The influence of formal and informal support systems on the labour supply of divorced mothers

THE INFLUENCE OF FORMAL ANDINFORMAL SUPPORT SYSTEMS ON THELABOUR SUPPLY OF DIVORCEDMOTHERS

Peter Raeymaeckers, Caroline Dewilde,Laurent Snoeckx and Dimitri MortelmansDepartment of Sociology, University of Antwerp, Sint-Jacobstraat 2, 2000 Antwerpen, Belgium

ABSTRACT: In this article, we evaluate the effect of both formal and informal

childcare support systems on the post-divorce labour supply of divorced

mothers. To this end, we model the change in working hours before and after

divorce by using a multilevel approach, estimating the impact of both micro-

and macro-level determinants. Although we find empirical evidence for the

hypothesis that a country’s institutional environment plays an important role in

facilitating employment as a strategy for mothers to cope with their financial

losses following partnership dissolution, our conclusion is that the change inlabour supply is more responsive to the whole of a country’s family policies

rather than to so-called ‘domain-specific’ indicators of formal and informal

childcare provision. Furthermore, our empirical evidence suggests that at the

micro-level, formal and informal childcare strategies are connected. The

complementary role of informal support systems, facilitating the use of formal

childcare, is an important finding from a policy point of view. However, further

research will have to make clear which conditions have to be fulfilled in order to

help divorced mothers to combine work and care, thus enabling them tomitigate the economic consequences of partnership dissolution.

Key words: economic consequences of divorce; childcare; panel analysis;

female employment

1. Introduction

Most studies focussing on the economic consequences of divorce find that

women suffer from a decreased level of prosperity following this event

(e.g., Burkhauser et al. 1991; Smock 1993, 1994; Bianchi et al. 1999;

Poortman 2000; McKeever and Wolfinger 2001). This is mainly related to

DOI: 10.1080/14616690701833480 453

European Societies10(3) 2008: 453�/477

– 2008Taylor & Francis

ISSN1461-6696 print

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their weaker attachment to and position in the labour market, and to thefact that the care responsibility for any children usually falls on theshoulders of the mother. In general, women experience a net incomedeterioration of about 20 per cent in the first few years after divorce (foran overview see Uunk 2004; Andreß et al. 2006). As previous studies haveshown that post-divorce employment acts as an important barrier againsteconomic deprivation (Poortman 2000; Dewilde 2006), the comparativestudy of female employment patterns following this life event hasimportant and policy-relevant implications.

The main research question of this contribution concerns the facilitatinginfluence of childcare support systems on the post-divorce employment ofwomen. Following Gunnarsson and Cochran (1993), we furthermore thinkthat any study of support systems should take account of both formal andinformal provisions. Or as Beck (1994: 106) states: ‘private and politicalstrategies for solutions must be seen as connected’. Therefore, in thisarticle we evaluate how formal and informal types of childcare supportinfluence the labour market participation of women following divorce.

Concerning the impact of formal support systems, our main premise isthat the post-divorce employment situation of women is largely dependenton welfare state policies supporting lone mothers with children to stay inor enter the labour market (Beck 1994). Cross-national comparisonsfocussing on female employment show that an important institutionalarrangement promoting women’s economic independence is the provisionof childcare facilities (Gornick et al. 1998; Drobnic 2000; Uunk et al.2005). However, in a recent publication on the impact of institutionalarrangements on the gender wage gap, Mandel and Semyonov (2005)conclude that while mother-friendly interventions enable women tobecome economically independent, these policies are also rather costlyin terms of their later occupational and economic attainment.

Studies examining the influence of welfare state arrangements on theeconomic consequences of partnership dissolution for women arerelatively scarce and most of them only analyse a limited number ofcountries (e.g., Burkhauser et al. 1991; Dewilde 2002; Andreß et al. 2006).In a recent study based on ECHP data, Uunk (2004) evaluates the impactof income- and unemployment-related welfare provisions on the incomeloss following divorce for a wider range of countries. While both types ofmeasures temper the economic consequences of divorce for women, theimpact of income-related policies seems to be stronger. Nevertheless, theprovision of public childcare facilities also has a strong negative effect onthe income loss following divorce.

Next to formal childcare arrangements, informal support networksalso play an important role in facilitating the care burden after marriagedissolution (Leira 1990; Bromer and Henly 2004; Raeymaeckers et al.

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2008). Informal care providers like relatives and friends often facilitate thebalance between work and care by providing practical help. Furthermore,from a social policy-perspective, it is crucial to evaluate the optimal mix ofsupport systems (Motel-Klingebiel 2005). Therefore, we do not only payattention to the influence of formal regulations, but also scrutinise theinterplay between formal arrangements and informal care.

Whereas most authors measure the impact of formal childcare provisionon individual outcomes by utilising only one indicator (Uunk 2004; Uunket al. 2005), in this article we consider the provision of childcare facilitiesand the coverage rate as two separate measures of day care policies (Stier2006). This way, we are able to disentangle the effects of both supply anddemand indicators. Furthermore, in order to test whether changes in post-divorce employment are driven by the general female employment-supportive climate rather than by specific institutional arrangements, wecontrast the effects of informal support networks and formal childcarefacilities with the index constructed by Mandel and Semyonov (2005)charting the whole of a country’s family policies.

