chiari Gonzal Chiari Gonzal

Be Chiari Robles Arias , Pini.ll Urruti Pini11 T akas

Espinosa, Ricardo a, Ernesto de la , Roberto F. Se'rgio Gonzales , Roberto F. Jose'' Dominador , Roberto F. ez Ruiz, Sergio

Roberto F. Ru l z

)

ez rnardino , Roberto F. , Marco Aurelio Arnulfp a, Jose M. a, Bolivar a, Jose M. Bahas, Demetrio


1-15,1955 i y 8m 16d P c 10- 1-1956 4y 0m Od e c 10- 1-1960 0y 9m 19d e 7-19-1961 Oy 0 m 5d P r 7-24-1961 Oy 8m 16d 4-10-1962 0v 0m 4d P r 4-14-1962 Oy lm 2 7d

P

6-11-1962 Ov 0m 6d P r 6-17-1962 Oy 9m Od

P

3-17-1963 Oy 0 m 6d P r

3-23-1963 lv 6m 7d c 10- 1-1964 4y 0m Od e c 10- 1-1968 0v 0m lid e u 10-12-1968 Ov 8m Id pv h 6-13-1969 Oy 3 m Od P r 9- -1969 0y 3m Od P u

12-18-1969 pv/i

365

Paraguay


Francia, Jose'' G.R. de 10-30-1814 2 5y 10m 20d V d Lo'pez, Carlos Antonio 3-12-1841 2 ly 5m 28d p/i d Lopez, Francisco Solano 9-10-1862 6v 11m 2 5d i u Rivarola, Cirilo 9- 1-1870 iy 3m 17d i u

Antonio iy

Jovellanos, Salvador 12-18-1871 2y 11m 23d P c Gill, Juan Bautiste 11-25-1874 2y 4m 17d i da Uriarte, Higinio 4-12-1877 lv 7m 13d P c Berreiro, Candido 11-25-1878 ly 9 m 9d i d Caballero, Bernardino 9- 4-1880 6y 2 m 2 Id P/i c Escobar, Patricio 11-25-1886 4y 0m Od i c Gonzales, Juan 11-25-1890 3y 6 m 14d i u

Gualberto 3y

Moringo, Marcos 6- 9-1894 0y 5m 16d pv c Eguzquiza, Juan 11-25-1894 4y 0m Od i c

Bautista Aceval, Emilio 11-25-1898 3y lm 14d i u Carballo, He'ctor 1- 9-1902 0v 10m 16d pv c Escurra, Juan A. 11-25-1902 2v 0m 2 4d i u Gaona, Juan Bautista 12-19-1904 Oy 11m 20d PV u Baez, Cecilio 12- 9-1905 Oy 11m 16d V u Ferreira, Benigno 11-25-1906 i y 7m 7d V u Gonzalez Navero, 7- 2-1908 2y 4m 23d pv c

Emiliano 2y pv

Gondra, Manuel 11-25-1910 0y lm 2 2d i u Jara, Albino 1-17-1911 Oy 5m 12d V r Roias, Liberato 7- 5-1911 Oy 7m 2 6d P u Pena, Pedro 3- 1-1912 Oy 0m 15d PV u Gonzalez Navaro, 3 -15-1912 Oy 5m Od pv c

Emi1iano Schaerer, Eduardo 8 -15-1912 4y 0m Od i c Franco, Manuel 8-15-1916 2y 9m 2 Od i d Montero, Josex 6- 5-1919 i y 2 m 10 d P c Gondra, Manuel 8-15-1920 0y 2m 2 2d i u Alaya, Eusebio 11- 7-1921 i y 5m 4d pv r Avala, Eligio 4-11-1923 0y 11m 6d P r Riart, Luis A. 3-17-1924 Oy 4 m 2 8d p c Ay a1a, Eligio 8-15-1924 4y 0m Od i c Guggiari , Jose P. 8-15-1928 3y 2m lid i Navaro, Emiliano Gonzales 10-26-1931 Oy 3 m 2d P r Guggiari, Jose'" P. 1-28-1932 0y 6m 17d c Alaya, Eusebio 8-15-1932 3y 6m 2d i u Franco, Rafael 2-18-1936 ly 5m 17d V u Paiva, Felix 8-15-1937 2v 0m Od pv c Estigarribia, Jose''Felix 8-15-1939 i y 1 lm 2 2d i d Morinigo, Higinio 9- 7-1940 7y 11m 8d P/i u

366

Paraguay--Continued

President Date Took Office

Frutos , Juan Manuel 6- 4-1948 Gonzales, Juan 8-15-1948

Natalicio Rolon, Raimundo 1-30-1949 Molas Lopez, Felipe 2-26-1949 Chaves, Federico ^ 9-11-1949 Romero Pereira, Tomas 5- 6-1954 Stroessner, Alfredo 8-15-1954 i(5)

Tenure In Out

Oy, 2m,lid PV c Oy, 5m,15d i u

Oy , 0m,26d pv u Oy, 6m,14d P/i u 4y, 7m,26d p/i u Oy, 3m, 9d pv c

Pres ident

/ / San Martin, Jose de Tagle, Jose'' Bernardo

de ^ San Martin, Jose LaMar, Jose^de Aguero, Jose Riva Tagle, Jose Bernardo

„de • Bolivar, Simon LaMar, Jose de Nieto, Domingo Sanchez Carrion, Jose" Unanue, Hipo'lito Santa Cruz, Andres LaMar, Jose de Salazar, Manuel Gutierrez, Antonio Reyes , Andre's Gutierrez, Antonio Gamarra, Agustin Gutierrez, Antonio Reyes , Andre's Gamarra, Agustin Reyes, Andres Gamarra, Agustin Telleria, Manuel Gamarra, Agustin Braulio del C, Jose'' Gamarra, Agustin Orbegoso, Luis Jose' Bermu'.1 c z , Pedro Orbegoso, Luis Jose Salazar, Manuel Orbegoso, Luis Jose Salaverry, Felipe Buianda, Juan Angel Salaverry, Felipe Salas , Junn Jose'' LaValle, Juan

Bautista de Salaverry, Felipe, Santa Cruz. Andres de Tristan, Pio Herrera, Ramon, Galdeano, Jose Maria Gamarra, Agustin

367

Peru


7- 6-1821 Oy 4m 13d V 1-19-1822 Oy 7m Od P r

8-19-1822 Ov lm Id r 9-20-1822 Oy 5m 7d P u 2-28-1823 Oy 8m 2 5d V u 7-17-1823 Oy 7m Od pv r

9- 1-1823 i y 5 m 2 3d V 2-24-1825 0y 11m 16d p r

1826 Oy 0m 24d p u 1826 Oy 0m Id pv r

9- 3-1826 Oy 0m Id. p r 9- 3-1826 Ov 11m 2 Id p r 8-24-1827 i y 9m 13d ec u

1828 i y

Pv u 7- 5-1829 Oy lm 2 5d pv 8-31-1829 Oy lm Od P 9-30-1829 Oy 2m 2 Od r

12-20-1829 0y 8 m 14d i r 9- 4-1830 Oy 7m lid p 4-15-1831 Oy lm 2 2d pv u 6- 7-1831 Ov 0 m 2 2d u 8-31-1831 Oy 10m Od P 6-31-1832 Ov 2m 2 5d r 9-27-1832 Oy lm 4d P 10-31rl832 Oy 9m Od r 7-30-1833 Oy 3m 23d P

11-23-1833 Oy 0m 2 7d r 12-20-1833 Oy 0m 14d ec c 1- 4-1834 Oy 0m 24d V u 1-28-1834 Ov 2m Od u 3- -1834 0v 2m Od P 5- 3-1834 Oy 9 m 2 2d r 2-25-1835 Ov lm lid V u 4- 6-1835 Oy lm Od p 5- 6-1835 Ov 4m 2 2d r 9-28-1835 Oy 0 m 16d p

10-14-1835 Oy 2m 14d p r i 1

12-28-1835 Oy lm 20d U

da 2-18-1836 Oy 11m 2 Id V u 2- 9-1837 Oy 3 m Id ec u 9-12-1837 0y lm Od PV r 1- 4-1838 Oy lm 16d P r 2-24-1838 2v 0 m 24d V