To conclude, this article focuses on the impact of formal and informalchildcare provision on the labour supply of divorced mothers, usingdifferent types of macro-level indicators. As the focal point of our analysisconcerns the effects of institutional arrangements, a comparative approachis needed. Using data from seven waves (1995�/2001) of the EuropeanCommunity Household Panel (ECHP), we include 13 countries in ouranalysis: Denmark, The Netherlands, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy,Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland, Germany and the UnitedKingdom.

The outline of this article is as follows. In the first section, we discussdifferent ways to measure the influence of formal childcare support onfemale post-divorce employment. Secondly, we take a closer look at therole of informal networks. Next, we introduce the data, method andoperationalisations, followed by the analysis. We end with an overview anddiscussion of our results.

2. The effect of formal childcare support on the female labour supply

The modernisation process and the dynamic of individualisation havemade it possible for both sexes to liberate themselves from their ascribedmale/female gender roles (Beck 1994). Whereas in the former industrialsociety men occupied an important breadwinning role and women wereresponsible for household tasks, the increasing female employment ratefrom the second part of the twentieth century onwards facilitated theindependency of women. According to Beck (1994: 111), a woman’s

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independence is determined by two factors: economic security andchildren. In his view, as long as women bear children and feel responsiblefor them, ‘children remain obstacles in the occupational competition, aswell as temptations to a conscious decision against economic autonomyand a career’. Indeed, numerous studies have found that the presence ofchildren has a detrimental effect on female employment (Joshi 1998;Drobnic 2000; van der Lippe and van Dijk 2002; Sorensen and Hill 2004;Vlasblom and Schippers 2005). The difficulties women experience whentrying to reconcile work and family are often referred to as the ‘negativechild-effect’ (Uunk et al. 2005) or the ‘child penalty’ (Gornick et al. 1998).The effect of children on the labour career of their mothers is howeverinfluenced by institutions at the macro-level. The way states regulate theirfamily policy, or more specifically, the childcare arrangements theyprovide, influences the restraining impact of pre-school children on thelabour market participation of their mothers (Stier et al. 2001). Equalgender roles can only be created in institutional structures that supportequality. In the following sections, we address the influence of welfare statearrangements on female employment.

2.1. Measuring the impact of welfare state arrangements

A classic study focussing on the influence of macro-level institutions onindividual outcomes is the work by Esping-Andersen (1990). His ‘ThreeWorlds of Welfare Capitalism’ reflect the different ways states and marketscombine in order to produce and allocate (economic) welfare, resulting indifferent patterns of decommodification (or market-independence) andstratification. Esping-Andersen’s typology is however criticised for its lackof attention given to the Southern-European welfare model (e.g., Ferrera1996; Bonoli 1997), and by feminist authors because it neglects the care-giving role of women (e.g., Sainsbury 1994, 1996). Concerning the lastissue, Sainsbury (1994, 1996) distinguishes between countries supportingan individual policy model promoting women’s economic independenceand countries supporting a male-breadwinner model. Applying the femaleindependency issue to Esping-Andersen’s (1999) typology, especially insocial-democratic welfare states (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland)female employment rates are particularly high (van der Lippe and vanDijk 2002). The liberal countries (Canada, Australia, United Kingdom,United States) occupy an intermediate position, while in conservativeregimes, female employment is low (Germany, France, Belgium, Italy).Next to differences in female employment rates, different types of welfarestates provide for different types of childcare provision (Gustaffson 1994).Social-democratic regimes provide universally available, state-subsidised

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public childcare. In liberal welfare states, the provision of childcarearrangements is a private responsibility and therefore mainly market-oriented. Conservative countries support the male-breadwinner model andprovide limited public childcare. Care arrangements in these countries areneither market-oriented nor well-expanded.

Although Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime typology inspired manyauthors, we notice that when taking a closer look at the way childcarearrangements are regulated, countries belonging to the same regimecluster actually show interesting variations. Norway for example differsfrom the other social-democratic countries in providing rather limitedformal childcare arrangements (van der Lippe and van Dijk 2002).Gornick and Meyers (2003) find that conservative welfare states arecharacterised by distinct patterns of care arrangements. While Germany,The Netherlands and Luxembourg provide only limited public childcare,provisions are more extended in France, Belgium and Italy. We thusconclude that Esping-Andersen’s welfare typology neglects specificcountry differences in the provision of public childcare (see also Stieret al. 2001; Uunk 2004).

A possible way to take account of country-specific variations in policiesis provided by Dewilde (2002) and Burkhauser et al. (1991). Both authorsevaluate the effect of different institutional environments on the economicconsequences of divorce for women by focussing more in-depth onspecific countries. Dewilde (2002) combines the typologies of Bonoli(1997), Siaroff (1994) and Esping-Andersen (1990) and uses a sample offive countries (Denmark, Belgium, Germany, Italy and the UnitedKingdom). She finds that in social-democratic welfare states (Denmark),the high accessibility of the labour market results in a high proportion ofdivorced women being able to work full-time. This can be attributed to theextensive provision of publicly funded childcare arrangements (Dewilde2002). In the United Kingdom, an example of a liberal Beveridgean highspending welfare state, the limited access to the labour market for womenwith care responsibilities results in a lower post-divorce female employ-ment rate. Concerning the conservative welfare states, Dewilde (2002)finds that the financial consequences of divorce are more limited inBelgium, where childcare provision is ample, than in Germany. Burkhau-ser et al. (1991) compare Germany and the United States and find theGerman welfare state to be less able to protect women from reductions inrelative economic status following marriage dissolution.

The above studies show that institutional arrangements influence femaleemployment outcomes, which in turn has consequences in terms of theeconomic impact of important life events, such as partnership dissolution.An important drawback is however that these authors neglect the interplaybetween macro- and micro-level determinants. Because post-divorce

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employment is an outcome of both a country’s institutional features andindividual human capital factors, it is important to include the combinedeffect of both determinants (van der Lippe and van Dijk 2002; Stier 2006).We thus have to use a so-called macro/micro or multilevel approach.

In the existing literature on the effects of institutions on femaleemployment we can distinguish two methodological approaches. The firstconsiders a specific institutional environment as more than the sum of theparts and uses an index that represents a country’s policy package(Sainsbury 1994, 1996; Mandel and Semyonov 2005). The secondapproach measures the influence of ‘domain-specific’ policy characteristicssuch as public childcare facilities (e.g., Uunk et al. 2004). We discuss bothapproaches in the next section.

2.2. Institutional environments

Only recently, studies examining the influence of a country’s macro-levelarrangements have focused on the combined effect of indicators at themicro-level and structural characteristics at the macro-level. Fuwa (2004)uses both macro- and micro-level determinants to explain the division ofhousehold labour in 22 countries. Mandel and Semyonov (2005) adopt thisapproach to examine if country differences in family policies and wagestructures influence the earnings gap between men and women.

Gornick et al. (1998) utilise a sample of 14 countries to study the effectof an index based on different indicators of child-support policy(maternity leave, paternity benefits, tax relief for childcare, guaranteedcare coverage, percentage of children in publicly funded childcare) onfemale employment. In addition to supply indicators of employment-friendly policies, they also include demand indicators such as childcareand paternity leave coverage rates. Their results show a strong ‘negativechild-effect’ in countries with low support of female employment (UnitedKingdom, United States). In countries with high support of female labourmarket participation (Belgium, France, Denmark, Finland), the childeffect is positive. While a high score on employment-friendly policiesresults in high employment rates of women with both young and oldchildren, countries with a low score tend to favour the employment ofwomen with older children.

The index used by Mandel and Semyonov (2005) is an indicator of thefamily-friendly features of a country’s policy environment. Their measureis based on the number of weeks of fully paid maternity leave, thepercentage of children (0�/6) in publicly funded childcare and publicemployment as a share of total employment. In this article, we use theirindex to test the effect of family-supportive policies on female employment

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following partnership dissolution. We hypothesise that family-supportive

policies have a positive effect on female post-divorce employment

(Hypothesis 1).

2.3. ‘Domain-specific’ institutional arrangements

The disadvantage of using a composite index when measuring the

influence of institutional characteristics is the impossibility to gauge the

exact causal effect of specific welfare state arrangements on individual

outcomes (Uunk 2004; Stier 2006; Pettit and Hook 2005). Therefore it is

important to include separate indicators of specific welfare state policies.

In the literature on female employment, ‘public childcare provision’ seems

to be the most used macro-indicator (van der Lippe and van Dijk 2002).

For instance, Gornick et al. (1998) find that the provision of public

childcare arrangements facilitates female labour supply. In general, public

childcare explains around one-third of the observed country differences in

the reduction of work hours following the birth of the first child (Uunk

et al. 2005). We thus hypothesise that the provision of childcare facilities

has a positive effect on female post-divorce employment (Hypothesis 2).A shortcoming of the study by Uunk et al. (2005) is that they neglect

the demand side of childcare arrangements. Pettit and Hook (2005)

however also include a demand measure for childcare in terms of the

percentage of children (0�/2 years old) that actually uses publicly funded

childcare. These authors find a positive relation between the demand side

indicator and female employment. In order to observe a more methodo-

logically correct relationship between childcare provision and female

labour supply, it is thus necessary to include both the provision of

childcare places and the coverage rate for each country. Or as Stier (2006)

states: ‘measures of institutional arrangements should include both direct

(e.g., specific policies and regulations) and indirect indicators (e.g.,

behavioural outcomes at the macro-level)’. Therefore, we not only include

a direct indicator of childcare institutions (provision), but also an indirect

indicator (coverage rate), as both can vary in a different way across the

countries in our sample. Different factors influence this relationship.

Firstly, the financial costs of childcare vary across countries and may lead

to differing coverage rates. Secondly, the cultural values of a country can

influence the use of childcare arrangements (Gornick et al. 1998). Next to

the effect of the provision of childcare facilities, we thus hypothesise that

the childcare coverage rate has a positive effect on the post-divorce

employment participation of women (Hypothesis 3).