36 8

Peru--Continued

Pres ident Date Took Of£ice Tenure In Out

Menendez, Manuel 3 -18-1841 i y 5m Od P u Torrico, Juan 8-18-1842 0y 0 m 2d V

Crisos tomo 0y

LaValle, Juan 8-20-1842 Oy 0m 5d P r Bautista de

Oy

Torrico, Juan 8-25-1842 Oy lm 2 2d u Crisostomo

Oy

Vidal , Juan 10-20-1842 Oy 4 m 2 0d V u Franci s co

Oy

Figuerola, Justo 3 ' 15-1843 Oy 0m 5d pv r Vivanco , Manuel 3-20-1843 Oy 8m 1 Od V u Elias , Domingo 11-30-1843 Ov 8m lOd V r Figuerola, Justo 8-10-1844 Oy lm 2 7d p r Menendez, Manuel 10- 7-1844 Oy 6m 13d V r Castilla, Ramon 4-20-1845 6v 0 m Od v/i c Echenique, Rufino 4-20-1851 3y 4m 1 7d i u Medina, Miguel 9- 7-1854 Oy 3m 2 8d pv r Castilla, Ramon 1- 5-18 5 5 2y 2m 2 7d V Raygada, Jose Maria 4- 2-1857 lv 3m 2 6d P r Castilla, Ramon 7-28-1858 lv 2m 24d Mar, Juan Manuel del 10-24-1859 0y 4m 2 7d P r Castilla, Ramon 3-21-1860 2y 7m Id c San Roman, Miguel 10-22-1862 0y 8m 8d i d Canseco, Pedro Diaz 4- 3-1863 Ov 4m 2d P r Pezet, Juan Antonio 8- 5-1863 2y 2 m 26d P u Canseco, Pedro Diaz 10-31-1865 Oy 0m 27d pv u Prado, Mariano 11-28-1865 i y 10m 14d v

Ignacio Puerta, Luis de la 10-12-1867 0y 2m 23d p r Prado, Mariano 1- 6-1868 Oy 0m 2d u

Ignacio Canseco, Pedro Diaz 1- 7-1868 Oy 6m 2 5d pv r Balta, Jose' 8- 1 _ u 1868 3v 11m 2 Od i da Gutierrez, Tomas 7-22-1872 Oy 0m 4d pv da Zevallos, Mariano 7-26-1872 Oy 0 m 7d pv c

Ilerencia Oy

Pardo, Manuel 8- 2-1872 2y 3m 16d e Costas, Manuel 11-18-1874 Oy 2m Id p r Pardo, Manuel 1-19-1875 i y 6 m 13d c Prado, Mariano 8- 2-1876 3 y 4 m 15d i u

Ignacio 5d Puerta, Luis de la 12-18-1879 Oy 0 m 5d pv u

Pierola, Nicola's de 12-23-1879 lv 11m 5d V u Garcia Caldero"n, 3-12-1881 Oy 6m 16d pv u

Francisco Montero, Lizardo 9-28-1881 2y , 0m , 27d V u

369

Peru--Continued


Iglesias, Miguel Arenas Merino, Antonio Caceres , Andre's

Avelino Morales Bermudez,

Remug io Borgono, Justiniano Cacers, Andres

Ave 1ino Candamo , Manuel Pierola, Nicolas de Lopez de Romana,

Eduardo Candamo, Manuel Calderon, Serapio Paro, Jose Leguia, Augusto B. Billinghurst,

Guillermo E. Benavides, Oscar " / Pardo, Jose Leguia, Augusto B. Ponce, Manuel Maria Cerro, Luis M. Sanchez Ilolguin, Mariano Arias, Ricardo Leoncio

El ias Jimenez, Gustavo A. Sanchez Ocampo, David Sanchez Cerro, Luis M. Matias Manzajiilla, Jose Benavides, Oscar Prado, Manuel Bustamante, Jose Noriega Aguero, Zenon Odris, Manuel A. Noriega Aguero, Zenon Odris, Manuel A. Prado, Manuel Military Junta Belaunde Terry, Fernando Velasco Alvarado, Juan

10-23-1883 2y lm lOd V u 12- 3-1885 Oy 6m Od pv r 6- 3-1886 4y lm 7d v/i c

8-10-1890 3y 7m 2 Id i d

4- 1-1894 0y 4m lOd p c 8-10-1894 Oy 7m lOd i u

3-20-1895 Oy 5m 18d pv r 9- 8-1895 4y 0m Od i c 9- 8-1899 4y 0m Od i c

9- 8-1903 Oy 7m lOd i d 4-18-1904 Oy 5m 6d P c 9-24-1904 4y 0m Od i c 9-24-1908 4y 0m Od i c 9-24-1912 ly 4m lOd i u

2- 4-1914 ly 6m 14d V c 8-18-1915 3y 10m 16d i u 7- 4-1919 llv lm 2 Id i/v u 8-25-1930 Oy 0m 3d pv r 8-28-1930 Ov 6m 3d V r 3- 1-1931 Oy 0m Id p r 3- 1-1931 Oy 0m 5d p r

3- 6-1931 Oy 0m 2d V u 3-10-1931 Oy 8m 2 8d V c

12- 8-1931 lv 4m 22d e da 4-30-1933 Oy 0m Id P r 4-30-1933 5y 7m 8d i c

12- 8-1939 5y 7m 30 d i c 8- 1-1945 3y 2m Od i u

10-29-1948 0y 0m 2d pv r 10-31-1948 ly 7m Od V r 6- 1-1950 0y lm 2 8d p c 7-28-1956 6y 0 m Od i c 7-28-1956 5v 11m 2 Id e u 7-19-1962 iy 0m 9d pv c 7-28-1963 5y 2m 5d e u