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3. The importance of informal support networks

Studies focussing on the social consequences of partnership dissolutionfind mixed evidence. When comparing single parents with couples,Gunnarsson and Cochran (1993) find that the number of networks ofthe latter category exceeds the first. However, while earlier studies observethat divorce has a decreasing effect on the social networks of the ex-spouses (Milardo 1987), recent studies using a broader operationalisationreject the negative divorce-effect. Terhell et al. (2004) find that a divorcecan signify both a negative and a positive evolution. Much depends on thesex of the former partners, as especially men experience chronicallyimpeded personal networks. However, a network loss after a divorce can becompensated at the long term (Terhell et al. 2004). Kalmijn and Broesevan Groenau (2005) also refute the devastating effect of divorce onnetworks and find that after a partnership dissolution, women tend toincrease their contacts with kin and non-kin relatives. Social contacts withneighbours, however, tend to decrease. These recent studies of the socialconsequences of partnership dissolution show that divorced mothers donot always experience a reduction of their social network, and can still relyon support from their social environment. Leslie and Grady (1985) findthat kin-ties in particular seem to provide divorced mothers withemotional and practical support when dealing with the negativeconsequences of divorce. Therefore, the influence of informal networkson the post-divorce labour market participation of divorced mothers is aninteresting question that needs further examination.

Concerning the impact of social networks on the economic conse-quences of divorce, a conceptual distinction must be made between socialactivity and social support (Hughes 1988). Social activity is defined as theextent of social interaction, while social support is often referred to interms of material or practical assistance. In this article, we evaluate theeffect of social support networks on the female labour market participationfollowing divorce. When women experience difficulties combining workand care, their existing social network could facilitate this combination byproviding specific practical aid (Leira 1990). Jarvis (1999) points at theimportance of the web of coping strategies of households in selecting theirpreferred childcare options. According to Leira (1990), women’s lateralself-organisation of childcare has been as important as welfare stateinterventions or services in restructuring the balance between femaleemployment and childcare. This leads us to the formulation of our nexthypothesis: informal care networks have a positive effect on female post-divorce employment (Hypothesis 4).

It is thus possible that the assumed positive effect of social supportnetworks on female employment after divorce counterbalances the state’s

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inability to provide formal care and facilitates the combination of paidwork and childcare. Jarvis argues that individuals and institutions aresituated in networks which are often haphazardly interconnected andreflexively reproduced, resulting in an adaptable web of social relationswhich evolve in the context of changing demands. In Britain, for instance,where the formal childcare coverage is very low, it is not surprising thatworking mothers have to rely on help from family and friends (Borchost1990). On the other hand, in a country like Belgium, where formalchildcare facilities are widespread, the existence of informal supportnetworks could be rather absent, and have no bearing on post-divorcefemale employment (Ghysels 2004).

The thesis that modern welfare states take over the functions ofinformal social networks is referred to as the crowding out-hypothesis.The trade-off between a country’s policy arrangements and the materialand practical assistance provided by informal support networks wasalready put forward by Parsons (1956), who argued that the expansion ofstate arrangements has a negative effect on the functions provided by thefamily and other networks. More recently, the crowding out-thesis wastaken up by Putnam (1995) and others, who found that economicdevelopment has a negative impact on the importance of social networks.

The trade-off between formal and informal support systems is alsopresent in the more recent work of Esping-Andersen on familialisationand defamilialisation (1999). Defamilialisation is defined as the degree towhich households’ care responsibilities are relaxed by welfare stateprovision. According to Esping-Andersen, familialistic regimes areinfluenced by Catholic social teachings, meaning that public interferenceonly takes place when family and social networks fail to provide certainfunctions �/ the so-called principle of subsidiarity. Especially in theSouthern-European countries, families and social networks are consideredas the most important source of social support; public interference infamily matters is thus restricted. While in the social-democratic regimecluster, care tasks of households are to a large extent considered as a socialresponsibility, in the liberal welfare states the gaps in the public and familysupport system are in principle filled by the market. However, as marketsonly rarely substitute for public services or family self-servicing, in theliberal welfare states one might speak of a ‘concomitant welfare state andmarket ‘‘failure’’’ (Esping-Andersen 1999: 64).

At a more disaggregate level, the trade-off between formal and informalchildcare provision seems to be confirmed by Gunnarsson and Cochran(1993), who compare social networks of lone mothers in the UnitedStates and Sweden. They find that in Sweden, a country promotingextensive public childcare, lone mothers have less social support networksat their disposal. Hansen (2005) observes that in countries with less

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family-supportive public policies, the most common caregivers are therelatives outside the family.

Following the above line of reasoning, we hypothesise that there exists acrowding-out effect between formal and informal childcare supportnetworks. We thus expect that when a state provides extensive childcareservices, divorced mothers rely less on their social network to combinework and care (Hypothesis 5). We test the crowding-out effect at both theindividual and the aggregate level.

4. Data, operationalisations and method

4.1. Data

As stated in the introduction, the analyses in this article are based on theEuropean Community Household Panel (ECHP). The ECHP is a cross-nationally comparative longitudinal survey containing data from the15 former European Union Member States. It is a so-called householdpanel study (HPS), that is a standardised questioning of an initial sampleof households and individuals at regular�/in this case annual�/points intime. The sample of households and individuals is representative of thepopulation in each of the participating countries. Cross-national compar-ability is guaranteed through a standardised design and common technicaland implementation procedures (EUROSTAT 2005).

In this article, data from 13 countries are analysed: Denmark, TheNetherlands, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal,Austria, Finland, Germany and the United Kingdom. Luxembourg is leftout because of the small sample size and Sweden due to the lack of panelinformation.

ECHP data is collected in a prospective way, allowing us to use alongitudinal research design. This way, problems of selectivity are avoided.Indeed, the group of divorced women in a cross-sectional survey consistsof women who experienced relationship dissolution over a longer period oftime. Some women divorced many years ago, while others only recentlysplit up with their partner. Furthermore, since most women eventuallyrepartner, it is possible that the group of divorced women remaining singleis quite a selective subsample of all women experiencing relationshipdissolution.

Starting point for our analysis is the construction of a sample of womenexperiencing partnership dissolution between 1995 and 2001 (due toreasons of data availability, wave 1 is not taken into account). Although thenumber of divorces on a yearly basis is rather small, the ‘pooling’ of eventsin a prospective way allows us to construct a sample large enough to allow

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for multivariate analysis. Divorce is defined as the transition frommarriage or cohabitation in one year (t) to not living as a couple or livingwith a new partner in the subsequent year (t�1). Our sample thuscontains both married and cohabiting respondents at time (t) and allowsfor the analysis of short-term changes in the labour supply of womenfollowing divorce. Restricting our analysis to women aged 16�/64, living ina heterosexual couple at time (t) and caring for children below 12 yearsold, the number of divorce events amounts to 941, of which we have validinformation for 836 cases. The number of events is rather small for Greece(n�20) and Ireland (n�23). The United Kingdom and Germanycontribute the largest number of divorced women (n�134 and n�173), while sample sizes for the other countries range from 50 to 90.Comparable small numbers of divorce events have been reported innumerous studies for different European countries (e.g., Burkhauser et al.1991; Jarvis and Jenkins 1999; Poortman 2000; Uunk 2004).

4.2. Operationalisations

Our main research question concerns the change in the labour supply ofmothers following divorce. To this end, we compare the employmentsituation of the women in our sample in the year before partnershipdissolution (year t) with the employment situation after this event (yeart�1). Our dependent variable is operationalised as the difference betweenpost-divorce and pre-divorce (weekly) working hours.

Micro-level control variables (measured at time t) are age, number ofchildren below five years old, education, weekly working hours, employ-ment and the use of formal and informal childcare. Education is measuredas the highest level of education achieved. The ECHP only distinguishesthree categories: (1) less than second stage of secondary education (ISCED0-2); (2) second stage of secondary education (ISCED 3); and (3)recognised third-level education (ISCED 5�/7). Respondents still at schoolare assigned to the lowest level of education. The effect of employment ismeasured with a dummy indicating whether the respondent is employedor not. Both indicators of childcare use are dummy variables (use/no use)and are derived from the following questions: ‘Are any of the childrenunder 12 in the household looked after on a regular basis by someone otherthan their parent or guardian whether at home or outside such as at acreche or garden?’ and ‘Does your household have to pay for any of thechildren to be looked after on a regular basis?’. We thus assume that paidchildcare corresponds to formal childcare, while unpaid childcare isassumed to be provided by informal caregivers.

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Our macro-level variables are the childcare coverage rate (demand), theprovision of childcare facilities (supply), the informal childcare coverageand the extent of family-friendly policies. The childcare coverage rate iscalculated on the ECHP data, and refers to the proportion of householdswith children below 12 years old using formal childcare (average figure forthe years 1995�/2001). Data on the provision of public childcare are takenfrom Uunk et al. (2005) and refer to the period between 1990 and 1995.Figures for Germany, however, refer to the situation during the late 1980s.Country scores for the availability of informal childcare are again derivedfrom the data, and refer to the proportion of households with childrenyounger than 12 using formal childcare (average figure for the years 1995�/

2001). The extent of family-friendly policies is operationalised as the‘Welfare State Intervention Index’ (WSII) constructed by Mandel andSemnyonov (2005). Scores for Greece, Spain and Portugal are based onILO data (ILO 2005) and Gauthier (1999) and are calculated using theformula of Mandel and Semyonov (2005).1

4.3. Method

The most appropriate method to evaluate the impact of macro-levelarrangements on the difference in pre- and post-divorce working hours ofdivorced mothers is a multilevel analysis, as this method allows us tocontrol for country-level differences in individual characteristics. Theimportance of taking human capital variables into account has beendemonstrated by several authors (Smock 1993; Poortman 2000; McKeeverand Wolfinger 2001; Drobnic 2004), who agree on the fact that womenwith high human capital in terms of substantial educational andprofessional resources seem to experience less severe economic con-sequences following divorce.

The Proc Mixed procedure in SAS allows us to assess the effect of bothmicro- and macro-level determinants for individuals nested within higher-level structures, and thus produces less biased estimates for the macro-level covariates, as standard errors are corrected accordingly (Snijders andBosker 1999). By using a random intercepts model, we assume that theintercept varies between countries, but that the slope is constant.

In a first step, we calculate the explainable variation in the change inworking hours before and after divorce. Next, the individual-level controlvariables are included. In the third model, the effect of the family-friendly

1. WSII�0.849�maternity�0.712�childcare�0.875�public employment. This

formula is derived from a factor analysis based on the Luxembourg Income Study

(Mandel and Semyonov 2005).