10- 3-1968 V

370

Uruguay

Pres ident Date Took 0£fice Tenure In Out

Rivera, Fructuoso 11- 6-1830 2v 4m Id V Pereira, Gabriel A. 3- 7-1833 0y 6 m 2 2d P r Rivera, Fructuoso 9-28-1833 Oy 5m 8d Anaya, Carlos 3- 6-1834 0y 11m 2 5d P c Oribe, Manuel 3- 1-1835 iy 11m 24d i Anaya, Carlos 2-24-1837 Oy 11m 2 5d P h Oribe, Manuel 2-19-1838 Oy 8m 5d u Pereira, Gabriel A. 10-24-1838 Oy 0m 17d PV r Rivera, Fructuoso 11-11-1838 oy 3m 4d V Suarez, Joaquin 2-15-1839 ly 0m Od P r

Luis M. ly

Rivera, Fructuoso Suare;: , Joaquin

2- -1840 3y 0m Od c Rivera, Fructuoso Suare;: , Joaquin 2-16-1843 9y 0m Od i u

Luis M. Berro , Bernardo 2-15-1852 0y 0m 15d P c

Prudencio 0y

Giro, Juan Francisco 3- 1-1852 0y 7m 27d i Berro , 'Bernardo 10-28-1852 Oy 2 m 14d P r

Prudencio Oy

Giro, Juan Francisco 1-12-1853 Oy 8m 13d u Flores , Venancio 1-13-1854 iy lm 24d V Bustamante, Manuel B. 3- 7-1855 Oy 0m 2 Id P r Flores , Venancio 3-28-1855 Oy 4m 12d u Bustamante, Manuel B. 8-10-1855 Oy 0m 18d pv u Lamas, Luis 8-28-1855 Ov 0m 13d PV r Bustamante, Manuel B. 9-11-1855 Oy 5m 20d P c Pereira, Gabriel A. 3- 1-1856 4v 0 m Od i c Berro, Bernardo 3- 1-1860 4y 0m Od i c

Prudencio 4y

Cruz Aguirre, 3- 1-1864 0y 11m 15d i u Atanasio de la

Vi11 alb a, Tomas 2-15-1865 Oy 0 m 6d PV r Flores , Venancio 2-21-1865 0y 3m 14d V Vidal, Francisco A. 6- 5-1865 iy 3 m Od P r Flores , Venancio 9- -1866 iy 5 m Od u Varela, Pedro 2-19-1868 0y 0m 12d pv c Batlle, Lorenzo 3- 1-1868 4y 0m Od i c Gomensoro, Tomas 3- 1-1872 0y 11m 15d pv c Ellauri, Jose' Eugenio 2-15-1873 ly 11m 7d i u Varela, Pedro 1-22-1875 iy 2m 18d v/i u Latorre, Lorenzo 3-10-1876 2y 10m 5d V c Vidal, Francisco A. 2-15-1879 0y 0m 15d p c Latorre, Lorenzo 3- 1-1879 ly 0m 13d i u Vidal, Francisco A. 3-13-1880 iy 11m 17d pv u

371

Uruguay--Continued


Santos, Maximo B.

Vidal, Francisco A. Santos, Maximo B. Taies, Maximo Ilerrera y Obes , Julio Idiarte Borda, Juan Cuestas , Juan Lindolfo

^ / Batlle y Ordonez, Jose Williman, Claudio Batlle y Ordonez, Jose Viera, Feliciano Brum, Baltasar Serrato, Jose Campisteguy, Juan Terra, Gabriel

Baldomir, Alfredo Charlone, Cesar Baldomir, Aldredo Amezaga, Juan Jose Berreta, Toinas Batlle Berres, Luis Mayo Gutierrez, Cesar Batlle Berres, Luis Martinez T^rueba, Andres Gestido, Oscar Daniel Pacheco Areco, Jorge

3- 1-1882 4y, 0m Od i c 3~ 1-1886 oy, 2m 24d i u 5- 24-1886 0v , 5 m 24d V u

11-18-1886 3y, 3m 12d V c 3- 1-1890 4y, 0m Od e c

3- 21-1894 3y, 5m 4d e da

8-25-1897 sy, 6m 5d p/i c 3- 1-1903 4y, 0m Od i c

3- 1-1907 4y, 0m Od i c

3- 1-1911 4y, 0 m Od i c 3- 1-1915 4y, 0m Od i c 3- 1-1919 4y, 0m Od i c 3- 1-1923 4y, 0m Od e c 3- 1-1927 4y, 0m Od e c 3- 1-1931 7y, 3m 18d e/v r