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policy-index on the change in working hours is calculated. The next stepconsists of including both the formal childcare coverage rate (demand) andthe provision of childcare facilities (supply). In a fifth model, we contrastthe provision of informal childcare with our composite index and finally inModel 6 we show how the individual-level use of formal and informalchildcare are related.

5. Results

5.1. Descriptive results

Table 1 displays the country scores on our macro-level determinants.Looking at the availability of informal childcare support, we note thatscores are lowest in the Scandinavian countries and highest in theSouthern-European countries. The provision of informal help is howeverhighest in the United Kingdom. This is in line with previous research byWheelock and Jones (2002), who find that grandparents are important careproviders for British mothers. Informal childcare provision is alsorelatively high in Belgium and France. Concerning our index of family-friendly policies, the Scandinavian countries display the highest values.Somewhat surprisingly, scores are furthermore relatively high in theSouthern-European countries. These countries have relatively generousand/or long maternity leave arrangements and extensive public serviceemployment (cf. Table 5 in Appendix). For instance, almost 80% ofSpanish women are employed in the public sector (Simo 2005). Irelandand the United Kingdom have the least family-friendly policies. As we sawearlier, public childcare provision is high in Denmark, Finland, Belgium,France, and to a lesser extent, Portugal. The coverage rates are more orless in line with this trend, although based on this indicator we note arather low score for Belgium, while the values for Germany and Italy arecomparatively high.

Table 2 shows mothers’ average weekly working hours before and afterpartnership dissolution. In line with other research, women workrelatively long hours in the Scandinavian welfare states (i.e. Denmarkand Finland). Conservative welfare states such as Germany and TheNetherlands have the lowest scores. Somewhat surprisingly, divorcedmothers’ working hours are also relatively high in the Southern-Europeancountries. This might be related to the fact that in these countries divorceis still more of an ‘elite’ phenomenon and thus less widespread. Womenwith high levels of human capital are more at risk of experiencingpartnership dissolution, as they are the only ones who can afford todivorce (Goode 1970).

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In general, with the exception of Ireland, mothers tend to increase their

labour market participation after experiencing partnership dissolution.

Employment can therefore be considered as an important coping strategy

for women in order to deal with the financial losses caused by a divorce.

Large differences are observed in Austria and Spain, where mothers work

TABLE 2. Change in mothers’ average weekly working hours following divorce

Country Working hoursbefore divorce

Working hoursafter divorce

Absolute change inworking hours before

and after divorce

Denmark 22.33 26.01 3.68Finland 28.31 28.79 0.48The Netherlands 9.98 10.73 0.75Belgium 21.81 23.08 1.27Germany 13.11 15.07 1.96France 17.58 19.54 1.96Austria 20.76 28.31 7.55Italy 24.68 25.43 0.75Greece 24.45 26.70 2.25Spain 14.04 20.66 6.62Portugal 24.76 25.27 0.51Ireland 12.29 8.21 �4.08United Kingdom 15.56 17.01 1.45

TABLE 1. Macro-level determinants

Country Informalchildcare1

WSII2 Formal childcare Formal childcare

Supply3 Demand4

Denmark 1.20 93 48 12.11Finland 3.54 57 32 7.34The Netherlands 3.99 26 8 4.31Belgium 9.47 49 30 3.80Germany 2.48 20 2 11.17France 12.09 48 23 12.12Austria 3.06 22 2 5.00Italy 10.45 40 6 7.95Greece 10.97 56 3 1.83Spain 8.86 58 5 5.10Portugal 9.31 48 12 10.06Ireland 2.90 18 2 4.52United Kingdom 13.90 27 2 5.14

1 ECHP: own calculations (1995�2001).2 WSII: Welfare State Intervention Index (Mandel and Semyonov 2005).3 Uunk, Kalmijn and Muffels (2005).4 ECHP: own calculations (1995�2001).

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approximately seven hours more after dissolution. Next to Denmark (3.68hours), the increase in working hours is also relatively elevated inGermany, France and Greece (about 2 hours).

5.2. Multivariate analyses: individual-level determinants

Before examining the effects of our individual-level independent variables,we estimate our baseline model which serves as the starting point for ourfurther analyses (see Table 3). In this model we include the pre-divorceworking hours as a control variable because the employment situationprior to divorce is an important determinant of differences in pre-andpost-divorce working hours. The variance components of Model 1 showthat the between-country variation is significant. The explainable varianceat level 2 is however low [�0.08�(19.427/(237.97�19.3272)]: 8 percent of the variation in the change in working hours before and afterdivorce can be explained by country-level differences.

Looking at Model 2, which contains the other individual-level variables,we see that women with children below 5 years of age experience moredifficulties to increase their working hours after divorce compared tomothers with older children. Furthermore, women who were alreadyemployed before divorce have a significantly higher chance of increasingtheir working hours compared to non-working mothers. Looking at theexplained variance at the macro-level, we notice that R2 reaches a value of10 per cent [�0.099�1�(17.5092/19.4272)]. It thus seems thatindividual characteristics explain a reasonable amount of variation.Looking at the country residuals (Table 4), we however see that thedifferences in observed and expected country residuals, in comparisonwith the baseline model, have not declined for all countries in our sample.

5.3. Multivariate analyses: macro-level determinants

Model 3 explains the change in mothers’ working hours following divorceby including the index constructed by Mandel and Semyonov (2005) thatattempts to measure the extent of family-friendly policies in a country.This effect is significant at the 0.05 level. The positive sign indicates thatfemale employment after divorce is facilitated in countries with morefamily-friendly policies. The explained country-level variation in compar-ison to the baseline model amounts to 42 per cent [�0.42�1�(11.2721/19.4272)]. Table 4 shows that especially in Denmark, a countrycharacterised by a high WSII-score (93), the country residuals decreasesubstantially from 1.4 (Model 1) to �0.2. In other words, in Denmark

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TABLE 3. Multilevel regressions of the change in mothers’ working hours following divorce

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

Intercept 12.384*** 11.700* 6.235 6.322 6.169 3.866Pre-divorce working hours �0.528*** �0.709*** �0.711*** �0.712*** �0.711*** �0.736***

Individual-level variablesAge 0.025 0.022 0.024 0.023 0.071Education �0.379 �0.361 �0.363 �0.365 0.230Number of children under 5 years old �2.928*** �2.959*** �2.958*** �2.984*** �3.815***Pre-divorce employment 11.10*** 11.145*** 11.139*** 11.114*** 9.488***Use of formal childcare 10.677***Use of informal childcare 5.760***

Country-level variablesWSII 0.127* 0.160 0.127* 0.132*Formal childcare (supply) �0.047 �0.086Formal childcare (demand) �0.125 �0.222Informal childcare 0.008 0.022

Between-country variance 19.427 17.506 11.272 14.195 13.168 13.575Within-country variance 237.97 213.54 213.58 213.57 213.53 198.83Explained country variance 0.000 0.099 0.420 0.269 0.322 0.301Log Likelihood 7422.47 7188.24 7187.36 7189.33 7189.25 7123.13

*pB0.05;**pB0.01;***pB0.001.

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EU

RO

PEA

NSO

CIE

TIE

S


family-friendly policies explain a substantial amount of variation in the

dependent variable. Our first hypothesis predicting a positive influence

from family-friendly policies is thus confirmed. These results are in line

with Mandel and Semyonov’s (2005) finding that, combining several

components, the WSII-index ‘measures a broad phenomenon that

represents more than the unique effect of each one of them’.In Model 4, we additionally include our two indicators of formal

childcare (supply and demand). First of all, we notice that our index of

family-friendly policies no longer has a significant impact on the change in

mothers’ working hours following divorce. Furthermore, both indicators

of formal childcare arrangements turn out to be insignificant. The same is

true when both are introduced separately, and they remain insignificant

when the family-friendly policy index is removed from the model (results

not shown). Both Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 are thus rejected. These

results seem to contradict studies finding a positive effect of formal

childcare arrangements on female employment (e.g., Uunk et al. (2005) on

the changes in working hours following the birth of the first child).

Additional analyses regressing the working hours of mothers on the

provision of formal childcare reveal a positive and clearly significant effect.

However, the change in working hours following divorce does not seem to

be related to the provision of public childcare. The country-level variance

explained by this model is 27 per cent [0.27�1�(14.1952/19.4272)],

which is significantly lower compared to Model 3.In Model 5, we include our macro-level indicator of informal support

together with our index of family-friendly policies. While the effect of the

composite index remains significant, we find no significant effect of

informal childcare provision on the change in mothers’ working hours

TABLE 4. Country-level differences between observed and expected values

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

Denmark 1.4 1.0 �0.2 �0.0 �0.2 �0.3Finland �0.5 �1.3 �1.2 �1.3 �1.4 �0.7The Netherlands �1.5 �1.0 �0.9 �0.8 �0.8 �0.9Belgium 0.4 0.1 �0.1 �0.1 �0.1 �0.3Germany 1.7 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.8France �0.3 �0.6 �0.8 �0.6 �0.7 �0.5Austria 1.2 1.5 2.7 2.4 2.5 2.1Italy 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4Greece 1.9 2.5 2.1 1.4 0.7 2.0Spain 0.9 1.5 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.2Portugal �2.7 �1.1 �0.6 �0.9 �0.8 �0.8Ireland �2.5 �2.3 �1.8 �1.5 �1.6 �1.5United Kingdom �0.5 �0.4 �0.3 �0.3 �0.3 �0.3

469



following divorce. The country-level variance explained by this modelamounts to 32 per cent [0.32�1�(13.1686/19.4272)]. Although in-formal social networks do not exercise an independent influence, thismodel seems to explain more variance compared to Model 4. However, wehave to conclude that Hypothesis 4 is not confirmed.

Finally, in Model 6 we evaluate the impact of our individual-levelvariables indicating the use of formal and informal childcare. Controllingfor all macro-level indicators and other individual-level determinants,both indicators of childcare use are highly significant. However, when weexclude the use of formal childcare from the model, the estimate for theuse of informal support becomes insignificant (results not reported),indicating that both support variables are interrelated. Hypothesis 4predicting an independent effect of informal support networks is thereforealso rejected at the micro-level, as we find that informal networks seems tofulfil a complementary role, enabling divorced mothers to use paidchildcare in order to increase their working hours. Our crowding-outhypothesis (Hypothesis 5) is thus not confirmed. In this model, the familyfriendly-policies indicator stays significant at the 0.05 level. The explainedcountry-level variance amounts to 30 per cent [0.30�1�(13.575/198.83)].