6-19-1938 0v, lm 2 Od P r 8- 9-1938 0v, 0 m 6d P c 8-15-1938 4y, 6 m 15d e c 3- 1-1943 4y, 0m Od e c

3- 1-1947 Oy, 5m Id e d

8- 2-1947 iy, 0m 2 9d P 8-31-1948 oy, 0 m 14d P r

9-14-1948 2y, 5m 16d c

3- 1-1951 iy, 0m Od e c

3- 1-1967 oy, 9m 5d e d

12- 6-1967 oy,

P

372

Venezuela

Pres ident

Paez, Jose Antonio Vargas, Jose Maria Navarte, Andres Soublette, Carlos Paez, Jose Soublette,

Antonio Carlos

Jose'' Tadeo

, Jose Tadeo Julian

Monagas, Monagas, Jose' Gregorio Monagas Cas tro Gual , Pedro

Tovar, Manuel Felipe de

Gual, Pedro Paez, Jose' Antonio Falcon, Juan Guzman Blanco, Antonio Falcon, Juan Monagas, Jose / Tadeo Monagas, Jose' Ruperto Pulsar, Venancio Guzman Blanco, Antonio Linares Alcantara,

Francis co Valera, Jose Gregorio Guzman Blanco, Antonio Crespo, Joaquin Guzman Blanco, Antonio Lopez, Hermogenes Rojas Paul, Juan Pablo Andueza Palacio,

Raimundo Crespo, Joaquin Andrade, Ignacio

/ S Rodriquez, Victor Ca,stro, Cipriano Gomez, Juan Vicente Marquez Bustillos, V. Gomez, Juan Vicente Perez, Juan Bautista Gomez, Juan Vicente Lopez Contreras, Eleazar Medina Angarita, Isaias Betancourt, Romulo Gallegos, Romulo Delgado Chalbaud, Carlos


1-13-1830 5y 0m 26d v/i c 2- 9-1835 lv 2m 15d i r

4- 24-1836 Ov 8m 2 6d P c 1- 20-1837 2y 0m Od i c

1- 20-1839 4y 0m Od i c 1- 20-1843 4y 0 m Od i u

1- 20-1847 4y 1m Od V c 2- 5-1851 3y 11m 15d i c

2- 5-1855 3y lm lOd i u 3-15-1858 iy 4 m 17d V u

8- 2-1859 0y lm 2 7d V u

9-29-1859 iy 7m 9d pv u

5- 8-1861 0y 3m 19d V u

8- 27-1861 iy 10m Od V u 6- 26-1863 ly 4m lOd y

11- 6-1864 Ov 8m Od P r

7- 6-1865 2y 11m 2 2d u

6- 28-1868 0y 4m 2 Od V d

11- 18-1868 ly lm Od P u

12- -1869 0y 5m Od pv u

4- 27-1870 6y 10m 5d V c

3- 2-1877 ly 8m 2 8d i d

11- 30-1878 0y 2m 26d P c

2- 26 ,1879 5y 2m Id i c

4- 27-1884 2y 4m 18d i c

9-17-1886 0y 10m 2 Id i r

8- 8-1887 Oy 10m 24d P c

7- 2-1888 ly 8m 5d i c

3- 7-1890 2y 7m Od i u

10- 7-1892 5y 6m 9d V c

4-16-1898 iy 6m 5d i u

10- 21-1899 0y 0m Id PV r

10- 22-1899 9y lm Od V u

12-19-1908 6y 0m Od i ( 5) 1914 iy 0 m Od P r

1915 14y 0 m Od c 1929 2y 6m Od i r

6- 1-1931 4y 6m 17d i d

12-18-1935 5y 4m 17d P c

5- 5-1941 3y 9m 8d i u

10- 8-1945 2y 4m 7d V c

2-15-1948 0y 9m 9d i u

11- 24-1948 iy 11m 19d V da

373

Venezuela--Continued

President

Sua'rez Flamerich, German

P/rez J imenez, Marcos Larrazabal, Wolfgang Betancourt, Romulo Leoni , Raoul Caldera, Rafael


11-13-1950 2y , 0m,2 Od P u

12- 3-1952 5y, lm,20d V u 1-23-1958 ly, 0m,20d pv c

2-13-1959 5y, 0m,19d e c 3- 2-1964 5y, 0m, Od e c 3- 2-1969

5y, 0m, Od e

i

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