6. Conclusion and discussion

In this article, we evaluate the effect of both formal and informal childcaresupport systems on the post-divorce labour supply of divorced mothers.We model the change in working hours before and after divorce by usingboth micro- and macro-level determinants. In order to assess the influenceof formal support systems at the macro-level, we chart the whole of acountry’s family policy environment by using the ‘Welfare State Inter-vention Index’ developed by Mandel and Semyonov (2005) and addition-ally include two variables that represent the formal childcare provision interms of supply and demand. Next to formal support systems, we also lookat the impact of informal childcare support systems.

Concerning the micro-level determinants, we find that being employedand the presence of young children are important indicators. Bothvariables are highly significant and influence divorced mothers’ possibi-lities to enter the labour market, the first in a positive way, the second in anegative way.

The combined strength of the three components included in our indexof family-friendly policies results in a positive effect on female post-divorce employment. The country-level residuals show that particularly inDenmark �/ a country where family policies can be defined as highly

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EUROPEAN SOCIETIES


‘woman friendly’ �/ the model fits the data very well. This finding is in linewith earlier research that policies supporting an individual model of socialrights for both sexes facilitate women’s independence. In other words,female employment after divorce is positively influenced by a policyenvironment that is characterised as highly woman-friendly.

Including the provision and coverage of formal childcare does not resultin a better model. The absence of any significant effects seems tocontradict studies reporting that female employment is positivelyinfluenced by extensive public childcare arrangements. A possibleexplanation is that our indicators are rather crude, and are thus no goodmeasures of a country’s facilitating influence on the ability of divorcedmothers to combine work and care. We do however find evidence that theavailability of formal childcare does influence mothers’ working hours assuch, but not necessarily the change in working hours following divorce.

In contradiction to our expectations, our macro-level indicator referringto the extent of informal childcare support also does not exercise anindependent influence on the change in divorced mothers’ working hoursfollowing partnership dissolution. However, compared to the model withonly the composite index of family-friendly policies, the increase in theexplained country-level variance does point at the facilitating role socialnetworks can play in combining work and care.

This latter finding is confirmed when we look at the way the individual-level use of formal and informal childcare are interrelated. Morespecifically, we find that formal childcare solutions reinforce the effectof the use of informal support networks on the labour supply of divorcedmothers. This is in accordance with earlier research stating that informalnetworks are of complementary importance. In this line of reasoning, it isfor instance possible that in some countries working hours do not matchthe closing hours of childcare or schools and that divorced mothers have torely on both kin and non-kin networks to bridge the gap between formalchildcare and the demands of the labour market.

To summarise, we find empirical evidence for our main hypothesis thata country’s institutional environment plays an important role in facilitatingemployment as a strategy for mothers to cope with their financial lossesfollowing partnership dissolution. However, contrary to our expectationswe find that the change in labour supply is more responsive to the wholeof a country’s family policies rather than to so-called ‘domain-specific’indicators of formal and informal childcare provision. In this sense, ourresults open up avenues for further research, as we need to look in otherdirections in other to explain country-level differences in the laboursupply of mothers following divorce. Furthermore, our empirical evidencesuggests that at the micro-level formal and informal strategies areconnected. The complementary role of informal support systems,

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facilitating the use of formal childcare, is an important finding from apolicy point of view. However, further research has to make clear whichconditions have to be fulfilled in order to help divorced mothers tocombine work and care, thus enabling them to mitigate the economicconsequences of partnership dissolution.

Acknowledgements

ECHP data was made available through the Research Centre for Long-itudinal and Life Course Studies (CELLO), University of Antwerp.EUROSTAT bears no responsibility for the analyses and interpretationspresented here.

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Peter Raeymaeckers is a Research Assistant associated with the Research

Unit on Inequality, Social Exclusion and the City (OASeS) at the University

of Antwerp.

Caroline Dewilde is a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow (Research Foundation-

Flanders) associated with the Research Unit on Inequality, Social

Exclusion and the City (OASeS) at the University of Antwerp.

Laurent Snoeckx is a Research Assistant associated with the Research

Centre for Longitudinal and Life Course Studies (CELLO) at the University

of Antwerp.

Dimitri Mortelmans is Associate Professor and head of the Research Centre

for Longitudinal and Life Course Studies (CELLO) at the University of

Antwerp.

Address for correspondence: Peter Raeymaeckers, Department of Sociology,

University of Antwerp, Sint-Jacobstraat 2, 2000 Antwerpen, Belgium.

E-mail: [email protected]

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TABLE 5. Components of the Welfare State Intervention Index

Country Fully paid weeksof maternity

leave

Employment inpublic service

sector as % of totalemployment

% of children inpublicly fundedchildcare (0�6)

Denmark 28 25 65Finland 32 16 35The Netherlands 16 8 39Belgium 12 13 63Germany 14 7 35France 16 11 61Austria 16 6 22Italy 17 11 52Greece 17 21 33.5Spain 16 15 44.5Portugal 17 14 30Ireland 10 11 18United Kingdom 8 16 28

Source: Mandel and Semyonov (2005). Information for Greece, Spain and Portugal taken from

Gauthier (1999) and ILO (2005).

Appendix

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The influence of formal and informal support systems on the labour supply of divorced mothers

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